05000482/FIN-2012009-02: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Inadequate Preventative Maintenance Procedure | | title = Inadequate Preventative Maintenance Procedure on Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump | ||
| docket = 05000482 | | docket = 05000482 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000482/2012009 | | inspection report = IR 05000482/2012009 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 93800 | | Inspection procedure = IP 93800 | ||
| Inspector = G Replogle, J Dixon, J Watkins, M Baquera, M Runyan, N O,' | | Inspector = G Replogle, J Dixon, J Watkins, M Baquera, M Runyan, N O, 'Keefen Okonkwo | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to have an adequate preventative maintenance procedure, PM 28129, Refueling Inspection of the Trip Tappet. Specifically, the dimensional criterion for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump head lever to tappet nut engagement was not verified to be in accordance with vendor recommended criteria. This resulted in an inadequate engagement that contributed to a false overspeed trip. The licensees corrective actions included replacement of the trip tappet nut, trip lever, and trip linkage spring, as well as, inspecting all contact points on the trip linkage for damage or wear and specifying a more precise method of measuring the head lever to tappet nut engagement. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 47658. This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Human Performance and Procedure Quality and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This deficiency resulted in the potential of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to trip during a seismic, or other jarring events. A Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis. The performance deficiency was determined to impact seismic events, since a seismic event could jar the mechanism enough to trip the turbine. Assuming all seismic events would trip the turbine, the analyst used SPAR-H to evaluate operator action to reset the trip mechanism. Considering the recovery, and conservatively assuming a zero baseline, the Delta-CDF of the finding was 7.9E-9/yr, or very low safety significance (Green). This finding did not have any cross-cutting aspects because the preventative maintenance procedure was changed in 1999 and no other procedure changes since then would have caused the licensee to review this change, therefore, it is not representative of current licensee performance | | description = The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to have an adequate preventative maintenance procedure, PM 28129, Refueling Inspection of the Trip Tappet. Specifically, the dimensional criterion for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump head lever to tappet nut engagement was not verified to be in accordance with vendor recommended criteria. This resulted in an inadequate engagement that contributed to a false overspeed trip. The licensees corrective actions included replacement of the trip tappet nut, trip lever, and trip linkage spring, as well as, inspecting all contact points on the trip linkage for damage or wear and specifying a more precise method of measuring the head lever to tappet nut engagement. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 47658. This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Human Performance and Procedure Quality and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This deficiency resulted in the potential of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to trip during a seismic, or other jarring events. A Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis. The performance deficiency was determined to impact seismic events, since a seismic event could jar the mechanism enough to trip the turbine. Assuming all seismic events would trip the turbine, the analyst used SPAR-H to evaluate operator action to reset the trip mechanism. Considering the recovery, and conservatively assuming a zero baseline, the Delta-CDF of the finding was 7.9E-9/yr, or very low safety significance (Green). This finding did not have any cross-cutting aspects because the preventative maintenance procedure was changed in 1999 and no other procedure changes since then would have caused the licensee to review this change, therefore, it is not representative of current licensee performance | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:47, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2012009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Replogle J Dixon J Watkins M Baquera M Runyan N O 'Keefen Okonkwo |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |