ML20207U154

Amend 56 to License DPR-57,modifying Tech Specs by Revising Limiting Conditions for Operation & Surveillance Requirements Associated W/Plant Svc Water Sys

ML20207U154
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/16/1978
From:	Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20204B112	List: ML20204B106 ML20204B137 ML20207U139 ML20207U144 ML20207U151 ML20207U154 ML20207U155 ML20207U159
References
FOIA-87-76 NUDOCS 8703240670
Download: ML20207U154 (13)

Text

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UNITE 3 STATES

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l NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20658

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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 56 License No. DPR-57 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The applications for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al, (the licensee) dated February 9 and 10, and April 26, 1978, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the pubitc, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendnent, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 56, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1-t i

Thomas A.

p olito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: June 16,1978 f

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 56 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-321 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert 3.5-12 3.5-12 3.5-13 3.5-13 3.5-21 3.5-21 3.6-9 3.6-9 3.7-10 3.7-10 3.7-11 3.7-11 3.7-12 3.7-12 3.7-13 3.7-13 3.7-34 3.7-34 3.7-34a 3.7-34a 3.12-1 3.12-1 e

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

,URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS p

3.5.J Plant. Service Water System 4.5.J Plant Service Water System

1. Normal Availability

1. The automatic pump start func-tions hnd automatic isolation The reactor shall not be functions shall be tested once made critical from the per operating cycle.

cold shutdown condition unless the Plant Service Water System (including 4 plant service water pumps

- and the standby service water pump) is operable.'

2. Inoperable components

'2.

Inoperable Components

a. The standby service water

a. When the standby service pump may be inoperable for water pump is made or found a period not to exceed 60 to be inoperable, the four

' days provided all diesel remaining PSW pumps, both generators are operable.

PSW divisions, and all three diesel generators, shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately.

b. One PSW pump may be in-l

b. When one PSW pump is made l

operable for a period not or found to be inoperable, to exceed 30 days provided the standby service water all diesel generators are pump, the three remaining operable.

PSW pumps, both PSW divisions and all three diesel genera-tors, shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately I

and weekly thereafter.

c. One PSW pump and the stand-

c. When one PSW pump and the by service water pump may standby service water pump be inoperable for a period are made or found to be not to exceed 30 days pro-inoperable, the three re-l vided all diesel generators maining PSW pumps, both PSW

! are operable.

divisions, and all three l

diesel generators, shall be l

demonstrated to be operable inanediately and Wekly there-after.

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d. When two PSW pumps or one l

d. Two PSW pumps or one PSW division may be inoperable for PSV division are made or

a period not to exceed 7 found to be inoperable, the

days provided the diesel standby service water pump l generators associated with the

'and all active components operable PSW components are of the operable division or

operable.

divisions and the diesel generators associated with the operable PSW components, shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

l l3.5-12

G.

-LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION buRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS p

3.5.J Flant Service Water System 4.5.J Plant Service Water System 1

2. Inoperable Components (Cont'd)

2. Inoperable components (Cont'd)

e. Two PSW pumps or one PSW

e. When two PSW pumps or one division, and the standby PSW division, and the service water pump may be in-standby service water pump operable for a period not to are made er found to be exceed 7 days provided the inoperable, all active diesel generators associated components of the operable with the operable PSW com-division or divisions and ponents are operable.

the diesel genarators asso-ciated with the operable For each condition above in which PSW components, shall be the standby service water pump is demonstrated to be operable inoperable, cooling water to diesel immediately and daily generator IB shall be intertied thereafter.

with the PSW divisional piping supply.

When cooling water to diesel

). Shutdown Requirements generator 1B is intertied with the PSW divisional U the requirements of Specifications piping supply, operability 3.5.J.1 and 3.5.J.2 cannot be met of the divisional interlock the reactor shall be placed in the valves shall be demonstrated.

cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.5.K Equipment Area Coolers 4.5.K Equipment Area Coolers

1. The equipment area coolers

1. Each equipment area cooler serving the Reactor Core Iso-is operated in conjunction lation Cooling (RCIC), High

' with the equipment served by Pressure Coolant Injection that particular cooler; (HPCI), Core Spray or Residual therefore, the equipment area Beat Removal (RHR) pumps must coolers are tested at the be operable at all times when same frequency as the pumps the pump or pumps served by which they serve.

that specific cooler is con-sidered to be operable.

2. When an equipment area cooler is not operab?.e, the pump (s) served by that cooler must be considered inoperable for Technical Specification purposes.

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'3.5-13

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t BASES FOR LIM. ING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION N SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.J/4.5.J Plant Service Water System Tha Plant Service Water (PSW) system consists of two subsystems (divisions) of two pumps scch and a separate standby service water pump system for diesel, generator 1B.

During nstmal full power cperation the two subsystems function as a 3 out of 4 pump cross ccnnected system supplying cooling water to the turbine and reactor building cooling cystems.

In the event of an accident signal, non safety-related cooling loads are iso-lcted and the PSW pumps in the two ' subsystems supply cooling water to diesel generators lA and IC, the reactor building cooling system and the control room air conditioners, while the standby service water pump is available to automatically supply cooling water to diesel generator 1B should it be needed. Additionally, diesel 1B has a manual back-up water supply available from the Unit 1 Division 1 or Division 2 PSW subsystems so thtt during maintenance on the standby diesel service water pump, either division of the PSW system can manually be aligned to supply cooling water to the 1B diesel.

The two cubsystems and the standby service water pump system are split in the accident mode for greater reliability with one pump in each of the two subsystems automatically starting while a start signal from diesel generator 1B initiates standby service wcter pump cparation.

Only one of the Division 1 PSW pumps and one of the Division 2 PSW pumps are required for cooling diesel generators lA and 1C, respectively, while the standby ser-vice water pump provides adequate cooling water to diesel generator 1B.

In the event thzt the standby service water pump is inoperable, the HNP.-l Division 1-Division 2 intertie supply piping can be aligned to cool the 1B diesel.

In this condition, one PSW pump is capable of supplying the cooling requiremente for the reactor building cooling eystem, the control room air conditioners, and the 1A, 1B, and IC diesel generators.

The P5W system can supply all power generation systems at full load and the diesel generators with redundancy if one PSW pump and/or the standby service water pump are inoperable. Hence, a 60-day outage time is justified if the standby service water pump is inoperable since all four PSW pumps are available (divisional intertie to 1B diesel required).

In addition, a 30-day outage is justified if one PSW pump is inoperable, or if one PSW pump and the standby service water pump arc &

erable (divisional intertie to 1B diesel required). Should two PSW pumps (or one subsystem) become inoperable, or should two PSW pumps (or one subsystem) and the standby service water pump become inoperable (division intertie to 1B diesel required) plant operation will probably only continue at less than full power. However, safety-related loads are still adequately powered for these conditions. Therefore, a 7 day outage time is justified for such events.

K.

JEngineering Safety Features Equipment Area Coolers l

The equipment area cooler in each pump compartment is capable of providing adequate ventilation flow and cooling.

Engineering analyses indicate that the temperature rise in safeguard compartments without adequate ventilation flow or cooling is such that continued operation of the safeguard equipment or associated auxiliary equip-j ment cannot be assured.

l The surveillance and testing of the equipment area coolers in each of their various modes is accomplished during the testing of the equipment served by these coolers.

The testing is adequate to assure the operability of the equipment area coolers.

L.

References 1.

FSAR Section 6, Core Standby Cooling System.

2.

HNP-2 PSAR Appendix I, Conformance to NRC Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems.

I 3.5-21

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LIMtTilm CO!1DJTIONS FOR OPERATION "SllRVEll.lW;CE M'5[lfl'IT65$5T'i

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~' '.6.11. Relief / Safety Valves 4.6.U. Relief / Safety Valves When more that. nns relief / safety

1. End of Opernting Cyele

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valve is knowa to be f ailed an orderly snutdown shall be Approximately one-half of all initiated and the reactor depres-relief / safety valves shal) be surized to lets than 113 psig with-benchchecked or replaced s ich a benchchecked valve each re-

• in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Prior to reactor

~ startup f rom a cold con _dition fueling outage.

All 11 velves all relief / safety valves shall will have been checked or

, replaced upon the completion be operable of every second operating cycle..

2. Each Operating; Cycle Once during cach operating cyc1c, at a reactor pressere

>100 psig each relief valva shall be manually opened until thermocouples downstream cf the valve indicate steam is floking from the valve.

3. Integrity of Relief Valve,%cilows

• The integrity of the relici valve bellows shall be continueuily monitored and the pressure switch calibrated once per operating cy-le and the accumulators and air pipin; shall be inspected for Icskage once per operating cycle. '

4. Relief Valve Maintenance At least one relief valve shall be disassembled and inspected each operating cycle.

I. Jet Pumps

1. Jet l' umps Whenever the reactor is in the Whenever both recirculating purps Start L llot Standby or Run llode are operating with the reacter in with both recirculating pumps the Start & Hot Standby or Run Meds, operating, all jet pumps shall be jet pump operability shall be cheelId operabic.

If it is determined that daily by verifying that the following a jet pump is inoperabic, an orderly condition: do not occur simultaneous 1).

shutdown shall be initiated and.the reactor shall be in the Cold Shut-

1. The two recirculation loops have doun Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.,

a flow imbalance of 15% or more when the pumps are operated at the'same speed.

l

• Does not apply to two-stage Target Rock SRVs 3.6-9

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SUD. yell (l.Afir,I I?lVI;1P! Mi!!TS q

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3.7.A.6.c.

H and 0 Analyzer 4.7.A.6.c.

IT and 0 Analyzer 2

2 2

2 Whenever the reactor is in power Instrumentation surveillance operation, there shall be at is listed in Table 4.2-11.

least one CAD System H and 0 9

2 analyzer serving the pPimary containment.

If one H and 0 2

2 analyzer is inoperable the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed seven days.

d.

Post-LOCA Repressurization Limit The maximum post-LOCA primary contain-ment repressurization limit allowable using the CAD System shall be 30 psig.

Venting via the SGTS to the main stack must be initiated at 30 psig following the initial post-LOCA pressure peak.

7.

Shutdown Requirements If Specification 3.7.A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

B.

Standby Gas Treatment System B.

Standby Gas Treatment System 1.

Operability Requirements 1.

Surveillance When System Operable A minimum of three (2 of 2 in Unit 1 and i of 2 in Unit 2) of the four in-At least once per operating dependent standby gas treatment system cycle, not to exceed 18 months, trains shall be operable at all times the following conditions shall when Unit 1 secondary containment be demonstrated:

integrity is required.

a.

Pressure drop across the With one of the Unit 1 standby gas combined HEPA filters and treatment systems inoperable, for charcoal absorber banks is any reason, Unit 1 reactor operation less than 6 inches of water and fuel handling and/or handling of at the system design flow casks in the vicinity of the spent rate (+10%, -0%).

fuel pools is permissible for a period of seven (7) days provided b.

Operability of inlet heater that all active components in the at rated power when tested remaining standby gas treatment in accordance with ANSI systems in each unit shall be N510-1975.

demonstrated to be operable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and daily thereafter.

l c.

Air distribution is uniform within 20% across the filter train when tested in accordance wi th ANSI N510-1975.

Amendment No.(( 56 3.7-lu, e

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ilsE'!LLMICL RLilijlRLptLtas,], _ _,]

L C.

S_econdary Containment C.

S ec,o nda,ry, Co,n.ta i n,me,n,t.

1.

Secondary Containment Integrity 1.

Surveillance While Integrity, Maintained a.

Integrity of the secondary con-tair. ment shall be maintained Secondary containment surveillance during all modes of Unit 1 plant l

shall be performed as indicated operation except when all of the below:

following co.-ditions are met:

(1) The reactor is subcritical and a.

A preoperational secondary contain-Specification 3.3.A is met.

ment capability test shall be (2) The reactor water temperature is conducted after isolating the below 2120F and the reactor secondary containment and placing coolant system is vented.

the standby gas treatment system filter trains in operation. Such (3) No activity is being performed tests shall demonstrate the capa-which can reduce the shutdown bility to maintain a minimum margin below that stated in 1/4-inch of water vacuum under Specification 3.3.A.

calm wind (<5 mph) conditions with each filter train flow rate not (4) The fuel cask or irradiated fuel m re than 4000 cfm.

1 is not being moved in the re-actor building.

(5) All hatches between Unit 1 sccondary containment and Unit 2 secondary containment are closed and sealed.

(6) At least one door in each access path between Unit 1 secondary containment and Unit 2 secondary containment is closed.

b Integrity of the Unit 1 secondary containment shall be maintained during all medes of Unit 2 plant operations except Operational Condition 4 as defined in the Unit 2 Techn4:al Specifications.

Amendment No.

56

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.a--------.

'4.7.C.l.

Surveillance While Integrity _

Maintained TCont'd)'

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b.

Secondary containment capability to maintain a minimum 1/4-inch of water vacuum under calm wind

(<5 mph) conditions with each filter train flow rate not more than~ 4000 cfm shall be demonstrated at each refueling outage, prior to

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refueling.

3.7.C.2.

Violation of Secondary -

2.

Surveillance Af ter Integrity Violated Containment Inteority After a secondary containment vio-If Specification 3.7.C.1 cannot lation is detennined the standby be met, procedures shall be gas treatment system will be operated initiated to establish conditions immediately after the affected zor.es listed in Specification 3.7.C.1.a are isolated from the remainder of through 3.7.C.1.d.

the secondary containment. The ability to maintain the remainder of the secondary containment at 1/4-inch of water vacuum pressure under calm (<5 mph) wind conditions shall be confirmed.

D.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves D.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves 1.

Valves Required to be Operable 1.

Surveillance of Operable Valves During reactor power operation, Surveillance of the primapy con-all primary containment isolation tainment isolation valves shall be valves listed in Table 3.7-1. and performed as follows:

all reactor coolant system instru.

ment line excess flow check valves a.

At least once per operating shall be operable except as stated cycle the operable isolation in Specification 3.7.D.2.

valves that are power operated and automatically initiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation and the closure times specified in Table 3.7-1.

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I Amendment No.

, 56

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3.7-13

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- 3. 7.'A. 7.

Shutdown Re3ui nents Bases for shutdown requirements are discussed above in conjunction with the in-dividual requirements for primary containment integrity.

B.

Standby Gas Treatment System The standby gas treatment systems are designed to filter and exhaust the Unit 1 secondary containment atmosphere to the off-gas stack during secondary contain-ment isolation conditions, with a minimum release of radioactive materials from these areas, to the environs. The Unit 1 standby gas treatment system fans are designed to automatically start upon receipt of a high radiation signal from either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors or the Unit I reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or upon receipt of a signal from the Unit 1 primary containment isolation system. The Unit 2 standby gas treatment system fans are designed to automatically start, to assist the Unit i fans to exhaust the Unit 1 secondary containment atmosphere upon receipt of a high radiation signal from either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 re-fueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors or the Unit I reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or upon receipt of a signal from the Unit 1 primary containment isolation system.

In addition, the systems may also be started manually, from the Mairi Control Room.

In the case of the Unit 1 standby gas treatment system, upon receipt of any of the isolation signals, both fans start, isolation dampers open and each fan draws air from the isolated Unit 1 secondary containment.

In the case of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment system, upon receipt of an isolation signal from the Unit 1 primary containment isolation system, reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or the Unit 1 or Unit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors, both fans start, fan supply and discharge I

dampers open, and the fans draw air from the isolated Unit 1 secondary containment.

Once the SGTS systems have been initiated automatically, the operator may place t

any one of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 trains in the standby mode provided the re-maining train in each unit is operable. Should a failure occur in the remain-ing operating trains, resulting in air flow reduction below a preset value, the standby systems will restart automatically.

As a minimum for operation, one of the two Unit 1 standby gas treatment trains and one of the two Unit 2 standby gas treatment trains is required to achieve the design differential pressure, given the design building infiltration rate.

Once this design differential pressure is achieved, any leakage past the secondary containment boundary shall be inleakage.

A detailed discussion of the standby gas treatment systems may be found in Section 5.3.3.3 of the Unit 1 FSAR, and in Section 6.2.3 of the Unit 2 FSAR.

Any one of the four filter trains has sufficient adsorption capacity to pro-vide for cleanup of the Unit 1 secondary containment atmosphere following containment isolation. Any one of the four available standby gas treatment trains may be considered an installed spare. Therefore, with one of the standby gas treatment trains in each unit inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the Unit 1 containment system performance, and reactor operation or fuel handling operations may continue while repairs are being made. Should either or both of the remaining standby gas treatment trains be found to be inoperable, the Unit 1 plant should be placed.in a condition that does not require a standby gas treatment system.

Amendment No. 56 3.7-34 l

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'B**NS FOR l IMITlflG f'.0* DITIOf!T FOR onl RATION

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High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the i'odine adsdrbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radiciodine to the environ-ment. Bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and particulate removal efficiency for HEPA filters are determined by halogenated hydrocarbon and DOP respectively. The laboratory carbon sample test results indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency for expected accident conditions. Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow will change the re-moval efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

If the performances are as specified, the calculated doses would be less than the guidelines stated in 10 CFR 100 for the accident analyzed.

3.7.C.

Secondary Containment The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The refueling area of the reactor building includes the Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling floor volumes. Therefore, the. reactor building provides secondary containment during Unit I reactor operation when the drywell is sealed and in service; and proVides primary containment When the 'Jnit 1 and/or Unit 2 reactor is shutdown and its respective drywell is open, as during refueling.

Amendment No. 56 3.7-34a

3.12 MAIN CONTROL RC ENh1RON} ENTAL 4.12 Mf CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENTAL SYba2M SYSTEM Applicability Applicability The Limiting conditions for The Surveillance Requirements Operation apply to the apply to the periodic tests and operating status of the main examinations of the main control control room environmental room environmental system.

system.

Objective Objective The objective of the Limiting The objective of the Surveillance Conditions for Operation is to Requirements is to verify the assure the availability of the operability, availability or main control room environmental efficiency of the main control system under conditions for which room environmental system under its capability is required to conditions for which its protect plant operators.

capability is required to protect plant operators.

Specifications Specifications A. Ventilations System Operability.

A. Ventilation System Tests, Requirements

1. Operability Requireinent At least once per operating cycle, not to exceed 18 months, a.Two independent control room the following shall be air treatment systems shall demonstrated:

be operable at all times when secondary containment

a. The pressure drop across integrity is required, the combined HEPA However, from and after the filters and charcoal date that one circuf ; of the adsorber banks is less control room air treatment than 6 inches of water system is made or found to at system design flow be inoperable for any reason, rate (+10%).

reactor operation or refuel-ing operation is ' permissible

b. Automatic initiation of only during the succeeding the control room air seven days. If the system treatment system.

is not made fully operable within 7 days, reactor shut-

c. Each circuit shall be down shall be initiated and operated for at least the reactor shall be in cold 15 minutes each month, shutdown within the next 36

d. The control room ventila-hours and irradiated fuel handling operations shall tion system shall be be terminated within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

demonstrated capable of maintaining the control '

room at a positive pressure b.The control room ventilation sys-11/10 inche W.G. relative tem shall be capable of maintain-to the turbine building

(

ing the control room at a positive during system operation rslative tithe ~ turbine' pressure d a m w n u p E &..

TbuildingTh511n th'e' pre'ssurization Emode.. h m..

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..ym 3.12-1 Amendment No.

, 56/

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