ML20148H114

Forwards Licensee Draft Changes to Graded Quality Assurance Operations Quality Assurance Plan Application,South Texas Project,Units 1 & 2

ML20148H114
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	06/06/1997
From:	Alexion T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
TAC-M92450, TAC-M92451, NUDOCS 9706090209
Download: ML20148H114 (20)

Text

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June 6, 1997 MEMORAND'M TO: PD IV-1 File FROM: Tom Alexion ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

LICENSEE'S DRAFT CHANGES TO THEIR GRADED QUALITY ASSURANCE OPERATIONS QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN (0QAP) APPLICATION, SOUTH :

TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M92450 AND M92451)

I received the attached fax on the above subject (including supporting information) from the licensee. The purpose of this memo is to place this information in the public document rotun.

i Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499

Attachment:

As stated j 9

i DISTRIBUTION:

Docket File

\

PUBLIC (PDR)

WBeckner TAlexion i

Document Name: ST92450.JUN l OFC PM/PD4-1 [U \

TAlexion/vw N NAME DATE d /97 COPY fYES)NO ~-

0FFICIALWCORD COPY 9706090209 970606 PDR ADOCK 05000498 P PDR m

pa n:oq g* t UNITED STATES g

f, f j NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30eeH001

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...,+ June 6, 1997 l

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MEMORANDUM T0: PD IV-1 File FROM: h Tom Alexion A

Project Directorate IV-1 i Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

LICENS12'S DRAFT CHANGES TO THEIR GRADED QUALITY ASSURANCE OPERATIONS QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN (00AP) APPLICATION, SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M92450 AND M92451)

I received the attached fax on the above subject (including supporting  ;

information) from the licensee. The purpose of this memo is to place this information in the public document room.

l Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499

Attachment:

As stated I

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Attached are the following items:  !

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Discussion of Risk Achievement Worth and Fussel-Vesely importance i Revised Comprehensive Risk Management Procedure, Addendum 3 and i i figure titled, Probabilistic Risk importance Thresholds for input for Graded  ;

QA Component Classifications l Graded QA Working Group Procedure changes  !

i e Discussions of Basis for Risk Importance Thresholds l

Discussion of South Texas Project's Philosophy for Risk Significance l l

Determination -

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. OOAP changes  !

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ATTACHMENT i i

i P0/Ea'd 96E8 E46 ETS DNISN3311 MEDrN 2D60 4661

• W

i Risk Achievement Worth and Fussel-Vesely importance The following changes are"being made to reflect changes in how items with RAW between 10 and 100 and FV greater than .01 will be treated.

OQAP '

See revision to Chapter 2, Sections 5.3.9 and 5.3.11. i Comorehensive Risk Manaaement Prov:= dure. OPGP02-ZAMS. Addendum 3 See attached revised flow chart titled GQA Process and figure (Nied, Probabilistic Risk importance Thresholds for input for Graded QA Componont Classifications.

Graded QA Workina Group Procedure chances This procedure is currently under development. It will include the following:

Components with a risk achievement worth greater than 100_QB a Fussel-Vesely importance greater than 0.01 are to be placed in the Full QA program. .

. Components with a risk achievement woith greater than 10 but less than 100 are to have full QA controic specifically placed on those critical attributes which cause the component to have a high risk achievement worth.

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PO40*d. 0628 E46 ETS DNISNIDil NO373nN LE:60 466TMM l

GQA PROCESS 3 Y

.

• d

n. B System or P psA y

% *  : M: ; PSA Med PSALow Not Modeled a Yes

+

y N Yes E {' Y" RAW between ml

'~ .

, 10 & 100 ~

4 D E

T u E Mode change or Mmpees accidents or R shundemn safety  % Min m " couldinn dek could directy cause u signuicent? transients? signWicant system? Inllisting event? 8 1 y Assess risk opfk:ance beoed on PSA 4 8 rankings andfor deterministic evaluations I

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4 Hh 9 *

• M'd "' l'" "*

• Not Risk '-

] Sigh 7 s

s K

y., .

E ,

v.s va 2 ,

1 o "

-w sessey relaisd? -

safety reissed? safety reinted? m e cualty reinted?

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Yes g

Yes Yee e

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( ~- ) (-) '

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• SR Components with a RAW between 10 and 100 are to have Full OA appiled to the critical attributes associated with that RAW

e -

PROBABILISTIC RISK IMPORTANCE THRESHOLDS FOR INPUT TO -

GRADED QA COMPONENT CLASSIFICATIONS H I G H s

s -

a  :

$ 100 -

E

• m i gjo_________y_g g_________

m ' --

2 -------------------T-LOW lMED 5

i 0.005 0.01 ,

FUSSELL-VESELY IMPORTANCE ,

• Full Program is applied to critical attributes associated with the ,, ,., ,

high Risk Achievement Worth  %=% -

- - ~~ y 1

Basis for Risk Importance Throeholds:

1he following table provides a discussion of the Bases for establishing the risk j thresholds applied in the Graded QA process. I RAW Threshold Value Threshold Basis 1 Components whose degradation and subsequent I

>2.0 failure could lead to a doubling of the CDF shot,ld receive increased emphasis and are to be considered "more" important.

Components whose degradation and subsequent i failure could lead to a CDF increase by an order of )

magnitude should receive increased emphasis and j 210.0 specific evaluations. Degradation and subsequent i failure of these components could result in unacceptable system perfomiance, and therefore, the evaluations are to be performed to ensure that i degradation of critical attributes is identified and

controlled.

I Components whose degradation and subsequent

{ failure could lead to an increase of two orders of

! magnitude should receive increased emphasis and are

! 2100.0 to be considered of high importance. Degradation of

these components will result in unacceptable system 4 performance, and possibly plant performance, therefore, full programmatic controls are maintained j and monitored to ensure degradation does not occur.

j Basis for Fussell-Vesely Risk Importance Thresholds j Fussell-Vesely importance Threshold Threshold Basis 2

Components with greater than one half l , percent in the Fussell-Vesely risk

importance measure should receive I

0.005 (0.5 %) increased emphasis and are to be

considered important since degradation j in thair failure rates could impact system

level performance.

i Components with greaterthan one percent in the Fussell-Vesely risk 3 importance measure should receive full  !

2 0.01 (1.0%) programmatic controls and are to be  !

i~ considered highly important since i 4

degradation in their failure rates would j impact system level performance and 3

possibly plant level performance.

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South Texas Project's Philosophy for Risk Significance Determination The purpose of this table is to compare the difference in approaches for i establishing risk significance as determined by Maintenance Rule criteria versus

Graded QA criteria, in general, Maintenance Rule established system leye) risk significance only for systems scoped in the Maintenance Rule, while Graded QA established comoonent level risk significance for systems evaluated under the Graded QA program.

! The Maintenance Rule risk significance determination was based on deterministic and probabilistic system level screening criteria such that 20G2.8 system was identified as Maintenance Rule risk sianificant. any Meintenance R_ule scoped function within that system was also cateoortzed as risk sianificut.

Since there was no requirernent to perform a risk significance determination at the component level, this had the effect ci adding increased numbers of components to the Maintenance Rule risk significance category based on the fact that a component was associated with a Maintenance Rule scoped function within a risk significant system. A more detailed component level analyses could show that some of the Maintenance Rule system functions do not have any true risk significance associated with them. In the case of Graded QA, degrees of risk significance (i.e., high, medium, low) were established at the component level based on probabilistic importance thresholds and deterministic screening criteria for all components within an evaluated system. The result is that fewer components were evaluated as risk significant in Graded QA than were identified in the Maintenance Rule.

GRADED QUALITY ASSURANCE l MAlffrENANCE RULE Scopino of Svotem Functions For eson eystem rewowed under the Graded Quality system funceons are scoped into lhe Warnenance Runo assurance program, al system functions are seeped and bened on the following detemuniste lesues:

evaluated. Graded QA levels for systems not yet reviewed remain conserva9vely under he Yulf' oA program. e AB safety Related sSCs.

• lL'f; noissed SSCs that Mitigate Acculeres or Trenaients.

e lWL f; ~ ^ f SSCs that are used in the EoPs.

e it'r; neinted ascs whose tailure direesy prevente " .:/ m J sSco fmm fuistiino ineir salsty relased funcnons, e Nonsalmy Reisted sSCs whose failure cause scrams or actuates safety eyelems Frobabilistic Safety Assessenent Risk Sionificance Determination

< Graded Quality Assurance determenes nok signecance at Mamienance Rule detemunes rtok ognrhoance at a a gnagogg level. The following PSA ortteria was used: system level The following system level PSA anterla was used:

• Migh Risk Achievement Worth 2100 or Fussell-Vesely k 0.01 or Fussell Vesely a 0.006 and Rek

• Risk Achievement Worth k 2.0,or Achievement Worth k 2.0

• Risk Reduciton Wor 1h 5 0.995

• Medium Riek Achievement Worth 2 2.0 and < 100 and Fussefl-Vessly < 0.005 or Risk Achievement Worih < a.0 and Fusses vesely = 0.00s and <0.01.

e Law - Risk Achevement Worth < 2.0 and Fussell-Vesely < 0.005.

• Additional Action Reeutred Risk Achievement

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JJRADED QUAUTY ASSURANCE MAINTENANCE RULE worth h to and < 100.

Deterministic Risk Sionificance Determination Graded Quahty Amourance determmes risk signincance at Mantenance Rule deermines nok eqpndcence at a syssom the cornponent level twough to totowing process; level. The fotowmg determinismo orteoria were used:

e Detonnine nok seywAcanoe of each system funceon Accident Rannonen Funcilons using the fonowmg ortteda..

• Required to shutdown the reactor and mentain k in a esse shedown soneson,

== Could direc5ycause or has caused an

• Requped to maintem sw reactor coolars pressure infilsam0 event? boundary, I

. Could imil e risk es0necent system? e Required to remow asnosphone heat and

== Mitigates Acc4ents or Transients? radioactMty fmm cordainment and maintain

== Used in EOPs or ERs? containment integrfty. l se Mode Change or Shutdown salsty e Required to mmove decay heat from Die remotor ,

signecent? NormalOnorationFuntaons )

e Required to prowse pnmary side heet removal, l

• Identify the system funeson(s) oupported by sech

• Required for power oorwersson, l component

• Required to provide pnmary, secondary, or

. Determine risk seyecance of each w .; using containment pressure conomi, tw same cettene above and includeng the day 6e to e Floquired to provide cooEng water, -n,~e-4 or which each component supporte a alsk sigrdcant morn coolmg, system funobon.

• Required to prownde electne power (AC, DC power) e For each risk sigruncant component, idenWy tuo e Required to provide ovier moelve or consol power critical attributes associated with that rtsk. (e.g., instrument air) ,

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OQAP CHANGE QA-032

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES Page 1 of 3 ALL CHANGES ARE IN BOLD TYPE CHAPTER LQCATION AC'TTON TEXT TOC DEFIN. INSERT QA-032 TOC CH. 1.0 INSERT QA-032 TOC CH. 2.0 INSERT QA-032 TOC CH. 13.0 INSERT QA-032 DEFIN. Critical DELETE Identifiable and Characteristics , measurable variables of a commercial grade item, which once selected to be verified, provide reasonable assurance that the item received is the item specified.

DEFIN. Critical INSERT Important design,

, Characteristics material, and performance characteristics of a commercial grade item that, once verified, will provide reasonable assurance that the item will perform its intended safety function.

l CH. 1.0 5.1.4.5 INSERT The Manager, Risk l Management & Industry l Relations is responsible l for activities related to  !

the Comprehensive Risk Management Program, l including' oversight of 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment activities.

The Manager, Risk Management & Industry Relations serves as the I Graded Quality Assurance I Expert Panel chairperson, t

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x ~ ,=- r ue w m :c m w m azantnmg yctezAn ,

OQAP CHANGE QA-032  ;

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES Page 2 of 3 i

ALL CHANGES ARE IN BOLD TYPE  :

i CHAPTER LOCATION ACTION IEXI CH.'2.0 3.1 DELETE , and station economics  !

5.3.3 INSERT Initial evaluatic.ns are -

performed by ths Working Group.

5.3.5 INSERT between "are" and

" ultimately" in the first sentence.. developed by

, the Working Group and l

l 5.3.9 INSERT Components that are I highly reliable, yet whose failure would

result in a signifiennt increase in risk, will receive Full program .

coverage, or will be l evaluated based on their '

risk importance to ensure that Full program controls are applied to their critical attributes. l 5.3.9 CHANGE renumber to 5.3.10 5.3.10 CHANGE renumber to 5.3.11 l 5.3.11 INSERT at the end of the second sentence insert...that  !

could result in recategorization of an SSC between "are" and "to" in the third sentence...also used i 4

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OQAP CHANGE QA-032

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES Page 3 of 3 ALL CHANGES ARE IN BOLD TYPE b

QARIER LOCATION ACTION TEXT CH. 2.0 (cont) 5.3.11 INSERT add the last sentence...

Those components for which an increase in failure rates results in a significant increase in risk will have Full program controls- ,

established.

e i Table I INSERT under the Basic Program column for ANSI N45.2.13, 1976, Section 12 - for audits of suppliers s.

CH. 13.0 5.8 INSERT For medium and low safaty i_ significant SSCs treated by the Basic program controls, measures shall be established to conduct 2

apparent cause determincation and to trend failures to assist

, in evaluating the need A

for more detailed root ,

cause analysis (if I 2

excessive failures occur) and proper corrective action. Further, particular consideration will be given to assessing the potential

, implications of such failures generically to similar SSCs treated by the Full program.

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION NUMSER REY.

NO.

Tatde of Contents 13 OPERATIONS QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN TABLE OF CONTENTS Errecme DATE Chapter Title Effective Effective Change Number Chapter Revision Notice Revis1on Date No.

Definitions 7 QA-032 1.0 Organization 9 QA-032 2.0 Program Description 11 QA-032 i j

3.0 Conduct of Plant Operations 7 I 4.0 Qualification, Training, and 6 Certification of Personnel 5.0 Maintenance, Installation of 5 Modifications, and Related Activities

! 6.0 Design and Modification Control 7 7.0 Procurement 7 8.0 Control and Issuance of 6 Documents 9.0 Control of Material 6 10.0 Inspection 7 I l

11.0 Test Control 6 l l

( 12.0 Instrument and Calibration 6 l l Control

, 13.0 Control Of Conditions Adverse 8 QA-032 to Quality 4

14.0 Records Control 5 15.0 Quality oversight 7 Activities 16.0 Reserved for Future Use lf

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION NUMsRa Rgy, NO.

Dennitions 7 OPERATMHt5 QUAUT( ASSURANCE PLAN PAca 4 or so DEP90 MONS errecTivt l DATE I correetfv. unintan=nen - Repair and restoration of equipment or i l

components that have failed or are malfunctioning and are not performing their intended function.

critieml Attribute - An attribute or capability of a component to l support its associated system's critical function. '

critieni charmetaristica - Important design, material, and performance characteristics of a commercial grade item that, once {.

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verified, will provide reasonable assurance that the item will  % l perform its intended safety function. ]

Dedication - An acceptance process hndertaken to provide ]

reasonable assurance that a commercial grade $ tem to be used as a  !

. basic component will perform its intended safaty function and, in j this respect, is deemed equivalent to an item designed and  ;

manufactured under a 10CFR50, Appendix _B, quality assurance  ;

program..This assurance is achieved by identifying the critical i characteristics of.the item and verifying their acceptability by i inspections, tests, or analyses performed by the purchaser or i third-party dedicating entity after deliv ry, supplemented as necessary by one or more of the followin, commercial grade )

surveys; product inspections or witness A holdpoints at the  ;

i

' manufacturer's facility, and analysis of 'storical records for 1 acceptable performance. In all cases, the lication process must be conducted in accordance with the applic<-le provisions of 10CFR50, Appendix B. The process is considered complete when the item is designated for use as a basic component.

Deficiency - The characteristic of an item or document that makes it nonconforming with the original criteria and is reported as

,i audit findings, supplier deficiencies, event reports, significant defects, nonconformance reports, corrective action reports, or other procedurally controlled mechanisms.

Damign - Technical and management processes which commence with

= identification of design input and which lead to and include the issuance of. design output documents.

Damian control - Design control-is the process used to verify that the design drawings, design calculations and specifications, including iabrication and inspection procedures for both shop and field, meet the project requirements.

IT

- m stznmn-rszmmmm SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATIN3 STATION wumeen new.

- NO. I chapter 1.0 s  !

OPERATIONS QUAUTY ASSURANCE PLAN PAgg 4 or s ORGANtZATION EFFEcnve -i DATE  !

i 5.1.4.3 The Director, Quality is

• responsible for Independent Safety Engineering Group activities, audits, independent assessments, surveillances, performance monitoring, inspections and NDE examinations. j 5.1.4.4 During the overview of activities performed by the NA&L organization, ,

the Director, Quality, at his discretion, reports-directly to the Executive Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear.

5.1.4.5 The Manager, Risk Management & ,

l Industry Relations is responsible i

for activities related to the Comprehensive Risk Management Program, including oversight of d Probablistic Safety Assessment { .

activities. The Manager, Risk .

Management & Industry Relations 56 serves as the Graded Quality Assurance Expert Panel chairperson.

5.1.5 The General Manager, Plant Services is responsible for implementing quality program requirements applicable to nuclear training, information systems, emergency response, records management and administration, and procurement and material control for STP.

5.1.5.1 The Manager, Nuclear Training; Manager, Nuclear Information .

Systems; Manager, Emergency Response; Director, Records Management and Administration; and Director, Nuclear Purchasing and

' Materials Management report to the General Manager, Plant Services.

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5.1.6 The General Manager, Human Resources Nuclear is responsible for implementing quality program requirements applicable to employee 4

relations (i.e., access authorization),

employee development and organizational effectiveness, salary / compensation, and legal and personnel services.

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC CENERATIN3 STATION NUMBER REV.

no.

! cupucto it

OPERATIONS QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN page 3 op .gg PROGRAM DESCRIPTION EFFECTIVE DATE

, 1.O PURPOSE i 1.1 The purpose of this chapter is to define criteria and establish administrative controls for implementation of the Quality Assurance (QA) Program for the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STP) .

=

2.O SCORE 4

2.1 The QA Program is implemented and controlled in j 4

accordance with the Operations Quality Assurance Plan '

(OQAP) and is applicable to structures, sys'tems, and components to an. extent consistent with their importance to safety, and complies with the >

requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B and othar program  ;

- commitments as appropriate. '

4 2.2 The QA Program will also extend, as applicable and/or I

determined by STP management, to programs including 10CFR71, Subpart H (except design and fabrication of NRC certified radioactive waste shipping casks), ASME i

j Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections III and XI; '

and to quality-related areas as defined herein

)

j including the Fire Protection Program, Emergency Plan, 1 j

j Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, Radwaste I j

Management Program, Computer Program Verification and Control, Seismic and Environmental Equipment j

Qualification Programs, Radiation Protection Program,  !

and Station Blackout (SBO) systems and equipment. l 3.0 DEFINTTIONS

' 3.1 comnvahennive Rink Manaaement - A process by which the W change in risk to station personnel, the public's health and  % l safety are evaluated as a result of changes in commitments, '

! processes, activities, and human and equipment performance. EE 3.2 armana cualiev Amaurance - The process by-which risk-based methodology [i.e. , Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)]

' and deterministic and performance-based information analyses are combined to establish appropriate levels of programmatic  ;

4 controls for SSCs and appropriate levels of first line and

] independent oversight needed to provide the necessary assurance that SSCs will operate safely.

I 3.3 Pu11 nrocram contro1m - The highest levels of controls and oversight, as prescribed in Table I to this chapter and

. throughout individual OQAP chapters.

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATIN3 STATION NUMeER REV.

+ No.

Chapter 2.0 11 l OPERATIONS QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN PAos 4 or is PROGRAM DESCRIPTION oAru 5.3.2 GQA is a process by which risk-based methodology (i.e., Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)], deterministic insights, and performance-based information are combined and analyzed to determine what' levels of programmatic controls are needed for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and what levels of first line and independent oversight are needed to provide assurance that items will operate safely and activities are accomplished as prescribed.

5.3.3 Selected systems are evaluated, at the component level, by a cross-discipline Axpert Panel comprised of high level station  %

management. Initial evaluations are performed 2 by the Working Group.

(  ;

5.3.4 These recommendations are developed in -

consideration of systems' missions, components' contribution to core damage frequency and risk achievement, components' critical attributes (needed to su ,

performance, regulatory pport system /QAmission),

requirements, and  ;

{

other deterministic considerations as i prescribed in the comprehensive Risk Management procedures.

5.3.5 n Program control recommendations are developed I by the Working Group and ultimately approved by g the Expert Panel and forwarded to the site for implementation. Controls are' implemented in three graded applications (i.e. , " Full",

" Basic", and " Targeted").

5.3.6 " Full" program controls are applied to safety-related SSCs categorized as being "high" safety +

significant/ risk important. These " Full" levels of controls and oversight are designed to provide a high degree of confidence that SSCs perform safely and activities are performed as expected. Table I to the OQAP chapter prescribes the program commitments applicable to " Full" program activities.

5.3.7 " Basic" program controls are applied to safety-related SSCs categorized as " medium" or " low" safety significant/ risk important. These are lower levels of control and oversight, designed Ih to maintain / preserve those identified critical

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. l SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC CENERATING STATION NUMse2 REV.

No.

Chapter 1.0 11 l

OPERATIONS QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN Pace 5 or is i PROGRAM DESCRIPTION errecTive i DATE l

l attributes of SSCs needed to support systems' critical functions. These controls are intended to reflect economical and efficient i business practices.- Table I to the OQAP chapter prescribes the program commitments applicable to " Basic" program activities.

5.3.8 " Targeted" program controls are applied to non-safety related SSCs categorized as "high" or

" medium" safety significant/ risk importance.

Specific program controls are applied to those items in a selected manner, " targeted" at those characteristics or critical attributes that render the SSC si.ynificant or important. '

5.3.9 Components that are highly reliable, yet whose failure would result in a significant increase in risk, will receive Pull program coverage, or w will be evaluated based on their risk

• importance to ensure'that Full program controls 9 are applied to their critical attributes.

5.3.10 SSCs governed by the OQAP shall retain " Full" program coverage until such time as prescribed risk-informed, performance-based analyses are completed and approved, and they are placed into other program categories (i.e., " Targeted" or " Basic") as appropriate, 5.3.11 A vital element of the GQA program is the i

" feedback" loop. On a periodic basis, and as y i

j prescribed in the Comprehensive Risk Management o  ;

procedure, the GQA Working Group and Expert d Panel shall review any changes to the PSA  %  !

infor1 nation and performance / operating i experience that could result in '

recategorization of an SSC. These reviews are i also used to assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of in-place' quality program i controls. Adjustments shall be made as determined necessary. Those components for which an increase in failure rates results in a d significant increase in risk will have Full 9 program controls established.

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TABI,E I PROGRAM CODMI'DfENTS

.R.GJAnos 5TANDAEtn FUM, PROGRAM BA5IC PROGRAM ANSI N45.2.13,1976 5.3.and 5.4 - Provisions are established for, in special caes and with Same as full.

(cont'd) management approval, completion of these activities after award of contract.

7.2.1, 73.1 - Hese activities will only be implemented as deemed necessary.

9.0 - His section will be implemented based on the scope, complexity Same as full.

and safety significance of the items being procured.

1011 - His section will only be implemented as deemed necessary, 12 - His section will only be g implemented as deemed e==a y for  ;

audits of suppliers.

g R.G.1.144, rev.1 (9/80) C.l - refer to table coverage of R.G.1.28 and ANSI N45.2. Some as fait refer to table coverage of R.G.1.74 and ANSI N45.2.10 C3.a(1)- refer to table coverage of R.G.133 regarding audit Same as full.

frequency.

c3.b SW will audit vendors only as deemed necessary.

STP will pfs,.m biennial evaluations.

ANSI N45.2.12,1977 No exceptions taken.

SW will audit vendors only as deemed -,

necessary. These audits will be .,

conducted as unplanned /enscheduled audits.

R.G.1.146, rev. 0 (8/80) C.I - refer to table coverage of R.G.1.28 and ANSI N45.2. Same as fuit

] refer to table coverage of R.G.1.74 and ANSI N45.2.10 '

Operatione Quality Aseterance Plan Chapter 2.0, Revision 11 affective Date .

14 of is

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC CENERATING STATION NUMSER CEV.

, NO.

campi.e n.o a OPERATIONS QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN PAsa 4 oF s CONTROL OF CONDmONS EFFECTIVE ADVERSE TO QUALfTY DATE 5.3.3 Actions to be taken to assure timely corrective action on conditions adverse to quality.

5.4 Procedures which identify and track conditions adverse to quality shall require management review of each report to determine if the condition is significant.

For significant conditions adverse to quality, the cause to of therepetition preclude conditionshall and.the corrective action be documented and taken reported to appropriate levels of management.

5.5 Measures shall be established for review and evaluation of conditions adverse to quality for reportability 4.2, 4.3, to the NRC.as required by References and 4.4, as appropriate.

5.6 The authority to stop work has been assigned to the General Manager, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing for any activity being performed by company personnel or contractors which do not conform to established requirements.

5.7 Measures shall be established for the evaluation and -

trending of conditions adverse to quality. The i

results of these reviews and analyses are reported to the affected organization and executive management,

• and are audited by the Quality organization. Adverse trends shall be evaluated and processed in accordance with controlling procedures.

L 5.8 i For medium and low safety significant SSCs treated by l

the Basic program controls, measures shall be i established to conduct apparent cause determination and to trend failures to assist in evaluating the need N for more detailed root cause analysis (if excessive @

failures occur) and proper corrective action.

Further, particular consideration will be given to ,

assessing the potential implications of such failures I generically program.

to similar SSCs treated by the Full ,

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TOTAL P.16 i

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