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*                            (202) 234-4433
*                            (202) 234-4433


1 1                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1 1                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2                          +    +      +    +      +
* 2                          +    +      +    +      +
3                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4                          +    +      +    +      +
3                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4                          +    +      +    +      +
5                  PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 6                            CONFERENCE CALL 7                          +    +      +    +      +
5                  PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 6                            CONFERENCE CALL 7                          +    +      +    +      +
8            VERMONT YANKEE 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION FROM 9                          MICHAEL MULLIGAN 10                          +    +      +    +      +
8            VERMONT YANKEE 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION FROM 9                          MICHAEL MULLIGAN 10                          +    +      +    +      +
11                                THURSDAY, 12                            JULY 9, 2009
11                                THURSDAY, 12                            JULY 9, 2009 13                          +    +      +    +      +
* 13                          +    +      +    +      +
14 15                  The above-entitled conference was 16 convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., TOM 17 BLOUNT, PRB Chair, presiding.
14 15                  The above-entitled conference was 16 convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., TOM 17 BLOUNT, PRB Chair, presiding.
18 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF:
18 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF:
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6 NRC REGION I:
6 NRC REGION I:
7            THOMAS SETZER, Senior Project Engineer 8            GARRETT NEWMAN,      Project Engineer 9            SARAH RICH, Reactor Engineer 10 11 PETITIONER:
7            THOMAS SETZER, Senior Project Engineer 8            GARRETT NEWMAN,      Project Engineer 9            SARAH RICH, Reactor Engineer 10 11 PETITIONER:
12            MICHAEL MULLIGAN
12            MICHAEL MULLIGAN 13 14 LICENSEE (ENTERGY):
* 13 14 LICENSEE (ENTERGY):
15            JIM DEVINCENTIS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
15            JIM DEVINCENTIS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
* 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
(202) 234-4433          WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701  www.nealrgross.com
(202) 234-4433          WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701  www.nealrgross.com


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7                  We are here today to allow the peti tioner, 8 Mr. Michael Mulligan,          to address the Petition Review 9 Board regarding 2.206 petition dated June 8th, 11, and 10 19, 2009.      I am the Petition Manager for the petition.
7                  We are here today to allow the peti tioner, 8 Mr. Michael Mulligan,          to address the Petition Review 9 Board regarding 2.206 petition dated June 8th, 11, and 10 19, 2009.      I am the Petition Manager for the petition.
11 The Petition Review Board Chairman is Tom Blount.
11 The Petition Review Board Chairman is Tom Blount.
12                  As  part of      the Petition Review Board's
12                  As  part of      the Petition Review Board's 13 review of        this peti tion,        Mr. Michael    Mulligan has 14 requested this opportunity to address the PRB.
* 13 review of        this peti tion,        Mr. Michael    Mulligan has 14 requested this opportunity to address the PRB.
15                  The meeting is scheduled from 10:30 a.m.
15                  The meeting is scheduled from 10:30 a.m.
16  to 12:30 p.m.        The meeting is being recorded by the 17 NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by a 18 court        reporter.      The    transcript      will  become        a 19 supplement to the petition.              The transcript will also 20 be made publicly available.
16  to 12:30 p.m.        The meeting is being recorded by the 17 NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by a 18 court        reporter.      The    transcript      will  become        a 19 supplement to the petition.              The transcript will also 20 be made publicly available.
21                  I  would like to open this meeting with 22 introductions.        As you go around t0e room, please be 23 sure to clearly state your name,                  your position,      and
21                  I  would like to open this meeting with 22 introductions.        As you go around t0e room, please be 23 sure to clearly state your name,                  your position,      and 24  the office that you work for within the NRC for the 25 record.        I'll start off.
* 24  the office that you work for within the NRC for the 25 record.        I'll start off.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
(202) 234*4433          WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701        www.nealrgross.com
(202) 234*4433          WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701        www.nealrgross.com
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8                CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:          Tom    Blount,      Deputy 9 Director for the Division of Policy and rulemaking in 10 NRR, also PRB Chair.
8                CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:          Tom    Blount,      Deputy 9 Director for the Division of Policy and rulemaking in 10 NRR, also PRB Chair.
11                MS. MENSAH:      Tanya Mensah.        I am the 2.206 12 Coordinator in the Office of NRR.
11                MS. MENSAH:      Tanya Mensah.        I am the 2.206 12 Coordinator in the Office of NRR.
* 13                MS. ROSENBERG:        Stacey Rosenberg.          I'm the 14 Branch Chief of the Special Projects Branch in the 15 Division of Policy and rulemaking in NRR.
13                MS. ROSENBERG:        Stacey Rosenberg.          I'm the 14 Branch Chief of the Special Projects Branch in the 15 Division of Policy and rulemaking in NRR.
16                MR. BOWMAN:        Eric Bowman.        I'm a Project 17 Manager in the Special Projects Branch in the Division 18 of Policy and rulemaking in NRR.
16                MR. BOWMAN:        Eric Bowman.        I'm a Project 17 Manager in the Special Projects Branch in the Division 18 of Policy and rulemaking in NRR.
19                MS. SALGADO:        I'm Nancy Salgado.            I'm the 20 Branch Chief for LTL 1-1 in NRR Division of Operator 21 Reactor Licensing.
19                MS. SALGADO:        I'm Nancy Salgado.            I'm the 20 Branch Chief for LTL 1-1 in NRR Division of Operator 21 Reactor Licensing.
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9                      MR. KIM:      Are there any representatives 10  for the licensee on the phone?
9                      MR. KIM:      Are there any representatives 10  for the licensee on the phone?
11                      MR. DEVINCENTIS:            Yes. This    is    Jim 12 Devincentis respecting Vermont Yankee Licensing.
11                      MR. DEVINCENTIS:            Yes. This    is    Jim 12 Devincentis respecting Vermont Yankee Licensing.
* 13                      MR. KIM:      Mr. Mulligan, would you please 14 introduce yourself for the record?
13                      MR. KIM:      Mr. Mulligan, would you please 14 introduce yourself for the record?
15                      MR. MULLIGAN:        I am Mike Mulligan.          And I 16 live about two miles away from the plant.
15                      MR. MULLIGAN:        I am Mike Mulligan.          And I 16 live about two miles away from the plant.
17                      MR. KIM:      Okay.      Are there any others on 18 the phone?
17                      MR. KIM:      Okay.      Are there any others on 18 the phone?
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Welcome 5 Mulligan.        I would like to first share some background 6 on our process.
Welcome 5 Mulligan.        I would like to first share some background 6 on our process.
7                    Section 2.206 of Title X of the Code of 8 Federal Regulations describes the petition process, 9  the    primary    mechanism      for    the    public    to  request 10 enforcement action by the NRC in a public process.
7                    Section 2.206 of Title X of the Code of 8 Federal Regulations describes the petition process, 9  the    primary    mechanism      for    the    public    to  request 10 enforcement action by the NRC in a public process.
11 This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take 12 enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or
11 This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take 12 enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or 13 licensed activities.
* 13 licensed activities.
14                    Depending        on    the        results    of      its 15 evaluation, NRC could modify,                suspend,    or revoke an 16 NRC-issued        license    or  take    any    other  appropriate 17 enforcement action            to  resolve a        problem.      The NRC 18 staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition 19 requests      is in management directive 8.11,                  which is 20 publicly available.
14                    Depending        on    the        results    of      its 15 evaluation, NRC could modify,                suspend,    or revoke an 16 NRC-issued        license    or  take    any    other  appropriate 17 enforcement action            to  resolve a        problem.      The NRC 18 staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition 19 requests      is in management directive 8.11,                  which is 20 publicly available.
21                    The purpose of today's meeting is to give 22 the      peti tioner    an    opportuni ty          to  provide        any 23 additional        explanation or support              for the petition 24 before        the    Petition        Review        Board's    initial
21                    The purpose of today's meeting is to give 22 the      peti tioner    an    opportuni ty          to  provide        any 23 additional        explanation or support              for the petition 24 before        the    Petition        Review        Board's    initial
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(202) 234-4433            WASHINGTON, D.C, 20005-3701        www.nealrgross.com
(202) 234-4433            WASHINGTON, D.C, 20005-3701        www.nealrgross.com


7 1                    This meeting is not a hearing.                Nor is it
7 1                    This meeting is not a hearing.                Nor is it 2 an    opportunity        for    the  petitioner        to  question        or 3 examine the PRB on the merits or the issues presented 4 in the petition request.
* 2 an    opportunity        for    the  petitioner        to  question        or 3 examine the PRB on the merits or the issues presented 4 in the petition request.
5                    No decisions regarding the merits of this 6 petition will be made at this meeting.
5                    No decisions regarding the merits of this 6 petition will be made at this meeting.
7                    Following        this    meeting,      the  Petition 8 Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations.
7                    Following        this    meeting,      the  Petition 8 Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations.
9 The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed 10 with the petitioner.
9 The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed 10 with the petitioner.
11                    The    Petition        Review      Board    typically 12 consists        of  a  Chairman,      usually a        manager at        the
11                    The    Petition        Review      Board    typically 12 consists        of  a  Chairman,      usually a        manager at        the 13 Senior Executive Service level at the NRC.                        It has a 14 Petition Manager and a PRB Coordinator.                      Other members 15 of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on 16 the      content      of  the    information        in  the  petition 17 request.
* 13 Senior Executive Service level at the NRC.                        It has a 14 Petition Manager and a PRB Coordinator.                      Other members 15 of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on 16 the      content      of  the    information        in  the  petition 17 request.
18                    At this time I would like to introduce the 19 Board.        I am Tom Blount,          the Petition Review Board 20 Chairman.        James Kim is the Petition Manager for the 21 petition under discussion today.                    Tanya Mensah is the 22 office's PRB Coordinator.
18                    At this time I would like to introduce the 19 Board.        I am Tom Blount,          the Petition Review Board 20 Chairman.        James Kim is the Petition Manager for the 21 petition under discussion today.                    Tanya Mensah is the 22 office's PRB Coordinator.
23                    Our      technical        staff      includes        Tony 24 Nakanishi          from      the    Office      of    Nuclear      Reactor
23                    Our      technical        staff      includes        Tony 24 Nakanishi          from      the    Office      of    Nuclear      Reactor
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* 2 also obtain advice from our Office of General Counsel, 3 represented by Molly Barkman.
* 2 also obtain advice from our Office of General Counsel, 3 represented by Molly Barkman.
4                    As described in our process, the NRC staff 5 may      ask    clarifying      questions        in    order  to    better 6 understand the petitioner's presentation and to reach 7 a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the 8 peti tioner' s      requests      for    review        under  the    2.206 9 process.
4                    As described in our process, the NRC staff 5 may      ask    clarifying      questions        in    order  to    better 6 understand the petitioner's presentation and to reach 7 a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the 8 peti tioner' s      requests      for    review        under  the    2.206 9 process.
10                    I would like to summarize the scope of the 11 petition under consideration and the NRC activities to 12 date.        On June 8th, 2008, as supplemented bye-mails
10                    I would like to summarize the scope of the 11 petition under consideration and the NRC activities to 12 date.        On June 8th, 2008, as supplemented bye-mails 13 on June 11th and 19th, 2009 -- let me reiterate.                              On 14 June 8th,        2009,  as supplemented bye-mails on June 15 11th and 19th, 2009, Mr. Mulligan submitted a petition 16 to    NRC    under  2.206    regarding        the    Vermont    Yankee 17 Nuclear Power Station.
* 13 on June 11th and 19th, 2009 -- let me reiterate.                              On 14 June 8th,        2009,  as supplemented bye-mails on June 15 11th and 19th, 2009, Mr. Mulligan submitted a petition 16 to    NRC    under  2.206    regarding        the    Vermont    Yankee 17 Nuclear Power Station.
18                    In this request, in this peti tion request, 19 Mr. Mulligan      requested      that    the      NRC  fine    Vermont 20 Yankee        $5,250,000      for    operating        their    reactor 21 illegally          and      unsafe1y        with        an    inoperable 22 high-pressure coolant injection system coming out of 23 their start-up after an outage from June 6, 2007 until 24 June 12, 2007.
18                    In this request, in this peti tion request, 19 Mr. Mulligan      requested      that    the      NRC  fine    Vermont 20 Yankee        $5,250,000      for    operating        their    reactor 21 illegally          and      unsafe1y        with        an    inoperable 22 high-pressure coolant injection system coming out of 23 their start-up after an outage from June 6, 2007 until 24 June 12, 2007.
* 25                    The petitioner raised a concern that the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
* 25                    The petitioner raised a concern that the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 Yankee operating wi th operating instruction 5210 being contrary to 10 CFR 50, appendix B, also questioned whether Entergy had implemented the DC criterion V.          He 5  contractor        inspection      on    the    three  cri tical      HPCI 6 valves, V23-14, V23-16, and V23-21, using the revised 7  inspection guidance since June 2007.
4 Yankee operating wi th operating instruction 5210 being contrary to 10 CFR 50, appendix B, also questioned whether Entergy had implemented the DC criterion V.          He 5  contractor        inspection      on    the    three  cri tical      HPCI 6 valves, V23-14, V23-16, and V23-21, using the revised 7  inspection guidance since June 2007.
8                    Allow me to discuss the NRC activities to 9 date.          On June    16th,    the peti tioner        requested          to 10 address        the  PRB prior      to    its    ini tial  meeting and 11  requested time to prepare supplemental information for 12  the Board's consideration.
8                    Allow me to discuss the NRC activities to 9 date.          On June    16th,    the peti tioner        requested          to 10 address        the  PRB prior      to    its    ini tial  meeting and 11  requested time to prepare supplemental information for 12  the Board's consideration.
* 13                    As a reminder for the phone participants, 14 please identify yourself if you make any remarks as 15 this will help us in the preparation of the meeting 16 transcript          that  will    be    made      publicly    available.
13                    As a reminder for the phone participants, 14 please identify yourself if you make any remarks as 15 this will help us in the preparation of the meeting 16 transcript          that  will    be    made      publicly    available.
17 Thank you.
17 Thank you.
18                    Mr. Mulligan, I'll turn it over to you to 19 allow you to provide any information you believe the 20 PRB should consider as part of this petition.                      At this 21 time you will have one hour to present additional 22 information in support of your petition to the PRB.
18                    Mr. Mulligan, I'll turn it over to you to 19 allow you to provide any information you believe the 20 PRB should consider as part of this petition.                      At this 21 time you will have one hour to present additional 22 information in support of your petition to the PRB.
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10 1                  Mr. Mulligan?
10 1                  Mr. Mulligan?
* 2                  MR. MULLIGAN:        Yes, sir?
2                  MR. MULLIGAN:        Yes, sir?
3                  CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          The floor is yours.
3                  CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          The floor is yours.
4                  MR. MULLIGAN:        I've got some cleanup stuff 5 to do here first.            I want to report that I made a 6 complaint about        the general        fairness    of  the    2.206 7 process.        And essentially James had told me it was 8 referred to the OIG, the series of concerns I had and 9 stuff like that.
4                  MR. MULLIGAN:        I've got some cleanup stuff 5 to do here first.            I want to report that I made a 6 complaint about        the general        fairness    of  the    2.206 7 process.        And essentially James had told me it was 8 referred to the OIG, the series of concerns I had and 9 stuff like that.
10                  So I  accepted that.            And then the next 11 morning I called up the OIG.              And Cheryl Windsor told 12 me she didn't know anything about it or anything like
10                  So I  accepted that.            And then the next 11 morning I called up the OIG.              And Cheryl Windsor told 12 me she didn't know anything about it or anything like 13 that.
* 13 that.
14                  I do know that the NRC has issues with 15 their document and internal communications and all 16 that sort of stuff, but that's the sense that I have.
14                  I do know that the NRC has issues with 15 their document and internal communications and all 16 that sort of stuff, but that's the sense that I have.
17 A lot of times NRC inspectors will tell me that I'm 18 reporting this -- I'll make a report to the OIG about 19 this concern.
17 A lot of times NRC inspectors will tell me that I'm 18 reporting this -- I'll make a report to the OIG about 19 this concern.
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11 1  it to the OIG.
11 1  it to the OIG.
* 2                    And I just wanted to make sure that that 3  was clear that from that she acknowledged that she 4  didn' t      receive anything from James or his boss or 5  anything like that and in a                  sense of fairness and 6  integrity right there with these types of things.                      So 7  that's one thing.
2                    And I just wanted to make sure that that 3  was clear that from that she acknowledged that she 4  didn' t      receive anything from James or his boss or 5  anything like that and in a                  sense of fairness and 6  integrity right there with these types of things.                      So 7  that's one thing.
8                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:        Before you pass on that, 9  could I offer some insight?                This is Tom Blount.
8                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:        Before you pass on that, 9  could I offer some insight?                This is Tom Blount.
10                    MR. MULLIGAN:        Yes.
10                    MR. MULLIGAN:        Yes.
11                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            We understand,      and I 12  received your e-mail or I saw a copy of it.                So I then
11                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            We understand,      and I 12  received your e-mail or I saw a copy of it.                So I then 13  subsequently also called the OIG's office to let them 14  know that you had wanted to follow up.
* 13  subsequently also called the OIG's office to let them 14  know that you had wanted to follow up.
15                    The OIG does not as a practice provide the 16  staff with insight or information 'on what they are 17  investigating or how that investigation is proceeding, 18  but I would encourage you to continue to interact wi th 19  the OIG as you deem necessary and appropriate because 20  they are a separate function of the* process.
15                    The OIG does not as a practice provide the 16  staff with insight or information 'on what they are 17  investigating or how that investigation is proceeding, 18  but I would encourage you to continue to interact wi th 19  the OIG as you deem necessary and appropriate because 20  they are a separate function of the* process.
21,                    So I just wanted to. let you know that we 22  here at the staff level don't necessarily have insight 23  that we could share with you other than to provide you 24  the information that it is recognized that we put that
21,                    So I just wanted to. let you know that we 22  here at the staff level don't necessarily have insight 23  that we could share with you other than to provide you 24  the information that it is recognized that we put that
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But we (202) 234*4433          WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005*3701      www.nealrgross.com
But we (202) 234*4433          WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005*3701      www.nealrgross.com


12 1  don't get into the machinations or mechanisms that the
12 1  don't get into the machinations or mechanisms that the 2  OIG will employ to evaluate or investigate.
* 2  OIG will employ to evaluate or investigate.
3                    MR. MULLIGAN:        But you understand what I'm 4  saying.        I called him the next morning.            James told me 5  the report was made.              And then the next morning I 6  called up, and she said she never heard of me.                      I just 7  want to make that clear.
3                    MR. MULLIGAN:        But you understand what I'm 4  saying.        I called him the next morning.            James told me 5  the report was made.              And then the next morning I 6  called up, and she said she never heard of me.                      I just 7  want to make that clear.
8                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          I unders tand . Thank you 9  very much.        And we recognize and hear your concern .
8                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          I unders tand . Thank you 9  very much.        And we recognize and hear your concern .
   . 10                    MR. MULL;I:GAN:        I  also  made    a  request 11  because, I mean, this is all                  I mean, everything for 12  the NRC is supposed to be in support of the peoples,
   . 10                    MR. MULL;I:GAN:        I  also  made    a  request 11  because, I mean, this is all                  I mean, everything for 12  the NRC is supposed to be in support of the peoples, 13  the community, and all that sort of stuff.                        Really, 14  that is what the NRC is about and stuff.
* 13  the community, and all that sort of stuff.                        Really, 14  that is what the NRC is about and stuff.
15                    And I    have an      issue with      the    Petition 16  Review        Board.      I    made      a    request    that      their 17  deliberations            we    are in a        democracy,    and their 18  deliberations should be transparent and recorded and 19  available for the public to understand how the process 20  goes behind closed doors.
15                    And I    have an      issue with      the    Petition 16  Review        Board.      I    made      a    request    that      their 17  deliberations            we    are in a        democracy,    and their 18  deliberations should be transparent and recorded and 19  available for the public to understand how the process 20  goes behind closed doors.
: 21.                    I don't understand why the PRB Board is 22  not a democratic, transparent presentation and stuff.
: 21.                    I don't understand why the PRB Board is 22  not a democratic, transparent presentation and stuff.
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I mean, I sit And I am making a petition to the United States 5 government.
I mean, I sit And I am making a petition to the United States 5 government.
6                    And I'm asking for some kind of an action 7 be taken against a corporation.                  I know that that is 8 an extraordinarily privileged position to be on the 9 planet,        with all the rest of the countries,                United 10 States affords a little guy like me to face, at least 11 complain about, a big corporation, big power center, 12 and stuff like that.
6                    And I'm asking for some kind of an action 7 be taken against a corporation.                  I know that that is 8 an extraordinarily privileged position to be on the 9 planet,        with all the rest of the countries,                United 10 States affords a little guy like me to face, at least 11 complain about, a big corporation, big power center, 12 and stuff like that.
* 13                    And I know and I feel as though I'm a very 14 privileged individual to be a United States citizen.
13                    And I know and I feel as though I'm a very 14 privileged individual to be a United States citizen.
15 And      I  think Uni ted States of America            is  the best 16 country in the world.            And God bless America.          I just 17 want everybody to know how I                feel about the United 18 States.
15 And      I  think Uni ted States of America            is  the best 16 country in the world.            And God bless America.          I just 17 want everybody to know how I                feel about the United 18 States.
19                    Just for some background information, the 20 Fitzpatrick plant recently had some issues with their 21 HPCI.          Well,  they    didn't    have      any issues.        They 22 admitted back in 2006 the -- the license event report 23 number is 2006-02-01.            That's rev. 1.
19                    Just for some background information, the 20 Fitzpatrick plant recently had some issues with their 21 HPCI.          Well,  they    didn't    have      any issues.        They 22 admitted back in 2006 the -- the license event report 23 number is 2006-02-01.            That's rev. 1.
* 24                    And it just recently came out on June 10th 25 and basically declaring that they didn't disclose a -
24                    And it just recently came out on June 10th 25 and basically declaring that they didn't disclose a -
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NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.w.
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6                    Now I'm      referencing        inspection    report, 7 Vermont        Yankee    inspection        report,      2009-006.        I'm 8 paraphrasing this.              Basically it goes through a                -
6                    Now I'm      referencing        inspection    report, 7 Vermont        Yankee    inspection        report,      2009-006.        I'm 8 paraphrasing this.              Basically it goes through a                -
9 Vermont Yankee had issues during 2007 with starting up 10 the plant.
9 Vermont Yankee had issues during 2007 with starting up 10 the plant.
11                    And it goes through a bunch of issues with 12 relays.        I believe there were five of them that should
11                    And it goes through a bunch of issues with 12 relays.        I believe there were five of them that should 13 have been inspected.              And they were over their limit 14 as far as they should have been replaced.
* 13 have been inspected.              And they were over their limit 14 as far as they should have been replaced.
15                    And it goes on            to  talk about up until 16 2008, they really didn't replace or inspect all of the 17 HPCI relays they were supposed to replace.
15                    And it goes on            to  talk about up until 16 2008, they really didn't replace or inspect all of the 17 HPCI relays they were supposed to replace.
18                    After 2008, they kept asking permission to 19 lay the inspection stuff like that.                      Really,    in the 20 inspection          reports,      we      really      don't  have        an 21 understanding            why    those      relays      weren't      being 22 inspected.        You would expect that, you know, you would 23 get an indication and they would replace the component
18                    After 2008, they kept asking permission to 19 lay the inspection stuff like that.                      Really,    in the 20 inspection          reports,      we      really      don't  have        an 21 understanding            why    those      relays      weren't      being 22 inspected.        You would expect that, you know, you would 23 get an indication and they would replace the component 24 as fast as they can.
* 24 as fast as they can.
25                    In . the    inspection        reports,    you    really NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
25                    In . the    inspection        reports,    you    really NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
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4 matter of fact information of what is going on.
4 matter of fact information of what is going on.
they don't really get into the motives and all that sort of        stuff.      It's    a  problem wi th      I  think But the 5 inspection process.
they don't really get into the motives and all that sort of        stuff.      It's    a  problem wi th      I  think But the 5 inspection process.
6                    Also in 2007, when this occurred, I find 7 it suspicious that the NRC didn't completely describe 8 it in their following inspection report.                      The events 9 surrounding the start-up of 2007, whenever that was, 10 06-08-07, you know, why didn't the inspection -- why 11 wasn't        the NRC    documenting what was            going on and 12 getting it down in the record for us to understand
6                    Also in 2007, when this occurred, I find 7 it suspicious that the NRC didn't completely describe 8 it in their following inspection report.                      The events 9 surrounding the start-up of 2007, whenever that was, 10 06-08-07, you know, why didn't the inspection -- why 11 wasn't        the NRC    documenting what was            going on and 12 getting it down in the record for us to understand 13 what was going on?
* 13 what was going on?
14                    You know, there's the issues of notifying 15 the rest of the industry of defense going on.                      And I'm 16 surprised.          I mean,    that is part of what the NRC is 17 supposed        to  be  doing.        They're      supposed      to      be 18 documenting these things as it occurs as completely as 19 they can and stuff like that.                      In this case there 20 really wasn't          a  mention of        the problems wi th            the 21 relays until the end of the year 2007.
14                    You know, there's the issues of notifying 15 the rest of the industry of defense going on.                      And I'm 16 surprised.          I mean,    that is part of what the NRC is 17 supposed        to  be  doing.        They're      supposed      to      be 18 documenting these things as it occurs as completely as 19 they can and stuff like that.                      In this case there 20 really wasn't          a  mention of        the problems wi th            the 21 relays until the end of the year 2007.
22                    I think that's a big problem with the NRC 23 not      meeting      the  community's        needs    of  immediately
22                    I think that's a big problem with the NRC 23 not      meeting      the  community's        needs    of  immediately 24 understanding what is going on with the components .
* 24 understanding what is going on with the components .
25 And Vermont Yankee, you know, I think if we had this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.w.
25 And Vermont Yankee, you know, I think if we had this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.w.
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4 tend to raise a ruckus and force the correction of these problems at an early stage, instead of .waiting two years afterwards.
4 tend to raise a ruckus and force the correction of these problems at an early stage, instead of .waiting two years afterwards.
5                    Back to that newest inspection report, 6 again,      they have this new violation.              What was the 7 violation?        The first violation was they didn't do it 8 according to NRC regulations.                  What is this one here 9 about?        Well, anyways, why?          I don't understand why 10 this kind of information is mostly available back in 11 2007.
5                    Back to that newest inspection report, 6 again,      they have this new violation.              What was the 7 violation?        The first violation was they didn't do it 8 according to NRC regulations.                  What is this one here 9 about?        Well, anyways, why?          I don't understand why 10 this kind of information is mostly available back in 11 2007.
12                    Why are we hearing it now?          Why aren't we
12                    Why are we hearing it now?          Why aren't we 13 hearing all of these problems immediately when they 14 occur or shortly after or at least in the inspection, 15 the next inspection report?                Why are we going through 16 these        cycles    of    two    years      hearing  about      these 17 violations two years later?
* 13 hearing all of these problems immediately when they 14 occur or shortly after or at least in the inspection, 15 the next inspection report?                Why are we going through 16 these        cycles    of    two    years      hearing  about      these 17 violations two years later?
18                    I mean, it doesn't make sense, really.                  I 19 think in order for NRC to be effective, all of these 20 issues should be as far as if they can raise them or 21 it's known - - and it looks like these things were 22 known,      -- instead of waiting for to go through this 23 mechanical inspection routine process or whatever you 24 guys call it, these folks showing up two years after
18                    I mean, it doesn't make sense, really.                  I 19 think in order for NRC to be effective, all of these 20 issues should be as far as if they can raise them or 21 it's known - - and it looks like these things were 22 known,      -- instead of waiting for to go through this 23 mechanical inspection routine process or whatever you 24 guys call it, these folks showing up two years after
* 25 the event.
* 25 the event.
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17 1                    I  think,    you know,        it's like getting a
17 1                    I  think,    you know,        it's like getting a 2 speeding ticket on the road and then getting pulled 3 over two years later on and the police officer is 4 saying, "Well, you speeded two years ago.                      And here is 5 the ticket for it" and stuff.
* 2 speeding ticket on the road and then getting pulled 3 over two years later on and the police officer is 4 saying, "Well, you speeded two years ago.                      And here is 5 the ticket for it" and stuff.
6                    I just don't think it's fair to anybody.
6                    I just don't think it's fair to anybody.
7 I      think      these    things      have      to    be  acknowledged 8 immediately, have to be outed, and the community has 9 to      be  alerted.        If    there    is    a  response    that      is 10 necessary from the community, then everybody will be 11 forced        to  correct    these    problems      at  the  earliest 12 opportunity.
7 I      think      these    things      have      to    be  acknowledged 8 immediately, have to be outed, and the community has 9 to      be  alerted.        If    there    is    a  response    that      is 10 necessary from the community, then everybody will be 11 forced        to  correct    these    problems      at  the  earliest 12 opportunity.
* 13                    MR. SETZER:      Excuse me, Mr. Mulligan.                If 14 I    could      just interrupt        for    a minute?        I've got a 15 question        for  the panel.          Tom Blount,        would it be 16 inappropriate or appropriate for me to shed some light 17 on the two-year issue that Mr. Mulligan has or is that 18 not part of this hearing?
13                    MR. SETZER:      Excuse me, Mr. Mulligan.                If 14 I    could      just interrupt        for    a minute?        I've got a 15 question        for  the panel.          Tom Blount,        would it be 16 inappropriate or appropriate for me to shed some light 17 on the two-year issue that Mr. Mulligan has or is that 18 not part of this hearing?
19                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            I'm sorry.      Who am I 20 speaking to?
19                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            I'm sorry.      Who am I 20 speaking to?
21                    MR. SETZER:        I'm sorry.          This    is    Tom 22 Setzer.        I'm a    senior project engineer, region I.
21                    MR. SETZER:        I'm sorry.          This    is    Tom 22 Setzer.        I'm a    senior project engineer, region I.
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7                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            So I really would like 8  to hear from Mr. Mulligan.
7                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            So I really would like 8  to hear from Mr. Mulligan.
9                    MR. SETZER:          Understood.        I just thought 10 I  could help clarify one point that would help Mr.
9                    MR. SETZER:          Understood.        I just thought 10 I  could help clarify one point that would help Mr.
11 Mulligan.        But if that's not the point and time to do 12 that, we'll
11 Mulligan.        But if that's not the point and time to do 12 that, we'll 13                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            So    if you could take 14 note of that question and then we can come back to 15 revisit that?
* 13                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            So    if you could take 14 note of that question and then we can come back to 15 revisit that?
16                    MR. SETZER:        Certainly.        All right. Sorry 17 for the interruption.              Go ahead, Mr. Mulligan.
16                    MR. SETZER:        Certainly.        All right. Sorry 17 for the interruption.              Go ahead, Mr. Mulligan.
18                    MR. MULLIGAN:            Now,    in a  prior recent 19 report        talking    about    the    diesel      generator,        they 20 basically did the same thing as                        far as,  you know, 21 finding these problems many months and a year or so 22 after it occurred and then reporting it to the public 23 and stuff.
18                    MR. MULLIGAN:            Now,    in a  prior recent 19 report        talking    about    the    diesel      generator,        they 20 basically did the same thing as                        far as,  you know, 21 finding these problems many months and a year or so 22 after it occurred and then reporting it to the public 23 and stuff.
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3 You've        got  a    ton    of    processes,      and  they      are 4 complicated and they're exotic and stuff like that.
3 You've        got  a    ton    of    processes,      and  they      are 4 complicated and they're exotic and stuff like that.
5                    I think I get the feeling, you guys, the 6 process        1S  the goal.      You have a problem.          You throw 7 the clothes in the washing machine.                    Another problem 8 comes      up.      You  throw    the    clothes    in  the  washing 9 machine.        And basically you never take the clothes out 10 of the washing machine and put them in the dryer.
5                    I think I get the feeling, you guys, the 6 process        1S  the goal.      You have a problem.          You throw 7 the clothes in the washing machine.                    Another problem 8 comes      up.      You  throw    the    clothes    in  the  washing 9 machine.        And basically you never take the clothes out 10 of the washing machine and put them in the dryer.
11                    Really, I don't get a feeling -- I mean, 12 this is the latest inspection report about the really
11                    Really, I don't get a feeling -- I mean, 12 this is the latest inspection report about the really 13 problem.          Why does this go on for so long?                Why is 14 this going on until later on this year?                    Why are these 15 relays problems not being fixed immediately and stuff?
* 13 problem.          Why does this go on for so long?                Why is 14 this going on until later on this year?                    Why are these 15 relays problems not being fixed immediately and stuff?
16                    So  I  think you're process-driven.                  The 17 goal      is when you have a problem when you want                          to 18 explain it to a guy like me or the public is you say, 19  "Well, we'll throw this in this process.                    We'll throw 20 it just in this agency process."                    And that's the goal 21 of regulation.
16                    So  I  think you're process-driven.                  The 17 goal      is when you have a problem when you want                          to 18 explain it to a guy like me or the public is you say, 19  "Well, we'll throw this in this process.                    We'll throw 20 it just in this agency process."                    And that's the goal 21 of regulation.
22                    The goal of regulation is not to sit there 23 and say,        you know,    we can't let this happen again.
22                    The goal of regulation is not to sit there 23 and say,        you know,    we can't let this happen again.
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4 it      r~ally I mean, doesn't what I lend    to see across the board is that you go through this convoluted ROP program.
4 it      r~ally I mean, doesn't what I lend    to see across the board is that you go through this convoluted ROP program.
a    change  in    utility And 5 behaviors.        You don't have enough horsepower in order 6  to get the utility to change their behavior.                    I mean, 7  I    think    the  utility      should        respond    without          a 8 horsepower, but it seems that                ~n  a lot of cases they 9 don't.
a    change  in    utility And 5 behaviors.        You don't have enough horsepower in order 6  to get the utility to change their behavior.                    I mean, 7  I    think    the  utility      should        respond    without          a 8 horsepower, but it seems that                ~n  a lot of cases they 9 don't.
10                  Also    I    have    seen      issues    where      these 11 utility folks rope-a-dope the inspectors.                      That is, 12  they      play  games,    bureaucratic          games.      And      the
10                  Also    I    have    seen      issues    where      these 11 utility folks rope-a-dope the inspectors.                      That is, 12  they      play  games,    bureaucratic          games.      And      the 13 inspector has an issue.              And then they will make an 14 engineering        evaluation,          a    shallow      engineering 15 evaluation, that they know is not correct.                      And then 16 the NRC will have to come back and spend a lot of time 17 to counteract that with their own evaluation.
* 13 inspector has an issue.              And then they will make an 14 engineering        evaluation,          a    shallow      engineering 15 evaluation, that they know is not correct.                      And then 16 the NRC will have to come back and spend a lot of time 17 to counteract that with their own evaluation.
18                  And you end up, you know, the utility has 19 800 people.        The NRC only has two inspectors on site 20 and stuff like that.            So the game is fixed.          You know, 21 they can tie up the hands repeatedly with these kind 22 of rope-a-doping game and trying to exhaust the NRC 23 and stuff because,          you know,      they're chasing their 24  tails and they're not looking at new events showing up 25 and stuff.
18                  And you end up, you know, the utility has 19 800 people.        The NRC only has two inspectors on site 20 and stuff like that.            So the game is fixed.          You know, 21 they can tie up the hands repeatedly with these kind 22 of rope-a-doping game and trying to exhaust the NRC 23 and stuff because,          you know,      they're chasing their
* 24  tails and they're not looking at new events showing up 25 and stuff.
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21 1                    So I generally have an issue as far as the
21 1                    So I generally have an issue as far as the
* 2 ability of the utilities to not directly answer the 3 problem.          Again,  basically,        I  mean,      as  far as the 4 LERs, we can go back.            And we can talk about the LER, 5 Vermont Yankee LER, 207 wait a minute.                            I want 6 to make sure this is right.                That's good, 207002-01.
* 2 ability of the utilities to not directly answer the 3 problem.          Again,  basically,        I  mean,      as  far as the 4 LERs, we can go back.            And we can talk about the LER, 5 Vermont Yankee LER, 207 wait a minute.                            I want 6 to make sure this is right.                That's good, 207002-01.
7                    And I've done a lot of work in the last 8 couple of weeks with NRC in trying to understand how 9 the      license    event    reports      work      and    stuff.          And 10 essentially what I've come out of that is that there 11 is no -- I can't trust what an LER says from these 12 last      interactions wi th        the NRC        with    the  last      two
7                    And I've done a lot of work in the last 8 couple of weeks with NRC in trying to understand how 9 the      license    event    reports      work      and    stuff.          And 10 essentially what I've come out of that is that there 11 is no -- I can't trust what an LER says from these 12 last      interactions wi th        the NRC        with    the  last      two 13 weeks, specifically about inspection report and LER.
* 13 weeks, specifically about inspection report and LER.
14                    Essentially the guidance is written so 15 loosely.          And who knows what they report and stuff 16 like that?        So I have no confidence that LER exposes 17 all of the problems associated with an event.                          I don't 18 understand.        I don't really understand the reason why 19 the guidance is written that way.                        I  can hazard a 20 guess.        It's part of the Republican nuclear ideology 21 of being objective and all that sort of stuff and not 22 forcing the utilities to explain what their problems 23 are and all that sort of stuff.
14                    Essentially the guidance is written so 15 loosely.          And who knows what they report and stuff 16 like that?        So I have no confidence that LER exposes 17 all of the problems associated with an event.                          I don't 18 understand.        I don't really understand the reason why 19 the guidance is written that way.                        I  can hazard a 20 guess.        It's part of the Republican nuclear ideology 21 of being objective and all that sort of stuff and not 22 forcing the utilities to explain what their problems 23 are and all that sort of stuff.
24                    And that's my guess.                  So    I  would      for
24                    And that's my guess.                  So    I  would      for
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4                  Once they got started up, instead of doing 5 the testing, there are issues with passing the system, 6 operational tests, minimum flow tests, whatever.                        I'm 7 not sure exactly how it goes and stuff like that.
4                  Once they got started up, instead of doing 5 the testing, there are issues with passing the system, 6 operational tests, minimum flow tests, whatever.                        I'm 7 not sure exactly how it goes and stuff like that.
8                  And then they started doing dull stroking 9 and stuff.        And then in the flow tests, the full flow 10 tests,      the valve didn't work.              And,  you know,      they 11 inappropriately shifted this event into two separate 12 events.
8                  And then they started doing dull stroking 9 and stuff.        And then in the flow tests, the full flow 10 tests,      the valve didn't work.              And,  you know,      they 11 inappropriately shifted this event into two separate 12 events.
* 13                  You know,      when they valve didn't work, 14 they should have said,          nOh, you know, we never proved 15 HPCI was operational when the pressure was 150 pounds.
13                  You know,      when they valve didn't work, 14 they should have said,          nOh, you know, we never proved 15 HPCI was operational when the pressure was 150 pounds.
16 We never had a minimum flow test.                    We never met the 17 tint of the minimum flow test."
16 We never had a minimum flow test.                    We never met the 17 tint of the minimum flow test."
18                  Because our procedures were defective, we 19 should have assumed that HPCI was always broken before 20 we even started up.          And the conservative thing would 21 have been to shut down immediately.                  And essentially 22 it      would    then  realized        that      the  procedure        was 23 inadequate and not accounting to the NRC requirements.
18                  Because our procedures were defective, we 19 should have assumed that HPCI was always broken before 20 we even started up.          And the conservative thing would 21 have been to shut down immediately.                  And essentially 22 it      would    then  realized        that      the  procedure        was 23 inadequate and not accounting to the NRC requirements.
* 24                  And then you would have shifted into not 25 an isolated problem and say systemic problem with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
24                  And then you would have shifted into not 25 an isolated problem and say systemic problem with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
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23 1 Vermont Yankee.            Then you would have had training.
23 1 Vermont Yankee.            Then you would have had training.
* 2 You know, the full details would have been disclosed.
2 You know, the full details would have been disclosed.
3 And you had a couple or three days of training, stuff 4 like that and what went wrong, and all that short of 5 stuff.        And then you start it back up.
3 And you had a couple or three days of training, stuff 4 like that and what went wrong, and all that short of 5 stuff.        And then you start it back up.
6                    And  Vermont      Yankee      could  have    bragged 7 about        what    they  did    and    stuff      like  that.        But, 8 instead, everybody played the "Let's be quiet" game.
6                    And  Vermont      Yankee      could  have    bragged 7 about        what    they  did    and    stuff      like  that.        But, 8 instead, everybody played the "Let's be quiet" game.
9 And essentially it              took you until          operational        and 10 stuff.
9 And essentially it              took you until          operational        and 10 stuff.
11                    So  that's    how,      you    know,  people        are 12 supposed to recognize their problems and correct them,
11                    So  that's    how,      you    know,  people        are 12 supposed to recognize their problems and correct them, 13 you know.        Even if you deny it in the beginning beyond 14 usually deny it, eventually people come back and keep 15 hounding us on it.
* 13 you know.        Even if you deny it in the beginning beyond 14 usually deny it, eventually people come back and keep 15 hounding us on it.
16                    Well,  then we see what we are doing is 17 wrong.        And then we try and correct it and stuff.                    And 18 I really don't see that the system is trying to engage 19 Vermont        Yankee  and    many    other      utilities    with      the 20 intent of making them change their behavior, not with 21 the intent of throwing a problem into                      a  problem.          I 22 think that's a big problem with the NRC.                            They're 23 process-driven.            They're not behavior-driven.                  They 24 don't shoot for a change in behavior .
16                    Well,  then we see what we are doing is 17 wrong.        And then we try and correct it and stuff.                    And 18 I really don't see that the system is trying to engage 19 Vermont        Yankee  and    many    other      utilities    with      the 20 intent of making them change their behavior, not with 21 the intent of throwing a problem into                      a  problem.          I 22 think that's a big problem with the NRC.                            They're 23 process-driven.            They're not behavior-driven.                  They 24 don't shoot for a change in behavior .
* 25                    I also noticed -
* 25                    I also noticed -
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24 1                    (Pause. )
24 1                    (Pause. )
* 2                    MR. MULLIGAN:        I'm sorry.        I'm trying to 3 fiddle with my computer.
2                    MR. MULLIGAN:        I'm sorry.        I'm trying to 3 fiddle with my computer.
4                    I  also did an award check on OP-5310, 5 motor control center.              And, I mean, this is just a -
4                    I  also did an award check on OP-5310, 5 motor control center.              And, I mean, this is just a -
6 it's not a detailed check or anything like that.                            But 7 in inspection report 2002-03 in 2001, OP-5210,                            rev.
6 it's not a detailed check or anything like that.                            But 7 in inspection report 2002-03 in 2001, OP-5210,                            rev.
8 10, MCC inspection,            in 2001,      they're up to rev. 10.
8 10, MCC inspection,            in 2001,      they're up to rev. 10.
9 In 2007,        OP-5210 is up to rev.            12. In June 3rd of 10 2009, they're up to rev. 29.
9 In 2007,        OP-5210 is up to rev.            12. In June 3rd of 10 2009, they're up to rev. 29.
11                    I  could make        the    case    and    I  made      an 12 allegation to the NRC that where I get this out of is
11                    I  could make        the    case    and    I  made      an 12 allegation to the NRC that where I get this out of is 13 the back side of the inspection report,                        the list of 14 documents reviewed from the NRC and stuff.
* 13 the back side of the inspection report,                        the list of 14 documents reviewed from the NRC and stuff.
15                    So,  you know,      the conclusion I          draw is 16 that      the    NRC    prior    to    the .2007      Vermont      Yankee 17 start-up, the NRC approved of the OP-5210 inspection 18 procedure of the switchgear or the relay cabinet and 19 stuff.        I mean, essentially the NRC declared that back 20 in at least 2001.
15                    So,  you know,      the conclusion I          draw is 16 that      the    NRC    prior    to    the .2007      Vermont      Yankee 17 start-up, the NRC approved of the OP-5210 inspection 18 procedure of the switchgear or the relay cabinet and 19 stuff.        I mean, essentially the NRC declared that back 20 in at least 2001.
21                    I'm not sure, you know, if they later did 22 a review of documents, you know, but what is an NRC 23 review of          documents?        I    asked    them,    what    is    the 24 definition of that type of thing?                      And I get nothing
21                    I'm not sure, you know, if they later did 22 a review of documents, you know, but what is an NRC 23 review of          documents?        I    asked    them,    what    is    the 24 definition of that type of thing?                      And I get nothing
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25 1                      Review if you look at the common usage and
25 1                      Review if you look at the common usage and 2 stuff like that,            that implies that the NRC goes in 3 details and looks up all the documents in the back of 4 the inspection report.
* 2 stuff like that,            that implies that the NRC goes in 3 details and looks up all the documents in the back of 4 the inspection report.
5                      Thus,    the      conclusion      I  draw    is      the 6 violation that Vermont Yankee was cited for in 2007, 7 the inadequacies that they were cited for, they didn't 8 have inspection criteria and stuff.
5                      Thus,    the      conclusion      I  draw    is      the 6 violation that Vermont Yankee was cited for in 2007, 7 the inadequacies that they were cited for, they didn't 8 have inspection criteria and stuff.
9                      You know, not having inspection criteria 10 generally          lends  to* the      idea    that    if  you    have      an 11 inspection criteria,                then you would have to either 12 fail it or pass it and stuff like that.                      And you would
9                      You know, not having inspection criteria 10 generally          lends  to* the      idea    that    if  you    have      an 11 inspection criteria,                then you would have to either 12 fail it or pass it and stuff like that.                      And you would 13 have less of an operational flexibility and stuff like 14 that.
* 13 have less of an operational flexibility and stuff like 14 that.
15                      So I am saying that the NRC approved of 16 that procedure they used in 2007 to start up Vermont 17 Yankee        and    start    up    that    HPCI    system.        The      NRC 18 according to the reports inspected and approved that 19 procedure that was in accord to 10 CFR 50 appendix B 20 cri terion        5 and stuff.            So  the NRC      approved tha t 21 improper Vermont Yankee procedure.
15                      So I am saying that the NRC approved of 16 that procedure they used in 2007 to start up Vermont 17 Yankee        and    start    up    that    HPCI    system.        The      NRC 18 according to the reports inspected and approved that 19 procedure that was in accord to 10 CFR 50 appendix B 20 cri terion        5 and stuff.            So  the NRC      approved tha t 21 improper Vermont Yankee procedure.
22                      I  mean,    I    can make a      case through the 23 records that that is what the NRC did and stuff.                              And so,    again,      you kriow,      I  just have issues here.                You
22                      I  mean,    I    can make a      case through the 23 records that that is what the NRC did and stuff.                              And so,    again,      you kriow,      I  just have issues here.                You 24 25 know,        we    could    sit          I  mean,      what    this        is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
* 24 25 know,        we    could    sit          I  mean,      what    this        is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
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4                    You  know,      how deep does      this go where 5 these plants have a lot of the inspectors take their 6 eyes off the ball and they walk away from the plant 7 while it's starting up because they're afraid that 8 they might interfere with the start-up.
4                    You  know,      how deep does      this go where 5 these plants have a lot of the inspectors take their 6 eyes off the ball and they walk away from the plant 7 while it's starting up because they're afraid that 8 they might interfere with the start-up.
9                    Anybody will start acting conservatively.
9                    Anybody will start acting conservatively.
10 And the plant will get a worse efficiency rating, you 11 know.        And then guys won't build a renaissance,                  the 12 new nukes and stuff like that.                  You know, you can go
10 And the plant will get a worse efficiency rating, you 11 know.        And then guys won't build a renaissance,                  the 12 new nukes and stuff like that.                  You know, you can go 13 on and stuff.
* 13 on and stuff.
14                    And so the NRC basically si ts back and 15 allows        them to do what they want and start up the 16 plant too efficiently without following the rules and 17 stuff.        And it's very problematic.
14                    And so the NRC basically si ts back and 15 allows        them to do what they want and start up the 16 plant too efficiently without following the rules and 17 stuff.        And it's very problematic.
18                    How big of a deal is this throughout the 19 country?        How many plants?        We already know that six 20 didn't declare that they properly entered a mode that 21 they shouldn't have been in.                  I mean, how widespread 22 is that?        You know, this is all about relays and not 23 having adequate repair parts on site and stuff.                            I 24 mean, how big of a problem is that nationwide?
18                    How big of a deal is this throughout the 19 country?        How many plants?        We already know that six 20 didn't declare that they properly entered a mode that 21 they shouldn't have been in.                  I mean, how widespread 22 is that?        You know, this is all about relays and not 23 having adequate repair parts on site and stuff.                            I 24 mean, how big of a problem is that nationwide?
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they      are And then everybody has to scrunch around when starting      to  plan up        and    play    games      and 5 deceive and speak crookedly and that type of stuff.
they      are And then everybody has to scrunch around when starting      to  plan up        and    play    games      and 5 deceive and speak crookedly and that type of stuff.
6                    I mean, you flip into, you know, where you 7 could      repair    the    safety      culture      of    a  plant.          If 8 everybody knows          the NRC        and  the    utility    can      talk 9 crookedly, then, you know, over a plant start-up, then 10 everybody        could    talk    crookedly        if    I  bring      up    a 11 problem,        if I bring up an expensive problem that I 12 discover on my own to the NRC or to a utility.
6                    I mean, you flip into, you know, where you 7 could      repair    the    safety      culture      of    a  plant.          If 8 everybody knows          the NRC        and  the    utility    can      talk 9 crookedly, then, you know, over a plant start-up, then 10 everybody        could    talk    crookedly        if    I  bring      up    a 11 problem,        if I bring up an expensive problem that I 12 discover on my own to the NRC or to a utility.
* 13                    And then you get into these games where, 14 you know, if you get into a destructive culture like 15 that, then you've got good guys and bad guys, you've 16 got a system of intimidation where people who have a 17 conscience are intimidated wi th                    speaking up.            And 18 you've got good guys and bad guys.
13                    And then you get into these games where, 14 you know, if you get into a destructive culture like 15 that, then you've got good guys and bad guys, you've 16 got a system of intimidation where people who have a 17 conscience are intimidated wi th                    speaking up.            And 18 you've got good guys and bad guys.
19                    The good guys might have a lot of issues 20 that are overlooked because they're lenient to the 21 company where a bad guy might catch a lot of problems 22 at the incipient stage.                  And he has        talked as not 23 being a player in the plant and he gets punished.                              He
19                    The good guys might have a lot of issues 20 that are overlooked because they're lenient to the 21 company where a bad guy might catch a lot of problems 22 at the incipient stage.                  And he has        talked as not 23 being a player in the plant and he gets punished.                              He 24 is deemed -- you know, I can make the case that for an 25 operator, you go through so many procedures.                            You go NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
* 24 is deemed -- you know, I can make the case that for an 25 operator, you go through so many procedures.                            You go NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
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5 There are a lot of mistakes made.                      And you go on to 6 the guys you like.              You know,      you exaggerate their 7 problems, and you ignore their mistakes.
5 There are a lot of mistakes made.                      And you go on to 6 the guys you like.              You know,      you exaggerate their 7 problems, and you ignore their mistakes.
8                    And,  you    know,    you      get    this  shift        of 9 people from a good guy and a bad guy.                    The good people 10 get promoted.          The guys that really care about the 11 plant, they get stuffed down in the bottom and stuff.
8                    And,  you    know,    you      get    this  shift        of 9 people from a good guy and a bad guy.                    The good people 10 get promoted.          The guys that really care about the 11 plant, they get stuffed down in the bottom and stuff.
12                    I mean, as an operator, I remember finding
12                    I mean, as an operator, I remember finding 13 a lot of -- you know, over a year and stuff like that, 14 you know.          You have so many procedure changes and 15 stuff.        I mean, you spend days going over operation 16 procedures that have been changed, revised, and stuff 17 like that.
* 13 a lot of -- you know, over a year and stuff like that, 14 you know.          You have so many procedure changes and 15 stuff.        I mean, you spend days going over operation 16 procedures that have been changed, revised, and stuff 17 like that.
18                    The magnitude of what              is going on with 19 these      procedure    revisions        and    stuff    like    that        is 20 astounding.          And    I  just    was    saying      that    with my 21 allegation with the NRC saying that they reviewed so 22 many procedures, I know that they didn't.                        They can't 23 review them all.
18                    The magnitude of what              is going on with 19 these      procedure    revisions        and    stuff    like    that        is 20 astounding.          And    I  just    was    saying      that    with my 21 allegation with the NRC saying that they reviewed so 22 many procedures, I know that they didn't.                        They can't 23 review them all.
What is the object of having that review
What is the object of having that review 24 25 list in the back of the inspection report?                        Is it to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
* 24 25 list in the back of the inspection report?                        Is it to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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* 2 doing work?          Are the inspectors spending too much time 3 looking over procedures when they should be inspecting 4 the plant?          You know, what is going on with that?
* 2 doing work?          Are the inspectors spending too much time 3 looking over procedures when they should be inspecting 4 the plant?          You know, what is going on with that?
5                    So, you know, those are the issues to have 6 wi th thi s      s tart -up.      I'm really worried about not 7 necessarily on just Vermont Yankee.                        You know, a lot 8 of this stuff with these operators being intimidated 9 across the board, I see it a lot.
5                    So, you know, those are the issues to have 6 wi th thi s      s tart -up.      I'm really worried about not 7 necessarily on just Vermont Yankee.                        You know, a lot 8 of this stuff with these operators being intimidated 9 across the board, I see it a lot.
10                    And it worries          me    that    somebody      can't 11 honestly talk about these problems and you're shifted 12 into being a bad guy or a good guy and stuff like
10                    And it worries          me    that    somebody      can't 11 honestly talk about these problems and you're shifted 12 into being a bad guy or a good guy and stuff like 13 that.            It's  unnecessary.              It's      part    of      this 14 Republicanism, you know.
* 13 that.            It's  unnecessary.              It's      part    of      this 14 Republicanism, you know.
15                    This ideology of the objective regulator 16 and all this sort I think is a big problem.                        It got us 17 into so much trouble on Wall Street and stuff like 18 that.          I  think    we    have    to    move      away    from      this 19 Republican NRC, the ideological NRC.
15                    This ideology of the objective regulator 16 and all this sort I think is a big problem.                        It got us 17 into so much trouble on Wall Street and stuff like 18 that.          I  think    we    have    to    move      away    from      this 19 Republican NRC, the ideological NRC.
20                    And,  you know,      utilities have that same 21 problem as being so ideologic Republicanism, so anti 22 -- I mean,        essentially they are anti-United States.
20                    And,  you know,      utilities have that same 21 problem as being so ideologic Republicanism, so anti 22 -- I mean,        essentially they are anti-United States.
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* 2                    You know,      in the background, they really 3 hate because they think the government is the enemy.
* 2                    You know,      in the background, they really 3 hate because they think the government is the enemy.
4 And I        just wonder how        that is,      you know,    how that 5 filters down to somebody overseeing that they hate 6 you.      And they think that the NRC and the government 7 are the bad people.              That must make it horrendously 8 hard for the NRC to oversee a big organization like a 9 nuclear plant.          I think that's a problem there.
4 And I        just wonder how        that is,      you know,    how that 5 filters down to somebody overseeing that they hate 6 you.      And they think that the NRC and the government 7 are the bad people.              That must make it horrendously 8 hard for the NRC to oversee a big organization like a 9 nuclear plant.          I think that's a problem there.
10                    I probably am getting down close to the 11 end of my time.          I mean,      that's what I think is -- I 12 mean,      I could go into detail,            you know.      I haven't
10                    I probably am getting down close to the 11 end of my time.          I mean,      that's what I think is -- I 12 mean,      I could go into detail,            you know.      I haven't 13 gone into a lot of detail in the nuts and bolts of 14 what I know and stuff like that because I don't think 15 this is the place for that.                But, you know, these are 16 my concerns.        I'm almost done.
* 13 gone into a lot of detail in the nuts and bolts of 14 what I know and stuff like that because I don't think 15 this is the place for that.                But, you know, these are 16 my concerns.        I'm almost done.
17                    Here's the crux from my petition in the 18 discussion section.            You see what I'm saying?              These 19 control room people are so smart.                    They all have been 20 trained so much they have gone over and over tech 21 specs training so often.              They had so many quizzes and 22 questions        thrown at      them and      light    in  school      and 23 recall training about tech specs requirements.                          They 24 know these things in and out.                  They see these things
17                    Here's the crux from my petition in the 18 discussion section.            You see what I'm saying?              These 19 control room people are so smart.                    They all have been 20 trained so much they have gone over and over tech 21 specs training so often.              They had so many quizzes and 22 questions        thrown at      them and      light    in  school      and 23 recall training about tech specs requirements.                          They 24 know these things in and out.                  They see these things
* 25 through professional            eyes, NEAL R. GROSS and we COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.w.
* 25 through professional            eyes, NEAL R. GROSS and we COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.w.
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straight  out.      You    see    any NRC licensed Nobody admits these inspectors 5 coming in and out.              And they have truly questioned 6 everyone, including the shift supervisor.
straight  out.      You    see    any NRC licensed Nobody admits these inspectors 5 coming in and out.              And they have truly questioned 6 everyone, including the shift supervisor.
7                    You  know    everybody        is  aware    of    what 8 occurred.        They started up that plant.            And management 9 with the knowledge fiddled with tech specs and the 10 rules.          They  pulled      their      punches    in  publicly 11 reporting this.          Management and the NRC concluded to 12 falsify the whole thing.
7                    You  know    everybody        is  aware    of    what 8 occurred.        They started up that plant.            And management 9 with the knowledge fiddled with tech specs and the 10 rules.          They  pulled      their      punches    in  publicly 11 reporting this.          Management and the NRC concluded to 12 falsify the whole thing.
* 13                    The young licensed operator would say, 14  "Really, what kind of risk              wa~  this to the public?";
13                    The young licensed operator would say, 14  "Really, what kind of risk              wa~  this to the public?";
15 especially thinking about it after it was fixed on 16 June 13th.        He would say there was absolutely no risk 17 to the public.
15 especially thinking about it after it was fixed on 16 June 13th.        He would say there was absolutely no risk 17 to the public.
18                    An astonishing,        chilling thought in the 19 back of 'his mind, he didn't know management and NRC 20 were        colluding    together,        potentially      saving        the 21 company millions of dollars.
18                    An astonishing,        chilling thought in the 19 back of 'his mind, he didn't know management and NRC 20 were        colluding    together,        potentially      saving        the 21 company millions of dollars.
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6 I mean,        that is what their risk-based perception is 7 based      on  this  event      or  is    it    about  a  completely 8 different accident than a simple assumption?
6 I mean,        that is what their risk-based perception is 7 based      on  this  event      or  is    it    about  a  completely 8 different accident than a simple assumption?
9                    What if the site and the licensed operator 10 lived with the idea that the nuclear industry was 11 brutally unjust and they thought they faced the fear 12 of being fired for raising legitimate safety concerns?
9                    What if the site and the licensed operator 10 lived with the idea that the nuclear industry was 11 brutally unjust and they thought they faced the fear 12 of being fired for raising legitimate safety concerns?
* 13                    There    was    only    one way      to  talk    about 14 conditions in the industry.                And everybody only talks 15 with      the    nuclear    industry's        single    voice.        The 16 industry and the NRC have absolute infinite brutal 17 power over these employees with absolutely no human 18 rights.
13                    There    was    only    one way      to  talk    about 14 conditions in the industry.                And everybody only talks 15 with      the    nuclear    industry's        single    voice.        The 16 industry and the NRC have absolute infinite brutal 17 power over these employees with absolutely no human 18 rights.
19                    How much money is human rights worth?                  How 20 much salary would you need if they told you the U.S.
19                    How much money is human rights worth?                  How 20 much salary would you need if they told you the U.S.
21 Constitution was not working on corporate property?
21 Constitution was not working on corporate property?
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8                    At this time, though, I would like to ask 9 if    the    staff    has    any    questions.          Staff    here      at 10  headquarters,          do    you    have    any    questions    for      Mr.
8                    At this time, though, I would like to ask 9 if    the    staff    has    any    questions.          Staff    here      at 10  headquarters,          do    you    have    any    questions    for      Mr.
11  Mulligan?
11  Mulligan?
12                      MR. NAKANISHI:          This      is Tony' Nakanishi
12                      MR. NAKANISHI:          This      is Tony' Nakanishi 13  with Reactor Systems.              I just want to go back to one 14  of the claims you are making regarding falsification.
* 13  with Reactor Systems.              I just want to go back to one 14  of the claims you are making regarding falsification.
15  I didn't hear you really discuss specifics regarding i6  that.        Can you elaborate on the falsification claim 17  and what makes you make that claim?
15  I didn't hear you really discuss specifics regarding i6  that.        Can you elaborate on the falsification claim 17  and what makes you make that claim?
18                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Mr. Mulligan?
18                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Mr. Mulligan?
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20                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Oh, okay.
20                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Oh, okay.
21                      MR. MULLIGAN:          I'm just thinking for a 22  second.
21                      MR. MULLIGAN:          I'm just thinking for a 22  second.
23                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Not a problem.          I just
23                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Not a problem.          I just 24  wanted to make. sure you heard the question.
* 24  wanted to make. sure you heard the question.
25                      MR. MULLIGAN:        Well, you know, how I would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
25                      MR. MULLIGAN:        Well, you know, how I would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 anybody collect any evidence on 5-31-01 during that inspection        when    they carbonized pitted relays and stuff?
4 anybody collect any evidence on 5-31-01 during that inspection        when    they carbonized pitted relays and stuff?
found      the    pitting      in      the 5                  I mean, you know,          see,    from my point of 6 view, you know, I know what my limits are.                      There is 7 a barrier in front of me.              I mean, 2.20, I mean, this 8 thing right here today is usually designed to limit me 9 on seeing what is really going on there.
found      the    pitting      in      the 5                  I mean, you know,          see,    from my point of 6 view, you know, I know what my limits are.                      There is 7 a barrier in front of me.              I mean, 2.20, I mean, this 8 thing right here today is usually designed to limit me 9 on seeing what is really going on there.
10                  So, you know, you say, well, what evidence 11 do I have,      you know?        What evidence does a control 12 room operator have, really, when the reactor level is
10                  So, you know, you say, well, what evidence 11 do I have,      you know?        What evidence does a control 12 room operator have, really, when the reactor level is 13 going down or there is increasing containment leakage 14 in there?
* 13 going down or there is increasing containment leakage 14 in there?
15                  Really, you have to make a judgment.                        I 16 mean,      it's not about evidence.            Evidence you end up 17 talking about        in a    courtroom or you end up going 18 through all the levels of our court system and stuff 19 like that.
15                  Really, you have to make a judgment.                        I 16 mean,      it's not about evidence.            Evidence you end up 17 talking about        in a    courtroom or you end up going 18 through all the levels of our court system and stuff 19 like that.
20                  You  know,    for    operating      a    plant,      you 21 cannot base it on evidence.              You base it on intuition 22 and skills and training and all that sort of stuff.
20                  You  know,    for    operating      a    plant,      you 21 cannot base it on evidence.              You base it on intuition 22 and skills and training and all that sort of stuff.
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I don't have (202) 234-4433          WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701        www.nealrgross.com
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35 1 the evidence in front of me other than what the LER
35 1 the evidence in front of me other than what the LER 2 said, what they found on the 31st.                        And, you know,          I 3 don't know what.            Did they save the relays?                I mean, 4 the evidence is that as soon as they started banging 5 around within relays,              it welded shut and stuff.                    I 6 mean, that's the evidence right there.                        Whenever they 7 were      doing    their    testing and        stuff      like  that,      it 8 welded shut.
* 2 said, what they found on the 31st.                        And, you know,          I 3 don't know what.            Did they save the relays?                I mean, 4 the evidence is that as soon as they started banging 5 around within relays,              it welded shut and stuff.                    I 6 mean, that's the evidence right there.                        Whenever they 7 were      doing    their    testing and        stuff      like  that,      it 8 welded shut.
9                    I  mean,    all of those indications of it 10 being carbonized and relays pitted were the evidence 11 that they weren't going to operate shortly they were 12 going to fail.            And probably they would fail                  in an 13 accident if there was need.
9                    I  mean,    all of those indications of it 10 being carbonized and relays pitted were the evidence 11 that they weren't going to operate shortly they were 12 going to fail.            And probably they would fail                  in an
* 13 accident if there was need.
14                    Does that help at all?              Tom?  Is that what 15 you were talking about?
14                    Does that help at all?              Tom?  Is that what 15 you were talking about?
16                    MR. NAKANISHI:          Yes.        Thanks  for      the 17 response.
16                    MR. NAKANISHI:          Yes.        Thanks  for      the 17 response.
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36 1 an intermittent shorted relay of a                      fuel pool pump.
36 1 an intermittent shorted relay of a                      fuel pool pump.
* 2 And I got a series of investigations and a whole bunch 3 of procedure changes and stuff like that, you know.
2 And I got a series of investigations and a whole bunch 3 of procedure changes and stuff like that, you know.
4                      So I worked at Vermont Yankee for 12 or 13 5 years.        I've also been involved in other events.                      My 6 biggest event was I put a bunch of executives in jail 7 and discovered a $450 million fraud issue with a paper 8 company that was in my area.
4                      So I worked at Vermont Yankee for 12 or 13 5 years.        I've also been involved in other events.                      My 6 biggest event was I put a bunch of executives in jail 7 and discovered a $450 million fraud issue with a paper 8 company that was in my area.
9                      CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:            So  when    you      say 10 "operator,        II you were a        control      room operator or a 11 plant operator?
9                      CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:            So  when    you      say 10 "operator,        II you were a        control      room operator or a 11 plant operator?
12                      MR. MULLIGAN:        A control room operator.
12                      MR. MULLIGAN:        A control room operator.
* 13                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Okay.
13                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Okay.
14                      MR. MULLIGAN:          I    was  licensed      for      a 15 control        room    operator,      but    I    was  working    as      an 16 auxiliary operator at the time we had our issues.
14                      MR. MULLIGAN:          I    was  licensed      for      a 15 control        room    operator,      but    I    was  working    as      an 16 auxiliary operator at the time we had our issues.
17                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          It helps me understand.
17                      CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          It helps me understand.
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37 1 in some ways,          the NRC is not doing its job.
37 1 in some ways,          the NRC is not doing its job.
* 2                    I. mean,    that is the technical problem we 3 always        have,    the communi ty has.              That's  a  complex 4 business that very few people understand what is going 5 on.      And we depend upon the NRC to interpret what is 6 going on.
2                    I. mean,    that is the technical problem we 3 always        have,    the communi ty has.              That's  a  complex 4 business that very few people understand what is going 5 on.      And we depend upon the NRC to interpret what is 6 going on.
7                    CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:          Okay. Any      other 8 questions from headquarters staff?
7                    CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:          Okay. Any      other 8 questions from headquarters staff?
9                    MR. NAKANISHI:          I    guess  this  is    Tony 10 Nakanishi again.              One additional question regarding 11 your claim that the reactor was operated illegally.
9                    MR. NAKANISHI:          I    guess  this  is    Tony 10 Nakanishi again.              One additional question regarding 11 your claim that the reactor was operated illegally.
12 I guess I just want to make sure I understand that one
12 I guess I just want to make sure I understand that one 13 reason you are making that claim is the inspection 14 procedure not confirming wi th the appendix B cri teria.
* 13 reason you are making that claim is the inspection 14 procedure not confirming wi th the appendix B cri teria.
15 I believe that was the only regulation per se that you 16 cite.        Is that the primary reason for concluding that 17 Vermont Yankee operated illegally?
15 I believe that was the only regulation per se that you 16 cite.        Is that the primary reason for concluding that 17 Vermont Yankee operated illegally?
18                    MR. MULLIGAN: Well, again, we get through 19 this, we get to this problem of what can I see.                            And 20 I have a very limited view on that.                      I mean,  I would 21 have to -- you know,              I mean,      my limitation is with 22 tech specs and what is the requirement.
18                    MR. MULLIGAN: Well, again, we get through 19 this, we get to this problem of what can I see.                            And 20 I have a very limited view on that.                      I mean,  I would 21 have to -- you know,              I mean,      my limitation is with 22 tech specs and what is the requirement.
23                    I know what is moral and ethical for the And that      is  that you never attempt              to
23                    I know what is moral and ethical for the And that      is  that you never attempt              to 24 community.
* 24 community.
25 start the reactor up with HPCI only being -- knowingly NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
25 start the reactor up with HPCI only being -- knowingly NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
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38 1 that it would be in a fragile condition where it could
38 1 that it would be in a fragile condition where it could 2 break in an accident.              And that's where the relays, 3 the testing and all that sort of stuff on 34 leads 4 you, was that machine before it even started up wasn't 5 capable        of meeting      its    design      function,  was    an    a 6 fragile state.
* 2 break in an accident.              And that's where the relays, 3 the testing and all that sort of stuff on 34 leads 4 you, was that machine before it even started up wasn't 5 capable        of meeting      its    design      function,  was    an    a 6 fragile state.
7                    And even if they would have gotten past 8 their      testing,    if    they would have        done  some more 9 testing and all that sort of stuff later on in the 10 cycle and stuff,          there was a high likelihood in an 11 accident it would fail.                And,  like I said, plus the 12 cu I ture of Vermont          Yankee would be          in a  degraded 13 condition that this indicates.
7                    And even if they would have gotten past 8 their      testing,    if    they would have        done  some more 9 testing and all that sort of stuff later on in the 10 cycle and stuff,          there was a high likelihood in an 11 accident it would fail.                And,  like I said, plus the 12 cu I ture of Vermont          Yankee would be          in a  degraded
* 13 condition that this indicates.
14                    So the question I would ask is, what does 15 the procedure say in Vermont Yankee specifically on 16 what HPCI has to be, what condition it has to be in 17 before they change the mode switch?
14                    So the question I would ask is, what does 15 the procedure say in Vermont Yankee specifically on 16 what HPCI has to be, what condition it has to be in 17 before they change the mode switch?
18                    I'm pretty sure, you know, that HPCI has 19 to be knowingly functional.                    In other words,          they 20 might have maintenance work on it and all that sort of 21 stuff.        But there has to be assurements to following 22 the procedures and having the skill of the trades and 23 the stuff like that that the people put that stuff
18                    I'm pretty sure, you know, that HPCI has 19 to be knowingly functional.                    In other words,          they 20 might have maintenance work on it and all that sort of 21 stuff.        But there has to be assurements to following 22 the procedures and having the skill of the trades and 23 the stuff like that that the people put that stuff 24 back together in the right way wi th quali ty components 25 and they don't install the greatest components and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
* 24 back together in the right way wi th quali ty components 25 and they don't install the greatest components and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.
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39 1 stuff like that,          you know,        the skill of the craft,
39 1 stuff like that,          you know,        the skill of the craft, 2 however        you  want    to  term      that      stuff  like    that.
* 2 however        you  want    to  term      that      stuff  like    that.
3 They're supposed to have a basic understanding that 4 that machine, even before it's tested, could meet its 5 commi tment and once they get into the testing routines 6 have to start up.            That gives you the insurance that 7 it can meet its intent and stuff like that.
3 They're supposed to have a basic understanding that 4 that machine, even before it's tested, could meet its 5 commi tment and once they get into the testing routines 6 have to start up.            That gives you the insurance that 7 it can meet its intent and stuff like that.
8                    So I would have two questions.              What does 9 the tech spec?          What does the procedure say?              I  really 10 don't have those capabilities to understand if it's 11 technically illegally.
8                    So I would have two questions.              What does 9 the tech spec?          What does the procedure say?              I  really 10 don't have those capabilities to understand if it's 11 technically illegally.
12                    I know morally and ethically but without
12                    I know morally and ethically but without 13 a doubt in my mind that that machine should have been 14 before that mode switch was changed, that that machine 15 should have had brand new relays in there and they 16 didn't.
* 13 a doubt in my mind that that machine should have been 14 before that mode switch was changed, that that machine 15 should have had brand new relays in there and they 16 didn't.
17                    CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:          Okay.      Any    other 18 questions here from headquarters?
17                    CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:          Okay.      Any    other 18 questions here from headquarters?
19                    MR. MULLIGAN:        I mean, you know,          I can't 20 ask      anybody    any  questions        about      what  the    Vermont 21 Yankee's        start-up procedures          say about HPCI.              I'm 22 pretty        sure  there    is  a    signature        in  the  start-up 23 procedure        that  says    HPCI    has    to    be  known    to    be 24 operational.          I am not quite sure what tech spec says
19                    MR. MULLIGAN:        I mean, you know,          I can't 20 ask      anybody    any  questions        about      what  the    Vermont 21 Yankee's        start-up procedures          say about HPCI.              I'm 22 pretty        sure  there    is  a    signature        in  the  start-up 23 procedure        that  says    HPCI    has    to    be  known    to    be 24 operational.          I am not quite sure what tech spec says
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9                    MR. NAKANISHI:          Yes, yes. Thank you.
9                    MR. NAKANISHI:          Yes, yes. Thank you.
10                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            From the region,          are 11 there any regional questions for Mr. Mulligan?
10                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            From the region,          are 11 there any regional questions for Mr. Mulligan?
12                  MR. SETZER:          No,  no questions from the
12                  MR. SETZER:          No,  no questions from the 13 region.        Again, pardon the earlier interruption.                      I 14 realize I spoke out of turn.                But no questions.
* 13 region.        Again, pardon the earlier interruption.                      I 14 realize I spoke out of turn.                But no questions.
15                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            And that's quite all 16 right, but if you do or would like to reiterate, this 17 would be a time.
15                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            And that's quite all 16 right, but if you do or would like to reiterate, this 17 would be a time.
18                    MR. SETZER:        No,  no specific questions.
18                    MR. SETZER:        No,  no specific questions.
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20                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            Understand. Does the 21 licensee have any questions for Mr. Mulligan?
20                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:            Understand. Does the 21 licensee have any questions for Mr. Mulligan?
22                  MR. DEVINCENTIS:            Vermont Yankee has no 23 questions.
22                  MR. DEVINCENTIS:            Vermont Yankee has no 23 questions.
* 24                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          I understand.
24                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          I understand.
25                    MR. MULLIGAN:          You guys have been more NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
25                    MR. MULLIGAN:          You guys have been more NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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41 1 talkative to me than you were last time.                That's good.
41 1 talkative to me than you were last time.                That's good.
* 2                CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Are there any members of 3 the public on the phone?
2                CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Are there any members of 3 the public on the phone?
4                (No response.)
4                (No response.)
5                MR. MULLIGAN:          One    more    thing.          The 6 Peti tion Review Board,        that's      important,      you know.
5                MR. MULLIGAN:          One    more    thing.          The 6 Peti tion Review Board,        that's      important,      you know.
7 That's a request I'm making, that the Petition Review 8 Board become    transparent        in  their      meetings    behind 9 closed doors are recorded and everybody gets                        their 10 comments put on the record so that the community can 11 understand what is going on.            So the -- hello?
7 That's a request I'm making, that the Petition Review 8 Board become    transparent        in  their      meetings    behind 9 closed doors are recorded and everybody gets                        their 10 comments put on the record so that the community can 11 understand what is going on.            So the -- hello?
12                CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Yes.
12                CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          Yes.
* 13                MR. MULLIGAN:          So    the  Peti tion    Review 14 Board could be more of a democratic process.                      Do you 15 understand what I am making with that?
13                MR. MULLIGAN:          So    the  Peti tion    Review 14 Board could be more of a democratic process.                      Do you 15 understand what I am making with that?
16                CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:              Your    point          is 17 understood.
16                CHAIRMAN      BLOUNT:              Your    point          is 17 understood.
18                MR. MULLIGAN:        Okay.      Thank you, not just 19 this, all the times in the future, not just this time, 20 you know, every time that this thing comes up again.
18                MR. MULLIGAN:        Okay.      Thank you, not just 19 this, all the times in the future, not just this time, 20 you know, every time that this thing comes up again.
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10                    THE REPORTER:          Okay.      That was g, as in 11 George?
10                    THE REPORTER:          Okay.      That was g, as in 11 George?
12                    MS. SALGADO:        Correct.
12                    MS. SALGADO:        Correct.
* 13                    THE REPORTER:        Okay. Thank you very much.
13                    THE REPORTER:        Okay. Thank you very much.
14                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          With that -
14                    CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:          With that -
15                    MR. MULLIGAN:          I  would    like  just      two 16 sentences.          I  would    like    to have      everybody to be 17 reminded that the utilities in a general manner are 18 under historic financial pressures and stuff as far as 19 with      their  stock prices        and    cutbacks    on  electric 20 loads.        And they're not bringing in as much money as 21 they did in the past.              And the background of all of 22 this      is  that  the    utility      industry,      the  electric 23 utility industry, is under an historic stressor.                          And 24 that's all I need to say.
15                    MR. MULLIGAN:          I  would    like  just      two 16 sentences.          I  would    like    to have      everybody to be 17 reminded that the utilities in a general manner are 18 under historic financial pressures and stuff as far as 19 with      their  stock prices        and    cutbacks    on  electric 20 loads.        And they're not bringing in as much money as 21 they did in the past.              And the background of all of 22 this      is  that  the    utility      industry,      the  electric 23 utility industry, is under an historic stressor.                          And 24 that's all I need to say.
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6                    (Whereupon,      the    foregoing matter      was 7 concluded at 11:45 a.m.)
6                    (Whereupon,      the    foregoing matter      was 7 concluded at 11:45 a.m.)
8 9
8 9
10 11 12
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* CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:                  Vermont Yankee 10 CFR 2.206 Name of Proceeding: Petition Docket Number:            (n/a)
* CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:                  Vermont Yankee 10 CFR 2.206 Name of Proceeding: Petition Docket Number:            (n/a)

Latest revision as of 11:06, 12 March 2020

G20090335/EDATS: OEDO-2009-0365 - Thomas Blount Letter in Response to Michael Mulligan e-mail Correspondence on June 8, 2009 as Supplemented by e-mails Dated June 11, 2009, and June 19, 2009, Addressed to Executive Director of Operations
ML092180454
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/17/2009
From: Blount T
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To: Mulligan M
- No Known Affiliation
Kim J, NRR/DORL, 415-4125
References
G20090335, NRC-2939, OEDO-2009-0365
Download: ML092180454 (48)
v • d • e


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Mr. Michael Mulligan P.O. Box 161 Hinsdale, NH 03451

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

Your e-mail correspondence dated June 8,2009, as supplemented bye-mails dated June 11 and June 19, 2009, addressed to the Executive Director for Operations has been referred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206. You requested Vermont Yankee pay a fine of $5,250,000 for operating their reactor illegally and unsafely with an inoperable high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system coming out of their start-up after an outage from June 6,2007, until June 12, 2007.

On June 16, 2009, you requested an opportunity to address the Petition Review Board (PRB) prior to its initial meeting to provide supplemental information for the PRB's consideration. By teleconference on July 9, 2009, you provided information to the PRB as further explanation and support for your petition. The transcript of this teleconference is enclosed.

The NRC's PRB met on July 21,2009, to discuss your petition. In addition to the petition, the PRB also considered information you provided via the transcribed teleconference, as supplemented by your e-mail dated July 9, 2009. The PRB's initial recommendation was not to accept your petition because your issues have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation at that facility. The PRB informed you of this determination on July 22, 2009.

Finally, bye-mail dated July 29, 2009, you provided additional supplemental information in response to the PRB's initial recommendation in which you did not provide any new information pertaining to the HPCI system that the PRB had not already considered.

The PRB's final determination is to not accept your petition request for review under the 10 CFR 2.206 process because your petition does not meet the criteria identified in Management Directive 8.11, "Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions" as explained below.

Your concern of an inoperable HPCI system at Vermont Yankee has already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation, for which a resolution has been achieved and the issues have been resolved. As documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000271/2007004, dated November 7, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073110213), the HPCI system was inoperable for approximately 6 days after motor-operated valve (MOV) V23-19 failed to open during a planned surveillance in June 2007. This finding was of very low safety significance as determined by an NRC Phase 3 significance determination using the Vermont Yankee Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model with the following assumptions: (1) a loss of system safety function due to the inoperability of the HPCI system, and (2) the exposure time was approximately 6 days and no operator recovery credit provided. The SPAR model internal event risk assessment yielded a low E-7 increase in core damage 'frequency, or very low safety significance.

M. Mulligan -2 This issue was entered into Entergy's corrective action program and the corrective actions taken included: performing an extent of condition review to identify affected contacts in other systems, evaluating system operability, developing a prioritized replacement schedule based on risk significance, developing criteria for replacement during preventive maintenance activities, and requiring periodic replacement of related heavily loaded MOV contactors.

In addition, Vermont Yankee has implemented "Commercial Dedicated Programs for Procurement" for purchasing the replacement contactors for three DC breaker cubicles (V23-14, V23-16, and V23-21). As short-term corrective actions until the replacement contactors are procured, Entergy performed a visual inspection of the three DC contactors, performed an operability evaluation for the HPCI system, and provided interim guidance to plant operators concerning DC contactor inspections following HPCI valve operations. Vermont Yankee has been successful in procuring the replacement DC contactors suitable for nuclear plant application and these DC contactors are scheduled to be replaced in September 2009.

As discussed above, the NRC staff has reviewed the licensee corrective actions and found them to be appropriate.

Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC.

Sincerely, Thomas Blount, Deputy Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-271

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

Official Transcript of Proceedings

~. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Vermont Yankee 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Docket Number: (n/a)

Location: (telephone conference)

  • Date: Thursday, July 9, 2009 .

Work Order No.: NRC-2939 Pages 1-43 ORIGINAL NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.

Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

  • (202) 234-4433

1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 + + + + +

3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 + + + + +

5 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 6 CONFERENCE CALL 7 + + + + +

8 VERMONT YANKEE 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION FROM 9 MICHAEL MULLIGAN 10 + + + + +

11 THURSDAY, 12 JULY 9, 2009 13 + + + + +

14 15 The above-entitled conference was 16 convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., TOM 17 BLOUNT, PRB Chair, presiding.

18 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF:

19 TOM BLOUNT, PRBChair 20 TANYA MENSAH, 2.206 Coordinator 21 JAMES KIM, Petition Manager and Vermont Yankee 22 Project Manager 23 MOLLY BARKMAN, OGC Advisor 24 TONY NAKANISHI, SRXB, NRR Technical Lead

  • 25 NANCY SALGADO, Branch Chief, LPL 1-1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N'w.

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2 1 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF (Continued):

  • 2 3

4 STACEY ROSENBERG, Branch Chief, Special Projects Branch ERIC BOWMAN, Special Projects Branch 5

6 NRC REGION I:

7 THOMAS SETZER, Senior Project Engineer 8 GARRETT NEWMAN, Project Engineer 9 SARAH RICH, Reactor Engineer 10 11 PETITIONER:

12 MICHAEL MULLIGAN 13 14 LICENSEE (ENTERGY):

15 JIM DEVINCENTIS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

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3 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

  • 2 (10:39 a.m.)

3 MR. KIM: Good morning. I would like to 4 thank everybody for attending this meeting. My name 5 is James Kim. And I am the Vermont Yankee Project 6 Manager.

7 We are here today to allow the peti tioner, 8 Mr. Michael Mulligan, to address the Petition Review 9 Board regarding 2.206 petition dated June 8th, 11, and 10 19, 2009. I am the Petition Manager for the petition.

11 The Petition Review Board Chairman is Tom Blount.

12 As part of the Petition Review Board's 13 review of this peti tion, Mr. Michael Mulligan has 14 requested this opportunity to address the PRB.

15 The meeting is scheduled from 10:30 a.m.

16 to 12:30 p.m. The meeting is being recorded by the 17 NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by a 18 court reporter. The transcript will become a 19 supplement to the petition. The transcript will also 20 be made publicly available.

21 I would like to open this meeting with 22 introductions. As you go around t0e room, please be 23 sure to clearly state your name, your position, and 24 the office that you work for within the NRC for the 25 record. I'll start off.

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4 1 This is James Kim, Vermont Yankee Project

  • 2 3

4 Manager in the Division of Operator Reactor Licensing in NRR.

MR. NAKANISHI: This is Tony Nakanishi.

5 I am with the Reactor Systems Branch of NRR.

6 MS. BARKMAN: This is Molly Barkman, an 7 attorney in the Office of General Counsel.

8 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Tom Blount, Deputy 9 Director for the Division of Policy and rulemaking in 10 NRR, also PRB Chair.

11 MS. MENSAH: Tanya Mensah. I am the 2.206 12 Coordinator in the Office of NRR.

13 MS. ROSENBERG: Stacey Rosenberg. I'm the 14 Branch Chief of the Special Projects Branch in the 15 Division of Policy and rulemaking in NRR.

16 MR. BOWMAN: Eric Bowman. I'm a Project 17 Manager in the Special Projects Branch in the Division 18 of Policy and rulemaking in NRR.

19 MS. SALGADO: I'm Nancy Salgado. I'm the 20 Branch Chief for LTL 1-1 in NRR Division of Operator 21 Reactor Licensing.

22 MR. KIM: We have finished with the 23 introductions at the NRC headquarters. At this time 24 are there any NRC participants from the regional

  • 25 office on the phone?

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5 1 MR. SETZER: Yes. This is Tom Setzer,'

  • 2 3

4 Senior Project Engineer supporting Vermont Yankee.

MR. NEWMAN: This Project Engineer, also in branch V, Vermont Yankee.

is Garrett Newman, 5 MS. RICH: This is Sarah Rich, a reactor 6 engineer In the Technical Support and Assessment 7 Branch.

8 MR. SETZER~ That's all for the region.

9 MR. KIM: Are there any representatives 10 for the licensee on the phone?

11 MR. DEVINCENTIS: Yes. This is Jim 12 Devincentis respecting Vermont Yankee Licensing.

13 MR. KIM: Mr. Mulligan, would you please 14 introduce yourself for the record?

15 MR. MULLIGAN: I am Mike Mulligan. And I 16 live about two miles away from the plant.

17 MR. KIM: Okay. Are there any others on 18 the phone?

19 (No response.)

20 MR. KIM: Hearing none, I would like to 21 emphasize that we each need to speak clearly and 22 loudly to make sure that the Court Reporter can 23 accurately transcribe this meeting. If you do have 24 something that you would like to say, please first

    • 25 state your name for the record.

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6 1 At this time I'll turn it over to the PRB

  • 2 3

4 Chairman: Tom Blount.

CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Good morning.

to this meeting regarding the 2.206 submitted by Mr.

Welcome 5 Mulligan. I would like to first share some background 6 on our process.

7 Section 2.206 of Title X of the Code of 8 Federal Regulations describes the petition process, 9 the primary mechanism for the public to request 10 enforcement action by the NRC in a public process.

11 This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take 12 enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or 13 licensed activities.

14 Depending on the results of its 15 evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend, or revoke an 16 NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate 17 enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC 18 staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition 19 requests is in management directive 8.11, which is 20 publicly available.

21 The purpose of today's meeting is to give 22 the peti tioner an opportuni ty to provide any 23 additional explanation or support for the petition 24 before the Petition Review Board's initial

  • 25 consideration and recommendation.

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7 1 This meeting is not a hearing. Nor is it 2 an opportunity for the petitioner to question or 3 examine the PRB on the merits or the issues presented 4 in the petition request.

5 No decisions regarding the merits of this 6 petition will be made at this meeting.

7 Following this meeting, the Petition 8 Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations.

9 The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed 10 with the petitioner.

11 The Petition Review Board typically 12 consists of a Chairman, usually a manager at the 13 Senior Executive Service level at the NRC. It has a 14 Petition Manager and a PRB Coordinator. Other members 15 of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on 16 the content of the information in the petition 17 request.

18 At this time I would like to introduce the 19 Board. I am Tom Blount, the Petition Review Board 20 Chairman. James Kim is the Petition Manager for the 21 petition under discussion today. Tanya Mensah is the 22 office's PRB Coordinator.

23 Our technical staff includes Tony 24 Nakanishi from the Office of Nuclear Reactor

  • 25 Regulation's Reactor Systems Branch; NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

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8 1 from NRC Region I's Division of Reactor Projects. We

  • 2 also obtain advice from our Office of General Counsel, 3 represented by Molly Barkman.

4 As described in our process, the NRC staff 5 may ask clarifying questions in order to better 6 understand the petitioner's presentation and to reach 7 a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the 8 peti tioner' s requests for review under the 2.206 9 process.

10 I would like to summarize the scope of the 11 petition under consideration and the NRC activities to 12 date. On June 8th, 2008, as supplemented bye-mails 13 on June 11th and 19th, 2009 -- let me reiterate. On 14 June 8th, 2009, as supplemented bye-mails on June 15 11th and 19th, 2009, Mr. Mulligan submitted a petition 16 to NRC under 2.206 regarding the Vermont Yankee 17 Nuclear Power Station.

18 In this request, in this peti tion request, 19 Mr. Mulligan requested that the NRC fine Vermont 20 Yankee $5,250,000 for operating their reactor 21 illegally and unsafe1y with an inoperable 22 high-pressure coolant injection system coming out of 23 their start-up after an outage from June 6, 2007 until 24 June 12, 2007.

  • 25 The petitioner raised a concern that the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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9 1 NRC-approved inspection report 2003-03 of the Vermont

  • 2 3

4 Yankee operating wi th operating instruction 5210 being contrary to 10 CFR 50, appendix B, also questioned whether Entergy had implemented the DC criterion V. He 5 contractor inspection on the three cri tical HPCI 6 valves, V23-14, V23-16, and V23-21, using the revised 7 inspection guidance since June 2007.

8 Allow me to discuss the NRC activities to 9 date. On June 16th, the peti tioner requested to 10 address the PRB prior to its ini tial meeting and 11 requested time to prepare supplemental information for 12 the Board's consideration.

13 As a reminder for the phone participants, 14 please identify yourself if you make any remarks as 15 this will help us in the preparation of the meeting 16 transcript that will be made publicly available.

17 Thank you.

18 Mr. Mulligan, I'll turn it over to you to 19 allow you to provide any information you believe the 20 PRB should consider as part of this petition. At this 21 time you will have one hour to present additional 22 information in support of your petition to the PRB.

23 We will provide you with notification when there are 24 ten minutes remaining as we approach the end of the

  • 25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

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10 1 Mr. Mulligan?

2 MR. MULLIGAN: Yes, sir?

3 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: The floor is yours.

4 MR. MULLIGAN: I've got some cleanup stuff 5 to do here first. I want to report that I made a 6 complaint about the general fairness of the 2.206 7 process. And essentially James had told me it was 8 referred to the OIG, the series of concerns I had and 9 stuff like that.

10 So I accepted that. And then the next 11 morning I called up the OIG. And Cheryl Windsor told 12 me she didn't know anything about it or anything like 13 that.

14 I do know that the NRC has issues with 15 their document and internal communications and all 16 that sort of stuff, but that's the sense that I have.

17 A lot of times NRC inspectors will tell me that I'm 18 reporting this -- I'll make a report to the OIG about 19 this concern.

20 I mean, it sounds like, from my point of 21 view, it sounds like you just throw my issue in the 22 wastebasket and nothing ever becomes of it with the 23 OIG. In the past, they never call me or inquire about 24 the concern or anything. I never hear anything from

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11 1 it to the OIG.

2 And I just wanted to make sure that that 3 was clear that from that she acknowledged that she 4 didn' t receive anything from James or his boss or 5 anything like that and in a sense of fairness and 6 integrity right there with these types of things. So 7 that's one thing.

8 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Before you pass on that, 9 could I offer some insight? This is Tom Blount.

10 MR. MULLIGAN: Yes.

11 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: We understand, and I 12 received your e-mail or I saw a copy of it. So I then 13 subsequently also called the OIG's office to let them 14 know that you had wanted to follow up.

15 The OIG does not as a practice provide the 16 staff with insight or information 'on what they are 17 investigating or how that investigation is proceeding, 18 but I would encourage you to continue to interact wi th 19 the OIG as you deem necessary and appropriate because 20 they are a separate function of the* process.

21, So I just wanted to. let you know that we 22 here at the staff level don't necessarily have insight 23 that we could share with you other than to provide you 24 the information that it is recognized that we put that

  • 25 information forward as we have indicated.

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12 1 don't get into the machinations or mechanisms that the 2 OIG will employ to evaluate or investigate.

3 MR. MULLIGAN: But you understand what I'm 4 saying. I called him the next morning. James told me 5 the report was made. And then the next morning I 6 called up, and she said she never heard of me. I just 7 want to make that clear.

8 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: I unders tand . Thank you 9 very much. And we recognize and hear your concern .

. 10 MR. MULL;I:GAN: I also made a request 11 because, I mean, this is all I mean, everything for 12 the NRC is supposed to be in support of the peoples, 13 the community, and all that sort of stuff. Really, 14 that is what the NRC is about and stuff.

15 And I have an issue with the Petition 16 Review Board. I made a request that their 17 deliberations we are in a democracy, and their 18 deliberations should be transparent and recorded and 19 available for the public to understand how the process 20 goes behind closed doors.

21. I don't understand why the PRB Board is 22 not a democratic, transparent presentation and stuff.

23 You know, with the internet and all that sort of 24 stuff; it's easy to make it accessible to everybody.

  • 25 So that's that.

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13 1 I would like to remind everybody that I

  • 2 3

4 realized how much of a privileged position I am in as far as being a United States citizen.

here.

I mean, I sit And I am making a petition to the United States 5 government.

6 And I'm asking for some kind of an action 7 be taken against a corporation. I know that that is 8 an extraordinarily privileged position to be on the 9 planet, with all the rest of the countries, United 10 States affords a little guy like me to face, at least 11 complain about, a big corporation, big power center, 12 and stuff like that.

13 And I know and I feel as though I'm a very 14 privileged individual to be a United States citizen.

15 And I think Uni ted States of America is the best 16 country in the world. And God bless America. I just 17 want everybody to know how I feel about the United 18 States.

19 Just for some background information, the 20 Fitzpatrick plant recently had some issues with their 21 HPCI. Well, they didn't have any issues. They 22 admitted back in 2006 the -- the license event report 23 number is 2006-02-01. That's rev. 1.

24 And it just recently came out on June 10th 25 and basically declaring that they didn't disclose a -

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14 1 when they made a mode change in their reactor, they

  • 2 should have disclosed it back in 2006. And they're 3 just getting around to disclosing it right now and 4 stuff. So that's the kind of background. There are 5 other issues as far as mode changes.

6 Now I'm referencing inspection report, 7 Vermont Yankee inspection report, 2009-006. I'm 8 paraphrasing this. Basically it goes through a -

9 Vermont Yankee had issues during 2007 with starting up 10 the plant.

11 And it goes through a bunch of issues with 12 relays. I believe there were five of them that should 13 have been inspected. And they were over their limit 14 as far as they should have been replaced.

15 And it goes on to talk about up until 16 2008, they really didn't replace or inspect all of the 17 HPCI relays they were supposed to replace.

18 After 2008, they kept asking permission to 19 lay the inspection stuff like that. Really, in the 20 inspection reports, we really don't have an 21 understanding why those relays weren't being 22 inspected. You would expect that, you know, you would 23 get an indication and they would replace the component 24 as fast as they can.

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15 1 don't get an idea why. They kind of tell you the

  • 2 3

4 matter of fact information of what is going on.

they don't really get into the motives and all that sort of stuff. It's a problem wi th I think But the 5 inspection process.

6 Also in 2007, when this occurred, I find 7 it suspicious that the NRC didn't completely describe 8 it in their following inspection report. The events 9 surrounding the start-up of 2007, whenever that was, 10 06-08-07, you know, why didn't the inspection -- why 11 wasn't the NRC documenting what was going on and 12 getting it down in the record for us to understand 13 what was going on?

14 You know, there's the issues of notifying 15 the rest of the industry of defense going on. And I'm 16 surprised. I mean, that is part of what the NRC is 17 supposed to be doing. They're supposed to be 18 documenting these things as it occurs as completely as 19 they can and stuff like that. In this case there 20 really wasn't a mention of the problems wi th the 21 relays until the end of the year 2007.

22 I think that's a big problem with the NRC 23 not meeting the community's needs of immediately 24 understanding what is going on with the components .

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16 1 information in front of us right immediately, we would

  • 2 3

4 tend to raise a ruckus and force the correction of these problems at an early stage, instead of .waiting two years afterwards.

5 Back to that newest inspection report, 6 again, they have this new violation. What was the 7 violation? The first violation was they didn't do it 8 according to NRC regulations. What is this one here 9 about? Well, anyways, why? I don't understand why 10 this kind of information is mostly available back in 11 2007.

12 Why are we hearing it now? Why aren't we 13 hearing all of these problems immediately when they 14 occur or shortly after or at least in the inspection, 15 the next inspection report? Why are we going through 16 these cycles of two years hearing about these 17 violations two years later?

18 I mean, it doesn't make sense, really. I 19 think in order for NRC to be effective, all of these 20 issues should be as far as if they can raise them or 21 it's known - - and it looks like these things were 22 known, -- instead of waiting for to go through this 23 mechanical inspection routine process or whatever you 24 guys call it, these folks showing up two years after

  • 25 the event.

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17 1 I think, you know, it's like getting a 2 speeding ticket on the road and then getting pulled 3 over two years later on and the police officer is 4 saying, "Well, you speeded two years ago. And here is 5 the ticket for it" and stuff.

6 I just don't think it's fair to anybody.

7 I think these things have to be acknowledged 8 immediately, have to be outed, and the community has 9 to be alerted. If there is a response that is 10 necessary from the community, then everybody will be 11 forced to correct these problems at the earliest 12 opportunity.

13 MR. SETZER: Excuse me, Mr. Mulligan. If 14 I could just interrupt for a minute? I've got a 15 question for the panel. Tom Blount, would it be 16 inappropriate or appropriate for me to shed some light 17 on the two-year issue that Mr. Mulligan has or is that 18 not part of this hearing?

19 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: I'm sorry. Who am I 20 speaking to?

21 MR. SETZER: I'm sorry. This is Tom 22 Setzer. I'm a senior project engineer, region I.

23 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Well, first of all, 24 let's be clear that this is not a hearing.

  • 25 MR. SETZER: Okay.

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18 1 term "loosely." This meeting.

  • 2 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: I understand. so is 3 there insight that you think would be beneficial to 4 Mr. Mulligan to understand that? This is his 5 opportunity to speak to us to support his petition.

6 MR. SETZER: Okay.

7 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: So I really would like 8 to hear from Mr. Mulligan.

9 MR. SETZER: Understood. I just thought 10 I could help clarify one point that would help Mr.

11 Mulligan. But if that's not the point and time to do 12 that, we'll 13 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: So if you could take 14 note of that question and then we can come back to 15 revisit that?

16 MR. SETZER: Certainly. All right. Sorry 17 for the interruption. Go ahead, Mr. Mulligan.

18 MR. MULLIGAN: Now, in a prior recent 19 report talking about the diesel generator, they 20 basically did the same thing as far as, you know, 21 finding these problems many months and a year or so 22 after it occurred and then reporting it to the public 23 and stuff.

24 The problem I see with the NRC generally

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19 1 Everybody is process-driven. Everybody has got these

  • 2 CARs and CR reports and all this sort of stuff.

3 You've got a ton of processes, and they are 4 complicated and they're exotic and stuff like that.

5 I think I get the feeling, you guys, the 6 process 1S the goal. You have a problem. You throw 7 the clothes in the washing machine. Another problem 8 comes up. You throw the clothes in the washing 9 machine. And basically you never take the clothes out 10 of the washing machine and put them in the dryer.

11 Really, I don't get a feeling -- I mean, 12 this is the latest inspection report about the really 13 problem. Why does this go on for so long? Why is 14 this going on until later on this year? Why are these 15 relays problems not being fixed immediately and stuff?

16 So I think you're process-driven. The 17 goal is when you have a problem when you want to 18 explain it to a guy like me or the public is you say, 19 "Well, we'll throw this in this process. We'll throw 20 it just in this agency process." And that's the goal 21 of regulation.

22 The goal of regulation is not to sit there 23 and say, you know, we can't let this happen again.

24 We've got to modify it. The results of the inspection

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20 1 their behavior. They have to change their behavior.

  • 2 3

4 it r~ally I mean, doesn't what I lend to see across the board is that you go through this convoluted ROP program.

a change in utility And 5 behaviors. You don't have enough horsepower in order 6 to get the utility to change their behavior. I mean, 7 I think the utility should respond without a 8 horsepower, but it seems that ~n a lot of cases they 9 don't.

10 Also I have seen issues where these 11 utility folks rope-a-dope the inspectors. That is, 12 they play games, bureaucratic games. And the 13 inspector has an issue. And then they will make an 14 engineering evaluation, a shallow engineering 15 evaluation, that they know is not correct. And then 16 the NRC will have to come back and spend a lot of time 17 to counteract that with their own evaluation.

18 And you end up, you know, the utility has 19 800 people. The NRC only has two inspectors on site 20 and stuff like that. So the game is fixed. You know, 21 they can tie up the hands repeatedly with these kind 22 of rope-a-doping game and trying to exhaust the NRC 23 and stuff because, you know, they're chasing their 24 tails and they're not looking at new events showing up 25 and stuff.

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21 1 So I generally have an issue as far as the

  • 2 ability of the utilities to not directly answer the 3 problem. Again, basically, I mean, as far as the 4 LERs, we can go back. And we can talk about the LER, 5 Vermont Yankee LER, 207 wait a minute. I want 6 to make sure this is right. That's good, 207002-01.

7 And I've done a lot of work in the last 8 couple of weeks with NRC in trying to understand how 9 the license event reports work and stuff. And 10 essentially what I've come out of that is that there 11 is no -- I can't trust what an LER says from these 12 last interactions wi th the NRC with the last two 13 weeks, specifically about inspection report and LER.

14 Essentially the guidance is written so 15 loosely. And who knows what they report and stuff 16 like that? So I have no confidence that LER exposes 17 all of the problems associated with an event. I don't 18 understand. I don't really understand the reason why 19 the guidance is written that way. I can hazard a 20 guess. It's part of the Republican nuclear ideology 21 of being objective and all that sort of stuff and not 22 forcing the utilities to explain what their problems 23 are and all that sort of stuff.

24 And that's my guess. So I would for

  • 25 example, this SER that the company wrote back in 2007.

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22 1 And my basic gist if back in 05-31-07, the contractors

  • 2 were carbonized, and they were fitted. To me those 3 are indications that HPCI was not functional.

4 Once they got started up, instead of doing 5 the testing, there are issues with passing the system, 6 operational tests, minimum flow tests, whatever. I'm 7 not sure exactly how it goes and stuff like that.

8 And then they started doing dull stroking 9 and stuff. And then in the flow tests, the full flow 10 tests, the valve didn't work. And, you know, they 11 inappropriately shifted this event into two separate 12 events.

13 You know, when they valve didn't work, 14 they should have said, nOh, you know, we never proved 15 HPCI was operational when the pressure was 150 pounds.

16 We never had a minimum flow test. We never met the 17 tint of the minimum flow test."

18 Because our procedures were defective, we 19 should have assumed that HPCI was always broken before 20 we even started up. And the conservative thing would 21 have been to shut down immediately. And essentially 22 it would then realized that the procedure was 23 inadequate and not accounting to the NRC requirements.

24 And then you would have shifted into not 25 an isolated problem and say systemic problem with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

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23 1 Vermont Yankee. Then you would have had training.

2 You know, the full details would have been disclosed.

3 And you had a couple or three days of training, stuff 4 like that and what went wrong, and all that short of 5 stuff. And then you start it back up.

6 And Vermont Yankee could have bragged 7 about what they did and stuff like that. But, 8 instead, everybody played the "Let's be quiet" game.

9 And essentially it took you until operational and 10 stuff.

11 So that's how, you know, people are 12 supposed to recognize their problems and correct them, 13 you know. Even if you deny it in the beginning beyond 14 usually deny it, eventually people come back and keep 15 hounding us on it.

16 Well, then we see what we are doing is 17 wrong. And then we try and correct it and stuff. And 18 I really don't see that the system is trying to engage 19 Vermont Yankee and many other utilities with the 20 intent of making them change their behavior, not with 21 the intent of throwing a problem into a problem. I 22 think that's a big problem with the NRC. They're 23 process-driven. They're not behavior-driven. They 24 don't shoot for a change in behavior .

  • 25 I also noticed -

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24 1 (Pause. )

2 MR. MULLIGAN: I'm sorry. I'm trying to 3 fiddle with my computer.

4 I also did an award check on OP-5310, 5 motor control center. And, I mean, this is just a -

6 it's not a detailed check or anything like that. But 7 in inspection report 2002-03 in 2001, OP-5210, rev.

8 10, MCC inspection, in 2001, they're up to rev. 10.

9 In 2007, OP-5210 is up to rev. 12. In June 3rd of 10 2009, they're up to rev. 29.

11 I could make the case and I made an 12 allegation to the NRC that where I get this out of is 13 the back side of the inspection report, the list of 14 documents reviewed from the NRC and stuff.

15 So, you know, the conclusion I draw is 16 that the NRC prior to the .2007 Vermont Yankee 17 start-up, the NRC approved of the OP-5210 inspection 18 procedure of the switchgear or the relay cabinet and 19 stuff. I mean, essentially the NRC declared that back 20 in at least 2001.

21 I'm not sure, you know, if they later did 22 a review of documents, you know, but what is an NRC 23 review of documents? I asked them, what is the 24 definition of that type of thing? And I get nothing

  • 25 from nobody and stuff like that.

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25 1 Review if you look at the common usage and 2 stuff like that, that implies that the NRC goes in 3 details and looks up all the documents in the back of 4 the inspection report.

5 Thus, the conclusion I draw is the 6 violation that Vermont Yankee was cited for in 2007, 7 the inadequacies that they were cited for, they didn't 8 have inspection criteria and stuff.

9 You know, not having inspection criteria 10 generally lends to* the idea that if you have an 11 inspection criteria, then you would have to either 12 fail it or pass it and stuff like that. And you would 13 have less of an operational flexibility and stuff like 14 that.

15 So I am saying that the NRC approved of 16 that procedure they used in 2007 to start up Vermont 17 Yankee and start up that HPCI system. The NRC 18 according to the reports inspected and approved that 19 procedure that was in accord to 10 CFR 50 appendix B 20 cri terion 5 and stuff. So the NRC approved tha t 21 improper Vermont Yankee procedure.

22 I mean, I can make a case through the 23 records that that is what the NRC did and stuff. And so, again, you kriow, I just have issues here. You 24 25 know, we could sit I mean, what this is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

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26 1 interesting, I mean, to me it is that what does this

  • 2 mean as far as all of these plants starting up after 3 an outage and stuff like that.

4 You know, how deep does this go where 5 these plants have a lot of the inspectors take their 6 eyes off the ball and they walk away from the plant 7 while it's starting up because they're afraid that 8 they might interfere with the start-up.

9 Anybody will start acting conservatively.

10 And the plant will get a worse efficiency rating, you 11 know. And then guys won't build a renaissance, the 12 new nukes and stuff like that. You know, you can go 13 on and stuff.

14 And so the NRC basically si ts back and 15 allows them to do what they want and start up the 16 plant too efficiently without following the rules and 17 stuff. And it's very problematic.

18 How big of a deal is this throughout the 19 country? How many plants? We already know that six 20 didn't declare that they properly entered a mode that 21 they shouldn't have been in. I mean, how widespread 22 is that? You know, this is all about relays and not 23 having adequate repair parts on site and stuff. I 24 mean, how big of a problem is that nationwide?

  • 25 You know, these plants are betting old.

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27 1 And these companies are going out of business. How

  • 2 3

4 big of a problem is that with them finding repair parts?

they are And then everybody has to scrunch around when starting to plan up and play games and 5 deceive and speak crookedly and that type of stuff.

6 I mean, you flip into, you know, where you 7 could repair the safety culture of a plant. If 8 everybody knows the NRC and the utility can talk 9 crookedly, then, you know, over a plant start-up, then 10 everybody could talk crookedly if I bring up a 11 problem, if I bring up an expensive problem that I 12 discover on my own to the NRC or to a utility.

13 And then you get into these games where, 14 you know, if you get into a destructive culture like 15 that, then you've got good guys and bad guys, you've 16 got a system of intimidation where people who have a 17 conscience are intimidated wi th speaking up. And 18 you've got good guys and bad guys.

19 The good guys might have a lot of issues 20 that are overlooked because they're lenient to the 21 company where a bad guy might catch a lot of problems 22 at the incipient stage. And he has talked as not 23 being a player in the plant and he gets punished. He 24 is deemed -- you know, I can make the case that for an 25 operator, you go through so many procedures. You go NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

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28 1 through so many valve lineups and all sorts of

  • 2 3

4 verification.

You will sign tens of thousands of things away a year and stuff. And everybody makes a mistake.

5 There are a lot of mistakes made. And you go on to 6 the guys you like. You know, you exaggerate their 7 problems, and you ignore their mistakes.

8 And, you know, you get this shift of 9 people from a good guy and a bad guy. The good people 10 get promoted. The guys that really care about the 11 plant, they get stuffed down in the bottom and stuff.

12 I mean, as an operator, I remember finding 13 a lot of -- you know, over a year and stuff like that, 14 you know. You have so many procedure changes and 15 stuff. I mean, you spend days going over operation 16 procedures that have been changed, revised, and stuff 17 like that.

18 The magnitude of what is going on with 19 these procedure revisions and stuff like that is 20 astounding. And I just was saying that with my 21 allegation with the NRC saying that they reviewed so 22 many procedures, I know that they didn't. They can't 23 review them all.

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29 1 fluff up the NRC to make everybody look like they're

  • 2 doing work? Are the inspectors spending too much time 3 looking over procedures when they should be inspecting 4 the plant? You know, what is going on with that?

5 So, you know, those are the issues to have 6 wi th thi s s tart -up. I'm really worried about not 7 necessarily on just Vermont Yankee. You know, a lot 8 of this stuff with these operators being intimidated 9 across the board, I see it a lot.

10 And it worries me that somebody can't 11 honestly talk about these problems and you're shifted 12 into being a bad guy or a good guy and stuff like 13 that. It's unnecessary. It's part of this 14 Republicanism, you know.

15 This ideology of the objective regulator 16 and all this sort I think is a big problem. It got us 17 into so much trouble on Wall Street and stuff like 18 that. I think we have to move away from this 19 Republican NRC, the ideological NRC.

20 And, you know, utilities have that same 21 problem as being so ideologic Republicanism, so anti 22 -- I mean, essentially they are anti-United States.

23 They hate the government and stuff like that. And I 24 wonder how that really filters down into like the

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30 1 utility hates the government so much.

  • 2 You know, in the background, they really 3 hate because they think the government is the enemy.

4 And I just wonder how that is, you know, how that 5 filters down to somebody overseeing that they hate 6 you. And they think that the NRC and the government 7 are the bad people. That must make it horrendously 8 hard for the NRC to oversee a big organization like a 9 nuclear plant. I think that's a problem there.

10 I probably am getting down close to the 11 end of my time. I mean, that's what I think is -- I 12 mean, I could go into detail, you know. I haven't 13 gone into a lot of detail in the nuts and bolts of 14 what I know and stuff like that because I don't think 15 this is the place for that. But, you know, these are 16 my concerns. I'm almost done.

17 Here's the crux from my petition in the 18 discussion section. You see what I'm saying? These 19 control room people are so smart. They all have been 20 trained so much they have gone over and over tech 21 specs training so often. They had so many quizzes and 22 questions thrown at them and light in school and 23 recall training about tech specs requirements. They 24 know these things in and out. They see these things

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31 1 through an outsider's eyes.

  • 2 3

4 things Imagine you are a young, fresh, operator up in the control room.

straight out. You see any NRC licensed Nobody admits these inspectors 5 coming in and out. And they have truly questioned 6 everyone, including the shift supervisor.

7 You know everybody is aware of what 8 occurred. They started up that plant. And management 9 with the knowledge fiddled with tech specs and the 10 rules. They pulled their punches in publicly 11 reporting this. Management and the NRC concluded to 12 falsify the whole thing.

13 The young licensed operator would say, 14 "Really, what kind of risk wa~ this to the public?";

15 especially thinking about it after it was fixed on 16 June 13th. He would say there was absolutely no risk 17 to the public.

18 An astonishing, chilling thought in the 19 back of 'his mind, he didn't know management and NRC 20 were colluding together, potentially saving the 21 company millions of dollars.

22 If I catch a safety effect that was going 23 to cost Entergy millions of dollars, what chance does 24 my career have to prevail if the NRC and management

  • 25 are in cahoots for the big bucks?

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32 1 lie, saying I'm an incompetent operator with a mental

  • 2 3

4 illness. And I could lose my job over safety effects of the NRC and my company.

So everybody, the NRC interprets this as 5 what is the risk of losing HPCI and stuff like that.

6 I mean, that is what their risk-based perception is 7 based on this event or is it about a completely 8 different accident than a simple assumption?

9 What if the site and the licensed operator 10 lived with the idea that the nuclear industry was 11 brutally unjust and they thought they faced the fear 12 of being fired for raising legitimate safety concerns?

13 There was only one way to talk about 14 conditions in the industry. And everybody only talks 15 with the nuclear industry's single voice. The 16 industry and the NRC have absolute infinite brutal 17 power over these employees with absolutely no human 18 rights.

19 How much money is human rights worth? How 20 much salary would you need if they told you the U.S.

21 Constitution was not working on corporate property?

22 Would you sell your Constitution rights for $100,000 23 a year in benefits?

24 The utility and the NRC are saying that

  • 25 our story is the absolute facts.

NEAL R. GROSS Our story can't be COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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33 1 contradicted. The truth is disconnected from real

  • 2

.3 4

reality.

standing Your story or evidence will never have any in our dehumanization, nothing is.

system . If this isn't brutal 5 And I think that's it. Yes. I'm done.

6 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Well, Mr. Mulligan, 7 thank you very much. This is Tom Blount.

8 At this time, though, I would like to ask 9 if the staff has any questions. Staff here at 10 headquarters, do you have any questions for Mr.

11 Mulligan?

12 MR. NAKANISHI: This is Tony' Nakanishi 13 with Reactor Systems. I just want to go back to one 14 of the claims you are making regarding falsification.

15 I didn't hear you really discuss specifics regarding i6 that. Can you elaborate on the falsification claim 17 and what makes you make that claim?

18 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Mr. Mulligan?

19 MR. MULLIGAN: Yes.

20 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Oh, okay.

21 MR. MULLIGAN: I'm just thinking for a 22 second.

23 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Not a problem. I just 24 wanted to make. sure you heard the question.

25 MR. MULLIGAN: Well, you know, how I would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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34 1 look at it was what is the evidence? I mean, did

  • 2 3

4 anybody collect any evidence on 5-31-01 during that inspection when they carbonized pitted relays and stuff?

found the pitting in the 5 I mean, you know, see, from my point of 6 view, you know, I know what my limits are. There is 7 a barrier in front of me. I mean, 2.20, I mean, this 8 thing right here today is usually designed to limit me 9 on seeing what is really going on there.

10 So, you know, you say, well, what evidence 11 do I have, you know? What evidence does a control 12 room operator have, really, when the reactor level is 13 going down or there is increasing containment leakage 14 in there?

15 Really, you have to make a judgment. I 16 mean, it's not about evidence. Evidence you end up 17 talking about in a courtroom or you end up going 18 through all the levels of our court system and stuff 19 like that.

20 You know, for operating a plant, you 21 cannot base it on evidence. You base it on intuition 22 and skills and training and all that sort of stuff.

23 And you make judgment calls that you don't have the 24 capability to do in a courtroom and stuff.

  • 25 So I know my limitations.

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35 1 the evidence in front of me other than what the LER 2 said, what they found on the 31st. And, you know, I 3 don't know what. Did they save the relays? I mean, 4 the evidence is that as soon as they started banging 5 around within relays, it welded shut and stuff. I 6 mean, that's the evidence right there. Whenever they 7 were doing their testing and stuff like that, it 8 welded shut.

9 I mean, all of those indications of it 10 being carbonized and relays pitted were the evidence 11 that they weren't going to operate shortly they were 12 going to fail. And probably they would fail in an 13 accident if there was need.

14 Does that help at all? Tom? Is that what 15 you were talking about?

16 MR. NAKANISHI: Yes. Thanks for the 17 response.

18 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: This is Tim Blount. Mr.

19 Mulligan, just for my clarification and understanding, 20 are you currently or previously an operator at the 21 facility?

22 MR. MULLIGAN: Yes, I was.

23 matter of fact, in 1993, I was fired from Vermont 24 Yankee or, actually, we had an agreement, but,

  • 25 actually, the interesting thing was that it was over NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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36 1 an intermittent shorted relay of a fuel pool pump.

2 And I got a series of investigations and a whole bunch 3 of procedure changes and stuff like that, you know.

4 So I worked at Vermont Yankee for 12 or 13 5 years. I've also been involved in other events. My 6 biggest event was I put a bunch of executives in jail 7 and discovered a $450 million fraud issue with a paper 8 company that was in my area.

9 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: So when you say 10 "operator, II you were a control room operator or a 11 plant operator?

12 MR. MULLIGAN: A control room operator.

13 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Okay.

14 MR. MULLIGAN: I was licensed for a 15 control room operator, but I was working as an 16 auxiliary operator at the time we had our issues.

17 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: It helps me understand.

18 MR. MULLIGAN: You know, that was in 1993.

19 I have more technical information, but I do not keep 20 up with the documents and'stuff like that. I know my 21 limitations. I have very little -- you know, I mean, 22 you guys are the experts.

23 I actually have to depend upon the NRC to 24 be my lens and to be able to see what is going on and

  • 25 stuff like that, you know.

NEAL R. GROSS Like I'm saying, I think COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

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37 1 in some ways, the NRC is not doing its job.

2 I. mean, that is the technical problem we 3 always have, the communi ty has. That's a complex 4 business that very few people understand what is going 5 on. And we depend upon the NRC to interpret what is 6 going on.

7 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Okay. Any other 8 questions from headquarters staff?

9 MR. NAKANISHI: I guess this is Tony 10 Nakanishi again. One additional question regarding 11 your claim that the reactor was operated illegally.

12 I guess I just want to make sure I understand that one 13 reason you are making that claim is the inspection 14 procedure not confirming wi th the appendix B cri teria.

15 I believe that was the only regulation per se that you 16 cite. Is that the primary reason for concluding that 17 Vermont Yankee operated illegally?

18 MR. MULLIGAN: Well, again, we get through 19 this, we get to this problem of what can I see. And 20 I have a very limited view on that. I mean, I would 21 have to -- you know, I mean, my limitation is with 22 tech specs and what is the requirement.

23 I know what is moral and ethical for the And that is that you never attempt to 24 community.

25 start the reactor up with HPCI only being -- knowingly NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

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38 1 that it would be in a fragile condition where it could 2 break in an accident. And that's where the relays, 3 the testing and all that sort of stuff on 34 leads 4 you, was that machine before it even started up wasn't 5 capable of meeting its design function, was an a 6 fragile state.

7 And even if they would have gotten past 8 their testing, if they would have done some more 9 testing and all that sort of stuff later on in the 10 cycle and stuff, there was a high likelihood in an 11 accident it would fail. And, like I said, plus the 12 cu I ture of Vermont Yankee would be in a degraded 13 condition that this indicates.

14 So the question I would ask is, what does 15 the procedure say in Vermont Yankee specifically on 16 what HPCI has to be, what condition it has to be in 17 before they change the mode switch?

18 I'm pretty sure, you know, that HPCI has 19 to be knowingly functional. In other words, they 20 might have maintenance work on it and all that sort of 21 stuff. But there has to be assurements to following 22 the procedures and having the skill of the trades and 23 the stuff like that that the people put that stuff 24 back together in the right way wi th quali ty components 25 and they don't install the greatest components and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

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39 1 stuff like that, you know, the skill of the craft, 2 however you want to term that stuff like that.

3 They're supposed to have a basic understanding that 4 that machine, even before it's tested, could meet its 5 commi tment and once they get into the testing routines 6 have to start up. That gives you the insurance that 7 it can meet its intent and stuff like that.

8 So I would have two questions. What does 9 the tech spec? What does the procedure say? I really 10 don't have those capabilities to understand if it's 11 technically illegally.

12 I know morally and ethically but without 13 a doubt in my mind that that machine should have been 14 before that mode switch was changed, that that machine 15 should have had brand new relays in there and they 16 didn't.

17 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Okay. Any other 18 questions here from headquarters?

19 MR. MULLIGAN: I mean, you know, I can't 20 ask anybody any questions about what the Vermont 21 Yankee's start-up procedures say about HPCI. I'm 22 pretty sure there is a signature in the start-up 23 procedure that says HPCI has to be known to be 24 operational. I am not quite sure what tech spec says

  • 25 as far as did Vermont Yankee NEAL R. GROSS start up having COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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40 1 cabinet open and relays removed?

  • 2 3

4 relays removed?

capable of Could Vermont Yankee start up with those And they know that that machine isn't meeting its intent because the relays 5 aren't there. The valve won't open. Could they start 6 up and say, "Well, you know, but that's 17 days. No 7 sweat. We'll get it fixed." Is that legal? Do you 8 see what I'm getting at?

9 MR. NAKANISHI: Yes, yes. Thank you.

10 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: From the region, are 11 there any regional questions for Mr. Mulligan?

12 MR. SETZER: No, no questions from the 13 region. Again, pardon the earlier interruption. I 14 realize I spoke out of turn. But no questions.

15 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: And that's quite all 16 right, but if you do or would like to reiterate, this 17 would be a time.

18 MR. SETZER: No, no specific questions.

19 Thank you.

20 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Understand. Does the 21 licensee have any questions for Mr. Mulligan?

22 MR. DEVINCENTIS: Vermont Yankee has no 23 questions.

24 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: I understand.

25 MR. MULLIGAN: You guys have been more NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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41 1 talkative to me than you were last time. That's good.

2 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Are there any members of 3 the public on the phone?

4 (No response.)

5 MR. MULLIGAN: One more thing. The 6 Peti tion Review Board, that's important, you know.

7 That's a request I'm making, that the Petition Review 8 Board become transparent in their meetings behind 9 closed doors are recorded and everybody gets their 10 comments put on the record so that the community can 11 understand what is going on. So the -- hello?

12 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Yes.

13 MR. MULLIGAN: So the Peti tion Review 14 Board could be more of a democratic process. Do you 15 understand what I am making with that?

16 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Your point is 17 understood.

18 MR. MULLIGAN: Okay. Thank you, not just 19 this, all the times in the future, not just this time, 20 you know, every time that this thing comes up again.

21 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: Mr. Mulligan, I would 22 like to thank you for taking the time to provide the 23 NRC staff with clarifying information on the petition 24 that you submitted.

  • 25 Before we close, does the Court Reporter NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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42 1 need any additional information for the meeting

  • 2 3

4 transcript?

THE REPORTER:

name that I had a question about.

I think there was just one It sounded like 5 Nancy Delgado.

6 MS. SALGADO: That's Nancy Salgado, 7 S-a-l-g-a-d, as in David, o.

8 THE REPORTER: S-a-l-z-a-d-o?

9 MS. SALGADO: S-a-l-g-a-d-o.

10 THE REPORTER: Okay. That was g, as in 11 George?

12 MS. SALGADO: Correct.

13 THE REPORTER: Okay. Thank you very much.

14 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT: With that -

15 MR. MULLIGAN: I would like just two 16 sentences. I would like to have everybody to be 17 reminded that the utilities in a general manner are 18 under historic financial pressures and stuff as far as 19 with their stock prices and cutbacks on electric 20 loads. And they're not bringing in as much money as 21 they did in the past. And the background of all of 22 this is that the utility industry, the electric 23 utility industry, is under an historic stressor. And 24 that's all I need to say.

  • 25 CHAIRMAN BLOUNT:

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43 1 again. And, with that, the meeting is concluded. We

  • 2 3

4 will be terminating the phone connection at this time.

I would like to wish everyone a good day.

MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you very much for 5 this opportunity.

6 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter was 7 concluded at 11:45 a.m.)

8 9

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  • CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of: Vermont Yankee 10 CFR 2.206 Name of Proceeding: Petition Docket Number: (n/a)

Location: Teleconference

  • were held as herein appears, and that original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, this is the thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
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M. Mulligan - 2 This issue was entered into Entergy's corrective action program that included: performing an extent of condition review to identify affected contacts in other systems, evaluating system operability, developing a prioritized replacement schedule based on risk significance, developing criteria for replacement during preventive maintenance activities, and requiring periodic replacement of related heavily loaded MOV contactors.

In addition, Vermont Yankee has implemented "Commercial Dedicated Programs for Procurement" for purchasing the replacement contactors for three DC breaker cubicles (V23-14, V23-16, and V23-21). As short-term corrective actions until the replacement contactors are procured, Entergy performed a visual inspection of the three DC contactors, performed an operability evaluation for the HPCI system, and provided interim guidance to plant operators concerning DC contactor inspections following HPCI valve operations. Vermont Yankee has been successful in procuring the replacement DC contactors suitable for nuclear plant application and these DC contactors are scheduled to be replaced in September 2009.

As discussed above, the NRC staff has reviewed the licensee corrective actions and found them to be appropriate.

Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC.

Sincerely,

/raJ Thomas Blount, Deputy Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-271

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv Package: ML092180459 Supplement 3: ML091910198 Incoming: ML091660122 Supplement 4: ML092170062 Supplement 1: ML091880499 Response: ML092180454 S uppiernen i t 2 ML091770498 E nc Iosure: ML092020329 OFFICE LPL 1-1/PM LPL 1-1/LA R1/BC LPL 1-1/BC DPRIPM DPR/DD NAME ,,'Kim SLittle DJackson NSalgado TMensah TBlount DATE 8/11/09 8/10/09 8/12/09 8/12/09 8/13/09 8/17/09 Via e-mail OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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