ENS 56936: Difference between revisions

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| NRC officer = Natalie Starfish
| NRC officer = Natalie Starfish
| event date = 01/29/2024 12:02 EST
| event date = 01/29/2024 12:02 EST
| last update date = 01/30/2024
| last update date = 02/01/2024
| title = Automatic Reactor Scram
| title = Automatic Reactor Scram
| event text = The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
| event text = The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
At approximately 1202 EDT on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram caused by a main turbine trip. Investigation is still ongoing.
At approximately 1202 EST on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram caused by a main turbine trip. Investigation is still ongoing.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All control rods were fully inserted. The licensee indicated that the turbine trip may have been caused by a power load imbalance, however the cause of the incident is under investigation. The scram was not complex.
All control rods were fully inserted. The licensee indicated that the turbine trip may have been caused by a power load imbalance, however the cause of the incident is under investigation. The scram was not complex.
Decay heat is currently being removed thru bypass valves dumping to the Main Condenser. Initially unit 2 lost the use of the bypass valves due to lack of condenser vacuum. Unit 2 used the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system in the condenser storage tank (CST) to CST mode to remove decay heat. Residual heat removal was used to keep the torus cool. Condenser vacuum was regained and unit 2 is back to removing decay heat with the turbine bypass valves.
Decay heat is currently being removed thru bypass valves dumping to the main condenser. Initially unit 2 lost the use of the bypass valves due to lack of condenser vacuum. Unit 2 used the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system in the condenser storage tank (CST) to CST mode to remove decay heat. Residual heat removal was used to keep the torus cool. Condenser vacuum was regained and unit 2 is back to removing decay heat with the turbine bypass valves.
There was no impact to unit 3.
There was no impact to unit 3.
The licensee confirmed there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The licensee confirmed there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * *UPDATE ON 01/29/24 AT 1935 EST FROM PAUL BOKUS TO NATALIE STARFISH* * *
* * *UPDATE ON 01/29/24 AT 1935 EST FROM PAUL BOKUS TO NATALIE STARFISH* * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email;
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
Licensee adds 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation report to original 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation report.
Licensee adds 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) specified system actuation report to original 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation report.
At approximately 1202 EDT on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram by a main turbine trip. All control rods inserted. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) was manually initiated for level control. HPCI was manually initiated for pressure control. Passive core injection system (PCIS) Group II and III isolations occurred (Specified System Actuation). Investigation is ongoing.
At approximately 1202 EST on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram by a main turbine trip. All control rods inserted. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) was manually initiated for level control. HPCI was manually initiated for pressure control. Primary containment isolation system (PCIS) Group II and III isolations occurred [specified system actuation]. Investigation is ongoing.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2024/20240131en.html#en56936
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2024/20240202en.html#en56936
}}{{unit info
}}{{unit info
| Unit = 2
| Unit = 2

Revision as of 07:30, 2 February 2024

ENS 56936 +/-
Where
Peach Bottom Constellation icon.png
Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1)
Reporting
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
LER: 05000277/LER-2024-001
Automatic Reactor Scram Due to an Invalid Generator Lockout
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-3.5 h-0.146 days <br />-0.0208 weeks <br />-0.00479 months <br />)
Opened: Eli Digon
13:32 Jan 29, 2024
NRC Officer: Natalie Starfish
Last Updated: Feb 1, 2024
56936 - NRC Website
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