05000368/FIN-2013012-05: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = D Loveless, G Werner, J Mitman, K Fuller, M Bloodgood, R Browder, S Campbellg, | | Inspector = D Loveless, G Werner, J Mitman, K Fuller, M Bloodgood, R Browder, S Campbellg, Georgeg Nicely, H Freeman, I Anchondo, J Kirkland, M Yeminy, N Okonkwo, R Deese, T Farnholtzh, Freemanj Choate, M Chambers, M Tobin, N O, 'Keefes Hedgerb, Lattag Werner, J Melfi, L Willoughby, N Okonkwo | ||
| CCA = H.2 | | CCA = H.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.2 | | INPO aspect = LA.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, which states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings. The licensee did not follow the requirements specified in Procedure EN-MA-119, Material Handling Program, in that, the licensee did not perform an adequate review of the subcontractors lifting rig design calculation and the licensee failed to conduct a load test of the lifting rig prior to use. The licensee initiated Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 to capture this issue in the corrective action program. The licensees corrective actions included repairing damage to the Unit 1 turbine deck, fire main system, and electrical system. In addition, changes were made to various procedures including Procedure EN-DC-114, Project Management, to provide guidance on review of calculations, quality requirements, and standards associated with third party reviews. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural control attribute of the initiating event cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstones objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. The stator drop caused a reactor trip on Unit 2 and damage to the fire main system which resulted in water intrusion into the electrical equipment causing a loss of startup transformer 3. This resulted in the loss of power to various loads, including reactor coolant pumps, instrument air compressors, and the safety-related Train B vital electrical bus. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, to evaluate the significance of the finding. Since this was an initiating event, the inspectors used Exhibit 1 of Appendix A and determined that Section C, Support System Initiators, was impacted because the finding involved the loss of an electrical bus and a loss of instrument air. The inspectors determined that Section E, External Event Initiators, of Exhibit 1 should also be applied because the finding impacted the frequency of internal flooding. Since Sections C and E were impacted, a detailed risk evaluation was required. The NRC risk analyst used the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model, Revision 8.21, and hand calculation methods to quantify the risk. The model was modified to include additional breakers and switching options, and to provide credit for recovery of emergency diesel generators during transient sequences. Additionally, the analyst performed additional runs of the risk model to account for consequential loss of offsite power risks that were not modeled directly under the special initiator. The largest risk contributor (approximately 96 percent) was a loss of all feedwater to the steam generators, with a failure of once-through cooling. The result of the analysis was a conditional core damage probability of 2.8E-5; therefore, this finding was preliminarily determined to have substantial safety significance (Yellow). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with field presence, because the licensee did not ensure adequate supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel. Specifically, the licensee did not provide a sufficient level of oversight in that, the requirements in Procedure EN-MA-119, for design approval and load testing of the temporary hoisting assembly, were not followed [H.2] (Section 4OA3.9). | | description = The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, which states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings. The licensee did not follow the requirements specified in Procedure EN-MA-119, Material Handling Program, in that, the licensee did not perform an adequate review of the subcontractors lifting rig design calculation and the licensee failed to conduct a load test of the lifting rig prior to use. The licensee initiated Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 to capture this issue in the corrective action program. The licensees corrective actions included repairing damage to the Unit 1 turbine deck, fire main system, and electrical system. In addition, changes were made to various procedures including Procedure EN-DC-114, Project Management, to provide guidance on review of calculations, quality requirements, and standards associated with third party reviews. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural control attribute of the initiating event cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstones objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. The stator drop caused a reactor trip on Unit 2 and damage to the fire main system which resulted in water intrusion into the electrical equipment causing a loss of startup transformer 3. This resulted in the loss of power to various loads, including reactor coolant pumps, instrument air compressors, and the safety-related Train B vital electrical bus. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, to evaluate the significance of the finding. Since this was an initiating event, the inspectors used Exhibit 1 of Appendix A and determined that Section C, Support System Initiators, was impacted because the finding involved the loss of an electrical bus and a loss of instrument air. The inspectors determined that Section E, External Event Initiators, of Exhibit 1 should also be applied because the finding impacted the frequency of internal flooding. Since Sections C and E were impacted, a detailed risk evaluation was required. The NRC risk analyst used the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model, Revision 8.21, and hand calculation methods to quantify the risk. The model was modified to include additional breakers and switching options, and to provide credit for recovery of emergency diesel generators during transient sequences. Additionally, the analyst performed additional runs of the risk model to account for consequential loss of offsite power risks that were not modeled directly under the special initiator. The largest risk contributor (approximately 96 percent) was a loss of all feedwater to the steam generators, with a failure of once-through cooling. The result of the analysis was a conditional core damage probability of 2.8E-5; therefore, this finding was preliminarily determined to have substantial safety significance (Yellow). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with field presence, because the licensee did not ensure adequate supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel. Specifically, the licensee did not provide a sufficient level of oversight in that, the requirements in Procedure EN-MA-119, for design approval and load testing of the temporary hoisting assembly, were not followed [H.2] (Section 4OA3.9). | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:50, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000368/2013012 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | Violation: Yellow |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Loveless G Werner J Mitman K Fuller M Bloodgood R Browder S Campbellg Georgeg Nicely H Freeman I Anchondo J Kirkland M Yeminy N Okonkwo R Deese T Farnholtzh Freemanj Choate M Chambers M Tobin N O 'Keefes Hedgerb Lattag Werner J Melfi L Willoughby N Okonkwo |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |