05000440/FIN-2012005-05: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = R Jickling, M Marshfield, C Moore, M Bielby, J Laughlin, M Learn, J Corujo | | Inspector = R Jickling, M Marshfield, C Moore, M Bielby, J Laughlin, M Learn, J Corujo-Sandin, J Beavers, R Edwards, J Nance | ||
| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-citied violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the failure to perform adequate maintenance on the single-failure-proof fuel handling building (FHB) crane used to handle dry storage casks containing spent nuclear fuel. The licensee corrected the issue prior to conducting lifts containing spent nuclear fuel and entered it into their corrective action program (Condition Reports 2012-13234, 2012-13315, and 2012-12933). The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor in that it affected the Human Performance attribute (maintenance performance) of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radioactive releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, if left uncorrected, a malfunction of the FHB crane could lead to a more significant safety concern. Based on answering No to all the screening questions in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety-significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because the licensee failed to have complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures that ensured personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to have maintenance procedures that ensured the FHB crane would be capable of performing its single-failure-proof design functions that assure nuclear safety. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-citied violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the failure to perform adequate maintenance on the single-failure-proof fuel handling building (FHB) crane used to handle dry storage casks containing spent nuclear fuel. The licensee corrected the issue prior to conducting lifts containing spent nuclear fuel and entered it into their corrective action program (Condition Reports 2012-13234, 2012-13315, and 2012-12933). The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor in that it affected the Human Performance attribute (maintenance performance) of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radioactive releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, if left uncorrected, a malfunction of the FHB crane could lead to a more significant safety concern. Based on answering No to all the screening questions in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety-significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because the licensee failed to have complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures that ensured personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to have maintenance procedures that ensured the FHB crane would be capable of performing its single-failure-proof design functions that assure nuclear safety. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2012005 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Jickling M Marshfield C Moore M Bielby J Laughlin M Learn J Corujo-Sandin J Beavers R Edwards J Nance |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |