05000237/FIN-2011003-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | ||
| Inspector = M Bielby, M Ring, T Go, J Draper, C Tilton, J Corujo | | Inspector = M Bielby, M Ring, T Go, J Draper, C Tilton, J Corujo-Sandin, M Munir, R Winter, A Dahbur, D Melendez-Colon, C Phillips, C Moore | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to establish adequate instructions for coping with the consequences of a dam failure. Specifically, DOA 0010-01, Dresden Lock and Dam Failure, lacked controls for the configuration of the associated foreign material exclusion (FME) screens and lacked specific instructions on how to shed load off the emergency diesel generators and restore power to the bus associated with equipment relied upon during this event. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and initiated procedure revisions to provide adequate controls on the configuration of the FME screens and to provide further guidance on restoring power to the refuse screen pumps. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the licensee estimated that the additional time required to install the inner screens and restore power to the screen refuse pumps was within the required 2-hours. The inspectors determined the cause of this finding did not represent current licensee performance and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to establish adequate instructions for coping with the consequences of a dam failure. Specifically, DOA 0010-01, Dresden Lock and Dam Failure, lacked controls for the configuration of the associated foreign material exclusion (FME) screens and lacked specific instructions on how to shed load off the emergency diesel generators and restore power to the bus associated with equipment relied upon during this event. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and initiated procedure revisions to provide adequate controls on the configuration of the FME screens and to provide further guidance on restoring power to the refuse screen pumps. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the licensee estimated that the additional time required to install the inner screens and restore power to the screen refuse pumps was within the required 2-hours. The inspectors determined the cause of this finding did not represent current licensee performance and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000237/2011003 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Bielby M Ring T Go J Draper C Tilton J Corujo-Sandin M Munir R Winter A Dahbur D Melendez-Colon C Phillips C Moore |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |