05000397/FIN-2015002-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.2 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.2 | ||
| Inspector = N Greene, P Elkmann, T Hipschman, C Scott, D Bradley, J Drake, J Groom, J O | | Inspector = N Greene, P Elkmann, T Hipschman, C Scott, D Bradley, J Drake, J Groom, J O'Donnell | ||
| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to follow procedures associated with operation of the fuel pool cooling system. Specifically, on May 12, 2015, the licensee failed to follow operating procedures for the fuel pool cooling system resulting in a trip of the running fuel pool-cooling pump and subsequent lifting of a relief valve in the fuel pool cooling system. The standby fuel pool cooling pump automatically started to maintain fuel pool cooling. No significant change in refueling cavity level occurred since the plant was in the refueling mode of operation with the refueling cavity flooded approximately 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. The licensee initiated Action Request 327593 to document the transient on the fuel pool cooling system and took immediate corrective action to disqualify the reactor operator pending remediation to address the human performance error. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affected the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because (1) it did not adversely affect decay heat removal capabilities from the spent fuel pool causing the pool temperature to exceed the maximum analyzed temperature limit specified in the site-specific licensing basis, (2) it did not result from fuel handling errors, dropped fuel assembly, dropped storage cask, or crane operations over the spent fuel pool, (3) it did not result in a loss of spent fuel pool water inventory decreasing below the minimum analyzed level limit specified in the sitespecific licensing basis, and (4) it did not involve spent fuel pool neutron absorber or a fuel bundle misplacement. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, avoid complacency, in that the reactor operator failed to consider potential undesired consequences of his actions before performing work and failed to implement appropriate error-reduction tools such as self and peer checking [H.12] | | description = The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to follow procedures associated with operation of the fuel pool cooling system. Specifically, on May 12, 2015, the licensee failed to follow operating procedures for the fuel pool cooling system resulting in a trip of the running fuel pool-cooling pump and subsequent lifting of a relief valve in the fuel pool cooling system. The standby fuel pool cooling pump automatically started to maintain fuel pool cooling. No significant change in refueling cavity level occurred since the plant was in the refueling mode of operation with the refueling cavity flooded approximately 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. The licensee initiated Action Request 327593 to document the transient on the fuel pool cooling system and took immediate corrective action to disqualify the reactor operator pending remediation to address the human performance error. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affected the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because (1) it did not adversely affect decay heat removal capabilities from the spent fuel pool causing the pool temperature to exceed the maximum analyzed temperature limit specified in the site-specific licensing basis, (2) it did not result from fuel handling errors, dropped fuel assembly, dropped storage cask, or crane operations over the spent fuel pool, (3) it did not result in a loss of spent fuel pool water inventory decreasing below the minimum analyzed level limit specified in the sitespecific licensing basis, and (4) it did not involve spent fuel pool neutron absorber or a fuel bundle misplacement. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, avoid complacency, in that the reactor operator failed to consider potential undesired consequences of his actions before performing work and failed to implement appropriate error-reduction tools such as self and peer checking [H.12] | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:22, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Columbia  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000397/2015002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Greene P Elkmann T Hipschman C Scott D Bradley J Drake J Groom J O'Donnell |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |