05000339/FIN-2007009-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | LACK OF PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE DURING SPURIOUS SAFETY INJECTION AND PROCEDURE USAGE FLEXIBILITY ACCEPTABILITY (Section 4OA3.6) |
| Description | The team determined that the procedures (i.e., EOPs, APs) used for this event lacked guidance to reset SI locally should normal methods (i.e., pushbutton in the MCR) not work. In several instances, the EOPs did not contain sufficient information in the Response Not Obtained column to respond to non-responsive equipment. For example, EOP steps that required manipulation of individual components did not provide guidance for local manipulation in the event these components could not be operated from the MCR. Thus, the operators had to rely on various procedures that contained applicable guidance, as well as, operator knowledge and support from engineering and I&C technicians for necessary actions. 12 Lack of formal procedural guidance also resulted in the 2-SI-MOV-2865C, C Cold leg Accumulator valve, re-opening when operators placed the SSPS B train in TEST. The Westinghouse SSPS technical manual stated that operators must hold the valve closed from the MCR when the SI train is in TEST to prevent the accumulator isolation valve from opening. The open accumulator valve resulted in injecting additional inventory into the RCS during cooldown. The inspection team made an additional observation with regard to the licensees actions and implementation of procedures. The team noted the licensees administrative procedure on procedure usage may allow too much flexibility in moving between steps in EOPs and use of other procedures before transition is directed or if the entry conditions are not met, without having previously identified the potential consequences, such as resetting SI before directed; and use of 2-AP-3 to re-establish letdown. This could allow the operator to arrive in a configuration in which system or component interactions are unknown. Typically these interactions are evaluated and administratively controlled per procedure. The team did not find any evidence this was being done. However, this flexibility did not cause any adverse impacts during this event. Based on the teams observation, the licensee entered the feedback into their corrective action program and plans to conduct an independent review and assessment of their process. The team identified an unresolved item (URI) to determine if the procedural guidance and procedure usage flexibility utilized by the licensee during this event was adequate. This item will remain unresolved pending NRC review of these items and inspection of the licensees final root cause evaluation and investigation of the event. This URI is identified as 05000339/2007009-01: Lack of Procedural Guidance During Spurious Safety Injection and Procedure Usage Flexibility Acceptability. |
| Site: | North Anna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000339/2007009 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2007 (2007Q3) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Rivera-Ortiz G Laska A Vargas-Mendez J Reece J Dodson E Lea R Clagg M Courseyf Ehrhardts Walker J Reece B Mckay |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - North Anna - IR 05000339/2007009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (North Anna) @ 2007Q3
Self-Identified List (North Anna)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||