05000293/FIN-2010002-01: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.8 | | CCA = H.8 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.4 | | INPO aspect = WP.4 | ||
| description = The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for Entergy's failure to accomplish procedures prescribed for activities affecting quality. Specifically, Entergy did not implement their operability determination process or their temporary modification process for compensatory measures needed to maintain the secondary containment operable. Entergy's corrective actions included designating the compensatory measures as necessary to maintain operability for both torus troughs and implementation of temporary modifications for the equipment installed in the plant to support these compensatory measures. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone's objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, operations and engineering personnel did not adequately implement operability determination and temporary modification procedures when degraded and/or non-conforming conditions associated with the secondary containment torus troughs were identified. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only represented an impact to the radiological barrier function provided by secondary containment and the standby gas treatment system. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices component, because Entergy personnel did not follow procedures. Specifically, Entergy did not implement their operability determination or temporary modification procedures for compensatory measures needed to maintain the secondary containment operable. H.4(b | | description = The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for Entergy\'s failure to accomplish procedures prescribed for activities affecting quality. Specifically, Entergy did not implement their operability determination process or their temporary modification process for compensatory measures needed to maintain the secondary containment operable. Entergy\'s corrective actions included designating the compensatory measures as necessary to maintain operability for both torus troughs and implementation of temporary modifications for the equipment installed in the plant to support these compensatory measures. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone\'s objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, operations and engineering personnel did not adequately implement operability determination and temporary modification procedures when degraded and/or non-conforming conditions associated with the secondary containment torus troughs were identified. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only represented an impact to the radiological barrier function provided by secondary containment and the standby gas treatment system. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices component, because Entergy personnel did not follow procedures. Specifically, Entergy did not implement their operability determination or temporary modification procedures for compensatory measures needed to maintain the secondary containment operable. H.4(b | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:39, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2010002 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jackson W Schmidt K Young R Rolph B Smith M Schneider |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |