ML20205E378

Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR73,allowing Implementation of Safeguards Contingency Plan Reflecting Permanent Shutdown & Defueled Condition of Brpnp

ML20205E378
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	03/29/1999
From:	Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
Shared Package
ML20205E352	List: ML20205E347 ML20205E378
References
NUDOCS 9904050163
Download: ML20205E378 (18)

Text

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7590-01-P UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the Matter of )

)

- CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY ) DOCKET No. 50-155

)

Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant ' )

EXEMPTION 1.

Consumers Energy Company (Consumers or the licensee) is the hWder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-6, which authorizes the licensee to possess the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant (BRP or the facility). The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect. The facility is'a boiling-water reactor located at the licensee's site in Charlevoix County, Michigan. The facility is permanently shut down and defueled and is no longer authorized to operate or place fuel in the reactor verael.

11.

It is stated in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulatio_n_s (10 CFR) Section 73.55,

" Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage," paragraph (a), that "[t]he licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are

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not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety." Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73 describes the general criteria for security personnel at nuclear power facilities. These criteria include physical and mental qualifications, medical examination, employment suitability, training and qualification, weapons training and qualification, and security equipm'ent. I By letter dated November 12,1998, and as supplemented by lette- dated 1 January 12,1999, the licensee requested 10 exemptions from certain requirements of 10 CFR Part 73. The requested exemptions are: (1) 10 CFR 73.55(a) - exemption from the requirement'for licensed' operators to suspend safeguards measures pursuant to 10 CFR.73.55 in an emergency; (2) 10 CFR 73.55(c)(1) - exemption from the requirement for vital areas # 10 CFR 73.55(c)(5) - exemption from the requirement to have 0.2 foot-candle illumination within the protected area; (4) 10 CFR 73.55(c)(6) -

exemption from the requirement that the control room be bullet resistant; (5) 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4) - exemption from the requirement to maintain designated licensee vehicles within the protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security, and emergency purposes; (6) 10 CFR 73.5 big)(4) - changing the periodicity of required security program reviews from once every 12 months to once every 24 months; (7) 13 CFR 73.55(e)(1) - exemption from the requirements to have a secondary alarm station and an onsite secondary power supply system for non-portable communications equipment; (8) 10 CFR 73.55(h)(3) - exemption from the requirement to have 5 or more guards per shift immediately available to fulfill response requirements; (9) 10 CFR 73.55(c)(3) - exemption from the requirement to maintain at all times an inside isolation 1

( zone in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected

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area:,; and (10) 10 CFR Part .73, Appendix B,Section IV, paragrtiph C - exemption from

. the requirement to' arm security response personnel.with a particular type of weaponry.

The proposed exemption is a preliminary step in Consumers' effort to revise its safeguards contingency plan under 10 CFR 50.54(p) commensurate with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the BRP facility 'vith all fuel stored in the spent fuel pool.

Ill.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, " Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or

- the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

Section 73.55(a) allows the Commission to authorize a licensee to provide alternate ,

i measures for protection against radiological sabotage, provided the licensee demonstrates that the proposed measu'es meet the general performance objective and requirements of the regulation and that the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent to that provided by the regulation.

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55 is to provide reasonable assurance that I

adequate secudty measures can be taken to protect against an act of radiological sabotage. Because of its permanently shutdown and defueled condition, ue radiological risk from BRP due to a sabotage event is less than the risk from such an event at an operating power reactor plant. Further, with more than 18 months of radiological and heat decay since the plant was shut down on August 30,1997, the potential radiological 4

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4 source term associated with the remaining design-basis accidents and radiological sabotage has decreased significantly.

1

. The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to have a licensed senior operator lon site who has the authority to suspend safeguards measures in an emergency. Licensee actions regarding the safety of the plant that vary from the technical specifications are addressed in 10 CFR 50.54(y). That regulation allows such actions to

'be taken by licensed senior operators or certified fuel handleis that have submitted L10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) certifications. Further, the BRP technical specifications require a certified fuel handler (CFH) on duty at all times who has knowledge to protect the fuel' from safety situations that may occur on site. A CFH at a facility that has permanently shut down and defueled is equivalent to having .a licensed senior operator at an operating nuclear pcwer plant in that the pcsitions are the most senior position on shift and require I i

sufficient qualifications to address events that may arise given the respective status of the facility. Further, CFHs at BRP are trained and certified to an NRC-approved training and qualification program that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.120. Thus, CFHs at BRP have the authority and training to make emergency decisions regarding operations that l

.may affec't the safety of the plant that vary from the technical specifications. .

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement ir, maintain vital- I areas,'which, as defined by 10 CFR 73.2, are areas that house equipment that could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Because the BRP f acility is permanently shut down and defueled, the potential for a release of a large radioactive source term to the environment due to high pressure and  !

temperature no longer exists. Additionally, due to the radioactive decay of short-lived )

i

m I-5 isotopes since final _ reactor shutdown on August 30,1997, there is a continuing reduction

' in the pouential radiological source term. S'ubsequently, Consumers determined that as of

l November 5,1997i there was no potential for designibasis accidents at BRP that would l

l result in offsit'e doses exceeding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Protective I 1

Action Guidelines. These dose guidelines are significant fractions below the siting criteria of 1'O CFR Part _100. At BRP, in its permanently shutdown and defueled status, civen the amount of decay time that has occurred, there are no areas that require designation as a vital area.- Consequently, there is no equipment nor are there areas at the BRP facility that are vital, including the control room, central alarm station (10 CFR 73.55(e)), and areas that contain onsite secondary power systems for annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment (10 CFR 73.55(e)). Further, safeguards are maintained for areas at the facility that continue to contain equipment and systems necessary to protect against acts of radiological sabotage.

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain 0.2 i foot-candle illumination inside the protected area. The licensee will maintain lighting of sufficient illumination in the protected area and isolation zones for observation by closed-I circuit television or security guards on patrol. Further, during periods of alarm assessment or conduct of routine guard patrols, lighting in the area of concern will be sufficient for evaluation. Therefore, this exemption replaces a measurable standard with a performance-based criterion. In addition, a lower level of illumination is consistent with the reduced l

radiologic ^al risk presented by the BRP facility. Thus, the reduction in protected area j l

illumination'does r.ot endanger life or property and me itains a high level of assurance of 1

public health and safety.

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The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain a bullet- )

reQtant control' room. The staff notes that one basis for this' requirement is to ensure safe reactor shutdown. With the BRP reactor permanently shut down and defueled, there are no reactor controls in the control room that could adversely impact public health and safety. Further, the manipulation of controls associated with spent fuel will not result in any immediate conditions adverse to safety, and these controls are located in an area l

protected by security and access control requirements. Thus, the removal of control room bullet resistance does not endanger life or property, and an equivalent high level of assurance of public health and safety is maintained through other security features.

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain licensee-designated vehicles within the protected area, except for operational, maintenance, repair, security, and emergency purposes. The licensee has stated that the storage of vehicles on site poses a safety hazard and has a negative impact on rer..ote surveillance of the protected area and the conduct of security guard patrols, primarily due to space limitations within the BRP protected area during distnantlement and decontamination activities The licensee searches all vehicles prior to entry into the protected area in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4).

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to review the security program at least every 12 months, and proposes to change this frequency to 24 months. The licensee maintains that security program activities, including types and significance of activities, are considereb!y diminished as cornpared with those activities at an operating site. The proposed reduction in review frequency is consistent with the reduction in security activities due to the reduction in vital areas and equipment.

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The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain a i

secondary alarm station and ar. onsite secondary power supply system for non-portable communications equipment. The licensee will maintain communications equipment with diverse and independent power supplies to maintain adequate onsite and offsite communication capability. Further, the central alarm station will continue to have access controls and remain a bullet-resistant structure to assure communications with offsite law enforcement agencies. The removal of the requirement to have a continuously manned secondary alarm statiori is consistent with the reduced radiological risk associated with i

the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the BRP facility, and the maintenance of

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a single alarm station provides reasonable assurance that an appropriate response to I

security events and alarms will occur.

l The licensee has requested an exemption to reduce the total number of security j l

guards immediately available to respond to security situations, as described in the l l

licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The staff notes that the number of vital areas 1

and the radiological consequences of an onsite event hava significantly decreased since i

the plant was pe manently shut down and defueled. Further, the licensee has procedures >

l and communication capability to respond with additionci security guards and local law enforcement agencies during security events. Thus, there is reasonable assurance that )

i adequate security measures can be taken to protect against an act of sodotage. {

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain interior l isolation zoner The licensee stated that, because of the small size of the protected area  !

l and the large amount of equipment planned to facilitate dismantlement and j

decontamination activities, maintenance of a 20-foot interior isolation zone would 1

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. constitute an unreasonable burden. Further, the licensee maintains perimeter alarms, responds to perimeter alarms, conducts routine patrols, and has visual assessment l

capability of the exterior isolation zone. The staff notes that the reduction in the interior isclation zone is commensurate with the reduction in radiological consequences associated with.the remainin'g design-basis accidents and does not result in a net reduction in security effectiveness, because the remaining security features maintain an adequate level of assurance that sabotage can be detected, assessed, and deterred.

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement for security responders to be trained and qualified in a particu!ar type of weaponry. Due to the reduced radiological risk posed by the BRP facility and significant reduction in vital areas as described above, the particular type of weaponry is no longer necessary to achieve the

. performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a) at the BRP facility, because the remaining fire" is utilized by the guard force at BRP are sufficiei' for deterrence and protection.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission has determined that the licensee's proposed alternative measures for protection against radiological sabotage meet the l

objective and the general performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 associated with the reduced risk of radiological sabotage for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor power facility that has its spent nuclear fuel stored in a spent fuci pool in addition, the staff has determined that the overalllevel of the proposed system's performance, as limited by this exemption, assures the existence of sufficient physical protection capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at BRP, given the reduced

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radiological risir presented by the shutdown and defueled facility. Specifically, a limited 1

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9 exemption is being granted for ten (10) specific areas, as described above, in which the

, licensee is authorized to modify the existing safeguards contingency plan commitments commensurate with the security threats associated with a permanently shutdown and I defueled reactor power plant. '

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, this I exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise 11, ine public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Consumers an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 at the BRP facility, as described above.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that this exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment (64 FR 3321, l 1

dated January 21, 1999). 1 This exemption is effective upon issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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,t i . g Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this March 29 1999

t .

7590-01-P UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the Matter of )

)

CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY ) DOCKET No. 50-155

)

Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant )

EXEMPTION 1.

Consumers Energy Company (Consumers or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-6, which authorizes the licensee to possess the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant (BRP or the facility). The license provides, arnong other thing that the (

i f acility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l l

! Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect. The facility is a boiling-water )

I reactor located et the licensee's site in Charlevoix County, Michigan. The facility is {

l permanently shut down and defueled and is no longer authorized to operate or place fuel l i

in the reactor vesse!.

il.

It is stated in Title 10 cf the Code of Federal Reaulations (10 CFR) Section 73.55, l

" Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors  !

against radiological sabotage," paragraph (a), that "[t]he licensee shall estab!ish and  !

maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as I

its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are !

I i

I I

7 1

2 not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety." Apperidix 0 to 10 CFR Part 73 describes the general criteria'for security personnel at nuclear power f acilities. These criteria include physical and mental qualifications, medical examination, employment suitability, training and ]

qualification, weapons training and qualification, and security equipment.

By letter dated November 12,1998, and as supplemented by letter dated l l

January 12,'1999, the !icensee requested 10 exemptions from certain requirements of- 1

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10 CFR Part 73. .The requested exemptions are: (1110 CFR 73.55(a) - exemption from the requirement for licensed operators to suspend safeguards measures pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 in an emergency; (2) 10 CFR 73.55(c)(1) - exemption from the l requirement for vital areas: (3)'10 CFR 73.55(c)(5) - exemption from the requirement to have 0.? foot candle illumination within the protected area; (4) 10 CFR 73.55(c)(6) - 1 exemption from the requirement that the control room be bullet resistant; (5) 10 CFR

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i 73.55(d)(4) - exemption from the requirement to maintain designated licensee vehicles within the protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security, and emergency purposes; (6) 10 CFR 73.55(g)(4) - changing the periodicity of required security program reviews from once every 12 months to once every 24 months; (7) 10 CFR 73.55(s)(1) - exemption from the requirements to have a secondary alarm

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station and an onsite secondarv power supply system for non-portable communications

- equipment; (8) 10 CFR 73.55(h)(3) - exemption from the requirement to have 5 or more guards per shift immedietaly available to fulfill response requirements; (9) 10 CFR 73.55(c)(3) - exemption from the requirement to maintain at all times an insido isolation zone in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected

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l areas; and (10) 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, Section IV, paragraph C - exemption from the requirement to arm security response personnel with a particular type of weaponry.

The proposed exemption is a preliminary step in Consumers' effort to revise its j

safeguards contingency plan under 10 CFR 60.54(p) commensurate with the pmaanently s shutdown and defueled condition of the BRP facility with all fuel stored in the spent fuel pool.

Ill.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, " Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions in I this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

Section 73.55(a) allows the Commission to authorize a licensee to provide alternate measures for protection against radiological sabotage, provided the licensee demonstrates that the proposed measures meet the general performance objective and requirements of the regulation and that the overalllevel of system performance provides protection against i radiological sabotage equivalent to that provided by the regulation.

- The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55 is to provide reasonable assurance that

' adequate security measures can be taken to protect against an act of radiological sabotage. Because of its permanently shutdown and defueled condition, the radiological risk from BRP due to a sabotage event is less than the risk from such an event at an operating power reactor plant f'urther, with more than 18 months of radiological and

-heat decay since the plant was shut down on August 30,1997, the potential radiological

a l

4 source term associated with the remaining design-basis accidents and radiological sabotage has decreased significantly.

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to have a licensed senior opu 9 tor on site who has the authority to suspend safeguards measures in an emergency. Licensee action, regarding the safety of the plant that vary from the technical specifications are addressed in 10 CFR 50.54(y). That regulation allows such actions to be taken by licensed senior operators or certified fuel handlers that have submitted 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) certifications. Further, the BRP technical specifications require a certified fuel handler (CFH) on duty at all times who has knowl3dge to protect the fuel from safety situations that may occur on site. A CFH at a facility that has permanently shut down and defue;ed is equivalent to having a licensed senior operator at an operating nuclear power plant in that the positions are the most senior position on shift and require sufficient qualifications to address events that may arise given the respective t,tatus of the facility. Further, CFHs at BRP are trained and certified to an NRC-approved training and qualification program that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.120. Thus, CFHs at BRP have the authority and training to make emergency decisions regarding operations that may affect the safety of the plant that vary from the technical specifications.

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain vital areas, which, as defined by 10 CFR 73.2, are areas that house equipment that could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Because the BRP facility is permanently shut down and defueled, the potential for a release of a large radioactive source term to the environment due to high pressure and temperature no longer exists. Additionally, due to the radioactive decay of short lived

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5.

-is'; topes since final reactor sh'utdown on August 30,1997, there is a continuing reduction in the potential radiological source term. Subsequently, Consumers determined that as of

- Novemb'er 5,1997, there was no potential for design basis accidents at BRP that would result in offsite doses exceeding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines. These dose guidelines are significant fractions below the siting criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. At BRP, in its permanently shutdown and defueled status, given the amount of decay time that has occurred, there are no areas that require designation as a vital area. Consequently, there is no equipment nor are there areas at the BRP facility that

-are. vital, incluoing the control room, central alarm station (10 CFR 73.55(e)), and areas that contain onsite secondary power systems for annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment (10 CFR 73.55(e)). Further, safeguards are maintained for j

areas at.the facility that continue to contain equipment and systems necessary to protect '

against acts of radiological sabotagec The licensee has requested an exemption from.the requirement to maintain 0.2 foot-candle illumination inside the protected area. The licensee will maintain lighting of sufficient illumination in the protected arca and isolation zones for observation by closed-circuit television or security guards on patrol. Further, during periods of alarm assessment or. conduct.ot routine guard patrols, lighting in the area of concern will be sufficient for -

evaluation. Therefore, thir exemption replaces a measurable standard with a performance-based criterion. In' addition, a lower level of illumination is consistent with the reduced radiological risk presented by the BRP facility. Thus, the reduction in protected area 1 illumination does not endanger life or property and maintains a high level of assurance of  ;

i public health and safety.

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6 The licensee has' requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain a bullet-

! . resistant control room. .The staff notes that one basis for this requirement is to ensure safe reactor shutdown. -With the BRP reactor permanently shut down and defueled, there-are no reactor contr'ois in the control room that could adversely impact public health and safety. Further, the manipulation of controls associated with spent fuel will not result in -

any immediate conditions adverse to safety, and these controls are located in an area protected by security and access control requirements. Thus, the removal of control room

. bullet resistance' does not endanger life or property, and an equivalent high level of

. assurance of public health and safety is maintained through other security features.

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain l licensee-designated vehicles within the protected area, except for operational, maintenance, repair, security, and emergency purposes. The licensee has stated that the  ;

storage of vehicles on site poses a safety hazard and has a negative impact on remote surveillance of the protected area and the conduct of security guard patrols, primari'y due to space. limitations within the BRP protected area during dismantlement and decontamination activities. The licensee searches all vehicles prior to entry into +he protected area in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4).

The licensee has requested an exemption from the reouirement to review the security program at least every 12' months, and proposes to change this frequency to 24 months. The licensee maintains that security program activities, including types and significance of activities, are considerably diminished as compared with those activities at an operating site. The proposed reduction in review frequency is consistent with the reduction in security activities due to the reduction in vital areas and equipment.

L_

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7 The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to maintain a secondary alarm station and an ensite secondary power supply system for non-portable communications equipment. The licensee will maintain' communications equipment with diverse and independent power supplies to maintain adequate onsite and offsite communication capability. Further, the central alarm station will continue to have access controls and remain a bullet resistant structure to assure communications with offsite law enforcement agencies. The removal of the requirement to have a continuously manned secondary alarm station is onsistent with the reduced radiological risk associated with

'the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the BRP facility, and the maintenance of a single alarm station provides reasonable assurance that an appropr i ate response to security events and alarms will occur.

The licensee has requested an exemption to reduce the total number of security guards immediately available to respond to security situations, as described in the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The staff notes that the number of vital areas and the radiological consequences of an onsite event have significantly decreased since the plant was permanently shut down and defueled. Further, the licensee has procedures and communication capability to respond with additional security guards and local law enforcement agencies during security events. Thus, there is reasonable ' assurance that adequate security measures can be taken to protect against an act of sabotage.

The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement to meintain interior isolation zones. The licensee stated that, because of the small size of the protected area and the large cmount of' equipment planned to f acilitate dismantlement and decontamination activities, rnaintonance of a 20-foot interior isolation zone would p

I 4 8

L* constitute an unreasonable burden. Further, the licensee maintains perimeter alarms, ,

responds to perimeter alarms, conducts routine patrols, and has visual assessment capability of the exterior isolation zone. The staff notes that the reduction in the interior isolation zone is commensurate with the reduction in radiological consequences associated ,

j with the remaining design-basis accidents and does not result in a net reduction in security )

effectiv6 ness, because the remaining security features maintain an adequate level of assurance that sabotage can be detected, assessed, and deterred.

1 The licensee has requested an exemption from the requirement for security responders to be trained and qualified in a particular type of weaponry. Due to the reduced radiological risk posed by the BRP facility and significant reduction in vital areas as described above, the particular type of weaponry is no longer necessary to achieve the performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a) at the BRP facility, because the remaining firearms utilized by the guard force at BRP are sufficiert for deterrence and protection.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission has determined that the licensee's proposed alternative measures for protection against radiological sabotage meet the objective and the general performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 associated with the reduced risk of radiological sabotage for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor power facility that has its spent nuclear fuel stored in a spent fuel pool. In addition, the staff has determined that the overall level of the proposed system's performance, as limited by'this exemption, assures the existence of sufficient physical protection capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at BRP, given the reduced radiological risk presented by the shutdown and defueled facility. Specifically, a limited L

e. q u i .o j

.s 9 exemption is being granted for ten (10) specific areas, as described above, in which the

. . licensee is authorized to modify the existing safeguards contingency plan commitments commensurate with the security threats associated with a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor power plant.

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, this l l

exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Consumers an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 at the BRP facility, as described above. l n 1 Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that this exemption  !

will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment (64 FR 3321, i

dated January 21,1999).

This exemption is effective upon issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b

SaMue'l 3. Co'llins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this March 29, 1999