ML20203J736

Comment Opposing Approval of NSHC to Plant License Termination Plan

ML20203J736
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	02/27/1998
From:	Gunter P NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE
To:	Meyer D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
FRN-63FR4308 63FR4308-00001, 63FR4308-1, NUDOCS 9803040261
Download: ML20203J736 (7)

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Nuclear Information and Resource Service 142416th St. NW, Suite 404, WasNngton. Dc 20036, 202-328 0002, fat 202-46;- N 83. e-maltnirsnot@yc.ap ,o g web www.nirs org o es b  % '

Febmary 27,1998 bM@MO i c-cn Mr. David Meyer, Chief, Rules and Directives Branch,

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N United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 {o d!w-.

g DELIVERED BY HAND TO: Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, * "

11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD RE: Comments, responding to NRC Notice in 63 Fed. Reg. 4308-4330 (January 28, 1998), opposing granting No Significant Hazarh Consideration to Yankee Nuclear Power Station License Termination Plan (50-29), and requesting that a 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart G public hearing be held convenient to the public living near the reactor site.

Dear Mr. Meyer,

By this letter I submit my comments for consideration by the Commission and request that the Commission hold a hearing in the above referenced matter rather than making a No Significant Hazards Consideration.

~ I contend, for myself and NIRS members living in close proximity to the Yankee Nuclear Power Station, that the public process which the NRC staff has .

conducted thus far is sorely lacking in very basic consideration of due process oflaw as guaranteed under the United States Constitution.

Specifically, the NRC staff provided far less than 30 days notice of the public meeting to discuss the Yankee Nuclear Power Station License Termination Plan (LTP). In fact, only 8 days notice was provided. See NRC Notice,- 63 Fed.

Reg. 275 (January 5,1998)(announcing the January 13,1998, meeting in

. Buikland, Massachusetts).

I was unable to make the necessary travel arrangements in time to attend that meeting. In lieu of personal attendance, I forwarded the attached comments to ~

\{g be placed in the record of the meeting by Mr. Frederick Katz. Although my comments have now been neatly bound into the text of the " Official" transcript of the public meeting, I have never received any written acknowl s3 ment from the NRC of my comments.

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' I have receised no copy of the transcript, but was told about my comments i being bound into it. Further, and most annoying, the NF C staff has not sent me response to my comments. . A copy of my comments is attached hereto as Exhibit ' A' and I hereby incorporate them into this comment and request for a 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart O hearing on the LTP., -

= I was also informed that at the hearing the NRC cut off public .uestioning.

This meant that many questions went (and remain) unanswered. Not only my own comments and those of NIRS members, but questions and comments from Northeast Utilities consultant Paul Blanch were not answered.-

L'r. Blanch had concerns similar to my own. In particular, he asked about the levels of background radiation on the site, given that the site release plan indicated 10 micro-Rad / hour. This is a number _way over the NRC's 25 millirem /yr limit from all sources. It is also far in excess of the EPA's 15 millirem / year standard. It is almost an order of magnitude over the L

Massachusetts Department of Public Health's 10 millirem / year standard. How can the NRC give N- Significant Hazards Considen. tion to an LTP, which contains such a totally out of Ne site release background radiation level? Thus, I ask that the Commission disapprove the Yankee Nuclear Power Station LTP, and

. direct that a public hearing be held in the vicinity of the Yankee facility.

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1 am also deeply concerned that the NRC staff (and Commission, it would seem)-

are poised to accord No significant Hazards Consideration license amendment

approval to the LTP when it proposes that Yankee build and place its spent 1 h" _ fuel in an ISFSI under a 10 CFR Part 50 operating license. This ruggestion is .

outrageous for several reasons. .

Not surprisingly, Yankee will be given a windfall benefit if the Commission approves the LTP. Specifically, Yankee will avoid the $283,000 per year Part L72 licensing fee. This reward will be given, along with mitigation of many of 4 the very circumstances which lead Congress to pass the Nuclear Waste Policy Act: less suiveillance of the site, greater danger of sabotage, lower level of i

- inspections by NRC and Yankee, everything done on an uncertified / experimental

- basis (uncertified and untested casks, uncertified and untested casks method -

of dealing with leaking casks, uncertified and untested methods of moving ~

degraded fuel, etc.). Plainly, when one looks at the dangers which Part 72 was intended to avert, the use of 10 CFR 50.59 as the basis of execution and oversight is totally inappropriate. Congress did not intend that licensees

would be allowed to develop experimental ways of dealing with spent nuclear fuel, including storage in areas without adequate safety and surveillance.

Yankee's LTI' offers a hazardous, untested proposal for dealing with spent fuel. Not only should the NRC require Yankee to submit to a full public hearing process on the LTP, it should direct the staff to conduct a Part 72 licensing all of Yankee's high-level waste storage schemes.

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Again, I ra.5e all of the issues raised _in my attached comments.

~ For the reasons stated therein and above, the NRC should not grant approval of Yankee's LTP on a No Sigtiificaint Hazards Consideration basis There are unanalyzed hazards. A hearing should be held under 10 CFR Part 2, subpart G, and is hereby requested on behalf of NIRS and its members whose lives and property are at risk through yet another experiment at the Yankee Nuclear ,

Power Station in Rowe, Massachusetts.

Sin ,

Paul Gunter, Reactor Watchdog Project

. Nuclear Information and Resource Service  :

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Enc / Comments submitted to January 13,'1998, r oblic Meeting -

in Buckland, Massachusetts, attached hereto as Exhibit ' A' I

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Nuclear Information and Resource Service 142416th Street NW Suite 404 WarSington, DC 20036 Tel: 202/328-0002 Fax: 202-462-2183 Website: http//www.nirs.org Statement of Paul Gunter 1)lrector of the Reactor Watchdog Project

• January 13,1998 Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Meeting on the Termination of the Yankee Rowe License

• Mohawk Valley Regional High School Auditorium Buckland, Massachusetts I would like to thank the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for this opportunity to address the license termination of the Yankee Rowe nuclear generating station.

However, my opening remark must be fra.ned as a criticism of the NRC's overall effort to circumvent meaningful public involvement in the decommissioning process. My organization recognizes that to date, the NRC has actively subverted the public interest in discovering the tme and potentiel impact of a major decommissioning operation at Yankee Rowe by thwarting the public's right to a hearing with dlscovery process and the cross examination of the licensee as

, required under the National Environmental Protection Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, -

l and the Atomic Energy Act.

It is our view that the NRC originally abandoned its decommissioning regulations and then rewrote its law to accommodate the economic interests of Yankee Atomic Electric Company by '

expediting the decommissioning process. This view is bolstered by the remarks of Judge Ponser in the Springfield Federal Court and the First Circuit Appellate Court decision in CAN vs NRC.

It is now our concern that at the behest of Yankee Atomic Elec::ic Company, the NRC is seeking to expedite the removal of the Yankee Rowe nuclear power station irradiated fuel pool through dry cask storage of the reactor's high level radioactive waste and the demoibhms of the irradiated fuel pool and building. There are several issues that NIRS seeks to address before Yankee proceeds with this plan. ,

Central to our concerns is that the NRC has bankrupted its credibility for effective regulatory oversight of the cask certific'ation program.

Long standing problems with two cask designers and vendors have demonstrated that tne federal regulator has failed to adequately oversee Quality Assurance and Quality Control in the certification and implementation of the Sierra Nuclear Corporation VSC-24 (vertical storage modules) dry cask system and the VECTRA Technologies Inc. NUHOMS-52 B (horizontal storage modules) dry cask system. NIRS believes that the'NRC failed its regulatory and oversight

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{* function as a result bf attempting to accommodate the nuclear imiustry's interests and schedules in j i such areas as retaining operational flexibility (i.e. the ability to 1 ave full core ofBoad.)

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I On August 21,1991, the NRC exempted and permitted Sierra Nuclear Corporation to build eight

VSC-24 Dry Shielded Casks (concrete casks) and 3 metal storage baskets for the Consumer Power's Palisades nuclear generating station before desian annroval was lasued. The exemadaa was granted by NRC stating that approval was given "at vendor's own risk". I

, By April,1992, NRC iaspections identified quality control / quality assurance problems with Sierra Nuclear VSC-24 construction involving inadequate design control and control of subcontractors and by May 28,1992 issued a Notice of Violation. The following day, May 29,1992, Michigan's ~

Consumers Power directed Sierra Nuclear to cease all construction of cask being buik under the ,

l uemption process at Palisades.

L In December 1992, the Michigan OfHce of Attorney General requested that NRC hold a public ~

hearing ott the Palisades dry cask storage system which the agency then denied.

l l: On May 7,1993 the NRC certified the VSC-24 design for five nuclear power stations ~without ' .

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requiring site specific studies, an Environmental Impact Statement, and barring a public hearing e process at any of the reactor locations.

On May 11,1992, Consumers Power loaded its first VSC<24 cask. That same month, a consulting firm to the NRC, The Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses of San Anionio Texas, commented on dry cask storage policy stating " dry environment has the potential of producing such problems as further fuel cladding oxidation, cladding stressing,'and creep

- deformation as a result ofinternal rod pressure."

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In February,1994, an NRC soil expert visited the Palisades dry cask storage site which is located

, in a "high risk erosion site"just 150 yards from the shore ofLake Michigan. Dr. Ross9adaman L found that the lack of site specific studies under the NRC licensing policy was seriously flawed

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i and could lead to " catastrophic consequences."

1- In June,1994, an NRC inspection report finils continued QA/QC problems at Sierra Nuclear and -

determined that Sierrc Nuclear has "a lack of management commitment "

On August 2,1994, a Consumers Power initiated radiograph finds weld flaws on a VSC-24 cask e already loaded with highly irradiated fuel. A subsequent meeting between the licensee and the

NRC on August 25,1994 at ERC Headquarters introduced problems with uajoading faulty casks where introducing 400 degree F. fuel to 100 degree F. fuel pool water will result in a radioactive steam flash and thermal shock to irradiated fuel in the dry cask This istue introduces problems with the unloading of faulty casks.

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I By March,1995, Consumers Power identi6ed funher multiple cracking ivt the closure welds on the VSC-24 shield lids. This will not be acknowledged until an NRC inspection March 17 -27, 1997 identifies cracking at a VSC-24 cask at Wisconsin Electric Power Company's Point Beach p reactor. .

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, On May 28,1996, while loading irradiated fuelint'o a VSC-24 cask at Wisconsin's Point Beach I i nuclear generating station, borated water from the fbel pool electro-chemically interacted with

. the zinc liner of the VSC-24 design generating hydrogen gas. The hydrogen gas detonated when an arc welded used to seal the cask lid ignited the ' gas lifting the 3 ton shield lid into the air setting

it upright on top of the cask. The accident initiated an NRC OfBce of the Inspector General L investigation into NRC staff criteria for safety evaluations and the vendor cenification and review -

process.

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In June,1996, Consumers P.ower canceled its preparations to unload the faulty cask at Palisades because of the issue of hot radioactive fuel coming in contact with cooling water in the fbel will .

create a steam flash anil minuihanwunsly generate more explosive hydrogen gas,

On July 5,1996 NRC ordered a halt to any funher loading of casks at reactors as a result of the

. galvanic reaction and hydrogen detonation at Point Beach. .

t i On October 18,1996, the citizen's group Dont Waste Michigan submitted a petition to the NRC h requesting an independent review of the VSC-24 design through the National Association of

. " Corrosion Engineers. Dr. Rudolph Hausler submits a report in support of the petition identifying

that flaws in both the utilities' and the NRC safety evaluations of the VSC-24 design and .

' construction,. including the lack ofWh.al verification for temperature calculations and heat transfer a=====manen, all of which have potential adverse impact on the public health and safety.

4 The NRC rejected the petition as lacking sufBcient merit to warrant emergency enforcement ~

, action. Dr. Hausler states that NRC is "stunningly ignorant on certain aspects the chemistry of -

i, metals." -. .

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, In an NRC inspection report dated March 17-21,1996, cracking is observed in the closure welds t t on inner and outer shields of fuel loaded VSC-24 casks at Palisades, Point Beach, and Arkansas '

. . -- Nuclear One units. The inspection identifies the root cause of cracking to involve unan+harized p weld repairs, the cask design, the welding environment and procedures.

- To date, NRC and the industry have not resolved the issue ofwhat to do with faulty casks 7 - ! where cracking of closure welds is observed on the loaded casks at these three nuclear power

~. stations. The NRC and the industry remain in a quandary without a strategy to unload irradiated .

fuel from failing casks. There are currently 19 VSC-24 casks loaded at reactors. Sierra Nuclear 4 and the licensees remain under NRC Confirmatory Action Letters with regard to any funher loading of the VSC-24 design.

Nuclear Information and Resource Service asserts that these problems and similar QA/QC problems with the VECTRA Technologies Inc. NUHOMs-52B dry cask system can be attributed

to the lack of NRC aggressive oversight and enforcement ofits regulations and a rigorous

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cenification process;L Essentially, NRC has deferred it regulatory responsibilities to the industry

} that it is supposed to be regulating. NIRS cautions the NRC, the licensee and the affected 1-

' communities to not allow the these identified problems or similar problems to be repeated at the t 1 Yankee Rowe site, Therefore, NIRS submits: .

1) The NRC must be required to obtain an independent and reputable third pany review (such as I

the National Association of Corrosion Engineers) of all dry cask design systems as pan ofits I

certification process, ,

4 2) The current NRC licensing process for dry cask storage must be resended to require site I- specific reviews at d potential sites _with a complete Environmental Impact Statement and that such process will be opened to the right to a public hearing with fhlt adjudicatory review.

3) Yankee Atomic Electric Company must retain full liability for its nuclear waste generated'at Yankee Rows and that both a wet storage and hot-cell capability be provided for the full ~- +

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retrievability ofirradiated fuel in the event that a duly certi6ed diy cask develop problem..

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