05000250/FIN-2014004-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = C Jones, D Dumbacher, D Mas, | | Inspector = C Jones, D Dumbacher, D Mas Penaranda, M Endress, T Hoeg, T Lighty | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3 and Unit 4 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1 required, in part, that the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be operable. Contrary to the above, for approximately 50 days from April 2013 until June 2013, the steam versus feed water flow mismatch reactor trip functions associated with Unit 4 feed water flow instruments F-4-487, F-4-496, and F-4-497 were inoperable because they exceeded their TS allowed actuation set points specified by TS Table 2.2-1, and the affected channels were not placed in trip within six hours or the unit placed in cold shutdown as required by TS. Additionally, for approximately 162 days from August 2012 until February 2013, the steam-feed water flow mismatch reactor trip function associated with Unit 3 feed water flow instrument F-3-476 was inoperable because it exceeded its TS allowed actuation set point and the affected channel was not placed in trip within six hours and the unit placed in cold shutdown as required by TS. The inspectors assessed the significance of the violation using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4, Appendix A and Exhibit 2 (June 19, 2012). The inspectors noted that the diverse low-low steam generator level reactor trip safety function was not affected by the inoperable feed water flow instruments and the violation did not represent a complete loss of the anticipatory steam versus feed water flow mismatch reactor trip function. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that violation was of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because the violation was not associated with a significant functional degradation of the reactor protection system. The licensee completed immediate corrective actions following discovery of the condition to adjust the affected instruments to within TS allowed values and entered the issue into the corrective action program as action request (AR) 1961512. | | description = Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3 and Unit 4 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1 required, in part, that the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be operable. Contrary to the above, for approximately 50 days from April 2013 until June 2013, the steam versus feed water flow mismatch reactor trip functions associated with Unit 4 feed water flow instruments F-4-487, F-4-496, and F-4-497 were inoperable because they exceeded their TS allowed actuation set points specified by TS Table 2.2-1, and the affected channels were not placed in trip within six hours or the unit placed in cold shutdown as required by TS. Additionally, for approximately 162 days from August 2012 until February 2013, the steam-feed water flow mismatch reactor trip function associated with Unit 3 feed water flow instrument F-3-476 was inoperable because it exceeded its TS allowed actuation set point and the affected channel was not placed in trip within six hours and the unit placed in cold shutdown as required by TS. The inspectors assessed the significance of the violation using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4, Appendix A and Exhibit 2 (June 19, 2012). The inspectors noted that the diverse low-low steam generator level reactor trip safety function was not affected by the inoperable feed water flow instruments and the violation did not represent a complete loss of the anticipatory steam versus feed water flow mismatch reactor trip function. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that violation was of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because the violation was not associated with a significant functional degradation of the reactor protection system. The licensee completed immediate corrective actions following discovery of the condition to adjust the affected instruments to within TS allowed values and entered the issue into the corrective action program as action request (AR) 1961512. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:51, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000250/2014004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Jones D Dumbacher D Mas Penaranda M Endress T Hoeg T Lighty |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |