ML20204B137
| ML20204B137 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1986 |
| From: | Gibson A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Holahan G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204B112 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-76 TAC-64455, TAC-64456, NUDOCS 8703240684 | |
| Download: ML20204B137 (28) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_- -- _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 08:1100 GTt.Tet [po neag*o NUCLE A'l CECULATORY COMMISSION j' ' ,
,, af GION la g* 101 MARILTT A STRLt T.N W.
- f' ATL ANT A,0tOMGI A 30323
- December 30, 1986 MEM3stNNH FOR: Gary Holahp. Director, Operatino Reactor Assessment Staff.
Offtct of Nuc1cer E. acto: 4galation FROM: Albert F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety ,
SUBJECT:
TRANSFEP OF LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVALUATING THE ADEQUACY OF THE TRANSFER CANAL SEAL BETWEEN HATCH UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDINGS As the result of the loss of air pressure to the inflatable seals in the transfer cenal at the three-inch cap between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 building, on December 3, 1986, approximately 141.000 gallons of water were lost from the spent fuel pools i and the transfer canal. Eighty thousand gallons may have been released to the i environs on Georgia Power Company property. It does not appear that this l inflatable seal in the transfer canal was adequately described in the FSAR or l evaluated by the NRC for its intended use. Figure 9.1 6 in the FSAR shows double redundant inflatable seals, but does not show that all six seals were inflated by a single air line. None of the seals were instrumented to alarm on loss of air l pressure. The same sketch shows the leak detection alam system.for these seals. l A critical review of this sketch and other prints at the site indicates a high probability that the leak detection alam system would not alert the operators to a common mode feilure of all seals such as the loss of all air pressure; leakage would preferentially flow to the three-inch gap between the building rather than into the leak detection system. Secondary containment is provided to reduce the potential for a ground IcVel l release of gases and particulate matter. Technical Specifications require periodic ttstirp to assure that st cendary containment rots specific criteria. It is Region 11 s position that containment is also required for the radioactive liquid in secondary containment. l FSAP 9.1.2.2.1 states that in order to limit the possibility of pool leakage ! around pool penetrations, each pool is lined with stainless steel and that l interconnected drainage paths are provided behind the liner to prevent uncontrolled loss of certainment parl water to other relatively cleaner areas within the secondary cortainment. The Hatch 2 Safety Evaluation Report dated June 1978 concluded that the design of the spent fuel storage facility was in . conformance with the requirements of GDC 61 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. We believe i l if the FSAR had adequately addressed the as installed transfer canal and the ' l transfer canal seals, the NRC would not have concluded that the intent of GDC 61 l was mot. CONTACT: F. Cantrell FTS: 242 5534 g 32 g 4 870319 MURPHYS7-76 PDM l
i g 3, . Gary Holahan 2 December 30, 1986 A subsequent evaluation by Georgia Power Company indicated that irradiated control blades are stored on short hanger rods clipped over the side of the spent fuel pool. Sorc of these centrol blades would be corpletely uncovered if the weter level dropped to the ten of the transfre canal. Because of cobalt in the relk rs er the cor,trcl bit 45, tFc rollert have e contact rr eding of 8,000 to 10,000 R/hr, which would result in a field of about 100 R/hr at the edge of the spent fuel pool and 1 R/hr 6 feet from the edge of the pool. Georgia Power Company provided the 3enior Pesident inspector with preliminary information that shows that with both condensate pumps in operation supplying 1,000 gpm, the pool level would stabilize at 6'3" above the botton of the transfer canal with a complete failure of the inflatable seals. Under these conditions, part of the control blades would still be uncovered with a possible 1,000 gpm unmonitored relecse. (Region 11 bcs net verified these figures.) Georgia Power Company has separated the air supply to the transfer canal seals and the air supply to the inner and outer gates between the transfer canal and the spent fuel pools, and is studying other changes to assure greater reliability. We request that you:
- 1. Evaluate the adequacy of the description of the transfer canal and sealing arrangement in the FSAR.
- 2. Evaluate proposed changes to the seals in the transfer canal to determine if inflatable seals can be upgraded to meet NRC requirements or if a different solution is required.
- 3. Evaluate the leak detection alarm system to determine if the current configuration is an acceptable method to identify leakage past the transfer canal seal. Consider the possibility of unmonitored releases of spent fuel pool water to the ervironment upon gross seal failure.
4 Determine if these inflatable seals should have a low air pressure alarm to indicate potential seal f ailures, rather than waiting for a leak to provide an alarm. Please provide ; response by March 1, 1987 V . Albert F. Gibson cc:[Rivenbarl,NPR
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- spent-fuel pool has a fuel storage capacity 31 more than five full-core loads of fuel assemblies. ,
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it } Thi spent-fuel eterage racks are designed and arranged es that I I the fuel assemblius can be efficiently handled daring refueling .t4 operations. Utterir)tten 9.1.2.2 The spent-fuel storage fae:1;ty ir located inside the Hatch i njn% ' Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (ID P-2) secondary centair. ment en the refueling floor (figure 9.1-3). Redundant radiation sensorm ,1. 4 . i are prov2ded in the ventilation dacts servicing the refueling ,iQgi. ,.i l floor to detect released duringanythe airborne refueling radiation process. that might accidently be 'dree i ghese sensors activate the standby gas treatment system (CCTU) and isolate the $% gred i ! i refueling floor upon sensing high radiation. Additionally, the ' area radiation monitors on the refueling ficor will alarm in o sdopo ' My' the main centrol roon (MCR) anc locally if the refueling floor activity exceeds the normal background activity during refueling,
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4 i severe loading to . Loading ccmbir.ations that predace the most . K .h the structure were incorpers ed to verify ' hat the structure . wW would carry the mechanical and thermal IcaJn for the design - e, -
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was evaluated resulting in a conconnus that a fuel assembly + F.h drop causes the most aar aging ef fe:t because of its weight and , s 4M geometrical ccnfiguration. Also, none of the ether loads can 1 646. l 1 be lifted to a position higher than that of Furthermore. a fael aseembly it was ;
. It l' j l above the liner plate and storage racks. M $J 1 j determined that a fuel assembly dropped from the maximum ' 4.8 .. : i possible height above the sper.t-fuel pool will not perforate z 1
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o To prevent pressure buildup benind the plate i 1 1 i g - e Ica g f cor.taminated e o ,( To preventGe unconentledYe3.91 t,c.o;.A9r r,n)ativ,c,'g.cleanar , Lcc(L1o ,
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T I e Te provide expedier.: liner leau detection and p j measurement l might permit the pool to Y?g lI 14o outlets cr drain 6 are provided thatthe bottom of the fuel pool. - be drained below 14 ft 9 in. Acove ' This level provides a cover for the active fuel. The two inlet
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liner near the top cf the poo; and extend to r. ear the bottom cf <- e the peol. Both of these lines are eq.ipped witt. two check = , valves in series to prevent s yphe ni r.g . , y Low water level alares are provided locally and ir the MOR in l:, vty i the un111taiy event of water loss. Ea_EnWn. ranet.or vesseltiowtoalarme drywellare ' W provided in the drain lines of the V.' > , ' ,,7- l 3* ; , RCV 17/83 9.1-6 , P . i
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ie:P-2-FSAR-9 The ICJP-2 under strictly controlled administrative procedures.which is not eingle-failure proofFV.and reactor building crans, is only used does not have the interlocks described above, '-" M t under strict administrative control. N h'-a, ! If unanticipated load handling should occur, the size of the v*. ' load that can be handled over stored spent-fuel, by any means, E
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9.1.2.3 tafety Evmiustion l I The design of the spent-fuel storage facility :neets the **Ti. requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.13 (March 1971).
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- i !. PURPOSE OF TRANSFER CANAL SEALS lI The transfer canal seal system has several functions:
A. To prevent loss of inventory of water from the transfer canal and the HNP-1 and HNP-2 fuel pools. This water is needed for shielding and cooling of the spent fuel rods in the fuel pool. !} B. To prevent the release of radicactive contaminants. ll
' C. To 411cw the transfer of fuel bundles between the HNP-1 and the HNP-2 spent fuel peals. This 411cws better flexibiliv in fuel arrangement in the reactor core of both units.
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I II. DESIGN CF SEALS $ A. Description of Transfer Canal l' The U-shaped transfer canal, locatec on the refueling floor between the HNP-1 and HNP-2 spent fuel pools, is removable and as such requires inflatable bellows type seals for watertightness. The seals are located at either end of the coral (hcrizontal seals), and in the 9-inch space adjacent to the 3-inch seismic gap between the HNP-1 and HNP-2 reactor buildings (vertical seals). i 8. Description of Seals l The transfer canal seals are located in pairs to provide an adcitional safety margin, i.e. if one of the seals fails, the other , , seal in the pair maintains integrity and water does not leak out. If l l both horizontal seals in a pair fails, water is prevented from ' leaking out by the vertical seal en that side. C. Air Supply 1 In the original design, the transfer canal seals were pressurized by a single feed line from a unit 2 service air system service l box which branched into six separate feeds to the individual seals. These lines were equipped with local pressure indicators and check valves. A manual cross t!e to the unit 1 air supply is available.
- 2. Subsequent to the fuel pool lesk down, several changes were made to improve reliability of the air supply. A second supply from i HNP-1 service air was incorporated such that in each horizontal i seal pair, one is fed from HNP-1 service air, and one is fed from Nh?-2 service air. In this arrangement, loss of, say, the whole unit 2 air system will not affect but one of the seals in the pair and system integrity is maintained (transfer canal seal
! system). A common line was incorporated to supply the vertical seals with both HNP-1 and HNP-2 service air. Check valves placed I
in the loss offeed piping air frem onetounit thisorccmon the other. headerOtherprevent changes backincludedflow upon] *Wg the addition of pressure switches that would alann in both I control rooms upon a drop in pressure in either supply. " D. i.eak Detection System
- 1. The transfer canal seal system is equipped with a level switch which wculd detect leakage if the horizontal seals on theJ' nit 2 side of the transfer canal fail (both seals in the pair).
- 2. One proposed design change is the placement of two holes in the vertical divider plate separating the HNP-1 side frem the HNP-2 side of the canal. This would allcw a leak on the HNP-1 side of the transfer canal to be detected by the Unit 2 level switch l! since no such level switch exists on the Unit I side. (The lj. transfer canal was added with tre completion of HNP-2)
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!!!. MFETY QUESTIONS I i.
A. Consequences of Seal Failure L If three seals on ene side of the transfer canal or all six seals f ati simultaneously, the water inventory in the transfer canal will drain out through the thme inch seismic gap between the
- HW 1 and NNP-2 reactor buildings to the yard drainage system.
If the transfer canal gates are closed then only water in the 5 canal will escape. If the gates are open, then water will also be lost from the spent fuel pools. The consequences of this loss are three fold.
- 1. Loss of fuel pool inventory reduces the shielding and cooling capacity of the pool. The fuel pcol is designed to maintain a level of the bottom of the transfer canal which would leave
! 14 f t.-9 in. of water in the pool. The active section of the ) pool would remain covered with water and not11ng would not occur j for 4.1 hours and 3.5 hours for the HNP-1 and HNP-2 pool water respectively. (See paragraph 9.1.2.3.1 is the NNP-2 FSAR)
- Corrective actions can be taken during this time to restore the i fuel pool level. These actions include repositioning the gates over the canal entrance, initiating make-up from condensate storage from the main control room, manually align the plant i
service water system to provide make-up if condensata is not available, and continue to refill the fuel pool to ncruel level.
- 2. Any release of radioactive materials must fall within the limits of 10 CFR 100. Since the water in the spent fuel pool is slightly radioactive, this release has been considered. The Ifmits of 10 CFR 100 will not be exceeded by a release of water from both the HWP-1 and HNP-2 fuel pools, even if they are drained down to the bottom of the transfer canal.
B. Sumary of Results and Conclusions Drawn The spent fuel pool is designed so that no single failure of structures or equipment will cause inability to maintain irradf ated fuel submerged in water, to re-establish nomal fuel pool water level, or to safely move fuel. Failure of the transfer canal seal system will not disable the fuel pool. The redundant air supply eliminates any single failure mode, except loss of off-site power. { This loss of power would cause a less of both HNP-1 and HNP-2 air . compressors. Compressed air is not required for safe shutdown of the plant; therefore, the compressors do not switch automatically to 5 diesel generatcr power upon loss of normal power. They may be i E.^ switched manually to diesel generated power f f required af ter shutdown.
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f 1 I' n GPC/NRC MEETING k FUEL TRANSFER CANAL JANUARY 22,1987 ; 1 AGE \ JA
- 1. OPENING REMARKS J. P. O'REILLY
! 11. EVENT
SUMMARY
J. T. BECKHAM, JR. ' q l11. GPC RESPONSE TO EVENT J. T. BECKHAM, JR. 4
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IV. RAD / ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE S. C. EWALD V. SAFETY / REGULATORY DESIGN BASIS L.T.GUCWA VI. SYSTEM DESIGN P. R. BEMIS Vil. INCIDENT REVIEW D. S. READ Vill. CONCLUSION J. P. O'REILLY l l l 4 k fk1 I .M '. We
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- STATUS OF UNITS
- AIR PRESSURE REGULATOR FAILS valve to transfer canal seals partially closed e AIR SUPPLY VALVE CLOSED t e PERIODIC REPLENISHMENT OF FUEL POOL WATER
- 1 CAUSE OF LEVEL DECREASE INVESTIGATED AND IDENTIF AIR SUPPLY VALVE OPENED- REESTABLISHING AIR TO S INCIDENT MITIGATION ACTMTIES UNDERTAKEN
- management notified and involved t
- NRC/ government agencies notified
.I , a spill contained i > cleanup activities undertaken ' f EVENT RESPONSE EXCELLENT fts2-1 i amamam p .
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- Executive Vice President i
- Senior Vice President i c;
- Vice President Plant Hatch '
j A CORPORATE COMMITMENT TO MITIGATE WITH FULL
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- No Offsite Impact
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- REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS hi DESIGNED APPROPRIATELY FOR ITS :
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- Regulatory Guide 1.26
- REVIEWED THE ACTUAL DESIGN AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES
- SEALS ARE NOT SAFETY-RELATED e THOSE PORTIONS OF SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS L
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, CORREC~VE AC~ ONS
- 70 R 1
I i JEN~~ 7 EJ >R03_EVS ) l i l l
- AIR SUPPLY OPERATION (regulator & ball valve) 1
- revised DR procedure l
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- in PE0 inspection procedures
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- valves tagged a ;
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! e LEAK DETECTOR OPERATION r
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- revised procedures l
- engineering review during replacement dwt I
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CORREC VE AC ONS 20R l < )EC EJ 3R03 EVS e TRANSFER CANAL SEAL OPERATION
- redundant air to seal system
- normal seal replacement
> further engineering evaluation l j
- ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS i!
- DR procedure
- procedure upgrade (calibration, annunciators) ll u l
- shift turn-over l
- discipline L
- fuel pool level l
I APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT CONTROLS IN PLACE i
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- s . - p December 4,1986
- i j PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-86-90
- This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or '
public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verifi-cati:n or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region II staff on this date. 1 FACILITY: Georgia Power Company Licensee Emergency Classification: Hatch Units 1 and 2 Notification of Unusual Event l l Docket Nos. 50-321/366 Alert l Baxley, Georgia Site Area Emergency , i General Emergency ' l X Not Applicable i i
SUBJECT:
AIT DISPATCHED TO INVESTIGATE LEAK FROM SPENT FUEL POOLS l Region II has dispatched an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to the Hatch site to ! investigate the leak of about 50,000 gallons of water from the Hatch Units 1 and 2 spent j fuel pools. s '
! Georgia Power discov<. red the leak at 10:02 p.m. (EST) yesterday, when it was found that
! water had spilled into an outside area between the Unit I and Unit 2 reactor buildings.
- Hatch Unit 1 is operating at 100 percent power; Hatch Unit 2 has completed a refueling
{ outage, but is in cold shutdown. ! I An immediate investigation by Georgia Power disclosed that the leak detection annunciator I l failed to alarm and that the spent fuel pool levels had dropped about five feet. The pools ,
- are built so that they cannot be completely drained and the fuel uncovered. Although the r i pool levels dropped by five feet, the levels did not go below the technical specification ,
f j l uits, l Of the approximately 50,000 gallons of water which leaked, between 5,000 and 10,000 gallons : l were released through the storm drain system to a swampy hrea within the owner controlled , I property. Plant personnel are building dikes and taking other steps to contain this water. ! Georgia Power believes no contaminated water has entered the nearby Altamaha River. Georgia Power also believes that leak may have been caused by a loss of air to inflatable ! seals in the transfer canal flexible-joint seismic area. A valve which regulates air ! i supply to these seals was found shut. Georgia Power is still investigating why the valve j was shut and why the leak detection annunciator failed to alarm. j j j Coolant sample analysis by Georgia Power indicates that 1.26 times the maximum permissible concsntrations of the following isotopes were released: cesium-134, cesium-137, zinc-65 and j
- manganese-54. l I I i The AIT is composed of a section chief from the Division of Reactor Projects, resident f l inspectors, and a specialist in both radiological effluents and chemistry, and l i environmental effects. !
i Media interest has occurred. Georgia Power has issued a press release, and Region II is : responding to inquiries. l l The State of Georgia has been informed and has dispatched a person to take environmental *I ! samples. _l , l foLfl 01~lN gvW
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Georgia Power informed the NRC incident response center of this occurrence by telephone at 1:35 a.m. today. This information is current as of 2:30 p.m. R. Croteau, 242-466B V. L. Brownlee, 242-5563
Contact:
DISTRIBUTION: MAIL: Phillips W111ste H. Street MNBB LEW KDRIG1B Chainnan Zech F NRR IE NMSS DOT: Trans Only Com. Rt;berts PA OIA RES AE00 Applicable State Com. Asselstine MPA Com. Bernthal ELD Air Rights INPO Com. Carr SP NSAC ' SECY ACRS CA PDR Regions: ~ Licensee: A Icble id Site
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