05000456/FIN-2013003-05: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | ||
| Inspector = M Learn, M Perry, N Feliz, | | Inspector = M Learn, M Perry, N Feliz Adorno, R Edwards, R Ng, T Daun, T Go, V Meghani, A Dahbur, A Dunlop, A Garmoe, A Sallman, E Duncan, J Benjamin, J Neurauter, J Robbins | ||
| CCA = P.5 | | CCA = P.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = CL.1 | | INPO aspect = CL.1 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed when licensee personnel performed inadequate functionality evaluations after previously identifying that the Unit 1 Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) bladder was degraded. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1498696, Secured Boric Acid Tank Transfer Earlier Than Expected. Corrective actions included the replacement of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 BAST bladders. The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately evaluate Unit 1 BAST system functionality after identifying that the Unit 1 BAST bladder had substantially degraded was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors screened the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors answered No to all of the Mitigating System Screening questions for Reactivity Control Systems, therefore the finding screened as having very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Operating Experience component of the PI&R cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to implement and institutionalize Operating Experience that specifically discussed the potential adverse consequences that a degraded tank bladder could have on plant safety. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed when licensee personnel performed inadequate functionality evaluations after previously identifying that the Unit 1 Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) bladder was degraded. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1498696, Secured Boric Acid Tank Transfer Earlier Than Expected. Corrective actions included the replacement of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 BAST bladders. The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately evaluate Unit 1 BAST system functionality after identifying that the Unit 1 BAST bladder had substantially degraded was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors screened the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors answered No to all of the Mitigating System Screening questions for Reactivity Control Systems, therefore the finding screened as having very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Operating Experience component of the PI&R cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to implement and institutionalize Operating Experience that specifically discussed the potential adverse consequences that a degraded tank bladder could have on plant safety. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:48, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2013003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Learn M Perry N Feliz Adorno R Edwards R Ng T Daun T Go V Meghani A Dahbur A Dunlop A Garmoe A Sallman E Duncan J Benjamin J Neurauter J Robbins |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
| ' | |