05000482/FIN-2008002-09: Difference between revisions
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| description = The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d because Procedure OFN RP 017, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 21, failed to account for the needed actions to reestablish reactor coolant pump seal cooling. Failure to reestablish seal cooling in a timely manner could have resulted in a small break loss of coolant accident. This performance deficiency resulted from an inadequate postfire safe shutdown procedure. The inspectors determined the finding is greater than minor in that it affected the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown following a control room fire. This finding is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (e.g. fire). This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in two physically separated panels. The licensee has Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 383 qualified cables and conductors throughout the plant. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance (Section 4OA3.5). | | description = The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d because Procedure OFN RP 017, \"Control Room Evacuation,\" Revision 21, failed to account for the needed actions to reestablish reactor coolant pump seal cooling. Failure to reestablish seal cooling in a timely manner could have resulted in a small break loss of coolant accident. This performance deficiency resulted from an inadequate postfire safe shutdown procedure. The inspectors determined the finding is greater than minor in that it affected the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown following a control room fire. This finding is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (e.g. fire). This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in two physically separated panels. The licensee has Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 383 qualified cables and conductors throughout the plant. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance (Section 4OA3.5). | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:34, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2008002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Long D Stearns G Pick S Cochrum V Gaddy |
| INPO aspect | |
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