05000454/FIN-2013005-01: Difference between revisions

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| identified by = NRC
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07
| Inspector = C Thompson, D Jones, E Duncan, J Cassidy, J Laughlin, J Mcghee, J Robbins, M Holmberg, M Jones, N Feliz,_Adorno R, Ng S, Sheldon B, Bartlett B, Palag
| Inspector = C Thompson, D Jones, E Duncan, J Cassidy, J Laughlin, J Mcghee, J Robbins, M Holmberg, M Jones, N Feliz Adorno, R Ng, S Sheldon, B Bartlett, B Palagi
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| INPO aspect =  
| INPO aspect =  
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, ?Test Control,? when licensee personnel failed to demonstrate the ability to isolate essential service water (SX) blowdown as credited in analyses described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Specifically, the licensee failed to periodically test the active function of the blowdown isolation valves. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1579361, ?Valves 0SX161A/B Closure Not Functionally Tested.? The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The finding screened as having very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the licensee reviewed recent history of the affected piping system and determined the subject blowdown isolation valves were opportunistically cycled without incident. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was confirmed not to reflect current performance due to the age of the performance deficiency.  
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, ?Test Control,? when licensee personnel failed to demonstrate the ability to isolate essential service water (SX) blowdown as credited in analyses described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Specifically, the licensee failed to periodically test the active function of the blowdown isolation valves. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1579361, ?Valves 0SX161A/B Closure Not Functionally Tested.? The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The finding screened as having very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the licensee reviewed recent history of the affected piping system and determined the subject blowdown isolation valves were opportunistically cycled without incident. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was confirmed not to reflect current performance due to the age of the performance deficiency.  
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Latest revision as of 20:49, 20 February 2018

01
Site: Byron Constellation icon.png
Report IR 05000454/2013005 Section 1R07
Date counted Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Mitigating Systems
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure: IP 71111.07
Inspectors (proximate) C Thompson
D Jones
E Duncan
J Cassidy
J Laughlin
J Mcghee
J Robbins
M Holmberg
M Jones
N Feliz Adorno
R Ng
S Sheldon
B Bartlett
B Palagi
Violation of: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI
INPO aspect
'