05000266/FIN-2012004-10: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Inadequate Procedural Guidance | | title = Inadequate Procedural Guidance for Heavy Loads Operations | ||
| docket = 05000266, 05000301 | | docket = 05000266, 05000301 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000266/2012004 | | inspection report = IR 05000266/2012004 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = C Zoia, J Jandovitz, M Kunowski, S Burton, R Krsek, V Meghani, M Learn, M Thorpe | | Inspector = C Zoia, J Jandovitz, M Kunowski, S Burton, R Krsek, V Meghani, M Learn, M Thorpe-Kavanaugh, P Cardona-Morales, K Carrington | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to have adequate procedures in place to ensure that heavy loads were operated safely within the primary auxiliary building (PAB). Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee failed to incorporate minimum crane operating temperature limits into procedures to avoid brittle fracture of structural components below the nil-ductility transition temperature. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program for resolution as action request AR01783306 for evaluation and development of corrective actions which included revising procedures to identify the minimum operating temperature of the PAB crane. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events because a PAB crane heavy load drop could cause damage to spent fuel. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Tables 2 and 3, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3 for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered No to Exhibit 3 questions in Appendix A for the spent fuel pool. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. In accordance with IMC 0612, Section 06.03.c, a cross-cutting aspect will not be assigned to this finding as it has occurred outside of the nominal three-year period and is not representative of present performance. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to have adequate procedures in place to ensure that heavy loads were operated safely within the primary auxiliary building (PAB). Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee failed to incorporate minimum crane operating temperature limits into procedures to avoid brittle fracture of structural components below the nil-ductility transition temperature. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program for resolution as action request AR01783306 for evaluation and development of corrective actions which included revising procedures to identify the minimum operating temperature of the PAB crane. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events because a PAB crane heavy load drop could cause damage to spent fuel. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Tables 2 and 3, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3 for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered No to Exhibit 3 questions in Appendix A for the spent fuel pool. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. In accordance with IMC 0612, Section 06.03.c, a cross-cutting aspect will not be assigned to this finding as it has occurred outside of the nominal three-year period and is not representative of present performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2012004 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Zoia J Jandovitz M Kunowski S Burton R Krsek V Meghani M Learn M Thorpe-Kavanaugh P Cardona-Morales K Carrington |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |