05000528/FIN-2004014-03: Difference between revisions
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| description = The team identified three examples of a noncited, Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.59 requirements involving the failure to perform written safety evaluations prior to implementing changes to the facility. The first example involved a change for using manual actions in lieu of automatic actions as compensatory measures to support the safety functions of the high pressure safety injection and containment spray systems during postulated design basis loss-of-coolant accident conditions following a recirculation actuation signal. The second example involved operation of emergency core cooling systems with a 10-20 cubic foot void in the suction piping. The third example involved the failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes involving filling the containment sump with borated water to a level above the containment sump safety injection recirculation piping. These changes were implemented in response to identifying that the safety injection system was not being maintained full of water | | description = The team identified three examples of a noncited, Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.59 requirements involving the failure to perform written safety evaluations prior to implementing changes to the facility. The first example involved a change for using manual actions in lieu of automatic actions as compensatory measures to support the safety functions of the high pressure safety injection and containment spray systems during postulated design basis loss-of-coolant accident conditions following a recirculation actuation signal. The second example involved operation of emergency core cooling systems with a 10-20 cubic foot void in the suction piping. The third example involved the failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes involving filling the containment sump with borated water to a level above the containment sump safety injection recirculation piping. These changes were implemented in response to identifying that the safety injection system was not being maintained full of water | ||
In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Disposition Screening," the team determined that traditional enforcement applied because this finding may have impacted the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The severity level of this finding was assessed as having very low safety significance reflective of a Severity Level IV violation. This determination was based in part on use of the significance determination process. | In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, \"Issue Disposition Screening,\" the team determined that traditional enforcement applied because this finding may have impacted the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory function. The severity level of this finding was assessed as having very low safety significance reflective of a Severity Level IV violation. This determination was based in part on use of the significance determination process. | ||
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Revision as of 18:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2004014 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2004 (2004Q4) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Howell G Miller J Shea M Hay |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.59 |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |