05000338/FIN-2008002-03: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = A self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1a was identified for a failure to adequately establish procedure requirements for protective relay testing which resulted in the inoperability of the '1H' emergency diesel generator (EDG). The licensee entered this problem into their corrective action program, revised the procedure, and successfully completed the relay testing. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related attribute of procedure quality. The finding was of very low safety significance or Green because it did not result in an actual loss of safety function nor a loss of one train for greater than the allowed Technical Specification outage time. The cause of this finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, the related component of resources, and the associated aspect of complete and accurate procedures, H.2(c), because the failure to establish adequate procedural requirements rendered '1H' EDG inoperable. (Section 1R12 | | description = A self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1a was identified for a failure to adequately establish procedure requirements for protective relay testing which resulted in the inoperability of the \'1H\' emergency diesel generator (EDG). The licensee entered this problem into their corrective action program, revised the procedure, and successfully completed the relay testing. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related attribute of procedure quality. The finding was of very low safety significance or Green because it did not result in an actual loss of safety function nor a loss of one train for greater than the allowed Technical Specification outage time. The cause of this finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, the related component of resources, and the associated aspect of complete and accurate procedures, H.2(c), because the failure to establish adequate procedural requirements rendered \'1H\' EDG inoperable. (Section 1R12 | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:34, 20 February 2018
| Site: | North Anna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000338/2008002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Laska J Reece J Dodson E Lea R Clagg |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |