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| issue date = 02/29/2012 | | issue date = 02/29/2012 | ||
| title = Calculation OSC-10008, Revision 1, Calculation Impact Assessment | | title = Calculation OSC-10008, Revision 1, Calculation Impact Assessment | ||
| author name = Watkins W | | author name = Watkins W | ||
| author affiliation = Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | | author affiliation = Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
| Line 16: | Line 16: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:CALCULATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT (CIA)Station / Unit Oconee 1 / 2/3 Calculation No. OSC-10008 Rev. I Page | {{#Wiki_filter:CALCULATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT (CIA) | ||
Originated By W.H. Watkins 740A ate 2/28QO12 Prob. No. (stress & s/r use only) Checked By W.E. Thomas , Date 2/28/2012 NEDL reviewed to identify calculations? | Station / Unit Oconee 1 / 2/3 Calculation No. OSC-10008 Rev. I Page _ | ||
0 Yes El No Note: a NEDL search is NOT required for calculation originations (i.e., Rev. 0)Identify in the blocks below, the groups consulted for an Impact Assessment of this calculation. | PIP No. (if applicable) Originated By W.H. Watkins 740A ate 2/28QO12 Prob. No. (stress & s/r use only) Checked By W.E. Thomas , Date 2/28/2012 NEDL reviewed to identify calculations? 0 Yes El No Note: a NEDL search is NOT required for calculation originations (i.e., Rev. 0) | ||
Indiv. Contacted/Date Indiv. Contacted/Date El Syis El NGO t.rower, I | Identify in the blocks below, the groups consulted for an Impact Assessment of this calculation. | ||
-OPS Support r Regulatory Compliance El Maintenance | Indiv. Contacted/Date Indiv. Contacted/Date El Syis El NGO t.rower, I AXL, Primary, L.t:lion Al Lspw*cUoIn, Reactor, BOP.] Safety Analysis, Nuclear Fuel Mgmt & Design, Corporate Design Support, Fuel Mech. & T/H Analysis, Nuclear Design] | ||
-Tech. Support r Chemistry r Work Control -Program. Supp. r Radiation Protection N Other Group DBG Allen Park 2/28/12 r No Group required to be consulted Listed below are the identified documents (ex: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS, UFSAR SECTIONS, DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS, STATION PROCEDURES*, DRAWINGS, OTHER CALCULATIONS, ETC.)that may require revision as a result of the calculation origination or revision, the document owner/group and the change required (including any necessary PIP Corrective Actions).*Note: Any design changes, which | r PCE | ||
DOCUMENT GROUP CHANGE REQUIRED (Attach Additional Sheets As Required)Page i Form 101.1 (R02-12'd CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number: Oconee 1 /2 13 Revision No.: 1 Title of Calculation: | [Mech. Comp., Elec. Comp, Programs] | ||
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System-Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Numbers OSC-1 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No[] | [] DES | ||
Originated By: W. H. Watkins Checked By: W.E. Thomas Verification Method: Method 1 1K Approved By: oe I | [Mechanical Engr., Electrical Engr., Civil Engr.] I' Training r[ Local IT El Operations - OPS Support r Regulatory Compliance El Maintenance - Tech. Support r Chemistry r Work Control - Program. Supp. r Radiation Protection N Other Group DBG Allen Park 2/28/12 r No Group required to be consulted Listed below are the identified documents (ex: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS, UFSAR SECTIONS, DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS, STATION PROCEDURES*, DRAWINGS, OTHER CALCULATIONS, ETC.) | ||
that may require revision as a result of the calculation origination or revision, the document owner/group and the change required (including any necessary PIP Corrective Actions). | |||
*Note:Any design changes, which requirechanges to Station Procedures,must be transmittedas DesignDeliverable Documents. | |||
iY/zZ/i-.Verif. Method 1[-- 2E] 3F] Other[:] Chk.: Date: Page ii Form 101.1 (R02-12)CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number: Oconee 112 / 3 Revision No.: Title of Calculation: | DOCUMENT GROUP CHANGE REQUIRED (Attach Additional Sheets As Required) | ||
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System-Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Number. OSC- | Page i | ||
Originated By: See Page ii for Revision I ORIGINATOR Date: Checked By: See Page ii for Revision 1 CHECKER Verification Method: Method 1 0 Method 2 Li Approved By: See Page ii for Rev I APPROVER Issued to DCRM: Date: Date: | |||
Verif. Method 1E-L 2E] 3E] Other[-i Chk.: Date: Pages: Orig.:_ Date: Verif. Method 1E] 21-] 3E] Other[] Chk.: Date: Page iii Form 101.1 I1R02-12 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number Oconee 1 / 2/3 Revision No.: 0 Title of Calculation: | Form 101.1 (R02-12' d CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number: Oconee 1 /2 13 Revision No.: 1 Title of Calculation: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System | ||
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System-Electical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Number OSC-1 0008 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No El TYPE I: Yes [E] No CIA CONDITION of items covered: 1 Microfiche Attachment List Yes C"] No 2 (See Form 101.4) DSD List: Yes LI No G] (See Form 101.7)Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (Vol.) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 1 through 31 Appendix A pages 1 thru 182 Attachment 1 pages 1 thru 23 The signatures below certify that this calculation has been originated, checked, Inspected and approved in accordance with established procedures. | - Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Numbers OSC-1 0008 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No[] TYPE I: Yes [I No 0 QA CONDITION of items covered: 1 Microfiche Attachment List Yes El No [K (See Form 101.4) DSD List Yes E-1 No N (See Form 101.7) | ||
Ordignated By: See Vendor Cover Sheet Date: Checked By: See Vendor Cover Sheet Date: Verification Method:. Method" M Method 2 [ , iMethod,,3 | Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (Vol.) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 4 iii (Form 101.1) ii (Form 101.1) i (CIA Form) 3 (Form 101.2) 3 (Form 101.2) 7 7 10 thru 12 10 thru 12 15 15 17 thru 25 17 thru 25 27 27 App. A, Page 1, App. A, Page 1, 2, 19, 23, 31,34, 2, 19, 23,31, 34, 106, 115,138, 106, 115,138, 146,154 146,154 The signatures below certify that this calculation has been originated, checked, inspected and approved in accordance with established procedures. | ||
[1 Other [1 Complete the Spaces Below for Documentation of Multiple Originators (Odg.) or Checkers (V Pages: .A. l Orig.: Date: Verif. Method 19_201 3[1 OtherLT.Ghk: | Originated By: W. H. Watkins W4 7dtt,- Date: 2129/2012 Checked By: W.E. Thomas Date: 2/29/2012 Verification Method: Method 1 1K Method 2 E Method 3 Other [] | ||
Date: 221 I? | |||
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. | Approved By: oe I Cfrks on - - Recive . | ||
Protected Service Water (PSW) System-FJectrcal and Mechanical EquIpment Calculation Number. OSC-10008 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No.- TYPE I: Yes [ No 0 QA CONDITION of Items covered 1 Microfiche Attachment Ust Yes [] No ( (See Form 101.4) DSD LIst Yesr"] No 0 (see Form 101.7)Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (VOL) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 1 through 31 Appendix A pages I thru 182 Attachment 1 pages 1 thru 23 I | Issued Received to DCRM: E)ate:-_____ by DCRM:__________ Date: | ||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese (S&L) Date: 2/17/12 Checked By: Mark Idel. .S&L Date,,,,,: | Complete the Spaces Below for Documentation of Multiple Originators (Orig.) or Checkers (Chk) | ||
_ ,/_ .Veriftcation Method: Method 1 N Maihod 2 ,] Method3h Other F1 Approved By: Mike Mortaruilo (S&L) i!( L. 9 0. Date: 17, Issued | Pages: ?---v wo, 2. Cl'a s OtL./Gir. ,L.rwdDate:Z-/2!-1 YTP* | ||
Vedf. Method 10 2] 3[] otherEj Chk.:M. Idell (S&L / Date:. //7,,7--Pages:. Mto 1I.Z 7 $r10the. Chk.: Aate: Verif. Method I @ 20] 30] OtherOl Chk.: Date: | ga Verif. Method Inl 2E] 3E1 OtherEl Chk.: Date: | ||
Form 101.2 (133-03)Calculation Number OSC-10008 REVISION DOCUMENTATION SHEET Revision Revision Description Number 0 Initial Issue per EC 91878. Calculation includes equipment from the following PSW ECs: 91870, 91871, 91833, 91856, 91877, 91850, 91863, 91866, 91868,91869, 91876, 91826, 91834, 91830, 91874, 91873, 91878, 91849, 91853, 91852, 91857, 91858, 91859 1 Revision 1 per EC91878 to incorporate comments from ONS Design Basis and Licensing Group. Clarified that PSW cooling is for HPI Pump Motor Bearing Coolers.Revised sections marked with change bars. Updated MCC numbers associated with PZR heater breakers.Calculation includes equipment from the following PSW ECs: 91870, 91871, 91833, 91856, 91877, 91850, 91863, 91866. 91868, 91869, 91876, 91826, 91834, 91830, 91874, 91873, 91878, 91849, 91853, 91852, 91857, 91858, 91859 | Pages: At( A t.Pipate: iY/zZ/i-. | ||
Originated By F. Calabrese (S&L) PJ-Date ,z 9) 7 Prob. No. (stress & s/r use only) Checked By M. Idell (S&L) Date _4LLL/2U | Verif. Method 1[-- 2E] 3F] Other[:] Chk.: Date: | ||
Page ii | |||
Indiv. Contacted/Dati Indiv. Contacted/Date | |||
[] SYS TravisBryant/ | Form 101.1 (R02-12) | ||
ll711t E] NGO[Power, I & C, Primary, [Section XI Inspection, Reactor, BOP.] Safety Analysis. | CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number: Oconee 112 / 3 Revision No.: | ||
Nuclear Fuel Mgmt & Design, Corporate Design Support, Fuel Mech. & T/H r PCE Analysis, Nuclear Design][Mech. Comp., Elec. Comp, Programl r DES[Mechanical Engr., Electrical Engr., Civil Engr.] r' Training r Local IT 0 Operations | Title of Calculation: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System | ||
-OPS Support Tom WehrmanI 1117111 F" Regulatory Compliance 0 Maintenance | - Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Number. OSC-1I0008 ACTIVE: Yes 10 No [] TYPE I: Yes ]-I No [K QA CONDITION of items covered: 1 Microfiche Attachment List: Yes [] No [K (See Form 101.4) DSD List Yes [] No Z (See Form 101.7) | ||
-Tech. Support Charles Black / 11i7/n I r Chemistry I Work Control -Program. Supp. rF Radiation Protection | Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (Vol.) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 4 iii (Form 101.1) ii (Form 101.1) | ||
[ Other Group DBG Bill Patton /I Int/It F No Group required to be consulted Listed below are the Identified documents (ex: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS, UFSAR SECTIONS, DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS, STATION PROCEDURES*, DRAWINGS, OTHER CALCULATIONS, ETC.)that may require revision as a result of the calculation origination or revision, the document owner/group and the change required (including any necessary PIP Corrective Actions).*Note: Any design changes, which require changes to Station Procedures, must be | I (CIA Form) 3 (Form 101.2) 3 (Form 101.2) 7 7 10 thru 12 10 thru 12 15 15 17 thru 25 17 thru 25 27 27 App. A, Page 1, App. A, Page 1, 2, 19, 23, 31, 34, 2, 19, 23, 31, 34, 106, 115,138, 106, 115,138, 146,154 146,154 The signatures below certify that this calculation has been originated, checked, inspected and approved in accordance with established procedures. | ||
DOCUMENT GROUP CHANGE REOUIRED (Attach Additional Sheets As Required)9 OF, .I1 Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: | Originated By: See Page ii for Revision I ORIGINATOR Date: | ||
8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Table of Contents Certificate of Engineering Calculation (Forms EDM-101.1) | Checked By: See Page ii for Revision 1 CHECKER Date: | ||
Revision Documentation Sheet (Form EDM-101.2) | Verification Method: Method 1 0 Method 2 Li Method 3 LI Other n-Approved By: See Page ii for Rev I APPROVER Date: | ||
Calculation Impact Assessment (CIA) (Form EM-4.9)Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose 2.0 Scope 3.0 References | Issued Received to DCRM: Date: by DCRM: Date: | ||
Complete the Spaces Below for Documentation of Multiple Originators (Orig.) or Checkers (Chk.) | |||
Pages: 9-7 0,I*OrduJ -QF..!'F.4 Date: 21:A2gbot2. | |||
Verif. Method 1E-L 2E] 3E] Other[-i Chk.: Date: | |||
Pages: Orig.:_ Date: | |||
Verif. Method 1E] 21-] 3E] Other[] Chk.: Date: | |||
Page iii | |||
Form 101.1 I1R02-12 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number Oconee 1 / 2/3 Revision No.: 0 Title of Calculation: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System | |||
- Electical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Number OSC-1 0008 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No El TYPE I: Yes [E] No CIA CONDITION of items covered: 1 Microfiche Attachment List Yes C"] No 2 (See Form 101.4) DSD List: Yes LI No G] (See Form 101.7) | |||
Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (Vol.) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 1 through 31 Appendix A pages 1 thru 182 Attachment 1 pages 1 thru 23 The signatures below certify that this calculation has been originated, checked, Inspected and approved in accordance with established procedures. | |||
Ordignated By: See Vendor Cover Sheet Date: | |||
Checked By: See Vendor Cover Sheet Date: | |||
Verification Method:. Method" M Method 2 [ , iMethod,,3 [1 Other [1 Complete the Spaces Below for Documentation of Multiple Originators (Odg.) or Checkers (V Pages: .A. l e*.cep-I- IZ9.-I*' Orig.: Date: | |||
Verif. Method 19_201 3[1 OtherLT.Ghk: r . ,.-.ate: 1 2-Pages: .ZA" IM"?., OrIg.: Date: | |||
Verif. Method 1E] 2[1] 31[] OtherE] .Gi.k..kA A 7. Date: ?,&I It2-I of 31 | |||
Form 101.1 iR02-t2 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number. Oconee I12/23 Revision No.: 0 Title of Calculation: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Protected Service Water (PSW) System | |||
- FJectrcal and Mechanical EquIpment Calculation Number. OSC-10008 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No.- TYPE I: Yes [ No 0 QA CONDITION of Items covered 1 Microfiche Attachment Ust Yes [] No ( (See Form 101.4) DSD LIst Yesr"] No 0 (see Form 101.7) | |||
Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (VOL) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 1 through 31 Appendix A pages I thru 182 Attachment 1 pages 1 thru 23 I Thsignatres below cermy that mis calculauon nas oeen onginated, ciMea, Inspectea am approved i1 accorance with established procedures. | |||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese (S&L) Date: 2/17/12 Checked By: Mark Idel. .S&L Date,,,,,: _ ,/_ . | |||
Veriftcation Method: Method 1 N Maihod 2 ,] Method3h Other F1 Approved By: Mike Mortaruilo (S&L) v i!( L. 9 I Received | |||
: 0. Date: 17, Issued to DCRM: Date:_ by DCRM: Date: | |||
Complete the Spaces Below for Documentatlon of Multiple Orignators (Odg.) or Che*kers (Chi.) | |||
Pages: Appendix A pages 129 thru 168 Orig.:W. Watkins (S&L) 7SIZ4,ate: | |||
Vedf. Method 10 2] 3[] otherEj Chk.:M. Idell (S&L / Date:. //7,,7-- | |||
Pages:.Mto 1I.Z 7 $r10the. Chk.: Aate: | |||
Verif. Method I @ 20] 30] OtherOl Chk.: Date: _ | |||
2 oF _3/ | |||
Form 101.2 (133-03) Calculation Number OSC-10008 REVISION DOCUMENTATION SHEET Revision Revision Description Number 0 Initial Issue per EC 91878. Calculation includes equipment from the following PSW ECs: | |||
91870, 91871, 91833, 91856, 91877, 91850, 91863, 91866, 91868,91869, 91876, 91826, 91834, 91830, 91874, 91873, 91878, 91849, 91853, 91852, 91857, 91858, 91859 1 Revision 1 per EC91878 to incorporate comments from ONS Design Basis and Licensing Group. Clarified that PSW cooling is for HPI Pump Motor Bearing Coolers. | |||
Revised sections marked with change bars. Updated MCC numbers associated with PZR heater breakers. | |||
Calculation includes equipment from the following PSW ECs: | |||
91870, 91871, 91833, 91856, 91877, 91850, 91863, 91866. 91868, 91869, 91876, 91826, 91834, 91830, 91874, 91873, 91878, 91849, 91853, 91852, 91857, 91858, 91859 I1_ | |||
4. | |||
4 FIGURE 101-2 REVISION DOCUMENTATION SHEET 3 of 31 | |||
CALCULATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT (CIA) . J-Station I Unit Oconee 1 / 2/3 Calculation No. OSC-10008 Rev. 0 Page PIP No. (if applicable) Originated By F. Calabrese (S&L) PJ-Date ,z 9) 7 Prob. No. (stress & s/r use only) Checked By M. Idell (S&L) .aj,-* Date _4LLL/2U-N""L NEDy reviewed re toe identify ty calcutlaons? | |||
uans rr [ONo o Note: a NEDL calculation search Is NOT originations 0.9., required Rev. 0) for Identify in the blocks below, the groups consulted for an Impact Assessment o--thi calculation. | |||
Indiv. Contacted/Dati Indiv. Contacted/Date | |||
[] | |||
SYS TravisBryant/ ll711t E] NGO | |||
[Power, I & C, Primary, [Section XI Inspection, Reactor, BOP.] Safety Analysis. Nuclear Fuel Mgmt & Design, Corporate Design Support, Fuel Mech. & T/H r PCE Analysis, Nuclear Design] | |||
[Mech. Comp., Elec. Comp, Programl r DES | |||
[Mechanical Engr., Electrical Engr., Civil Engr.] r' Training r Local IT 0 Operations - OPS Support Tom WehrmanI 1117111 F" Regulatory Compliance 0 Maintenance - Tech. Support Charles Black / 11i7/n I r Chemistry I Work Control - Program. Supp. rF Radiation Protection | |||
[ Other Group DBG Bill Patton /I Int/It F No Group required to be consulted Listed below are the Identified documents (ex: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS, UFSAR SECTIONS, DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS, STATION PROCEDURES*, DRAWINGS, OTHER CALCULATIONS, ETC.) | |||
that may require revision as a result of the calculation origination or revision, the document owner/group and the change required (including any necessary PIP Corrective Actions). | |||
*Note: Any design changes, which require changes to Station Procedures,must be transmittedas Design Deliverable Documents. | |||
DOCUMENT GROUP CHANGE REOUIRED (Attach Additional Sheets As Required) 9 OF, .I1 | |||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L) | |||
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Table of Contents Certificate of Engineering Calculation (Forms EDM-101.1) 1,2 Revision Documentation Sheet (Form EDM-101.2) 3 Calculation Impact Assessment (CIA) (Form EM-4.9) 4 Table of Contents 5 1.0 Purpose 6 2.0 Scope 6 3.0 References 7-15 4.0 Assumptions 15-16 5.0 Methodology 16-17 6.0 Analysis / Matrices 17-21 7.0 Conclusions 21-31 8.0 Attachments & Appendices 31 (Appendix A) (1 -182) | |||
(1) - OE Search Results (1 -23) 5 of 31 | |||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L) | |||
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 1.0 Purpose The purpose of this calculation is to perform a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) on the Protected Service Water (PSW) System. | |||
Since the PSW System is safety related and its components are required to mitigate a licensing basis event, this system meets the criteria for performing a FMEA per the requirements of EDM 105, "Guidelines for Performing a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Single Failure Analysis". | |||
2.0 Scope This FMEA will address the following areas to provide a failure modes and effects analysis for the PSW System: | |||
2.1 Identify the essential PSW Systems / components and their functions. Describe the system to the extent necessary to delineate its boundaries and to clearly define the system's mission. | |||
2.2 Identify supporting systems / components and their functions. | |||
Ensure interfaces are clearly defined. | |||
2.3 Identify relevant operational conditions in which the essential functions are required. | |||
2.4 Use current design drawings to identify boundaries of the analysis and identify "success" path for each postulated failure mode. | |||
2.5 Identify any pertinent system level effects from spurious actuations or transients. | |||
2.6 In order to address reliability in the FMEA, the determination of the detectability of the identified failures (detected by periodic surveillance testing or revealed by alarms or anomalous indications) will be included in the scope of the analysis. | |||
2.7 Calculations OSC-7548 (Ref. 3.12) and OSC-9674 (Ref. 3.13) have been updated to address issues related to the addition of the PSW System / PSW equipment on the existing HPI System. HPI equipment covered by this calculation may also be addressed in calculations OSC-7548 and OSC-9674. | |||
6 of 31 | |||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L) | |||
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.0 References 3.1 EDM 105 Rev. 1 - Guidelines for Performing a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Single Failure Analysis 3.2 OSS-0245-00-00-1053 Draft Rev. 0 File Date 8/29/11 - Design Basis Specification for the Protected Service Water (PSW) System 3.3 OSS-0254.00-00-1033 Rev. 28A, 28B, 30A, 33 - Design Basis Specification for the Reactor Coolant System 3.4 OSS-0254.00-00-2006 Rev. 9 - Design Basis Specification for the 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System 3.5 LAR 2006-009 (June 26, 2008) - License Amendment Request to Revise Portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Related to the Tornado Licensing Basis 3.6 LAR 2008-005 (June 26, 2008) - Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the Oconee Nuclear Station Current Licensing Basis for HELB events outside of the Containment Buildings Unit 1 3.7 LAR 2008-006 (Dec 22, 2008)- Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the Oconee Nuclear Station Current Licensing Basis for HELB events outside of the Containment Buildings Unit 2 3.8 LAR 2008-007 (June 29, 2009) - Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the Oconee Nuclear Station Current Licensing Basis for HELB events outside of the Containment Buildings Unit 3 3.9 Tornado and High Energy Line Break (HELB) Mitigation License Amendment Requests (LARs) - Responses to Request for RI Additional Information, dated 12/16/2011. | |||
3.10 OSS-0254.00-00-1001 Rev. 42D, 43A, 43B, 45B, 45C, 48 & 48A - | |||
Design Basis Specification for the High Pressure Injection and Deborating Demineralizer Systems 3.11 OSC-9510 Rev. 0 - FMEA for the Alternate Power Feeds to SSF 4.16 kV switchgear OTS1 from PSW Electrical System 3.12 OSC-7548 Rev. 17 - High Pressure Injection (HPI) Single Failure Analysis 3.13 OSC-9674 Rev. 1 - HPI System Addition of PSW Power Feeds Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 3.14 Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 Technical Specification Bases B3.4.9, Pressurizer 7 of 31 | |||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L) | |||
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 812912011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.15 O-703-D Rev. 56A, 59A, 61 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.16 0-703-F Rev. 69D - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.17 0-1703-C Rev. 29A, 29B, 30 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.18 O-1703-D Rev. 49B, 51B, 55B, 56A, 57 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.19 0-2703-C Rev. 43A, 43C, 46 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.20 0-2703-D Rev. 55A, 55C, 59, 59A - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.21 0-6700 Rev. B, E, F, G, H, K, L, N - One Line Diagram Main PSW Switchgear 13.8/4.16 kV System 3.22 0-6700-01 Rev. A, D, H, K - One Line Diagram 125VDC Safety Related PSW Distribution Center for PSW Building 3.23 0-6700-02 Rev. D - One Line Diagram PSW 125VDC Power Panelboard for PSW Building 3.24 0-6700-03 Rev. C, F, G, I, K, L, 1 - One Line Diagram PSW 125VDC Power Panelboard 3.25 0-6701 Rev. C, E, F, H, 1, 1A - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V PSW MCC lXPSW 3.26 0-6702 Rev. B, F, J, K, L, 1 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V PSW MCC 2XPSWA & 2XPSWB 3.27 0-6703 Rev. B, E, I, J, K - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V PSW MCC 3XPSW 3.28 0-6704 Rev. B, C, 0 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 208Y/120VAC PWR PNL BD No. 1PSWPL1KPSW 3.29 0-6705 Rev. A, C, 0 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 208Y/120VAC PWR PNL BD No. 2PSWPL2KPSW 3.30 0-6706 Rev. A, D - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 208Y/120VAC PWR PNL BD No. 3PSWPL3KPSW 8 of 31 | |||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L) | |||
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.31 0-6707 Rev. C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L - One Line Diagram 600VAC Load Center PSWLXPX13 3.32 0-6707-01 Rev. C, D, F - One Line Diagram 600V MCC PSWMXXPSW PSW Building Elev. 797' 3.33 0-6719-E Rev. A - Connection Diagram PSW 600VAC Automatic Transfer Switches 1PSWSXTRN001 & 1PSWSXTRN002 3.34 0-6719-F Rev. D - Connection Diagram PSW 600VAC Automatic Transfer Switches 2PSWSXTRN001 & 2PSWSXTRN002 3.35 0-6719-G Rev. C - Connection Diagram PSW 600VAC Automatic Transfer Switches 3PSWSXTRN001 & 3PSWSXTRN002 3.36 0-6720-E Rev. E - Connection Diagram Manual Transfer Switches PSW 3.37 0-6756-A Rev. A - PSW Building Interconnection Diagram Air Conditioning Equipment and Room Temperature Transmitters 3.38 OEE-150-15 Rev. 4A, 5A, 6 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 1A Vent Valves 1RC157 & 1RC158 3.39 OEE-150-16 Rev. 4A, 5A, 6 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 1A Vent Valves 1RC159 & 1RC160 3.40 OEE-150-19 Rev. 4A, 5A, 6 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 1A Vent Valves 1RC155 & 1RC156 3.41 OEE-151-04 Rev. 16E, 17B, 18 - Elementary Diagram 1A HPI BWST Suction Valve 1HP-24 3.42 OEE-151-06 Rev. 13C, 14A, 15- Elementary Diagram HP Injection to Reactor Inlet Valve 1HP-26 3.43 OEE-165-01 Rev. E, F, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Stm Gen 1A | |||
& 1B Flow Isolation MOV 1PSW-6 3.44 OEE-165-02 Rev. C, D, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 1A Flow Control Solenoid Valve 1PSW22 3.45 OEE-165-03 Rev. E, F, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 1A Throttle MOV 1PSW-23 3.46 OEE-165-04 Rev. C, D, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 1B Flow Control Solenoid Valve 1PSW24 9 of 31 | |||
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.47 OEE-165-05 Rev. E, F, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 1B Throttle MOV 1PSW-25 3.48 OEE-165-06 Rev. C, 0C, 1 - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Isolation Valve 1HP139 3.49 OEE-165-07 Rev. B, F, G, 1 - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Flow Throttle Valve I HP140 3.50 OEE-165-08 Rev. A, C, D (PENDING) - Elementary Diagram 600V LC R! | |||
PSWLXPX13 (2B) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 1XJ 3.51 OEE-165-09 Rev. A, C - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (3B) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch-for MCC 1XK 3.52 OEE-165-11 Rev. C - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (4D) Feed to MCC 1XPSW 3.53 OEE-250-15 Rev. 4B, 4E, 5 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 2A Vent Valves 2RC1 55 & 2RC1 56 3.54 OEE-250-16 Rev. 4B, 4D, 5 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 2A Vent Valves 2RC157 & 2RC158 3.55 OEE-250-17 Rev. 4B, 4D, 5 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 2A Vent Valves 2RC159 & 2RC160 3.56 OEE-251-04 Rev. 12A, 12G, 12K, 121,13 - Elementary Diagram 2A HPI BWST Suction Valve 2HP-24 3.57 OEE-251-06 Rev. 12A, 12G, 121, 12K, 13 - Elementary Diagram HP Injection to Reactor Inlet Valve 2HP-26 3.58 OEE-265-01 Rev. G, H, I, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Stm Gen 2A & 2B Flow Isolation MOV 2PSW-6 3.59 OEE-265-02 Rev. C, E, F, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 2A Flow Control Solenoid Valve 2PSW22 3.60 OEE-265-03 Rev. F, G, H, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 2A Throttle MOV 2PSW-23 3.61 OEE-265-04 Rev. C, D, E, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 2B Flow Control Solenoid Valve 2PSW24 3.62 OEE-265-05 Rev. F, G, H, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 2B Throttle MOV 2PSW-25 10 of 31 | |||
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Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.63 OEE-265-06 Rev. H, I, K, J, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Isolation Valve 2HP139 3.64 OEE-265-07 Rev. G, I, J, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Flow Throttle Valve 2HP140 3.65 OEE-265-08 Rev. C - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (4B) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 2Xi 3.66 OEE-265-09 Rev. C, D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX1 3 (2D) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 2XK 3.67 OEE-265-10 Rev. C, D, E (PENDING) - Elementary Diagram 600V LC R1 PSWLXPX1 3 (2C) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 2XJ 3.68 OEE-265-11 Rev. D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (3C) Feed to MCC 2XPSWA 3.69 OEE-265-19 Rev. F - Elementary Diagram PSW Recirc Valve OPSW14 Normal Feed 3.70 OEE-265-19-1 Rev. D - Elementary Diagram PSW Recirc Valve 0PSW14 Normal Feed 3.71 OEE-265-21 Rev. A - Elementary Diagram PSW Pump Room Exhaust Fan Normal Feed 3.72 OEE-350-15 Rev. 3, 3B - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 3A Vent Valves 3RC155 & 3RC156 3.73 OEE-350-16 Rev. 3, 3B, 3C - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 3A Vent Valves 3RC155 & 3RC156 3.74 OEE-350-17 Rev. 3, 3B, 3C - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 3A Vent Valves 3RC155 & 3RC156 3.75 OEE-351-04 Rev. 10, 10A, 10B, 10F, 10G - Elementary Diagram 3A HPI BWST Suction Valve 3HP-24 3.76 OEE-351-06 Rev. 12, 12A, 12B, 12F, 12G - Elementary Diagram HP Injection to Reactor Inlet Valve 3HP-26 3.77 OEE-365-01 Rev. E, F, G - Elementary Diagram PSW Stm Gen 3A | |||
& 3B Flow Isolation MOV 3PSW-6 3.78 OEE-365-02 Rev. C, D, E - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 3A Flow Control Solenoid Valve 3PSW22 11 of 31 | |||
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Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.79 OEE-365-03 Rev. E, G, H - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 3A Throttle MOV 3PSW-23 3.80 OEE-365-04 Rev. C, D, E - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 3B Flow Control Solenoid Valve 3PSW24 3.81 OEE-365-05 Rev. E, F, G - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 3B Throttle MOV 3PSW-25 3.82 OEE-365-06 Rev. A, E, F - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Isolation Valve 3HP139 3.83 OEE-365-07 Rev. A, E, F - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Flow Throttle Valve 3HP140 3.84 OEE-365-08 Rev. C, D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX1 3 (1 D) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 3XI 3.85 OEE-365-09 Rev. C, D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX1 3 (2A) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 3XK 3.86 OEE-365-10 Rev. C, D, E (PENDING) - Elementary Diagram 600V LC RI PSWLXPX1 3 (1B) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 3XJ 3.87 OEE-365-11 Rev. C - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (3D) Feed to MCC 3XPSW 3.88 OEE-606-01 Rev. B - Elementary Diagram 13.8kV/4.16kV Transformer Feeder for 4.16kV B7T-1 Tie Breaker 3.89 OEE-607-01 Rev. C - Elementary Diagram B6T-2 Feed to Transformer PX13 For Load Center PSWLXPX13 Normal Feed 3.90 OEE-608-01 Rev. D, E, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW 4kV Breaker B6T-6, 2000HP PSW Main Pump 3.91 OEE-609-01 Rev. B, C, 0 - Elementary Diagram 4.16kV Switchgear B6T-3 Feed To Alignment Sw IHPISXALGN001 For HPI Injection Pumps 1A & 1B 3.92 OEE-610 Rev. F - Elementary Diagram 1A HPI Pump Transfer Sw 1HPISXTRN001 HPI Pump Motor 1A 3.93 OEE-610-01 Rev. G, 1 - Elementary Diagram 1B HPI Pump Transfer Sw IHPISXTRN002 HPI Pump Motor 1B 12 of 31 | |||
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Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.94 OEE-611-01 Rev. A, D, E, 0 - Elementary Diagram 4.16kV Switchgear B6T-4 Feeder to Manual Transfer Sw for HPI Injection Pumps 2A or 2B 3.95 OEE-612 Rev. A, D, 1 - Elementary Diagram 2A HPI Pump Transfer Sw 2HPISXTRN001 HPI Pump Motor 2A 3.96 OEE-612-01 Rev. A, D, 1 - Elementary Diagram 2B HPI Pump Transfer Sw 2HPISXTRN002 HPI Pump Motor 2B 3.97 OEE-613-01 Rev. C, D, F - Elementary Diagram 4.16kV Switchgear B6T-5 Feed to Alignment Sw 3HPIALGN001 for HPI Injection Pumps 3A & 3B 3.98 OEE-614 Rev. C, E - Elementary Diagram 3A HPI Pump Transfer Sw 3HPISXTRN001 HPI Pump Motor 3A 3.99 OEE-614-01 Rev. C, E - Elementary Diagram 3B HPI Pump Transfer Sw 3HPISXTRN001 HPI Pump Motor 3B 3.100 OEE-625 Rev. D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (4C) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC XPSW 3.101 OEE-631-OE Rev. A - Elementary Diagram PSW Building 480V Non-Safety Related HVAC Battery Room 1 Condenser PSWAH203A 3.102 OEE-631-OH Rev. A - Elementary Diagram PSW Building 480V Non-Safety Related HVAC Battery Room 2 Condenser PSWAH206A 3.103 OEE-632-01 Rev. D, E, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW 4kV Breaker B6T-7 200HP Booster Pump 3.104 OEE-633 Rev. D - Elementry Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (5B) | |||
Main Breaker 3.105 OFD-1OOA-1.1 Rev. 38 - Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System 3.106 OFD-1OOA-2.1 Rev. 43 - Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System 3.107 OFD-10OA-3.1 Rev. 36, 36A - Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System 3.108 OFD-101A-1.3 Rev. 21B, 25 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 13 of 31 | |||
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Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.109 OFD-101A-1.4 Rev. 41 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.110 OFD-101A-2.3 Rev. 20D, 23A, 23E, 23F, 23G, 26 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.111 OFD-101A-2.4 Rev. 40 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.112 OFD-101A-3.3 Rev. 22C, 25, - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.113 OFD-101A-3.4 Rev. 37C, 38 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.114 OFD-131A-1.1 Rev. E, 0, 0B- Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW) System 3.115 OFD-131A-1.2 Rev. B, C, 0 - Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW) System (Steam Generator & HPI Pump - Motor Cooling Service) 3.116 OFD-131A-2.2 Rev. A, C, 0 - Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW) System (Steam Generator & HPI Pump Motor Cooling Service) 3.117 OFD-131A-3.2 Rev. B, C, D - Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW) System (Steam Generator & HPI Pump Motor Cooling Service) 3.118 OFD-116M-1.8 Rev. A - Flow Diagram of Misc Structures HVAC PSW Building 3.119 OFD-116G-3.1 Rev. 6, 6A - Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABV) Basement, 1st, 2nd & 3rd Floors 3.120 OM.322-106 Sh. 1 Rev. DOHA, DOHC - PSW System 5kV Motor Operated Transfer Switch Outline Detail 3.121 OM.303-0191.001 Rev. 5 - 24VDC Trip Unit Power Distribution for 600V Switchgear PX13 3.122 NLI Drawing 29412389-WD-1 Sh. 1, Rev. 9 - PSW 600V Auto Transfer Switch Wiring 3.123 GEH-2038 Rev. E - Control and Transfer Switch Type SBM 3.124 OSC-9689 Rev. 0 - Electrical Design Inputs for EC #91856 14 of 31 | |||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L) | |||
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.125 OSS-0254.00-00-1004 Rev. 37 - Design Basis Spec. for Standby Shutdown Facility Reactor Coolant Makeup System 3.126 KC-2190, Rev. 0 FMEA for the Keowee 13.8kV Switchgear (KPF) Power Feeds to Protected Service Water System (PSW) Switchgear 3.127 O-1703-E, Rev. 55A (PENDING) One Line, Station Aux Circuits 600V RI 3.128 O-2703-E, Rev. 44A (PENDING) One Line, Station Aux Circuits 600V I 208V | |||
==4.0 Assumptions== | ==4.0 Assumptions== | ||
4.1 Common-Cause Failure Analysis to identify modes and mechanisms of failures of components that are considered to be redundant is not typically included in the scope of an FMEA analysis. | |||
4.2 Concurrent random multiple failures are not normally included in the scope of an FMEA analysis. However, a single failure can affect the performance of a large part of the system in which it occurs or it may cause other consequential failures. Any such failure, including the consequential failures, has to be taken as a single failure for the purpose of the analysis, which has to continue until all components and all credible failures have been considered. | |||
4.3 Environmental effects such as steam impingement, temperature, dose, etc. that are the result of a postulated failure, are not normally considered in the scope of the FMEA. Collateral damage unrelated to the system being analyzed is not considered. | |||
4.4 Software common cause failures are not random single failures in the context of IEEE 379 and therefore, are not part of the FMEA. Where required to be postulated, software common cause failures are analyzed via a "Diversity-and-Defense-in-Depth" analysis prescribed in the SRP by BTP-19. | |||
4.5 Per EDM-1 05, failure of a manual valve is not analyzed unless required to be operated by procedure. No manual valves are required to be operated by procedure for PSW to fulfill its design function. | |||
4.6 Certain references used in this calculation have not yet been approved. | |||
This assumption tracks those references to ensure information used in this calculation from those references is not altered in a way that affects the results/conclusions of this calculation prior to their approval. The list of references being tracked is identified below: | |||
3.2 OSS-0245-00-00-1053 Draft Rev. 0 3.9 No longer tracked as of Revision I RI 3.16 0-703-F Rev. 69D 15 of 31 | |||
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L) | |||
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Electrical Protected Service and Mechanical Water (PSW) System - | |||
Equipment 3.36 O-6720-E Rev. E 3.38 OEE-150-15 Rev. 4A 3.39 OEE-150-16 Rev. 4A 3.40 OEE-150-19 Rev. 4A 3.71 OEE-265-21 Rev. A 3.116 OFD-131A-2.2 Rev. A 3.122 NLI Drawing 29412389-WD-1 Sh. 1 Rev. 9 5.0 Methodology The methodology is in keeping with the worksheet in Appendix A of EDM-105 and the failure modes for components provided in Appendix B of EDM-105, except where engineering judgment dictates additional failure mechanisms should be considered. Any additional failure mechanisms will be described and justified. The following basic questions are considered in the evaluation of components provided in Appendix A to this calculation: | |||
" What are the essential functions of the system? | |||
* What components are needed for the essential functions? | |||
" How can each component credibly fail? | |||
" What mechanisms might produce these modes of failure? | |||
* What could the effects be if the failures did occur? | |||
* Is the failure in a safe or unsafe direction? | |||
* How is the failure detected? | |||
* What inherent provisions are provided in the design to compensate for the failure? | |||
* What redundant provisions exist to provide an equivalent function? | |||
" If no redundant provisions exist, then what repair options exist? | |||
* Using PIP and Operating Experience, identify any operator errors that should be considered. | |||
Generally, the "Remarks and Other Effects" column has considered the worst case failure result from the "Failure Mode" column. Failure modes that result in effects that are non-significant to PSW System or equipment functionality were not reported. | |||
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment For AC breakers whose control power is supplied from a 125VDC source, the loss of control power failure mode is addressed under the DC component that supplies the control power to the AC breaker. | |||
6.0 Analysis / Matrices (Ref. Appendix A) 6.1 System / Component Descriptions The PSW System is designed as a standby system for use under emergency conditions where plant systems in the Turbine Building are lost. The PSW System includes a dedicated power system. The PSW System provides additional "defense in-depth" protection by serving as a backup to existing safety systems and as such, the system is not required to comply with single failure criteria. The PSW System is provided as an alternate means to achieve and maintain a stable RCS pressure and temperature for one, two, or three units following postulated high energy line breaks (HELBs) or fire events (excluding fires in the Auxiliary Building) that disable plant systems needed for safe shutdown. | |||
The PSW System replaces the Station Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) | |||
System. The design functions performed by the Station ASW System are performed by the PSW System. This includes providing long term decay heat removal following a loss of Lake Keowee. | |||
The PSW system is not initially credited following a tornado event that RI disables plant safe shutdown systems in that neither power source to PSW is fully protected from the effects of tornado damage. Power is restored to the PSW System using damage repairs that are to be completed within 72 hours. Following repair, the mission of the PSW System is for the PSW booster pump and associated electrical system to be locally aligned, started and controlled to provide cooling water to the motor bearing cooler of a High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump on each of the affected units. One HPI pump (for each affected unit) is powered from the PSW electrical system and is locally started. The 'A' Injection header and the reactor coolant pump seal injection header are locally aligned and controlled. The PSW electrical system is used to power the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF), allowing the SSF Diesel-Generator to be shutdown. | |||
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment The PSW System is also capable of cooling the RCS to 250'F and maintaining this condition until damage repairs can be implemented to proceed to cold shutdown. | |||
The mechanical portion of the PSW System is designed to provide decay heat removal by feeding Keowee Lake water to the secondary side of the steam generators. The system, consisting of one booster pump and one high head pump, shall be capable of providing 375 gpm per unit at 1082 psig. In addition, the system is designed to supply Keowee Lake water at 10 gpm per unit to the HPI pump motor bearing coolers. | |||
The PSW System utilizes the inventory of lake water contained in the plant Unit.2 CCW embedded piping. The PSW pump is located in the Auxiliary Building at Elev. 771' and takes suction from the Unit 2 CCW embedded piping and discharges into the steam generators of each unit via separate lines into the emergency feedwater headers. The raw water is vaporized in the steam generator removing residual heat and ,I then dumped to the atmosphere. The Unit 2 CCW embedded piping is interconnected with Units 1 & 3. For extended operation, a portable (submersible) pump, powered by PSW and accessories (electrical cables, flexible hoses and connectors) can be utilized via operator actions to pump water directly from Lake Keowee to the Unit 2 CCW embedded piping. | |||
The piping system has pump minimum flow lines that discharge back into the Unit 2 CCW embedded piping. For flow testing to the steam generators, the system is connected to a condensate water source located in the Turbine Building that is normally isolated using valves in the Auxiliary Building. | |||
The PSW pumps and motor operated valves required to bring the system into service are controlled from the Main Control Rooms. | |||
Check valves and manual hand wheel operated valves are used to prevent back-flow, accommodate testing, or are used for system isolation. | |||
The PSW electrical system is designed to provide power to PSW mechanical and electrical components as well as other system components needed to establish and maintain a SSD condition. The PSW electrical system provides power to portions of the HPI System for reactor coolant make-up (RCMU) and Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal cooling purposes. A separate safety related seismic 18 of 31 | |||
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Category I PSW electrical equipment building is provided for major PSW electrical equipment. Alternate QA-1 power is provided from the Keowee Hydroelectric Units (KHU) via a tornado protected underground feeder path. Normal power is provided by a non-QA transformer substation connected to a 100 kV transmission line that receives power from the Central Tie Switchyard located approximately 8 miles from the plant. The new 100/13.8 kV substation is strategically placed to reduce the probability of concurrent tornado damage to the station switchyard, KHU, and the new substation. These external power sources provide power to transformers, switchgear, breakers, load centers, and battery chargers located in the PSW electrical RI equipment building. The PSW switchgear provides power to the PSW pumps (booster and pnmary) and valves, each unit's vital I & C battery chargers, an HPI pump and associated RCMU valves, valves to align the Borated Water Storage Tanks (BWSTs) to the HPI pump, Pressurizer (PZR) heaters, and reactor coolant system (RCS) high point and reactor head vent valves for boration and RCS inventory control. The PSW switchgear also provides power to the SSF to allow for its operation beyond 72 hours. | |||
(Ref. 3.5 Enclosure 2) | |||
(Ref. 3.6 Enclosure 3) | |||
(Ref. 3.7 Enclosure 2) | |||
(Ref. 3.8 Enclosure 2) | |||
(Ref. 3.9 Enclosure 1) 6.2 Boundary of the Analysis 6.2.1 This FMEA discusses credible PSW System failures under the following events: | |||
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment | |||
* HELBs resulting in the loss of existing plant systems inside the Turbine Building needed for SSD that will be mitigated by the PSW System | |||
* Tornados resulting in the loss of existing plant systems needed for SSD that will be mitigated by the PSW System 6.3 Depth of Analysis (i.e., level of detail) | |||
This FMEA examines large scale functional failures of the PSW System electrical power sources, individual electrical equipment failures and their impact on the ability of the PSW System to perform its safety function, as well as failures to equipment that interfaces with existing plant systems. | |||
This FMEA examines mechanical equipment failures and their impact on the ability of the PSW System to perform its safety function. | |||
6.4 Identification of Failure Modes Failure modes of the equipment are identified in column 4 of the FMEA worksheets provided in Appendix A of this calculation. | |||
6.5 Operational condition of the system / component The PSW System is normally aligned in the standby mode. The PSW electrical system is normally energized from the 100kV / 13.8kV substation. Components that can receive backup power from the PSW electrical system are normally isolated from the PSW electrical system. RI The PSW pumps are normally off and the PSW system is normally isolated from the steam generators by closed electric valves. The mechanical system may be placed into service for routine testing during unit operation. | |||
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6.5 Operational condition of the system / component The PSW System is normally aligned in the standby mode. The PSW electrical system is normally energized from the 100kV / 13.8kV substation. | |||
Components that can receive backup power from the PSW electrical system are normally isolated from the PSW electrical system. RI The PSW pumps are normally off and the PSW system is normally isolated from the steam generators by closed electric valves. The mechanical system may be placed into service for routine testing during unit operation. | |||
6.6 Methods of detecting failure Methods of detecting the failure are provided in column 7 of the FMEA worksheets provided in Appendix A of this calculation. | 6.6 Methods of detecting failure Methods of detecting the failure are provided in column 7 of the FMEA worksheets provided in Appendix A of this calculation. | ||
20 of 31 Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: | 20 of 31 | ||
8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 6.7 Evaluation of Failure Effects Evaluation of the failure effects are provided in column 8 of the FMEA worksheets provided in Appendix A of this calculation. | |||
6.8 Operating Experience The OE database was searched for any applicable operator errors that should be identified and considered in performance of this FMEA.While the PSW System is a new system with no Oconee operations history, general industry errors may still be found to be applicable in certain situations. | Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L) | ||
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System - | |||
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 6.7 Evaluation of Failure Effects Evaluation of the failure effects are provided in column 8 of the FMEA worksheets provided in Appendix A of this calculation. | |||
6.8 Operating Experience The OE database was searched for any applicable operator errors that should be identified and considered in performance of this FMEA. | |||
While the PSW System is a new system with no Oconee operations history, general industry errors may still be found to be applicable in certain situations. | |||
Although numerous hits were obtained on equipment failure, there we no items directly related to operator error that needed to be considered in this FMEA. However, there are some OE items directly attributable to equipment failure during maintenance or testing. A selection of these items is included as Attachment I to this calculation. | Although numerous hits were obtained on equipment failure, there we no items directly related to operator error that needed to be considered in this FMEA. However, there are some OE items directly attributable to equipment failure during maintenance or testing. A selection of these items is included as Attachment I to this calculation. | ||
OE database keywords used in the search included: | |||
Dead bus transfer Power transfer Tie Breaker Operation Load shedding Motor restart Automatic loading sequence Loss of power Operator errors 7.0 Conclusion Overall System reliability Although the PSW System is not designed to meet single failure criterion, it has design features which create added reliability which may allow the system to perform its design function following certain gI failure modes. This added reliability includes features such as dual flow paths and equipment redundancy (e.g., PSW building HVAC, 125Vdc batteries and chargers, dual feeders from each of the two independent power sources, etc.). | |||
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment RI Summary of failure effects The failure effects of the PSW System equipment are provided in the worksheets in Appendix A. | |||
The SSF is credited as an alternate | |||
There is no further impact however, as the downstream motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source. | There is no further impact however, as the downstream motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 10 of 182 FailureMoeadEfcsA a44 0Aw System: ........ Protected Service Water__________ | |||
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: :10/18/I I Equipment: __ 16BT-6 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Component Effects on Method of No m on Function Fiue Faiur Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) | |||
(6) . (7) 20 B6T-6 4.16kV switchgear Fail Open, Electrical or PSW Primary Breaker Should the PSW System be unavailable, the (0-6700) breaker for PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical Pump indication Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited (OEE-608 Primary Pump Partial Trip, failure unavailable (local & MCR) as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining series) Motor Partial and therefore QAC in the SSD for the first 72 hours. | |||
OPSWMR0002 Close, Loss PSW is MCR See Item No. 300 (OPSWPU0002) for additional BKR is N.O. of control unavailable info. | |||
power Pump status indication in Under normal operation, should the breaker MCR inadvertently close, power will be available at the primary pump and the pump will attempt to start. | |||
However, since the primary pump is interlocked with the booster pump and the booster pump is not running in this failure, the primary pump will be unable to start. Therefore, there is no impact. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 11 of 182 Failure Made and Effteet, Aq jsi**.W k hee..t. . . | |||
System: __-Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: ~F. Calabrese_____ | |||
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System__ Date : _____10/18/11 Equipment: B6T-7 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Failure Failure Effects Efcsoon Method ehdoof Component No Identification Function Fiue Fair Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects | |||
() (2)Mode(I) (2)(3)(4)(5)(6) Mechanism System (7) | |||
Detection (8) 21 B6T-7 4.16kV Fail Open. Electrical or PSW Booster Breaker Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby (0-6700) switchgear Fail Closed, Mechanical Pump indication Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an (OEE-632 breaker for Partial Trip, failure unavailable (local & MCR) alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for PSW Booster Partial and therefore the first 72 hours. | |||
series) Pump Motor Close, Loss PSW is OCi h PumpWMRoto Cofe, c ols unvill MCR See Item No. 301 (OPSWPUOOO1) for additional info. | |||
0PSWMR0001 of control unavailable BKR is N.O. power Pump status Under normal operation, should the breaker indication in inadvertently close, power will be available at the MCR booster pump and the pump will start. | |||
22 Not Used 23 Not Used 24 Not Used | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 10 of 182 FailureMoeadEfcsA a44 0Aw System: ........ Protected Service Water__________ | |||
Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 12 of 182 SFaili&~0-de and'Effects -Ana*ikoksheet System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: .F. Calabrese_____ | ||
PSW Electrical System Date: :10/18/I I Equipment: | Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 9/29/11 Equipment: __I HPISXALGNOO I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No Identification c ation Function Mode Mode Faism Mechanism and/or oSystem Effects Failure Deeto(8 Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (7) 25 IHPISXALGNOOI Manuail Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power Switch PSW is available for tornado / HELB events for (0-6700) alignment fails open Mechanical to either HPI position Units 2 and 3. For Unit I tornado /HELB, the switch Contact set failure Injection Pump indication Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be provides fails closed motors IA or I B (white light) credited as an alternate means of achieving and operators the Switch fails is unavailable, in MCR lost. maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | ||
__ 16BT-6 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Component Effects on Method of No m on Function Fiue Faiur Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)(6) .(7)20 B6T-6 4.16kV switchgear Fail Open, Electrical or PSW Primary Breaker Should the PSW System be unavailable, the (0-6700) breaker for PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical Pump indication Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited (OEE-608 Primary Pump Partial Trip, failure unavailable (local & MCR) as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining series) Motor Partial and therefore QAC in the SSD for the first 72 hours.OPSWMR0002 Close, Loss PSW is MCR See Item No. 300 (OPSWPU0002) for additional BKR is N.O. of control unavailable info.power Pump status indication in Under normal operation, should the breaker MCR inadvertently close, power will be available at the primary pump and the pump will attempt to start.However, since the primary pump is interlocked with the booster pump and the booster pump is not running in this failure, the primary pump will be unable to start. Therefore, there is no impact. | ability to select to transfer Ability to select PSW still available but only I train of HPI is either B trainthe A or HPI between HPI available through PSW power source. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 11 of 182 Failure Made and Effteet, Aq W k hee..t. ..System: __-Protected Service Water__________ | pump. pumps I A or lB Under normal operation should the alignment is lost. switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to both the IA & I B HP! pumps simultaneously. However, since the upstream switchgear breaker B6T-3 is open and the motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source, paralleling power sources to the HPI pumps is not credible. | ||
Prepared by: ~F. Calabrese_____ | |||
Subsystem: | |||
PSW Electrical | |||
B6T-7 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Effects | |||
( | |||
Prepared by: .F. Calabrese_____ | |||
Subsystem: | |||
PSW Electrical System Date: 9/29/11 Equipment: | |||
__I HPISXALGNOO I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No c ation Function Mode Faism | |||
However, since the upstream switchgear breaker B6T-3 is open and the motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source, paralleling power sources to the HPI pumps is not credible. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 13 of 182 Failu:re Md System: ......................... | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 13 of 182 Failu:re Md System: ......................... | ||
Protected Service Water Prepared by: _ F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 9/29/11 Equipment: 2HPISXALGNOO I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 on Tain Method of Remarks and Other Effects Component Failure Failure Effects onFailure No Identification Function Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | |||
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 26 2HPISXALGNOOI Manual Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power Switch PSW is available for tornado / HELB events for (0-6700) alignment fails open Mechanical to either HPI position Units I and 3. For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, the switch Contact set failure Injection Pump indication Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited provides fails closed motors 2A or 2B (white light) as an alternate means of achieving and operators the Switch fails is unavailable, in MCR lost. maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | |||
ability to to transfer Ability to select PSW still available but only I train of HPl is select the A oreither B t rnfrAiiyt eetPWsilaalbebtol ri fHIi between HPI available through PSW power source. | |||
train HPI pumps 2A or 2B Under normal operation should the alignment pump. is lost. switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to both the 2A & 2B HPI pumps simultaneously | |||
ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 47 of 182 ,... ..... | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 47 of 182 | |||
,... ..* *'. *. t** .:*........ | |||
* Failure Mbde and .Effeets ýAna! | |||
System: Protected Service Water__________ | |||
Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____ | Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____ | ||
Subsystem: | Subsystem: PSW Electrical System________ | ||
PSW Electrical System________ | |||
Date: _____10/26/11_______ | Date: _____10/26/11_______ | ||
Equipment: | Equipment: __I XPSW Breakers 4C, 4D Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6701 Failure Effects on Train *Method Methd..of No ComponentCmoetFailure Function Falr alr fet nTan Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Dete (8) | ||
__I XPSW Breakers 4C, 4D Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6701 | (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 93 IXPSW - 4C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6701) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well power exists to Vital I&C battery charger 1CB battery charger Partial Close ICB is lost as local until manual xfer is performed. | ||
Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well power exists to Vital I&C battery charger 1CB battery charger Partial Close ICB is lost as local until manual xfer is performed. | I CB through ATS indication. Batteries can supply load for up to 1 hour per I PSWSXTRN002 ICB trouble OSC-8 113. Standby charger I CS can be annunciated in connected if IXS3 power is available. | ||
I CB through ATS indication. | MCR. ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ||
Batteries can supply load for up to 1 hour per I PSWSXTRN002 | 94 IXPSW-4D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves IRC155 through IRCI60 (0-6701) power to xfmr Fail Closed, Mechanical I KPSW and its relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 1. See Item IPSWTFIXPSW Partial Trip, failure loads (IPSW22, IKPSW bus in No. 335 for more information. | ||
MCR. ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | which feeds power Partial Close 24 and IRC155 IPSWCA0002 Loss of IPSW22 and IPSW24 maybe panel IKPSW thru 160) is lost. alarms in mitigated by operation of manual bypass MCR valves IPSW26 & I PSW28. See Item Nos. | ||
94 IXPSW-4D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves IRC155 through IRCI60 (0-6701) power to xfmr Fail Closed, Mechanical I KPSW and its relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 1. See Item IPSWTFIXPSW Partial Trip, failure loads (IPSW22, IKPSW bus in No. 335 for more information. | 312 & 310 for more information. | ||
which feeds power Partial Close 24 and IRC155 | 95 Not Used 96 Not Used 97 Not Used 98 Not Used 99 Not Used | ||
95 Not Used 96 Not Used 97 Not Used 98 Not Used 99 Not Used OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 48 of 182 Failure Mode and teffcts Analsi Wo'ksh~ee System: Protected Service | |||
.......PSW Electrical System Date: 10/9/11 Equipment: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 48 of 182 Failure Mode and teffcts Analsi Wo'ksh~ee System: Protected Service Water_F. Prepared by: Calabrese Subsystem: ....... PSW Electrical System Date: 10/9/11 Equipment: . 1HPISXTRN003, IHPISXTRN004 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-151-04, OEE-151-06 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | ||
.1HPISXTRN003, | (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 100 Not Used 101 Not Used 102 Not Used 103 IHPISXTRN003 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to IA HPI Valve fails to See Item No. 330 (IHP-0024) | ||
AC power fails open Mechanical BWST Suction respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer Contact set failure Valve I HP24 is electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power from capability fails closed lost. as determined by PSW MCC IXPSW would be paralleled with for | (OEE-i51-04) AC power fails open Mechanical BWST Suction respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer Contact set failure Valve I HP24 is electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power from capability fails closed lost. as determined by PSW MCC IXPSW would be paralleled with for IHP24 Switch fails valve position power from MCC IXS4 to valve I HP24. To from normal to transfer indication, flow prevent the paralleling of power sources this station anomalies and calculation recommends keeping MCC power to pump indications IXPSW breaker 3D in the normally open PSW power observed in the position when power to the I HP24 valve is MCR. aligned to the station source. | ||
AC power fails open Mechanical Injection Reactor respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer Contact set failure Inlet Valve electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power from capability fails closed IHP26 is lost. as determined by PSW MCC IXPSW would be paralleled with for | 104 I HPISXTRN004 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to HP to Valve fails to See Item No. 331 (I HP-0026) | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 49 of 182<Fa iure Mvzode an MesAayi worksneet System: Protected Service Water__________ | (OEE-151-06) AC power fails open Mechanical Injection Reactor respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer Contact set failure Inlet Valve electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power from capability fails closed IHP26 is lost. as determined by PSW MCC IXPSW would be paralleled with for IHP26 Switch fails valve position power from MCC IXS4 to valve I HP26. To from normal to transfer indication, flow prevent the paralleling of power sources this station anomalies and calculation recommends keeping MCC power to pump indications IXPSW breaker 4A in the normally open PSW power observed in the position when power to the I HP26 valve is MCR. aligned to the station source. | ||
Subsystem:_ | |||
PSW Electrical System Prepare : FCa | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 49 of 182 | ||
___I PSWSXTRN00 1, | <Fa iure Mvzode an MesAayi worksneet System: Protected Service Water__________ | ||
Batteries can supply load for up to I | Subsystem:_ PSW Electrical System Prepare Date : : FCa 10/4/11I e___ | ||
power to PSW A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm.106 | Equipment: ___I PSWSXTRN00 1, 1PSWSXTRN002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6701 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8) | ||
Batteries can supply load for up to I ICB battery Switch fails Station power to ICB trouble hour per OSC-81 13. Standby charger charger from tCharger ICB is | (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 105 IPSWSXTRNOO I Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6701) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to vital I&C charger ICA. | ||
normal station lost MCR.power to PSW A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm. | capability for fails closed ICA is lost local indication. Batteries can supply load for up to I ICA battery Switch fails Station power to I CA trouble hour per OSC-8 113. Standby charger charger from t a Charger ICA is annuiatd in ICS can be connected if IXS3 power is normal station to transfer lot aci available. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 50 of 182-a.l.re .'ivlnnP:2nnI[..1 | power to PSW A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm. | ||
* | 106 1PSWSXTRN002 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6701) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to vital I&C charger I CB. | ||
Subsystem: | capability for fails closed ICB is lost local indication. Batteries can supply load for up to I ICB battery Switch fails Station power to ICB trouble hour per OSC-81 13. Standby charger charger from tCharger ICB is ICS can be connected if IXS3 power is norml . to transfer Chre C s annunciated in available. | ||
PSW Electrical System Pare b0C | normal station lost MCR. | ||
.....I....PSWSTFIXPSW, IKPSW Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_ | power to PSW A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm. | ||
0-6701, 0-6704 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)(2) (4) (5) (6) (7)107 I PSWTFIXPSW Provides Loss of power Electrical Power to Loss of power Loss of valves IRCI55 through (0-6701) 208/I20VAC in failure | |||
thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of IPSW22 and IPSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves I PSW26 & IPSW28.See Item Nos. 312 & 310 for more information. | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 50 of 182 | ||
108 I KPSW Provides power Loss of output Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves | -a.l.re | ||
and IRC155 thru thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of I PSW22 and I PSW24 may 160) be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves I PSW26 & | * . 'ivlnnP:2nnI[..1 Effects, t.*. A System: Protected Service Water__________ | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 51 of 182 , " " , Failure Mode and | Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Pare b0C Date : ____10/4/I re11 I______ | ||
.- 'System: __Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: | Equipment: ..... I....PSWSTFIXPSW, IKPSW Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_ 0-6701, 0-6704 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8) | ||
PSW Electrical System Date: 10/12/11l Equipment: | (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 107 I PSWTFIXPSW Provides Loss of power Electrical Power to Loss of power Loss of valves IRCI55 through (0-6701) 208/I20VAC in failure IKPSW and its relay on I KPSW IRC 160 renders PSW unavailable power to panel Loss of power loads (IPSW22, bus in for Unit I. See Item No. 335 for IKPSW out 24 and IRC155 I PSWCA0002 more information. | ||
_ I KPSW Breakers Main, 1, 2 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _...0-6704 No .Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects | thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of IPSW22 and IPSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves I PSW26 & IPSW28. | ||
160) thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of | See Item Nos. 312 & 310 for more information. | ||
110 1KPSW -I Provides | 108 I KPSW Provides power Loss of output Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves IRC155 through (0-6704) to I KPSW and power - Mechanical I KPSW and its relay on IKPSW I RC 160 renders PSW unavailable its loads complete bus failure loads (IPSW22, bus in for Unit I. See Item No. 335 for (IPSW22, 24 failure 24 and 1RC155 IPSWCA0002 more information. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 52 of 182 Failure Mode nd "Effects An.alyis ..orkshe..,. | and IRC155 thru thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of I PSW22 and I PSW24 may 160) be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves I PSW26 & IPSW28. | ||
System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____ | See Item Nos. 312 & 310 for more information. | ||
Subsystem: | |||
PSW Electrical System | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 51 of 182 | ||
_ | ,"" , Failure Mode and.- Effects*Any's*. ' | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 53 of 182 FailureMode. | System: __Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/12/11l Equipment: _ I KPSW Breakers Main, 1, 2 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _...0-6704 No .Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects | ||
and Effects Analysis Worksheet | () Identification (2) Fno()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6)System Detection (7) (8) . | ||
109 IKPSW - Aux building panel Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves I RC155 through Main I KPSW main breaker Closed, Partial Mechanical IKPSW and its relay on I KPSW I RC160 renders PSW unavailable (0-6704) feeding (IPSW22, 24 Trip, Partial failure loads (IPSW22, bus in for Unit I. See Item No. 335 for and 1RC155 thru Close 24 and IRCI55 IPSWCA0002 more information. | |||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | 160) thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of 1PSW22 and IPSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves IPSW26 & | ||
Subsystem: | IPSW28. See Item Nos. 312 & | ||
PSW Electrical System Date: 10/17/11 Equipment: -I KPSW Breakers 9, 10 Rev. No. ..0 Diagram: 0-6704 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)(2) (4) (5) (6) (7)115 I KPSW -9 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 310 (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen | 310 for more information. | ||
SOV | 110 1KPSW - I Provides 120VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW powerto Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6704) PSW power to RC Closed, Partial Mechanical IRC!55 and indicating lights in (IRC-0155/0156) sys reactor vessel Trip, Partial failure I RC 156 is lost MCR lost. | ||
Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese | head vent valves Close Yellow CS position IRC155 & IRC156 indicating light in through power xfer MCR lost. | ||
sw IRC-CS-155/156 MCR lost_ | |||
_ I PSWSI00 I, | Ill I KPSW -2 Provides 120VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6704) PSW power to RC Closed, Partial Mechanical IRC157 and indicating lights in (IRC-0157/0158) sys reactor vessel Trip, Partial failure I RC158 is lost MCR lost. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 55 of 182.........dk'u | head vent valves Close Yellow CS position IRC157& IRCI58 indicating light in through power xfer MCR lost. | ||
Subsystem: | sw IRC-CS-157/158 MRlost. | ||
__PSW Electrical System Pare : 10/ | |||
I RC-CS-l 55/156 (157/158) | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 52 of 182 Failure Mode nd "Effects An.alyis . .orkshe..,. | ||
(159/160)Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-150-19 (15) (16).No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects ( Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)(2) (4) (5) (6) (7)122 IRC-CS-1551156 Provides forAC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (1RC-0155/0156)(OEE-150-19) power transfer fails open Mechanical I RC155 and indicating lights The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure I RC 156 is lost in MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to I RC 155 and I RC 156 fails closed Station power to White and. prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails I RC 155 and Yellow CS followers to be closed simultaneously. | System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____ | ||
power to PSW power to transfer I RC 156 is lost position Therefore paralleling of normal and indicating light PSW power sources is not a credible in MCR lost. failure.123 1RC-CS-157/158 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (IRC-0157/0158)(OEE- I50-15) power transfer fails open Mechanical I RC157 and indicating lights The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure I RC158 is lost in MCR lost, switch constructed in such a way as to | Date: __ _ Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System | ||
power to PSW power to transfer | _ Re N 0 Equipment: _ IKPSW Breakers 3, 4, 5 0-6704 Diagram: | ||
power to PSW power to transfer | No Component Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Method of Remarks and Other o Identification F Mode Mechanism System Failure Detection Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 112 I KPSW 3 Provides 120VAC PSW power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to I RC 159 Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6704) to RC sys reactor vessel head Closed, Partial Mechanical and IRCI60 is lost indicating lights (IRC-0159/0160) vent valves I RC 159 & Trip, Partial failure in MCR lost. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 56 of 182&7 | IRC 160 through power xfer Close Yellow CS sw IRC-CS-159/160 position indicating light in MCR lost. | ||
Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calarese Subsystem: | 113 IKPSW -4 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV I PSW22 Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen IA flow Closed, Partial Mechanical signal isolator information to of SOV IPSW22 is lost control SOV IPSW22 signal Trip, Partial failure I PSWSI001, flow MCR OAC point See Item No.310 isolator, instrument controller Close controller and flow is lost. (I PSW-0022) and flow transmitter in transmitter is lost. | ||
PSW Electrical System Pare : F. C Date : ____10/7/!I______ | IPSWCA0001 114 I KPSW -5 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV I PSW24 Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen IB flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical signal isolator information to of SOV IPSW24 is lost SOV IPSW24 signal isolator, Trip, Partial failure IPSWSI002, flow MCR OAC point See Item No. 312 instrument controller and flow Close controller and flow is lost. (I PSW-0024) transmitter in IPSWCAOOOI transmitter is lost. | ||
Equipment: | |||
___2XPSWA, 2XPSWB Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 53 of 182 FailureMode. and Effects Analysis Worksheet . | ||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | ||
Subsystem:-, PSW Electrical System Date: ____1/I Equipment: | Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/17/11 Equipment: -I KPSW Breakers 9, 10 Rev. No. ..0 Diagram: 0-6704 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | ||
..2XPSWA Breakers | (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 115 I KPSW -9 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 310 (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen IA flow Closed, Partial Mechanical I PSW22 is lost indicating lights in (IPSW-0022) control SOV I PSW22, power Trip, Partial failure MCR panel I UB2 converter I PSWVF0022 and Close are lost. | ||
Subsystem: | positioner assembly IPSWVP0022 116 IKPSW - 10 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 312 (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen IB flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 1PSW24 is lost indicating lights in (IPSW-0024) | ||
PSW Electrical System Prepared by: F. Calabrese Date : ____10/7/Il_______ | SOV IPSW24, power Trip, Partial failure MCR panel IUB2 converter I PSWVF0024 and Close are lost. | ||
Equipment: | positioner assembly I PSWVP0024 117 Not Used 118 Not Used 119 Not Used | ||
_2XPSWA Breaker 2B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ___.0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects ( | |||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 54 of 182 | ||
.PSW Electrical System Date_: 1029/11 Equipment: | "",*, Faj luje Mode and Effects AnqIyus ork heet System:.. Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Date : 10/7/11 Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Equipment: _ I PSWSI00 I, 1PSWSI002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-165-02, OEE-l165-04 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other No Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (2).(3) (4) (5) .(6) (7) (8) 120 I PSWSI00I PSW Stm Gen I A flow Loss of power in Electrical Automatic flow Transfer of flow See Item No. 310 (OEE- 165-02) control SOV I PSW22 Loss of power out failure control of SOV information to MCR (IPSW-0022) signal isolator, flow I PSW22 is lost OAC point is lost. | ||
...2XPSWA Breakers 2D, | controller and flow Failure effects of transmitter in IPSWSIOOI bounds trPSWCA0001 failure effects of IPSWSSOOI and I PSWFTOO I. | ||
to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well Therefore, no power exists to Vital i&C battery charger Partial Close 2CA is lost as local battery charger 2CA until manual xfer is 2CA through ATS .indication, performed. | 121 1PSWSI002 PSW Stm Gen IB flow Loss of power in Electrical Automatic flow Transfer of flow See Item No. 312 (OEE-165-04) control SOV 1PSW24 Loss of power out failure control of SOV information to MCR (IPSW-0024) signal isolator, flow I PSW24 is lost OAC point is lost. Failure effects of controller and flow PSWS1002 I bounds transmitter in failure effects of I PSWCA0OOI I PSWSS002 and IPSWFT002. | ||
2PSWSXTRNOO I 2CA trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I annunciated in hour per OSC-8113. | |||
Standby charger MCR. 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is available. | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 55 of 182 | ||
ATS will not transfer to PSW source.___should PSW power be unavailable. | . e and | ||
132 2XPSWA -3D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC 155 through 2RC 160 (0-6702) power to xfmr Fail Closed, Mechanical 2KPSW and its relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See 2PSWTF2XPSW Partial Trip, failure loads (2PSW22 2KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | ........ a ...dk'u ,Effec*s*Analysis.W sheet System: ___Protected Service Water__________ | ||
which feeds power Partial Close & 24 and their 2PSWCA0002 | Subsystem: __PSW Electrical System Pare Date : : 10/ | ||
OPSWIR001 and Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be OPSWIR002) is mitigated by operation of manual bypass lost. valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information. | 10/28/11I e____ | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 60 of 182 Failure System: Protected Service Water_____ | Equipment: I RC-CS-l 55/156 (157/158) (159/160) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-150-19 (15) (16). | ||
Subsystem: | No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects | ||
PSW Electrical System_ | ( Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8) | ||
2XPSWA Breakers 3E, 3F Diagram: 0-6702 | (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 122 IRC-CS-1551156 Provides forAC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (1RC-0155/0156) | ||
through xfer sw PSW Primary See Item 336 for additional OPSWSXTRN008 and / or Booster information. | (OEE-150-19) power transfer fails open Mechanical I RC155 and indicating lights The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure I RC 156 is lost in MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to I RC 155 and I RC 156 fails closed Station power to White and. prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails I RC 155 and Yellow CS followers to be closed simultaneously. | ||
Pump Bearing Temperature Alarms in MCR.134 2XPSWA -3F Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the (0-6702) emergency power Closed, Partial Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in non PSW source via manual re-to Vital i&C Trip, Partial failure Battery Charger MCR as well as transfer. | power to PSW power to transfer I RC 156 is lost position Therefore paralleling of normal and indicating light PSW power sources is not a credible in MCR lost. failure. | ||
Therefore, no power exists battery charger Close 2CB is lost local indication, to Vital l&C battery charger 2CB 2CB through ATS 2CB trouble until manual xfer is performed. | 123 1RC-CS-157/158 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (IRC-0157/0158) | ||
2PSWSXTRN002 annunciated in Batteries can supply load for up to I MCR. hour per OSC-8113. | (OEE- I50-15) power transfer fails open Mechanical I RC157 and indicating lights The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure I RC158 is lost in MCR lost, switch constructed in such a way as to IRC 157 and IRC 158 fails closed Station power to White and prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails IRC157 and Yellow CS followers to be closed simultaneously. | ||
Standby charger 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is available. | power to PSW power to transfer IRCI 58 is lost position Therefore paralleling of normal and indicating light PSW power sources is not a credible in MCR lost. failure. | ||
124 I RC-CS-159/160 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (IRC-0159/0160) | |||
(OEE-150-16) power transfer fails open Mechanical IRC159 and indicating lights The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure I RC 160 is lost in MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to I RC 159 and I RC 160 fails closed Station power to White and prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails 1RC159 and Yellow CS followers to be closed simultaneously. | |||
power to PSW power to transfer IRCI60 is lost position Therefore paralleling of normal and indicating light PSW power sources is not a credible in MCR lost. failure. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 56 of 182 | |||
&7 .~'< >< ~ .Failur Mode andEfct System: .................. | |||
Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calarese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Pare : F. C Date : ____10/7/!I______ | |||
Equipment: ___2XPSWA, 2XPSWB Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train on Train Mehdoof Method No Identification Cmoe FunctionMode Fni Mode Mechanism M hi and/or System ao Se Failure Detection Remarks and(8)Other Effects (2) ((5) (6) (7) 125 2XPSWA Aux building MCC Loss of Electrical or Loss of power to Unit Bus monitor PSW is available for tornado / | |||
(0-6702) 2XPSWA supplies power output Mechanical 2 PSW valves, HPI on MCC HELB events for Units I and 3. | |||
to PSW valves, HPI valves, power - failure valves, Vital I&C 2XPSWA For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, the Vital I&C battery charger complete battery chargers, alarms in Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) xfer switches, PSW pump bus failure PSW pump room MCR will be credited as an alternate room exhaust fan, 2KPSW exhaust fan, power means of achieving and power panel and MCC panel I KPSW and maintaining SSD for the first 72 2XPSWB MCC 2XPSWB hours. | |||
126 2XPSWB Aux building MCC Loss of Electrical or Loss of power to Unit HPI valve PSW is available for tornado / | |||
(0-6702) 2XPSWB supplies power output Mechanical 2 HPI valves and indicating HELB events for Units I and 3. | |||
to PSW-14 valve and Unit power- failure PSW-14 valve lights lost in For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, the 2 HPI valves complete MCR. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) bus failure, PSw-14 valve will be credited as an alternate cable tie Pmeans of achieving and failuretgs indilating maintaining SSD for the first 72 lights lost in MCR. hours. | |||
hus | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 57 of 182 Failure Mode Effects Analysis Worksheet' System: Protected Service Water_________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | |||
Subsystem:-, PSW Electrical System Date: ____1/I Equipment: .. 2XPSWA Breakers IA, I D, 2A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (2)Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | |||
(I2) (3) (4) (5) (6)!i (7) 127 2XPSWA- IA Aux building MCC Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Bus monitor on PSW is available for tornado / | |||
(0-6702) 2XPSWA main breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 1 PSW MCC 2XPSWA HELB events for Units I and feeding PSW valves, HPI Partial Trip, failure valves, HPI alarms in MCR 3. For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, valves, Vital I&C battery Partial Close valves, Vital the Standby Shutdown charger xfer switches, I&C battery Facility (SSF) will be credited PSW pump room exhaust chargers and as an alternate means of fan, 2KPSW power panel power panel achieving and maintaining and MCC 2XPSWB I KPSW SSD for the first 72 hours. | |||
128 2XPSWA- ID Provides 600VAC power Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 314 (0-6702) to PSW Steam generator Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 2 PSW flow indication in MCR (2PSW-0006) 2A & 2B flow isolation Partial Trip, failure isolation valve lost. | |||
MOV 2PSW6 Partial Close 2PSW6. Inability to establish or control flow as indicated by 2PSW-FTOOOI and 2PSW-FT0002. | |||
129 2XPSWA - 2A Provides 600VAC power Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 321 (0-6702) to PSW Steam generator Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 2 PSW indication in MCR 2B throttle MOV Partial Trip, failure throttle Valve lost. (2PSW-0025) 2PSW25 Partial Close 2PSW25. Flow anomalies as indicated by 2PSW-FT0002 | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 58 of 182 FailureM~ode and EffectsAna yvr~fieet System: _.....-Protected Service Water__________ | |||
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Prepared by: F. Calabrese Date : ____10/7/Il_______ | |||
Equipment: _2XPSWA Breaker 2B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ___.0-6702 No (I) Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Effects and/or on Train System Method of Failure Detection Remarks and(8)Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 130 2XPSWA - 2B Provides 600VAC power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No, 319 (0-6702) to PSW Steam generator Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 PSW indication in MCR 2A throttle MOV Trip, Partial failure throttle valve lost. (2PSW-0023) 2PSW23 Close 2PSW23. Flow anomalies as indicated by 2PSW-FT0001 | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 59 of 182 Faitu.e Modeand.Effeet' alysis Worksheet An$ ** | |||
System: ...... Protected Service Water_____ | |||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: . PSW Electrical System Date_: 1029/11 Equipment: ... 2XPSWA Breakers 2D, 3D______ Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_., 0-6702 -. _ _ | |||
Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | |||
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 131 2XPSWA - 2D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non (0-6702) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in PSW source via manual re-transfer. | |||
to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well Therefore, no power exists to Vital i&C battery charger Partial Close 2CA is lost as local battery charger 2CA until manual xfer is 2CA through ATS . indication, performed. | |||
2PSWSXTRNOO I 2CA trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I annunciated in hour per OSC-8113. Standby charger MCR. 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is available. | |||
ATS will not transfer to PSW source | |||
.___should PSW power be unavailable. | |||
132 2XPSWA - 3D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC 155 through 2RC 160 (0-6702) power to xfmr Fail Closed, Mechanical 2KPSW and its relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See 2PSWTF2XPSW Partial Trip, failure loads (2PSW22 2KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | |||
which feeds power Partial Close & 24 and their intruent 2PSWCA0002 larm inin Loss the PSW power feed tornfro of the mainsmtgtdb panel 2KPSW pane 2KPW instrument alarms cnrlpnl power, 2RC 155 MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of thru 160, and power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw control panels OPSWSXTRN006. | |||
OPSWIR001 and Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be OPSWIR002) is mitigated by operation of manual bypass lost. valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 60 of 182 Failure System: Protected Service Water_____ | |||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_ _ | |||
Date : _ 017111 Equipment: 2XPSWA Breakers 3E, 3F Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects | |||
()(2) Identification ()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6)System Failure (7)(8 Detection 133 2XPSWA - 3E Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of normal Fan relay panel Power to PSW pump room exhaust (0-6702) power to PSW Closed, Partial Mechanical power to PSW status indicating fan can be supplied from the pump room Trip, Partial failure pump room lights (local) alternate PSW source 3XPSW- ID exhaust fan Close exhaust fan lost. through MTS OPSWSXTRN008. | |||
through xfer sw PSW Primary See Item 336 for additional OPSWSXTRN008 and / or Booster information. | |||
Pump Bearing Temperature Alarms in MCR. | |||
134 2XPSWA - 3F Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the (0-6702) emergency power Closed, Partial Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in non PSW source via manual re-to Vital i&C Trip, Partial failure Battery Charger MCR as well as transfer. Therefore, no power exists battery charger Close 2CB is lost local indication, to Vital l&C battery charger 2CB 2CB through ATS 2CB trouble until manual xfer is performed. | |||
2PSWSXTRN002 annunciated in Batteries can supply load for up to I MCR. hour per OSC-8113. Standby charger 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is available. | |||
ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 61 of 182;<:~. *.*~ ~:~: ~ ..Fail uire lo'de and Effec~ts'nalysis Wor~heet~System: _____Protected Service Water__________ | |||
Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 61 of 182 | ||
...._.PSW Electrical System Pare : . | ;<:~. | ||
2XPSWA Breakers 4C, 4D, 5A, 5B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects No Identification FMode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)(() (2) (4) (5) (6) (7)135 2XPSWB -4C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of normal MCR loss of Power to valve OPSWI4 can (0-6702) power to PSW recirc Closed, Partial Mechanical power to valve position be supplied from alternate MOV OPSW14 through Trip, Partial failure OPSWF4 valve, indication lights. PSW source 3XPSW-5A xfer sw Close OPSWSXTRN007 136 2XPSWB -4D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 332 (0-6702) power to HPI seal flow Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 HPI MOV indication in (2HP-0139) injection isolation Trip, Partial failure 2HP139. MCR lost.control MOV 2HP 139 Close 137 2XPSWB -5A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 2HP26 could be (0-6702) power to HP reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2HP26 is lost. indication in supplied through the normal inlet valve 2HP26 Trip, Partial failure MCR lost. station power source via through xfer sw Close Control switch manual xfer switch 2HPISXTRN004 yellow position 2HPISXTRN004 if available. | *.*~ ~:~: ~ .. Fail uire lo'de and Effec~ts'nalysis Wor~heet~ | ||
light in MCR See Item No. 331 for lost. additional info.138 2XPSWB- 5B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 333 (0-6702) power to HPI seal flow Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 HPI MOV indication in (2HP-0140) injection throttle MOV Trip, Partial failure 2HPi40. MCR lost.2HP 140 Close OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 62 of 182" ; Failure Mode System: ._Protected Service Water | System: _____Protected Service Water__________ | ||
Subsystem: .... _.PSW Electrical System Pare Date : : . | |||
.10/7/11 Cabee____ | |||
through xfer sw yellow position See Item No. 330 for additional 2HPISXTRN003 light in MCR lost. info.140 Not Used 141 Not Used 142 Not Used 143 2PSWSXTRN001 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails (0-6702) power transfer fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in to transfer on loss of normal source, capability for 2CA Contact set failure Battery MCR as well as no power exists to vital I&C charger battery charger fails closed Charger 2CA local indication. | Equipment: 2XPSWA Breakers 4C, 4D, 5A, 5B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects No Identification FMode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8) | ||
2CA. Batteries can supply load for from normal Switch fails is lost 2CA trouble up to I hour per OSC-8 113.station power to to transfer Station power annunciated in Standby charger 2CS can be PSW power to Charger MCR. connected if 2XS3 power is 2CA is lost available. | (() (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 135 2XPSWB - 4C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of normal MCR loss of Power to valve OPSWI4 can (0-6702) power to PSW recirc Closed, Partial Mechanical power to valve position be supplied from alternate MOV OPSW14 through Trip, Partial failure OPSWF4 valve, indication lights. PSW source 3XPSW-5A xfer sw Close OPSWSXTRN007 136 2XPSWB - 4D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 332 (0-6702) power to HPI seal flow Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 HPI MOV indication in (2HP-0139) injection isolation Trip, Partial failure 2HP139. MCR lost. | ||
control MOV 2HP 139 Close 137 2XPSWB - 5A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 2HP26 could be (0-6702) power to HP reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2HP26 is lost. indication in supplied through the normal inlet valve 2HP26 Trip, Partial failure MCR lost. station power source via through xfer sw Close Control switch manual xfer switch 2HPISXTRN004 yellow position 2HPISXTRN004 if available. | |||
light in MCR See Item No. 331 for lost. additional info. | |||
138 2XPSWB- 5B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 333 (0-6702) power to HPI seal flow Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 HPI MOV indication in (2HP-0140) injection throttle MOV Trip, Partial failure 2HPi40. MCR lost. | |||
2HP 140 Close | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 62 of 182 | |||
" ; Failure Mode System: . _Protected Service Water Prepared by: -F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/9/11 Equipment: ._2XSPWA Breaker 5C, 2PSWSXTRNOO1 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 Efects on Component Function Failure Failure Effec on Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism TDetection (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 139 2XPSWB - 5C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 2HP24 could be supplied (0-6702) power to 2A HPI Fail Closed, Mechanical 2HP24 is lost. indication in MCR through the normal station power BWST suction Partial Trip, failure lost. source via manual xfer switch valve 2HP24 Partial Close Control switch 2HPISXTRN003 if available. | |||
through xfer sw yellow position See Item No. 330 for additional 2HPISXTRN003 light in MCR lost. info. | |||
140 Not Used 141 Not Used 142 Not Used 143 2PSWSXTRN001 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails (0-6702) power transfer fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in to transfer on loss of normal source, capability for 2CA Contact set failure Battery MCR as well as no power exists to vital I&C charger battery charger fails closed Charger 2CA local indication. 2CA. Batteries can supply load for from normal Switch fails is lost 2CA trouble up to I hour per OSC-8 113. | |||
station power to to transfer Station power annunciated in Standby charger 2CS can be PSW power to Charger MCR. connected if 2XS3 power is 2CA is lost available. | |||
A switch failure where both sets of contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm. | A switch failure where both sets of contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 63 of 182 Failure Mod an ffects An~ orlkshee System: Protected Service Water | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 63 of 182 Failure Mod an ffects An~ orlkshee System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: _ 10/7/il Equipment: _ 2PSWSXTRN002, 2PSWTF2XPSW_ | |||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 144 2PSWSXTRN002 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6702) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to vital [&C charger 2CB. | |||
capability for fails closed 2CB is lost local indication. Batteries can supply load for up to I 2CB battery Switch fails Station power to 2CB trouble hour per OSC-8 113. Standby charger charger from 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is normal station to transfer Charger 2CB is annunciated in available. | |||
Batteries can supply load for up to I 2CB battery Switch fails Station power to 2CB trouble hour per OSC-8 113. Standby charger charger from 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is normal station to transfer Charger 2CB is annunciated in available. | power to PSW lost MCR. A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm. | ||
power to PSW lost MCR. A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm.145 2PSWTF2XPSW Provides Loss of Electrical Power to Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC155 through 2RC160 (0-6702) 208/120VAC power in failure 2KPSW and its relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See power to panel Loss of loads (2PSW22 bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | 145 2PSWTF2XPSW Provides Loss of Electrical Power to Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC155 through 2RC160 (0-6702) 208/120VAC power in failure 2KPSW and its relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See power to panel Loss of loads (2PSW22 bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | ||
2KPSW power out & 24 and their 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW instrument alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of power, 2RC155 thru 160, and power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw control panels 0PSWSXTRN006. | 2KPSW power out & 24 and their 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW instrument alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of power, 2RC155 thru 160, and power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw control panels 0PSWSXTRN006. | ||
OPSWIR001 and Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be OPSWIR002) is mitigated by operation of manual bypass lost. valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information. | OPSWIR001 and Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be OPSWIR002) is mitigated by operation of manual bypass lost. valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 64 of 182 jFailure Mode and Effects Analvsi§Ao~ksheet System:.- | |||
Protected Service Water _ .......Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem:.... | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 64 of 182 jFailure Mode and Effects Analvsi§Ao~ksheet System:.- Protected Service Water _ . ...... | ||
PSW Electrical System Date :10/7/11I Equipment: | Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem:.... PSW Electrical System Date :10/7/11I Equipment: _2HPISXTRN003, 2HPISXTRN004 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-25 1-04, OEE-251-06 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects | ||
_2HPISXTRN003, 2HPISXTRN004 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-25 1-04, OEE-251-06 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects | ()(2) Identification ()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6) | ||
AC power set fails Mechanical Injection Reactor respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer open failure Inlet Valve electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power capability Contact 2HP26 is lost. as determined by from PSW MCC 2XPSW would be for 2HP26 set fails valve position paralleled with power from MCC 2XS4 to from normal closed indication, flow valve 2HP26. To prevent the paralleling of station Switch anomalies and power sources this calculation recommends power to filt pump indications keeping MCC 2XPSWB breaker 5A in the PSW power transfer observed in the normally open position when power to the IransferMCR. | System Detection (7)() (8) 146 2HPISXTRN003 Provides for Contact Electrical or Power to 2A HPI Valve fails to See Item No. 330 (2HP-0024) | ||
2HP26 valve is aligned to the station source. | (OEE-25 1-04) AC power set fails Mechanical BWST Suction respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer open failure Valve 2HP24 is electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power capability Contact lost. as determined by from PSW MCC 2XPSW would be for 2HP24 set fails valve position paralleled with power from MCC 2XS4 to from normal closed indication, flow valve 2HP24. To prevent the paralleling of station Switch anomalies and power sources this calculation recommends power to fails to pump, indications keeping MCC 2XPSWB breaker 5C in the PSW power transfer observed in the normally open position when power to the MCR. 2HP24 valve is aligned to the station source. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 65 of 182... Failure Modeand System: .Protected Service Water__________ | 147 2HPISXTRN004 Provides for Contact Electrical or Power to HP to Valve fails to See Item No. 331 (2HP-0026) | ||
(OEE-251-06) AC power set fails Mechanical Injection Reactor respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer open failure Inlet Valve electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power capability Contact 2HP26 is lost. as determined by from PSW MCC 2XPSW would be for 2HP26 set fails valve position paralleled with power from MCC 2XS4 to from normal closed indication, flow valve 2HP26. To prevent the paralleling of station Switch anomalies and power sources this calculation recommends power to filt pump indications keeping MCC 2XPSWB breaker 5A in the PSW power transfer observed in the normally open position when power to the IransferMCR. 2HP26 valve is aligned to the station source. | |||
Equipment: | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 65 of 182 | ||
OPSWSXTRN007, OPSWSXTRN008 | ... Failure Modeand System: . Protected Service Water__________ | ||
Exhaust Fan closed unavailable PSW Primary and / Under normal operation should the switch from U2 or U3 Switch or Booster Pump inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW MCC PSW Aux fails to Bearing Temperature 2XPSW would be paralleled with power from building MCC transfer Alarms in MCR. MCC 3XPSW to the pump room exhaust fan. To prevent the paralleling of power sources this Noidection orns. calculation recommends keeping MCC 3XPSW breaker I D in the normally open position when power to the exhaust fan is aligned to the normal source (2XPSWA-3E) | Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : __ | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 66 of 182.. .. .. Failure Mode*and V.ects ik | Dae__1_91 __1019/1_______ | ||
.....PSW Electrical System Date: 10/17/11 Equipment: | Equipment: OPSWSXTRN007, OPSWSXTRN008 Diagram: ....... | ||
2KPSW, 2KPSW Breakers Main Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6705 ._.......-No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (F) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)(2) (4) (5) (6) (7)150 2KPSW Provides power to Loss of Electrical or Power to 2KPSW and Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC 155 through 2RC 160 (0-6705) 2KPSW and its loads output Mechanical its loads (2PSW22 & relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See (2PSW22, 24 and power -failure 24 and their bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | O6720-E__ Rev. No. 0 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (2)() (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 148 OPSWSXTRN007 Provides for AC Contact Electrical or PSW MCR loss of valve See Item No. 305 (OPSW-0014) | ||
their instrument complete instrument power, 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW power, 2RC155 thru bus failure 2RC155 thru 160, alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of 160, and control conro paelnismiigaedbyarasfelo panels oPSWIR0ol and control panels power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw p sOPSWIROO and OPSWSXTRN006. | (O-6720-E) power transfer set fails Mechanical Recirculating position indicating Under normal operation should the switch capability for open failure valve OPSWI 4 lights on switch indertnormal o sedtion the fro m MCC the OPSW14 Contact electrically failure in complete inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW MCC valve from U2 set fails unavailable, open position MCC 3XPSW to valve PSW-a14. To prevent the or U3 PSW closed However, or MC3PWt av S- .T rvn h can be paralleling cOPSW4 recommendsofkeeping power sources this calculation MCC 3XPSW breaker 5A Aux buildin Swtch MCfailsfo manually via a controlled in the normallyis aligned PSW-142HP to the when open position normalpower sourceto the transfer hand wheel. (2XPSWB-4C) 149 OPSWSXTRN008 Provides for AC Contact Electrical or PSW Pump Fan relay panel status Should the PSW System be unavailable, the (O-6720-E) power transfer set fails Mechanical Room Exhaust indicating lights Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited capability for open failure Fan unavailable (local) lost when both as an alternate means of achieving and the Contact and therefore sets of contacts fail maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | ||
and OPSWIR002 0PSWIR002) are lost.Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information. | OPSWMR0003 set fails PSW is open. See Item 336 for additional information. | ||
151 2KPSW -Aux building panel Fail Open, Electrical or Power to 2KPSW and Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC155 through 2RC160 Main 2KPSW main breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical its loads (2PSW22, relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See (0-6705) feeding (2PSW22, 24 Partial Trip, failure 24 and their bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | Exhaust Fan closed unavailable PSW Primary and / Under normal operation should the switch from U2 or U3 Switch or Booster Pump inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW MCC PSW Aux fails to Bearing Temperature 2XPSW would be paralleled with power from building MCC transfer Alarms in MCR. MCC 3XPSW to the pump room exhaust fan. To prevent the paralleling of power sources this Noidection orns. calculation recommends keeping MCC 3XPSW breaker I D in the normally open position when power to the exhaust fan is aligned to the normal source (2XPSWA-3E) | ||
and their instrument Partial Close instrument power, 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW power, 2RC155 thru 2RC155 thru 160, alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of 160, and control and control panels power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw panels OPSWIROOI OPSWIR001 and OPSWSXTRN0o6. | |||
and OPSWIR002 OPSWIR002 are lost.Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information. | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 66 of 182 | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 67 of 182 FailureMode and Effets.Anay okhe System: ._....... | .. .. .. Failure Mode*and "beet V.ects Anas*iso**' ik System: Protected Service Water_ _ | ||
_Protected Service Water Prepared by: __F. Calabrese. | Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: ..... PSW Electrical System Date: 10/17/11 Equipment: 2KPSW, 2KPSW Breakers Main Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6705 . _.......- | ||
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (F) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8) | |||
.......PSW Electrical System _ | (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 150 2KPSW Provides power to Loss of Electrical or Power to 2KPSW and Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC 155 through 2RC 160 (0-6705) 2KPSW and its loads output Mechanical its loads (2PSW22 & relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See (2PSW22, 24 and power - failure 24 and their bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | ||
2KPSW Breakers 1,2,3 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ........0-6705 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects N Identification 2 Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)I (2) (3)(4) (6) (7)152 2KPSW -I Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC155 and indicating lights in (2RC-0155/0156) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 156 are lost MCR lost.2RC155 & 2RC156 through Close Yellow CS position power xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 1551156 MCR lost.153 2KPSW -2 Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC 157 and indicating lights in (2RC-0157/0158) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 158 are lost MCR lost.2RC 157 & 2RC158 through Close Yellow CS position power xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 157/158 MCR lost.154 2KPSW -3 Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC1 59 and indicating lights in (2RC-0159/0160) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 160 are lost MCR lost.2RC159 & 2RC160 through Close Yellow CS position manual xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 159/160 MCR lost. | their instrument complete instrument power, 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW power, 2RC155 thru bus failure 2RC155 thru 160, alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of 160, and control conro paelnismiigaedbyarasfelo panels oPSWIR0ol and control panels power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw p sOPSWIROO and OPSWSXTRN006. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 68 of 182 FiueMode and Effets Anialysis Wv~rD.sueet System:_.... -Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: | and OPSWIR002 0PSWIR002) are lost. | ||
PSW Electrical System________ | Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information. | ||
Date : ____10/17/Il_______ | 151 2KPSW - Aux building panel Fail Open, Electrical or Power to 2KPSW and Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC155 through 2RC160 Main 2KPSW main breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical its loads (2PSW22, relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See (0-6705) feeding (2PSW22, 24 Partial Trip, failure 24 and their bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | ||
Equipment: | and their instrument Partial Close instrument power, 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW power, 2RC155 thru 2RC155 thru 160, alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of 160, and control and control panels power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw panels OPSWIROOI OPSWIR001 and OPSWSXTRN0o6. | ||
-.. 2KPSW Breakers 4, 5, Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ....0-6705 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other No Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (I) (2(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)155 2KPSW- 4 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Transfer of flow Automatic flow control of (0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2A flow Closed, Partial Mechanical 2PSW22 signal information to MCR SOV 2PSW22 is lost control SOV 2PSW22 signal Trip, Partial failure isolator 2PSWSi001, OAC point is lost. See Item No. 318 isolator, instrument controller Close flow controller and and flow transmitter in flow transmitter is (2PSW-0022) 2PSWCA0001 lost.156 2KPSW -5 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Transfer of flow Automatic flow control of (0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 2PSW24 signal information to MCR SOV 2PSW24 is lost SOV 2PSW24 signal isolator, Trip, Partial failure isolator 2PSWSI002, OAC point is lost. See Item No. 320 instrument controller and flow Close flow controller and transmitter in 2PSWCA000I flow transmitter is (2PSW-0024) lost.157 2KPSW -- 7 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to Loss of bar graph PSW control panel board (0-6705) PSW Control Panel Boards Closed, Partial Mechanical OPSWIR001 and readings in MCR as can be powered thru OPSWIR001 and OPSWIR002 Trip, Partial failure OPSWIR002 well as lack of input 3KPSW-7 after manual thru MTS OPSWSXTRN006 Close available thru to computer from transfer of 3KPSW -7 OAC points. OPSWSXTRN006. | and OPSWIR002 OPSWIR002 are lost. | ||
No I | Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 69.of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analyss Worksheet System: __Protected Service Water_______ | |||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 67 of 182 FailureMode and Effets.Anay okhe System: ._......._Protected Service Water Prepared by: __F. Calabrese. | ||
Subsystem: | : 7/__ | ||
PSW Electrical System | Subsystem: ....... PSW Electrical System _ _ae__F. | ||
..2KPSW Breakers 9, 10 / 2PSWSIOOI, 2PSWSI002 R | Date: 10/17/11 Equipment: 2KPSW Breakers 1,2,3 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ........ 0-6705 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects N Identification 2 Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | ||
(0-6705) Stm Gen | I (2) (3)(4) (6) (7) 152 2KPSW - I Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC155 and indicating lights in (2RC-0155/0156) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 156 are lost MCR lost. | ||
(0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Fail Closed, Mechanical 2PSW24 is indicating lights in SOV 2PSW24, power converter Partial Trip, failure lost MCR panel 2UB2 2PSWVF0024 and positioner Partial Close are lost.assembly 2PSWVP0024 160 Not Used 161 2 PSWSI001 PSW Stm Gen 2A flow control Loss of Electrical Automatic Transfer of flow See Item No. 318 (2PSW-0022)(OEE-265-02) | 2RC155 & 2RC156 through Close Yellow CS position power xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 1551156 MCR lost. | ||
SOV 2PSW22 signal isolator, power in failure flow control of information to Failure effects of2PSWSlO0l flow controller and flow Loss of SOV:2PSW22 MCR OAC point is bounds failure effects of transmitter in 2PSWCA00I power out is lost lost. 2PSWSSOOI and 2PSWFTOOI. | 153 2KPSW - 2 Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC 157 and indicating lights in (2RC-0157/0158) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 158 are lost MCR lost. | ||
162 2PSWS1002 PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Loss of Electrical Automatic Transfer of flow See Item No. 320 (2PSW-0024)(OEE-265-04) | 2RC 157 & 2RC158 through Close Yellow CS position power xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 157/158 MCR lost. | ||
SOV 2PSW24 signal isolator, power in failure flow control of information to Failure effects of 2PSWS1002 flow controller and flow Loss of SOV 2PSW24 MCR OAC point is bounds failure effects of transmitter in 2PSWCAOOOI power out is lost lost. 2PSWSS002 and 2PSWFT002. | 154 2KPSW - 3 Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC1 59 and indicating lights in (2RC-0159/0160) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 160 are lost MCR lost. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 70 of 182 FailureMode | 2RC159 & 2RC160 through Close Yellow CS position manual xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 159/160 MCR lost. | ||
'nEffects Analysis W o | |||
Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 68 of 182 FiueMode and Effets Anialysis Wv~rD.sueet System:_.... -Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System________ Date : ____10/17/Il_______ | ||
PSW Electrical System_________ | Equipment: -.. 2KPSW Breakers 4, 5, Rev. No. 0 Diagram: .... 0-6705 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other No Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (I) (2(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 155 2KPSW- 4 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Transfer of flow Automatic flow control of (0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2A flow Closed, Partial Mechanical 2PSW22 signal information to MCR SOV 2PSW22 is lost control SOV 2PSW22 signal Trip, Partial failure isolator 2PSWSi001, OAC point is lost. See Item No. 318 isolator, instrument controller Close flow controller and and flow transmitter in flow transmitter is (2PSW-0022) 2PSWCA0001 lost. | ||
Date : 10/28/11I Equipment: | 156 2KPSW -5 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Transfer of flow Automatic flow control of (0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 2PSW24 signal information to MCR SOV 2PSW24 is lost SOV 2PSW24 signal isolator, Trip, Partial failure isolator 2PSWSI002, OAC point is lost. See Item No. 320 instrument controller and flow Close flow controller and transmitter in 2PSWCA000I flow transmitter is (2PSW-0024) lost. | ||
.....2RC-CS- 1551156 (157/158) | 157 2KPSW -- 7 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to Loss of bar graph PSW control panel board (0-6705) PSW Control Panel Boards Closed, Partial Mechanical OPSWIR001 and readings in MCR as can be powered thru OPSWIR001 and OPSWIR002 Trip, Partial failure OPSWIR002 well as lack of input 3KPSW-7 after manual thru MTS OPSWSXTRN006 Close available thru to computer from transfer of 3KPSW - 7 OAC points. OPSWSXTRN006. No I I_impact to PSW. | ||
(159/160) | |||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram:__ | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 69.of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analyss Worksheet System: __Protected Service Water_______ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | ||
OEE-250-15 (16) (17)Failure Failure Effects on Method of Failure No | Subsystem: PSW Electrical System ________ | ||
Therefore paralleling power to PSW power to transfer 2RC 156 is lost light in MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not | Date: 10/18/11 Equipment: .. 2KPSW Breakers 9, 10 / 2PSWSIOOI, 2PSWSI002 R No. | ||
Provides for AC | Rev. N 0 Diagram: _0-6705, OEE-265-02, OEE-265-04 Co N omponentiFunction mp Mode Failure Mechanism Failure System Effects on Method of Failure | ||
The GE SBM switch is a cam operated | ()(8) Remarks and Other Effects (N) (2) ione Function (3) MTrain (4) (5) and/or (6) Detection (7) | ||
(2)) | |||
power to P5W power to transfer 2RC160 is lost light in MCR lost. Therefore paralleling of normal and PSW I I I I power sources is not a credible failure. | 158 2KPSW 9 Provides 120V2C power to PSW Fail Open, Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 318 (2PSW-0022) | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 71 of 182* ~~~Failure Mod an f s nli orkshe'e System: Protected Service Water__________ | (0-6705) Stm Gen IA flow control SOV Fail Closed, Mechanical 2PSW22 is indicating lights in 2PSW22, power converter Partial Trip, failure lost MCR panel 2UB2 2PSWVF0022 and positioner Partial Close are lost. | ||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | assembly 2PSWVP0022 159 2KPSW - 10 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 320 (2PSW-0024) | ||
Subsystem: | (0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Fail Closed, Mechanical 2PSW24 is indicating lights in SOV 2PSW24, power converter Partial Trip, failure lost MCR panel 2UB2 2PSWVF0024 and positioner Partial Close are lost. | ||
PSW Electrical System Date : 10/27/1l1 Equipment: | assembly 2PSWVP0024 160 Not Used 161 2 PSWSI001 PSW Stm Gen 2A flow control Loss of Electrical Automatic Transfer of flow See Item No. 318 (2PSW-0022) | ||
...OPSWSXTRN006 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: O-6720-E.. | (OEE-265-02) SOV 2PSW22 signal isolator, power in failure flow control of information to Failure effects of2PSWSlO0l flow controller and flow Loss of SOV:2PSW22 MCR OAC point is bounds failure effects of transmitter in 2PSWCA00I power out is lost lost. 2PSWSSOOI and 2PSWFTOOI. | ||
Failure | 162 2PSWS1002 PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Loss of Electrical Automatic Transfer of flow See Item No. 320 (2PSW-0024) | ||
OPSWIR0001 and fails closed panel well | (OEE-265-04) SOV 2PSW24 signal isolator, power in failure flow control of information to Failure effects of 2PSWS1002 flow controller and flow Loss of SOV 2PSW24 MCR OAC point is bounds failure effects of transmitter in 2PSWCAOOOI power out is lost lost. 2PSWSS002 and 2PSWFT002. | ||
See Instrument panels and safety computer from from U2 or U3 to transfer instrument OAC points. Item No. 305 (OPSW-00 14) for more PSW power panels panel .information. | |||
2KPSW & 3KPSW OPSWIR0002 Inability to Should OPSWI4 be unavailable, the PSW | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 70 of 182 FailureMode 'nEffects Analysis W o rksheetl System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: ___F. Calabrese_____ | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 72 of 182 4 Failu're. | Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_________ | ||
Mode and Effects Analysis-orkslieet4-System: Protected Service Water__________ | Date : 10/28/11I Equipment: .....2RC-CS- 1551156 (157/158) (159/160) Rev. No. 0 Diagram:__ OEE-250-15 (16) (17) | ||
Subsystem:.-- | Failure Failure Effects on Method of Failure No No) Identification Copnn(unt3)oe Function ehns Train and/or System DetectionRemarks (7) and Other Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 163 2RC-CS-155/156 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (2RC-0155/0156) | ||
PSW Electrical System Pate : FCare/11 Date : ____10/27/I11 | (OEE-250-15) power transfer fails open Mechanical 2RC155 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam operated switch capability for Contact set failure 2RC 156 is lost MCR lost. constructed in such a way as to prevent 2RC 155 and 2RC1 56 fails closed Station power White and Yellow CS contacts from separate cam followers to be from normal station Switch fails to 2RC 155 and position indicating closed simultaneously. Therefore paralleling power to PSW power to transfer 2RC 156 is lost light in MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not a | ||
_____credible failure. | |||
_..... OPSWIROO1, 0PSWIR002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram:- | 164 2RC-CS-157/158 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (2RC-0157/0158) | ||
0-6798 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (I) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7)167 0PSWIR00I Provides non- Loss of Electrical or PSW Instrument Loss of bar Loss of non-safety indication has no impact on (0-6798) safety local power in Mechanical panel graph readings in PSW System functionality during an event.indication and Loss of failure OPSWIR001 MCR as well as Loss of safety panel affects control of OPSWl4.non-safety OAC power out. unavailable. | (OEE-250-16) power transfer fails open Mechanical 2RC157 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure 2RC 158 is lost MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to 2RC157 and 2RC158 fails closed Station power White and Yellow CS prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station to 2RC 157 and position indicating followers to be closed simultaneously. | ||
lack of input to ifOPSW 14 fails, then the ability of PSW to points in MCR. PSW Instrument computer from perform its design function may be affected.Provides safety panel See Item No. 305 (0PSW-0014) for more related relay and OPSWIR002 Inability to information. | Switch fails power to PSW power 2RC158 is lost light in MCR lost. Therefore paralleling of normal and PSW to transfer power sources is not a credible failure. | ||
flow switch unavailable control OPSWI4 | 165 2RC-CS-159/160 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (2RC-0159/0160) | ||
perform its design function may be affected.controls for power out. unavailable by OPSW- See Item No. 305 (OPSW-00 14) for more OPSW 14 valve. FT0001 information. | (OEE-250-17) power transfer fails open Mechanical 2RC 159 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure 2RC 160 is lost MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to 2RC 159 and 2RC 160 fails closed Station power White and Yellow CS prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails to 2RC 159 and position indicating followers to be closed simultaneously. | ||
power to P5W power to transfer 2RC160 is lost light in MCR lost. Therefore paralleling of normal and PSW I I I I power sources is not a credible failure. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 71 of 182 | |||
* ~~~Failure Mod an f s nli orkshe'e System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | |||
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 10/27/1l1 Equipment: ... OPSWSXTRN006 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: O-6720-E.. | |||
Failure Effects on Method of No Copoentifcto Function Failure Mode Mechanism Sse eeto 8Other Effects Identification ()()()()()System Mode Faism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and(8) | |||
(2) | |||
(I (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 166 OPSWSXTRN006 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW non- Loss of bar Loss of non-safety indication has no impact on Manual Transfer power transfer fails open Mechanical safety graph readings PSW System functionality during an event. | |||
Switch capability for the Contact set failure instrument in MCR as Loss of safety panel affects control of OPSW14. | |||
(O-6720-E) OPSWIR0001 and OPSWIR0002 fails closed panel 0PSWIR0001 well asto lack of input IffPW4fis OPSW 4 fails,s .henthe t hn h ability PSW to blt offPWt Switch fails Iperform its design function may be affected. See Instrument panels and safety computer from from U2 or U3 to transfer instrument OAC points. Item No. 305 (OPSW-00 14) for more PSW power panels panel . information. | |||
2KPSW & 3KPSW OPSWIR0002 unavailable Inability control to Should OPSWI4 be unavailable, the PSW OPSWI4 flow System may be unavailable and therefore, the as indicated by SSF will be credited as an alternate means of O0PSW-FT0001 achieving and maintaining SSD. | |||
Under normal operation should the switch inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW Panel 2KPSW would be paralleled with power from Panel 3KPSW to both PSW Instrument panels. | |||
To prevent the paralleling of power sources this calculation recommends keeping PSW Panel 3KPSW breaker 7 in the normally open position when power to the PSW Instrument panels is aligned to the normal source (2KPSW-7) | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 72 of 182 4 Failu're. Mode and Effects Analysis-orkslieet4-System: Protected Service Water__________ | |||
Subsystem:.-- PSW Electrical System Pate : FCare/11 Date : ____10/27/I11 _____ | |||
Equipment: _..... | |||
OPSWIROO1, 0PSWIR002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram:- 0-6798 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (I) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 167 0PSWIR00I Provides non- Loss of Electrical or PSW Instrument Loss of bar Loss of non-safety indication has no impact on (0-6798) safety local power in Mechanical panel graph readings in PSW System functionality during an event. | |||
indication and Loss of failure OPSWIR001 MCR as well as Loss of safety panel affects control of OPSWl4. | |||
non-safety OAC power out. unavailable. lack of input to ifOPSW 14 fails, then the ability of PSW to points in MCR. PSW Instrument computer from perform its design function may be affected. | |||
Provides safety panel See Item No. 305 (0PSW-0014) for more related relay and OPSWIR002 Inability to information. | |||
flow switch unavailable control OPSWI4 flow as indicated Should OPSW 14 be. unavailable, the PSW 0 PSW 14 for controls valve. by 0PSW- System may be unavailable and therefore, the PW vav.bSSF will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD. | |||
168 OPSWIR002 Provides safety Loss of Electrical or PSW Instrument Inability to Loss of safety panel affects control of OPSWI4. | |||
(0-6798) related relay and power in Mechanical panel control OPSWi4 IfOPSWI4 fails, then the ability of PSW to flow switch Loss of failure OPSWIR002 flow as indicated: perform its design function may be affected. | |||
controls for power out. unavailable by OPSW- See Item No. 305 (OPSW-00 14) for more OPSW 14 valve. FT0001 information. | |||
Should OPSWI4 be unavailable, the PSW System may be unavailable and therefore, the SSF will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD. | Should OPSWI4 be unavailable, the PSW System may be unavailable and therefore, the SSF will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 73 of 182..Failure Mode an System:.- | |||
Protected Service Water Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 73 of 182 | ||
....PSW Electrical System Equipment: | .. Failure Mode an System:.- Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: .... PSW Electrical System Date: 10/18/1l! | ||
__3XPSW and 3XPSW Breaker I A- | Equipment: __3XPSW and 3XPSW Breaker I A-Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703 Train Method of No Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism and/or on Effects System Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Deecin)8 | ||
((7) 169 3XPSW Aux building MCC 3XPSW Loss of Electrical or Loss of power to Unit Bus monitor PSW is available for tornado / | |||
(0-6703) supplies power to PSW output Mechanical 3 PSW valves, HPI on MCC HELB events for Units I and 2. | |||
valves, HPI valves, Vital power - failure valves, Vital l&C 3XPSW For Unit 3 tornado /HELB, the I&C battery charger xfer complete battery chargers, alarms in Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) switches, PSW pump room bus failure PSW pump room MCR will be credited as an alternate exhaust fan, 3KPSW power exhaust fan, power means of achieving and panel panel 3KPSW maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | |||
170 3XPSW - IA Aux building MCC 3XPSW Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Unit Bus monitor PSW is available for tornado / | |||
(0-6703) main breaker feeding PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical 3 PSW valves, HPI on MCC HELB events for Units I and 2. | |||
valves, HPI valves, Vital Partial Trip, failure valves, Vital I&C 3XPSW For Unit 3 tornado /HELB, the I&C battery charger xfer Partial Close battery chargers and alarms in Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) switches, PSW pump room power panel 3KPSW MCR will be credited as an alternate exhaust fan, 3KPSW power means of achieving and panel maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 74 of 182 Failure Mod1e and Effects Anal1ysis AWorksheet ~ i System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date.: .__._10/18/l1 Equipment: .... 3XPSW Breakers I D, 2A, 2C, 3A Rev. No. K 0 Diagram:_0-6703 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train : | |||
No Function Method of Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects | |||
()(Id (2) i () (4) | |||
Mode (5) | |||
Mechanism and/or(6) | |||
System (8) 171 3XPSW - I D Provides alternate Fail Open, Fail Electrical Loss of alternate Fan relay panel pump status Power to PSW pump room (0-6703) 600VAC power to PSW Closed, Partial or power to PSW indicating lights (local) lost. exhaust fan can be supplied pump room exhaust fan Trip, Partial Mechanical pump room from the normal PSW source through xfer sw Close failure exhaust fan PSW Primary and I or 2XPSWA-3E through MTS OPSWSXTRN008 Booster Pump Bearing 0PSWSXTRN008. | |||
Temperature Alarms in MCR. See Item 336 for additional information. | |||
_ 3XPSW Breakers 4B, 4C Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) 6) (7)(8)179 3XPSW -4B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6703) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. | 172 3XPSW - 2A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical Loss of power to Valve position indication in See Item No. 322 (0-6703) power to PSW Steam Closed, Partial or Unit 3 PSW flow MCR lost. (3PSW-0006) generator 3A & 3B flow Trip, Partial Mechanical isolation valve Inability to establish flow as isolation MOV 3PSW6 Close failure 3PSW6. indicated by 3PSW-FT0001 and 3PSW-FT0002. | ||
Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to Vital I&C battery charger battery charger Partial Close 3CA is lost local indication. | 173 3XPSW -2C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical Loss of power to Valve position indication in See Item No. 327 (0-6703) power to PSW Steam Closed, Partial or Unit 3 PSW MCR lost. (3PSW-0023) generator 3A throttle Trip, Partial Mechanical throttle valve Flow anomalies as indicated MOV 3PSW23 Close failure 3PSW23. by 3PSW-FT0001 174 3XPSW - 3A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical Loss of power to Valve position indication in See Item No. 329 (0-6703) power to PSW Steam Closed, Partial or Unit 3 PSW MCR lost. (3 PSW-0025) generator 3B throttle Trip, Partial Mechanical throttle valve Flow anomalies as indicated MOV 3PSW25 Close failure 3PSW25. by 3 PSW-FT0002 | ||
3CA until manual xfer is performed. | |||
3CA through ATS 3CA trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I hour per 3PSWSXTRN0 I annunciated in OSC-81 13. Standby charger 3CS can be MCR. connected if 3XS3 power is available. | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 75 of 182 | ||
. Tafihre'Nt~e and Effe'ec tgiA "i sME ee System: -ProtectedService Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/8/I1 l | |||
Equipment: .. 3XPSW Breakers 3B, 3C, 3D, 4A_ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (2) (34) (5) (6) 7). (8) 175 3XPSW - 3B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 332 " | |||
(0-6703) power to HPI seal Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 3 HPI MOV indication in MCR (3HP-0139) flow injection Trip, Partial failure 3HP139. lost. | |||
isolation control Close MOV 3HP139 176 3XPSW - 3C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 333 (0-6703) power to HPI seal Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 3 HPI MOV indication in MCR (3HP-0140) flow injection throttle Trip, Partial failure 3HP140. lost. | |||
MOV 3HP140 Close 177 3XPSW - 3D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 3HP24 could be supplied (0-6703) power to 3A HPI Closed, Partial Mechanical 3HP24 is lost. indication in MCR through the normal station power BWST suction valve Trip, Partial failure lost. source via manual xfer switch 3HP24 through xfer Close Control switch 3HPISXTRN003 if available. | |||
w 3HPISXTRN003 yellow position See Item No. 330 for additional light in MCR lost. info. | |||
178 3XPSW - 4A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 3HP26 could be supplied (0-6703) power to HP reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 3HP26 is lost. indication in MCR through the normal station power inlet valve 3HP26 Trip, Partial failure lost. source via manual xfer switch through xfer sw Close Control switch 3HPISXTRN004 if available. | |||
3HPISXTRN004 yellow position See Item No. 331 for additional light in MCR lost. info. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 76 of 182 | |||
>*. :***,::: ,' ,.: :*::FailureModeand Effects.Analysis Worksheet '"*;:,' + : : : *"."'* | |||
System: _Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Date : : _FCae__ | |||
Subsystem:_PSW Electrical System Pare _ | |||
10/18/I11 Equipment: _ 3XPSW Breakers 4B, 4C Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) 6) (7)(8) 179 3XPSW - 4B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6703) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to Vital I&C battery charger battery charger Partial Close 3CA is lost local indication. 3CA until manual xfer is performed. | |||
3CA through ATS 3CA trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I hour per 3PSWSXTRN0 I annunciated in OSC-81 13. Standby charger 3CS can be MCR. connected if 3XS3 power is available. | |||
ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ||
180 3XPSW -4C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6703) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. | 180 3XPSW - 4C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6703) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to Vital I&C battery charger battery charger Partial Close 3CB is lost local indication. 3CB until manual xfer is performed. | ||
Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to Vital I&C battery charger battery charger Partial Close 3CB is lost local indication. | 3CB through ATS 3CB trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I hour per 3PSWSXTRN002 annunciated in OSC-8i 13. Standby charger 3CS can be MCR. connected if 3XS3 power is available. | ||
3CB until manual xfer is performed. | |||
3CB through ATS 3CB trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I hour per 3PSWSXTRN002 annunciated in OSC-8i 13. Standby charger 3CS can be MCR. connected if 3XS3 power is available. | |||
ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 77 of 182..,. .-Failure Mode and Effects Analysi Workshieet System: -Protected Service Water Prepared by: .F. Calabrese_____ | |||
Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 77 of 182 | ||
PSW Electrical System | ..* ,.. - Failure Mode and Effects Analysi Workshieet System: - Protected Service Water Prepared by: .F. Calabrese_____ | ||
* 10/26/11l Equipment: | Date: F._Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : | ||
3XPSW Breaker 5A, 5E Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703" ponentTrain | * 10/26/11l Equipment: 3XPSW Breaker 5A, 5E Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703" ponentTrain Effects on Train Method Failure of Remarks and Other Effects No ComponenFunction Failure Failure Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (8) | ||
which feeds power Partial Close instrument power, 3PSWCA0002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the panel 3KPSW 3RC 155 thru 160, alarms in PSW control panels is mitigated by and alternate power MCR transfer of power to 2KPSW-7 through to control panels xfer sw OPSWSXTRN006. | (7) 181 3XPSW - 5A Provides alternate Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of alternate MCR loss of Power to valve OPSW14 can be supplied (0-6703) 600VAC power to Fail Closed, Mechanical power to OPSWI4 valve position from normal PSW source 2XPSW-4C PSW recirc MOV Partial Trip, failure valve, indication OPSWI4 through Partial Close lights. | ||
OPSW[ROOI | xfer sw OPSWSXTRN007 182 3XPSW - 5E Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or Power to 3KPSW and Loss of power Loss of valves 3RC155 through 3RC 160 (0-6703) power to xfmr Fail Closed, Mechanical its loads (3PSW22 & relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 3. See 3PSWTF3XPSW Partial Trip, failure 24 and their 3KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | ||
& .Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be 0PSWJRO02) is lost, mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos. 326 & 328 for more information. | which feeds power Partial Close instrument power, 3PSWCA0002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the panel 3KPSW 3RC 155 thru 160, alarms in PSW control panels is mitigated by and alternate power MCR transfer of power to 2KPSW-7 through to control panels xfer sw OPSWSXTRN006. | ||
183 Not Used 184 Not Used 185 Not Used 186 Not Used OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 78 of 182 Failure Mode and: Efeets AnlssWokhe System:___... | OPSW[ROOI & .Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be 0PSWJRO02) is lost, mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos. 326 & 328 for more information. | ||
_Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: | 183 Not Used 184 Not Used 185 Not Used 186 Not Used | ||
......... | |||
PSW Electrical System Date: 10/4/11 Equipment: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 78 of 182 Failure Mode and: Efeets AnlssWokhe System:___... _Protected Service Water Prepared by: F.Calabrese Subsystem: .........PSW Electrical System Date: 10/4/11 Equipment: ... 3HPISXTRN003, 3HPISXTRN004, 3PSWSXTRNOOI Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_OEE-351-04, OEE-351-06, 0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | ||
... | (I) (2) ()(4)(5 (6) (7) 187 Not Used 188 3HPISXTRNO03 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to 3A HPi Valve fails to respond See Item No. 330 (3HP-0024) | ||
AC power xfer fails open Mechanical BWST Suction to electronic controls Under normal operation should the M contactor capability for Contact set failure Valve 3HP24 is as determined by inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW 3HP24 from fails closed lost. valve position MCC 3XPSW would be paralleled with power normal station Sindication, flow from MCC 3XS4 to valve 3HP24. To prevent power to PSW Switch fails anomalies and pump the paralleling of power sources this power indications observed calculation recommends keeping MCC in the MCR. 3XPSW breaker 3D in the normally open position when power to the 3HP24 valve is aligned to the station source.189 3HPISXTRN004 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to HP to Valve fails to respond See Item No. 331 (3HP-0026)(OEE-351-06) | (OEE-351-04) AC power xfer fails open Mechanical BWST Suction to electronic controls Under normal operation should the M contactor capability for Contact set failure Valve 3HP24 is as determined by inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW 3HP24 from fails closed lost. valve position MCC 3XPSW would be paralleled with power normal station Sindication, flow from MCC 3XS4 to valve 3HP24. To prevent power to PSW Switch fails anomalies and pump the paralleling of power sources this power indications observed calculation recommends keeping MCC in the MCR. 3XPSW breaker 3D in the normally open position when power to the 3HP24 valve is aligned to the station source. | ||
AC power xfer fails open Mechanical Injection Reactor to electronic controls Under normal operation should the M contactor capability for Contact set failure Inlet Valve as determined by inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW 3HP26 from fails closed 3HP26 is lost. valve position MCC 3XPSW would be paralleled with power normal station Switch fails indication, flow from MCC 3XS4 to valve 3HP26. To prevent power to PSW to transfer anomalies and pump the paralleling of power sources this power indications observed calculation recommends keeping MCC in the MCR. 3XPSW breaker 4A in the normally open position when power to the 3HP26 valve is I aligned to the station source. | 189 3HPISXTRN004 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to HP to Valve fails to respond See Item No. 331 (3HP-0026) | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 79 of 182* Service : Failure Mode a nd Effects A a W heet System _Protected SrieWater_________ | (OEE-351-06) AC power xfer fails open Mechanical Injection Reactor to electronic controls Under normal operation should the M contactor capability for Contact set failure Inlet Valve as determined by inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW 3HP26 from fails closed 3HP26 is lost. valve position MCC 3XPSW would be paralleled with power normal station Switch fails indication, flow from MCC 3XS4 to valve 3HP26. To prevent power to PSW to transfer anomalies and pump the paralleling of power sources this power indications observed calculation recommends keeping MCC in the MCR. 3XPSW breaker 4A in the normally open position when power to the 3HP26 valve is I aligned to the station source. | ||
Systm:..-.--...ev.ceWate Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: | |||
PSW Electrical System Pare | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 79 of 182 | ||
_3PSWSXTRN002, 3PSWTF3XPSW Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) .(7)... (8)190 3PSWSXTRN001 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW powerto ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6703) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no power transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as exists to vital I&C charger 3CA. Batteries capability for fails closed 3CA is lost local indication, can supply load for up to 1 hour per OSC-3CA battery Switch fails Station power to 3CA trouble 8113. Standby charger 3CS can be charger from | * Service : Failure Mode a nd Effects A a W heet System _Protected SrieWater_________ | ||
normal | Systm:..-.--...ev.ceWate Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : : | ||
normal station lost MCR. A switch failure where both sets of contacts power to PSW are closed is not credible as this switch is power designed with a single transfer arm. | Pare FCae8/11 10/18/11 Equipment: _3PSWSXTRN002, 3PSWTF3XPSW Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) . (7)... (8) 190 3PSWSXTRN001 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW powerto ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6703) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no power transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as exists to vital I&C charger 3CA. Batteries capability for fails closed 3CA is lost local indication, can supply load for up to 1 hour per OSC-3CA battery Switch fails Station power to 3CA trouble 8113. Standby charger 3CS can be charger from totans Charg er 3CA teduine connected if 3XS3 power is available. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 80 of 182~F" | power PSW normal tostation to transfer lost Charger 3CA is MCR. | ||
_________________________ | annunciated in A switch failure where both sets of contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is power designed with a single transfer arm. | ||
System: ____Protected Service Water__________ | 191 3PSWSXTRN002 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6703) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no power transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as exists to vital I&C charger 3CB. Batteries capability for fails closed 3CB is lost local indication, can supply load for up to I hour per OSC-3CB battery Switch fails Station power to 3CB trouble 8113. Standby charger 3CS can be charger from to transfer Charger 3CB is annunciated in connected if3XS3 power is available. | ||
Subsystem: | normal station lost MCR. A switch failure where both sets of contacts power to PSW are closed is not credible as this switch is power designed with a single transfer arm. | ||
.PSW Electrical SystemCalabrese Date : 10/i8/I1 Equipment: | |||
__3PSWTFXPSW, 3KPSW Rev. No 0 Diagram:_ | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 80 of 182 | ||
0-6703,_-6706 Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)192 3PSWTF3XPSW Provides Loss of Electrical Power to 3KPSW Loss of power Loss of valves 3RC155 through 3RCI60 (0-6703) 208/120VAC power in failure and its loads relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 3. See power to panel Loss of (3PSW22, 24 and 3KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | ~F" Ure:Moderand EffectsyAnAlyis Woidkiheet _________________________ | ||
3KPSW power out 3RC!55 thru 160) 3PSWCA0002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the PSW is lost. alarms in control panels is mitigated by transfer of MCR power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw OPSWSXTRN006. | System: ____Protected Service Water__________ | ||
Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos.326 & 328 for more information. | Subsystem: .PSW Electrical SystemCalabrese Date : | ||
193 3KPSW Provides power Loss of Electrical or Power to 3KPSW Loss of power Loss of valves 3RC155 through 3RC160 (0-6706) to 3KPSW and output Mechanical and its loads relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 3. See its loads power- failure (3 PS W22 & 24 and 3KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | 10/i8/I1 Equipment: __3PSWTFXPSW, 3KPSW Rev. No 0 Diagram:_ 0-6703,_-6706 Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | ||
(3 PSW22, 24 complete their instrument 3PSWCAO002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the PSW and their bus failure power, 3RC 155 alarms in control panels is mitigated by transfer of instrument thru 160, and MCR power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw power, 3RC155 alternate power to OPSWSXTRN006. | (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 192 3PSWTF3XPSW Provides Loss of Electrical Power to 3KPSW Loss of power Loss of valves 3RC155 through 3RCI60 (0-6703) 208/120VAC power in failure and its loads relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 3. See power to panel Loss of (3PSW22, 24 and 3KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | ||
thru 160, and control panels Loss of3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be alternate power OPSWIR00) and mitigated by operation of manual bypass to control panels OPSWIRt. 2) is valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos.OPSWIR002 and lost. 326 & 328 for more information. | 3KPSW power out 3RC!55 thru 160) 3PSWCA0002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the PSW is lost. alarms in control panels is mitigated by transfer of MCR power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw OPSWSXTRN006. | ||
Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos. | |||
326 & 328 for more information. | |||
193 3KPSW Provides power Loss of Electrical or Power to 3KPSW Loss of power Loss of valves 3RC155 through 3RC160 (0-6706) to 3KPSW and output Mechanical and its loads relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 3. See its loads power- failure (3 PS W22 & 24 and 3KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information. | |||
(3 PSW22, 24 complete their instrument 3PSWCAO002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the PSW and their bus failure power, 3RC 155 alarms in control panels is mitigated by transfer of instrument thru 160, and MCR power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw power, 3RC155 alternate power to OPSWSXTRN006. | |||
thru 160, and control panels Loss of3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be alternate power OPSWIR00) and mitigated by operation of manual bypass to control panels OPSWIRt. 2) is valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos. | |||
OPSWIR002 and lost. 326 & 328 for more information. | |||
_____________OPSWIR.002__________________________________ | _____________OPSWIR.002__________________________________ | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 81 of 182 VFailure Mode and Effects Analysis W rkshet , .System: ............. | |||
Protected Service Water_____ | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 81 of 182 VFailure Mode and Effects Analysis W rkshet , . | ||
Subsystem: | System: ............. Protected Service Water_____ | ||
PSW El.SetrviceWalytem Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem | Subsystem: PSW El.SetrviceWalytem Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem : -..........PSW Electrical SystemDa e:01 81 Date : ____10118/Il______ | ||
: -.......... | Equipment: ......... 3KPSW Breakers main, I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 omoetFire Failure Fire Failure Train and/or Detection(8 No (I) Identification (2) Function Mode Mechanism Effects Systemon Method of Failure (7) Remarks and Other Effects (3) (4) (5) S6e (7) 194 3KPSW - Aux building panel Fail Open, Electrical or Power to Loss of power relay on Loss of valves 3RC155 through Main 3KPSW main breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical 3KPSW and 3KPSW bus in 3RC 160 renders PSW (0-6706) feeding (3PSW22, 24 Partial Trip, failure its loads 3PSWCA0002 alarms in unavailable for Unit 3. See Item and 3RC155 thru 160) Partial Close (3PSW22, 24 MCR No. 335 for more information. | ||
PSW Electrical SystemDa e:01 | and alternate power to and 3RC 155 Loss of the alternate power feed control panels thru 160, and to the PSW control panels is OPSWIR001 and alternate mitigated by transfer of power to OPSWIR002 power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw control panels OPSWSXTRN006. | ||
Equipment: | OPSWIROOd Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 aPSWIRO02) may be mitigated by operation of isloPst, manual bypass valves 3PSW26 is lost. & 3PSW28. See Item Nos. 326 | ||
......... | & 328 for more information. | ||
3KPSW Breakers main, I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 Failure Failure | 195 3KPSW- I Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to Valve position indicating See Item No. 335 (0-6706) power to RC sys reactor Fail Closed, Mechanical 3RC155 and lights in MCR lost. (3RC-0155/0156) vessel head vent valves Partial Trip, failure 3RC156 is lost White and Yellow CS 3RC155 & 3RC156 Partial Close position indicating light in through powerl xfer sw MCR lost. | ||
and alternate power to and 3RC 155 Loss of the alternate power feed control panels thru 160, and to the PSW control panels is OPSWIR001 and alternate mitigated by transfer of power to OPSWIR002 power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw control panels OPSWSXTRN006. | 3 RC-CS- 155/156 1 1 CR ost. | ||
OPSWIROOd Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 aPSWIRO02) may be mitigated by operation of isloPst, manual bypass valves 3PSW26 is lost. & 3PSW28. See Item Nos. 326& 328 for more information. | |||
195 3KPSW- I Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to Valve position indicating See Item No. 335 (0-6706) power to RC sys reactor Fail Closed, Mechanical 3RC155 and lights in MCR lost. (3RC-0155/0156) vessel head vent valves Partial Trip, failure 3RC156 is lost White and Yellow CS 3RC155 & 3RC156 Partial Close position indicating light in through powerl xfer sw MCR lost.3 RC-CS- 155/156 | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 82 of 182 | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 82 of 182~Fai.I ure: Mod.e, and gfit AnlyisWoksee System: Protected Service Water__________ | ~Fai.I ure: Mod.e, and gfit AnlyisWoksee System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese______ | ||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese______ | Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/18/l _ | ||
Subsystem: | Equipment: - 3KPSW Breakers 2, 3t 4 Rev. No. 0 D iagram: ... ........ | ||
PSW Electrical System Date: 10/18/l | 0 -6706 ........................ | ||
-3KPSW Breakers 2, 3t 4 Rev. No. 0 D iagram: ... ........ 0 -6706 ........................ | Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 196 3KPSW - 2 Provides 120VAC PSW power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6706) to RC sys reactor vessel head Closed, Partial Mechanical 3RC157 and indicating lights in (3RC-0157/0158) vent valves 3RC157 & Trip, Partial failure 3RC158 is lost MCR lost. | ||
Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)196 3KPSW -2 Provides 120VAC PSW power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6706) to RC sys reactor vessel head Closed, Partial Mechanical 3RC157 and indicating lights in (3RC-0157/0158) vent valves 3RC157 & Trip, Partial failure 3RC158 is lost MCR lost.3RC 158 through power xfer Close White and Yellow CS sw 3RC-CS- 157/158 position indicating light in MCR lost.197 3KPSW 3 Provides 120VAC PSW power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6706) to RC sys reactor vessel head Closed, Partial Mechanical 3RC159 and indicating lights in (3RC-0159/0160) vent valves 3RC159 & Trip, Partial failure 3RC160 is lost MCR lost.3RC160 through power xfer Close White and Yellow CS sw | 3RC 158 through power xfer Close White and Yellow CS sw 3RC-CS- 157/158 position indicating light in MCR lost. | ||
flow OAC point is lost. See Item No. 326 isolator, instrument controller Close controller and flow (3PSW-0022) and flow transmitter in transmitter in 3PSWCA000 | 197 3KPSW 3 Provides 120VAC PSW power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6706) to RC sys reactor vessel head Closed, Partial Mechanical 3RC159 and indicating lights in (3RC-0159/0160) vent valves 3RC159 & Trip, Partial failure 3RC160 is lost MCR lost. | ||
!3PSWSIOOI is lost.199 3KPSW -5 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV .Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 3PSW24 signal information to MCR of SOV 3PSW24 is lost SOV 3PSW24 signal isolator, Trip, Partial failure isolator, flow OAC point is lost. See Item No. 328 instrument controller and flow Close controller and flow (3PSW-0024) transmitter in 3PSWCA0001 transmitter in I I_ , 3PSWS1002 is lost. | 3RC160 through power xfer Close White and Yellow CS sw 3RC-CS- 159/160 position indicating light in MCR lost. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev, 1 Appendix A Page 83 of 182.,; .r,..ailure .W rk..ee , " | 198 3KPSW 4 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3A flow Closed, Partial Mechanical 3PSW22 signal information to MCR of SOV 3PSW22 is lost control SOV 3PSW22 signal Trip, Partial failure isolator,*flow OAC point is lost. See Item No. 326 isolator, instrument controller Close controller and flow (3PSW-0022) and flow transmitter in transmitter in 3PSWCA000 !3PSWSIOOI is lost. | ||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | 199 3KPSW - 5 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV .Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 3PSW24 signal information to MCR of SOV 3PSW24 is lost SOV 3PSW24 signal isolator, Trip, Partial failure isolator, flow OAC point is lost. See Item No. 328 instrument controller and flow Close controller and flow (3PSW-0024) transmitter in 3PSWCA0001 transmitter in I I_ , 3PSWS1002 is lost. | ||
Subsystem: | |||
PSW Electrical System Date : 10/9/ | OSC-10008, Rev, 1 Appendix A Page 83 of 182 | ||
........... | . ,; Moe*anulffectsA | ||
3KPSW Breakers 7, 9, 10 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _0-6706 Component F Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7)200 3KPSW -7 Provides alternate 120VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to Loss of bar PSW control panel board (0-6706) power to PSW Control Panel Closed, Partial Mechanical OPSWIR001 graph readings in can be powered thru Boards OPSWIROOI and Trip, Partial failure and MCR as well as 2KPSW-7 after manual OPSWIR002 through manual Close OPSWIR0O02 lack of input to transfer of transfer switch available thru computer from OPSWSXTRN006. | .r,..ailure | ||
No 0PSWSXTRN006 2KPSW -7 OAC points. impact to PSW.201 3KPSW -9 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 326 (3PSW-(0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3A flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 3PSW22 is indicating lights 0022)SOV 3PSW22, power converter Trip, Partial failure lost in MCR panel 3PSWVF0022 and positioner Close 3UBlis lost.assembly 3PSWVP0022 202 3KPSW- 10 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 328 (3PSW-(0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical | .W rk..ee t , "X- '.- ,: | ||
.3PSW24 is indicating lights 0024)SOV 3PSW24, power converter Trip, Partial failure lost in MCR panel 3PSWVF0024 and positioner Close 3UB | System: .--.- Protected Service Water_________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | ||
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 10/9/11 Equipment: ........... | |||
3KPSW Breakers 7, 9, 10 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _0-6706 Component F Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) 200 3KPSW - 7 Provides alternate 120VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to Loss of bar PSW control panel board (0-6706) power to PSW Control Panel Closed, Partial Mechanical OPSWIR001 graph readings in can be powered thru Boards OPSWIROOI and Trip, Partial failure and MCR as well as 2KPSW-7 after manual OPSWIR002 through manual Close OPSWIR0O02 lack of input to transfer of transfer switch available thru computer from OPSWSXTRN006. No 0PSWSXTRN006 2KPSW - 7 OAC points. impact to PSW. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 85 of 182 Failure Niode. and Worksheet.. | 201 3KPSW - 9 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 326 (3PSW-(0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3A flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 3PSW22 is indicating lights 0022) | ||
SOV 3PSW22, power converter Trip, Partial failure lost in MCR panel 3PSWVF0022 and positioner Close 3UBlis lost. | |||
assembly 3PSWVP0022 202 3KPSW- 10 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 328 (3PSW-(0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical .3PSW24 is indicating lights 0024) | |||
SOV 3PSW24, power converter Trip, Partial failure lost in MCR panel 3PSWVF0024 and positioner Close 3UB Iis lost. | |||
assembly 3PSWVP0024 203 Not Used 204 Not Used | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 84 of 182 Failur, Mode System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F.Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 10/18/11 Equipment: 3PSWSI00 1,3PSWSI002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_ _OEE-365-13, OEE-365-16 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 205 3PSWSIOO1 PSW Stm Gen 3A flow Loss of power in Electrical Automatic flow Transfer of flow See Item No. 326 (OEE-365-13) control SOV 3PSW22 Loss of power failure control of SOV information to MCR (3PSW-0022) signal isolator, flow out 3PSW22 is lost OAC point is lost. Failure effects of controller and flow. 3PSWSi0l1 bounds transmitter in failure effects of 3PSWCAO00 1 3PSWSSOOI and 3PSWFT00 I. | |||
206 3PSWSI002 PSW Stm Gen 3B flow Loss of power in Electrical Automatic flow Transfer of flow See Item No. 328 (OEE-365-16) control SOV 3PSW24 Loss of power failure control of SOV information to MCR (3PSW-0024) signal isolator, flow out 3PSW24 is lost OAC point is lost. Failure effects of controller and flow 3PSWS1002 bounds transmitter in failure effects of 3PSWCA0001 3PSWSS002 and f 3PSWFT002. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 85 of 182 Failure Niode. and Effec*sAn:alysis. Worksheet.. | |||
System: ........ Protected Service Water_____ | System: ........ Protected Service Water_____ | ||
Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: | Prepared by: _F. | ||
PSW Electrical System Date: 10/28/11 Equipment: | Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/28/11 Equipment: 3RC-CS-1 55/156 (157/158) (159/160) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-350-15 (16) (17) | ||
3RC-CS-1 55/156 (157/158) | No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection | ||
(159/160) | (!) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 207 3RC-CS-155/156 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0155/0156) fails open Mechanical 3RC155 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam (OEE-350-15) power transfer capability for Contact set failure 3RC156 is lost MCR lost. operated switch constructed in such a 3RC 155 and 3RC156 fails closed Station power to White and Yellow way as to prevent contacts from from normal station Switch fails 3RC155 and CS position separate cam followers to be closed power to PSW power to transfer 3RCi 56 is lost indicating light in simultaneously. Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not a credible failure. | ||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-350-15 (16) (17)No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (!) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)207 3RC-CS-155/156 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0155/0156) | 208 3RC-CS-1 57/158 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0157/0158) | ||
Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not a credible failure.208 3RC-CS-1 57/158 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0157/0158)(OEE-350-16) power transfer fails open Mechanical 3RC 157 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam capability for Contact set failure 3RC158 is lost MCR lost. operated switch constructed in such a 3RC157 and 3RC158 fails closed Station power to White and Yellow way as to prevent contacts from from normal station Switch fails 3RC157 and CS position separate cam followers to be closed power to PSW power to transfer 3RC 158 is lost indicating light in simultaneously. | (OEE-350-16) power transfer fails open Mechanical 3RC 157 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam capability for Contact set failure 3RC158 is lost MCR lost. operated switch constructed in such a 3RC157 and 3RC158 fails closed Station power to White and Yellow way as to prevent contacts from from normal station Switch fails 3RC157 and CS position separate cam followers to be closed power to PSW power to transfer 3RC 158 is lost indicating light in simultaneously. Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not a credible failure. | ||
Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not a credible failure.209 3RC-CS-159/160 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0159/0160)(OEE-350-17) power transfer fails open Mechanical 3RCI 59 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam capability for Contact set failure 3RC160 is lost MCR lost. operated switch constructed in such a 3RC 159 and 3RC160 fails closed Station power to White and Yellow way as to prevent contacts from from normal station Switch fails 3RC159 and CS position separate cam followers to be closed power to PSW power to transfer 3RC 160 is lost indicating light in simultaneously. | 209 3RC-CS-159/160 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0159/0160) | ||
Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is I not a credible failure. | (OEE-350-17) power transfer fails open Mechanical 3RCI 59 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam capability for Contact set failure 3RC160 is lost MCR lost. operated switch constructed in such a 3RC 159 and 3RC160 fails closed Station power to White and Yellow way as to prevent contacts from from normal station Switch fails 3RC159 and CS position separate cam followers to be closed power to PSW power to transfer 3RC 160 is lost indicating light in simultaneously. Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is I not a credible failure. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 86 of 182 F~~ailure M~ode and Effects Anayi"y se System: ___Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: | |||
N/A Pare : | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 86 of 182 F~~ailure M~ode and Effects Anayi"y se System: ___Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: N/A Pare : | ||
.N/A......_.._N/ARev.No.0 | Date : ____10/28/lFCar8/11i______ | ||
.........Rev. No. 0 Diagram: N/A No Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (() (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)210 Not Used 211 Not Used.. . | Equipment: . N/A......_.._N/ARev.No.0 | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 87 of 182 Failune Mode an fetsA ayi Worksheelt System: __Protected Service Water____________ | ......... Rev. No. 0 Diagram: N/A No Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects | ||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | (() (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 210 Not Used 211 Not Used.. ._ | ||
Subsystem:_PSW Electrical System__________ | 212 Not Used ._ | ||
Date : 9/27/2011 Equipment: | 213 Not Used 214 Not Used _ | ||
_PSWBAOOOI, PSWBA0002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) * (7) (8)215 PSWBA000I Primary Safety Open cell, Electrical or Primary supply for PSWLXDCO1 (27) A leaking cell, or a shorted cell Battery I Related supply for shorted cell; Mechanical PSW 126V DC under voltage relay will not affect the DC power PSW 125V DC output voltage failure power distribution in MCR alarms system as the battery is sized to (0-6700-01) power distribution fails low or cell center should operate on 58 (out of 60) cells.center leakage. PSWLXDC01 is PSWBC0001 also PSWLXDC0I lost. be unavailable and An open cell and PSW High &PSWBC000I X308 Low voltage fat lures are over voltage relay mitigated via manual transfer to to alarm the backup battery PSWBA0002. | |||
216 PSWBA0002 Alternate Safety Open cell, Electrical or Alternate supply PSWLXDC01 27 A leaking cell, or a shorted cell Battery 2 Related supply for shorted cell; Mechanical for PSW 125V DC under voltage relay will not affect the DC power () PSW 125V DC output voltage failure power distribution in MCR alarms system as the battery is sized to power distribution fails low or cell center should operate on 58 (out of 60) cells.center leakage PSWLXDCO1 is PSWBC0002 also PSWLXDCOI lost. be unavailable and An ope ell | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 87 of 182 Failune Mode an fetsA ayi Worksheelt System: __Protected Service Water____________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____ | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 88 of 182... . | Subsystem:_PSW Electrical System__________ Date : 9/27/2011 Equipment: _PSWBAOOOI, PSWBA0002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) * (7) (8) 215 PSWBA000I Primary Safety Open cell, Electrical or Primary supply for PSWLXDCO1 (27) A leaking cell, or a shorted cell Battery I Related supply for shorted cell; Mechanical PSW 126V DC under voltage relay will not affect the DC power PSW 125V DC output voltage failure power distribution in MCR alarms system as the battery is sized to (0-6700-01) power distribution fails low or cell center should operate on 58 (out of 60) cells. | ||
center leakage. PSWLXDC01 is PSWBC0001 also PSWLXDC0I lost. be unavailable and An open cell and PSW High & | |||
PSWBC000I X308 Low voltage fat lures are over voltage relay mitigated via manual transfer to to alarm the backup battery PSWBA0002. | |||
216 PSWBA0002 Alternate Safety Open cell, Electrical or Alternate supply PSWLXDC01 27 A leaking cell, or a shorted cell Battery 2 Related supply for shorted cell; Mechanical for PSW 125V DC under voltage relay will not affect the DC power | |||
() PSW 125V DC output voltage failure power distribution in MCR alarms system as the battery is sized to power distribution fails low or cell center should operate on 58 (out of 60) cells. | |||
center leakage PSWLXDCO1 is PSWBC0002 also PSWLXDCOI lost. be unavailable and PSWBOOO2X308 An Low ope ell afailures voltage P are i PSWBC0002r X30g mitigated via manual transfer to over voltage relay the primary battery to alarm PSWBA000I. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 88 of 182 Failbe Mod and Effect, ',ecsAD Uiy~i W~ksheet, System: -.... Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/27/2011 Equipment: -.... | |||
PSWBC000I, PSWBC0002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 217 PSWBC000I Primary supply for Loss of output, Electrical or Primary supply for PSWBC0001 X306 The chargers are 100% | |||
Charger 1 PSW 125V DC output voltage Mechanical 125V DC power under voltage relay redundant, Failures are power distribution fails high, or failure distribution center to alarm in MCR. mitigated via manual transfer to (0-6700-01) center output voltage PSWLXDCOI & the battery charger 2, (OEE- 165-18) PSWBC000I X308 PSWLXDCOI and fails low charging function PSWBC0002. | |||
over voltage relay for charging of battery to alarm in MCR. | |||
battery PSWBAOOO1 are PSWBA0001 lost. | |||
218 PSWBC0002 Alternate supply Loss of output, Electrical or Secondary supply PSWBC0002 X306 The chargers are 100% | |||
( | Charger 2 for PSW 125V DC output voltage Mechanical for 125V DC.: under voltage relay redundant. Failures are (0-6700-01) power distribution fails high, or failure power distribution to alarm in MCR. mitigated via manual transfer to center output voltage center PSWBC0002 X308 the battery charger I, (OEE-165-18) PSWLXDC0I and fails low (PSWLXDCOI) & oola rela PSWBIC0001. | ||
for charging charging function over voltage relay of battery to alarm in MCR. | |||
battery PSWBA002 (PSWBA0002) are lost. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 89 of 182 | |||
~~ ~Failure Mode and Efets Analysis Work~heet ' | |||
System:.,--" Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese System Pre : 9/27/2011 Subsystem: PSW Electrical | |||
......... Date :9/27/2011I Equipment: __PSWLXDCO I, PSWLXDC0 I Breaker 3B3 Rev. No. 0 Diagram. 0-6700-01 | |||
'Method of Function Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Failure R No Component Identification (3) Mode Mechanism System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 219 PSWLXDC01 Source of Loss of Electrical or PSW DC power PSWLXDC0I Failure of the PSW DC system, fails 125V DC power for output Mechanical unavailable. (27) under the PSW System. If the PSW System Power PSW 125V power - Failure voltage relay is unavailable, the Safe Shutdown Distribution DC control complete to alarm in Facility (SSF) will be credited as an Center system bus failure MCR alternate means of achieving and SSD for the first 72 hours. | |||
(0-6700-01) _maintaining 220 PSWLXDC0 Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Control Power Status Status indication in MCR of Unit 3 Breaker- 3B3 for Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical to Auto Xfer Switches indication of ATS switch position is lost. No (0-6700-01) 3PSWPL2DC Partial Trip, Failure 3PSWSXTRN001 ATS in MCR impact on PSW System functionality. | |||
BKR is N.C. Partial Close 3PSWSXTRN002 and lost. Operators will be unable to switch to Motor Operated Xfer o peras wimary p o sourc to switches 3HPISXTRN001 White and/or PSW as primary power source to 3HPISXTRN002 is lost Yellow lights operate HPI pump 3A or 3B. | |||
in MCR However, switch has manual indicating HPI capability. No impact to PSW. | |||
switch position are lost | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 90 of 182 | |||
, Failure Mode and Effects Aualysis Workshet . | |||
System: .................... | |||
Protected Service Water_____________ | Protected Service Water_____________ | ||
Subsystem: | Subsystem: ........... | ||
........... | PSW Electrical System Pare Date : : 9F abe___ | ||
PSW Electrical System Pare : 9F | 9/27/2011] | ||
Equipment: | Equipment: PSWLXDCO0 Breaker 3B4 Re._o. | ||
PSWLXDCO0 Breaker 3B4 Re._o.Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ......0-6700-01 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or -Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism System Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (8)___________(7) 221 PSWLXDC0I Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Control Power Status Status indication in MCR of Unit I Breaker-- | Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ...... 0-6700-01 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or - Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism System Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (8) | ||
3B4 for Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical to Auto Xfer Switches indication of ATS switch position is lost. No (0-6700-01) | ___________(7) 221 PSWLXDC0I Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Control Power Status Status indication in MCR of Unit I Breaker-- 3B4 for Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical to Auto Xfer Switches indication of ATS switch position is lost. No (0-6700-01) I PSWPL2DC Partial Trip, Failure IPSWSXTRN00 I : ATS in MCR impact on PSW System functionality. | ||
I PSWPL2DC Partial Trip, Failure | BKR is N.C. Partial Close Motor Operated XferOprtrwileunbeositht IPSWSXTRN002 and lost. Operators will be unable to switch to switches IHPISXTRN001 White and/or PSW as primary power source to switches PISX is lost Yellow lights operate H-PI pump IA or I B. | ||
BKR is N.C. Partial Close | in MCR However, switch has manual indicating HPI capability. No impact to PSW switch position are lost | ||
No impact to PSW switch position are lost OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 91 of 182....Failure Mode and Effects Ana lyis,.W rksheet ..System: __Protected Service Water____________ | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 91 of 182 | |||
... . Failure Mode and Effects Ana lyis,.W rksheet .. | |||
Equipment: | System: __Protected Service Water____________ | ||
PSWLXDC01 Breaker 3B5_Rv.No__ | Date : 9/27/a01 s Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/27/2011! | ||
Diagram: .-.. 0-6700-0!No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of | Equipment: PSWLXDC01 Breaker 3B5_Rv.No__ | ||
Panel Partial Trip, Failure various 13.8kV, 600V breaker to be exercised, PSW System will operate PSWPLI DC Partial Close 4.16kV Breakers indication normally.and PSW Load (local &BKR is N.C. Center Breakers MCR) is lost Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and B7T-C should Keowee source be required.Loss of control power to B6T-I is mitigated via the above steps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional closure of tie breaker B7T-I Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable. | Diagram: .-.. 0-6700-0! | ||
Should any of the other B6T or PX13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker.Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | No Component NoFuctionFailure Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System DetectionRemarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 222 PSWLXDC0I Feeder Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control Power 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V Breaker- 3B5 Breaker for Fail Closed, Mechanical unavailable to 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need (0-6700-01) Panel Partial Trip, Failure various 13.8kV, 600V breaker to be exercised, PSW System will operate PSWPLI DC Partial Close 4.16kV Breakers indication normally. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 92 of 182"".. " ..Failure Mode and Effets- An olks'System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: | and PSW Load (local & | ||
_PSW Electrical System_ | BKR is N.C. Center Breakers MCR) is lost Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and B7T-C should Keowee source be required. | ||
_PSWLXDC01 Breaker | Loss of control power to B6T-I is mitigated via the above steps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional closure of tie breaker B7T-I Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable. | ||
___ ((5(6) (7)223 PSWLXDC0 Feeder Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and Load Breaker..- | Should any of the other B6T or PX13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker. | ||
3B6 Breaker for Fail Closed, Mechanical Power and, center breakers are in normal alignment and do not need (0-6700-01) | Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | ||
Panel Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to 4.16kV to be exercised, PSW System will operate normally.PSWPL2DC Partial Close various and 600V Loss of control power to B6T-A and B7T-C is mitigated BKR is NC. 4.16kV indication via manual trip | |||
Should PXi3-4C be open, loss of control power is mitigated via closure of RW2 MCC breaker to provide power to XPSW MCC.Should any of the other PXI3 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for Unit 2.Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 92 of 182 | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 93 of 182 St:..Failu.e..ode aPrdEffectsoAeateSiis WriWsheete System: __Protected Service Water ........Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: | "".. " . . Failure Mode and Effets-An a*S olks' System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: _PSW Electrical System_ _ 98/0 Date: ____9/28/2011I 3B6Dae Equipment: _PSWLXDC01 Breaker Rev. No. 0 0-6700-01 Rev.iNo._:_0 Diagram: | ||
.... PSW Electrical System Date : 9/28/2011I Equipment: | Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechan ism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) System Detection (8) | ||
.PSWLXDCOI Breakers 3B7, | ( ___)___(2 ___ ((5(6) (7) 223 PSWLXDC0 Feeder Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and Load Breaker..- 3B6 Breaker for Fail Closed, Mechanical Power and, center breakers are in normal alignment and do not need (0-6700-01) Panel Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to 4.16kV to be exercised, PSW System will operate normally. | ||
2PSWSXTRN002 control power to switches 006 and 008. Switches 006 and 008 have and Manual Xfer no dc function.Switches White and/or Yellow lights Operators will be unable to OPSWSXTRN006 in MCR indicating HPI switch between Unit 2 and OPSWSXTRN007 switch position are lost Unit 3 PSW MCC power OPSWSXTRN008 supplies for operation of and Motor OPSWI4 valve through Operated Xfer switch 007.switches 2HPISXTRN001 Operators will be unable to 2HPISXTRN002 is switch to PSW as primary lost power source to operate HPI pump 2A or 2B. However, switch has manual capability. | PSWPL2DC Partial Close various and 600V Loss of control power to B6T-A and B7T-C is mitigated BKR is NC. 4.16kV indication via manual trip ofofbreakers to release electrical interlock Breakers and (local & enabling closure B6T-B and B7T-D should Keowee PSW Load MCR) is source be required. | ||
No impact to PSW.225 PSWLXDCOi Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC None. Test connection Loss of battery I test Breaker- IA for battery I test Fail Closed, Mechanical control power equipment is not typically connection box. No impact (0-6700-01) connection box Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to connected. | Center lost Loss of control power to B7T-1, 2 and 4 have no impact Breakers on PSW function. | ||
During use, to PSW functionality. | Should PXI3-5B be open, loss of control power to renders PSW unavailable. | ||
PSWPLTBOI Partial Close battery test failure is detected via BKR is N.C. connection box observance of equipment I_ I I not functioning. | Should PXi3-4C be open, loss of control power is mitigated via closure of RW2 MCC breaker to provide power to XPSW MCC. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 94 of 182 Faihure Mode a~ndEffects Anl AU s , System: -Protected Service | Should any of the other PXI3 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for Unit 2. | ||
Subsystem: | Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | ||
.PSW Electrical System Pare : .Cabee2011 | |||
_, _PSWLXDCOI Breakers | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 93 of 182 St:..Failu.e..ode aPrdEffectsoAeateSiis WriWsheete System: __Protected Service Water . ....... Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: .... PSW Electrical System Date : 9/28/2011I Equipment: . PSWLXDCOI Breakers 3B7, IA_ | ||
DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery I Closed, Failure distribution center Under accident scenario battery I is mitigated via feed Partial PSWLXDCOI on loss battery would be manual transfer to the backup BKR is N.C. Trip, of AC power events depleted and all battery PSWBA0002 via Partial Loss of ability to charge associated DC alarms closure of PSWLXDCO I Close battery PSWBAOOOI. | Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _ O-6700-0l No Component Function Failure Failure Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or on Train System Method of Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 224 PSWLXDCOI Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Control Status indication of ATS in Status indication in MCR of Breaker- 3B7 for Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical Power to Auto Xfer MCR lost. Unit 2 ATS switch position is (0-6700-01) 2PSWPL2DC Partial Trip, Failure Switches N i o lost. No impact on PSW BKR is N.C. Partial Close 2PSWSXTRN001 No indication on loss of DC System functionality. | ||
would be received, breakers 4A, 4B and 5B.227 PSWLXDCOI PSWLXDC01 Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDC01 27 under Loss of the ability to supply Breaker- 2A Main Panel breaker Fail Mechanical supply power to voltage relay would DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery Closed, Failure distribution center alarm in MCR when battery charger I is mitigated Charger I feed Partial PSWLXDCOI battery is depleted. | 2PSWSXTRN002 control power to switches 006 and 008. Switches 006 and 008 have and Manual Xfer no dc function. | ||
via manual transfer to the BKR is N.C. Trip, Loss of ability to charge backup battery charger Partial battery PSWBAOOOI PSWBC0002 via closure of Close PSWLXDCO I breakers 4A, S4Band 5B. | Switches White and/or Yellow lights Operators will be unable to OPSWSXTRN006 in MCR indicating HPI switch between Unit 2 and OPSWSXTRN007 switch position are lost Unit 3 PSW MCC power OPSWSXTRN008 supplies for operation of and Motor OPSWI4 valve through Operated Xfer switch 007. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 95 of 182 FailureyMode:and | switches 2HPISXTRN001 Operators will be unable to 2HPISXTRN002 is switch to PSW as primary lost power source to operate HPI pump 2A or 2B. However, switch has manual capability. | ||
....... Aelyste W rksheet System: __Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: | No impact to PSW. | ||
PSW Electrical System Date : 9/29/ | 225 PSWLXDCOi Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC None. Test connection Loss of battery I test Breaker- IA for battery I test Fail Closed, Mechanical control power equipment is not typically connection box. No impact (0-6700-01) connection box Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to connected. During use, to PSW functionality. | ||
PSWLXDC0 I Breakers 2B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of (N) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)228 PSWLXDC01 PSWLXDC01 Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDCOI Loss of the ability to supply DC Breaker- 2B Main Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to (27) under distribution center from battery I or battery (0-6700-01) breaker for both Partial Trip, Failure distribution voltage relay charger I is mitigated via manual transfer PSW Battery I Partial Close center alarms in MCR. to the backup battery system PSWBA0002 feed and PSW PSWLXDCOI and PSWBC0002 via closure of Battery Charger PSWLXDCO I breakers 4A, 4B and 5B.I feed Should the PSW DC system be aligned to BKR is N.C. battery 2 and battery charger 2, an inadvertent closure failure of breaker 2B would parallel battery I and battery charger I to the PSWLXDCOI bus along with battery 2 and battery charger 2. This calculation recommends keeping breaker 2B racked out under while battery I and battery charger I is not being used as the PSW DC power source. | PSWPLTBOI Partial Close battery test failure is detected via BKR is N.C. connection box observance of equipment I_ I I not functioning. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 96 of 182 | |||
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 94 of 182 Faihure Mode a~ndEffects Anl AU s , | ||
PSW Electrical | System: -Protected Service Water___________ | ||
_PSWLXDCOI Breakers 5A, 5B, 4A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)229 PSWLXDCO I Feeder breaker for Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC None. Test connection. | Subsystem: . PSW Electrical System Pare Date:: : .Cabee2011 | ||
Loss of battery 2 test Breaker- 5A battery 2 test Fail Closed, Mechanical control power equipment is not typically connection box. No impact (0-6700-01) connection box Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to -connected. | .9/29/2011 Equipment: _, _PSWLXDCOI Breakers IB, 2A, R~ev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Method of Failure No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 226 PSWLXDCO I PSWLXDC01 Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to None under normal Loss of the ability to supply Breaker- 11B Main Panel breaker Fail Mechanical supply power to operation. DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery I Closed, Failure distribution center Under accident scenario battery I is mitigated via feed Partial PSWLXDCOI on loss battery would be manual transfer to the backup BKR is N.C. Trip, of AC power events depleted and all battery PSWBA0002 via Partial Loss of ability to charge associated DC alarms closure of PSWLXDCO I Close battery PSWBAOOOI. would be received, breakers 4A, 4B and 5B. | ||
During use, to PSW functionality. | 227 PSWLXDCOI PSWLXDC01 Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDC01 27 under Loss of the ability to supply Breaker- 2A Main Panel breaker Fail Mechanical supply power to voltage relay would DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery Closed, Failure distribution center alarm in MCR when battery charger I is mitigated Charger I feed Partial PSWLXDCOI battery is depleted. via manual transfer to the BKR is N.C. Trip, Loss of ability to charge backup battery charger Partial battery PSWBAOOOI PSWBC0002 via closure of Close PSWLXDCO I breakers 4A, S4Band 5B. | ||
PSWPLTBO2 Partial Close battery test failure is detected via BKR is N.C. connection box. .observance of equipment not functioning. | |||
230 PSWLXDCOI PSWLXDCOI Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to None under normal Loss of the ability to supply Breaker-- | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 95 of 182 FailureyMode:and ....... Aelyste W rksheet System: __Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/29/201_ | ||
5B Main Panel breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to operation. | Equipment:. PSWLXDC0 I Breakers 2B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of (N) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 228 PSWLXDC01 PSWLXDC01 Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDCOI Loss of the ability to supply DC Breaker- 2B Main Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to (27) under distribution center from battery I or battery (0-6700-01) breaker for both Partial Trip, Failure distribution voltage relay charger I is mitigated via manual transfer PSW Battery I Partial Close center alarms in MCR. to the backup battery system PSWBA0002 feed and PSW PSWLXDCOI and PSWBC0002 via closure of Battery Charger PSWLXDCO I breakers 4A, 4B and 5B. | ||
DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery 2 Partial Trip, Failure distribution center Under accident scenario battery 2 is mitigated via feed Partial Close PSWLXDCOI on manual transfer to the battery would be depleted maranser toBthe BKR is N.C. loss of AC power pirbattery PSWBAOOO I events alassocld DC via closure of PSWLXDCOI Loss of ability to alarms would be received, breakers | I feed Should the PSW DC system be aligned to BKR is N.C. battery 2 and battery charger 2, an inadvertent closure failure of breaker 2B would parallel battery I and battery charger I to the PSWLXDCOI bus along with battery 2 and battery charger 2. This calculation recommends keeping breaker 2B racked out under while battery I and battery charger I is not being used as the PSW DC power source. | ||
231 PSWLXDC0I PSWLXDCOI Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDCO0 27 under Loss of the ability to supply Breaker- 4A Main Panel breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to voltage relay would alarm DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery Partial Trip, Failure distribution center in MCR when battery was battery charger 2 is mitigated Charger 2 feed Partial Close PSWLXDCO I depleted. | |||
via manual transfer to the BKR is N.C. Loss of ability to primary battery charger charge battery PSWBCOOO I via closure of PSWBA0002 PSWLXDC0 I breakers I B, 2A and 2B.ii. | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 96 of 182 Vailui'& Mode andEfet En yi okhe System: Protected Service Water_____ | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 97 of 182.. '*,;L i .Failure Mode System: __.Protected Service Water Subsystem: | Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_ | ||
_._PSW Electrical System | Date: 9/29/2011 Equipment: _PSWLXDCOI Breakers 5A, 5B, 4A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 229 PSWLXDCO I Feeder breaker for Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC None. Test connection. Loss of battery 2 test Breaker- 5A battery 2 test Fail Closed, Mechanical control power equipment is not typically connection box. No impact (0-6700-01) connection box Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to - connected. During use, to PSW functionality. | ||
_PSWLXDCO I Breaker 4B Diagram: 0-6700-01 | PSWPLTBO2 Partial Close battery test failure is detected via BKR is N.C. connection box. . observance of equipment not functioning. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 98 of 182 W .Failuzre.Mode and Effects AnalysisWoriksheet System: Protected Service Water_____________ | 230 PSWLXDCOI PSWLXDCOI Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to None under normal Loss of the ability to supply Breaker-- 5B Main Panel breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to operation. DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery 2 Partial Trip, Failure distribution center Under accident scenario battery 2 is mitigated via feed Partial Close PSWLXDCOI on manual transfer to the battery would be depleted maranser toBthe BKR is N.C. loss of AC power pirbattery PSWBAOOO I events alassocld DC via closure of PSWLXDCOI Loss of ability to alarms would be received, breakers IB, 2A and 2B. | ||
Prepared by: F. calabrese | charge battery PSWBA0002. | ||
231 PSWLXDC0I PSWLXDCOI Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDCO0 27 under Loss of the ability to supply Breaker- 4A Main Panel breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to voltage relay would alarm DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery Partial Trip, Failure distribution center in MCR when battery was battery charger 2 is mitigated Charger 2 feed Partial Close PSWLXDCO I depleted. via manual transfer to the BKR is N.C. Loss of ability to primary battery charger charge battery PSWBCOOO I via closure of PSWBA0002 PSWLXDC0 I breakers I B, 2A and 2B. | |||
PSW Electrical System Date: 10/21/11 Equipment: | ii. | ||
_PSWPL I DC Rev. No. 0 Diagram:~ | |||
0-6700-02 Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)233 PSWPL I DC 125V DC Loss of Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V 125V DC control power on Mechanical Power 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need to Panelboard power input, loss Failure unavailable to 600V be exercised, PSW System will operate normally.distribution of power 13.8kV, 4.16kV breaker Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is (0-6700-02) for 13.8kV, on output breakers, and indication mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release 4.16kV PSW Load (local & electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and breakers, Center. MCR) is lost BTT-C should Keowee source be required.and PSW Loss of various Load Center PSW equipment Loss of control power to B6T-i is mitigated via the Control above lteps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional Power closure of tie breaker B7T-I Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable. | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 97 of 182 | ||
Should any of the other B6T or PX 13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker.All 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V LC breakers have manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | ":* .. '*,;L i . Failure Mode System: __.Protected Service Water Prepared by: -F.Calabrese Subsystem: _._PSW Electrical System Date: 9/29/2011 Equipment: _PSWLXDCO I Breaker 4B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 FucinFailure Failure Effects on Train Method Methodreof No Component No Identification Function Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 232 PSWLXDCOI PSWLXDCO I Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDCOI Loss of the ability to supply DC Breaker- 4B Main Panel breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to (27) under distribution center from battery 2 or (0-6700-01) for both PSW Partial Trip, Failure distribution center voltage relay battery charger 2 is mitigated via manual Battery 2 feed and Partial Close PSWLXDC01 to alarm in transfer to the primary battery system PSW Battery MCR. PSWBA0001 and PSWBC0001 via Charger 2 feed closure of PSWLXDCOI breakers IB, BKR is N.O. 2A and 2B. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 99 of 182 IJ....Fai~lur .e Moide | Under normal operation, should the breaker inadvertently close, battery 2 and battery charger 2 will be paralleled to the PSWLXDCOI bus along with battery I and battery charger 1. This calculation recommends keeping breaker 4B racked out under while battery 2 and battery charger 2 is not being used as the PSW DC power source. | ||
Prepared by: _F. Calabrese______ | |||
Subsystem:- | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 98 of 182 W.Failuzre.Mode and Effects AnalysisWoriksheet System: Protected Service Water_____________ Prepared by: F. calabrese _____ | ||
PSW Electrical System Date: 10/21/11 Equipment: | Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/21/11 Equipment: _PSWPL I DC Rev. No. 0 Diagram:~ 0-6700-02 Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8) | ||
....PSWPL I DC Main Breaker________ | (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 233 PSWPL I DC 125V DC Loss of Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V 125V DC control power on Mechanical Power 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need to Panelboard power input, loss Failure unavailable to 600V be exercised, PSW System will operate normally. | ||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identificati Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (6) (7) (8)234 PSWPLI DC -PSW Building Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V Main Breaker panel Fail Closed, Mechanical Power 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need to PSWPLIDC Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to 600V be exercised, PSW System will operate normally.(0-6700-02) | distribution of power 13.8kV, 4.16kV breaker Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is (0-6700-02) for 13.8kV, on output breakers, and indication mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release 4.16kV PSW Load (local & electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and breakers, Center. MCR) is lost BTT-C should Keowee source be required. | ||
Main Breaker Partial Close 13.8kV, breaker Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is feeding 125V 4.16kV indication mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release DC control breakers, and (local & electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and power for PSW Load MCR) is lost B7T-C should Keowee source be required.13.8kV, Center.4.16kV and Loss of Loss of control power to B6T-I is mitigated via the PSW Load various PSW above steps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional Center equipment closure of tie breaker B7T-1 breakers Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable. | and PSW Loss of various Load Center PSW equipment Loss of control power to B6T-i is mitigated via the Control above lteps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional Power closure of tie breaker B7T-I Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable. | ||
Should any of the other B6T or PX 13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker.All 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V LC breakers have manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours.i[ | Should any of the other B6T or PX 13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker. | ||
All 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V LC breakers have manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power. | |||
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 99 of 182 IJ....Fai~lur .e Moide andtftects Alal~ w r "* | |||
System: Protected Service Water___________ Prepared by: _F. Calabrese______ | |||
Subsystem:- PSW Electrical System Date: 10/21/11 Equipment: ....PSWPL I DC Main Breaker________ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identificati Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (6) (7) (8) 234 PSWPLI DC - PSW Building Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V Main Breaker panel Fail Closed, Mechanical Power 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need to PSWPLIDC Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to 600V be exercised, PSW System will operate normally. | |||
(0-6700-02) Main Breaker Partial Close 13.8kV, breaker Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is feeding 125V 4.16kV indication mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release DC control breakers, and (local & electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and power for PSW Load MCR) is lost B7T-C should Keowee source be required. | |||
13.8kV, Center. | |||
4.16kV and Loss of Loss of control power to B6T-I is mitigated via the PSW Load various PSW above steps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional Center equipment closure of tie breaker B7T-1 breakers Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable. | |||
Should any of the other B6T or PX 13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker. | |||
All 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V LC breakers have manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power. | |||
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours. | |||
i[ | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 100 of 182 anitiEffects AfilaissWorksheet.. | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 100 of 182 anitiEffects AfilaissWorksheet.. | ||
System: ,__Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System __ | |||
Date : 10/21/11l Breakers 1, 2.3 Equipment: PSWPLIDC Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (6) (7) (8) 235 PSWPLIDC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or DC control PSW SWGR Should B6T-B be open, loss of control BKR # I power for 13.8kV Fail Closed, Mechanical power Breaker status power is mitigated via closure of either (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB6T-B Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to Indication breakers B7T-C or B7T-D, closure of tie (0-600-02) (In feed for swgr. Partial Close PSWB6T-B lights (local & breaker B7T-l and opening of B6T-l main (OEE-60 -0i) B6T from Fant line) breaker. MCR) will breaker. | |||
extinguish Alternatively, B6T-A could be closed powering B6T from Keowee. | |||
B6T-B also | |||
OPSWPT0003 Primary Pump Suction Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO03 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2). | OPSWPT0003 Primary Pump Suction Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO03 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2). | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 130 of 182..,Failure.Mode and System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem | |||
: N /AD ate_9/22/11 Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 130 of 182 | ||
_ PSW Booster Pump (OPSWPUO001) | ..,Failure.Mode and EffectsA*aJ*i* | ||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 13 1A-1. 1 ,= Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Syslem Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)Fail to Start Mechanical or Inadequate Control room Electrical Failure NPSH to indications | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem : N /AD ate_9/22/11 Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: _ PSW Booster Pump (OPSWPUO001) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 13 1A-1. 1 | ||
Primary Pump Fails to stop Electrical Failure Damage to See above OPSW- 14 (min flow valve) will on pump without maintain minimum flow to prevent command min. flow. pump running at shutoff head.OPSW-14 (min flow valve) may also be operated manually to restore flow control to prevent damage to equipment. | ,= Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Syslem Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | ||
'OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2).0ý! I.L ý,,, - | Fail to Start Mechanical or Inadequate Control room Electrical Failure NPSH operate to indications OAC or Main via Inadequate NPSH to operate PSW Primary Pump Control Boards primary pump without the booster pump operating therefore there the Possible loss of Indications on the system will not meet its design cooling water Control Panel function and the SSF must be used to HPIPMCs. located in the PSW as an alternate in the event of this Damage to Pump Room. failure. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. .1 Appendix A Page 131 of 182 | Provides adequate HPIPs without NPSH to the PSW motor cooling. Primary Pump will The High Pressure Service Water Primary Pump not start due to (HPSW) System could supply OPSWPU0001 interlock, cooling water to the HPIPMCs 301 Provides cooling depending on the availability of the (OFD-I 3 IA-1. 1) water to the High Fails Mechanical or Inadequate See above Elevated Water Service Tank Pressure Injection During Electrical Failure NPSH to (EWST) | ||
ý¶i*W kiffi1- -Ir System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: | Pump Motor Coolers Operation operate (HPIPMCs) Primary Pump Fails to stop Electrical Failure Damage to See above OPSW- 14 (min flow valve) will on pump without maintain minimum flow to prevent command min. flow. pump running at shutoff head. | ||
N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: | OPSW-14 (min flow valve) may also be operated manually to restore flow control to prevent damage to equipment. | ||
PSW Primary Pump Discharge Check Valve PSW-4 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.1 c | 'OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2). | ||
Possible water and booster pumps are via OAC or hammer effects with pump stopped). | 0ý! I.L ý,,, - | ||
Possible Main stop/restart. | |||
Possible foreign foreign material effects Control material effect (most likely at downstream if failure Boards'. downstream PSW-FEOOOI flow | OSC-10008, Rev. .1 Appendix A Page 131 of 182 | ||
element).302 through the PSW Control (OFD- 13 IA- I.l) System room Fail Mechanical Loss of Flow at Primary indications Primary pump inoperable, SSF Closed Failure Pump Discharge via OAC or system must be operated as Main alternate. | ~Faifi"ý'ý i~* de andAýIftei~s~n ý¶i*W kiffi1- - Ir System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW Primary Pump Discharge Check Valve PSW-4 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.1 c Failure Effects on Train and/or *Method Failure of R No. Component Function Failure Identification Mode Mechanism System Detection Remarks and Other Effects deic(2) ni i(4) (5) (6) .(7) (8) | ||
Control Boards'. | Potential water hammer Except in case of disk separation (column separation Control or pump stop / restart, no effect collapse) on pump restart room on system design function during Fail Mechanical in event both primary indications design operation. Possible water and booster pumps are via OAC or hammer effects with pump stopped). Possible Main stop/restart. Possible foreign foreign material effects Control material effect (most likely at downstream if failure Boards'. downstream PSW-FEOOOI flow includes disk separation. element). | ||
OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-000 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2).I OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 132 of 182 Failure Mode and ffecAii.. | OPSWVA0004 Prevents backflow 302 through the PSW Control (OFD- 13 IA-I.l) System room Fail Mechanical Loss of Flow at Primary indications Primary pump inoperable, SSF Closed Failure Pump Discharge via OAC or system must be operated as Main alternate. | ||
.""j "or1 "e | Control Boards'. | ||
Mid-Fail Mechanical Reduced Flow / pressure Depending on level of flow Failure anomalies See above restriction, primary pump may be Travel Failure anomalies inoperable. | |||
PSW Primary Pump Bvypass Check Valve | OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-000 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2). | ||
OPSWVA0007 Prevents backflow No effect during normal system 303 through the PSW operation. | I | ||
When only the booster (OFD-131A-1.I) | |||
System pump is operating, the only Fail Closed Mechanical Failure None None discharge flow path would be through the non-operating PSW Primary Pump and HPI motor cooler lines. This is not a credited alignment. | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 132 of 182 Failure Mode and ffecAii.. .""j .t "or1 "e System: Protected Service Water (PSW) | ||
Reduced flow as indicated by Depending on level ofbackflow, Fail Mid' Mechanical Failure Flow / pressure Control Room primary pump may be inoperable Travel anomalies indicator OPSW- prim pum ay be inoperable FT-0001 -shown (see fall open and fail closed above).on OAC1.OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2). | Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 92/ | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 133 of 182~>K Failure Mode. ad Effects AnaIJ | OPSW-7 Equipment: PSW Primary Pump Bvypass Check Valve Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.1 No. Component Function Mode Failure Mechanism Effects on Train Method of (I) Identification (3)Mode and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (6) (7) (8) | ||
_____N/A________ | Main effect would be reduced Short circuit performance of primary pump and primary pump possible system damage requiring flow, loss of pump Control room primary pump shutdown. | ||
Date : 921 Equipment: | Fail Open Mechanical Failure discharge pressure indications via Manual closure of OPSW-3 will and flow to SG's. OAC or Main mitigate the effects during normal Possible foreign Control Boards'. operation however would have material effects on similar effects to "fail closed" when loss of valve disk. only the booster pump is operating if not re-opened. | ||
PSW Test Line Check Valve -OPSW-13 Diagram: OFD-131A-1. | OPSWVA0007 Prevents backflow No effect during normal system 303 through the PSW operation. When only the booster (OFD-131A-1.I) System pump is operating, the only Fail Closed Mechanical Failure None None discharge flow path would be through the non-operating PSW Primary Pump and HPI motor cooler lines. This is not a credited alignment. | ||
Reduced flow as indicated by Depending on level ofbackflow, Fail Mid' Mechanical Failure Flow / pressure Control Room primary pump may be inoperable Travel anomalies indicator OPSW- prim pum ay be inoperable FT-0001 - shown (see fall open and fail closed above). | |||
Will eliminate one Auxiliary Building flood prevention barrier.Depending on system alignment and the number of S/G's being supplied Prevents backflow and "fail closed" may have differing back-pressure to the effects. Fail closed while serving at PSW System while Inability to Inability to control least one unit at full design flow may testing PSW with the use flow as indicated not have an immediate effect OPSWVA0013 CCW Intake Pumps Fail Closed Mechanical Failure minimum by Control Room however at reduced flows or no units 304 operating flow line indicator OPSW- being served "fail closed" is likely to (OFD-131A-I.I) (PSW.14) FTOOO1. Erratic cause primary pump failure. Some flow indication'. | on OAC1. | ||
recovery may be possible by closing Provides an Auxiliary PSW-28 and throttling PSW-l5 to Flood Isolation divert minimum flow to the test Feature sump however this is not a credited alignment. | OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2). | ||
Inability to control Fail id- Fow / flow as indicated Flow b Conteo Depending on the level of flow Travel Mechanical Failure pressure indicator OPSWo restriction primary pump may be anomalies FTo I. Erratic inoperable (see fail closed above).flow indication OPSWFT-000 I PSW Total Flow Indication to U2 MCR or 1,2,3PSW-FT'000 I A SG' and 1,2,3PSWFTOO02 | |||
'B SO' PSW Flow Indicators to respective Unit MCR ifsupplying SG (Reference 3.2). | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 133 of 182 | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 134 of 182 Failure Mode an'd Effect Anairis Woksheet .System: Protected Service Water (PSW) | ~>K Failure Mode. ad Effects AnaIJ W40ksheet v System: Protected Service Water (PSW) | ||
N/A Prepared by: William Watkins Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: | Subsystem: _____N/A________ | ||
PSW Minimum Flow Throttle Valve -0PSW-14 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13iA-1. | Prepared by: William Watkins Date : 921 Equipment: PSW Test Line Check Valve - OPSW-13 R Diagram: OFD-131A-1. | ||
I Effects on No. Component Failure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Function Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | Effects on MehdoFilr No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | ||
PSW-14 has the Fail Open Mechanical or indicator OPSW- capability to be manually operated Electrical Failure Primary and FT000 I. using the handwhcl on the booster pumps Limitorque operator. | No effect on system design function Fail Open Mechanical Failure None None during design operation. Will eliminate one Auxiliary Building flood prevention barrier. | ||
Some level of run at or above control using this valve and/or Ensures the PSW runout flow. OPSW-12 may be possible.Pumps have Possible pump Inability | Depending on system alignment and the number of S/G's being supplied Prevents backflow and "fail closed" may have differing back-pressure to the effects. Fail closed while serving at PSW System while Inability to Inability to control least one unit at full design flow may testing PSW with the use flow as indicated not have an immediate effect OPSWVA0013 CCW Intake Pumps Fail Closed Mechanical Failure minimum by Control Room however at reduced flows or no units 304 operating flow line indicator OPSW- being served "fail closed" is likely to (OFD-131A-I.I) (PSW.14) FTOOO1. Erratic cause primary pump failure. Some flow indication'. recovery may be possible by closing Provides an Auxiliary PSW-28 and throttling PSW-l5 to Flood Isolation divert minimum flow to the test Feature sump however this is not a credited alignment. | ||
Flow / pressure Similar to "Fail Depending on the level of flow Fail Mid- Mechanical or anomalies Closed" Above restriction primary pump may be Travel Electrical Failure inoperable (see fail closed -remarks below and fail open above).Fail Closed: Depending on system alignment and the number of S/G's being supplied "fail closed" may have differing effects. Fail closed while serving at least one unit at full design flow may not have an immediate effect however at reduced flows or no units being served "fail closed" is likely to cause primary pump failure. PSW-14 has the capability to be manually operated using the handwheel on the Limitorque operator. | Inability to control Fail id- Fow / flow as indicated Flow b Conteo Depending on the level of flow Travel Mechanical Failure pressure indicator OPSWo restriction primary pump may be anomalies FTo I. Erratic inoperable (see fail closed above). | ||
Some level of recovery using this valve and/or PSW-12 may be possible.'OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-000 I PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2). | flow indication OPSWFT-000 I PSW Total Flow Indication to U2 MCR or 1,2,3PSW-FT'000 I A SG' and 1,2,3PSWFTOO02 'B SO' PSW Flow Indicators to respective Unit MCR ifsupplying SG (Reference 3.2). | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 135 of 182 Failu'e Mod and Effe 6s Anals Wokbe System : Protected Service W ater (PSW ) P e a e y il a ak n | |||
N /AD ate_:_9/22/11 Date : 9/22111I Equipment: | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 134 of 182 Failure Mode an'd Effect Anairis Woksheet . | ||
Unit I PSW Header Isolation Valve - | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) | ||
Operators will open Failure indicated by handwheel on the Limitorque this valve from the Control Room operator. | N/A Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: | ||
Some level of recovery MCR to allow PSW indicator IPSW- may be possible if valve can be System flow to the FT0001I' and operated with handwheel. | Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: PSW Minimum Flow Throttle Valve - 0PSW-14 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13iA-1. I Effects on No. Component Failure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Function Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) | ||
Unit I S/Gs IPSW-FT0002'. | System (7) (8) | ||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Possible PSW Inability to Depending on the level of flow Travel Electrical System Inoperable to control flow as restriction PSW may be inoperable Failure Unit I indicated by to Unit 1. IPSW-6 has the capability Control Room to be manually operated using the indicator I PSW- handwheel on the Limitorque FT0001' and operator. | Inadequate Inability to control Fail full open would prevent the flow to S/0's flow as indicated PSW System from performing its or HPIPMCs. by Control Room design function. PSW-14 has the Fail Open Mechanical or indicator OPSW- capability to be manually operated Electrical Failure Primary and FT000 I. using the handwhcl on the booster pumps Limitorque operator. Some level of run at or above control using this valve and/or Ensures the PSW runout flow. OPSW-12 may be possible. | ||
Some level of recovery IPSW-FT0002'. | Pumps have Possible pump Inability OPSWVA0014 required m inim um d ah a e l wa to nicontrol ae 305flw urig lldeadheaded flow as indicated (OFD.131A-l.l) flow during all condition, by Control Room conditions requiring Mechanical or indicator OPSW-PSW Pump Fail Closed Electrical Failure FT0001 ' or See Remarks Below operationpr s u easa pressure indicated by OPSWPT0004'. | ||
may be possible using handwheel. | Flow / pressure Similar to "Fail Depending on the level of flow Fail Mid- Mechanical or anomalies Closed" Above restriction primary pump may be Travel Electrical Failure inoperable (see fail closed - remarks below and fail open above). | ||
Fail Closed: Depending on system alignment and the number of S/G's being supplied "fail closed" may have differing effects. Fail closed while serving at least one unit at full design flow may not have an immediate effect however at reduced flows or no units being served "fail closed" is likely to cause primary pump failure. PSW-14 has the capability to be manually operated using the handwheel on the Limitorque operator. Some level of recovery using this valve and/or PSW-12 may be possible. | |||
'OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-000 I PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 135 of 182 Failu'e Mod and Effe 6s Anals Wokbe System : Protected Service W ater (PSW ) SPrepared P e a e by:y William il a Watkins ak n S ubsystem : .. .. . ........... N /AD ate_:_9/22/11 Date : 9/22111I Equipment: Unit I PSW Header Isolation Valve - IPSW-6 (EMO Ooerated Gate Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.2 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of (I) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) | |||
Depending on No effect on system design function downstream valve during design operation to Unit I alignments and S/G's. In the event of spurious possible internal opening when not operating PSW to Mechanical or leakage through Periodic Testing Unit I, flow would be restricted by Fail Open Electrical valves, Condensate normally closed downstream valves. | |||
Failure grade water could propagate to the lake The possibility of Condensate grade Provides PSW Header via the min-flow water propagating to the lake is high Isolation to Unit I path. Note that PSW- improbable due to the number of Steam Generators 14 is normally open. failures and misalignments required. | |||
I PSWVA0006 (S/Gs) when system is Fail Closed Mechanical or PSW System Inability to IPSW-6 has the capability to be 306 in standby mode. Electrical Inoperable to Unit I establish flow as manually operated using the (OFD-131A-I.2) Operators will open Failure indicated by handwheel on the Limitorque this valve from the Control Room operator. Some level of recovery MCR to allow PSW indicator IPSW- may be possible if valve can be System flow to the FT0001I' and operated with handwheel. | |||
Unit I S/Gs IPSW-FT0002'. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Possible PSW Inability to Depending on the level of flow Travel Electrical System Inoperable to control flow as restriction PSW may be inoperable Failure Unit I indicated by to Unit 1. IPSW-6 has the capability Control Room to be manually operated using the indicator I PSW- handwheel on the Limitorque FT0001' and operator. Some level of recovery IPSW-FT0002'. may be possible using handwheel. | |||
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on IUBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC- 10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 136 of 182 S - 9 | |||
* ..... Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. Worksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/I1 Equipment: PSW to SG I A Header Check Valve - IPSW-9 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A- 1.2 Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) ()()(6) | |||
(3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed PSW Possible discovery allow SG pressure back to normally flow control by piping external closed PSW flow control valves valves, temperature causing no immediate detrimental anomaly. effects. | |||
PSWVA0009 Provides a P - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 307 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD3037 A-.2) isolation feature SG IA. indicated by through SG IB (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator IPSW- heat removal depending on specific FT0001 '. event conditions). | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies as Depending on level of flow Travel System, indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to IA SG. Refer to "fail SG IA. indicator IPSW- closed" above. | |||
FTooo I. | |||
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on IUBI (Reference 3.2). | Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on IUBI (Reference 3.2). | ||
OSC- 10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 137 of 182 Failuire Mode and Effecis Analyiis W19'rksh6it C .unn D . t A Q ;,. 111.t- MQUA Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: -_/________ Date : | |||
v 9/22/11 Rev. No. 0 Equipment: to SG11*1IBA -Header PSWn'FlT'- I I) | |||
Check Valve IPSW- I I r%; | |||
Failure normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed PSW Possible | ~,o~I4A,5I. S., S ~ | ||
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies | Effects on Component Function FFailure Mfchnis T n Method of No. Identification Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)(7 System (7) s (8) | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page | Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure normally, system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed PSW Possible allow SG pressure back to normally flow control discovery by closed PSW flow control valves valves.:, piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects. | ||
anomaly. | |||
Date : | IPSWVAOOI I Provides a PSW - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 308 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD-131A-1.2) isolation feature SG l1B. indicated by through SG IA (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator I PSW- heat removal depending on specific FT0002 . event conditions). | ||
PSW to | Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to IB SG. Refer to "fail SG lB. indicator IPSW- closed" above. | ||
FTO002'. | |||
Failure | uigital uisplay in unit I Lontrol Koom on IUI (RKeference 3.2). | ||
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 138 of 182 | |||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW)Prepared by: | *Failure Modeand Effects Analysis Works°hee. | ||
N/A Date: | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) | ||
PSW to | Prepared by: bAWilliam Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 2/28/12 Equipment: PSW to U I HPI Pump Mtr Bearing Coolers Chk Valve IPSW-21 RI Rev. No. .*____. _ I_______ | ||
Diagram: OFD- 131 A- 1.2 Effects on Method of No. | |||
No. Identification Component ()Mode Function Failure (5 Failure Mechanism ytmDjcinRemarks Train: and/or Failure and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection(8 | |||
()()(6) ()(8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical Failure N/A(PSW Event) N/A (PSW Event) | |||
N/A | Inadequate HPI Failure open while supplying HPI Motor Cooling as pump motor coolers from LPSW or None (PSW indicated by HPI HPSW~backup could cause back | ||
PSW to | * Event) Pump Motor leakage to the PSW System and Bearing Cooling interruptfflow to the HPI Pump Back-Leakage Flow or Bearing motor coolers, rendering HPI pumps from LPSW or Temperature inoperable. Some recovery may be HPSW during Alarms - possible if immediate action is taken otherevents indications to close manual valves. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page | Provides a PSW - available in the IPSWVA0021 LPSW/HPSW Control Rooms 309 (OFD-131A-1.2) boundary isolation and locally in the feature HPIP Room. | ||
N/A | Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit I HPI Pump HPI Pump Motor coolers can also to Unit I HPI motor bearing be supplied from the LPSW or pump motor flow/temperature HPSW System however this is not coolers alarms .. credited in a PSW event. | ||
PSW to SG | unavailable Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit I HPI Pump Depending on event and failure Travel to Unit I HPI motor bearing position, similar effects as described pump motor flow/temperature for "fail open" and "fail closed" coolers alarms '. could be expected. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. | unavailable RI HPI Motor Bearing Cooling Flow and upper / lower bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed to Unit I OAC (Reference 3. 10). I | ||
N/ | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 139 of 182 Failure Mode andIEffct Ana " o System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/1) | ||
PSW to SG I B | Equipment: PSW to SGI A Flow Control Valve - IPSW-22 (Solenoid Onerated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.2 Component Failure Effects on Method of No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) | ||
() | (6) (7) | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page | Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit I (closing PSW-6 from MCR) or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing IPSW-8 to isolate control PSW as indicated by flow to the I A SG). These actions flow to ]A Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown indicator I PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FT0001 ' event ofspurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit I, flow would be restricted by normally closed IPSWVA0022 High flow control to upstream and downstream valves. | ||
: N/ | 3 (OFD 131 A- 1.2) the Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on event and das indicated by circumstances, adequate control of aprovidePSW adequate as inted Control by Room PSW flow to IA S/G may be flow to IA indicator IPSW- possible by controlling IPSW-23 SG. FT0001' flow control bypass or IPSW-26 manual bypass. | ||
PSW | Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to failure, operators may be required to controlPSW as indicated by isolate flow to IA S/G as described flow to IA indicator IPSW- in "fail open" or provide additional SG. flow as described in "fail closed" FT00O Ii shown above. | ||
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on I UBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 140 of 182 SFaiih er e Sreita System: Protected Servýice Water (PSW) | |||
Subsystem: N/A Prepared by: William Watkins Equipment: PSW to SG IA Flow Control Bypass Valve -IPSW-23 (EMO Operated Date : 9/22/I11 Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13lA-l.2 N. Component FucinFailure Failure Mechanism Effects Train on and/or Method Failureof No. identification Function Mode eRemarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) | |||
(6) a O)neE c Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit I (closing PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing IPSW-8 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the IA SG). These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to IA indicator IPSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the S6. FT0001'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit I, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | |||
IPSWVA0023 Low flow control to 31 the Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD- 131 A-I1.2) Unit I A SG Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by circumstances, adequate control of control PSW Control Room PSW flow to IA S/G may be flow to IA indicator IPSW- possible by controlling IPSW-22 or SG. FTrom1i. manual bypass IPSW-26. This is particularly true early in the event. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to IA Control Room isolate flow to IA S/G as described SG. indicator IPSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FTOOO I. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
operator. | Uigital uisplay in unit I Control Room on IUBI (RKeference 3.2). | ||
Some level of recovery may be possible using handwheel. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 141 of 182 | |||
..... .. ...... " FailureeeMode and Effel.ts Ana.y-.I | |||
.. .*or.F _._.._.. | |||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG IB Flow Control Valve I PSW-24 (Solenoid Onerated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A- 1.2 Effects on Method of No. () Component Identification Function | |||
()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism (5 Train and/or ytmDtcinRemarks Failure and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) | |||
System (7)() | |||
Detection (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit I (closing PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing IPSW-10 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the I B SG) These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to IB indicator I PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FT0002'. event ofspurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit I, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | |||
IPSWVA0024 High flow control to 312 (OFD-131A-1.2) the Unit IB SG Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on event and Electrical Failure circumstances, adequate control of provide as indicated by flow to B / maybe adequate PSW Control Room flow to IB indicator IPSW- possible by controlling IPSW-25 SG. FT0002'. flow control bypass or IPSW-28 Manual Bypass. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control PSW isolate flow to I B S/G as described flow to IB indicator oPSW-in "fail open" or provide additional SG. FT0002o. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on IUBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 142 of 182 2.7 ~ Failure M~earni Effe' -- &See System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem : N/ADate_9/22/11 Date : 9/22/IlI Equipment: PSW to SG I B Fiow Control Bypass Valve IPSW-25 (EMO Operated Valve) | |||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A- 1.2 Effects on Method of No. I) Component Identification Function | |||
()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism (5 TrainytmDtcinRemarks and/or Failure and Other Effects | |||
(!)() (3) ()(5) System Detection (2) (4) 7 (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit I (closing PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing I PSW-10 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to I B SO). These actions will adequate PSW Control Room prevent unacceptable cooldown rates flow to iB indicator IPSW- due to excessive flow. In the event SO. FT0002'. of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit I, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | |||
I1PSWVA0025 Low flow control to 313 (OFD- 1A-12) the f nitr to Fail Closed Mechanical or Depending on event and (OFD- 131A-.2) the Unit I B SG Electrical Failure Inability to Flow anomalies circumstances, adequate control of control oPSW as indicated by PSW flow to IB S/O may be flowIB Control Room flow to I B indicator IPSW- possible by controlling IPSW-24 or SG. FT0002'. I PSW-28 Manual Bypass. This is particularly true early in the event. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to IB Control Room isolate flow to I B S/G as described SO. indicator IPSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT00021 . flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on I UBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 143 of 182 FjailrMoe4 System Proectd. Sr.ie.Wte (P5W Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: Unit 2 PSW Header Isolation Valve 2PSW-6 (EMO Operated Gate Valve) | |||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: - OFD- 13 1A-2.2 No. Component Identification Function Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Method of Failure Mode Mechanism System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or No effect on system design function Electrical Depending on during design operation to Unit 2 Failure downstream valve S/G's. In the event of spurious alignments and possible opening when not operating PSW to internal leakage through Unit 2, flow would be restricted by valves, Condensate grade Periodic Testing normally closed downstream valves. | |||
water could propagate to the lake via the min-flow The possibility of Condensate grade Provides PSW path. Note that PSW-14 water propagating to the lake is high Header Isolation to is normally open. improbable due to the number of Unit 2 Steam failures and misalignments required. | |||
Generators (S/Gs) 2PSWVA0006 when system is in Fail Closed Mechanical or PSW System Inoperable Inability to 2PSW-6 has the capability to be 314 standby mode. Electrical to Unit 2 establish flow as manually operated using the (OFD-13 1A-2.2) Operators will open Failure indicated by handwheel on the Limitorque this valve from the Control Room operator. Some level of recovery MCR to allow PSW indicators 2PSW- may be possible if valve can be System flow to the FT0001' and operated with handwheel. | |||
Unit 2 S/Gs 2PSW-FT0002 . | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Possible PSW System Inability to control Depending on the level of flow Travel Electrical Inoperable to Unit 2 flow as indicated restriction PSW may be inoperable Failure by Control Room to Unit 2. 2PSW-6 has the capability indicators 2PSW- to be manually operated using the FT0001' and handwheel on the Limitorque 2PSW-FT0002'. operator. Some level of recovery may be possible using handwheel. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2). | Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2). | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 144 of 182 | |||
* III D UI Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 144 of 182 I. | ||
N/A Equipment: | . .. ,-t " .: .* . Fail C'w t , D + + AQ | ||
PSW to SG 2A Header Check Valve 2PSW-9 | * III D UI Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 2A Header Check Valve 2PSW-9 Rev. No. 0 Diaeram: OFD-131 A-2-2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) detc3(6) (7) (_) | ||
Failure PSW normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed flow Possible allow SG pressure back to normally control valves, discovery by closed PSW flow control valves piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects.anomaly.2PSWVA0009 Provides a PSW -Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 315 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD-13IA-2.2) isolation feature SG 2A. indicated by through SG 2B (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator 2PSW- heat removal depending on specific FTOO01'. event conditions). | Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure PSW normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed flow Possible allow SG pressure back to normally control valves, discovery by closed PSW flow control valves piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects. | ||
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 2A SG. Refer to "fail SG 2A. indicator 2PSW- closed" above.FTO00I'.Digital in unit 2 Control Room on 2UB I (Keterence | anomaly. | ||
..2). | 2PSWVA0009 Provides a PSW - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 315 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD-13IA-2.2) isolation feature SG 2A. indicated by through SG 2B (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator 2PSW- heat removal depending on specific FTOO01'. event conditions). | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 145 of 182-;~ Failure Modid~and Effect Anlyi r he~e System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: | Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 2A SG. Refer to "fail SG 2A. indicator 2PSW- closed" above. | ||
N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: | FTO00I'. | ||
PSW to SG 2B Header Check Valve 2PSW-I 1 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131 A-2.2 Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. | Digital *isplay in unit 2 Control Room on 2UB I (Keterence .. 2). | ||
Failure PSW normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed PSW Possible allow SG pressure back to normally flow control discovery by closed PSW flow control valves valves, piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects.anomaly.2PSWVAOOI I Provides a PSW -Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 316 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD-131A-2.2) isolation feature SG 2B. indicated by through SO 2A (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate Indicator 2PSW- heat removal depending on specific FT0002'. event conditions). | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 2B SG. Refer to "fail SG 2B. Indicator 2PSW- closed" above.FTOO2'.'Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2). | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 145 of 182 | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 146 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analysisy Wo"ksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: -NA Date : 2/28/12 Equipment: | -;~Failure Modid~and Effect Anlyi r he~e System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 2B Header Check Valve 2PSW-I 1 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131 A-2.2 Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | ||
PSW to U2 HPI Pump Mtr Bearing Coolers Chk Valve 2PSW-21 Rev. No. _____i______ | Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure PSW normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed PSW Possible allow SG pressure back to normally flow control discovery by closed PSW flow control valves valves, piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects. | ||
Diagram: OFD-131A-2.2 Failure Effects on Method of Failure No. Component Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)(6)Fail Open Mechanical Failure N/A (PSW Event) N/A (PSW Event)Inadequate HPI Failure open while supplying HPI Motor Cooling as pump motor coolers from LPSW or None (PSW indicated by HPI HPSW backup could cause back Event) Pump Motor leakage to the PSW System and Bearing Cooling interrupt flow to the HPI Pump Back-Leakage Flow or Bearing motor coolers, rendering HPI pumps from LPSW or Temperature inoperable. | anomaly. | ||
Some recovery may be HPSW during Alarms -possible if immediate action is taken other events indications to close manual valves.Provides a PSW -available in the 2PSWVA0021 LPSW/HPSW Control Rooms 317 (OFD-13 IA-2.2) boundary isolation and locally in the feature HPIP Room.Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 2 HPI Pump HPI Pump Motor coolers can also to Unit 2 HPI motor bearing be supplied from the LPSW or pump motor flow/temperature HPSW System however this is not coolers alarms'. credited in a PSW event.unavailable Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 2 HPI Pump Depending on event and failure Travel to Unit 2 HPI motor bearing position, similar effects as described pump motor flow/temperature for "fail open" and "fail closed" coolers alarms'. could be expected.unavailable HPI~ Puma Motor Bearinq Flow and uinner / | 2PSWVAOOI I Provides a PSW - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 316 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD-131A-2.2) isolation feature SG 2B. indicated by through SO 2A (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate Indicator 2PSW- heat removal depending on specific FT0002'. event conditions). | ||
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 2B SG. Refer to "fail SG 2B. Indicator 2PSW- closed" above. | |||
.OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 147 of 182 System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem:__- | FTOO2'. | ||
N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: | 'Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2). | ||
PSW to SG 2A Flow Control Valve 2PSW-22 f Solenoid Operated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-i 31 A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 146 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analysisy Wo"ksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: -NA Date : 2/28/12 Equipment: PSW to U2 HPI Pump Mtr Bearing Coolers Chk Valve 2PSW-21 Ri Rev. No. _____i______ | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 148 of 182 Failure | Diagram: OFD-131A-2.2 Failure Effects on Method of Failure No. Component Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | ||
ý rk-he System: Protected Service Water (PSW)Subsystem: | (6) | ||
_________ | Fail Open Mechanical Failure N/A (PSW Event) N/A (PSW Event) | ||
N/ | Inadequate HPI Failure open while supplying HPI Motor Cooling as pump motor coolers from LPSW or None (PSW indicated by HPI HPSW backup could cause back Event) Pump Motor leakage to the PSW System and Bearing Cooling interrupt flow to the HPI Pump Back-Leakage Flow or Bearing motor coolers, rendering HPI pumps from LPSW or Temperature inoperable. Some recovery may be HPSW during Alarms - possible if immediate action is taken other events indications to close manual valves. | ||
PSW to SG IA Flow Control Bypass Valve 2PSW-23 (EMO Operated Date : 9/22/1 i Valve Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure (I) Identification (3) Mode (5) System Detection (2) (4) (7) (8)Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-8 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the 2A SG). These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to 2A Indicator 2PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FT0001'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | Provides a PSW - available in the 2PSWVA0021 LPSW/HPSW Control Rooms 317 (OFD-13 IA-2.2) boundary isolation and locally in the feature HPIP Room. | ||
319 the Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD-3IA2.2) | Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 2 HPI Pump HPI Pump Motor coolers can also to Unit 2 HPI motor bearing be supplied from the LPSW or pump motor flow/temperature HPSW System however this is not coolers alarms'. credited in a PSW event. | ||
Unit 2 A SG Electrical Failure Inability to circumstances, adequate control of control PSW Control Room PSW flow to 2A S/G may be flow to 2A Indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-22 or SG. FT0001i'. | unavailable Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 2 HPI Pump Depending on event and failure Travel to Unit 2 HPI motor bearing position, similar effects as described pump motor flow/temperature for "fail open" and "fail closed" coolers alarms'. could be expected. | ||
manual bypass 2PSW-26. This is particularly true early in the evenL Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 2A Control Room isolate flow to 2A S/G as described SG. Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT0001I'. | unavailable HPI~Puma Motor Bearinq Coolin*x Flow and uinner / .[...-..~-...-.----.~ | ||
flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2). | lower hearina temneratmtre sare monitoredl aind alarmed to tlnit *20AC ' (Reference - U.lOV. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 149 of 182.. | RI HPI Pumn Motor Bearing Cooling Flow and upper lower bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed to Unit 2 OAC (Reference 3 10) I I | ||
N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: | |||
PSW to SG 2B Flow Control Valve 2PSW-24 (Solenoid Operated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure | .OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 147 of 182 System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem:__- N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 2A Flow Control Valve 2PSW-22 f Solenoid Operated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-i 31 A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. () Component Identification Function | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 150 of 182 Failure Modeand Effeets | ()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism (5 Train and/or ytmDtcinRemarks Failure and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (6) (7) (8) | ||
. | Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR) or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-8 to isolate control PSW as indicated by flow to the 2A SG). These actions flow to 2A Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown FT0ooo2PSW-Indicator . event due rates to excessive of spurious opening In the flow.when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | ||
N/A Date : : 9/22/11!Equipment: | 318 2PSWVA0022 High flow control to Fail Closed Mechanical orevent and (OFD-813 A-2.2) the Unit 2A SG Electrical Failure Inability to Flow anomalies circumstances, adequate control of provide as indicated PSW flow to 2A S/G may be adequate PSW Control Room flow to 2A Indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-23 So.to 2i . flow control bypass or 2PSW-26 manual bypass. | ||
PSW to SG 2B Flow Control Bypass | Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control flow toPSW2A ainted Control Room by isolate flow to 2A S/G as described Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional SG. FTO001'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 151 of 182 Failur Mode and 9ffects nalvsisyW h | Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2). | ||
: .- -N /A _D ate_:_9/22/11 Date: 9/22/ il Equipment: | |||
Unit 3 PSW Header Isolation Valve 3PSW-6 (EMO Operated Gate Valve)Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-3.2 | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 148 of 182 Failure anidEffei~tsAaly& ý | ||
Some 3PSW-FT0001 level of recovery may be possible if System flow to the and 3PSW- valve can be operated with handwheel. | -Mode rk-he System: Protected Service Water (PSW) | ||
Unit 3 S/Gs FT0002'.Fail Mid- Mechanical or Possible PSW Inability to Depending on the level of flow Travel Electrical System Inoperable control flow as restriction PSW may be inoperable to Failure to Unit 3 indicated by Unit 3. 3PSW-6 has the capability to be 3PSW-FT0001 manually operated using the handwheel and 3PSW- on the Limitorque operator. | Subsystem: _________ N/A__ Prepared by: William Watkins Equipment: PSW to SG IA Flow Control Bypass Valve 2PSW-23 (EMO Operated Date : 9/22/1 i Valve Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure (I) Identification (3) Mode (5) System Detection (2) (4) (7) (8) | ||
Some FT0002'. level of recovery may be possible using handwheel. | Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-8 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the 2A SG). These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to 2A Indicator 2PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FT0001'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed 2PSWVA0023 Low flow control to________ upstream and downstream valves. | ||
319 the Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD-3IA2.2) Unit 2 A SG Electrical Failure Inability to circumstances, adequate control of control PSW Control Room PSW flow to 2A S/G may be flow to 2A Indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-22 or SG. FT0001i'. manual bypass 2PSW-26. This is particularly true early in the evenL Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 2A Control Room isolate flow to 2A S/G as described SG. Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT0001I'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 149 of 182 | |||
..FaiureT o1 5 e and Effects Analyss Wo t,; | |||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 2B Flow Control Valve 2PSW-24 (Solenoid Operated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) | |||
(6) (7) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-10 to isolate control PSW as indicated by flow to the 2B SG) These actions flow to 2B Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown Indicator 2PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the S. FT0002'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | |||
30 2PSWVAO024 High flowv control to FalCoe Mchnalr 320 theDUnit.2B2SthFail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on event and Electricalprovide as indicated by circumstances, adequate control of adequate PSW Control Room PSW flow to 2B S/G may be flow to 2B Indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-25 SG. FT0002'. flow control bypass or 2PSW-28 Manual Bypass. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control PSW aintr d by isolate flow to 2B S/G as described flow o 2B Control Room flow to 2B Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional SG. FT0002'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UB I (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 150 of 182 Failure Modeand Effeets A.naI*yiWoisee.4.:> . | |||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : : 9/22/11! | |||
2PSW-25 (EMO Onerated Valve) | |||
Equipment: PSW to SG 2B Flow Control Bypass Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13 IA-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or .Failure Identification (3) Mode (5)Remarks and Other Effects (2)(6) (7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-I 0 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to 2B SG). These actions will adequate PSW Control Room prevent unacceptable cooldown rates flow to 2B indicator 2PSW- due to excessive flow. In the event SG. FT0002'. of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | |||
2PSWVA0025 Low flow control to 321 Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD-131 A-2.2) the Unit 2 B SG Electrical Failure Inability to dtd b circumstances, adequate control of flow toPSW control 2B Control Roomy indicatd R PSW flow to 2B S/G may be indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-24 or SG. Ft0002'. 2PSW-28 Manual Bypass. This is particularly true early in the event Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 2B Control Room isolate flow to 2B S/G as described SG. Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT0002'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 151 of 182 Failur Mode and 9ffects nalvsisyW . h ;K. | |||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem : .- - N /A _D ate_:_9/22/11 Date: 9/22/ il Equipment: Unit 3 PSW Header Isolation Valve 3PSW-6 (EMO Operated Gate Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-3.2 N. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Effects Train on and/or Method of Failure MehdfFalr No. Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | |||
(6) (7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or Depending on Electrical downstream valve No effect on system design function Failure alignments and during design operation to Unit 3 possible internal S/G's. In the event of spurious leakage through opening when not operating PSW to valves, Condensate eUnit 3, flow would be restricted by grade waterond Periodic Testing normally closed downstream valves. | |||
propagate to the The possibility of Condensate grade Provides PSW Header lake via the min- water propagating to the lake is high Isolation to Unit 3 flow path. Note that improbable due to the number of Steam Generators PSW-14 is normally failures and misalignments required. | |||
(S/Gs) when system is open. | |||
322 3PSWVA0006 in standby mode. Fail Closed Mechanical or PSW System Inability to 3PSW-6 has the capability to be (OFD-l 3 IA-3.2) Operators this valve will fromopen the Electrical Inoperable to Unit 3 establish flow as manually operated using the handwheel MCR to allow PtW Failure indicated by on the Limitorque operator. Some 3PSW-FT0001 level of recovery may be possible if System flow to the and 3PSW- valve can be operated with handwheel. | |||
Unit 3 S/Gs FT0002'. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Possible PSW Inability to Depending on the level of flow Travel Electrical System Inoperable control flow as restriction PSW may be inoperable to Failure to Unit 3 indicated by Unit 3. 3PSW-6 has the capability to be 3PSW-FT0001 manually operated using the handwheel and 3PSW- on the Limitorque operator. Some FT0002'. level of recovery may be possible using handwheel. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 152 of 182 Failure~lode, System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9'/21 1 Equipment: PSW to SG 3A Header Check Valve 3PSW-9 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-!31 A-3.2 Component Failure Effects on Method of No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design to upstream undetected until function during design operation. | |||
normally system testing. Failure open when not operating. | |||
closed PSW Possible PSW would allow SG pressure flow control discovery by back to normally closed PSW valves. piping external temperature flow control valves causing no anomaly. immediate detrimental effects. | |||
Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect 3PSWVAO009 Provides a PSW - Inoperable to establish flow as PSW System heat removal from 323 EFW boundary SG 3A. indicated by the RCS through SG 3B (PSW to (OFD-13IA-3.2) isolation feature Control indicatorRoom 3 PSW- aasnl single SG may or may Qmyo a not o | |||
FTO OOI.r provided adequate heat removal depending on specific event conditions). | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 3A SG. Refer to SG 3A. indicator 3PSW- "fail closed" above. | |||
FTOOO1'. | |||
Digitl~ Display inlU~I unt. Controlrj KoUo on.)Ui5i t~eterencc .) | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 153 of 182 | |||
*.Failure Mode and Effects Ana ys . OK . ... .. . | |||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 3B Header Check Valve 3PSW-1 I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131 A-3.2 Effects on No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)()() | |||
System (7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure PSW normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed flow Possible allow SG pressure back to normally control valves, discovery by closed PSW flow control valves piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects. | |||
anomaly. | |||
3PSWVAO0I1 Provides a PSW - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 324 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD- 131 A-3.2) isolation feature SG 3B. indicated by through SG 3A (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator 3PSW- heat removal depending on specific FTO002'. event conditions). | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 3B SG. Refer to "fail SG 3B. indicator 3PSW- closed" above. | |||
FT0002'. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 154 of 182 | |||
:*'*"*': i~ ii '* * : Failure"'Mq'de, a*anlEffects Analysis ,Worksh-eet, -. i .-. ,.:. : , | |||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 2/28/12 RI. | |||
Equipment: PSW to U3 HPI Pump Mtr Bearing Coolers Chk Valve 3PSW-21 Rev. No. I Diagram: OFD- 131 A-3.2 N. Component FucinFailure Failure Mechanism Effects Train on and/or Method Meodt'aurof Failure No. Identification Mode Syilem Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical Failure N/A (PSW Event) N/A (PSW Event) | |||
Inadequate HPI Failure open while supplying HPI Motor Cooling as pump motor coolers from LPSW or None (PSW indicated by HPI HPSW backup could cause back Event) Pump Motor leakage to the PSW System and Bearing Cooling interrupt flow to the HPI Pump Back-Leakage Flow or Bearing motor coolers, rendering HPI pumps from LPSW or Temperature inoperable. Some recovery may be HPSW during Alarms - possible if immediate action is taken other events indications to close manual valves. | |||
Provides a PSW - available in the 3PSWVA0021 LPSW/HPSW Control Rooms' 325 (OFD- 131 A-3.2) and locally in the boundary isolation feature HPIP room. | |||
Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 3 HPI Pump HPI Pump Motor coolers can also to Unit 3 HPI motor bearing be supplied from the LPSW or pump motor flow/temperature HPSW System however this is not coolers alarms'. credited in a PSW event. | |||
unavailable Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 3 HPI Pump Depending on event and failure Travel to Unit 3 HPI motor bearing position, similar effects as described pump motor flow/temperature for "fail open" and "fail closed" coolers alarmst. could be expected. | |||
unavailable RI HPI Pump Motor Bearing Cooling Flow and upper / lower bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed to Unit 3 OAC (Reference 3.10). I | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 155 of 182 Failur~eModean Effects Ala~i 'orksheet ýiLX System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins S ubsy stem : N /A_D ate_:_9/2 2/11I Date : 9/22/I Equipment: PSW to SO 3A Flow Control Valve 3PSW-22 (Solenoid Operated Valve Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-3.2 Effects on No. Component Functi FFailure ailure Mechanism Train andor Method of No. Identification (3) Mode (5) System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)() | |||
System(8) ) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 3 (closing 3PSW-6 from MCR) or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 3PSW-8 to isolate control PSW as indicated by flow to the 3A SG). These actions flow to 3A Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown SG. indicator 3PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the FT0001s. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 3, flow would be restricted by normally closed High flow control to upstream and downstream valves. | |||
3PSWVA0022 326 the Fail Closed Mechanical or . Depending on event and (OFD13 1A3.2) Unit 3 A SG Electrical Failure Inability to Flow anomalies circumstances, adequate control of provide as indicated by flow to 3A / may be adequate PSW Control Room flow to 3A indicator 3PSW- possible by controlling 3PSW-23 SG. FT0001. flow control bypass or 3PSW-26 manual bypass. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control PSW Control Room isolate flow to 3A S/G as described flow to 3A indicator 3PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional SG. FTro flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
QSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 156 of 182 Failure Moade C * | |||
.JOUIa l | |||
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# + AC IVL4~R J'. | |||
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III # | |||
VT aV. -* X DIZ111 IT Subsystem: N/A Prepared by: William Watkins Equipment: PSW to SG 3A Flow Control Bvyass Valve 3PSW-23 (EMO Operated Date : 9/22/11 Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13 IA-3.2 Component FFailure Effects on Method of No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) | |||
System 7() | |||
(7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 3 (closing 3PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 3PSW-8 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the 3A SG). These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to 3A indicator 3PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FTromOI. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 3, flow would be restricted by normally closed 3PSWVA0023 Low flow control to upstream and downstream valves. | |||
327 the Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD-13 A-3.2) Unit 3 A SG Electrical Failure Inability to n ae circumstances, adequate control of cirumsancsideuatecotrobo control PSW Control Room PSW flow to 3A S/G may be flow to 3A indicator 3PSW- possible by controlling 3PSW-22 or SG. FTOOO11. manual bypass particularly true3PSW-26. | |||
early in theThis is event. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 3A Control Room isolate flow to 3A S/G as described SG. Indicator 3PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FTOOOI. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
Digita Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 157 of 182 | |||
*j,<,. .:., i 7 " | |||
..,*.' | |||
* w. Failur*eM de andMdEffects An is orksheet ,I. .'. | |||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem : _ __ N/ADate_9/22/11 Date : 9/22/IlI Equipment: PSW to SG 31 Flow Control Valve 3PSW-24 (Solenoid Operated Valve) | |||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A-3.2 Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | |||
_ (6) | |||
Fail Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Open Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 3 (closing 3PSW-6 from MCR or by Flow anomalies manually closing 3PSW-I0 to isolate Inability to as indicated by flow to the 3B SG) These actions control PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to 3B SG. indicator 3PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the FT0002'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 3, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | |||
328 3PSWVA3224 High flow control to Fail Mechanical or Depending on event and Fo nmle (OFD- 13 IA-3.2) the Unit 31 SG Closed Electrical Failure Inability to F anomales circumstances, adequate control provide Control Room of PSW flow to 3B S/G may be adequate PSW indicator 3PSW- possible by controlling 3PSW-25 flow to 3B SG. FT0002'. flow control bypass or 3PSW-28 Manual Bypass. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control PSW Control Room isolate flow to 3B S/G as described in"fail open" or provide additional flow to 3B SG. indicator 3PSW- flow as described in"fail closed" FT0002'. shown above. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UB I (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 158 of 182 rFailure Mode a nd Effets iýna*I DA Wo kshr Ie it , *g[ | |||
* System: Protected Service Water (PSW) | |||
Prepared by: / _William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 3B Flow Control Bypass Valve 3PSW-25 (EMO Operated Valve) | |||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A-3.2 CmoetFailure Effects on Method of No. Component Function Fire Failure Mechanism EfeTs on Methodo Identification Mode Train andor Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) ý..- (6) | |||
System (7) (8) | |||
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 3 (closing 3PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 3PSW-10 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to 3B SG). These actions will adequate PSW Control Room prevent unacceptable cooldown rates flow to 3B indicator 3PSW- due to excessive flow. In the event SG. FTO002'. of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 3, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves. | |||
329 (OFD- 131 A-3.2) the Unit 3 B SG Fail Closed Mechanical or Depending on event and Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by circumstances, adequate control of control P asControl Room PSW flow to 3B S/G may be flowto 3B indicator 3PSW- possible by controlling 3PSW-24 or so. FT0002'. 3PSW-28 Manual Bypass. This is particularly true early in the event. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 3B ControliRoom isolate flow to 3B S/G as described SG. indicator 3PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT0002'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above. | |||
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2). | Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2). | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 159 of 182 S~j ~Fa ilur'' lode and Efetse WAualyiy Workseet System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: _ _ _ N/A Date: 9/22/I I Equipment: 'A' HPI BWST Suction Valve 1,2.3HP-0024 (EMO Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 10I A- 1.3. 2.3. 3.3 Effects on Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of No. Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | |||
(6) (7__(_) | |||
Fail Mechanical or None (if Valve position This valve is normally closed to Open Electrical Failure aligned to indicator lights isolate the BWST from the HPI BWST) in MCR. pump suction. Failure in the open position during PSW operation would not have an effect if the HPI pumps were operating and aligned to the BWST. | |||
1,2,3HP VA0024 Swaps HPI suction Fail Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to align BWST to HPI 330 (OFD-IOIA-I.3, from the LDST to Closed Electrical Failure align BWST to indicator lights, pump suction from MCR. | |||
2.3, 3.3) the BWST HPl Pump flow anomalies, Depending on the event and Suction. pump indications circumstances, HP-24 or HP-25 may (over temp. etc) be opened using the Limitorque in MCR. operator handwheel. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Same as "fail Depending on valve position and Travel Electrical Failure align BWST to closed" percent open, consequences of "fail HPT Pump. open" and "fail closed" above are Suction. applicable. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 159 of 182 S~j ~Fa ilur'' lode and Efetse WAualyiy Workseet System: HPI System (PSW Interface) | |||
Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: | |||
_ _ _ N/A Date: 9/22/I I Equipment: | |||
'A' HPI BWST Suction Valve 1,2.3HP-0024 (EMO Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Same as "fail Depending on valve position and Travel Electrical Failure align BWST to closed" percent open, consequences of "fail HPT Pump. open" and "fail closed" above are Suction. applicable. | |||
The PSW electrical system provides an alternate power source to HP-24. This calculation only addresses the failure of HP-24 during a PSW event. | The PSW electrical system provides an alternate power source to HP-24. This calculation only addresses the failure of HP-24 during a PSW event. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 160 of | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 160 of 182 | |||
Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: | *FailureM~ode.andlEffects2 Analyss Worksheet : | ||
_NA Date: 9/22/I I Equipment: | System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: _NA Date: 9/22/I I Equipment: Train A' HPI Disch. Header Isolation Valve 1.2.3HP-0026 (EMO Valve¢ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- I 1A- 1.4, 2.4. 3.4 No. Copnn ucinFiue Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Effects on Mthdo Method of Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | ||
Train A' HPI Disch. Header Isolation Valve 1.2.3HP-0026 (EMO Valve¢ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- I | (6) | ||
Fail Open Mechanical or Inability to Valve position This normally closed valve controls Electrical Failure control flow to indicator lights, RCS injection from HPI through RCS system pressure Train 'A'. Inability to throttle the or flow valve may require shutdown of the indication in HPI pump. Some level of control MCR. may be possible using the Limitorque manual operator to throttle HP-26 or by closing HP-26 and manually opening / throttling HP-122. | |||
1,2,3HPVA0026 Provides full HPI Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Valve position This normally closed valve controls 331 (OFD-IOIA-l.4, 2.4. Injection flow to Electrical Failure establish flow indicator lights, RCS injection from HPI through flow Train 'A'. Inability to open the 3.4) System Loop A to RCS pumpanomalies, indications valve would require shutdown of the (over temp. etc) HPI pump. Some level of control in MCR. may be possible using the Limitorque manual operator to open/throttle HP-26 or by manually opening/throttling HP-I122. | |||
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Same as "fail Depending on valve position and Travel Electrical Failure control HPI closed" percent open, consequences of "fail full flow to open" and "fail closed" above are RCS. applicable. | |||
The PSW electrical system provides an alternate power source to HP-26. This calculation only addresses the failure of HP-26 during a PSW event. | The PSW electrical system provides an alternate power source to HP-26. This calculation only addresses the failure of HP-26 during a PSW event. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 161 of 182~.- | |||
Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 161 of 182 | ||
N/A | ~.- | ||
.:.* .*:- ..... Y , FailureMode andEffects.An .i" v W e*. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 162 of 182 Failure AnalyiseN System: HPI System (PSW Interface) | System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: 'William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/II Equipment: RCP Seal Flow Outlet Isolation Valve 1.2,3HP-0139 (EMO Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-. .A- 4-. 434 Effects on Component Failure . Method of Identification Function Failure Mechanism Train and/or Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (3) (5) System (7) | ||
Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: | (2) (4) 46) (8) | ||
N/A Date :92211 Equipment: | Fail Open Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely isolate HPI Electrical Failure control RCP indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Flow can be seal flow from RCP seal flow manually isolated using Limitorque HPI indication in handwheel or by manually closing MCR'. IHP-138. | ||
RCP Seal Flow Control Bypass Valve 1.2.3HP-0140 (EMO Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-101A-1.4. | This normally open Fail Closed Mechanical or None Valve position RCP seal flow can be controlled by valve shall be capable Electrical Failure indicator lights, throttling bypass valve IHP- 140 1,2,3HP VA0139 of being closed from (PSW event) RCP seal flow (this is credited during a PSW the MCR using PSW (OFD- 101 A-i .4, 2.4. power prior to re- indication in event). Therefore, there will be no 3.4) MCR1 . significant impact due to fail closed establishing seal during a PSW event. | ||
2.4. 3.4 Effects on Method or No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (8)(6)dnicain(Fail Open Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely control HPI Electrical Failure remotely indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Some control control HPI RCP seal flow may be possible by manually flow to RCP indication in operating the valve handwheel or by seals. MCR'. using the downstream individual RCP seal line throttle valves. Note that these actions are not credited to This normally closed mitigate PSW events.valve shall be capable Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely control HPI 1,2,3HP VA 0140 of being opened and Electrical Failure remotely indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Some control 333 (OFD-lO0A-1.4, 2.4, throttled from the control HPI RCP seal flow may be possible by manually 3.4) MCR using PSW flow to RCP indication in operating the valve or downstream power to re-establish seals. | injection via HP-140 (see Item 333 below) Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Although not credited, manual Travel Electrical Failure control RCP indicator lights, operation to close HP-I139 using the seal flow from RCP seal flow Limitorque operator or by manually HPI indication in closing I HP-138 if possible would MCR'. allow RCP seal flow control using HP-140. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 163 of 182 FailureMode and E .t.System: HPI System (PSW Interface) | 1,2.3HP-139 receives power from the PSW electrical system and is only credited for EMO operation in PSW events. Manual operation is credited in other events. | ||
Prepared by: .William Watkins Subsystem: | 1,2,3HPI-FT0075 (RCP Seal Injection Header Flow) alarms (STATALARM) in the respective control room. | ||
N/A Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: | |||
HPI PumDs (A & B Only)Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-IOIA-I.3. | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 162 of 182 Failure AnalyiseN System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date :92211 Equipment: RCP Seal Flow Control Bypass Valve 1.2.3HP-0140 (EMO Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-101A-1.4. 2.4. 3.4 Effects on Method or No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (8) | ||
2.3. 3.3 tFailure Failure Method of No. Component Function Mode Mechanism Effects on Train and/or System | (6)dnicain( | ||
(7))(8)Fail to Start Mechanical Inadequate Flow to RCS & RCP Control room or Seal Injection indicator light.Electrical Reduced or Failure Absent Flow /Pressure Indication in HPI Pump operation is credited in a MCR'. PSW event and Pumps 'A' or 'B'Fails During Mechanical Inadequate Flow to RCS & RCP Control Room receives alternate power from the Operation or Seal Injection Indicator Light. PSW electrical system. The pumps Electrical MCR Flow / are operated independently and I,2,3HPIPU000I HPI Pump Failure Pressure either pump can perform the design 1.2,3HPIPU0002 | Fail Open Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely control HPI Electrical Failure remotely indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Some control control HPI RCP seal flow may be possible by manually flow to RCP indication in operating the valve handwheel or by seals. MCR'. using the downstream individual RCP seal line throttle valves. Note that these actions are not credited to This normally closed mitigate PSW events. | ||
*A indication functions. | valve shall be capable Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely control HPI 1,2,3HP VA 0140 of being opened and Electrical Failure remotely indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Some control 333 (OFD-lO0A-1.4, 2.4, throttled from the control HPI RCP seal flow may be possible by manually 3.4) MCR using PSW flow to RCP indication in operating the valve or downstream power to re-establish seals. MCR1 . individual RCP seal line throttle seal injection valves (in conjunction with opening HP-139). Note that these actions are not credited to mitigate PSW events. | ||
Therefore redundancy 334D decreasing. | Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely control UPI Travel Electrical Failure remotely indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Similar effects as control HPI RCP seal flow "fail open or fail closed above" flow to RCP indication in seals. MCR'. | ||
exists with respect to the pumps.OFD-IOIA-.3. | 1,2,3H-P-140 receives power from the PSW electrical system and is only credited for EMO operation in PSW events. Manual operation is credited in other events. | ||
HPI Pump deHowever the PSW electrical system 2.3, 3.3 "B" Fails to stop Electrical Possible RCS overpress. | ' 1,2,3HPI-FT0075 (RCP Seal Injection Header Flow) alarms (STATALARM) in the respective control room. | ||
Control Room is not single failure proof and an on command Failure Pump failure to stop on Indicator Light. electrical failure within the system command could be mitigated by Indication of (See Item # I, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, closing downstream isolation continued flow / 27) could restrict pump operations valves. This would stop HPI pressure in in which case the SSF RCMU injection and possibly seal MCR'. Pump would be used.cooling. The HPI pump's minimum flow will protect the HPI pumps by flowing through the LDST and back to the HPI pump suction header.'HPI Injection Flow and Seal Injection Flow are monitored and alarmed in the respective control room (reference 3.10, Section 4.4) | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 164 of 182~>Failure Node-a System: RCS System (PSW Interface) | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 163 of 182 FailureMode and E .t. | ||
System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: . William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: HPI PumDs (A & B Only) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-IOIA-I.3. 2.3. 3.3 tFailure Failure Method of No. ()Identification Component Function Mode Mode(4 Mechanism Effects on Train and/or System (Mech)aetetio Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1I)() (3) ()(5) (6) Detection() | |||
N/A Equipment: | (7))(8) | ||
RC HIot Leg and Vessel High Point Vent Valves | Fail to Start Mechanical Inadequate Flow to RCS & RCP Control room or Seal Injection indicator light. | ||
2.1, 3. / Provides a vent level etc) shown in and inability to use valve in its design path to exhaust MCR. function during a PSW event. PSW Series Isolation B Hot non-condensible electrical system provides alternate power.Leg High Point Vents gases and/or 335 1,2.3RCVA0157 steam from the 1,2,3RCVA0158 RCS that could Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Failure of either valve in the closed OFD-IOOA-I. | Electrical Reduced or Failure Absent Flow / | ||
Pressure Indication in HPI Pump operation is credited in a MCR'. PSW event and Pumps 'A' or 'B' Fails During Mechanical Inadequate Flow to RCS & RCP Control Room receives alternate power from the Operation or Seal Injection Indicator Light. PSW electrical system. The pumps Electrical MCR Flow / are operated independently and I,2,3HPIPU000I HPI Pump Failure Pressure either pump can perform the design 1.2,3HPIPU0002 *A indication functions. Therefore redundancy 334D decreasing. exists with respect to the pumps. | |||
/, 2.1. 3. 1 indicated in MCR General comments on operability of RC vent valves. Although not credited for single failure during a PSW event, failure affecting one set of valves may still allow operability using the other sets for letdown and the unaffected loop for heat removal through natural circulation. | OFD-IOIA-.3. HPI Pump deHowever the PSW electrical system 2.3, 3.3 "B" Fails to stop Electrical Possible RCS overpress. Control Room is not single failure proof and an on command Failure Pump failure to stop on Indicator Light. electrical failure within the system command could be mitigated by Indication of (See Item # I, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, closing downstream isolation continued flow / 27) could restrict pump operations valves. This would stop HPI pressure in in which case the SSF RCMU injection and possibly seal MCR'. Pump would be used. | ||
Unavailability of all 3 sets during a PSW event due to single failure in the PSW electrical system (See Item # 83, 84, 94, 107, 108, 109 for Unit I, 125, 127, 132, 145, 150, 151 for Unit 2, 169, 170, 182, 192, 193, 194 for Unit 3) would remove/ render the PSW System unavailable (removing letdown capability affects the HPI injection | cooling. The HPI pump's minimum flow will protect the HPI pumps by flowing through the LDST and back to the HPI pump suction header. | ||
/ RCP seal injection and removing venting capability would affect natural circulation and S/G heat removal operations). | 'HPI Injection Flow and Seal Injection Flow are monitored and alarmed in the respective control room (reference 3.10, Section 4.4) | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 165 of 182 and -,-As2nal's jWol~heet& | |||
System: PSW (Pump Room Ventilation) | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 164 of 182 | ||
Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: | ~>Failure Node-a System: RCS System (PSW Interface) | ||
N/ADate: 9/22/Il Equipment: | Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/1I Equipment: RC HIot Leg and Vessel High Point Vent Valves Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-IOOA- 1.I. 2.1. 3.1 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) | ||
PSW Pump Room Ventilation Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-1 16G-3.1 Effects on | Series Isolation A Hot Fail Open Mechanical or Uncontrolled RCS RCS pressure Valves are in series and both are required Leg High Point Vents Electrical Depressurization indication, valve to establish a vent path therefore a single 1-ihPntV ents Failure position indication, failure at the actual valves would not lead 1.2,3RCVA0155 (both valves in or other RCS to uncontrolled venting. Loss of electrical 1,2,3RCVA0156 series fail open) indications (PZR power would result in valve failing closed OFD-IOOA-I.1. 2.1, 3. / Provides a vent level etc) shown in and inability to use valve in its design path to exhaust MCR. function during a PSW event. PSW Series Isolation B Hot non-condensible electrical system provides alternate power. | ||
Leg High Point Vents gases and/or 335 1,2.3RCVA0157 steam from the 1,2,3RCVA0158 RCS that could Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Failure of either valve in the closed OFD-IOOA-I. 1.2.1, 3. inhibit natural Electrical perform venting indication, no RCS position would restrict the ability to vent circulation core Failure system response as from the respective loop or from the cooling indicated in MCR vessel. | |||
PSW 336 OFD- I 16G-3.1 environment in the (Not Electrical Failure (Not / or Booster Pump pump room will quickly exceed PSW Pump Room Running) Running) Bearing allowable temperatures resulting Temperature in equipment shutdown and/or Alarms' in MCR. damage.From a mechanical perspective, the only credible failure would occur at the PSW Pump Room fan. A single failure in the associated electrical power or start circuit would render the fan inoperable (See Items 133, 149, 171). There is no capability to operate the PSW System without pump room ventilation. | Reactor Vessel High Fail Mid- Mechanical Inability (or Valve position Mechanical failure is the only credible Point Vents Travel Failure restricted ability) indication, means for a mid-travel failure. | ||
Furthermore, continued operation of equipment within the PSW Pump Room (particularly the primary and booster pump) without ventilation operable could rapidly result in heat up of the pump room and immediate adjacent areas beyond design basis temperatures. | 1,2.3RCVA0159 to perform venting, unexpected RCS Uncontrolled venting would not occur due 1,2.3RCVAO160 response as to single failure (i.e. valves in series). | ||
Temperature effects due to operation of the PSW primary and booster pump without ventilation has not been analyzed.'The PSW Primary Pump and Booster Pump motor inboard and motor outboard bearings as well as the pump inboard and pump outboard bearings are monitored and alarm to the Unit 2 OAC. The alarms have an "alarm" and "shutdown setpoint. | OFD-IOOA-I /, 2.1. 3.1 indicated in MCR General comments on operability of RC vent valves. Although not credited for single failure during a PSW event, failure affecting one set of valves may still allow operability using the other sets for letdown and the unaffected loop for heat removal through natural circulation. Unavailability of all 3 sets during a PSW event due to single failure in the PSW electrical system (See Item # 83, 84, 94, 107, 108, 109 for Unit I, 125, 127, 132, 145, 150, 151 for Unit 2, 169, 170, 182, 192, 193, 194 for Unit 3) would remove/ render the PSW System unavailable (removing letdown capability affects the HPI injection / RCP seal injection and removing venting capability would affect natural circulation and S/G heat removal operations). | ||
Therefore in the event of PSW Pump Room ventilation failure, operators will have warnings to allow action to prevent equipment damage (Reference 3.2). | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 166 of 182 Failu're Mode and Effets Analy, is Vork~heet System: Protected Service Water (PSW)Subsystem: | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 165 of 182 and -,-As2nal's jWol~heet& | ||
N/A | System: PSW (Pump Room Ventilation) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/ADate: 9/22/Il Equipment: PSW Pump Room Ventilation Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-1 16G-3.1 Effects on Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train Method of Failure No. Mode and/or Detection Remarks and Other Effects (o. Identification (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | ||
PSW Building Heating and Ventilation Diagram: OFD-lI 16M-1.8 | (6) | ||
System (8)cio (2) (4) (6) (7) (8)PSW Building Safety Fail Mechanical or Building Temperature Limited effect except in "fail on" Related Heating and Running Electrical Failure Overheat Alarm (Control of heaters during hot conditions. | Fail On Electrical Failure Electrical None No Effect Failure Maintains (Running) | ||
Ventilation Room OAC)'Various Fans, Mechanical or No Temperature Dampers, Heater Fail to Start Ventilation Alarm (Control PSW System inoperable without Coils, Fan Motors Maintains acceptable Electrical Failure (overheat) | OPSWAHEF009 acceptable Fail Off Mechanical or Fail Off PSW Primary and PSW System Inoperable. PSW 336 OFD- I 16G-3.1 environment in the (Not Electrical Failure (Not / or Booster Pump pump room will quickly exceed PSW Pump Room Running) Running) Bearing allowable temperatures resulting Temperature in equipment shutdown and/or Alarms' in MCR. damage. | ||
Room OAC)' PSW building heat / ventilation. | From a mechanical perspective, the only credible failure would occur at the PSW Pump Room fan. A single failure in the associated electrical power or start circuit would render the fan inoperable (See Items 133, 149, 171). There is no capability to operate the PSW System without pump room ventilation. | ||
337sFa envrMiromntains aethbe Mecanca.o 337 Train A environment in the Failure No Temperature PSW Building During Mechanical or Ventilation Alarm (Control PSW System inoperable without Operation Electrical Failure Roo OA PSW building heat / ventilation.(Redundant trains) Fl f A failure of a single component in OFD-1 16M-1.8 au 0 Mechanical or Inadequate Teither Train A or Train B QA- I Individual Electrical Failure Ventilation Room AC)r Ventilation System should not Components Room defeat the ventilation function.tnc raw Builuing rteaing and ventiuation is not single railure proorano failure unoeruesign conauttonswouiu renaeruie rPw System moperaole. | Furthermore, continued operation of equipment within the PSW Pump Room (particularly the primary and booster pump) without ventilation operable could rapidly result in heat up of the pump room and immediate adjacent areas beyond design basis temperatures. Temperature effects due to operation of the PSW primary and booster pump without ventilation has not been analyzed. | ||
Ine rw ouiding neaung and ventilation system can meet its design function with only one of two trains operable however redundancy was included in the design only to maintain system availability during maintenance on one train. Due to the high degree of redundancy and robust design, the system is likely to retain some level of operability in most conditions following failure of any single component. | 'The PSW Primary Pump and Booster Pump motor inboard and motor outboard bearings as well as the pump inboard and pump outboard bearings are monitored and alarm to the Unit 2 OAC. The alarms have an "alarm" and "shutdown setpoint. Therefore in the event of PSW Pump Room ventilation failure, operators will have warnings to allow action to prevent equipment damage (Reference 3.2). | ||
In some cases, failure in the associated electrical power system would prevent the system from operating (See Item No. 58, 60 and 61)One temperature transmitter is located in each PSW battery room and one is located in the (common) transformer area. These transmitters alarm to the OAC and are detailed in OSC-9689, Rev. 0. Other methods of detection include discovery during operator rounds.Note that the PSW building air conditioning system is non-safety related and is not credited for PSW operation. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 166 of 182 Failu're Mode and Effets Analy, is Vork~heet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW Building Heating and Ventilation Rev. No. 0-Diagram: OFD-lI 16M-1.8 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Identification (I)()()()(5) Mode System Detection Remarks and(8)cio Other Effects (2) (4) (6) (7) (8) | |||
PSW Building Safety Fail Mechanical or Building Temperature Limited effect except in "fail on" Related Heating and Running Electrical Failure Overheat Alarm (Control of heaters during hot conditions. | |||
Ventilation Room OAC)' | |||
Various Fans, Mechanical or No Temperature Dampers, Heater Fail to Start Ventilation Alarm (Control PSW System inoperable without Coils, Fan Motors Maintains acceptable Electrical Failure (overheat) Room OAC)' PSW building heat / ventilation. | |||
337sFa envrMiromntains aethbe Mecanca.o 337 Train A environment in the Failure No Temperature PSW Building During Mechanical or Ventilation Alarm (Control PSW System inoperable without Operation Electrical Failure Roo OA PSW building heat / ventilation. | |||
(Redundant trains) Fl f A failure of a single component in OFD-1 16M-1.8 au 0 Mechanical or Inadequate Teither Train A or Train B QA- I Individual Electrical Failure Ventilation Room AC)r Ventilation System should not Components Room OAC)* defeat the ventilation function. | |||
tnc raw Builuing rteaing and ventiuation is not single railure proorano failure unoeruesign conauttonswouiu renaeruie rPw System moperaole. Ine rw ouiding neaung and ventilation system can meet its design function with only one of two trains operable however redundancy was included in the design only to maintain system availability during maintenance on one train. Due to the high degree of redundancy and robust design, the system is likely to retain some level of operability in most conditions following failure of any single component. In some cases, failure in the associated electrical power system would prevent the system from operating (See Item No. 58, 60 and 61) | |||
One temperature transmitter is located in each PSW battery room and one is located in the (common) transformer area. These transmitters alarm to the OAC and are detailed in OSC-9689, Rev. 0. Other methods of detection include discovery during operator rounds. | |||
Note that the PSW building air conditioning system is non-safety related and is not credited for PSW operation. | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 167 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects A.,nalysis W.6rsheet. | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 167 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects A.,nalysis W.6rsheet. | ||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to HPI Pump CoolinE Filters (Cuno Filters) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-l31A-1.2. 2.2, 3.2 No. opoetFunction Component aiue Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Effects on Method of Failure Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8) | ||
N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: | (6) | ||
PSW to HPI Pump CoolinE Filters (Cuno Filters) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-l31A-1.2. | Plugging Mechanical Loss of or Inadequate HPI HPI Pump Motor coolers can reduced Motor Cooling as also be supplied from the cooling to indicated by HPI LPSW or I-PSW System HPI motor Pump Motor however this is not credited in a coolers Bearing Cooling PSW event. | ||
2.2, 3.2 | Flow or Bearing Temperature Alarms - indications 1,2,3PSW-FLOOOI available inthe 3P8 Filter PSW water to Control Rooms' and OFD-131A- HPI motor coolers. locally in the HPIP 1.2. 2.2, 3.2 room. | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 168 of 182 , .... .Failure | Leakage Mechanical Same a "Plugging" HPI Pump Motor coolers can above also be supplied from the LPSW or -PSW System however this is not credited ina PSW event. | ||
_ N/A Date : 9/22/1 1 Equipment: | RCP Motor Bearing Cooling Flow and upper / lower bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed to respective Unit OAC (Reference 3.10 HPI DBD). | ||
_ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure | |||
PSW Electrical System Date: I/1 8/2012 Equipment: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 168 of 182 | ||
B6T-8. B7T-3(5), PSWLXPX13-IA(IC). | , .... .Failure | ||
XPSW-2B(4B)(4C) | - ."e:" Analysis Mode and Effects, I.:. | ||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_0-6700, 0-6707, 0-6707-01* Effects on Method of No. | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: _ N/A Date : 9/22/1 1 Equipment: _ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: | ||
()Mode (5 | Effects on Method of No. Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) | ||
-IA Spare N/A (0-6707)404 PSWLXPXI3 | (6) (7) (_ ) | ||
-IC Spare N/A (0-6707)405 XPSW -2B Spare N/A.__ (0-6707-01) 406 XPSW -4B Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 407 XPSW -4C Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 1 OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 170 of 182 FailureModeand Effects Analy~is Worksheet | 339 through Not Used 399 | ||
PSW Electrical System _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 169 of 182 Failure Mode and Efet nlsi okhe System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: I/1 8/2012 Equipment: B6T-8. B7T-3(5), PSWLXPX13-IA(IC). XPSW-2B(4B)(4C) Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_0-6700, 0-6707, 0-6707-01 | ||
XPSW-5C(5D), | *Effects on Method of No. | ||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01. | (o. Component Identification Function | ||
0-6701 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure | ()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism (5 TrainytmDtcin and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1)(2) M3)de4 (5) .System Detection Rmrs (8) | ||
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: | (2)_(4) (6) (7) O rf 400 B6T-8 Spare N/A | ||
fPSW Electrical System Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: | _ _ (0-6700) 401 B7T-3 Spare N/A (0-6700) 402 B7T-5 Spare N/A (0-6700) 403 PSWLXPX13 - IA Spare N/A (0-6707) 404 PSWLXPXI3 - IC Spare N/A (0-6707) 405 XPSW - 2B Spare N/A | ||
IXPSW-5D(5E). | . __ (0-6707-01) 406 XPSW -4B Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 407 XPSW - 4C Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 1 | ||
I KPSW-6(7)(8) 2XPSWA-2C(3B)(3C) | |||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-670 1, 0-6704, 0-6702 | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 170 of 182 FailureModeand Effects Analy~is Worksheet : | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 172 of 182 System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:.., PSW Electrical System _ _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:. PSW Electrical System _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: XPSW-5C(5D), IXPSW-2A(2C)(3B)(5A)(5B)(5C) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01. 0-6701 Effects on Method of No. Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) | ||
2XPSWB-4B(5D), 2KPSW-6(8), 3XPSW-2B(2D)(4D)(5B) | (6) (7) 408 XPSW - 5C Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 409 XPSW- 5D Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 410 1XPSW-2A Spare N/A (0-6701) 411 1XPSW - 2C Spare N/A (0-6701) 412 IXPSW-3B Spare N/A (0-6701) 413 IXPSW-5A Spare N/A (0-6701) 414 1XPSW - 5B Spare N/A (0-6701) 1 1 415 1XPSW.- 5C Spare N/A (0-6701) 1 | ||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702, 0-6705, 0-6703 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure | |||
()()(6) (7) (8) | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 171 of 182 de Eali. AnalysisMorksheet. | ||
PSW Electrical System | dkffe~cts System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: fPSW Electrical System Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: IXPSW-5D(5E). I KPSW-6(7)(8) 2XPSWA-2C(3B)(3C) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-670 1, 0-6704, 0-6702 No. Component FucinFailure Failure Mechanism *Effects Train on and/or Failureof Method Identification Function Mode Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) | ||
3XPSW-5C(5D). | (6) (7) __ | ||
3KPSW-6(8), PSWLXDCOI-3BI(3B2)(3B8) | 416 IXPSW 5D Spare N/A (0-6701) 417 ]XPSW--5E Spare N/A (0-6701) 418 IKPSW-6 Spare N/A (0-6704) 419 IKPSW-7 Spare N/A (0-6704) 420 I KPSW - 8 Spare N/A (0-6704) 421 2XPSWA - 2C Spare N/A (0-6702) 422 2XPSWA - 3B Spare N/A (0-6702) 423 2XPSWA - 3C Spare N/A (0-6702) | ||
-3 B 1 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 437 PSWLXDCOI | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 172 of 182 System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:.., PSW Electrical System _ _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: 2XPSWB-4B(5D), 2KPSW-6(8), 3XPSW-2B(2D)(4D)(5B) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702, 0-6705, 0-6703 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure 1)(2) Identification (3) Mode (4) (5) System Detection(8 Remarks and Other Effects | ||
-31B2 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 438 PSWLXDCOI | ()()(6) (7) (8) 2XPSWB - 4B Spare N/A 424 (0-6702) 425 2XPSWB 51D Spare N/A (0-6702) 426 2KPSW - 6 Spare N/A (0-6705) 427 2KPSW - 8 Spare N/A (0-6705) 428 3XPSW - 2B Spare N/A | ||
-3 B8 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 1 1 OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 174 of 182..> >Faiilure Mode and An-,sTl Yorksee | - _ (0-6703) 429 3XPSW - 2D Spare N/A (0-6703) 430 3XPSW - 4D Spare N/A (0-6703) 431 3XPSW - 5B Spare N/A 431___ | ||
PSW Electrical System :1 | _ (0 -6703) N/A | ||
PSWPL | |||
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 173 of 182 11 ý, | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 175 of 182 Failure Mode D #- # .4 C " U/ f. DC11/1.,33t lla l. | I k- . I I.: , Failure, "Aloile'aiinid Effects Aniýýýkw6rksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) II Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: .1/18/2012 Equipment: 3XPSW-5C(5D). 3KPSW-6(8), PSWLXDCOI-3BI(3B2)(3B8) | ||
PSW Electrical System Equipment: | Rev. No. 0 Diagram: . | ||
PSWPL2DC Breakers 5.7.9,10,11, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24 Diagram: 0-6700-02 | 0-6701 O-6706 O-Ai7nQ-n I | ||
PSWPL2DC -7 N/A | ..... I ..... I ....... | ||
Comonnt aiur Effects on Method of No. Identification Component Function Mode Failure Failure Mechanism Tri"ndo Train and/or aiueRemarks and Other Effects Failure (4) (5) System Detection (8) | |||
- | (I) (2) (3) | ||
Spe 456 PSWPL2DC -24 N/A (0-6700-02) | (6) "_(7) (8) 432 3XPSW - 5C Spare N/A (0-6703) 433 3XPSW- 5D Spare N/A (0-6703) 434 3KPSW-6 Spare N/A (0-6706) 435 3KPSW- 8 Spare N/A (0-6706) 436 PSWLXDCOI - 3 B 1 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 437 PSWLXDCOI - 31B2 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 438 PSWLXDCOI - 3 B8 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 1 1 | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 176 of 182 Failure Mode and'Effects She.System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: | |||
PSW Electrical System | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 174 of 182 | ||
.. > >Faiilure Mode and *ffects An-,sTl Yorksee tt* | |||
S 458 | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date :1 1/1:8/2012 Equipment: PSWPL IDC- !0(11 )( 12)(I 5)(16)(22)(23)(24) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No. Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) | ||
-10 N/A (0-6700-03) 463 I PSWPL2DC -I I N/A (0-6700-03) 464 | (6) (7) 439 PSWPLIDC- 10 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 440 PSWPLI DC - I I Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 441 PSWPLIDC- 12 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 442 PSWPLIDC- 15 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 443 PSWPL IDC - 16 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 444 PSWPLIDC-22 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 445 PSWPLIDC - 23 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 446 PSWPLIDC-24 Spare N/A | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 177 of 182 Failure"M d.A ayivokh System: Protected Service Water (PSW)Subsystem: | , (0-6700-02) | ||
....... PSW Electrical System | |||
Equipment: | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 175 of 182 Failure Mode D #- # .4 C " U/ f. DC11/1 | ||
I PSWPL2DC | .,33t lla U l. ýL.tt | ||
-16 N/A (0-6700-03) 469 | ý " i iv otý a i. a Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: PSWPL2DC Breakers 5.7.9,10,11, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No. Component Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects Identification (1) (2) (3)(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 178 of 182 , Fai"ur e and Effects"Ana'l& | PSWPL2DC - 5 N/A 4487 (0-6700-02) | ||
ors et;System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:. | SP2D SpareN/ | ||
PSW Electrical System_ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: | 448Spr PSWPL2DC - 7 N/A (0-6700-02) 449 PSWPL2DC - 9 N/A 450 PSWPL2DC (0-6700-02) - 1 Spr Spare (0-6700-02) 452 PSWPL2DC- 10 N/A (0-6700-02)re 452 PSWPL2DC-212 (0-6700-02) Sar N/A 453 PSWPL2DC - 22 N/A (0-6700-02) | ||
2PSWPL2DC Breakers 8 thru 16 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)(4) (5) (6) (7)477 2PSWPL2DC | N/A 455 454 PSWPL2DC- --223 PSWPL2DC N/A | ||
-8 N/A (0-6700-03) 478 2PSWPL2DC | _______(0-6700-02) | ||
-9 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 479 2PSWPL2DC | (0-6700-02) Spe 456 PSWPL2DC - 24 N/A (0-6700-02) | ||
-10 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 480 2PSWPL2DC | |||
-II Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 481 2PSWPL2DC | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 176 of 182 Failure Mode and'Effects A.A*" She. | ||
-12 N/A (0-6700-03) 482 2PSWPL2DC | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System ________ | ||
-13 rN/A (0-6700-03) 483 2PSWPL2DC-14 N/A (0-6700-03) | Equipment: IPSWPL2DC Breakers 3.4,5.8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 De: N Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No. Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection R a r | ||
((2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 457 I PSWPL2DC - 3 N/A (0-6700-03) S 458 IPSWPL2DC - 4 N/A (0-6700-03) 459 1PSWPL2DC - 5 N/A (0-6700-03) 460 I PSWPL2DC - 8 N/A (0-6700-03) 461 I PSWPL2DC - 9 N/A (0-6700-03) 462 IPSWPL2DC -10 N/A (0-6700-03) 463 I PSWPL2DC - I I N/A (0-6700-03) 464 1PSWPL2DC - 12 N/A (0-6700-03) 465 I PSWPL2DC - 13 N/A (0-6700-03) 466 1PSWPL2DC - 14 N/A | |||
-15 N/A (0-6700-03) | - (0-6700-03) | ||
Spare 485 2PSWPL2DC-16 N/A (0-6700-03) | |||
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 177 of 182 Failure"M d.A ayivokh System: Protected Service Water (PSW) | |||
........... | Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: .......PSW Electrical System Date : 1/182012...... | ||
PSW Electrical System Equipment: | Breakers 15 thru 24 Equipment: I PSWPL2DC Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection | ||
2PSWPL2DC Breakers 17 thru 24 Diagram: 0-6700-03 | ((2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 467 1PSWPL2DC - 15S N/A (0-6700-03) 468 IPSWPL2DC - 16 N/A (0-6700-03) 469 1PSWPL2DC - 17 N/A (0-6700-03) 470 IPSWPL2DC - 18 N/A (0-6700-03) 471 I PSWPL2DC - 19 N/A (0-6700-03) 472 1PSWPL2DC - 20 N/A (0-6700-03) 473 I PSWPL2DC - 21 N/A | ||
-17 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 487 2PSWPL2DC | - (0-6700-03) 474 IPSWPL2DC - 22 N/A (0-6700-03) 475 IPSWPL2DC- 23 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 476 I PSWPL2DC - 24 N/A (0-6700-03) | ||
-18 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 488 2PSWPL2DC-19 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 489 2PSWPL2DC | |||
-20 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 490 2PSWPL2DC | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 178 of 182 | ||
-21 N/A 491 2PSWPL2DC | , Fai"ur e M,*de and Effects"Ana'l& ors et; System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:. PSW Electrical System_ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: 2PSWPL2DC Breakers 8 thru 16 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8) | ||
-22 N/A (0-6700-03) 492 2PSWPL2DC | (4) (5) (6) (7) 477 2PSWPL2DC - 8 N/A (0-6700-03) 478 2PSWPL2DC - 9 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 479 2PSWPL2DC - 10 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 480 2PSWPL2DC - II Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 481 2PSWPL2DC - 12 N/A (0-6700-03) 482 2PSWPL2DC - 13 rN/A (0-6700-03) 483 2PSWPL2DC- 14 N/A Spare (0-6700-03) 484 2PSWPL2DC - 15 N/A (0-6700-03) Spare 485 2PSWPL2DC- 16 N/A (0-6700-03) Spr | ||
-23 N/A (0-6700-03) 493 2PSWPL2DC | |||
-24 N/ | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 179 of 182 Failure Mo6de andlfcts Anal . Wo'rkshee 0 | ||
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 180 of 182 an.Failure | System Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: ........... | ||
_PSW Electrical System _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: | PSW Electrical System Date: 1/18/2012 Equipment: 2PSWPL2DC Breakers 17 thru 24 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No. ComponentiFunction Failure Failure Effects on Train "Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7(8) 486 2PSWPL2DC - 17 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 487 2PSWPL2DC - 18 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 488 2PSWPL2DC- 19 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 489 2PSWPL2DC -20 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 490 2PSWPL2DC - 21 N/A 491 2PSWPL2DC - 22 N/A (0-6700-03) 492 2PSWPL2DC - 23 N/A (0-6700-03) 493 2PSWPL2DC - 24 N/A | ||
3PSWPL2DC Breakers 3.4.5.8.9,10.11 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure | _ (0-6700-03) | ||
-3 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 495 3 PSWPL2DC -4 N/A (0-6700-03) 496 3PSWPL2DC | |||
-Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 497 3PSWPL2DC | OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 180 of 182 | ||
-8 N/A (0-6700-03) 498 3PSWPL2DC | *dEffectsA"naly Mode an.Failure qWorks ee. | ||
-9 N/A (0-6700-03) 499 3PSWPL2DC | System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: _PSW Electrical System _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: 3PSWPL2DC Breakers 3.4.5.8.9,10.11 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Effects on Method of No. C) Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism (5 Train and/or Failure (1I) Identification (2) (3) Mode (4) (5) SytmDtcin ystem Detection(8 Remarks and Other Effects (6) (7)((8) 494 3PSWPL2DC - 3 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 495 3 PSWPL2DC - 4 N/A (0-6700-03) 496 3PSWPL2DC - Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 497 3PSWPL2DC - 8 N/A (0-6700-03) 498 3PSWPL2DC - 9 N/A (0-6700-03) 499 3PSWPL2DC - 10 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 500 3PSWPL2DC - I I N/A (0-6700-03) Spare | ||
-10 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 500 3PSWPL2DC | |||
-I I N/A (0-6700-03) | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 181 of 182 | ||
..Falure'Modeand Efects Analysis Worksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:.PSW Electrical System Date: 1/18/2012 Equipment: 3PSWPL2DC Breakers 12 thru 19 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Effects on Method of No. () Identification Component ()Mode Function Failure (5 Failure Mechanism TrainytmDtcin and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) | |||
3PSWPL2DC Breakers 12 thru 19 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism | System (7) | ||
Detection (8) 502 3PSWPL2DC- 12 N/A (0-6700-03) 502 3PSWPL2DC - 13 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) . | |||
-13 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) | 503 3PSWPL2DC- 14 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 504 3PSWPL2DC - 15 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 505 3PSWPL2DC- 16 N/A (0-6700-03) 506 3PSWPL2DC - 17 N/A Spare (0-6700-03) 507 3PSWPL2DC - 18 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 508 3PSWPL2DC- 19 N/A (0-6700-03) | ||
Spare | |||
-15 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 505 3PSWPL2DC-16 N/A (0-6700-03) 506 3PSWPL2DC | |||
-17 N/A Spare (0-6700-03) 507 3PSWPL2DC | OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 182 of 182 | ||
-18 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 508 3PSWPL2DC-19 N/A (0-6700-03) | .Vi Falu&re Mode and Effects A a ss rkshe:,t System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by:: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_ Date: 1/18/2012 Equipment: 3PSWPL2DC Breakers 20 thru 24 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 N. Component FucinFailure Failure Mechanism Effects Train on and/or Failureof Method No. Identification Function Mode (5) Systes Dete Remarks and Other Effects | ||
Spare OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 182 of 182.Vi Falu&re Mode and Effects A a ss rkshe:,t System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by:: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: | (!) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection() | ||
PSW Electrical System_ Date: 1/18/2012 Equipment: | (6) (7)((8) 509 3PSWPL2DC - 20 N/A (0-6700-03) 510 3PSWPL2DC - 21 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 511 3PSWPL2DC - 22 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 512 3PSWPL2DC - 23 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 513 3PSWPL2DC - 24 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) | ||
3PSWPL2DC Breakers 20 thru 24 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 | |||
(6) (7)((8)509 3PSWPL2DC | Attachment (1) - OE Search Results The OE Search Results information is available for inspection onsite at the Oconee Nuclear Station. | ||
-20 N/A (0-6700-03) 510 3PSWPL2DC | |||
-21 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 511 3PSWPL2DC | |||
-22 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 512 3PSWPL2DC | |||
-23 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 513 3PSWPL2DC | |||
-24 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) | |||
Attachment (1) -OE Search Results The OE Search Results information is available for inspection onsite at the Oconee Nuclear Station. | |||
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis For Standby. Shutdown Facility}} | Failure Modes and Effects Analysis For Standby. Shutdown Facility}} | ||
Latest revision as of 12:08, 10 March 2020
| ML12080A200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/29/2012 |
| From: | Watkins W Duke Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| OSC-10008, Rev 1 | |
| Download: ML12080A200 (218) | |
Text
CALCULATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT (CIA)
Station / Unit Oconee 1 / 2/3 Calculation No. OSC-10008 Rev. I Page _
PIP No. (if applicable) Originated By W.H. Watkins 740A ate 2/28QO12 Prob. No. (stress & s/r use only) Checked By W.E. Thomas , Date 2/28/2012 NEDL reviewed to identify calculations? 0 Yes El No Note: a NEDL search is NOT required for calculation originations (i.e., Rev. 0)
Identify in the blocks below, the groups consulted for an Impact Assessment of this calculation.
Indiv. Contacted/Date Indiv. Contacted/Date El Syis El NGO t.rower, I AXL, Primary, L.t:lion Al Lspw*cUoIn, Reactor, BOP.] Safety Analysis, Nuclear Fuel Mgmt & Design, Corporate Design Support, Fuel Mech. & T/H Analysis, Nuclear Design]
r PCE
[Mech. Comp., Elec. Comp, Programs]
[] DES
[Mechanical Engr., Electrical Engr., Civil Engr.] I' Training r[ Local IT El Operations - OPS Support r Regulatory Compliance El Maintenance - Tech. Support r Chemistry r Work Control - Program. Supp. r Radiation Protection N Other Group DBG Allen Park 2/28/12 r No Group required to be consulted Listed below are the identified documents (ex: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS, UFSAR SECTIONS, DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS, STATION PROCEDURES*, DRAWINGS, OTHER CALCULATIONS, ETC.)
that may require revision as a result of the calculation origination or revision, the document owner/group and the change required (including any necessary PIP Corrective Actions).
- Note:Any design changes, which requirechanges to Station Procedures,must be transmittedas DesignDeliverable Documents.
DOCUMENT GROUP CHANGE REQUIRED (Attach Additional Sheets As Required)
Page i
Form 101.1 (R02-12' d CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number: Oconee 1 /2 13 Revision No.: 1 Title of Calculation: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System
- Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Numbers OSC-1 0008 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No[] TYPE I: Yes [I No 0 QA CONDITION of items covered: 1 Microfiche Attachment List Yes El No [K (See Form 101.4) DSD List Yes E-1 No N (See Form 101.7)
Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (Vol.) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 4 iii (Form 101.1) ii (Form 101.1) i (CIA Form) 3 (Form 101.2) 3 (Form 101.2) 7 7 10 thru 12 10 thru 12 15 15 17 thru 25 17 thru 25 27 27 App. A, Page 1, App. A, Page 1, 2, 19, 23, 31,34, 2, 19, 23,31, 34, 106, 115,138, 106, 115,138, 146,154 146,154 The signatures below certify that this calculation has been originated, checked, inspected and approved in accordance with established procedures.
Originated By: W. H. Watkins W4 7dtt,- Date: 2129/2012 Checked By: W.E. Thomas Date: 2/29/2012 Verification Method: Method 1 1K Method 2 E Method 3 Other []
Date: 221 I?
Approved By: oe I Cfrks on - - Recive .
Issued Received to DCRM: E)ate:-_____ by DCRM:__________ Date:
Complete the Spaces Below for Documentation of Multiple Originators (Orig.) or Checkers (Chk)
Pages: ?---v wo, 2. Cl'a s OtL./Gir. ,L.rwdDate:Z-/2!-1 YTP*
ga Verif. Method Inl 2E] 3E1 OtherEl Chk.: Date:
Pages: At( A t.Pipate: iY/zZ/i-.
Verif. Method 1[-- 2E] 3F] Other[:] Chk.: Date:
Page ii
Form 101.1 (R02-12)
CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number: Oconee 112 / 3 Revision No.:
Title of Calculation: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System
- Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Number. OSC-1I0008 ACTIVE: Yes 10 No [] TYPE I: Yes ]-I No [K QA CONDITION of items covered: 1 Microfiche Attachment List: Yes [] No [K (See Form 101.4) DSD List Yes [] No Z (See Form 101.7)
Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (Vol.) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 4 iii (Form 101.1) ii (Form 101.1)
I (CIA Form) 3 (Form 101.2) 3 (Form 101.2) 7 7 10 thru 12 10 thru 12 15 15 17 thru 25 17 thru 25 27 27 App. A, Page 1, App. A, Page 1, 2, 19, 23, 31, 34, 2, 19, 23, 31, 34, 106, 115,138, 106, 115,138, 146,154 146,154 The signatures below certify that this calculation has been originated, checked, inspected and approved in accordance with established procedures.
Originated By: See Page ii for Revision I ORIGINATOR Date:
Checked By: See Page ii for Revision 1 CHECKER Date:
Verification Method: Method 1 0 Method 2 Li Method 3 LI Other n-Approved By: See Page ii for Rev I APPROVER Date:
Issued Received to DCRM: Date: by DCRM: Date:
Complete the Spaces Below for Documentation of Multiple Originators (Orig.) or Checkers (Chk.)
Pages: 9-7 0,I*OrduJ -QF..!'F.4 Date: 21:A2gbot2.
Verif. Method 1E-L 2E] 3E] Other[-i Chk.: Date:
Pages: Orig.:_ Date:
Verif. Method 1E] 21-] 3E] Other[] Chk.: Date:
Page iii
Form 101.1 I1R02-12 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number Oconee 1 / 2/3 Revision No.: 0 Title of Calculation: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System
- Electical and Mechanical Equipment Calculation Number OSC-1 0008 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No El TYPE I: Yes [E] No CIA CONDITION of items covered: 1 Microfiche Attachment List Yes C"] No 2 (See Form 101.4) DSD List: Yes LI No G] (See Form 101.7)
Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (Vol.) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 1 through 31 Appendix A pages 1 thru 182 Attachment 1 pages 1 thru 23 The signatures below certify that this calculation has been originated, checked, Inspected and approved in accordance with established procedures.
Ordignated By: See Vendor Cover Sheet Date:
Checked By: See Vendor Cover Sheet Date:
Verification Method:. Method" M Method 2 [ , iMethod,,3 [1 Other [1 Complete the Spaces Below for Documentation of Multiple Originators (Odg.) or Checkers (V Pages: .A. l e*.cep-I- IZ9.-I*' Orig.: Date:
Verif. Method 19_201 3[1 OtherLT.Ghk: r . ,.-.ate: 1 2-Pages: .ZA" IM"?., OrIg.: Date:
Verif. Method 1E] 2[1] 31[] OtherE] .Gi.k..kA A 7. Date: ?,&I It2-I of 31
Form 101.1 iR02-t2 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION Station and Unit Number. Oconee I12/23 Revision No.: 0 Title of Calculation: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Protected Service Water (PSW) System
- FJectrcal and Mechanical EquIpment Calculation Number. OSC-10008 ACTIVE: Yes 0 No.- TYPE I: Yes [ No 0 QA CONDITION of Items covered 1 Microfiche Attachment Ust Yes [] No ( (See Form 101.4) DSD LIst Yesr"] No 0 (see Form 101.7)
Calculation Body Pages (Vol.) Supporting Documents (VOL) Volumes Revised Deleted Added Revised Deleted Added Deleted Added 1 through 31 Appendix A pages I thru 182 Attachment 1 pages 1 thru 23 I Thsignatres below cermy that mis calculauon nas oeen onginated, ciMea, Inspectea am approved i1 accorance with established procedures.
Originated By: Frank Calabrese (S&L) Date: 2/17/12 Checked By: Mark Idel. .S&L Date,,,,,: _ ,/_ .
Veriftcation Method: Method 1 N Maihod 2 ,] Method3h Other F1 Approved By: Mike Mortaruilo (S&L) v i!( L. 9 I Received
- 0. Date: 17, Issued to DCRM: Date:_ by DCRM: Date:
Complete the Spaces Below for Documentatlon of Multiple Orignators (Odg.) or Che*kers (Chi.)
Pages: Appendix A pages 129 thru 168 Orig.:W. Watkins (S&L) 7SIZ4,ate:
Vedf. Method 10 2] 3[] otherEj Chk.:M. Idell (S&L / Date:. //7,,7--
Pages:.Mto 1I.Z 7 $r10the. Chk.: Aate:
Verif. Method I @ 20] 30] OtherOl Chk.: Date: _
2 oF _3/
Form 101.2 (133-03) Calculation Number OSC-10008 REVISION DOCUMENTATION SHEET Revision Revision Description Number 0 Initial Issue per EC 91878. Calculation includes equipment from the following PSW ECs:
91870, 91871, 91833, 91856, 91877, 91850, 91863, 91866, 91868,91869, 91876, 91826, 91834, 91830, 91874, 91873, 91878, 91849, 91853, 91852, 91857, 91858, 91859 1 Revision 1 per EC91878 to incorporate comments from ONS Design Basis and Licensing Group. Clarified that PSW cooling is for HPI Pump Motor Bearing Coolers.
Revised sections marked with change bars. Updated MCC numbers associated with PZR heater breakers.
Calculation includes equipment from the following PSW ECs:
91870, 91871, 91833, 91856, 91877, 91850, 91863, 91866. 91868, 91869, 91876, 91826, 91834, 91830, 91874, 91873, 91878, 91849, 91853, 91852, 91857, 91858, 91859 I1_
4.
4 FIGURE 101-2 REVISION DOCUMENTATION SHEET 3 of 31
CALCULATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT (CIA) . J-Station I Unit Oconee 1 / 2/3 Calculation No. OSC-10008 Rev. 0 Page PIP No. (if applicable) Originated By F. Calabrese (S&L) PJ-Date ,z 9) 7 Prob. No. (stress & s/r use only) Checked By M. Idell (S&L) .aj,-* Date _4LLL/2U-N""L NEDy reviewed re toe identify ty calcutlaons?
uans rr [ONo o Note: a NEDL calculation search Is NOT originations 0.9., required Rev. 0) for Identify in the blocks below, the groups consulted for an Impact Assessment o--thi calculation.
Indiv. Contacted/Dati Indiv. Contacted/Date
[]
SYS TravisBryant/ ll711t E] NGO
[Power, I & C, Primary, [Section XI Inspection, Reactor, BOP.] Safety Analysis. Nuclear Fuel Mgmt & Design, Corporate Design Support, Fuel Mech. & T/H r PCE Analysis, Nuclear Design]
[Mech. Comp., Elec. Comp, Programl r DES
[Mechanical Engr., Electrical Engr., Civil Engr.] r' Training r Local IT 0 Operations - OPS Support Tom WehrmanI 1117111 F" Regulatory Compliance 0 Maintenance - Tech. Support Charles Black / 11i7/n I r Chemistry I Work Control - Program. Supp. rF Radiation Protection
[ Other Group DBG Bill Patton /I Int/It F No Group required to be consulted Listed below are the Identified documents (ex: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS, UFSAR SECTIONS, DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS, STATION PROCEDURES*, DRAWINGS, OTHER CALCULATIONS, ETC.)
that may require revision as a result of the calculation origination or revision, the document owner/group and the change required (including any necessary PIP Corrective Actions).
- Note: Any design changes, which require changes to Station Procedures,must be transmittedas Design Deliverable Documents.
DOCUMENT GROUP CHANGE REOUIRED (Attach Additional Sheets As Required) 9 OF, .I1
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Table of Contents Certificate of Engineering Calculation (Forms EDM-101.1) 1,2 Revision Documentation Sheet (Form EDM-101.2) 3 Calculation Impact Assessment (CIA) (Form EM-4.9) 4 Table of Contents 5 1.0 Purpose 6 2.0 Scope 6 3.0 References 7-15 4.0 Assumptions 15-16 5.0 Methodology 16-17 6.0 Analysis / Matrices 17-21 7.0 Conclusions 21-31 8.0 Attachments & Appendices 31 (Appendix A) (1 -182)
(1) - OE Search Results (1 -23) 5 of 31
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 1.0 Purpose The purpose of this calculation is to perform a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) on the Protected Service Water (PSW) System.
Since the PSW System is safety related and its components are required to mitigate a licensing basis event, this system meets the criteria for performing a FMEA per the requirements of EDM 105, "Guidelines for Performing a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Single Failure Analysis".
2.0 Scope This FMEA will address the following areas to provide a failure modes and effects analysis for the PSW System:
2.1 Identify the essential PSW Systems / components and their functions. Describe the system to the extent necessary to delineate its boundaries and to clearly define the system's mission.
2.2 Identify supporting systems / components and their functions.
Ensure interfaces are clearly defined.
2.3 Identify relevant operational conditions in which the essential functions are required.
2.4 Use current design drawings to identify boundaries of the analysis and identify "success" path for each postulated failure mode.
2.5 Identify any pertinent system level effects from spurious actuations or transients.
2.6 In order to address reliability in the FMEA, the determination of the detectability of the identified failures (detected by periodic surveillance testing or revealed by alarms or anomalous indications) will be included in the scope of the analysis.
2.7 Calculations OSC-7548 (Ref. 3.12) and OSC-9674 (Ref. 3.13) have been updated to address issues related to the addition of the PSW System / PSW equipment on the existing HPI System. HPI equipment covered by this calculation may also be addressed in calculations OSC-7548 and OSC-9674.
6 of 31
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.0 References 3.1 EDM 105 Rev. 1 - Guidelines for Performing a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Single Failure Analysis 3.2 OSS-0245-00-00-1053 Draft Rev. 0 File Date 8/29/11 - Design Basis Specification for the Protected Service Water (PSW) System 3.3 OSS-0254.00-00-1033 Rev. 28A, 28B, 30A, 33 - Design Basis Specification for the Reactor Coolant System 3.4 OSS-0254.00-00-2006 Rev. 9 - Design Basis Specification for the 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System 3.5 LAR 2006-009 (June 26, 2008) - License Amendment Request to Revise Portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Related to the Tornado Licensing Basis 3.6 LAR 2008-005 (June 26, 2008) - Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the Oconee Nuclear Station Current Licensing Basis for HELB events outside of the Containment Buildings Unit 1 3.7 LAR 2008-006 (Dec 22, 2008)- Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the Oconee Nuclear Station Current Licensing Basis for HELB events outside of the Containment Buildings Unit 2 3.8 LAR 2008-007 (June 29, 2009) - Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the Oconee Nuclear Station Current Licensing Basis for HELB events outside of the Containment Buildings Unit 3 3.9 Tornado and High Energy Line Break (HELB) Mitigation License Amendment Requests (LARs) - Responses to Request for RI Additional Information, dated 12/16/2011.
3.10 OSS-0254.00-00-1001 Rev. 42D, 43A, 43B, 45B, 45C, 48 & 48A -
Design Basis Specification for the High Pressure Injection and Deborating Demineralizer Systems 3.11 OSC-9510 Rev. 0 - FMEA for the Alternate Power Feeds to SSF 4.16 kV switchgear OTS1 from PSW Electrical System 3.12 OSC-7548 Rev. 17 - High Pressure Injection (HPI) Single Failure Analysis 3.13 OSC-9674 Rev. 1 - HPI System Addition of PSW Power Feeds Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 3.14 Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 Technical Specification Bases B3.4.9, Pressurizer 7 of 31
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 812912011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.15 O-703-D Rev. 56A, 59A, 61 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.16 0-703-F Rev. 69D - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.17 0-1703-C Rev. 29A, 29B, 30 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.18 O-1703-D Rev. 49B, 51B, 55B, 56A, 57 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.19 0-2703-C Rev. 43A, 43C, 46 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.20 0-2703-D Rev. 55A, 55C, 59, 59A - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V 3.21 0-6700 Rev. B, E, F, G, H, K, L, N - One Line Diagram Main PSW Switchgear 13.8/4.16 kV System 3.22 0-6700-01 Rev. A, D, H, K - One Line Diagram 125VDC Safety Related PSW Distribution Center for PSW Building 3.23 0-6700-02 Rev. D - One Line Diagram PSW 125VDC Power Panelboard for PSW Building 3.24 0-6700-03 Rev. C, F, G, I, K, L, 1 - One Line Diagram PSW 125VDC Power Panelboard 3.25 0-6701 Rev. C, E, F, H, 1, 1A - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V PSW MCC lXPSW 3.26 0-6702 Rev. B, F, J, K, L, 1 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V PSW MCC 2XPSWA & 2XPSWB 3.27 0-6703 Rev. B, E, I, J, K - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V PSW MCC 3XPSW 3.28 0-6704 Rev. B, C, 0 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 208Y/120VAC PWR PNL BD No. 1PSWPL1KPSW 3.29 0-6705 Rev. A, C, 0 - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 208Y/120VAC PWR PNL BD No. 2PSWPL2KPSW 3.30 0-6706 Rev. A, D - One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 208Y/120VAC PWR PNL BD No. 3PSWPL3KPSW 8 of 31
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.31 0-6707 Rev. C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L - One Line Diagram 600VAC Load Center PSWLXPX13 3.32 0-6707-01 Rev. C, D, F - One Line Diagram 600V MCC PSWMXXPSW PSW Building Elev. 797' 3.33 0-6719-E Rev. A - Connection Diagram PSW 600VAC Automatic Transfer Switches 1PSWSXTRN001 & 1PSWSXTRN002 3.34 0-6719-F Rev. D - Connection Diagram PSW 600VAC Automatic Transfer Switches 2PSWSXTRN001 & 2PSWSXTRN002 3.35 0-6719-G Rev. C - Connection Diagram PSW 600VAC Automatic Transfer Switches 3PSWSXTRN001 & 3PSWSXTRN002 3.36 0-6720-E Rev. E - Connection Diagram Manual Transfer Switches PSW 3.37 0-6756-A Rev. A - PSW Building Interconnection Diagram Air Conditioning Equipment and Room Temperature Transmitters 3.38 OEE-150-15 Rev. 4A, 5A, 6 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 1A Vent Valves 1RC157 & 1RC158 3.39 OEE-150-16 Rev. 4A, 5A, 6 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 1A Vent Valves 1RC159 & 1RC160 3.40 OEE-150-19 Rev. 4A, 5A, 6 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 1A Vent Valves 1RC155 & 1RC156 3.41 OEE-151-04 Rev. 16E, 17B, 18 - Elementary Diagram 1A HPI BWST Suction Valve 1HP-24 3.42 OEE-151-06 Rev. 13C, 14A, 15- Elementary Diagram HP Injection to Reactor Inlet Valve 1HP-26 3.43 OEE-165-01 Rev. E, F, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Stm Gen 1A
& 1B Flow Isolation MOV 1PSW-6 3.44 OEE-165-02 Rev. C, D, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 1A Flow Control Solenoid Valve 1PSW22 3.45 OEE-165-03 Rev. E, F, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 1A Throttle MOV 1PSW-23 3.46 OEE-165-04 Rev. C, D, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 1B Flow Control Solenoid Valve 1PSW24 9 of 31
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.47 OEE-165-05 Rev. E, F, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 1B Throttle MOV 1PSW-25 3.48 OEE-165-06 Rev. C, 0C, 1 - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Isolation Valve 1HP139 3.49 OEE-165-07 Rev. B, F, G, 1 - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Flow Throttle Valve I HP140 3.50 OEE-165-08 Rev. A, C, D (PENDING) - Elementary Diagram 600V LC R!
PSWLXPX13 (2B) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 1XJ 3.51 OEE-165-09 Rev. A, C - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (3B) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch-for MCC 1XK 3.52 OEE-165-11 Rev. C - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (4D) Feed to MCC 1XPSW 3.53 OEE-250-15 Rev. 4B, 4E, 5 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 2A Vent Valves 2RC1 55 & 2RC1 56 3.54 OEE-250-16 Rev. 4B, 4D, 5 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 2A Vent Valves 2RC157 & 2RC158 3.55 OEE-250-17 Rev. 4B, 4D, 5 - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 2A Vent Valves 2RC159 & 2RC160 3.56 OEE-251-04 Rev. 12A, 12G, 12K, 121,13 - Elementary Diagram 2A HPI BWST Suction Valve 2HP-24 3.57 OEE-251-06 Rev. 12A, 12G, 121, 12K, 13 - Elementary Diagram HP Injection to Reactor Inlet Valve 2HP-26 3.58 OEE-265-01 Rev. G, H, I, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Stm Gen 2A & 2B Flow Isolation MOV 2PSW-6 3.59 OEE-265-02 Rev. C, E, F, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 2A Flow Control Solenoid Valve 2PSW22 3.60 OEE-265-03 Rev. F, G, H, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 2A Throttle MOV 2PSW-23 3.61 OEE-265-04 Rev. C, D, E, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 2B Flow Control Solenoid Valve 2PSW24 3.62 OEE-265-05 Rev. F, G, H, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 2B Throttle MOV 2PSW-25 10 of 31
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.63 OEE-265-06 Rev. H, I, K, J, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Isolation Valve 2HP139 3.64 OEE-265-07 Rev. G, I, J, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Flow Throttle Valve 2HP140 3.65 OEE-265-08 Rev. C - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (4B) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 2Xi 3.66 OEE-265-09 Rev. C, D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX1 3 (2D) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 2XK 3.67 OEE-265-10 Rev. C, D, E (PENDING) - Elementary Diagram 600V LC R1 PSWLXPX1 3 (2C) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 2XJ 3.68 OEE-265-11 Rev. D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (3C) Feed to MCC 2XPSWA 3.69 OEE-265-19 Rev. F - Elementary Diagram PSW Recirc Valve OPSW14 Normal Feed 3.70 OEE-265-19-1 Rev. D - Elementary Diagram PSW Recirc Valve 0PSW14 Normal Feed 3.71 OEE-265-21 Rev. A - Elementary Diagram PSW Pump Room Exhaust Fan Normal Feed 3.72 OEE-350-15 Rev. 3, 3B - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 3A Vent Valves 3RC155 & 3RC156 3.73 OEE-350-16 Rev. 3, 3B, 3C - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 3A Vent Valves 3RC155 & 3RC156 3.74 OEE-350-17 Rev. 3, 3B, 3C - Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System STM GEN 3A Vent Valves 3RC155 & 3RC156 3.75 OEE-351-04 Rev. 10, 10A, 10B, 10F, 10G - Elementary Diagram 3A HPI BWST Suction Valve 3HP-24 3.76 OEE-351-06 Rev. 12, 12A, 12B, 12F, 12G - Elementary Diagram HP Injection to Reactor Inlet Valve 3HP-26 3.77 OEE-365-01 Rev. E, F, G - Elementary Diagram PSW Stm Gen 3A
& 3B Flow Isolation MOV 3PSW-6 3.78 OEE-365-02 Rev. C, D, E - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 3A Flow Control Solenoid Valve 3PSW22 11 of 31
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.79 OEE-365-03 Rev. E, G, H - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 3A Throttle MOV 3PSW-23 3.80 OEE-365-04 Rev. C, D, E - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 3B Flow Control Solenoid Valve 3PSW24 3.81 OEE-365-05 Rev. E, F, G - Elementary Diagram PSW Steam Generator 3B Throttle MOV 3PSW-25 3.82 OEE-365-06 Rev. A, E, F - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Isolation Valve 3HP139 3.83 OEE-365-07 Rev. A, E, F - Elementary Diagram PSW HPI Flow Throttle Valve 3HP140 3.84 OEE-365-08 Rev. C, D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX1 3 (1 D) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 3XI 3.85 OEE-365-09 Rev. C, D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX1 3 (2A) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 3XK 3.86 OEE-365-10 Rev. C, D, E (PENDING) - Elementary Diagram 600V LC RI PSWLXPX1 3 (1B) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC 3XJ 3.87 OEE-365-11 Rev. C - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (3D) Feed to MCC 3XPSW 3.88 OEE-606-01 Rev. B - Elementary Diagram 13.8kV/4.16kV Transformer Feeder for 4.16kV B7T-1 Tie Breaker 3.89 OEE-607-01 Rev. C - Elementary Diagram B6T-2 Feed to Transformer PX13 For Load Center PSWLXPX13 Normal Feed 3.90 OEE-608-01 Rev. D, E, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW 4kV Breaker B6T-6, 2000HP PSW Main Pump 3.91 OEE-609-01 Rev. B, C, 0 - Elementary Diagram 4.16kV Switchgear B6T-3 Feed To Alignment Sw IHPISXALGN001 For HPI Injection Pumps 1A & 1B 3.92 OEE-610 Rev. F - Elementary Diagram 1A HPI Pump Transfer Sw 1HPISXTRN001 HPI Pump Motor 1A 3.93 OEE-610-01 Rev. G, 1 - Elementary Diagram 1B HPI Pump Transfer Sw IHPISXTRN002 HPI Pump Motor 1B 12 of 31
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.94 OEE-611-01 Rev. A, D, E, 0 - Elementary Diagram 4.16kV Switchgear B6T-4 Feeder to Manual Transfer Sw for HPI Injection Pumps 2A or 2B 3.95 OEE-612 Rev. A, D, 1 - Elementary Diagram 2A HPI Pump Transfer Sw 2HPISXTRN001 HPI Pump Motor 2A 3.96 OEE-612-01 Rev. A, D, 1 - Elementary Diagram 2B HPI Pump Transfer Sw 2HPISXTRN002 HPI Pump Motor 2B 3.97 OEE-613-01 Rev. C, D, F - Elementary Diagram 4.16kV Switchgear B6T-5 Feed to Alignment Sw 3HPIALGN001 for HPI Injection Pumps 3A & 3B 3.98 OEE-614 Rev. C, E - Elementary Diagram 3A HPI Pump Transfer Sw 3HPISXTRN001 HPI Pump Motor 3A 3.99 OEE-614-01 Rev. C, E - Elementary Diagram 3B HPI Pump Transfer Sw 3HPISXTRN001 HPI Pump Motor 3B 3.100 OEE-625 Rev. D - Elementary Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (4C) Feed to Manual Transfer Switch for MCC XPSW 3.101 OEE-631-OE Rev. A - Elementary Diagram PSW Building 480V Non-Safety Related HVAC Battery Room 1 Condenser PSWAH203A 3.102 OEE-631-OH Rev. A - Elementary Diagram PSW Building 480V Non-Safety Related HVAC Battery Room 2 Condenser PSWAH206A 3.103 OEE-632-01 Rev. D, E, 0 - Elementary Diagram PSW 4kV Breaker B6T-7 200HP Booster Pump 3.104 OEE-633 Rev. D - Elementry Diagram 600V LC PSWLXPX13 (5B)
Main Breaker 3.105 OFD-1OOA-1.1 Rev. 38 - Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System 3.106 OFD-1OOA-2.1 Rev. 43 - Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System 3.107 OFD-10OA-3.1 Rev. 36, 36A - Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System 3.108 OFD-101A-1.3 Rev. 21B, 25 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 13 of 31
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.109 OFD-101A-1.4 Rev. 41 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.110 OFD-101A-2.3 Rev. 20D, 23A, 23E, 23F, 23G, 26 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.111 OFD-101A-2.4 Rev. 40 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.112 OFD-101A-3.3 Rev. 22C, 25, - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.113 OFD-101A-3.4 Rev. 37C, 38 - Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section) 3.114 OFD-131A-1.1 Rev. E, 0, 0B- Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW) System 3.115 OFD-131A-1.2 Rev. B, C, 0 - Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW) System (Steam Generator & HPI Pump - Motor Cooling Service) 3.116 OFD-131A-2.2 Rev. A, C, 0 - Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW) System (Steam Generator & HPI Pump Motor Cooling Service) 3.117 OFD-131A-3.2 Rev. B, C, D - Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW) System (Steam Generator & HPI Pump Motor Cooling Service) 3.118 OFD-116M-1.8 Rev. A - Flow Diagram of Misc Structures HVAC PSW Building 3.119 OFD-116G-3.1 Rev. 6, 6A - Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABV) Basement, 1st, 2nd & 3rd Floors 3.120 OM.322-106 Sh. 1 Rev. DOHA, DOHC - PSW System 5kV Motor Operated Transfer Switch Outline Detail 3.121 OM.303-0191.001 Rev. 5 - 24VDC Trip Unit Power Distribution for 600V Switchgear PX13 3.122 NLI Drawing 29412389-WD-1 Sh. 1, Rev. 9 - PSW 600V Auto Transfer Switch Wiring 3.123 GEH-2038 Rev. E - Control and Transfer Switch Type SBM 3.124 OSC-9689 Rev. 0 - Electrical Design Inputs for EC #91856 14 of 31
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3.125 OSS-0254.00-00-1004 Rev. 37 - Design Basis Spec. for Standby Shutdown Facility Reactor Coolant Makeup System 3.126 KC-2190, Rev. 0 FMEA for the Keowee 13.8kV Switchgear (KPF) Power Feeds to Protected Service Water System (PSW) Switchgear 3.127 O-1703-E, Rev. 55A (PENDING) One Line, Station Aux Circuits 600V RI 3.128 O-2703-E, Rev. 44A (PENDING) One Line, Station Aux Circuits 600V I 208V
4.0 Assumptions
4.1 Common-Cause Failure Analysis to identify modes and mechanisms of failures of components that are considered to be redundant is not typically included in the scope of an FMEA analysis.
4.2 Concurrent random multiple failures are not normally included in the scope of an FMEA analysis. However, a single failure can affect the performance of a large part of the system in which it occurs or it may cause other consequential failures. Any such failure, including the consequential failures, has to be taken as a single failure for the purpose of the analysis, which has to continue until all components and all credible failures have been considered.
4.3 Environmental effects such as steam impingement, temperature, dose, etc. that are the result of a postulated failure, are not normally considered in the scope of the FMEA. Collateral damage unrelated to the system being analyzed is not considered.
4.4 Software common cause failures are not random single failures in the context of IEEE 379 and therefore, are not part of the FMEA. Where required to be postulated, software common cause failures are analyzed via a "Diversity-and-Defense-in-Depth" analysis prescribed in the SRP by BTP-19.
4.5 Per EDM-1 05, failure of a manual valve is not analyzed unless required to be operated by procedure. No manual valves are required to be operated by procedure for PSW to fulfill its design function.
4.6 Certain references used in this calculation have not yet been approved.
This assumption tracks those references to ensure information used in this calculation from those references is not altered in a way that affects the results/conclusions of this calculation prior to their approval. The list of references being tracked is identified below:
3.2 OSS-0245-00-00-1053 Draft Rev. 0 3.9 No longer tracked as of Revision I RI 3.16 0-703-F Rev. 69D 15 of 31
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Equipment 3.36 O-6720-E Rev. E 3.38 OEE-150-15 Rev. 4A 3.39 OEE-150-16 Rev. 4A 3.40 OEE-150-19 Rev. 4A 3.71 OEE-265-21 Rev. A 3.116 OFD-131A-2.2 Rev. A 3.122 NLI Drawing 29412389-WD-1 Sh. 1 Rev. 9 5.0 Methodology The methodology is in keeping with the worksheet in Appendix A of EDM-105 and the failure modes for components provided in Appendix B of EDM-105, except where engineering judgment dictates additional failure mechanisms should be considered. Any additional failure mechanisms will be described and justified. The following basic questions are considered in the evaluation of components provided in Appendix A to this calculation:
" What are the essential functions of the system?
- What components are needed for the essential functions?
" How can each component credibly fail?
" What mechanisms might produce these modes of failure?
- What could the effects be if the failures did occur?
- Is the failure in a safe or unsafe direction?
- How is the failure detected?
- What inherent provisions are provided in the design to compensate for the failure?
- What redundant provisions exist to provide an equivalent function?
" If no redundant provisions exist, then what repair options exist?
- Using PIP and Operating Experience, identify any operator errors that should be considered.
Generally, the "Remarks and Other Effects" column has considered the worst case failure result from the "Failure Mode" column. Failure modes that result in effects that are non-significant to PSW System or equipment functionality were not reported.
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment For AC breakers whose control power is supplied from a 125VDC source, the loss of control power failure mode is addressed under the DC component that supplies the control power to the AC breaker.
6.0 Analysis / Matrices (Ref. Appendix A) 6.1 System / Component Descriptions The PSW System is designed as a standby system for use under emergency conditions where plant systems in the Turbine Building are lost. The PSW System includes a dedicated power system. The PSW System provides additional "defense in-depth" protection by serving as a backup to existing safety systems and as such, the system is not required to comply with single failure criteria. The PSW System is provided as an alternate means to achieve and maintain a stable RCS pressure and temperature for one, two, or three units following postulated high energy line breaks (HELBs) or fire events (excluding fires in the Auxiliary Building) that disable plant systems needed for safe shutdown.
The PSW System replaces the Station Auxiliary Service Water (ASW)
System. The design functions performed by the Station ASW System are performed by the PSW System. This includes providing long term decay heat removal following a loss of Lake Keowee.
The PSW system is not initially credited following a tornado event that RI disables plant safe shutdown systems in that neither power source to PSW is fully protected from the effects of tornado damage. Power is restored to the PSW System using damage repairs that are to be completed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Following repair, the mission of the PSW System is for the PSW booster pump and associated electrical system to be locally aligned, started and controlled to provide cooling water to the motor bearing cooler of a High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump on each of the affected units. One HPI pump (for each affected unit) is powered from the PSW electrical system and is locally started. The 'A' Injection header and the reactor coolant pump seal injection header are locally aligned and controlled. The PSW electrical system is used to power the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF), allowing the SSF Diesel-Generator to be shutdown.
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment The PSW System is also capable of cooling the RCS to 250'F and maintaining this condition until damage repairs can be implemented to proceed to cold shutdown.
The mechanical portion of the PSW System is designed to provide decay heat removal by feeding Keowee Lake water to the secondary side of the steam generators. The system, consisting of one booster pump and one high head pump, shall be capable of providing 375 gpm per unit at 1082 psig. In addition, the system is designed to supply Keowee Lake water at 10 gpm per unit to the HPI pump motor bearing coolers.
The PSW System utilizes the inventory of lake water contained in the plant Unit.2 CCW embedded piping. The PSW pump is located in the Auxiliary Building at Elev. 771' and takes suction from the Unit 2 CCW embedded piping and discharges into the steam generators of each unit via separate lines into the emergency feedwater headers. The raw water is vaporized in the steam generator removing residual heat and ,I then dumped to the atmosphere. The Unit 2 CCW embedded piping is interconnected with Units 1 & 3. For extended operation, a portable (submersible) pump, powered by PSW and accessories (electrical cables, flexible hoses and connectors) can be utilized via operator actions to pump water directly from Lake Keowee to the Unit 2 CCW embedded piping.
The piping system has pump minimum flow lines that discharge back into the Unit 2 CCW embedded piping. For flow testing to the steam generators, the system is connected to a condensate water source located in the Turbine Building that is normally isolated using valves in the Auxiliary Building.
The PSW pumps and motor operated valves required to bring the system into service are controlled from the Main Control Rooms.
Check valves and manual hand wheel operated valves are used to prevent back-flow, accommodate testing, or are used for system isolation.
The PSW electrical system is designed to provide power to PSW mechanical and electrical components as well as other system components needed to establish and maintain a SSD condition. The PSW electrical system provides power to portions of the HPI System for reactor coolant make-up (RCMU) and Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal cooling purposes. A separate safety related seismic 18 of 31
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Category I PSW electrical equipment building is provided for major PSW electrical equipment. Alternate QA-1 power is provided from the Keowee Hydroelectric Units (KHU) via a tornado protected underground feeder path. Normal power is provided by a non-QA transformer substation connected to a 100 kV transmission line that receives power from the Central Tie Switchyard located approximately 8 miles from the plant. The new 100/13.8 kV substation is strategically placed to reduce the probability of concurrent tornado damage to the station switchyard, KHU, and the new substation. These external power sources provide power to transformers, switchgear, breakers, load centers, and battery chargers located in the PSW electrical RI equipment building. The PSW switchgear provides power to the PSW pumps (booster and pnmary) and valves, each unit's vital I & C battery chargers, an HPI pump and associated RCMU valves, valves to align the Borated Water Storage Tanks (BWSTs) to the HPI pump, Pressurizer (PZR) heaters, and reactor coolant system (RCS) high point and reactor head vent valves for boration and RCS inventory control. The PSW switchgear also provides power to the SSF to allow for its operation beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
(Ref. 3.5 Enclosure 2)
(Ref. 3.6 Enclosure 3)
(Ref. 3.7 Enclosure 2)
(Ref. 3.8 Enclosure 2)
(Ref. 3.9 Enclosure 1) 6.2 Boundary of the Analysis 6.2.1 This FMEA discusses credible PSW System failures under the following events:
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment
- HELBs resulting in the loss of existing plant systems inside the Turbine Building needed for SSD that will be mitigated by the PSW System
- Tornados resulting in the loss of existing plant systems needed for SSD that will be mitigated by the PSW System 6.3 Depth of Analysis (i.e., level of detail)
This FMEA examines large scale functional failures of the PSW System electrical power sources, individual electrical equipment failures and their impact on the ability of the PSW System to perform its safety function, as well as failures to equipment that interfaces with existing plant systems.
This FMEA examines mechanical equipment failures and their impact on the ability of the PSW System to perform its safety function.
6.4 Identification of Failure Modes Failure modes of the equipment are identified in column 4 of the FMEA worksheets provided in Appendix A of this calculation.
6.5 Operational condition of the system / component The PSW System is normally aligned in the standby mode. The PSW electrical system is normally energized from the 100kV / 13.8kV substation. Components that can receive backup power from the PSW electrical system are normally isolated from the PSW electrical system. RI The PSW pumps are normally off and the PSW system is normally isolated from the steam generators by closed electric valves. The mechanical system may be placed into service for routine testing during unit operation.
6.6 Methods of detecting failure Methods of detecting the failure are provided in column 7 of the FMEA worksheets provided in Appendix A of this calculation.
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 6.7 Evaluation of Failure Effects Evaluation of the failure effects are provided in column 8 of the FMEA worksheets provided in Appendix A of this calculation.
6.8 Operating Experience The OE database was searched for any applicable operator errors that should be identified and considered in performance of this FMEA.
While the PSW System is a new system with no Oconee operations history, general industry errors may still be found to be applicable in certain situations.
Although numerous hits were obtained on equipment failure, there we no items directly related to operator error that needed to be considered in this FMEA. However, there are some OE items directly attributable to equipment failure during maintenance or testing. A selection of these items is included as Attachment I to this calculation.
OE database keywords used in the search included:
Dead bus transfer Power transfer Tie Breaker Operation Load shedding Motor restart Automatic loading sequence Loss of power Operator errors 7.0 Conclusion Overall System reliability Although the PSW System is not designed to meet single failure criterion, it has design features which create added reliability which may allow the system to perform its design function following certain gI failure modes. This added reliability includes features such as dual flow paths and equipment redundancy (e.g., PSW building HVAC, 125Vdc batteries and chargers, dual feeders from each of the two independent power sources, etc.).
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment RI Summary of failure effects The failure effects of the PSW System equipment are provided in the worksheets in Appendix A.
The SSF is credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining hot standby (Mode 3) in those failure events that render PSW unavailable.
There are certain PSW equipment failures that are significant to PSW System operation. These failures are discussed below.
Assessment of failure significance PSW System or equipment failures have methods of failure detection to provide plant operators with adequate information to operate the PSW System to achieve its safety design function or to move to the credited alternate system (SSF) to achieve and maintain hot standby (Mode 3). There are certain failures that are of significance to the PSW System operation and are annotated below (For Failure Effects/Consequences see applicable Item # in Appendix A):
PSW System Electrical Failures - Normal Operation Certain PSW System electrical equipment failures have been identified while the system is in it's normal alignment (not considering a Tornado Event or a Turbine Building HELB). Since the PSW System is not required to be single failure proof and therefore is not designed to be single failure proof, avoidance of these failures is not required. These failures are detectable and include the following:
B6T-B 13.8kV switchgear breaker for Fant Line feed (Item 5)
B7T-D 13.8kV switchgear breaker for Fant Line feed (Item 6)
B7T-1 4.16kV switchgear tie breaker (Item 13)
PSWSXTRN009 XPSW manual transfer switch (Item 59) 1HPISXTRN003 1HP-0024 transfer switch (Item 103) 1HPISXTRN004 1HP-0026 transfer switch (Item 104) 2HPISXTRN003 2HP-0024 transfer switch (Item 146) 22 of 31
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 2HPISXTRN004 2HP-0026 transfer switch (Item 147) 3HPISXTRN003 3HP-0024 transfer switch (Item 188) 3HPISXTRN004 3HP-0026 transfer switch (Item 189)
OPSWSXTRN006 PSW Instrument Panels transfer switch (Item 166)
OPSWSXTRN007 PSW-14 valve transfer switch (Item 148)
OPSWSXTRN008 PSW Pp Rm exhaust fan transfer switch (Item 149)
PSWLXDC01 - 2B Main Breaker Battery and Charger I (Item 228)
PSWLXDC01 - 4B Main Breaker Battery and Charger 2 (Item 232) 1PSWSXTRN004 &005 Unit 1PZR Heater Transfer Switches (Item 51 &52) 2PSWSXTRN003, 004 &005 Unit 2 PZR Heater Transfer Switches (Item 53, 54 &55) RI 3PSWSXTRN003, 004 &005 Unit 3 PZR Heater Transfer Switches (Item 56, 57 &59)
PSW System Electrical Failures - Accident Operation Certain PSW System electrical equipment failures would render the PSW System unavailable. Since the PSW System is not required to be single failure proof and therefore is not designed to be single failure proof, avoidance of these failures is not required. These failures are detectable to move to the alternate credited shutdown system in the event of PSW System electrical failures that render PSW unavailable. These failures include:
B6T switchgear failure (Item No. 1)
B7T switchgear failure (Item No. 2)
Keowee Hydro Station failure (Item No. 4)
B6T-2 switchgear breaker feeding 5MVA transformer (Item No. 16)
B6T-6 switchgear breaker feeding PSW primary pump (Item No. 20)
B6T-7 switchgear breaker feeding PSW booster pump (Item No. 21)
PSWTFPX1 3 5MVA transformer (Item No. 28)
PSWLXPX13 600V load center (Item No. 35)
PSWLXPX13-5B 600V load center main breaker (Item No. 36)
PSWSXTRN009 Transfer switch for MCC XPSW (Item No. 58)
XPSW MCC failure (Item No. 60)
XPSW-1 C 600V motor control center main breaker (Item No. 61)
OPSWSXTRN008 Transfer switch for PSW exhaust fan (Item No. 149) 23 of 31
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Electrical and Mechanical Equipment OPSWSXTRN006 xfer sw for OPSW14 control panel (Item No. 166)
OPSWIR002 control panel for OPSW14 valve (Item No. 168)
PSWLXDC01 125VDC Distribution Load Center (Item No. 219)
PSWLXDC01-3B5 125VDC to Panel PSWPL1DC (Item No. 222)
PSWLXDC01-3B6 125VDC to Panel PSWPL2DC (Item No. 223)
PSWPLIDC 125VDC Distribution Panel failure (Item No. 233)
PSWPL2DC 125VDC Distribution Panel failure (Item No. 253)
PSWPL2DC-13 125VDC power to PSWLXPX13-5B (Item No. 261) 1PSWSXTRN004 & 005 Unit 1 PZR Heater Transfer Switches (item 51 & 52) 2PSWSXTRNOO3, 004 &005Unit 2 PZR Heater Transfer Switches (Item 53,54 &55) Ri 3PSWSXTRNO03, 004 &005 Unit 3 PZR Heater Transfer Switches (Item 56, 57 & 59)
PSW Pump Room Ventilation A single failure in the associated AC electrical power or start circuit would render the PSW Pump Room exhaust fan unavailable (See Item No. 133, 149, 171). With the exhaust fan unavailable, PSW pump room temperature is expected to increase rapidly. Excessive high temperatures in the PSW Pump Room would create operability issues with the PSW primary and booster pumps. These electrical failures would be detected at the fan control panel in the Pump Room or by PSW Primary and / or Booster Pump Bearing Temperature Alarms in the MCR.
In addition, should the 600VAC exhaust fan power source be aligned to Unit 3 power 3XPSW-1 D and 125VDC control power is lost from 2PSWPL2DC-05, the control power circuit for the exhaust fan will not be powered and the exhaust fan will not operate (See Item No. 286). There is no capability to operate the PSW System without pump room ventilation. This DC circuit failure is only detected via loss of fan status indication on the fan control panel in the PSW Pump Room or by PSW Primary and / or Booster Pump Bearing Temperature Alarms in the MCR.
Operation of equipment within the PSW Pump Room (particularly the Primary and Booster Pump) without ventilation results in rapid heat up of the Pump Room and immediate adjacent areas beyond design basis temperatures. Temperature effects due to operation of the PSW Primary and Booster Pump without ventilation has not been analyzed (See Item No. 336).
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Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment General Statement on PSW System Valve Leakage The PSW System piping was designed such that external leakage (other than catastrophic failure of a component or piping) will not have an impact on adjacent equipment.
Minor internal leakage will not affect the operability of any valve within the PSW System with the exception of 1,2,3PSW-0021 (Item Number 309, 317, 325). Internal leakage of any severity on any PSW System valve would have similar effects to the "Fail Mid-Position" case analyzed for each valve in this calculation.. See specific discussion on 1,2,3PSW-0021 valves below.
PSW Minimum Flow Throttle Valve OPSW-0014 Fail full open would prevent the PSW System from performing its design function.
Fail Closed: Depending on system alignment and the number of SGs being supplied "fail closed" may have differing effects. Fail closed while serving at least one unit at full design flow may not have an immediate effect however at reduced flows or no units being served "fail closed" is likely to cause Primary Pump failure (See Item No. 167, 168, 305)
In addition, should the 600VAC PSW-14 valve power source be aligned to Unit 3 power 3XPSW-5A and 125VDC control power is lost from 2PSWPL2DC-04, the control power circuit for the PSW-14 valve will be dead and the valve will lose MCR operation. (See Item No.
285). This DC circuit failure is detected via loss of valve position indication in the MCR.
PSW-14 has the capability to be manually operated using the hand wheel on the Limitorque operator. Some level of control / recovery using this valve and/or PSW-12 may be possible.
PSW to HPI Motor Bearing Cooler Check Valve 1.2,3PSW-0021 R)
Failure open while supplying HPI Pump motor bearing coolers from LPSW or HPSW backup could cause back leakage to the PSW System and interrupt flow to the HPI Pump motor coolers, rendering HPI pumps inoperable. Some recovery may be possible if immediate action is taken to close manual valves. (See Item No. 309, 317, 325).
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Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment PSW Power System Failures to HPI Pump Motors An electrical failure within the PSW System (See Item No. 1, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, 27, 334) could restrict pump operations in which case the SSF would be used as the alternate to PSW for that specific Unit's failure. PSW breaker status indication is available in the MCRs to detect these failures.
PSW Power System Failures to RCS Vent Valves Unavailability of all 3 sets of RC Vent Valves during a PSW event due to single failure in the PSW electrical system (See Item No. 83, 84, 94, 107, 108, 109 for Unit 1, 125, 127, 132, 145, 150, 151 for Unit 2, 169, 170, 182, 193, 194 for Unit 3 and Item No. 335) would render the PSW System unavailable for that specific Unit's failure (removing letdown capability affects the HPI injection / RCP seal injection and removing venting capability could potentially affect natural circulation and S/G heat removal operations).
Assessment of failure significance on Interfacing Systems The PSW System has interfaces with existing plant equipment. The significance of failures of this interfacing equipment is discussed below.
Pressurizer Heater Interface New transfer switches have been introduced into the Pressurizer Heater System which enable certain Pressurizer Heater MCCs to be powered from the PSW System during PSW credited events. Any Pressurizer Heater transfer switch failures during non-PSW credited events are no worse than any existing postulated Pressurizer Heater MCC failure.
The PSW System supplies in excess of 400kW pressurizer heater load per unit to meet TS 3.4.9 requirement. Loss of any one pressurizer heater MCC may drop OPERABLE heater load capable of being supplied from an emergency source below 400kW, which may cause the affected unit to enter LCO 3.4.9 until the required heater load can be restored. The required 400kW of heater load can be restored through the use of the SSF.
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Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Vital I&C Battery Charqer Interface New automatic transfer switches have been introduced into the Vital I&C Battery Charger System. These transfer switches allow the A & B I R1 Vital I&C Battery Chargers to be powered from either the Plant or PSW power sources. Once power is transferred to the PSW source, power can only be restored to the Plant source via manual re-transfer.
Therefore, should the PSW .power source feeding an I&C charger fail or should the Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS) fail open no power would exist to a single train Vital I&C battery charger until manual transfer is performed. The batteries can supply the load for up to I hour per OSC-8113. The standby charger can also be connected if the standby charger plant power supply is available. Since only one I&C I R1 charger train is affected by this failure, the other I&C charger train is unaffected and is available. Should both I&C charger trains be impacted by a PSW failure (e.g., load center), then the SSF is credited as the alternate means of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown.
HPI System Interface New transfer switches have been introduced into the HPI System which enable certain HPI equipment to be powered from the PSW System during PSW credited events. It may be possible to power certain HPI equipment from both the normal plant source and the PSW source on a transfer switch failure where both sets of contacts fail closed. Recommendations for alleviating the impacts of this type of failure have been provided below in the "Recommendations for Preventive Maintenance, Surveillance Testing, or Other Condition Monitoring" section of the conclusions.
RCS System Interface New transfer switches have been introduced into the RCS System which enable certain RCS equipment to be powered from the PSW System during PSW credited events. Any RCS transfer switch failures during non-PSW credited events are no worse than any existing postulated RCS System failure. Failure of both sets of switch contacts in a closed position thus paralleling of power sources is not a credible failure mode of the GE SBM power transfer switch.
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Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number:
1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment
" Recommendations for Failure Mode Validations by Testing in FAT or SAT The failure modes postulated by this calculation have specific known consequences. There is no need to validate the postulated failure modes via testing. Therefore, there are no specific recommendations for additional failure mode validation via FAT or SAT recommended by this calculation.
- Recommendations for Preventive Maintenance, Surveillance Testing, or Other Condition Monitoring This calculation has identified the following potential weaknesses and equipment failures:
PSW System detection weaknesses:
> PSW Pump Room temperature monitoring should be provided in the MCR to monitor the operation of the PSW Pump Room Exhaust Fan. This action will help to alleviate detection weaknesses in the following components: 2XPSWA-3E, 3XPSW-1 D, 2PSWPL2DC-5 and OPSWSXTRN008
> PSW MCC XPSW Breaker 4D supplies back-up power to 100HP SSF submersible pump. This pump is not typically connected to the PSW system. A failure of the XPSW 4D breaker is not detectible under normal conditions. Under accident conditions, the only failure detection method would be the observance of the submersible pump not functioning.
> PSW DC Load Center LXDC01 breakers 1A and 5A supply power to the battery 1 and battery 2 test connection boxes. No equipment is typically connected to these boxes, therefore a failure of these breakers is not detectible. While in use, the only failure detection method would be the observance of the equipment not functioning.
> PSW DC Load Center LXDC01 breakers 1B and 5B provide charging power to battery 1 and battery 2 and allow the batteries to supply power to the DC system when called upon. A failure of these breakers is not detectible. Should these breakers fail during normal operation the batteries would not be receiving their float charge and may not be completely capable of supplying their accident loads during a PSW credited Tomado/HELB event.
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Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment
> PSW DC Power panel PSWPL2DC breaker 8 supplies 125VDC control power to 4.16kV breaker test box PSWPLTB03. No equipment is typically connected to this box, therefore a failure of this breaker is not detectible. While in use, the only failure detection method would be the observance of the equipment not functioning.
> PSW DC Power panel PSWPL2DC breaker 19 supplies 125VDC control power to the PSW 600V load center undervoltage (27) relays and bus power monitor. A loss of control power or a failure of the DC breaker is not detectible and will prevent the 600V LC from alarming in the MCR on loss of power.
> PSW DC Power panel PSWPL2DC breaker 20 supplies 125VDC control power to a 24VDC power supply which supplies control power to the 600V LC micrologic trip units. A loss of control power or failure of the DC breaker is not detectible until the micrologic unit internal battery is depleted. When the micrologic unit battery is depleted, indication and functions controlled via the display panel will be unavailable.
> PSW DC Power panel 2PSWPL2DC breaker 3 supplies 125VDC control power to transfer switch OPSWSXTRN006 which feeds PSW instrument control panels OPSWIR001 and OPSWIR002. A loss of control power or failure of the DC breaker is not detectible.
However, even though DC power is supplied to this transfer switch the switch does not use DC power for any function.
> PSW DC Power panel 2PSWPL2DC breaker 4 supplies 125VDC control power to transfer switch OPSWSXTRN007 which feeds valve OPSW-0014. A loss of control power or failure of the DC breaker is not detectible if the valve AC power source is aligned to it's primary power feed 2XPSWB-4C. There is no impact to valve functionality for this non detectible failure.
PSW System Equipment failure recommendations:
> Paralleling of both Keowee and Fant power sources is possible on an inadvertent close failure of breakers B6T-B or B6T-D while PSW is aligned to the Keowee power source. This failure could cause damage to the PSW System equipment making it difficult to effect repairs within the prescribed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This calculation recommends considering opening of the APS substation 29 of 31
Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment transformer 13.8kV output breaker whenever PSW is aligned to Keowee to prevent this possible failure mode.
> At least one PSW power source is required to be available after a tornado to supply back-up power to the SSF within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. A failure of switchgear B7T would render all PSW power sources unavailable to the SSF. This calculation recommends dedicating a spare breaker on switchgear B6T to provide back-up power to the SSF in the event of a B7T switchgear failure.
> Powering the PSW switchgear from both Fant sources or both Keowee sources is possible on an inadvertent closure failure of switchgear tie breaker B7T-1. This calculation recommends considering keeping B7T-1 racked out to prevent this possible failure mode.
> Powering the XPSW MCC from both PSW and Rad Waste sources is possible on a failure of transfer switch PSWSXTRN009 with both sets of contacts closed. With power to the XPSW MCC aligned to the Rad Waste source, this calculation recommends opening the PSWLXPX13-4C breaker. With power to the XPSW MCC aligned to the PSWLXPX13-4C source, this calculation recommends opening the RW2-4D breaker to prevent this failure mode.
> Paralleling both DC Battery Chargers / Batteries to the PSWLXDC01 bus is possible on an inadvertent closure failure of breakers PSWLXDCOI-4B or PSWLXDC01-2B (if battery charger 2 is in use). This failure could cause damage to the PSW DC System equipment making it difficult to effect repairs within the prescribed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This calculation recommends racking out breaker PSWLXDC01-4B when battery charger 1 / battery 1 is in use and racking out breaker PSWLXDC01-2B when battery charger 2 /
battery 2 is in use.
Powering the Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3 HP24 and HP26 valves from both the PSW and plant sources is possible on an inadvertent closure failure of the M2 contactor in switches I(2)HPISXTRN003(4) or the M contactor in switches 3HPISXTRN003(4). This calculation recommends keeping the PSW MCC breaker open when power is aligned to the plant source.
The list of breakers to be kept open is: 1XPSW-3D, 1XPSW-4A, 2XPSWB-5C, 2XPSWB-5A, 3XPSW-3D, 3XPSW-4A.
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Originated By: Frank Calabrese Calculation Number: OSC-10008 (S&L)
Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/2011 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Protected Service Water (PSW) System -
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment
> Powering both the safety related and non-safety related PSW Instrument Panels from both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 PSW power sources is possible on a failure of transfer switch OPSWSXTRN006 with both sets of contacts closed. With power aligned to the Unit 2 power panel 2KPSW, this calculation recommends opening the 3KPSW-7 breaker. With power aligned to the Unit 3 power panel 3KPSW, this calculation recommends opening the Unit 2 2KPSW-7 breaker.
> Powering the PSW-14 valve from both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 PSW power sources is possible on a failure of transfer switch OPSWSXTRN007 with both sets on contacts closed. With power aligned to the Unit 2 MCC 2XPSWB, this calculation recommends opening the 3XPSW-5A breaker. With power aligned to the Unit 3 MCC 3XPSW, this calculation recommends opening the Unit 2 2XPSWB-4C breaker.
> Powering the PSW Pump Room Exhaust Fan from both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 PSW power sources is possible on a failure of transfer switch OPSWSXTRN008 with both sets of contacts closed. With power aligned to the Unit 2 MCC 2XPSWA, this calculation recommends opening the 3XPSW-1D breaker. With power aligned to the Unit 3 MCC 3XPSW, this calculation recommends opening the Unit 2 2XPSWA-3E breaker.
8.0 Attachments & Appendices Appendix A - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Worksheets
-Item No(s) 1-299 Electrical
- Item No(s) 300-399 Mechanical
- Item No(s) 400-513 Spare Electrical Breakers Attachment 1 - OE Search Results 31 of 31
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 1 of 182 System: . Protected Service Water_ _
Subsystem: __PSW Electrical System _ Prepared by: F. Calabrese (Rev 0)/ W. Watkins (Rev i)
RI Equipment: _B6T, B7T and Fant Line___ Date : 2/27/2012 Diagram: .0-6700 Rev. No. I No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (N) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection R a r
(_)_(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 1 B6T Electrical power Loss of output Electrical or PSW AC electrical 4.16kV bus Should the PSW System be RI Switchgear to PSW System power Mechanical power unavailable Voltage unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Bus equipment, vital failure to PSW equipment, transducer to Facility (SSF) will be credited as an I (0-6700) battery chargers, vital battery computer in alternate means of achieving and pressurizer chargers, MCR maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
heaters, HPI pressurizer heaters, valves and pump HPI valves and motor pump motor 2 B7T Alternate Loss of output Electrical or PSW AC electrical. 4.16kV bus At least one electrical power source RI Switchgear Electrical power power Mechanical power unavailable Voltage from PSW is required to be available Bus to SSF failure to SSF switchgear transducer to after a tornado for back-up power to (0-6700) switchgear OTS I OTS! computer in the SSF within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This failure from PSW MCR would render back-up power to the System SSF unavailable making it difficult to effect the necessary repairs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Recommend dedicating a spare breaker on B6T to mitigate this failure.
3 Fant Line Normal source of Loss of normal Voltage PSW Normal AC 13.8kV bus PSW AC power can be supplied from RI (0-6700) power to PSW input power - regulator electrical power 27/59 relay to the alternate safety related power System 13.8kV undervoltage, failure unavailable computer and source, Keowee if required to mitigate switchgear overvoltage, alarm in MCR a Tornado / HELB event.
short circuit, line
_ _failure. _
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 2 of 182
.. :*';=.= ;.=. ? K.
.* * . K~Failure
- .. .*"K"Mode* * "
System:- Protected Service Water Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Prepared by: F. Calabrese (Rev 0) / W. Watkins (Rev I)
RI Equipment: ... B6T-B and Keowee Date : 2/27/12 Diagram: .- ....0-6700 Rev. No. I _
Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification (3) Mode Mechanism System Detection (8)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 4 Keowee Hydro Alternate Loss of Electrical or See KC-2190 See KC-2190 See KC-2190 Station Safety Related Alternate AC Mechanical (Ref 3.126) (Ref 3.126) (Ref 3.126)
(0-6700) source of Safety Related failure power to PSW input power - RI System undervoltage, 13.8kV overvoltage, switchgear short circuit, line failure 5 B6T-B Normal supply Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW normal AC input 13.8kV bus PSW AC power can be supplied from (0-6700) 13.8kV Closed, Partial Mechanical power lost to B6T 27/59 relay to the alternate safety related power source, (OEE-601 breaker for Trip, Partial failure switchgear. See #1 for computer and Keowee if required to mitigate a sees) B6T Close, Loss of loads affected alarm in MCR Tornado / HELB event. Tie breaker series) switchgear control power B6T-B fail closed could B7T-I can be closed to power B6T BKR is N.C. cause paralleling of switchgear through B7T-D Keowee and Fant Paralleling of Keowee and Fant power power sources. sources is a credible failure mode for a B6T-B failure. This failure would render PSW unavailable making it difficult to effect the necessary repairs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Recommend opening the APS substation breaker whenever PSW is supplied from Keowee.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 3 of 182 Failure Mode System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: -F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 9/5/1 _
Equipment: __ B7T -D Rev. No. -0 Diagram: 0-6700 Method Failureof Remarks and Other Effects Component Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Identification Mode Mechanism System (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (8) 6 B7T-D Normal supply Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW normal AC input 13.8kV bus PSW AC power can be supplied from (0-6700) 13.8kV Closed, Partial Mechanical power lost to B7T 27/59 relay to the alternate safety related power source, (OEE-603 breaker for Trip, Partial failure switchgear. See #2 for computer and Keowee if required to mitigate a sees) B7T Close, Loss of loads affected alarm in MCR Tornado / HELB event. Tie breaker series) switchgear control power B7T-D fail closed could B7T-! can be closed to power B7T BKR is N.C. cause paralleling of switchgear through B6T-B Keowee and Fant Paralleling of Keowee and Fant power power sources, sources is a credible failure mode for a B7T-D failure. This failure would render PSW unavailable making it difficult to effect the necessary repairs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Recommend opening the APS substation breaker whenever PSW issupplied from Keowee.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 4 of 182 Failure ModendEffets Ar System: Protected Service Water___________ *Prepared by: F. Calabrese____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_________ Date : 9/6/2011 Equipment: __ B6T, B7T, CT6_Rev._No._0 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Method of Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or FaiMure Remarks and Other Effects Component N oIn onent Function Mode Mechanism System Dete (8)
SIdentification (l) (3) 2) () (5 (6)(7)
(6) Detection (8) 7 B6T-A Alternate Fail Open, Electrical or PSW alternate safety 4.16kV bus PSW AC power can be supplied through (0-6700) Safety Related Fail Closed, Mechanical related AC input power voltage B7T-C by closing tie breaker B7T- I thus (OEE-600 supply 13.8kV Partial Trip, failure lost to B6T switchgear. transducer to powering B6T switchgear.
series) breaker for Partial See #1 for loads affected, computer in Paralleling of Keowee and Fant power eB6T Close, Loss B6T-A fail closed could MCR sources is not a credible failure mode for switchgear of control cause paralleling of B6T-A failure as you would need a BKR is N.O. power Keowee and Fant power second failure of a Koewee breaker to sources. achieve this result. See KC-2190 8 B7T-C Alternate Fail Open, Electrical or PSW alternate safety 4.16kV bus Power to SSF loads can be supplied (0-6700) Safety Related Fail Closed, Mechanical related AC input power voltage through B6T-A by closing tie breaker (OEE-602 supply 13.8kV Partial Trip, failure lost to B7T switchgear. transducer to B7T-I thus powering B7T switchgear.
series) breaker for Partial See #2 for loads affected, computer in Paralleling of Keowee and Fant power B7T Close, Loss B7T-C fail closed could MCR sources is not a credible failure mode for switchgear of control cause paralleling of B7T-C failure as you would need a BKR is N.O. power Keowee and Fant power second failure of a Koewee breaker to sources. achieve this result. See KC-2190 9 CT6 B6T Loss of Electrical PSW normal or alternate 4.16kV bus Tie breaker B7T-1 can be closed to (0-6700) switchgear power in failure safety related AC power Voltage power B6T switchgear through B7T-C Main Loss of lost to B6T switchgear. transducer to or B7T-D Transformer power out See #1 for loads affected computer in MCR
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 5 of 182 Failure Mode a'n'd ffe~fssXiiaiygjs Worksleet-System: ...............- . Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/6/Il Equipment: _CT7, B6T-l, B7T-2 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No Identification(I dniiain()Mode Function Flue Faiur Mechanism Effects and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and(8)Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (c8 10 CT7 B7T switchgear Loss of power in Electrical PSW normal or 4.16kV bus Tie breaker B7T-I can be closed to (0-6700) Main Transformer Loss of power out failure alternate safety Voltage power B7T switchgear through related AC power transducer to B6T-A or B6T-B lost to B7T computer in switchgear. See #2 MCR for loads affected I1 B6T-l B6T switchgear Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW normal or 4.16kV bus Tie breaker B7T-I can be closed to (0-6700) Main 4.16kV Closed, Partial Mechanical alternate safety Voltage power B6T switchgear through (OEE-604 breaker Trip, Partial Close, failure related AC power transducer to B7T-C or B7T-D series) BKR is N.C. Loss of control lost to B6T computer in power switchgear. See #1 MCR for loads affected 12 B7T-2 B7T switchgear Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW normal or 4.16kV bus Tie breaker B7T-I can be closed to (0-6700) Main 4.16kV Closed, Partial Mechanical alternate safety Voltage power B7T switchgear through (OEE-605 breaker Trip, Partial Close, failure related AC power transducer to B6T-A or B6T-B BKR is N.C. Loss of control lost to B7T computer in series) power switchgear. See #2 MCR for loads affected I I
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 6 of 182
" ,.Faiu re Mode and%ffects Analysis Worksheet System: ___Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 10/19/I11 Equipment: .... B7T-!, B7T-4, OTSI-0 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 No omoet Component Function Failure Fon Failure Train Effects onTan Failureof Method Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System (1) (2) (3) (2) (4)
() (5)
(5 (6)
(6)(7) Detection (8) 13 B7T-I B6T / B7T Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Operator selected Breaker Norma] system alignment is for the (0-6700) switchgear 4.16kV Closed, Partial Mechanical bus alignment is indication tie breaker to be open.
(OEE-606 tie breaker Trip, Partial Close, failure not available. (local & Open failures are mitigated by series) BKR is N.O. Loss of control Operator actions to MCR) supplying B6T and B7T from both power open and/or close source breakers.
other 13.8kV Inadvertent closure of B7T- I would and/or 4.16kV place 4.16kV power from both Fant breakers. required sources or both Keowee sources on to PSWachieve powerrequired the PSW switchgear Recommend keepingsimultaneously.
B7T- I racked alignment, out to prevent this failure.
14 B7T-4 Alternate Electrical Fail Open, Fail Electrical or See OSC-9510 See See OSC-9510 (0-6700) power to SSF Closed, Partial Mechanical OSC-9510 (OEE-615 series) switchgear OTSI Trip, Partial Close, failure from PSW System Loss of control series) power 15 OTSI-0 Connects alternate Fail Open, Fail Electrical or See OSC-9510 See See OSC-9510 (0-6700) PSW power to SSF Closed, Partial Mechanical OSC-9510 switchgear OTS I Trip, Partial Close, failure Loss of control power
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 7 of 182 Failu e Mode and fects Analysis Workse..
System: __Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: ...............
PSW Electrical System Pare: ___F.
Date : ____9/28/Il_______a Equipment: B6T-2, B6T-3 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ....
0-6700 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection "
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) .. (7) (8) 16 B6T-2 4.16kV switchgear Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to: Breaker indication %. Loss of power to PSW building MCC and (0-6700) breaker for PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical UI, U2, U3 Aux (Iocal.& MCR) .. '.. UI, U2, U3 Aux Building MCCs renders (OEE-607 Load Center Partial Trip, failure Bldg MCCs, OAC in the main PSW unavailable.
series) Transformer Partial Pressuizer control room Should the PSW System be unavailable, the PSWTFPX BKR. is N.C.13 Close, Loss of control Heater switchesXfer and* 27 UV relay on Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be power PSW Bldg MCC PX 13 alarms in credited as an alternate means of achieving MCR and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
17 B6T-3 4.16kV switchgear Fail Open, Electrical or PSW AC Power Breaker indication PSW is available for tornado / HELB (0-6700) breaker for Manual Fail Closed, Mechanical to both HPI (local & MCR) events for Units 2 and 3. For Unit 1.
Alignment Switch Partial Trip, failure injection Pump tornado /HELB, the Standby Shutdown (OEE-609 series) IHPISXALGNOOI IPSA N01 Partial PrilmtrIAnd motorsIond control OAC in room the mai:. . Facility (SSF) will be credited as an BKR is N.O. Close, Loss I B is alternate means of achieving and of control unavailable, maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
power See Item No. 334 (1HPI-PUOOO1(2) for additional info.
Under normal operation, should the breaker inadvertently close, power will be available at the manual alignment switch and subsequently one of the downstream motor operated transfer switches. There is no further impact however, as the downstream motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 8 of 182 I~ Failure Mode and*Effcts. A lysi ,- .,, .,**...o ,, *=, o, : *.,:
System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: _PSW Electrical System Date: _28/1 I Equipment: _B6T-4 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 . ...
Effects on Method of Component Flue Fair Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects No m on Function (1) (2) Mode Mechanism System Detection (8)
(Identificato (3) ((6) (7) 18 B6T-4 4.16kV switchgear Fail Open, Electrical or PSW AC Breaker PSW is available for tornado / HELB events for (0-6700) breaker for Manual Fail Closed, Mechanical Power to both indication Units I and 3. For Unit 2 tornado / HELB, the (OEE-611 Alignment Switch Partial Trip, failure HPI Injection (local & MCR) Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited series) 2HPISXALGN001 Partial Pump motors OAC in t as an alternate means of achieving and BKR is N.O. Close, of Loss control 2A and 2B is unavailable. main control ancoto maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
room See Item No. 334 (2HPI-PU001(2) for additional power info.
Under normal operation, should the breaker inadvertently close, power will be available at the manual alignment switch and subsequently one of the downstream motor operated transfer switches.
There is no further impact however, as the downstream motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 9 of 182
,: .;:.-~::
,Failure vModeand. ffecis Anal System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
PSW Electrical System Subsystem:.............
Date. 0_
9/28/1 Equipment: _1B6T-5 0-6700 Diagram: .............
Effects on Method of No Component Function Foue Fair Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) Mode Mechanism System Detection (8)
Idniicto (3) (4) (*(6) (7) 19 B6T-5 4.16kV switchgear Fail Open, Electrical or PSW AC Breaker PSW is available for tornado / HELB events for (0-6700) breaker for Manual Fail Closed, Mechanical Power to both indication Units I and 2. For Unit 3 tornado / HELB, the (OEE-613 Alignment Switch Partial Trip, failure HPI Injection (local & MCR) Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited series) 3HPISXALGN001 Partial Pump motors as an alternate means of achieving and BKR is N.O. Close, Loss of control 3A and 3B is unavailable. OC h maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
MCRmanannSDfothfit72ous See Item No. 334 (3HPI-PU0001(2) for additional power info.
Under normal operation, should the breaker inadvertently close, power will be available at the manual alignment switch and subsequently one of the downstream motor operated transfer switches.
There is no further impact however, as the downstream motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 10 of 182 FailureMoeadEfcsA a44 0Aw System: ........ Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: :10/18/I I Equipment: __ 16BT-6 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Component Effects on Method of No m on Function Fiue Faiur Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) . (7) 20 B6T-6 4.16kV switchgear Fail Open, Electrical or PSW Primary Breaker Should the PSW System be unavailable, the (0-6700) breaker for PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical Pump indication Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited (OEE-608 Primary Pump Partial Trip, failure unavailable (local & MCR) as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining series) Motor Partial and therefore QAC in the SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OPSWMR0002 Close, Loss PSW is MCR See Item No. 300 (OPSWPU0002) for additional BKR is N.O. of control unavailable info.
power Pump status indication in Under normal operation, should the breaker MCR inadvertently close, power will be available at the primary pump and the pump will attempt to start.
However, since the primary pump is interlocked with the booster pump and the booster pump is not running in this failure, the primary pump will be unable to start. Therefore, there is no impact.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 11 of 182 Failure Made and Effteet, Aq jsi**.W k hee..t. . .
System: __-Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: ~F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System__ Date : _____10/18/11 Equipment: B6T-7 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Failure Failure Effects Efcsoon Method ehdoof Component No Identification Function Fiue Fair Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects
() (2)Mode(I) (2)(3)(4)(5)(6) Mechanism System (7)
Detection (8) 21 B6T-7 4.16kV Fail Open. Electrical or PSW Booster Breaker Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby (0-6700) switchgear Fail Closed, Mechanical Pump indication Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an (OEE-632 breaker for Partial Trip, failure unavailable (local & MCR) alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for PSW Booster Partial and therefore the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
series) Pump Motor Close, Loss PSW is OCi h PumpWMRoto Cofe, c ols unvill MCR See Item No. 301 (OPSWPUOOO1) for additional info.
0PSWMR0001 of control unavailable BKR is N.O. power Pump status Under normal operation, should the breaker indication in inadvertently close, power will be available at the MCR booster pump and the pump will start.
22 Not Used 23 Not Used 24 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 12 of 182 SFaili&~0-de and'Effects -Ana*ikoksheet System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: .F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 9/29/11 Equipment: __I HPISXALGNOO I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No Identification c ation Function Mode Mode Faism Mechanism and/or oSystem Effects Failure Deeto(8 Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (7) 25 IHPISXALGNOOI Manuail Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power Switch PSW is available for tornado / HELB events for (0-6700) alignment fails open Mechanical to either HPI position Units 2 and 3. For Unit I tornado /HELB, the switch Contact set failure Injection Pump indication Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be provides fails closed motors IA or I B (white light) credited as an alternate means of achieving and operators the Switch fails is unavailable, in MCR lost. maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
ability to select to transfer Ability to select PSW still available but only I train of HPI is either B trainthe A or HPI between HPI available through PSW power source.
pump. pumps I A or lB Under normal operation should the alignment is lost. switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to both the IA & I B HP! pumps simultaneously. However, since the upstream switchgear breaker B6T-3 is open and the motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source, paralleling power sources to the HPI pumps is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 13 of 182 Failu:re Md System: .........................
Protected Service Water Prepared by: _ F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 9/29/11 Equipment: 2HPISXALGNOO I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700 on Tain Method of Remarks and Other Effects Component Failure Failure Effects onFailure No Identification Function Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 26 2HPISXALGNOOI Manual Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power Switch PSW is available for tornado / HELB events for (0-6700) alignment fails open Mechanical to either HPI position Units I and 3. For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, the switch Contact set failure Injection Pump indication Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited provides fails closed motors 2A or 2B (white light) as an alternate means of achieving and operators the Switch fails is unavailable, in MCR lost. maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
ability to to transfer Ability to select PSW still available but only I train of HPl is select the A oreither B t rnfrAiiyt eetPWsilaalbebtol ri fHIi between HPI available through PSW power source.
train HPI pumps 2A or 2B Under normal operation should the alignment pump. is lost. switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to both the 2A & 2B HPI pumps simultaneously. However, since the upstream switchgear breaker B6T-4 is open and the motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source, paralleling power sources to the HPI pumps is not credible
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 14 of 182 Failure Mode and Efet AnaysisWorksheet System: .......... Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: ______F. Calabrese____
Subsystem: __...PSW Electrical System Date :9129/I11 Equipment: _3HPISXALGN00 1, PSWTFPX 13 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700, 0-6707 Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train **Failure Remarks and Other Effects (o Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 27 3HPISXALGN001 Manual Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power Switch PSW is available for tornado / HELB events for (0-6700) alignment fails open Mechanical to either HPI position Units I and 2. For Unit 3 tornado /HELB, the switch Contact set failure Injection Pump indication Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be provides fails closed motors 3A or 3B (white light) credited as an alternate means of achieving and operators the Switch fails is unavailable, in MCR lost. maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
ability to slceihr to transfer Ability to select PSW still available but only 1 train of HPI is the A and B between HPI available through PSW power source.
train HPI pumps 3A or 3B Under normal operation should the alignment pump. is lost. switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to both the 3A & 3B HPI pumps simultaneously. However, since the upstream switchgear breaker B6T-5 is open and the motor operated transfer switch is aligned to the plant source, paralleling power sources to the HPI pumps is not credible.
28 PSWTFPX 13 Provides Loss of Electrical Loss of power to 27 under Loss of power to PSW building MCC and U1, (0-6707) 600VAC power in failure U 1, U2, U3 Aux voltage relay U2, U3 Aux Building MCCs renders PSW power to Loss of Bldg MCCs, on PX13 unavailable.
PSW Load Center power out Pressurizer Heater Xfer alarms in Should the PSW System be unavailable, the MCRShudtePWysebenaialte PSWLXPXI switches and Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be 3 sw and credited as an alternate means of achieving and 3P5W Bldg MCC maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 15 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Ana6ysi jrksh'eet System:_ .... Service Water
- ...Protected Prepared by: ~.F.9/29/11 Calabrese_____
Date:
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Re N 9 Equipment: I HPISXTRN00 1, IHPISXTRN002 E E-6 10 -0 1 .....
D ia gra m : __. .. .OEE-6 10 , O Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 29 1HPISXTRNOOI Motor Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power White No impact to PSW functionality. HPI train IB can be (OEE-61 0) operated fails open Mechanical to HPI Injection and/or used through alignment switch IHPISXALGNOO1.
xfer switch Contact set failure Pump motor IA Yellow No impact to HPI functionality on non-PSW credited provides fails closed is lost. lights in events. HPI train IB is available.
motive SwthaisSainAMC power to the Switch fails Station AC MCR Under normal operation should the motor operated pA HPI to transfer power to HPI indicating transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, IAmotor pum fomInjection IA Pump is lost, switch position are power could be available to IA HPI pump from both PSWo lost PSW and plant sources. However, since the upstream PSW switchgear breaker B6T-3 is open paralleling power sources to the HPI pump is not credible.
30 IHPISXTRN002 Motor Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power White No impact to PSW functionality. HPI train IA can be (OEE-610-01) operated fails open Mechanical to HPI Injection and/or used through alignment switch IHPISXALGNOO1.
xfer switch provides Contact set fails closed failure Pump is lost, motor I B Yellow lights in No impact to HPI functionality on non-PSW credited provdes ail cloed s lot. ight in events. HPI train I A is available.
motiveMC potote Switch fails Station AC MCR power to the indicating Under normal operation should the motor operated I B HPI to transfer power to HPI switch transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, pump from Injection Pump position are power could be available to IB HPI pump from both PSW PSW. motor IB is lost. lost and plant sources. However, since the upstream PSW switchgear breaker B6T-3 is open paralleling power sources to the HPI pump is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 16 of 182 "Faiure Mode and Effecs A System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 9/29/11 Equipment: 2HPISXTRNOOI, 2HPISXTRN002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-612, OEE-612-01 ponen on rain Component Failure Failure Effects onFailure Method of Remarks and Other Effects No Identification Function Mode Mechanism and/or System Fete R8)
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (8)
- (7) 31 2HPISXTRN001 Motor Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power White No impact to PSW functionality. HPI train 2B can be (OEE-612) operated xfer fails open Mechanical to HPI Injection and/or used through alignment switch 2HPISXALGNOO1.
switch Contact set failure Pump motor 2A Yellow No impact to HPI functionality on non-PSW credited provides fails closed is lost, lights in events. HPI train 2B is available.
motive power Switch fails Station AC MCR to from to transfer power to HPI indicating Under normal operation should the motor operated pump from Injection Pump switch transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, PSW.motor 2A is lost position power could be available to 2A HPI pump from both are lost PSW and plant sources. However, since the upstream PSW switchgear breaker B6T-4 is open paralleling power sources to the HPI pump is not credible.
32 2HPISXTRN002 Motor Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power White No impact to PSW functionality. HPI train 2A can be (OEE-612-01) operated xfer fails openset Mechanical to HPI Injection and/or used through alignment switch 2HPISXALGNOOI.
switch poides Contact failure Pump motor 2B Yellow fonais csed isilure provides fails closed is lumost, lost. 3 Ylgs Ilights iin No impactBPItotrain events. HPI 2A functionality on non-PSW credited is available.
motive power Switch fails Station AC MCR to from to transfer power to H2I indicating Under normal operation should the motor operated pump from Injection Pump switch transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, PSW.motor 2 is lost position power could be available to 2B HPI pump from both are lost PSW and plant sources. However, since the upstream PSW switchgear breaker B6T-4 is open paralleling power sources to the HPI pump is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 17 of 182 Failuire Mode System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/29/11 Equipment: _ HPISXTRN00 I, 3HPISXTRN002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _OEE-614, OEE-614-01 No Coipnn t ponentFailure Function Fiuealre Failure Effects on Train EecsFailure Method of Remarks and Other Effects No Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Dete (a )
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (8) 33 3HPISXTRN001 Motor Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power White No impact to PSW functionality. HPI train 3B can be (OEE-614) operated xfer fails open Mechanical to HPI Injection and/or used through alignment switch 3HPISXALGN001.
switch Contact provdesset fais failure clsedis Pump motor 3A ost.li~ Yellowin No impact to HP! functionality on non-PSW credited provides fails closed is lost. lights in events. HPI train 3B is available.
motive power Switch fails Station AC MCR to the 3A HPI ransfer power to HPI indicating Under normal operation should the motor operated pump from Injection Pump switch transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, PSW. motor 3A is lost position power could be available to 3A HPI pump from both are lost PSW and plant sources. However, since the upstream PSW switchgear breaker B6T-5 is open paralleling power sources to the HPI pump is not credible.
34 3HPISXTRN002 Motor Contact set Electrical or PSW AC Power White No impact to PSW functionality. HPI train 3A can be (OEE-614-01) operated xfer fails open Mechanical to HPI Injection and/or used through alignment switch 3HPISXALGN001.
switch Contact set failure Pump motor 3B Yellow provides fails closed is lost. lights in No impact to HPI functionality on non-PSW credited motive power Switch fails Station AC MCR events. HPI train 3A is available.
to the 3B HPI ransfer power to HP! indicating Under normal operation should the motor operated pump from Injection Pump switch transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, PSW. motor 3B is lost position power could be available to 3B HPI pump from both are lost PSW and plant sources. However, since the upstream PSW switchgear breaker B6T-5 is open paralleling power sources to the HPI pump is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 18 of 182 Failure-Mode and Effee'ts A nAy'sis 0r let System: ____Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: _.__F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System________ Date : ____9/30/Il ______
Equipment: _PSWLXPX 13, PSWLXPX13 Breaker 5B__ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707..........
0-670 No No Component Identification Function (3) Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Effects and/or on Train System Method Failure of Detection Remarks and(8)Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (_ )
35 PSWLXPXI3 PSW 600VAC Loss of output Electrical or Loss of power to 27 under voltage Loss of power to PSW building MCC and (0-6707) Load Center power - Mechanical UI, U2, U3 Aux relay on UI, U2, U3 Aux Building MCCs renders feeding PSW complete bus failure Bldg MCCs, PSWLXPXI3 PSW unavailable.
building MCC failure Pressurizer Heater alarms in MCR Should the PSW System be unavailable, and U 1, U2 and Xfer switches and Bldg MCCthe the StandbyPa WSystemFacility Shutdown bavilable (SSF) will U3 Aux Building PSW Bldg MCC be credited as an alternate means of MCCs achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
36 PSWLXPX 13 - PSW 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to 27 under voltage Loss of power to PSW buildingMCC and 5B Load Center Closed, Partial Mechanical U I, U2, U3 Aux relay on U1, U2, U3 Aux Building MCCs renders (0-6707) Main breaker Trip, Partial failure Bldg MCCs, PSWLXPXI3 PSW unavailable.
(OEE-633 feeding PSW Close, Loss of Pressurizer Heater alarms in MCR Should the PSW System be unavailable, series) building MCC control power Xfer switches and Breaker the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will and U I, U2 and PSW Bldg MCC indication (local) be credited as an alternate means of U3 Aux Building is lost. achieving and maintaining SSD for the MCCs first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
BKR is N.C. OAC point in MCR for PSW LC Bkr Trouble
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 19 of 182 FailureMode and. f cts A'.sis W*'rksheet System: Protected Service Water Subsystem: ... PSW Electrical System Prepared by: __ F. Calabrese (Rev 0) /W. Watkins (Rev 1)_.,.
RI Equipment: -....PSWLXPX 13 Breaker IB Date : 2/29/12 Diagram: 0-6707 Rev. No. I1 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection I o (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 37 PSWLXPX 13 - PSW feed to Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication Loss of ability to power Unit 3 Bank 4 RI IB manual xfer switch Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 3 (local & East Pen Group J pressurizer heaters from PSW (0-6707) 3PSWSXTRN003 Partial Trip, failure pressurizer Room) lost. will require sufficient heater capacity to (OEE-365-10 series) for pressurizer heater MCC 3XJ Partial Close, Loss heaters on MCC 3XJ drops OAC for PSW LCinBkr point MCR be PSW powered from the is available for SSF.
tornado / HELB BKR is N.O. of control operable kW Trouble events for Units I and 2.
power below TS 3 .4.9 limit of 400kW White indicating light Under normal operation, should the on the MTS is lost. breaker inadvertently close, power will be available at the manual transfer Bank 4 heater switch. There is no further impact operating status is however, as the manual transfer switch indicated on their RZ is aligned to the plant source.
module in MCR
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 20 of 182
>~Failure Mode and Effects A alssW kshe System: . Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __ F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: .............
PSW Electrical System_ Date : 9/30/__
Equipment: PSWLXPX 13 Breakers ID, 2A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ....... 0-6707_
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection deif(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 7 (8) 38 PSWLXPXI3 - PSW feed to Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication Loss of ability to power Unit 3 ID manual xfer switch Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 3 (local & East Pen Bank 3 Group F and Bank 4 (0-6707) 3PSWSXTRN004 Partial Trip, failure pressurizer Room) lost. Group I pressurizer heaters from (OEE-365-08 for pressurizer Partial heaters on MCC OAC point in MCR for PSW will require sufficient heater series) heater MCC 3Xi Close, Loss 3XI drops PSW LC Bkr Trouble capacity to be powered from the BKR is N.O. of control power operable below TSkW 3.4.9 Wite indicating light Wieidctn ih SSF.
limit of 400kW on the MTS is lost. PSW is available for tornado I Bank 3 and Bank 4 W HELB events for Units I and 2.
heater operating status Under normal operation, should is indicated on their RZ the breaker inadvertently close, module in MCR power will be available at the manual transfer switch. There is no further impact however, as the manual transfer switch is aligned
_ _to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 21 of 182 z...*:
..... .. FailureModeand tfet na'lyi W rksheet..*',......** ....* ..
System: ..............Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/30/11 Equipment: ... PSWLXPX13 Breaker 2A Rev. No. 0
.. 0..0-6707 Diagram: ...........
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection i i(2) i ( (4) (5) (6) (8) 39 PSWLXPX 13 - PSW feed to Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication Loss of ability to power Unit 3 2A manual xfer switch Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 3 . (local & East Pen Bank I Group A and K (0-6707) 3PSWSXTRN005 Partial Trip, failure pressurizer Room) lost. pressurizer heaters from PSW (OEE-36509 for pressurizer Partial heaters on MCC point in MCR for wlOAC sufficient heater wilrequire series) heater MCC 3XK Close, Loss 3XK drops PSW LC Bkr Trouble capac BKR is N.O. of control operable kW SSF.
power below TS 3.4.9 White indicating light PSW is available for tornado I limit of 400kW on the MTS is lost. HELB events for Units I and 2.
Bank 1 heater operating Under normal operation, should status indicated by red the breaker inadvertently close, power will be available at the manual transfer switch. There is no further impact however, as the manual transfer switch is aligned to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 22 of 182 Failure Mode anu nci System: Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : :
Pare FC 9/30/11lbe___
Equipment: _PSWLXPXI3 Breaker 2B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 Effects on No
() Component
() ()Mode Idntfiato Function (3) Failure Failusm
()5)System Mechanism Train Sytmand/or . Method of Failure Detection(8
()(8) Remarks and Other Effects (denti(cation I (3)((6) (7) 40 PSWLXPX13 - PSW feed to Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power Breaker indication Loss of ability to power Unit 1 Bank 2 2B manual xfer switch Fail Closed, Mechanical to Unit I (local and East Pen Group D, Bank 3 Group G, and Bank (0-6707) 1PSWSXTRN004 Partial Trip, failure pressurizer Room) lost. 4 Group J pressurizer heaters from for pressurizer Partial heaters on PSW will require sufficient heater (OEE-165-08 heater MCC IXJ Close, Loss MCC IXJ OAC point in MCR pWwill require ffiietheater series) BKR is N.O. of control drops operable for PSW LC Bkr capacity to be powered from the SSF.
power kW below TS Trouble PSW is available for tornado / HELB 3.4.9 limit of White indicating light, events for Units 2 and 3.
400kW on the MTS is lost. Under normal operation, should the breaker inadvertently close, power will Bank 2, Bankr a be available at the manual transfer eatink 4 sater i switch. There is no further impact operating status is however, as the manual transfer switch indiled on trR is aligned to the plant source.
module in MCR
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 23 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Anayi$ okhe System: .......... Protected Service Water Prepared by: - F. Calabrese (Rev 0)/ W. Watkins (Rev 1)__ ._*
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 2/29/12 RI Equipment: _PSWLXPX13 Breaker 2C Rev. No. I Diagram: 0-6707 Component Compon Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Effects ond Method of Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) 41 PSWLXPXI3 - PSW feed to Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power Breaker indication Loss of ability to power Unit 2 Bank 3 2C manual xfer switch Fail Closed, Mechanical to Unit 2 (local & East Pen Group G and Bank 4 Group J RI (0-6707) 2PSWSXTRN003 Partial Trip, failure pressurizer Room) lost. pressurizer heaters from PSW will (OEE-265- I0 for pressurizer Partial heaters on require sufficient heater capacity to be series) heater MCC 2XJ Close, Loss MCC 2XJ ACfor PswintLinMCR powered from the SSF.
BKR is N.O. of control drops operable Trouble PSW is available for tornado / HELB power kW below TS Tevents for Units I and 3.
3.4.9 limit of White indicating light 400kW on the MTS is lost. Under normal operation, should the Bank 3 and Bank 4 breaker inadvertently close, power will Beankr operatnd Bbe available at the manual transfer heater operating switch. There is no further impact their RZ module in however, as the manual transfer switch rRZ mis aligned to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 24 of 182 FailureMode 1
A ' ý System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: :__F. Calabrese Subsystem: _ PSW Electrical System Date: 9/30/I !
Equipment: _PSWLXPXI3 Breaker 2D Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 0.............
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects No (i) Identification (2) ()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6)
System *.(7)() Detection 42 PSWLXPXI3 - PSW feed to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss ofrpower to Breaker indication Loss of ability to power Unit 2 2D manual xfer switch Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 pressurizer (local & East Pen Bank I Group A and K (0-6707) 2PSWSXTRN005 Trip, Partial failure heaters on MCC Room) lost. pressurizer heaters from PSW
'OEE-265-09 for pressurizer Close, Loss of 2XK. Operable will require sufficient heater sees) heater MCC 2XK control power heater kW may be OACcapacity to be powered from the series)BKR is N.O. BK i NO.limit belowofTS 3.4.9 for PSW LC Bkr SSF.
400kW Trouble Whmte indicatingrlight PSW is available for tornado /
White indicating light HELB events for Units I and 3.
on the MTS is lost.
Bank I heater Under normal operation, should operating status the breaker inadvertently close, indicated by red light power will be available at the manual transfer switch. There in MCR. is no further impact however, as the manual transfer switch is aligned to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 25 of 182
-o Faiiur"e ail a, System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by:" ___F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_________ Date : _____9/30/I I_______
Equipment: __PSWLXPX 13 Breaker 3BR. Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure and Other Effects Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (I) (2) (_ ) (4) (5) (6) (7) (_ )
43 PSWLXPXI3 - PSW feed to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication Loss of ability to power Unit I 3B manual xfer switch Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit I pressurizer (local & East Pen Bank I Group A and K (0-6707) IPSWSXTRN005 Trip, Partial failure heaters on MCC Room) lost. pressurizer heaters from PSW (OEE-165-09 for pressurizer Close, Loss of IXK drops will require sufficient heater series) heater MCC I XK control power operable kW below OAC point in MCR capacity to be powered from the BKR is N.O. TS 3.4.9 limit of Tr CSSF.
400kW TPSW is available for tornado /
White indicating light HELB events for Units 2 and 3.
on the MTS is lost.
Bank I heater Under normal operation, should operating status the breaker inadvertently close, indicated by red light power will be available at the ind byR manual transfer switch. There is no further impact however, as the manual transfer switch is aligned to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 26 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Ana.lysis Workshee System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Pare: :
Date . 9/30/11!
Caars_____
Equipment: _PSWLXPX13 Breakers 3C, 3D_____ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification Fno Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
()(2) ()(4) (5) (6) (7) 44 PSWLXPX 13 - 3C PSW feed to Aux Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication PSW is available for tornado/
(0-6707) building MCC Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 2 PSW valves, (local) is lost. HELB events for Units I and 3.
(OEE-265-11 2XPSWA and Partial Trip, failure HPI valves, pump OAC point in MCR For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, the series) 2XPSWB Partial room exhaust fan, forStandby Shutdown Facility BKR is N.C. Close, Loss Vital I&C battery for (SSF) will be credited as an of control chargers and power Trouble alternate means of achieving power panel 2KPSW Bus monitor on MCC and maintaining SSD for the 2XPSWA alarms in first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
MCR 45 PSWLXPXI3 - 3D PSW feed to Aux Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication PSW is available for tornado /
(0-6707) building MCC Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 3 PSW valves, (local) is lost. HELB events for Units I and 2.
(OEE-365-1 I 3XPSW Partial Trip, failure HPI valves, pump OAC point in MCR For Unit 3 tornado /HELB, the series) BKR is N.C. Partial room exhaust fan, for PSW LC Bkr Standby Shutdown Facility Close, Loss Vital I&C battery Trouble (SSF) will be credited as an of control chargers and power alternate means of achieving power panel 3KPSW Bus monitor on MCC and maintaining SSD for the 3XPSW alarms in first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 27 of 182 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS WORKSHEET I
System: ............................
Protected Service W ater Prepared by: F. Calabrese_
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System__
Date : 9/29/11 Equipment: _ PSWLXPX 13 Breaker 4B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) -
Identif(4) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection
( (5) (6)(7) (8) 46 PSWLXPX13 - PSW feed to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication Loss of ability to power Unit 2 4B manual xfer switch Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 (local & East Pen Bank 3 Group F and Bank 4 (0-6707) 2PSWSXTRN004 Trip, Partial failure pressurizer Room) lost. Group I pressurizer heaters from (OEE-265-08 for pressurizer Close, Loss of heaters on MCC point in MCR PSW will require sufficient heater heater MCC 2XI control power 2XI drops capacity to be powered from the series) BKR is N.O. operable kW for PSW LC Bkr SSF.
below o TS 3.4.9 belowTS 4.9 Trul WTroubeindPSW is available for tornado limit of 400kW White indicating light HELB events for Units I and 3.
on the MTS is lost.
Bank 3 and Bank 4 Under normal operation, should heater othe breaker inadvertently close, stats ioperating power will be available at the statis inmodited on manual transfer switch. There is trR mno further impact however, as the manual transfer switch is aligned to the plant source.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 28 of 182 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
- i.i. . 7 .< .Faildure Mode and.Effeefs Anal ... . . . ....
System: Protected Service Water Subsystem: PSW Electrical System ________
Date : 9/29/11 Equipment: _PSWLXPX 13 Breakers 4C, 4D Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 47 PSWLXPX 13 - 4C PSW feed to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication Power to XPSW loads can be (0-6707) manual xfer switch Closed, Partial Mechanical PSW building (local) is lost. supplied from Rad Waste Load (OEE-625 series) PSWSXTRN009 Trip, Partial failure house loads, safety Center RW2 through manual for MCC XPSW Close, Loss of and non-safety for PSW LC Bkr xfernswitchg WSXTRN009 BKR is N.C. control power HVAC and PSW Trouble battery chargers Bus monitor on MCC XPSW alarms in MCR 48 PSWLXPX13 - 4D PSW feed to Aux Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Breaker indication PSW is available for tornado /
(0-6707) building MCC Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit I PSW valves, (local) is lost. HELB events for Units 2 and 3.
(OEE-165-11 IXPSW Trip, Partial failure HPI valves, Vital OAC point in MCR For Unit I tornado /HELB, the series) BKR is N.C. Close, Loss of I&C battery for PSW LC Bkr Standby Shutdown Facility control power chargers and power Trouble (SSF) will be credited as an panel IKPSW alternate means of achieving Bus monitor on and maintaining SSD for the MCC IXPSW first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
alarms in MCR 49 Not Used 50 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 29 of 182
. , i. _____
____ ____ Fail'ure Mode and Effects
____ ____ _ nalyS W.
lyWorjsheet, A System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: .. PSW Electrical System Date: 10/4/11 Equipment: __I PSWSXTRN004ReN. Rev. No. 0 Diagram: O-703-E No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects
()(2) Identification F3o ()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6)System Detection (7)() (8) 51 1PSWSXTRN004 Provides for Contact Electrical or PSW AC power to White indicating Loss of ability to power Unit I Bank 2 (0-703-F) AC power set fails Mechanical Unit I pressurizer light on the MTS is Group D, Bank 3 Group G and Bank 4 transfer open failure heater MCC IXJ is lost. Group J pressurizer heaters from PSW capability for Contact lost dropping Ba 3 and will require sufficient heater capacity to pressurizer set fails operable kW below operblekW blow Bank Bank 24,eheaterat d be powered from the SSF.
heater MCC closed TS 3.4.9 limit of lXa from ch 400kW operating status Loss of power to pressurizer heater MCC nomaSwitch sto indicated is on their IXJ may put Unit I in LCO 3.4.9 until normal station fails to Station AC power RZ module in power to MCC I XJ can be restored power to PSW transfer to Unit I MCR through manual closure of MCC IXJ power pressurizer heater breaker 5A and LC I X6 breaker 6A, or MCC IXJ is lost until the lost heater load is replaced via heaters powered from the SSF.
Under normal operation should the transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to the IXJ pressurizer heater MCC from both PSW and plant sources.
However, since the upstream PSW load center breaker PSWLXPXi3-2B is open paralleling power sources to the pressurizer heaters is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 30 of 182
.. * . .,.... .... .... * ,..railu'ri ....
- ......".....................Fa Mede.an....Ef.....
ModeanduEffect Ana:.............
Analysis Wor ____
System: - -Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System ... ...................... 0/4/11 Equipment: _I1PSWSXTRN005 R.e.N Rev. No. - 0 Diagram:,. -.-- 0-703-D Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method Remarks and Other Effects No Identification ()Detection Mode Mechanism and/or System Faiure (8)
(I) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 52 1PSWSXTRNO05 Provides for Contact Electrical or PSW AC power to White Loss of ability to power Unit I Bank I Group (O-703-D) AC power set fails Mechanical Unit I pressurizer indicating light A and K pressurizer heaters from PSW will transfer open failure heater MCC IXK on the MTS is require sufficient heater capacity to be capability for Contact is lost dropping lost. powered from the SSF.
pressurizer set fails operable kW below heater MCC closed TS 3.4.9 limit of Bank I heater Loss of power to pressurizer heater MCC IXK from cl 400kW operating IXK may put Unit I in LCO 3.4.9 until Switch status power to MCC IXK can be restored through normal station fails to Station AC power indicated by manual closure of MCC I XK breaker 2B and power to PSW transfer to Unit I red light in LC I X6 breaker 6B, or until the lost heater power pressurizer heater MCR load is replaced via heaters powered from the MCC IXK is lost SSF.
Under normal operation should the transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to the 1XK pressurizer heater MCC from both PSW and plant sources. However, since the upstream PSW load center breaker PSWLXPX I3-3B is open paralleling power sources to the pressurizer heaters is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 31 of 182 Faiure Mod and:EffectsAnalysis .Workshe System:... Protected Service Water Prepared by: _ F. Calabrese (Rev 0) I W. Watkins (Rev I)._ _
Subsystem: _ PSW Electrical System Date: 2/29/12 RI Equipment: _2PSWSXTRN003._ Rev. No. _ 1 Diagram: ____O- 1703-C..
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 53 2PSWSXTRN003 Provides for Contact Electrical or PSW AC power to White indicating Loss of ability to power Unit 2 Bank 3 (0- 1703-E) AC power set fails Mechanical Unit 2 pressurizer light on the MTS is Group G and Bank 4 Group J pressurizer transfer open failure heater MCC 2XJ is lost. heaters from PSW will require sufficient capability for Contact lost dropping Bank 3 and Bank 4 heater capacity to be powered from the pressurizer set fails operable kW below SSF.
heater MCC closed TS 3.4.9 limit of heater operating RI 2XJ from Switch 400kW status is indicated Loss of power to pressurizer heater MCC normal station on their RZ module 2XJ may put Unit 2 in LCO 3.4.9 until fails to Station AC power in MCR power to MCC 2XJ can be restored power to PSW transfer to Unit 2 through manual closure of MCC 2XJ power pressurizer heater breaker 5A and LC 2X5 breaker 6A, or MCC 2XJ is lost until the lost heater load is replaced via heaters powered from the SSF.
Under normal operation should the transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to the 2XJ pressurizer heater MCC from both PSW and plant sources.
However, since the upstream PSW load center breaker PSWLXPX I 3-2C is open paralleling power sources to the pressurizer heaters is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 32 of 182 Failure Mode System: ... _............
Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 9/30/1l Equipment: ___ 2PSWSXTRNO04___
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _ O-1703-D No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 54 2PSWSXTRN004 Provides for Contact Electrical or PSW AC power to White indicating Loss of ability to power Unit 2 Bank 3 (0-I 703-D) AC power set fails Mechanical Unit 2 pressurizer light on the MTS is Group F and Bank 4 Group I pressurizer transfer open failure heater MCC 2X! is lost. heaters from PSW will require sufficient capability for Contact lost dropping Bank 3 and Bank 4 heater capacity to be powered from the pressurizer heater MCC set fails closed operable TS 3.4.9 kWlimitbelow of heater oSSF.
operating 2XI from Switch 400kW status is indicated Loss of power to pressurizer heater MCC nXIforma Swih 4on their RZ module 2XI may put Unit 2 in LCO 3.4.9 until normal station fails to Station AC power in MCR power to MCC 2XI can be restored power to PSW transfer to Unit 2 through manual closure of MCC 2XI power pressurizer heater breaker 5A and LC 2X4 breaker 6A, or MCC 2XI is lost until the lost heater load is replaced via heaters powered from the SSF.
Under normal operation should the transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to the 2XI pressurizer heater MCC from both PSW and plant sources.
However, since the upstream PSW load center breaker PSWLXPX 13-4B is open paralleling power sources to the pressurizer heaters is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 33 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Workset**et System:-- ___ Protected Service Water Subsystem: PSW Electrical System ________
Date : 10/7/11 Equipment: __2PSWSXTRN005 ..... Rev. No. 0 Diagram: O-1703-DRev._No.__
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects and/or on (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects System Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) ,_(7) 55 2PSWSXTRN005 Provides for Contact Electrical or PSW AC power to White indicating Loss of ability to power Unit 2 Bank I (0-1703-C) AC power set fails Mechanical Unit 2 pressurizer light on the MTS is Group A and K pressurizer heaters from transfer open failure heater MCC 2XK lost. PSW will require sufficient heater capability for Contact is lost dropping Bank I heater capacity to be powered from the SSF.
pressurizer heater MCC set fails operable kW below closed TS 3.4.9 limit of operating status is Loss of power to pressurizer heater MCC 2XK from ch 400kW indicated by red 2XK may put Unit 2 in LCO 3.4.9 until n omaSwitch sto light in MCR power to MCC 2XK can be restored por to fails to Station AC power through manual closure of MCC 2XK transfer to Unit 2 breaker 2B and LC 2X6 breaker 6B, or power pressurizer heater until the lost heater load is replaced via MCC 2XK is lost heaters powered from the SSF.
Under normal operation should the transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to the 2XK pressurizer heater MCC from both PSW and plant sources.
However, since the upstream PSW load center breaker PSWLXPX13-2D is open paralleling power sources to the pressurizer heaters is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 34 of 182 i ~ Faiur Mode anid Effects Aznalyss Wo'rksheet,,
System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _ F. Calabrese (Rev 0)I W. Watkins (Rev 1)
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System__ Date: 2/29/12 RI Equipment: 3PSWSXTRN003_ Rev. No. I Diagram:._,, 0-2703-C No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
( (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 56 3PSWSXTRNO03 Provides for Contact Electrical or PSW AC power to White indicating. Loss of ability to power Unit 3 Bank 4 (O-2703-E) AC power set fails Mechanical Unit 3 pressurizer . light on the MTS is Group J pressurizer heaters from PSW transfer open failure heater MCC 3XHJ lost. will require sufficient heater capacity to capability for Contact is lost dropping Bank 4 heater be powered from the SSF.
pressurizer heater MCC set fails operable kW below closed TS 3.4.9 limit of operating status is Loss of power to pressurizer heater MCC 3XJ from ch 400kW indicated on their 3XJ may put Unit 3 in LCO 3.4.9 until nom falst Switch RZ module in power to MCC 3XJ can be restored normal station fails to Station AC power MCR through manual closure of MCC 3XJ power to PSW transfer to Unit 3 breaker 5A and LC 3X5 breaker 6A, or power pressurizer heater until the lost heater load is replaced via MCC 3XJ is lost heaters powered from the SSF. RI Under normal operation should the transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to the 3XJ pressurizer heater MCC from both PSW and plant sources.
However, since the upstream PSW load center breaker PSWLXPX 13-1B is open paralleling power sources to the pressurizer heaters is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 35 of 182 i Failure:
=.. ,;: Node
- '*. .. and
.. "./A System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: _PSW Electrical System Date : 10/07/11 Equipment: -. 3PSWSXTRN004 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ___O-2703-D_
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects
)
Identification F n Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 57 3PSWSXTRN004 Provides for Contact Electrical or PSW AC power to White indicating Loss of ability to power Unit 3 Bank 3 (O-2703-D) AC power set fails Mechanical Unit 3 pressurizer light on the MTS is Group F and Bank 4 Group I pressurizer transfer open failure heater MCC 3Xl is lost. heaters from PSW will require sufficient capability for Contact lost dropping Bank 3 and Bank 4 heater capacity to be powered from the pressurizer set fails operable kW below heater operating SSF.
heater MCC 3XI from closed TS 3.4.9 limit of status 400kWLosopoetopesrzrharMC is indicated Loss of power to pressurizer heater MCC nX frorma Switch on their RZ module 3XI may put Unit 3 in LCO 3.4.9 until power to PSW fails to Station AC power in MCR power to MCC 3Xl can be restored transfer to Unit 3 through manual closure of MCC 3X1 power pressurizer heater breaker 5A and LC 3X4 breaker 6A, or MCC 3X1 is lost until the lost heater load is replaced via heaters powered from the SSF.
Under normal operation should the transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to the 3X1 pressurizer heater MCC from both PSW and plant sources.
However, since the upstream PSW load center breaker PSWLXPX 13-1D is open paralleling power sources to the pressurizer heaters is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 36 of 182 S> Failure Mode and Effects4a System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/0711 Equipment: ..... PSWSXTRN009 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7(8) 58 PSWSXTRN009 Provides for Contact Electrical or Loss of power to Bus monitor on Should the PSW System be unavailable, (0-6707-01) AC power xfer set fails Mechanical PSW building MCC XPSW the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) capability for open failure house loads, safety alarms in MCR will be credited as an alternate means of MCC XPSW Contact and non-safety achieving and maintaining SSD for the from PSW LC set fails HVAC and PSW first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
PSWLXPX 13 closed battery chargers Under normal operation should the or Rad Waste Switch transfer switch fail with both sets of LC RW2 fails to contacts closed, power could be transfer available to the XPSW MCC from both PSW and Rad Waste sources.
If the transfer switch is aligned to the Rad Waste source, it is recommended that the PSWLXPX 13-4C breaker be OPEN, thus preventing a possible paralleling of power sources.
If the transfer switch is aligned to the PSWLXPX I3-4C source, it is recommended that the RW2-4D breaker be OPEN, thus preventing a possible paralleling of power sources.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 37 of 182 System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_
Date : 10/12/11 Equipment: _3PSWSXTRNO_5 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-2703-C
"" ~Method Failureof" Remarks and Other Effects Component Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or No Identification Function Mode Mechanism System Detection (8)
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dei (7) 59 3PSWSXTRN005 Provides for AC Contact Electrical or PSW AC power to Unit. White Loss of ability to power Unit 3 Bank I (O-2703-C) power transfer set fails Mechanical 3 pressurizer heater indicating light Group A and K pressurizer heaters from capability for open failure MCC 3XK is lost . on the MTS is PSW will require sufficient heater pressurizer Contact dropping operable kW lost. capacity to be powered from the SSF.
heater MCC set fails below TS 3.4.9 limit of Bank I heater Loss of power to pressurizer heater MCC 3XK from closed 400kW operating 3XK may put the station in LCO 3.4.9 normal station Switch Station AC power to status is until power to MCC 3XK can be restored power to PSW fails to Unit 3 pressurizer indicated by through manual closure of MCC 3XK power transfer heater MCC 3XK is red light in breaker 2B and LC 3X6 breaker 6B, or lost MCR until the lost heater load is replaced via heaters powered from the SSF.
Under normal operation should the transfer switch fail with both sets of contacts closed, power could be available to the 3XK pressurizer heater MCC from both PSW and plant sources. However, since the upstream PSW load center breaker PSWLXPX13-2A is open paralleling power sources to the pressurizer heaters is not credible.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 38 of 182
- Fail urMode and~tfcsAujsý-okhe System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: ___F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System ________
Date : 10/12/11 Equipment: ___XPSW, XPSW-IC Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01 Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification (n) Mode Mechanism System Detection (8)
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) D cn 60 XPSW PSW 600VAC Loss of Electrical or Loss of power to PSW Bus monitor Should the PSW System be (0-6707-01) MCC feeding output Mechanical building house loads, on MCC unavailable, the Standby Shutdown PSW house power - failure safety and non-safety XPSW alarms Facility (SSF) will be credited as an loads, safety and complete HVAC and PSW in MCR alternate means of achieving and non-safety bus failure battery chargers maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
HVAC and PSW battery chargers 61 XPSW- IC PSW MCC Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to PSW Bus monitor Should the PSW System be (0-6707-01) XPSW main Fail Mechanical building house loads, on MCC unavailable, the Standby Shutdown breaker feeding Closed, failure safety and non-safety XPSW alarms Facility (SSF) will be credited as an PSW house Partial HVAC and PSW in MCR alternate means of achieving and loads, safety and Trip, battery chargers maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
non-safety Partial HVAC and PSW Close battery chargers , I I II_ _
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 39 of 182
- ~ .;:, * ,
- ]..ii .*.i.
."] .:Faiit' ...*ur..,eM. .Faiure and *Effects
.ci Modee:.-..an **
.* :,**AnajyiiWorksh . z.i. *',* .
System:_ Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 10/4/Il1 Equipment: .... _XPSW Breakers 2A, 2C, 3A_
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (o i)Identification (2) ()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6)System Detection (7)()
62 XPSW - 2A Power to PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to PSW building lights are No impact to PSW (0-6707-01) building lighting and Closed, Partial - Mechanical PSW building lost. functionality. PSWPLLPI receptacles on panel Trip, Partial failure lighting and feeds non-safety related PSWPLLP I through Close receptacles, loads.
xfmr PSWTFLP 1 63 XPSW - 2C Power to safety Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Fan and damper local No impact. Safety related (0-6707-01) related H&V control Closed, Partial Mechanical safety related position indication on H&V system is 100%
panel CPECO1. Trip, Partial failure H&V control CPECOI is lost. redundant. PSW building Close panel CPECOI, and battery room H&V can exhaust fans and temperature information heatersteprtrinomin be supplied from B train.
64 XPSW - 3A Power to safety Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Fan and damper local No impact. Safety related (0-6707-01) related H&V control Closed, Partial Mechanical safety related position indication on H&V system is 100%
panel CPEC02. Trip, Partial failure H&V control CPEC02 is lost. redundant. PSW building Close panel CPEC02, and battery room H&V can exhaust fans and ACbe supplied from A train.
heaters, temperature information
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 40 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analy orkleet- "
System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: __PSW Electrical System Date: 10/7/1 Equipment: _XPSW Breakers 3B, 3C, 3D, 4A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System (7) (8) 65 XPSW - 3B Power to Battery Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of I train of OAC point from each battery No impact on PSW. Battery (0-6707-01) Room I & 2 non Fail Closed, Mechanical PSW battery room providing battery room Room A/C units are 100%
safety A/C unit Partial Trip, failure room I & 2 A/C. temperature information redundant. Battery room A/C through xfimr Partial Close can be supplied from the PSWTF203A / other train.
205A 66 XPSW - 3C Power to Battery Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of I train of OAC point from each battery No impact on PSW. Battery (0-6707-01) Room I & 2 non Fail Closed, Mechanical PSW battery room providing battery room Room A/C units are 100%
safety A/C unit Partial Trip, failure room I & 2 A/C temperature information redundant. Battery room A/C through xfmr Partial Close can be supplied from the PSWTF204A/ other train.
206A 67 XPSW- 3D Power to PSW Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of PSW PSWLXPSWDCOI 27 under PSW DC power can be (0-6707-01) battery charger Fail Closed, Mechanical battery charger voltage relay to alarm in MCR supplied through the back-up PSWBC000I Partial Trip, failure PSWBCO00I. PSWBCOOOI X306 under battery and charger by Partial " relay to alar manually closing Close, Loss voltage relay to alarm in MCR. PSWLXDC0I breaker 4B of control power 68 XPSW - 4A Power to PSW Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of PSW PSWLXPSWDCO1 27 under PSW DC power can be (0-6707-01) battery charger Fail Closed, Mechanical battery charger voltage relay to alarm in MCR supplied through the primary PSWBC0002 Partial Trip, failure PSWBC0002. PSWBC0002 X306 under battery and charger by Partialvoltage relay to alarm manually closing PSWLXDCO I breaker 2B
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 41 of 182 Failure.Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 1014l11 Equipment: XPSW Breakers 4D, 5A, 5B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01 N Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects o Identification Function Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(!) Identifi(4) (5) (6). (8) 69 XPSW 4D Power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power is None. Pump is typically No impact to PSW
& 100 HP SSF Closed, Partial Trip, Mechanical unavailable for the not connected to PSW functionality. PSW provides PSWRSOOO submersible Partial Close, failure 100 HP SSF system. backup power to the SSF pump Fail tripped, fail submersible pump supple m p w hi (0-6707-01) .. While in use,: failure is submersible pump which closed, partial trip, detected via observance partial close, loss of of pump not spent fuel pool.
control power functioning.
70 XPSW SA Power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of non-safety OAC point from PSW No impact to PSW (0-6707-01)
- non-safety Closed, Partial Trip,. Mechanical air conditioning to building transformer functionality. Load is non-HVAC Partial Close failure PSW building room providing safety related and is also 100%
condenser I transformer room temperature redundant with HVAC information condenser 2.
71 XPSW - 5B Power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of non-safety OAC point. from PSW No impact to PSW (0-6707-01) non-safety Closed, Partial Trip, Mechanical air conditioning to building transformer functionality. Load is non-HVAC Partial Close failure PSW building room providing safety related and is also 100%
condenser 2 transformer room temperature redundant with HVAC information condenser 1.
72 XPSW - I B Power to Fuses fail open Electrical or Nuisance alarm in Bus monitor alarms in No impact to PSW (0-6707-01) XPSW bus Fuses fail closed Mechanical MCR indicating MCR. functionality, indication circuit monitor failure faulty loss of MCC only.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 42 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Anal~ysi Wrksh~eet System: Protected Service Water_F.___arese Prepared by:
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/9/l1 Equipment: ___PSWTFLP I, PSWPLLPI Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01, 0-6830 o dComponent Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No Identification FMode Mechanism and/or System Detection R8)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) D7) 73 Not Used 74 Not Used 75 Not Used 76 Not Used 77 PSWTFLPI Power to PSW panel Loss of power in Electrical Loss of PSW PSW building No impact to PSW (0-6707-01) PSWPLLPI which Loss of power failure building lighting lights are lost. functionality. PSWPLLPI feeds building out and receptacles feeds non-safety related loads.
lighting and receptacles 78 PSWPLLPI and all Power to PSW Loss of output Electrical or Loss of PSW PSW building No impact to PSW branch breakers building lighting and power- Mechanical building lighting lights are lost. functionality. PSWPLLPI (0-6830) receptacles complete bus failure and receptacles feeds non-safety related loads.
I_ failure
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A, Page 43 of 182
, Failure Mode and Effects-An ay'i 4W, s System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_______ Date : _____10/7/I I_______
Equipment: __CPEC01, CPEC02, PSWTF203A/205A, PSWTF204A/206A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-63 I -OA (OB) (OE) (OH)__
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 79 CPECO1 Provides 600VAC Loss of Electrical or Train A safety Fan, heater and damper No impact. Safety related (OEE-631-OA) power to control power in Mechanical related HVAC to local position indication HVAC system is 100%
panel for Train A Loss of failure PSW building is on CPECO I is lost. redundant. PSW building safety related power out lost. HVAC can be supplied from HVAC unit fans QAC points formron B train.
and heaters, temperature information 80 CPEC02 Provides 600VAC Loss of Electrical or Train B safety Fan, heater and damper No impact. Safety related (OEE-63 i-OB) power to control power in Mechanical related HVAC to local position indication HVAC system is 100%
panel for Train B Loss of failure PSW building is on CPEC02 is lost. redundant. PSW building safety related power out lost. HVAC can be supplied from HVAC unit fans pw o.AC points formron A train.
and heaters, temperature information 81 PSWTF203A/205A Power to Battery Loss of Electrical Loss of I train of OAC point from each No impact on PSW. Battery (OEE-63 I-OE) Room I & 2 non power in failure PSW battery battery room indicating Room A/C units are 100%
safety A/C unit Loss of room I & 2 A/C. battery room temperature redundant. Battery room A/C power out can be supplied from the other train.
82 PSWTF204A/206A Power to Battery Loss of Electrical Loss of I train of OAC point from each No impact on PSW. Battery (OEE-63 I-0H) Room I & 2 non power in failure PSW battery battery room indicating Room A/C units are 100%
safety A/C unit Loss of room I & 2 A/C battery room temperature redundant. Battery room A/C power out can be supplied from the other train.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 44 of 182
" .... ....* Failure Mode and Effects Analn WW ee System: Protected Service Water__________
Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: _PSW Electrical System______________ Date : 10/7/11 Equipment: _ 1IXPSW, IXPSW Breakers IA, ID Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6701 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train* Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (2) (3)(4) (5) (6) .. .(7) (8) 83 I XPSW Aux building MCC Loss of output Electrical or Loss of power to Bus monitor on MCC PSW is available for tornado /
(0-6701) I XPSW supplies power - Mechanical Unit I PSW IXPSW alarms in MCR HELB events for Units 2 and 3.
power to PSW complete bus failure valves, HPI For Unit I tornado /HELB, the valves, HPI valves, failure valves, Vital Standby Shutdown Facility Vital I&C battery I&C battery (SSF) will be credited as an chargers xfer chargers and alternate means of achieving switches and I KPSW power panel and maintaining SSD for the power panel I KPSW first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
84 IXPSW - IA. Aux building MCC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Bus monitor on MCC PSW is available for tornado/
(0-6701) IXPSW main breaker Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit I PSW IXPSW alarms in MCR HELB events for Units 2 and 3.
feeding PSW valves, Trip, Partial failure valves, HPI For Unit I tornado /HELB, the HPI valves, Vital Close valves, Vital Standby Shutdown Facility I&C battery charger l&C battery (SSF) will be credited as an xfer switches and chargers and alternate means of achieving I KPSW power panel power panel and maintaining SSD for the IKPSW first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
85 I XPSW -- I D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 306 (0-6701) powerto PSW Steam Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit I PSW flow indication in MCR lost. (IPSW-0006) generator I A & IB Trip, Partial failure isolation valve Inability to establish or flow isolation MOV Close I PSW6. control flow as IPSW6 indicated by 1PSW-FT0001 and IPSW-FT0002.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 45 of 182 JiFail iure Mode and Wfedts Analysis AV~ksh System: ...-- Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: *F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: . PSW Electrical System_________ Date : 10H/7/1 Equipment: _ IXPSW Breakers 2B, 2D, 3A, 3C Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6701 Effects on Component Failure Failure Remarks and Other No Identification Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Detection Effects No (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
(6) 86 IXPSW - 2B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power Valve position indication in See Item No. 311 (0-6701) power to PSW Steam Closed, Partial Trip, Mechanical to Unit 1 PSW MCR lost. (I PSW-0023) generator I A throttle Partial Close failure throttle Valve Flow anomalies as indicated MOV IPSW23 IPSW23. by IPSW-FTOOO I 87 I XPSW - 2D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power Valve position indication in See Item No. 313 (0-6701) power to PSW Steam Closed, Partial Trip, Mechanical to Unit 1 PSW MCR lost. (I PSW-0025) generator I B throttle Partial Close failure throttle valve Flow anomalies as indicated MOV I PSW25 IPSW25. by I PSW-FT0002 88 IXPSW - 3A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power Valve position indication in See Item No. 332 (0-6701) power to HPI seal Closed, Partial Trip, Mechanical to Unit I HPI MCR lost.
flow injection Partial Close failure MOV IHPI39. (1HP-0139) isolation control MOV IHP139 89 I XPSW - 3C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power Valve position indication in See Item No. 333 (0-6701) power to HPI seal Closed, Partial Trip, Mechanical to Unit I HPI MCR lost.
flow injection throttle Partial Close failure MOV IHPi40. (IHP-140)
MOV IHPI40
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 46 of 182 Failure Mode and . Effects Analysis Worksheet System: ........ Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: .. _._...PSW Electrical System Date; Re N _____10/7/Il____!__
0 Equipment: -I XPSW Breakers 3D, 4A, 4B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-670 I No Component Funati Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects oIdentification Function Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (a )
() _(2) (3)_(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 90 IXPSW - 3D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to I HP24 could be supplied through (0-6701) power to IA HPI Fail Closed, Mechanical IHP24 is lost. indication in MCR the normal station power source via manual BWST suction Partial Trip, failure lost. xfer switch IHPISXTRN003 if available.
valve I1HP24 throughvxe HP4 Partial Close through xfer sw PControl switch yellow position See Item No. 330 for additional info.
I HPISXTRN003yelwpsto light in MCR lost.
91 IXPSW - 4A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to I -HP26could be supplied through (0-6701) power to HP Fail Closed, Mechanical IHP26 is lost indication in MCR the normal station power source via manual reactor inlet valve Partial Trip, failure lost. xfer switch IHPISXTRN004 if available.
I HP26 through Partial Close Control switch See Item No. 331 for additional info.
xfer sw I HPISXTRN004 yellow position light in MCR lost.
92 IXPSW -4B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6701) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to Vital I&C battery charger battery charger Partial Close ICA is lost local indication. ICA until manual xfer is performed.
ICA through ATS Batteries can supply load for up to I hour IPSWSXTRNOOI ICA trouble annunciated in per OSC-8113. Standby charger ICS can be MCR. connected if 1XS3 power is available.
ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 47 of 182
,... ..* *'. *. t** .:*........
- Failure Mbde and .Effeets ýAna!
System: Protected Service Water__________
Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System________
Date: _____10/26/11_______
Equipment: __I XPSW Breakers 4C, 4D Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6701 Failure Effects on Train *Method Methd..of No ComponentCmoetFailure Function Falr alr fet nTan Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Dete (8)
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 93 IXPSW - 4C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6701) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well power exists to Vital I&C battery charger 1CB battery charger Partial Close ICB is lost as local until manual xfer is performed.
I CB through ATS indication. Batteries can supply load for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per I PSWSXTRN002 ICB trouble OSC-8 113. Standby charger I CS can be annunciated in connected if IXS3 power is available.
MCR. ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable.
94 IXPSW-4D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves IRC155 through IRCI60 (0-6701) power to xfmr Fail Closed, Mechanical I KPSW and its relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 1. See Item IPSWTFIXPSW Partial Trip, failure loads (IPSW22, IKPSW bus in No. 335 for more information.
which feeds power Partial Close 24 and IRC155 IPSWCA0002 Loss of IPSW22 and IPSW24 maybe panel IKPSW thru 160) is lost. alarms in mitigated by operation of manual bypass MCR valves IPSW26 & I PSW28. See Item Nos.
312 & 310 for more information.
95 Not Used 96 Not Used 97 Not Used 98 Not Used 99 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 48 of 182 Failure Mode and teffcts Analsi Wo'ksh~ee System: Protected Service Water_F. Prepared by: Calabrese Subsystem: ....... PSW Electrical System Date: 10/9/11 Equipment: . 1HPISXTRN003, IHPISXTRN004 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-151-04, OEE-151-06 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 100 Not Used 101 Not Used 102 Not Used 103 IHPISXTRN003 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to IA HPI Valve fails to See Item No. 330 (IHP-0024)
(OEE-i51-04) AC power fails open Mechanical BWST Suction respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer Contact set failure Valve I HP24 is electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power from capability fails closed lost. as determined by PSW MCC IXPSW would be paralleled with for IHP24 Switch fails valve position power from MCC IXS4 to valve I HP24. To from normal to transfer indication, flow prevent the paralleling of power sources this station anomalies and calculation recommends keeping MCC power to pump indications IXPSW breaker 3D in the normally open PSW power observed in the position when power to the I HP24 valve is MCR. aligned to the station source.
104 I HPISXTRN004 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to HP to Valve fails to See Item No. 331 (I HP-0026)
(OEE-151-06) AC power fails open Mechanical Injection Reactor respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer Contact set failure Inlet Valve electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power from capability fails closed IHP26 is lost. as determined by PSW MCC IXPSW would be paralleled with for IHP26 Switch fails valve position power from MCC IXS4 to valve I HP26. To from normal to transfer indication, flow prevent the paralleling of power sources this station anomalies and calculation recommends keeping MCC power to pump indications IXPSW breaker 4A in the normally open PSW power observed in the position when power to the I HP26 valve is MCR. aligned to the station source.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 49 of 182
<Fa iure Mvzode an MesAayi worksneet System: Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem:_ PSW Electrical System Prepare Date : : FCa 10/4/11I e___
Equipment: ___I PSWSXTRN00 1, 1PSWSXTRN002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6701 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 105 IPSWSXTRNOO I Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6701) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to vital I&C charger ICA.
capability for fails closed ICA is lost local indication. Batteries can supply load for up to I ICA battery Switch fails Station power to I CA trouble hour per OSC-8 113. Standby charger charger from t a Charger ICA is annuiatd in ICS can be connected if IXS3 power is normal station to transfer lot aci available.
power to PSW A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm.
106 1PSWSXTRN002 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6701) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to vital I&C charger I CB.
capability for fails closed ICB is lost local indication. Batteries can supply load for up to I ICB battery Switch fails Station power to ICB trouble hour per OSC-81 13. Standby charger charger from tCharger ICB is ICS can be connected if IXS3 power is norml . to transfer Chre C s annunciated in available.
normal station lost MCR.
power to PSW A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 50 of 182
-a.l.re
- . 'ivlnnP:2nnI[..1 Effects, t.*. A System: Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Pare b0C Date : ____10/4/I re11 I______
Equipment: ..... I....PSWSTFIXPSW, IKPSW Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_ 0-6701, 0-6704 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 107 I PSWTFIXPSW Provides Loss of power Electrical Power to Loss of power Loss of valves IRCI55 through (0-6701) 208/I20VAC in failure IKPSW and its relay on I KPSW IRC 160 renders PSW unavailable power to panel Loss of power loads (IPSW22, bus in for Unit I. See Item No. 335 for IKPSW out 24 and IRC155 I PSWCA0002 more information.
thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of IPSW22 and IPSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves I PSW26 & IPSW28.
See Item Nos. 312 & 310 for more information.
108 I KPSW Provides power Loss of output Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves IRC155 through (0-6704) to I KPSW and power - Mechanical I KPSW and its relay on IKPSW I RC 160 renders PSW unavailable its loads complete bus failure loads (IPSW22, bus in for Unit I. See Item No. 335 for (IPSW22, 24 failure 24 and 1RC155 IPSWCA0002 more information.
and IRC155 thru thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of I PSW22 and I PSW24 may 160) be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves I PSW26 & IPSW28.
See Item Nos. 312 & 310 for more information.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 51 of 182
,"" , Failure Mode and.- Effects*Any's*. '
System: __Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/12/11l Equipment: _ I KPSW Breakers Main, 1, 2 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _...0-6704 No .Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects
() Identification (2) Fno()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6)System Detection (7) (8) .
109 IKPSW - Aux building panel Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves I RC155 through Main I KPSW main breaker Closed, Partial Mechanical IKPSW and its relay on I KPSW I RC160 renders PSW unavailable (0-6704) feeding (IPSW22, 24 Trip, Partial failure loads (IPSW22, bus in for Unit I. See Item No. 335 for and 1RC155 thru Close 24 and IRCI55 IPSWCA0002 more information.
160) thru 160) is lost. alarms in MCR Loss of 1PSW22 and IPSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves IPSW26 &
IPSW28. See Item Nos. 312 &
310 for more information.
110 1KPSW - I Provides 120VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW powerto Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6704) PSW power to RC Closed, Partial Mechanical IRC!55 and indicating lights in (IRC-0155/0156) sys reactor vessel Trip, Partial failure I RC 156 is lost MCR lost.
head vent valves Close Yellow CS position IRC155 & IRC156 indicating light in through power xfer MCR lost.
sw IRC-CS-155/156 MCR lost_
Ill I KPSW -2 Provides 120VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6704) PSW power to RC Closed, Partial Mechanical IRC157 and indicating lights in (IRC-0157/0158) sys reactor vessel Trip, Partial failure I RC158 is lost MCR lost.
head vent valves Close Yellow CS position IRC157& IRCI58 indicating light in through power xfer MCR lost.
sw IRC-CS-157/158 MRlost.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 52 of 182 Failure Mode nd "Effects An.alyis . .orkshe..,.
System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: __F. Calabrese_____
Date: __ _ Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System
_ Re N 0 Equipment: _ IKPSW Breakers 3, 4, 5 0-6704 Diagram:
No Component Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Method of Remarks and Other o Identification F Mode Mechanism System Failure Detection Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 112 I KPSW 3 Provides 120VAC PSW power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to I RC 159 Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6704) to RC sys reactor vessel head Closed, Partial Mechanical and IRCI60 is lost indicating lights (IRC-0159/0160) vent valves I RC 159 & Trip, Partial failure in MCR lost.
IRC 160 through power xfer Close Yellow CS sw IRC-CS-159/160 position indicating light in MCR lost.
113 IKPSW -4 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV I PSW22 Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen IA flow Closed, Partial Mechanical signal isolator information to of SOV IPSW22 is lost control SOV IPSW22 signal Trip, Partial failure I PSWSI001, flow MCR OAC point See Item No.310 isolator, instrument controller Close controller and flow is lost. (I PSW-0022) and flow transmitter in transmitter is lost.
IPSWCA0001 114 I KPSW -5 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV I PSW24 Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen IB flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical signal isolator information to of SOV IPSW24 is lost SOV IPSW24 signal isolator, Trip, Partial failure IPSWSI002, flow MCR OAC point See Item No. 312 instrument controller and flow Close controller and flow is lost. (I PSW-0024) transmitter in IPSWCAOOOI transmitter is lost.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 53 of 182 FailureMode. and Effects Analysis Worksheet .
System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/17/11 Equipment: -I KPSW Breakers 9, 10 Rev. No. ..0 Diagram: 0-6704 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 115 I KPSW -9 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 310 (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen IA flow Closed, Partial Mechanical I PSW22 is lost indicating lights in (IPSW-0022) control SOV I PSW22, power Trip, Partial failure MCR panel I UB2 converter I PSWVF0022 and Close are lost.
positioner assembly IPSWVP0022 116 IKPSW - 10 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 312 (0-6704) PSW Stm Gen IB flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 1PSW24 is lost indicating lights in (IPSW-0024)
SOV IPSW24, power Trip, Partial failure MCR panel IUB2 converter I PSWVF0024 and Close are lost.
positioner assembly I PSWVP0024 117 Not Used 118 Not Used 119 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 54 of 182
"",*, Faj luje Mode and Effects AnqIyus ork heet System:.. Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Date : 10/7/11 Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Equipment: _ I PSWSI00 I, 1PSWSI002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-165-02, OEE-l165-04 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other No Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (2).(3) (4) (5) .(6) (7) (8) 120 I PSWSI00I PSW Stm Gen I A flow Loss of power in Electrical Automatic flow Transfer of flow See Item No. 310 (OEE- 165-02) control SOV I PSW22 Loss of power out failure control of SOV information to MCR (IPSW-0022) signal isolator, flow I PSW22 is lost OAC point is lost.
controller and flow Failure effects of transmitter in IPSWSIOOI bounds trPSWCA0001 failure effects of IPSWSSOOI and I PSWFTOO I.
121 1PSWSI002 PSW Stm Gen IB flow Loss of power in Electrical Automatic flow Transfer of flow See Item No. 312 (OEE-165-04) control SOV 1PSW24 Loss of power out failure control of SOV information to MCR (IPSW-0024) signal isolator, flow I PSW24 is lost OAC point is lost. Failure effects of controller and flow PSWS1002 I bounds transmitter in failure effects of I PSWCA0OOI I PSWSS002 and IPSWFT002.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 55 of 182
. e and
........ a ...dk'u ,Effec*s*Analysis.W sheet System: ___Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem: __PSW Electrical System Pare Date : : 10/
10/28/11I e____
Equipment: I RC-CS-l 55/156 (157/158) (159/160) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-150-19 (15) (16).
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects
( Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 122 IRC-CS-1551156 Provides forAC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (1RC-0155/0156)
(OEE-150-19) power transfer fails open Mechanical I RC155 and indicating lights The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure I RC 156 is lost in MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to I RC 155 and I RC 156 fails closed Station power to White and. prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails I RC 155 and Yellow CS followers to be closed simultaneously.
power to PSW power to transfer I RC 156 is lost position Therefore paralleling of normal and indicating light PSW power sources is not a credible in MCR lost. failure.
123 1RC-CS-157/158 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (IRC-0157/0158)
(OEE- I50-15) power transfer fails open Mechanical I RC157 and indicating lights The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure I RC158 is lost in MCR lost, switch constructed in such a way as to IRC 157 and IRC 158 fails closed Station power to White and prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails IRC157 and Yellow CS followers to be closed simultaneously.
power to PSW power to transfer IRCI 58 is lost position Therefore paralleling of normal and indicating light PSW power sources is not a credible in MCR lost. failure.
124 I RC-CS-159/160 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (IRC-0159/0160)
(OEE-150-16) power transfer fails open Mechanical IRC159 and indicating lights The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure I RC 160 is lost in MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to I RC 159 and I RC 160 fails closed Station power to White and prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails 1RC159 and Yellow CS followers to be closed simultaneously.
power to PSW power to transfer IRCI60 is lost position Therefore paralleling of normal and indicating light PSW power sources is not a credible in MCR lost. failure.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 56 of 182
&7 .~'< >< ~ .Failur Mode andEfct System: ..................
Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calarese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Pare : F. C Date : ____10/7/!I______
Equipment: ___2XPSWA, 2XPSWB Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train on Train Mehdoof Method No Identification Cmoe FunctionMode Fni Mode Mechanism M hi and/or System ao Se Failure Detection Remarks and(8)Other Effects (2) ((5) (6) (7) 125 2XPSWA Aux building MCC Loss of Electrical or Loss of power to Unit Bus monitor PSW is available for tornado /
(0-6702) 2XPSWA supplies power output Mechanical 2 PSW valves, HPI on MCC HELB events for Units I and 3.
to PSW valves, HPI valves, power - failure valves, Vital I&C 2XPSWA For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, the Vital I&C battery charger complete battery chargers, alarms in Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) xfer switches, PSW pump bus failure PSW pump room MCR will be credited as an alternate room exhaust fan, 2KPSW exhaust fan, power means of achieving and power panel and MCC panel I KPSW and maintaining SSD for the first 72 2XPSWB MCC 2XPSWB hours.
126 2XPSWB Aux building MCC Loss of Electrical or Loss of power to Unit HPI valve PSW is available for tornado /
(0-6702) 2XPSWB supplies power output Mechanical 2 HPI valves and indicating HELB events for Units I and 3.
to PSW-14 valve and Unit power- failure PSW-14 valve lights lost in For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, the 2 HPI valves complete MCR. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) bus failure, PSw-14 valve will be credited as an alternate cable tie Pmeans of achieving and failuretgs indilating maintaining SSD for the first 72 lights lost in MCR. hours.
hus
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 57 of 182 Failure Mode Effects Analysis Worksheet' System: Protected Service Water_________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem:-, PSW Electrical System Date: ____1/I Equipment: .. 2XPSWA Breakers IA, I D, 2A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (2)Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(I2) (3) (4) (5) (6)!i (7) 127 2XPSWA- IA Aux building MCC Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Bus monitor on PSW is available for tornado /
(0-6702) 2XPSWA main breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 1 PSW MCC 2XPSWA HELB events for Units I and feeding PSW valves, HPI Partial Trip, failure valves, HPI alarms in MCR 3. For Unit 2 tornado /HELB, valves, Vital I&C battery Partial Close valves, Vital the Standby Shutdown charger xfer switches, I&C battery Facility (SSF) will be credited PSW pump room exhaust chargers and as an alternate means of fan, 2KPSW power panel power panel achieving and maintaining and MCC 2XPSWB I KPSW SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
128 2XPSWA- ID Provides 600VAC power Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 314 (0-6702) to PSW Steam generator Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 2 PSW flow indication in MCR (2PSW-0006) 2A & 2B flow isolation Partial Trip, failure isolation valve lost.
MOV 2PSW6 Partial Close 2PSW6. Inability to establish or control flow as indicated by 2PSW-FTOOOI and 2PSW-FT0002.
129 2XPSWA - 2A Provides 600VAC power Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 321 (0-6702) to PSW Steam generator Fail Closed, Mechanical Unit 2 PSW indication in MCR 2B throttle MOV Partial Trip, failure throttle Valve lost. (2PSW-0025) 2PSW25 Partial Close 2PSW25. Flow anomalies as indicated by 2PSW-FT0002
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 58 of 182 FailureM~ode and EffectsAna yvr~fieet System: _.....-Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Prepared by: F. Calabrese Date : ____10/7/Il_______
Equipment: _2XPSWA Breaker 2B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ___.0-6702 No (I) Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Effects and/or on Train System Method of Failure Detection Remarks and(8)Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 130 2XPSWA - 2B Provides 600VAC power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No, 319 (0-6702) to PSW Steam generator Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 PSW indication in MCR 2A throttle MOV Trip, Partial failure throttle valve lost. (2PSW-0023) 2PSW23 Close 2PSW23. Flow anomalies as indicated by 2PSW-FT0001
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 59 of 182 Faitu.e Modeand.Effeet' alysis Worksheet An$ **
System: ...... Protected Service Water_____
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: . PSW Electrical System Date_: 1029/11 Equipment: ... 2XPSWA Breakers 2D, 3D______ Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_., 0-6702 -. _ _
Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 131 2XPSWA - 2D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non (0-6702) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in PSW source via manual re-transfer.
to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well Therefore, no power exists to Vital i&C battery charger Partial Close 2CA is lost as local battery charger 2CA until manual xfer is 2CA through ATS . indication, performed.
2PSWSXTRNOO I 2CA trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I annunciated in hour per OSC-8113. Standby charger MCR. 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is available.
ATS will not transfer to PSW source
.___should PSW power be unavailable.
132 2XPSWA - 3D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or Power to Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC 155 through 2RC 160 (0-6702) power to xfmr Fail Closed, Mechanical 2KPSW and its relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See 2PSWTF2XPSW Partial Trip, failure loads (2PSW22 2KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information.
which feeds power Partial Close & 24 and their intruent 2PSWCA0002 larm inin Loss the PSW power feed tornfro of the mainsmtgtdb panel 2KPSW pane 2KPW instrument alarms cnrlpnl power, 2RC 155 MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of thru 160, and power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw control panels OPSWSXTRN006.
OPSWIR001 and Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be OPSWIR002) is mitigated by operation of manual bypass lost. valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 60 of 182 Failure System: Protected Service Water_____
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_ _
Date : _ 017111 Equipment: 2XPSWA Breakers 3E, 3F Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects
()(2) Identification ()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6)System Failure (7)(8 Detection 133 2XPSWA - 3E Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of normal Fan relay panel Power to PSW pump room exhaust (0-6702) power to PSW Closed, Partial Mechanical power to PSW status indicating fan can be supplied from the pump room Trip, Partial failure pump room lights (local) alternate PSW source 3XPSW- ID exhaust fan Close exhaust fan lost. through MTS OPSWSXTRN008.
through xfer sw PSW Primary See Item 336 for additional OPSWSXTRN008 and / or Booster information.
Pump Bearing Temperature Alarms in MCR.
134 2XPSWA - 3F Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the (0-6702) emergency power Closed, Partial Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in non PSW source via manual re-to Vital i&C Trip, Partial failure Battery Charger MCR as well as transfer. Therefore, no power exists battery charger Close 2CB is lost local indication, to Vital l&C battery charger 2CB 2CB through ATS 2CB trouble until manual xfer is performed.
2PSWSXTRN002 annunciated in Batteries can supply load for up to I MCR. hour per OSC-8113. Standby charger 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is available.
ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 61 of 182
- <
- ~.
- .*~ ~:~: ~ .. Fail uire lo'de and Effec~ts'nalysis Wor~heet~
System: _____Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem: .... _.PSW Electrical System Pare Date : : .
.10/7/11 Cabee____
Equipment: 2XPSWA Breakers 4C, 4D, 5A, 5B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects No Identification FMode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)
(() (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 135 2XPSWB - 4C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of normal MCR loss of Power to valve OPSWI4 can (0-6702) power to PSW recirc Closed, Partial Mechanical power to valve position be supplied from alternate MOV OPSW14 through Trip, Partial failure OPSWF4 valve, indication lights. PSW source 3XPSW-5A xfer sw Close OPSWSXTRN007 136 2XPSWB - 4D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 332 (0-6702) power to HPI seal flow Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 HPI MOV indication in (2HP-0139) injection isolation Trip, Partial failure 2HP139. MCR lost.
control MOV 2HP 139 Close 137 2XPSWB - 5A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 2HP26 could be (0-6702) power to HP reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2HP26 is lost. indication in supplied through the normal inlet valve 2HP26 Trip, Partial failure MCR lost. station power source via through xfer sw Close Control switch manual xfer switch 2HPISXTRN004 yellow position 2HPISXTRN004 if available.
light in MCR See Item No. 331 for lost. additional info.
138 2XPSWB- 5B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 333 (0-6702) power to HPI seal flow Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 2 HPI MOV indication in (2HP-0140) injection throttle MOV Trip, Partial failure 2HPi40. MCR lost.
2HP 140 Close
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 62 of 182
" ; Failure Mode System: . _Protected Service Water Prepared by: -F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/9/11 Equipment: ._2XSPWA Breaker 5C, 2PSWSXTRNOO1 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 Efects on Component Function Failure Failure Effec on Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism TDetection (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 139 2XPSWB - 5C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 2HP24 could be supplied (0-6702) power to 2A HPI Fail Closed, Mechanical 2HP24 is lost. indication in MCR through the normal station power BWST suction Partial Trip, failure lost. source via manual xfer switch valve 2HP24 Partial Close Control switch 2HPISXTRN003 if available.
through xfer sw yellow position See Item No. 330 for additional 2HPISXTRN003 light in MCR lost. info.
140 Not Used 141 Not Used 142 Not Used 143 2PSWSXTRN001 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails (0-6702) power transfer fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in to transfer on loss of normal source, capability for 2CA Contact set failure Battery MCR as well as no power exists to vital I&C charger battery charger fails closed Charger 2CA local indication. 2CA. Batteries can supply load for from normal Switch fails is lost 2CA trouble up to I hour per OSC-8 113.
station power to to transfer Station power annunciated in Standby charger 2CS can be PSW power to Charger MCR. connected if 2XS3 power is 2CA is lost available.
A switch failure where both sets of contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 63 of 182 Failure Mod an ffects An~ orlkshee System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: _ 10/7/il Equipment: _ 2PSWSXTRN002, 2PSWTF2XPSW_
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 144 2PSWSXTRN002 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6702) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to vital [&C charger 2CB.
capability for fails closed 2CB is lost local indication. Batteries can supply load for up to I 2CB battery Switch fails Station power to 2CB trouble hour per OSC-8 113. Standby charger charger from 2CS can be connected if 2XS3 power is normal station to transfer Charger 2CB is annunciated in available.
power to PSW lost MCR. A switch failure where both sets of power contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is designed with a single transfer arm.
145 2PSWTF2XPSW Provides Loss of Electrical Power to Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC155 through 2RC160 (0-6702) 208/120VAC power in failure 2KPSW and its relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See power to panel Loss of loads (2PSW22 bus in Item No. 335 for more information.
2KPSW power out & 24 and their 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW instrument alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of power, 2RC155 thru 160, and power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw control panels 0PSWSXTRN006.
OPSWIR001 and Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be OPSWIR002) is mitigated by operation of manual bypass lost. valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 64 of 182 jFailure Mode and Effects Analvsi§Ao~ksheet System:.- Protected Service Water _ . ......
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem:.... PSW Electrical System Date :10/7/11I Equipment: _2HPISXTRN003, 2HPISXTRN004 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-25 1-04, OEE-251-06 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects
()(2) Identification ()(4) Mode Mechanism (5) and/or(6)
System Detection (7)() (8) 146 2HPISXTRN003 Provides for Contact Electrical or Power to 2A HPI Valve fails to See Item No. 330 (2HP-0024)
(OEE-25 1-04) AC power set fails Mechanical BWST Suction respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer open failure Valve 2HP24 is electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power capability Contact lost. as determined by from PSW MCC 2XPSW would be for 2HP24 set fails valve position paralleled with power from MCC 2XS4 to from normal closed indication, flow valve 2HP24. To prevent the paralleling of station Switch anomalies and power sources this calculation recommends power to fails to pump, indications keeping MCC 2XPSWB breaker 5C in the PSW power transfer observed in the normally open position when power to the MCR. 2HP24 valve is aligned to the station source.
147 2HPISXTRN004 Provides for Contact Electrical or Power to HP to Valve fails to See Item No. 331 (2HP-0026)
(OEE-251-06) AC power set fails Mechanical Injection Reactor respond to Under normal operation should the M2 xfer open failure Inlet Valve electronic controls contactor inadvertently fail closed, power capability Contact 2HP26 is lost. as determined by from PSW MCC 2XPSW would be for 2HP26 set fails valve position paralleled with power from MCC 2XS4 to from normal closed indication, flow valve 2HP26. To prevent the paralleling of station Switch anomalies and power sources this calculation recommends power to filt pump indications keeping MCC 2XPSWB breaker 5A in the PSW power transfer observed in the normally open position when power to the IransferMCR. 2HP26 valve is aligned to the station source.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 65 of 182
... Failure Modeand System: . Protected Service Water__________
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : __
Dae__1_91 __1019/1_______
Equipment: OPSWSXTRN007, OPSWSXTRN008 Diagram: .......
O6720-E__ Rev. No. 0 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (2)() (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 148 OPSWSXTRN007 Provides for AC Contact Electrical or PSW MCR loss of valve See Item No. 305 (OPSW-0014)
(O-6720-E) power transfer set fails Mechanical Recirculating position indicating Under normal operation should the switch capability for open failure valve OPSWI 4 lights on switch indertnormal o sedtion the fro m MCC the OPSW14 Contact electrically failure in complete inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW MCC valve from U2 set fails unavailable, open position MCC 3XPSW to valve PSW-a14. To prevent the or U3 PSW closed However, or MC3PWt av S- .T rvn h can be paralleling cOPSW4 recommendsofkeeping power sources this calculation MCC 3XPSW breaker 5A Aux buildin Swtch MCfailsfo manually via a controlled in the normallyis aligned PSW-142HP to the when open position normalpower sourceto the transfer hand wheel. (2XPSWB-4C) 149 OPSWSXTRN008 Provides for AC Contact Electrical or PSW Pump Fan relay panel status Should the PSW System be unavailable, the (O-6720-E) power transfer set fails Mechanical Room Exhaust indicating lights Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited capability for open failure Fan unavailable (local) lost when both as an alternate means of achieving and the Contact and therefore sets of contacts fail maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OPSWMR0003 set fails PSW is open. See Item 336 for additional information.
Exhaust Fan closed unavailable PSW Primary and / Under normal operation should the switch from U2 or U3 Switch or Booster Pump inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW MCC PSW Aux fails to Bearing Temperature 2XPSW would be paralleled with power from building MCC transfer Alarms in MCR. MCC 3XPSW to the pump room exhaust fan. To prevent the paralleling of power sources this Noidection orns. calculation recommends keeping MCC 3XPSW breaker I D in the normally open position when power to the exhaust fan is aligned to the normal source (2XPSWA-3E)
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 66 of 182
.. .. .. Failure Mode*and "beet V.ects Anas*iso**' ik System: Protected Service Water_ _
Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: ..... PSW Electrical System Date: 10/17/11 Equipment: 2KPSW, 2KPSW Breakers Main Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6705 . _.......-
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (F) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)
(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 150 2KPSW Provides power to Loss of Electrical or Power to 2KPSW and Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC 155 through 2RC 160 (0-6705) 2KPSW and its loads output Mechanical its loads (2PSW22 & relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See (2PSW22, 24 and power - failure 24 and their bus in Item No. 335 for more information.
their instrument complete instrument power, 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW power, 2RC155 thru bus failure 2RC155 thru 160, alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of 160, and control conro paelnismiigaedbyarasfelo panels oPSWIR0ol and control panels power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw p sOPSWIROO and OPSWSXTRN006.
and OPSWIR002 0PSWIR002) are lost.
Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information.
151 2KPSW - Aux building panel Fail Open, Electrical or Power to 2KPSW and Loss of power Loss of valves 2RC155 through 2RC160 Main 2KPSW main breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical its loads (2PSW22, relay on 2KPSW renders PSW unavailable for Unit 2. See (0-6705) feeding (2PSW22, 24 Partial Trip, failure 24 and their bus in Item No. 335 for more information.
and their instrument Partial Close instrument power, 2PSWCA0002 Loss of the main power feed to the PSW power, 2RC155 thru 2RC155 thru 160, alarms in MCR control panels is mitigated by transfer of 160, and control and control panels power to 3KPSW-7 through xfer sw panels OPSWIROOI OPSWIR001 and OPSWSXTRN0o6.
and OPSWIR002 OPSWIR002 are lost.
Loss of 2PSW22 and 2PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 2PSW26 & 2PSW28. See Item Nos. 318 & 320 for more information.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 67 of 182 FailureMode and Effets.Anay okhe System: ._......._Protected Service Water Prepared by: __F. Calabrese.
- 7/__
Subsystem: ....... PSW Electrical System _ _ae__F.
Date: 10/17/11 Equipment: 2KPSW Breakers 1,2,3 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ........ 0-6705 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects N Identification 2 Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
I (2) (3)(4) (6) (7) 152 2KPSW - I Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC155 and indicating lights in (2RC-0155/0156) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 156 are lost MCR lost.
2RC155 & 2RC156 through Close Yellow CS position power xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 1551156 MCR lost.
153 2KPSW - 2 Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC 157 and indicating lights in (2RC-0157/0158) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 158 are lost MCR lost.
2RC 157 & 2RC158 through Close Yellow CS position power xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 157/158 MCR lost.
154 2KPSW - 3 Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6705) power to RC sys reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 2RC1 59 and indicating lights in (2RC-0159/0160) vessel head vent valves Trip, Partial failure 2RC 160 are lost MCR lost.
2RC159 & 2RC160 through Close Yellow CS position manual xfer sw 2RC-CS- indicating light in 159/160 MCR lost.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 68 of 182 FiueMode and Effets Anialysis Wv~rD.sueet System:_.... -Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System________ Date : ____10/17/Il_______
Equipment: -.. 2KPSW Breakers 4, 5, Rev. No. 0 Diagram: .... 0-6705 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other No Identification Fni Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (I) (2(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 155 2KPSW- 4 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Transfer of flow Automatic flow control of (0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2A flow Closed, Partial Mechanical 2PSW22 signal information to MCR SOV 2PSW22 is lost control SOV 2PSW22 signal Trip, Partial failure isolator 2PSWSi001, OAC point is lost. See Item No. 318 isolator, instrument controller Close flow controller and and flow transmitter in flow transmitter is (2PSW-0022) 2PSWCA0001 lost.
156 2KPSW -5 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Transfer of flow Automatic flow control of (0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 2PSW24 signal information to MCR SOV 2PSW24 is lost SOV 2PSW24 signal isolator, Trip, Partial failure isolator 2PSWSI002, OAC point is lost. See Item No. 320 instrument controller and flow Close flow controller and transmitter in 2PSWCA000I flow transmitter is (2PSW-0024) lost.
157 2KPSW -- 7 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to Loss of bar graph PSW control panel board (0-6705) PSW Control Panel Boards Closed, Partial Mechanical OPSWIR001 and readings in MCR as can be powered thru OPSWIR001 and OPSWIR002 Trip, Partial failure OPSWIR002 well as lack of input 3KPSW-7 after manual thru MTS OPSWSXTRN006 Close available thru to computer from transfer of 3KPSW - 7 OAC points. OPSWSXTRN006. No I I_impact to PSW.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 69.of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analyss Worksheet System: __Protected Service Water_______ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System ________
Date: 10/18/11 Equipment: .. 2KPSW Breakers 9, 10 / 2PSWSIOOI, 2PSWSI002 R No.
Rev. N 0 Diagram: _0-6705, OEE-265-02, OEE-265-04 Co N omponentiFunction mp Mode Failure Mechanism Failure System Effects on Method of Failure
()(8) Remarks and Other Effects (N) (2) ione Function (3) MTrain (4) (5) and/or (6) Detection (7)
(2))
158 2KPSW 9 Provides 120V2C power to PSW Fail Open, Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 318 (2PSW-0022)
(0-6705) Stm Gen IA flow control SOV Fail Closed, Mechanical 2PSW22 is indicating lights in 2PSW22, power converter Partial Trip, failure lost MCR panel 2UB2 2PSWVF0022 and positioner Partial Close are lost.
assembly 2PSWVP0022 159 2KPSW - 10 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 320 (2PSW-0024)
(0-6705) PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Fail Closed, Mechanical 2PSW24 is indicating lights in SOV 2PSW24, power converter Partial Trip, failure lost MCR panel 2UB2 2PSWVF0024 and positioner Partial Close are lost.
assembly 2PSWVP0024 160 Not Used 161 2 PSWSI001 PSW Stm Gen 2A flow control Loss of Electrical Automatic Transfer of flow See Item No. 318 (2PSW-0022)
(OEE-265-02) SOV 2PSW22 signal isolator, power in failure flow control of information to Failure effects of2PSWSlO0l flow controller and flow Loss of SOV:2PSW22 MCR OAC point is bounds failure effects of transmitter in 2PSWCA00I power out is lost lost. 2PSWSSOOI and 2PSWFTOOI.
162 2PSWS1002 PSW Stm Gen 2B flow control Loss of Electrical Automatic Transfer of flow See Item No. 320 (2PSW-0024)
(OEE-265-04) SOV 2PSW24 signal isolator, power in failure flow control of information to Failure effects of 2PSWS1002 flow controller and flow Loss of SOV 2PSW24 MCR OAC point is bounds failure effects of transmitter in 2PSWCAOOOI power out is lost lost. 2PSWSS002 and 2PSWFT002.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 70 of 182 FailureMode 'nEffects Analysis W o rksheetl System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: ___F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_________
Date : 10/28/11I Equipment: .....2RC-CS- 1551156 (157/158) (159/160) Rev. No. 0 Diagram:__ OEE-250-15 (16) (17)
Failure Failure Effects on Method of Failure No No) Identification Copnn(unt3)oe Function ehns Train and/or System DetectionRemarks (7) and Other Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 163 2RC-CS-155/156 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (2RC-0155/0156)
(OEE-250-15) power transfer fails open Mechanical 2RC155 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam operated switch capability for Contact set failure 2RC 156 is lost MCR lost. constructed in such a way as to prevent 2RC 155 and 2RC1 56 fails closed Station power White and Yellow CS contacts from separate cam followers to be from normal station Switch fails to 2RC 155 and position indicating closed simultaneously. Therefore paralleling power to PSW power to transfer 2RC 156 is lost light in MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not a
_____credible failure.
164 2RC-CS-157/158 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (2RC-0157/0158)
(OEE-250-16) power transfer fails open Mechanical 2RC157 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure 2RC 158 is lost MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to 2RC157 and 2RC158 fails closed Station power White and Yellow CS prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station to 2RC 157 and position indicating followers to be closed simultaneously.
Switch fails power to PSW power 2RC158 is lost light in MCR lost. Therefore paralleling of normal and PSW to transfer power sources is not a credible failure.
165 2RC-CS-159/160 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (2RC-0159/0160)
(OEE-250-17) power transfer fails open Mechanical 2RC 159 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam operated capability for Contact set failure 2RC 160 is lost MCR lost. switch constructed in such a way as to 2RC 159 and 2RC 160 fails closed Station power White and Yellow CS prevent contacts from separate cam from normal station Switch fails to 2RC 159 and position indicating followers to be closed simultaneously.
power to P5W power to transfer 2RC160 is lost light in MCR lost. Therefore paralleling of normal and PSW I I I I power sources is not a credible failure.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 71 of 182
- ~~~Failure Mod an f s nli orkshe'e System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 10/27/1l1 Equipment: ... OPSWSXTRN006 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: O-6720-E..
Failure Effects on Method of No Copoentifcto Function Failure Mode Mechanism Sse eeto 8Other Effects Identification ()()()()()System Mode Faism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and(8)
(2)
(I (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 166 OPSWSXTRN006 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW non- Loss of bar Loss of non-safety indication has no impact on Manual Transfer power transfer fails open Mechanical safety graph readings PSW System functionality during an event.
Switch capability for the Contact set failure instrument in MCR as Loss of safety panel affects control of OPSW14.
(O-6720-E) OPSWIR0001 and OPSWIR0002 fails closed panel 0PSWIR0001 well asto lack of input IffPW4fis OPSW 4 fails,s .henthe t hn h ability PSW to blt offPWt Switch fails Iperform its design function may be affected. See Instrument panels and safety computer from from U2 or U3 to transfer instrument OAC points. Item No. 305 (OPSW-00 14) for more PSW power panels panel . information.
2KPSW & 3KPSW OPSWIR0002 unavailable Inability control to Should OPSWI4 be unavailable, the PSW OPSWI4 flow System may be unavailable and therefore, the as indicated by SSF will be credited as an alternate means of O0PSW-FT0001 achieving and maintaining SSD.
Under normal operation should the switch inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW Panel 2KPSW would be paralleled with power from Panel 3KPSW to both PSW Instrument panels.
To prevent the paralleling of power sources this calculation recommends keeping PSW Panel 3KPSW breaker 7 in the normally open position when power to the PSW Instrument panels is aligned to the normal source (2KPSW-7)
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 72 of 182 4 Failu're. Mode and Effects Analysis-orkslieet4-System: Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem:.-- PSW Electrical System Pate : FCare/11 Date : ____10/27/I11 _____
Equipment: _.....
OPSWIROO1, 0PSWIR002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram:- 0-6798 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (I) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 167 0PSWIR00I Provides non- Loss of Electrical or PSW Instrument Loss of bar Loss of non-safety indication has no impact on (0-6798) safety local power in Mechanical panel graph readings in PSW System functionality during an event.
indication and Loss of failure OPSWIR001 MCR as well as Loss of safety panel affects control of OPSWl4.
non-safety OAC power out. unavailable. lack of input to ifOPSW 14 fails, then the ability of PSW to points in MCR. PSW Instrument computer from perform its design function may be affected.
Provides safety panel See Item No. 305 (0PSW-0014) for more related relay and OPSWIR002 Inability to information.
flow switch unavailable control OPSWI4 flow as indicated Should OPSW 14 be. unavailable, the PSW 0 PSW 14 for controls valve. by 0PSW- System may be unavailable and therefore, the PW vav.bSSF will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD.
168 OPSWIR002 Provides safety Loss of Electrical or PSW Instrument Inability to Loss of safety panel affects control of OPSWI4.
(0-6798) related relay and power in Mechanical panel control OPSWi4 IfOPSWI4 fails, then the ability of PSW to flow switch Loss of failure OPSWIR002 flow as indicated: perform its design function may be affected.
controls for power out. unavailable by OPSW- See Item No. 305 (OPSW-00 14) for more OPSW 14 valve. FT0001 information.
Should OPSWI4 be unavailable, the PSW System may be unavailable and therefore, the SSF will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 73 of 182
.. Failure Mode an System:.- Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: .... PSW Electrical System Date: 10/18/1l!
Equipment: __3XPSW and 3XPSW Breaker I A-Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703 Train Method of No Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism and/or on Effects System Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Deecin)8
((7) 169 3XPSW Aux building MCC 3XPSW Loss of Electrical or Loss of power to Unit Bus monitor PSW is available for tornado /
(0-6703) supplies power to PSW output Mechanical 3 PSW valves, HPI on MCC HELB events for Units I and 2.
valves, HPI valves, Vital power - failure valves, Vital l&C 3XPSW For Unit 3 tornado /HELB, the I&C battery charger xfer complete battery chargers, alarms in Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) switches, PSW pump room bus failure PSW pump room MCR will be credited as an alternate exhaust fan, 3KPSW power exhaust fan, power means of achieving and panel panel 3KPSW maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
170 3XPSW - IA Aux building MCC 3XPSW Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of power to Unit Bus monitor PSW is available for tornado /
(0-6703) main breaker feeding PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical 3 PSW valves, HPI on MCC HELB events for Units I and 2.
valves, HPI valves, Vital Partial Trip, failure valves, Vital I&C 3XPSW For Unit 3 tornado /HELB, the I&C battery charger xfer Partial Close battery chargers and alarms in Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) switches, PSW pump room power panel 3KPSW MCR will be credited as an alternate exhaust fan, 3KPSW power means of achieving and panel maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 74 of 182 Failure Mod1e and Effects Anal1ysis AWorksheet ~ i System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date.: .__._10/18/l1 Equipment: .... 3XPSW Breakers I D, 2A, 2C, 3A Rev. No. K 0 Diagram:_0-6703 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train :
No Function Method of Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects
()(Id (2) i () (4)
Mode (5)
Mechanism and/or(6)
System (8) 171 3XPSW - I D Provides alternate Fail Open, Fail Electrical Loss of alternate Fan relay panel pump status Power to PSW pump room (0-6703) 600VAC power to PSW Closed, Partial or power to PSW indicating lights (local) lost. exhaust fan can be supplied pump room exhaust fan Trip, Partial Mechanical pump room from the normal PSW source through xfer sw Close failure exhaust fan PSW Primary and I or 2XPSWA-3E through MTS OPSWSXTRN008 Booster Pump Bearing 0PSWSXTRN008.
Temperature Alarms in MCR. See Item 336 for additional information.
172 3XPSW - 2A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical Loss of power to Valve position indication in See Item No. 322 (0-6703) power to PSW Steam Closed, Partial or Unit 3 PSW flow MCR lost. (3PSW-0006) generator 3A & 3B flow Trip, Partial Mechanical isolation valve Inability to establish flow as isolation MOV 3PSW6 Close failure 3PSW6. indicated by 3PSW-FT0001 and 3PSW-FT0002.
173 3XPSW -2C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical Loss of power to Valve position indication in See Item No. 327 (0-6703) power to PSW Steam Closed, Partial or Unit 3 PSW MCR lost. (3PSW-0023) generator 3A throttle Trip, Partial Mechanical throttle valve Flow anomalies as indicated MOV 3PSW23 Close failure 3PSW23. by 3PSW-FT0001 174 3XPSW - 3A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical Loss of power to Valve position indication in See Item No. 329 (0-6703) power to PSW Steam Closed, Partial or Unit 3 PSW MCR lost. (3 PSW-0025) generator 3B throttle Trip, Partial Mechanical throttle valve Flow anomalies as indicated MOV 3PSW25 Close failure 3PSW25. by 3 PSW-FT0002
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 75 of 182
. Tafihre'Nt~e and Effe'ec tgiA "i sME ee System: -ProtectedService Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/8/I1 l
Equipment: .. 3XPSW Breakers 3B, 3C, 3D, 4A_ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (2) (34) (5) (6) 7). (8) 175 3XPSW - 3B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 332 "
(0-6703) power to HPI seal Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 3 HPI MOV indication in MCR (3HP-0139) flow injection Trip, Partial failure 3HP139. lost.
isolation control Close MOV 3HP139 176 3XPSW - 3C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Loss of power to Valve position See Item No. 333 (0-6703) power to HPI seal Closed, Partial Mechanical Unit 3 HPI MOV indication in MCR (3HP-0140) flow injection throttle Trip, Partial failure 3HP140. lost.
MOV 3HP140 Close 177 3XPSW - 3D Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 3HP24 could be supplied (0-6703) power to 3A HPI Closed, Partial Mechanical 3HP24 is lost. indication in MCR through the normal station power BWST suction valve Trip, Partial failure lost. source via manual xfer switch 3HP24 through xfer Close Control switch 3HPISXTRN003 if available.
w 3HPISXTRN003 yellow position See Item No. 330 for additional light in MCR lost. info.
178 3XPSW - 4A Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position Power to 3HP26 could be supplied (0-6703) power to HP reactor Closed, Partial Mechanical 3HP26 is lost. indication in MCR through the normal station power inlet valve 3HP26 Trip, Partial failure lost. source via manual xfer switch through xfer sw Close Control switch 3HPISXTRN004 if available.
3HPISXTRN004 yellow position See Item No. 331 for additional light in MCR lost. info.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 76 of 182
>*. :***,::: ,' ,.: :*::FailureModeand Effects.Analysis Worksheet '"*;:,' + : : : *"."'*
System: _Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Date : : _FCae__
Subsystem:_PSW Electrical System Pare _
10/18/I11 Equipment: _ 3XPSW Breakers 4B, 4C Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) 6) (7)(8) 179 3XPSW - 4B Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6703) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to Vital I&C battery charger battery charger Partial Close 3CA is lost local indication. 3CA until manual xfer is performed.
3CA through ATS 3CA trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I hour per 3PSWSXTRN0 I annunciated in OSC-81 13. Standby charger 3CS can be MCR. connected if 3XS3 power is available.
ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable.
180 3XPSW - 4C Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure Power can only be restored to the non PSW (0-6703) emergency power Fail Closed, Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in source via manual re-transfer. Therefore, no to Vital I&C Partial Trip, failure Battery Charger MCR as well as power exists to Vital I&C battery charger battery charger Partial Close 3CB is lost local indication. 3CB until manual xfer is performed.
3CB through ATS 3CB trouble Batteries can supply load for up to I hour per 3PSWSXTRN002 annunciated in OSC-8i 13. Standby charger 3CS can be MCR. connected if 3XS3 power is available.
ATS will not transfer to PSW source should PSW power be unavailable.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 77 of 182
..* ,.. - Failure Mode and Effects Analysi Workshieet System: - Protected Service Water Prepared by: .F. Calabrese_____
Date: F._Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date :
- 10/26/11l Equipment: 3XPSW Breaker 5A, 5E Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703" ponentTrain Effects on Train Method Failure of Remarks and Other Effects No ComponenFunction Failure Failure Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (8)
(7) 181 3XPSW - 5A Provides alternate Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of alternate MCR loss of Power to valve OPSW14 can be supplied (0-6703) 600VAC power to Fail Closed, Mechanical power to OPSWI4 valve position from normal PSW source 2XPSW-4C PSW recirc MOV Partial Trip, failure valve, indication OPSWI4 through Partial Close lights.
xfer sw OPSWSXTRN007 182 3XPSW - 5E Provides 600VAC Fail Open, Electrical or Power to 3KPSW and Loss of power Loss of valves 3RC155 through 3RC 160 (0-6703) power to xfmr Fail Closed, Mechanical its loads (3PSW22 & relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 3. See 3PSWTF3XPSW Partial Trip, failure 24 and their 3KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information.
which feeds power Partial Close instrument power, 3PSWCA0002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the panel 3KPSW 3RC 155 thru 160, alarms in PSW control panels is mitigated by and alternate power MCR transfer of power to 2KPSW-7 through to control panels xfer sw OPSWSXTRN006.
OPSW[ROOI & .Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be 0PSWJRO02) is lost, mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos. 326 & 328 for more information.
183 Not Used 184 Not Used 185 Not Used 186 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 78 of 182 Failure Mode and: Efeets AnlssWokhe System:___... _Protected Service Water Prepared by: F.Calabrese Subsystem: .........PSW Electrical System Date: 10/4/11 Equipment: ... 3HPISXTRN003, 3HPISXTRN004, 3PSWSXTRNOOI Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_OEE-351-04, OEE-351-06, 0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(I) (2) ()(4)(5 (6) (7) 187 Not Used 188 3HPISXTRNO03 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to 3A HPi Valve fails to respond See Item No. 330 (3HP-0024)
(OEE-351-04) AC power xfer fails open Mechanical BWST Suction to electronic controls Under normal operation should the M contactor capability for Contact set failure Valve 3HP24 is as determined by inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW 3HP24 from fails closed lost. valve position MCC 3XPSW would be paralleled with power normal station Sindication, flow from MCC 3XS4 to valve 3HP24. To prevent power to PSW Switch fails anomalies and pump the paralleling of power sources this power indications observed calculation recommends keeping MCC in the MCR. 3XPSW breaker 3D in the normally open position when power to the 3HP24 valve is aligned to the station source.
189 3HPISXTRN004 Provides for Contact set Electrical or Power to HP to Valve fails to respond See Item No. 331 (3HP-0026)
(OEE-351-06) AC power xfer fails open Mechanical Injection Reactor to electronic controls Under normal operation should the M contactor capability for Contact set failure Inlet Valve as determined by inadvertently fail closed, power from PSW 3HP26 from fails closed 3HP26 is lost. valve position MCC 3XPSW would be paralleled with power normal station Switch fails indication, flow from MCC 3XS4 to valve 3HP26. To prevent power to PSW to transfer anomalies and pump the paralleling of power sources this power indications observed calculation recommends keeping MCC in the MCR. 3XPSW breaker 4A in the normally open position when power to the 3HP26 valve is I aligned to the station source.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 79 of 182
- Service : Failure Mode a nd Effects A a W heet System _Protected SrieWater_________
Systm:..-.--...ev.ceWate Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : :
Pare FCae8/11 10/18/11 Equipment: _3PSWSXTRN002, 3PSWTF3XPSW Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6703 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) . (7)... (8) 190 3PSWSXTRN001 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW powerto ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6703) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no power transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as exists to vital I&C charger 3CA. Batteries capability for fails closed 3CA is lost local indication, can supply load for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per OSC-3CA battery Switch fails Station power to 3CA trouble 8113. Standby charger 3CS can be charger from totans Charg er 3CA teduine connected if 3XS3 power is available.
power PSW normal tostation to transfer lost Charger 3CA is MCR.
annunciated in A switch failure where both sets of contacts are closed is not credible as this switch is power designed with a single transfer arm.
191 3PSWSXTRN002 Provides for Contact set Electrical or PSW power to ATS failure If switch fails open or if switch fails to (0-6703) AC power fails open Mechanical Vital I&C annunciated in transfer on loss of normal source, no power transfer Contact set failure Battery Charger MCR as well as exists to vital I&C charger 3CB. Batteries capability for fails closed 3CB is lost local indication, can supply load for up to I hour per OSC-3CB battery Switch fails Station power to 3CB trouble 8113. Standby charger 3CS can be charger from to transfer Charger 3CB is annunciated in connected if3XS3 power is available.
normal station lost MCR. A switch failure where both sets of contacts power to PSW are closed is not credible as this switch is power designed with a single transfer arm.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 80 of 182
~F" Ure:Moderand EffectsyAnAlyis Woidkiheet _________________________
System: ____Protected Service Water__________
Subsystem: .PSW Electrical SystemCalabrese Date :
10/i8/I1 Equipment: __3PSWTFXPSW, 3KPSW Rev. No 0 Diagram:_ 0-6703,_-6706 Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 192 3PSWTF3XPSW Provides Loss of Electrical Power to 3KPSW Loss of power Loss of valves 3RC155 through 3RCI60 (0-6703) 208/120VAC power in failure and its loads relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 3. See power to panel Loss of (3PSW22, 24 and 3KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information.
3KPSW power out 3RC!55 thru 160) 3PSWCA0002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the PSW is lost. alarms in control panels is mitigated by transfer of MCR power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw OPSWSXTRN006.
Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be mitigated by operation of manual bypass valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos.
326 & 328 for more information.
193 3KPSW Provides power Loss of Electrical or Power to 3KPSW Loss of power Loss of valves 3RC155 through 3RC160 (0-6706) to 3KPSW and output Mechanical and its loads relay on renders PSW unavailable for Unit 3. See its loads power- failure (3 PS W22 & 24 and 3KPSW bus in Item No. 335 for more information.
(3 PSW22, 24 complete their instrument 3PSWCAO002 Loss of the alternate power feed to the PSW and their bus failure power, 3RC 155 alarms in control panels is mitigated by transfer of instrument thru 160, and MCR power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw power, 3RC155 alternate power to OPSWSXTRN006.
thru 160, and control panels Loss of3PSW22 and 3PSW24 may be alternate power OPSWIR00) and mitigated by operation of manual bypass to control panels OPSWIRt. 2) is valves 3PSW26 & 3PSW28. See Item Nos.
OPSWIR002 and lost. 326 & 328 for more information.
_____________OPSWIR.002__________________________________
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 81 of 182 VFailure Mode and Effects Analysis W rkshet , .
System: ............. Protected Service Water_____
Subsystem: PSW El.SetrviceWalytem Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem : -..........PSW Electrical SystemDa e:01 81 Date : ____10118/Il______
Equipment: ......... 3KPSW Breakers main, I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707 omoetFire Failure Fire Failure Train and/or Detection(8 No (I) Identification (2) Function Mode Mechanism Effects Systemon Method of Failure (7) Remarks and Other Effects (3) (4) (5) S6e (7) 194 3KPSW - Aux building panel Fail Open, Electrical or Power to Loss of power relay on Loss of valves 3RC155 through Main 3KPSW main breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical 3KPSW and 3KPSW bus in 3RC 160 renders PSW (0-6706) feeding (3PSW22, 24 Partial Trip, failure its loads 3PSWCA0002 alarms in unavailable for Unit 3. See Item and 3RC155 thru 160) Partial Close (3PSW22, 24 MCR No. 335 for more information.
and alternate power to and 3RC 155 Loss of the alternate power feed control panels thru 160, and to the PSW control panels is OPSWIR001 and alternate mitigated by transfer of power to OPSWIR002 power to 2KPSW-7 through xfer sw control panels OPSWSXTRN006.
OPSWIROOd Loss of 3PSW22 and 3PSW24 aPSWIRO02) may be mitigated by operation of isloPst, manual bypass valves 3PSW26 is lost. & 3PSW28. See Item Nos. 326
& 328 for more information.
195 3KPSW- I Provides 120VAC PSW Fail Open, Electrical or PSW power to Valve position indicating See Item No. 335 (0-6706) power to RC sys reactor Fail Closed, Mechanical 3RC155 and lights in MCR lost. (3RC-0155/0156) vessel head vent valves Partial Trip, failure 3RC156 is lost White and Yellow CS 3RC155 & 3RC156 Partial Close position indicating light in through powerl xfer sw MCR lost.
3 RC-CS- 155/156 1 1 CR ost.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 82 of 182
~Fai.I ure: Mod.e, and gfit AnlyisWoksee System: Protected Service Water__________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese______
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/18/l _
Equipment: - 3KPSW Breakers 2, 3t 4 Rev. No. 0 D iagram: ... ........
0 -6706 ........................
Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 196 3KPSW - 2 Provides 120VAC PSW power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6706) to RC sys reactor vessel head Closed, Partial Mechanical 3RC157 and indicating lights in (3RC-0157/0158) vent valves 3RC157 & Trip, Partial failure 3RC158 is lost MCR lost.
3RC 158 through power xfer Close White and Yellow CS sw 3RC-CS- 157/158 position indicating light in MCR lost.
197 3KPSW 3 Provides 120VAC PSW power Fail Open, Fail Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (0-6706) to RC sys reactor vessel head Closed, Partial Mechanical 3RC159 and indicating lights in (3RC-0159/0160) vent valves 3RC159 & Trip, Partial failure 3RC160 is lost MCR lost.
3RC160 through power xfer Close White and Yellow CS sw 3RC-CS- 159/160 position indicating light in MCR lost.
198 3KPSW 4 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3A flow Closed, Partial Mechanical 3PSW22 signal information to MCR of SOV 3PSW22 is lost control SOV 3PSW22 signal Trip, Partial failure isolator,*flow OAC point is lost. See Item No. 326 isolator, instrument controller Close controller and flow (3PSW-0022) and flow transmitter in transmitter in 3PSWCA000 !3PSWSIOOI is lost.
199 3KPSW - 5 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV .Transfer of flow Automatic flow control (0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 3PSW24 signal information to MCR of SOV 3PSW24 is lost SOV 3PSW24 signal isolator, Trip, Partial failure isolator, flow OAC point is lost. See Item No. 328 instrument controller and flow Close controller and flow (3PSW-0024) transmitter in 3PSWCA0001 transmitter in I I_ , 3PSWS1002 is lost.
OSC-10008, Rev, 1 Appendix A Page 83 of 182
. ,; Moe*anulffectsA
.r,..ailure
.W rk..ee t , "X- '.- ,:
System: .--.- Protected Service Water_________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 10/9/11 Equipment: ...........
3KPSW Breakers 7, 9, 10 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _0-6706 Component F Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) 200 3KPSW - 7 Provides alternate 120VAC Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to Loss of bar PSW control panel board (0-6706) power to PSW Control Panel Closed, Partial Mechanical OPSWIR001 graph readings in can be powered thru Boards OPSWIROOI and Trip, Partial failure and MCR as well as 2KPSW-7 after manual OPSWIR002 through manual Close OPSWIR0O02 lack of input to transfer of transfer switch available thru computer from OPSWSXTRN006. No 0PSWSXTRN006 2KPSW - 7 OAC points. impact to PSW.
201 3KPSW - 9 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 326 (3PSW-(0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3A flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical 3PSW22 is indicating lights 0022)
SOV 3PSW22, power converter Trip, Partial failure lost in MCR panel 3PSWVF0022 and positioner Close 3UBlis lost.
assembly 3PSWVP0022 202 3KPSW- 10 Provides 120VAC power to Fail Open, Fail Electrical or Power to SOV Valve position See Item No. 328 (3PSW-(0-6706) PSW Stm Gen 3B flow control Closed, Partial Mechanical .3PSW24 is indicating lights 0024)
SOV 3PSW24, power converter Trip, Partial failure lost in MCR panel 3PSWVF0024 and positioner Close 3UB Iis lost.
assembly 3PSWVP0024 203 Not Used 204 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 84 of 182 Failur, Mode System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F.Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 10/18/11 Equipment: 3PSWSI00 1,3PSWSI002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_ _OEE-365-13, OEE-365-16 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 205 3PSWSIOO1 PSW Stm Gen 3A flow Loss of power in Electrical Automatic flow Transfer of flow See Item No. 326 (OEE-365-13) control SOV 3PSW22 Loss of power failure control of SOV information to MCR (3PSW-0022) signal isolator, flow out 3PSW22 is lost OAC point is lost. Failure effects of controller and flow. 3PSWSi0l1 bounds transmitter in failure effects of 3PSWCAO00 1 3PSWSSOOI and 3PSWFT00 I.
206 3PSWSI002 PSW Stm Gen 3B flow Loss of power in Electrical Automatic flow Transfer of flow See Item No. 328 (OEE-365-16) control SOV 3PSW24 Loss of power failure control of SOV information to MCR (3PSW-0024) signal isolator, flow out 3PSW24 is lost OAC point is lost. Failure effects of controller and flow 3PSWS1002 bounds transmitter in failure effects of 3PSWCA0001 3PSWSS002 and f 3PSWFT002.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 85 of 182 Failure Niode. and Effec*sAn:alysis. Worksheet..
System: ........ Protected Service Water_____
Prepared by: _F.
Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/28/11 Equipment: 3RC-CS-1 55/156 (157/158) (159/160) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OEE-350-15 (16) (17)
No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection
(!) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 207 3RC-CS-155/156 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0155/0156) fails open Mechanical 3RC155 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam (OEE-350-15) power transfer capability for Contact set failure 3RC156 is lost MCR lost. operated switch constructed in such a 3RC 155 and 3RC156 fails closed Station power to White and Yellow way as to prevent contacts from from normal station Switch fails 3RC155 and CS position separate cam followers to be closed power to PSW power to transfer 3RCi 56 is lost indicating light in simultaneously. Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not a credible failure.
208 3RC-CS-1 57/158 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0157/0158)
(OEE-350-16) power transfer fails open Mechanical 3RC 157 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam capability for Contact set failure 3RC158 is lost MCR lost. operated switch constructed in such a 3RC157 and 3RC158 fails closed Station power to White and Yellow way as to prevent contacts from from normal station Switch fails 3RC157 and CS position separate cam followers to be closed power to PSW power to transfer 3RC 158 is lost indicating light in simultaneously. Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is not a credible failure.
209 3RC-CS-159/160 Provides for AC Contact set Electrical or PSW power to Valve position See Item No. 335 (3RC-0159/0160)
(OEE-350-17) power transfer fails open Mechanical 3RCI 59 and indicating lights in The GE SBM switch is a cam capability for Contact set failure 3RC160 is lost MCR lost. operated switch constructed in such a 3RC 159 and 3RC160 fails closed Station power to White and Yellow way as to prevent contacts from from normal station Switch fails 3RC159 and CS position separate cam followers to be closed power to PSW power to transfer 3RC 160 is lost indicating light in simultaneously. Therefore paralleling MCR lost. of normal and PSW power sources is I not a credible failure.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 86 of 182 F~~ailure M~ode and Effects Anayi"y se System: ___Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: N/A Pare :
Date : ____10/28/lFCar8/11i______
Equipment: . N/A......_.._N/ARev.No.0
......... Rev. No. 0 Diagram: N/A No Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Effects
(() (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 210 Not Used 211 Not Used.. ._
212 Not Used ._
213 Not Used 214 Not Used _
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 87 of 182 Failune Mode an fetsA ayi Worksheelt System: __Protected Service Water____________ Prepared by: F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem:_PSW Electrical System__________ Date : 9/27/2011 Equipment: _PSWBAOOOI, PSWBA0002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) * (7) (8) 215 PSWBA000I Primary Safety Open cell, Electrical or Primary supply for PSWLXDCO1 (27) A leaking cell, or a shorted cell Battery I Related supply for shorted cell; Mechanical PSW 126V DC under voltage relay will not affect the DC power PSW 125V DC output voltage failure power distribution in MCR alarms system as the battery is sized to (0-6700-01) power distribution fails low or cell center should operate on 58 (out of 60) cells.
center leakage. PSWLXDC01 is PSWBC0001 also PSWLXDC0I lost. be unavailable and An open cell and PSW High &
PSWBC000I X308 Low voltage fat lures are over voltage relay mitigated via manual transfer to to alarm the backup battery PSWBA0002.
216 PSWBA0002 Alternate Safety Open cell, Electrical or Alternate supply PSWLXDC01 27 A leaking cell, or a shorted cell Battery 2 Related supply for shorted cell; Mechanical for PSW 125V DC under voltage relay will not affect the DC power
() PSW 125V DC output voltage failure power distribution in MCR alarms system as the battery is sized to power distribution fails low or cell center should operate on 58 (out of 60) cells.
center leakage PSWLXDCO1 is PSWBC0002 also PSWLXDCOI lost. be unavailable and PSWBOOO2X308 An Low ope ell afailures voltage P are i PSWBC0002r X30g mitigated via manual transfer to over voltage relay the primary battery to alarm PSWBA000I.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 88 of 182 Failbe Mod and Effect, ',ecsAD Uiy~i W~ksheet, System: -.... Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/27/2011 Equipment: -....
PSWBC000I, PSWBC0002 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 217 PSWBC000I Primary supply for Loss of output, Electrical or Primary supply for PSWBC0001 X306 The chargers are 100%
Charger 1 PSW 125V DC output voltage Mechanical 125V DC power under voltage relay redundant, Failures are power distribution fails high, or failure distribution center to alarm in MCR. mitigated via manual transfer to (0-6700-01) center output voltage PSWLXDCOI & the battery charger 2, (OEE- 165-18) PSWBC000I X308 PSWLXDCOI and fails low charging function PSWBC0002.
over voltage relay for charging of battery to alarm in MCR.
battery PSWBAOOO1 are PSWBA0001 lost.
218 PSWBC0002 Alternate supply Loss of output, Electrical or Secondary supply PSWBC0002 X306 The chargers are 100%
Charger 2 for PSW 125V DC output voltage Mechanical for 125V DC.: under voltage relay redundant. Failures are (0-6700-01) power distribution fails high, or failure power distribution to alarm in MCR. mitigated via manual transfer to center output voltage center PSWBC0002 X308 the battery charger I, (OEE-165-18) PSWLXDC0I and fails low (PSWLXDCOI) & oola rela PSWBIC0001.
for charging charging function over voltage relay of battery to alarm in MCR.
battery PSWBA002 (PSWBA0002) are lost.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 89 of 182
~~ ~Failure Mode and Efets Analysis Work~heet '
System:.,--" Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese System Pre : 9/27/2011 Subsystem: PSW Electrical
......... Date :9/27/2011I Equipment: __PSWLXDCO I, PSWLXDC0 I Breaker 3B3 Rev. No. 0 Diagram. 0-6700-01
'Method of Function Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Failure R No Component Identification (3) Mode Mechanism System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 219 PSWLXDC01 Source of Loss of Electrical or PSW DC power PSWLXDC0I Failure of the PSW DC system, fails 125V DC power for output Mechanical unavailable. (27) under the PSW System. If the PSW System Power PSW 125V power - Failure voltage relay is unavailable, the Safe Shutdown Distribution DC control complete to alarm in Facility (SSF) will be credited as an Center system bus failure MCR alternate means of achieving and SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
(0-6700-01) _maintaining 220 PSWLXDC0 Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Control Power Status Status indication in MCR of Unit 3 Breaker- 3B3 for Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical to Auto Xfer Switches indication of ATS switch position is lost. No (0-6700-01) 3PSWPL2DC Partial Trip, Failure 3PSWSXTRN001 ATS in MCR impact on PSW System functionality.
BKR is N.C. Partial Close 3PSWSXTRN002 and lost. Operators will be unable to switch to Motor Operated Xfer o peras wimary p o sourc to switches 3HPISXTRN001 White and/or PSW as primary power source to 3HPISXTRN002 is lost Yellow lights operate HPI pump 3A or 3B.
in MCR However, switch has manual indicating HPI capability. No impact to PSW.
switch position are lost
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 90 of 182
, Failure Mode and Effects Aualysis Workshet .
System: ....................
Protected Service Water_____________
Subsystem: ...........
PSW Electrical System Pare Date : : 9F abe___
9/27/2011]
Equipment: PSWLXDCO0 Breaker 3B4 Re._o.
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ...... 0-6700-01 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or - Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism System Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Detection (8)
___________(7) 221 PSWLXDC0I Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Control Power Status Status indication in MCR of Unit I Breaker-- 3B4 for Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical to Auto Xfer Switches indication of ATS switch position is lost. No (0-6700-01) I PSWPL2DC Partial Trip, Failure IPSWSXTRN00 I : ATS in MCR impact on PSW System functionality.
BKR is N.C. Partial Close Motor Operated XferOprtrwileunbeositht IPSWSXTRN002 and lost. Operators will be unable to switch to switches IHPISXTRN001 White and/or PSW as primary power source to switches PISX is lost Yellow lights operate H-PI pump IA or I B.
in MCR However, switch has manual indicating HPI capability. No impact to PSW switch position are lost
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 91 of 182
... . Failure Mode and Effects Ana lyis,.W rksheet ..
System: __Protected Service Water____________
Date : 9/27/a01 s Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/27/2011!
Equipment: PSWLXDC01 Breaker 3B5_Rv.No__
Diagram: .-.. 0-6700-0!
No Component NoFuctionFailure Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System DetectionRemarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 222 PSWLXDC0I Feeder Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control Power 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V Breaker- 3B5 Breaker for Fail Closed, Mechanical unavailable to 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need (0-6700-01) Panel Partial Trip, Failure various 13.8kV, 600V breaker to be exercised, PSW System will operate PSWPLI DC Partial Close 4.16kV Breakers indication normally.
and PSW Load (local &
BKR is N.C. Center Breakers MCR) is lost Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and B7T-C should Keowee source be required.
Loss of control power to B6T-I is mitigated via the above steps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional closure of tie breaker B7T-I Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable.
Should any of the other B6T or PX13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker.
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 92 of 182
"".. " . . Failure Mode and Effets-An a*S olks' System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: _PSW Electrical System_ _ 98/0 Date: ____9/28/2011I 3B6Dae Equipment: _PSWLXDC01 Breaker Rev. No. 0 0-6700-01 Rev.iNo._:_0 Diagram:
Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechan ism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) System Detection (8)
( ___)___(2 ___ ((5(6) (7) 223 PSWLXDC0 Feeder Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and Load Breaker..- 3B6 Breaker for Fail Closed, Mechanical Power and, center breakers are in normal alignment and do not need (0-6700-01) Panel Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to 4.16kV to be exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
PSWPL2DC Partial Close various and 600V Loss of control power to B6T-A and B7T-C is mitigated BKR is NC. 4.16kV indication via manual trip ofofbreakers to release electrical interlock Breakers and (local & enabling closure B6T-B and B7T-D should Keowee PSW Load MCR) is source be required.
Center lost Loss of control power to B7T-1, 2 and 4 have no impact Breakers on PSW function.
Should PXI3-5B be open, loss of control power to renders PSW unavailable.
Should PXi3-4C be open, loss of control power is mitigated via closure of RW2 MCC breaker to provide power to XPSW MCC.
Should any of the other PXI3 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for Unit 2.
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 93 of 182 St:..Failu.e..ode aPrdEffectsoAeateSiis WriWsheete System: __Protected Service Water . ....... Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: .... PSW Electrical System Date : 9/28/2011I Equipment: . PSWLXDCOI Breakers 3B7, IA_
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _ O-6700-0l No Component Function Failure Failure Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or on Train System Method of Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 224 PSWLXDCOI Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Control Status indication of ATS in Status indication in MCR of Breaker- 3B7 for Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical Power to Auto Xfer MCR lost. Unit 2 ATS switch position is (0-6700-01) 2PSWPL2DC Partial Trip, Failure Switches N i o lost. No impact on PSW BKR is N.C. Partial Close 2PSWSXTRN001 No indication on loss of DC System functionality.
2PSWSXTRN002 control power to switches 006 and 008. Switches 006 and 008 have and Manual Xfer no dc function.
Switches White and/or Yellow lights Operators will be unable to OPSWSXTRN006 in MCR indicating HPI switch between Unit 2 and OPSWSXTRN007 switch position are lost Unit 3 PSW MCC power OPSWSXTRN008 supplies for operation of and Motor OPSWI4 valve through Operated Xfer switch 007.
switches 2HPISXTRN001 Operators will be unable to 2HPISXTRN002 is switch to PSW as primary lost power source to operate HPI pump 2A or 2B. However, switch has manual capability.
No impact to PSW.
225 PSWLXDCOi Feeder breaker Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC None. Test connection Loss of battery I test Breaker- IA for battery I test Fail Closed, Mechanical control power equipment is not typically connection box. No impact (0-6700-01) connection box Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to connected. During use, to PSW functionality.
PSWPLTBOI Partial Close battery test failure is detected via BKR is N.C. connection box observance of equipment I_ I I not functioning.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 94 of 182 Faihure Mode a~ndEffects Anl AU s ,
System: -Protected Service Water___________
Subsystem: . PSW Electrical System Pare Date:: : .Cabee2011
.9/29/2011 Equipment: _, _PSWLXDCOI Breakers IB, 2A, R~ev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Method of Failure No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 226 PSWLXDCO I PSWLXDC01 Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to None under normal Loss of the ability to supply Breaker- 11B Main Panel breaker Fail Mechanical supply power to operation. DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery I Closed, Failure distribution center Under accident scenario battery I is mitigated via feed Partial PSWLXDCOI on loss battery would be manual transfer to the backup BKR is N.C. Trip, of AC power events depleted and all battery PSWBA0002 via Partial Loss of ability to charge associated DC alarms closure of PSWLXDCO I Close battery PSWBAOOOI. would be received, breakers 4A, 4B and 5B.
227 PSWLXDCOI PSWLXDC01 Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDC01 27 under Loss of the ability to supply Breaker- 2A Main Panel breaker Fail Mechanical supply power to voltage relay would DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery Closed, Failure distribution center alarm in MCR when battery charger I is mitigated Charger I feed Partial PSWLXDCOI battery is depleted. via manual transfer to the BKR is N.C. Trip, Loss of ability to charge backup battery charger Partial battery PSWBAOOOI PSWBC0002 via closure of Close PSWLXDCO I breakers 4A, S4Band 5B.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 95 of 182 FailureyMode:and ....... Aelyste W rksheet System: __Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 9/29/201_
Equipment:. PSWLXDC0 I Breakers 2B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of (N) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 228 PSWLXDC01 PSWLXDC01 Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDCOI Loss of the ability to supply DC Breaker- 2B Main Panel Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to (27) under distribution center from battery I or battery (0-6700-01) breaker for both Partial Trip, Failure distribution voltage relay charger I is mitigated via manual transfer PSW Battery I Partial Close center alarms in MCR. to the backup battery system PSWBA0002 feed and PSW PSWLXDCOI and PSWBC0002 via closure of Battery Charger PSWLXDCO I breakers 4A, 4B and 5B.
I feed Should the PSW DC system be aligned to BKR is N.C. battery 2 and battery charger 2, an inadvertent closure failure of breaker 2B would parallel battery I and battery charger I to the PSWLXDCOI bus along with battery 2 and battery charger 2. This calculation recommends keeping breaker 2B racked out under while battery I and battery charger I is not being used as the PSW DC power source.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 96 of 182 Vailui'& Mode andEfet En yi okhe System: Protected Service Water_____
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_
Date: 9/29/2011 Equipment: _PSWLXDCOI Breakers 5A, 5B, 4A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 229 PSWLXDCO I Feeder breaker for Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC None. Test connection. Loss of battery 2 test Breaker- 5A battery 2 test Fail Closed, Mechanical control power equipment is not typically connection box. No impact (0-6700-01) connection box Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to - connected. During use, to PSW functionality.
PSWPLTBO2 Partial Close battery test failure is detected via BKR is N.C. connection box. . observance of equipment not functioning.
230 PSWLXDCOI PSWLXDCOI Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to None under normal Loss of the ability to supply Breaker-- 5B Main Panel breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to operation. DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery 2 Partial Trip, Failure distribution center Under accident scenario battery 2 is mitigated via feed Partial Close PSWLXDCOI on manual transfer to the battery would be depleted maranser toBthe BKR is N.C. loss of AC power pirbattery PSWBAOOO I events alassocld DC via closure of PSWLXDCOI Loss of ability to alarms would be received, breakers IB, 2A and 2B.
charge battery PSWBA0002.
231 PSWLXDC0I PSWLXDCOI Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDCO0 27 under Loss of the ability to supply Breaker- 4A Main Panel breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to voltage relay would alarm DC distribution center from (0-6700-01) for PSW Battery Partial Trip, Failure distribution center in MCR when battery was battery charger 2 is mitigated Charger 2 feed Partial Close PSWLXDCO I depleted. via manual transfer to the BKR is N.C. Loss of ability to primary battery charger charge battery PSWBCOOO I via closure of PSWBA0002 PSWLXDC0 I breakers I B, 2A and 2B.
ii.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 97 of 182
":* .. '*,;L i . Failure Mode System: __.Protected Service Water Prepared by: -F.Calabrese Subsystem: _._PSW Electrical System Date: 9/29/2011 Equipment: _PSWLXDCO I Breaker 4B Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-01 FucinFailure Failure Effects on Train Method Methodreof No Component No Identification Function Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 232 PSWLXDCOI PSWLXDCO I Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of ability to PSWLXDCOI Loss of the ability to supply DC Breaker- 4B Main Panel breaker Fail Closed, Mechanical supply power to (27) under distribution center from battery 2 or (0-6700-01) for both PSW Partial Trip, Failure distribution center voltage relay battery charger 2 is mitigated via manual Battery 2 feed and Partial Close PSWLXDC01 to alarm in transfer to the primary battery system PSW Battery MCR. PSWBA0001 and PSWBC0001 via Charger 2 feed closure of PSWLXDCOI breakers IB, BKR is N.O. 2A and 2B.
Under normal operation, should the breaker inadvertently close, battery 2 and battery charger 2 will be paralleled to the PSWLXDCOI bus along with battery I and battery charger 1. This calculation recommends keeping breaker 4B racked out under while battery 2 and battery charger 2 is not being used as the PSW DC power source.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 98 of 182 W.Failuzre.Mode and Effects AnalysisWoriksheet System: Protected Service Water_____________ Prepared by: F. calabrese _____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/21/11 Equipment: _PSWPL I DC Rev. No. 0 Diagram:~ 0-6700-02 Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 233 PSWPL I DC 125V DC Loss of Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V 125V DC control power on Mechanical Power 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need to Panelboard power input, loss Failure unavailable to 600V be exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
distribution of power 13.8kV, 4.16kV breaker Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is (0-6700-02) for 13.8kV, on output breakers, and indication mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release 4.16kV PSW Load (local & electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and breakers, Center. MCR) is lost BTT-C should Keowee source be required.
and PSW Loss of various Load Center PSW equipment Loss of control power to B6T-i is mitigated via the Control above lteps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional Power closure of tie breaker B7T-I Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable.
Should any of the other B6T or PX 13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker.
All 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V LC breakers have manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 99 of 182 IJ....Fai~lur .e Moide andtftects Alal~ w r "*
System: Protected Service Water___________ Prepared by: _F. Calabrese______
Subsystem:- PSW Electrical System Date: 10/21/11 Equipment: ....PSWPL I DC Main Breaker________ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identificati Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (6) (7) (8) 234 PSWPLI DC - PSW Building Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V Main Breaker panel Fail Closed, Mechanical Power 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need to PSWPLIDC Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to 600V be exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
(0-6700-02) Main Breaker Partial Close 13.8kV, breaker Loss of control power to B6T-B and B7T-D is feeding 125V 4.16kV indication mitigated via manual trip of breakers to release DC control breakers, and (local & electrical interlock enabling closure of B6T-A and power for PSW Load MCR) is lost B7T-C should Keowee source be required.
13.8kV, Center.
4.16kV and Loss of Loss of control power to B6T-I is mitigated via the PSW Load various PSW above steps for B6T-B and B7T-D with additional Center equipment closure of tie breaker B7T-1 breakers Should B6T-2, B6T-6 or B6T-7 be open, loss of control power renders PSW unavailable.
Should any of the other B6T or PX 13 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for the specific unit affected by the open breaker.
All 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V LC breakers have manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
i[
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 100 of 182 anitiEffects AfilaissWorksheet..
System: ,__Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System __
Date : 10/21/11l Breakers 1, 2.3 Equipment: PSWPLIDC Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (6) (7) (8) 235 PSWPLIDC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or DC control PSW SWGR Should B6T-B be open, loss of control BKR # I power for 13.8kV Fail Closed, Mechanical power Breaker status power is mitigated via closure of either (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB6T-B Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to Indication breakers B7T-C or B7T-D, closure of tie (0-600-02) (In feed for swgr. Partial Close PSWB6T-B lights (local & breaker B7T-l and opening of B6T-l main (OEE-60 -0i) B6T from Fant line) breaker. MCR) will breaker.
extinguish Alternatively, B6T-A could be closed powering B6T from Keowee.
B6T-B also has manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
236 PSWPL I DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR Loss of control power to B7T-D is BKR# 2 power for 13.8kV Fail Closed, Mechanical DC control Breaker status mitigated via closure of either breakers (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB7T-D Partial Trip, Failure power Indication B6T-A or B, closure of tie breaker B7T- I (OEE-603-01) (In feed for swgr. Partial Close unavailable to lights (local & and opening of B7T-2 main breaker.
1B7T from Fant line) PSWB7T-D MCR) will Alternatively, B7T-C could be closed breaker. extinguish powering B6T from Keowee.
B7T-D also has manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
0SC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 101 of 182
- . Failure Mode and Effects'Anal o System: __Protected Service Water_F. Prepared by: Calabres Subsystem: _..PSW Electrical System Date : 10/21/l1 Equipment: _PSWPLI DC Breakers 3, 4 Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_ .. 0-6700-02 Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) 237 PSWPLI DC 125 V DC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC PSW SWGR Loss of control power to B6T-I is mitigated via BKR # 3 control power Fail Closed, Mechanical control power Breaker status closure of either breakers B7T-C or D, closure (0-6700-02) for 4.16kV Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to Indication of tie breaker B7T-I and opening of B6T-A and breaker Partial Close PSWB6T-i lights (local & B feeder breakers.
(OEE-6040)I) PSWB6T-I breaker MCR) will B6T-l also has manual charging capability to (Swgr. B6T main extinguish effect breaker closure upon loss of control in feed breaker) power.
238 PSWPLIDC 125 V DC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC PSW SWGR Assuming PSW System is in normal alignment BKR # 4 control power Fail Closed, Mechanical control power Breaker status (B6T-2 breaker is closed) and does not need to (0-6700-02) for 4.16kV Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to Indication be exercised, PSW System will operate breaker Partial Close PSWB6T-2 lights (local & normally. Alternatively if B6T-2 is open, PSW (OEE-607-01) PSWB6T-2 breaker MCR) will load center will be lost and PSW System will (feeder breaker extinguish be unavailable.
for Load center Should the PSW System be unavailable, the transformer Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be PX 13) credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
B6T-2 also has manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control I power
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 102 of 182 Failure.Mode and Effects Ana, isis v..s..- .
System: Protected Service Water____________ Prepared by: _F. Calabrese_____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_________ Date : ____10/22/i I_______
Equipment:. PSWPL I DC Breakers 5,6 Rev.No. 0 Diagram: .0-6700-02 component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identificati Function Mode Mechanism rain and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (6) (7) (8) 239 PSWPLI DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR B6T-3 is normally open, therefore power to IA &
BKR # 5 power for 4.16kV Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker I B HPI pumps through the manual alignment (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB6T-3 Closed, Failure power status switch will be unavailable and unit I PSW (feeder breaker for Partial unavailable to Indication System will be unavailable. PSW System for (OEE-609-01) manual alignment Trip, PSWB6T-3 lights (local units 2&3 for tornado/HELB scenario will be switch Partial breaker & MCR) available.
I HPISXALGNOOI) Close will B6T-3 also has manual charging capability to extinguish effect breaker closure upon loss of control power Should the unit I PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and
. . maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
240 PSWPL I DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR B6T-4 is normally open, therefore power to 2A &
BKR #6 power for 4.16kV Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker 2B HPI pumps through the manual alignment (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB6T-4 Closed, Failure power status switch will be unavailable and unit 2 PSW (0E-670-02) (feeder breaker for Partial unavailable to Indication System will be unavailable. PSW System for (OEE-61 1-01) manual alignment Trip, PSWB6T-4 lights (local units 1&3 for tornado/HELB scenario will be switch Partial breaker & MCR) available.
2HPISXALGN001) Close will B6T-4 also has manual charging capability to extinguish effect breaker closure upon loss of control power Should the unit 2 PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 103 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analvs "'Worksheet System: .- _.Protected Service Water____________
Subsystem: PSW Electrical .....System Pare: : . Cabe4/11.
Date 10/24/11I Equipment: ...........
PSWPLI DC Breakers 7, 8_______ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: ..............-6700-02 Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Function Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (2) (3) System Detection (8) dnit(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 241 PSWPLI DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR B6T-5 is normally open,..therefore powerto 3A &
BKR # 7 power for 4.16kV Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker 3B. HPI pumps through the. manual alignment (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB6T-5 Closed, Failure power status'. switch will be unavailable and unit 3 PSW (feeder breaker for Partial unavailable to Indication System will be unavailable.PSW System for (OEE-6i3-01) manual alignment Trip, PSWB6T-5 lights (local runits l&2 for tornado/HELB scenario will be switch Partial breaker & MCR) available.
3HPISXALGN001) Close will B6T-5 also has manual charging capability to extinguish effect breaker closure upon loss of control power Should the unit 3 PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
242 PSWPL I DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR B6T-6 is normally open, therefore power to PSW BKR # 8 power for 4.16kV Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker primary pump motor will be lost and PSW (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB6T-6 Closed, Failure power status System will be unavailable.
(0-600-02) (feeder breaker for Partial unavailable to Indication B6T-6 also has manual charging capability to (OEE-608-0l) PSW primary pump Trip, PSWB6T-6 lights (local effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
motor Partial breaker & MCw) Should the PSW System be unavailable, the extinguish Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and I maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 104 of 182 Failure -Mod.eu Effects Analysis W System: Protected Service
............. Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System -- :
Date: 10/25/11 Equipment: _PSWPL IDC Breakers 9, 13 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No Component Function Failue Failure Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) () Identification (3Mode (3) Mechanism Sse System eeto Detection (8)
(6) (7) 243 PSWPLIDC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR B6T-7 is normally open, therefore power to PSW BKR 0 9 power for 4.16kV Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker booster pump motor will be unavailable and PSW (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB6T-7 Closed, Failure power status System will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) (feeder breaker for Partial unavailable to Indication B6T-7 also has manual charging capability to (OEE-632-0l) PSW booster pump Trip, PSWB6T-7 lights (local effect breaker closure upon loss of control power motor Partial breaker & MCR) Should the PSW System be unavailable, the OPSWMROOOe) Close will Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited extinguish as an alternate means ofachieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
244 PSWPLI DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load Assuming PSW System is in normal alignment BKR # 13 power for PSW load Fail Mechanical DC control Center. (breaker is closed) and does not need to be (0-6700-02) center feeder breaker Closed, Failure power breaker exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
to Aux Building Partial unavailable to status Alternatively if PX I3-4D is open, power to MCC (OEE-165-1 1) MCC IXPSW Trip, PSW load indication IXPSW will be lost and PSW System for unit 1 (PSWLXPX 13 Partial center breaker lights (local) will be unavailable. PSW for Units 2 & 3 is still Compt. 4D) Close PSWLXPXI3 will available.
Compt 4D extinguish PSWLXPX I3-4D also has manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
Should the Unit IPSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 105 of 182 Failu re Mode an fet 'n yi System: __Protected Service Water Prepared by: F Calabrese Subsystem: ..PSW Electrical System Date : 10/25/I I Equipment: _PSWPLIDC Breakers 14, 17 0.....
Diagram: . _-6700-02 Effects on Method No Component Function Failure Failure Train and/or Failureof Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) 245 PSWPLI DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load Assuming PSW System is in normal alignment BKR # 14 power for PSW load Fail Mechanical DC control Center. (breaker is closed) and do not need to be center feeder breaker Closed, Failure power breaker exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
to Aux Building Partial unavailable status Alternatively ifPX13-3D is open, power to MCC (OEE-365-1 1) MCC 3XPSW Trip, to PSW load indication 3XPSW will be lost and PSW System for Unit 3 (PSWLXPXI3 Partial center lights (local) will be unavailable. PSW for Units I & 2 is still Compt. 3D) Close PSWLXPX13 will.. available.
Compt 3D extinguish PSWLXPX 13-3 D also has manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
Should the Unit 3 PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
246 PSWPLIDC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load PXI3-2B is normally open, therefore PSW power BKR # 17 power for PSW load Fail Mechanical DC control Center to MCC I XJ will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) center feeder breaker Closed, Failure power breaker PSWLXPXI3-2B also has manual charging to manual transfer Partial unavailable status capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of (OEE-165-08) switch Trip, to PSW load indication control power.
I PSWSXTRN004 for Partial center lights (local Loss of ability to power Unit I Bank 2 Group C, MCC IXj Close PSWLXPX13 & MCR) Bank 3 and 4 pressurizer heaters from PSW will Compt 2B)
__________ extinguish require sufficient heater capacity to be powered
____ 2B)__ _from extinguis the SSF.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 106 of 182 Servce Failure Mode andi Effec ts ýAw~jvsoiks el~
System: Protected Service Water Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Prepared by: - F. Calabrese (Rev 0) / W. Watkins (Rev 1)
Equipment: _PSWPLIDC Breakers 18, 19 Date: 2/29/12 RI Diagram: 0-6700-02 Rev. No. _ 1 Effects on Method of No Component Identification Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) 247 PSWPLi DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load PX13-3B is normally open, therefore PSW power BKR # 18 power for PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical DC control Center to MCC IXK will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) load center feeder Partial Trip, Failure power breaker PSWLXPXI3-3B also has manual charging breaker to manual Partial Close unavailable status capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of (OEE-165-09) transfer switch to PSW load indication control power.
PSWSXTRN005 Ifr center Ilights (local cnrlpwr PW XKRN 5 center I lightst(loPen Loss of ability to power Unit I Bank I pressurizer heaters from PSW will require sufficient heater (PSWLXPX 13 Compt 3B room) will Compt 3B) extinguish capacity to be powered from the SSF.
248 PSWPLIDC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load PXi3-1B is normally open, therefore PSW power BKR # 19 power for PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical DC control Center to MCC 3XJ will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) load center feeder Partial Trip, Failure power breaker PSWLXPX 13-1B also has manual charging breaker to manual Partial Close unavailable status capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of (OEE-365-10) transfer switch to PSW load indication control power. RI 3PSWSXTRN003 center lights (local Loss of ability to power Unit 3 Bank 4 pressurizer for MCC 3XJ PSWLXPXI3 & East Pen heaters from PSW will require sufficient heater (PSWLXPXcapacity to be powered from the SSF.
I Compt I B) I extinguish
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 107 of 182
- <Failure Mode and, Efet Anal CA ,
System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: -F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date 10/26/l1 Equipment: PSWPLIDC Breakers 20, 21 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No Component Identification Function Failure Failure Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects Mode Mechanism System Detection (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 249 PSWPLI DC 125V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load PXI3-ID is normally open, therefore PSW BKR # 20 power for PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical DC control Center breaker power to MCC 3XI will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) load center feeder Partial Trip, Failure power status PSWLXPX 13-1D also has manual charging breaker to manual Partial Close unavailable to indication capability to effect breaker closure upon loss (OEE-365-08) transfer switch PSW load lights (local & of control power.
3PSWSXTRN004 center East Pen Loss of ability to power Unit 3 Bank 2 Group for MCC 3XI PSWLXPX 13 room) will C, Bank 3 and 4 pressurizer heaters from (PS WLXPX13 Compt I D extinguish PSW will require sufficient heater capacity to Compt I D) be powered from the SSF.
250 PSWPLIDC 125V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load PX 13-2A is normally open, therefore PSW BKR # 21 power for PSW Fail Closed, Mechanical DC control Center breaker power to MCC 3XK will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) load center feeder Partial Trip, Failure power status PSWLXPX 13-2A also has manual charging breaker to manual Partial Close unavailable to indication capability to effect breaker closure upon loss (OEE-365-09) transfer switch PSW load lights (local & of control power.
3PSWSXTRN005 center East Pen Loss of ability to power Unit 3 Bank I for MCC 3XK PSWLXPX13 room) will pressurizer heaters from PSW will require (PSWLXPX13 Compt 2A extinguish sufficient heater capacity to be powered from Compt 2A) the SSF.
i
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 108 of 182
' Failure Mode d and Efeck*Swe an*d Effec :lao"t : ..
ks. . " .
System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem:_ N/A _11/3/11 Date :
Equipment: _ N/A____________ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: N/A N
dCoponen Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Component Function Mode Faism Train and/or Failure Remarks and(8)
Other Effects (3) Mode Mechanism System Detection (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 251 Not Used 252 Not Used Ii i*.*.**. r *. *. .: *Z.,;.,;*
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 109 of 182 Failure M.ode~andE . k System:........ Protected Service Water______
Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/2611 Equipment: ... PSWPL2DC Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of:
No Identification Component Function Mode Failure Mechanism Failure Sse Train and/or eeto Failure Remarks and8Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4)System Detection(
(2) (4) (5) ~~(6) (7) ____________________________
253 PSWPL2DC 125V DC Loss of Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and Load center i25V DC control power power Mechanical Power and, :breakers are in normal alignment and do not need to be Panelboard distribution for on Failure unavailable to 4.16kV exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
13.8kV, input, 13.8kV, and 600V Loss of control power to B6T-A and B7T-C is mitigated via (0-6700-02) 4.16kV loss of 4.16kV breaker manual trip of breakers to release electrical interlock enabling breakers, PSW power breakers, and indication closure of B6T-B and B7T-D should Keowee source be Load Center on PSW Load (local & required.
Control PowerP output Center. MCR) is PSW Loss of lost Loss of control power to B7T-I, 2 and 4 have no impact on undervoltage various PSW PSW function.
and bus equipment Should PXI3-5B be open, loss of control power to renders monitoring Micrologic PSW unavailable.
and micrologic display Should PX I3-4C be open, loss of control power is mitigated trip unit unavailable. via closure of RW2 MCC breaker to provide power to XPSW display power PSW load MCC.
center 27 undervoltage Should any of the other PX 13 breakers be open, loss of control relay and bus power would render PSW unavailable only for Unit 2.
monitor failure All 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V LC breakers have manual to alarm. charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means I of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 110 of 182 Failure_ M d a'nd Effe _Anl ,Wh.e is System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: 10/26/11 Equipment: PSWPL2DC Main Breaker_________ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: O-6700-02 Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (3) System Detection (8)
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 254 PSWPL2DC PSW Fail Open, Electrical or DC Control 13.8kV and, Assuming various PSW 13.8kV, 4.16kV and Load center
- Main Building Fail Mechanical Power 4.16kV and breakers are in normal alignment and do not need to be Breaker panel Closed, Failure unavailable 600V exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
(0-6700-02) PSWPL2DC Partial to 13.8kV, breaker Loss of control power to B6T-A and B7T-C is mitigated via Main Trip, 4.16kV indication manual trip of breakers to release electrical interlock enabling Breaker Partial breakers, (local & closure of B6T-B and B7T-D should Keowee source be feeding Close and PSW MCR) is lost required.
125V DC Load control Center. Loss of control power to B7T-I, 2 and 4 have no impact on power for Loss of PSW function.
13.8kV, various Should PX 13-5B be open, loss of control power to renders 4.16kV and PSW PSW unavailable.
PSW Load equipment Should PX13-4C be open, loss of control power is mitigated Center via closure of RW2 MCC breaker to provide power to XPSW breakers MCC.
Should any of the other PXl 3 breakers be open, loss of control power would render PSW unavailable only for Unit 2.
All 13.8kV, 4.16kV and 600V LC breakers have manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means
_ of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Uý-:
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 111 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects*An .,*ksheet System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese PSW Electrical System Subsystem: ...........
Date: 10/27/I11 Equipment: _PSWPL2DC Breakers 1,2 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: _.. 0-6700-02 Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism Traine Failure Detection (8)
(.) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 255 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR Should B6T-A be open, loss of control power is BKR # I control power Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker status mitigated via closure of either breakers B7T-C or for 13.8kV Closed, Failure power Indication lights B7TTD, closure of tie breaker B7T-I and opening (0-6700-02) breaker Partial unavailable (local & MCR) of B6T-l main breaker.
(OEE-600-01) PSWB6T-A Trip, to PSWB6T- will extinguish B6T-A also has manual charging capability to (in feed for Partial A breaker, effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
switchgear B36T Close Alternatively, B6T-B could be closed powering from Keowee) B6T from Fant line.
256 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR Loss of control power to B7T-C is mitigated via BKR # 2 control power Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker status closure of either breakers B6T-A or B, closure of for 13.8kV Closed, Failure power Indication lights tie breaker B7T-I and opening of B7T-2 main (0-6700-02) breaker Partial unavailable (local & MCR) breaker.
(OEE-602-01) PSWB7T-C Trip, to PSWB7T- will extinguish B7T-C also has manual charging capability to (in feed for Partial C breaker. effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
switchgear. B7T Close from Keowee) Alternatively, B7T-D could be closed powering 3B6T from Fant line.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 112 of 182 Failure Mode and EffectsAz l or eet-',
System: ........... Protected Service Water_____________ Prepared by: _F. calabrese _____
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: _0/27/11 Equipment: _..PSWPL2DC Breakers 3,4 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No l) Identification Component Function
()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism Train Sytmand/or Method Failure Detection(8 Remarks and Other Effects
(!) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
(6) 257 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR Normal system alignment is for the tie breaker to BKR # 3 control power Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker status be open. Loss of control power has no impact to (0-6700-02) for 4.16 kV Closed, Failure power Indication lights PSW System functionality.
breaker Partial unavailable (local & MCR) B7T- I also has manual charging capability to (OEE-606-01) PSWB7T-l Trip, to PSWB7T- will extinguish effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
(B6T 1B7T Tie Partial I breaker.
breaker) Close 258 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW SWGR Assuming PSW System is in normal alignment BKR # 4 control power Fail Mechanical DC control Breaker status (B7T-2 is closed) and does not need to be (0-6700-02) for 4.16 kV Closed, Failure power Indication lights exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
breaker Partial unavailable (local & MCR) Alternately, if B7T-2 is open, B7T switchgear can (OEE-605-01) PSWB7T-2 Trip, to PSWB7T- will extinguish still be powered by closing the tie breaker B7T-I (main in feed Partial 2 breaker. and power to SSF OTS-I will be available.
breaker for Close B7T-2 also has manual charging capability to Switchgear. effect breaker closure upon loss of control power.
3B7T)
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 113 of 182 Failure*Mode and.Effe sAnav .isWor. ""
shte
ýýI
'"ýtj,,,.
System: Protected Service
........ Water_ _ Prepared by: F. Calabrese______
Dare : _0/27/ rs Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Re N 0 Equipment: PSWPL2DC Breakers 6, 8 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure (7)
Detection Idi(2) (a) (4) (5) (6) (8) 259 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC PSW SWOR Assuming PSW System is in normal BKR # 6 power for 4.16 kV Fail Closed, Mechanical control power Breaker status alignment (B7T-4 is closed) and does (0-6700-02) breaker PSWB7T-4 Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to Indication lights not need to be exercised, PSW power Partial Close PSWB7T-4 (local & remote to OTS I switchgear will be available.
(OEE-615-01) (alternate feed to SSF OTS- I Switchgear.) breaker. operator panel) Alternatively if B7T4 is open see will extinguish OSC-9510 for impact.
B7T-4 also has manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power 260 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC None. Loss of 4.16kV breaker test BKR # 8 power for 4.16 kV Fail Closed, Mechanical control power connection box. No impact to PSW breaker Test Box Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to functionality.
(0-6700-02) PSWPLTB03 Partial Close bkr.test box.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 114 of 182
.,>x Failure Mode .....
System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem:- PSW Electrical System Date: 10/27/111 Equipment: .- _.._PSWPL2DC Breakers 13, 14 R No.
Rev. 0 Diagram:
Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No () Identification cation Function 3)Mode Mode Faism Mechanism Train Sse and/or Failure eeto Remarks and8Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) 261 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC Fail Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load Assuming PSW System is in normal alignment BKR # 13 control power Open, Mechanical DC control Center breaker (PX 13-5B is closed) and does not need to be (0-6700-02) for PSW load Fail Failure power status exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
center main Closed, unavailable to indication Alternatively if PX 13-5B is open, PSW load center (OEE-633) breaker Partial PSW load lights (local) will be lost and PSW System will be unavailable.
(PSWLXPXi3 Trip, center will extinguish PSWLXPX 13-5B also has manual charging Compt 5B) Partial PSWLXPX 13 capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of Close Compt 5B control power.
Should the PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
262 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC Fail Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load Assuming PSW System is in normal alignment BKR # 14 control power Open, Mechanical DC control Center breaker (PXI3-4C is closed) and does not need to be (0-6700-02) for PSW load Fail Failure power status exercised, PSW System power will be available to center feeder Closed, unavailable to indication manual xfr. Switch for MCC XPSW. Alternatively (OEE-625* breaker to MCC Partial PSW load lights (local) ifPXI 3-4C is open, XPSW can be supplied from XPSW through Trip, center will extinguish Rad Waste Load Center RW2 through manual manual transfer Partial PSWLXPX13 transfer switch.
switch Close Compt 4C PSWLXPX I3-4C also has manual charging PSWSXTRN009 capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of (PSWLXPX 13 control power.
Compt 4C)
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 115 of 182 FailureMode and Effects Analy"6 *io heet System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _ F. Calabrese (Rev 0) W. Watkins (Rev 1)
Subsystem: ..... PSW Electrical System Date : 2/29/12 RI Equipment: _ PSWPL2DC Breakers 15, 16 Rev. No. _ 1 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism System Detection (8)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 263 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load Assuming PSW System is in normal alignment BKR # 15 power for PSW Open, Mechanical DC control Center breaker (PX 13-3C is closed) and does not need to be (0-6700-02) load center feeder Fail Failure power status exercised, PSW System will operate normally.
breaker to MCC Closed, unavailable to indication Alternatively if PX 13-3C is open, power to MCC (OEE-265-1 1) 2XPSWA Partial PSW load lights (local) 2XPSWA & B will be lost and PSW System for Unit (PSWLXPXI3 Trip, center will extinguish 2 will be unavailable. PSW for Units I and 3 is still Compt 3C) Partial PSWLXPX13 available.
Close Compt 3C PXI 3-3C also has manual charging capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of control power Should the unit 2 PSW System be unavailable, the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be credited as an alternate means of achieving and maintaining SSD for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
264 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load PXI3-2C is normally open, therefore PSW power to BKR # 16 power for PSW Open, Mechanical DC control Center breaker MCC 2XJ will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) load center feeder Fail Failure power status PSWLXPXI3-2C also has manual charging breaker to manual Closed, unavailable to indication capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of (OEE-265-10) transfer switch Partial PSW load lights (local & control power.
2PSWSXTRN00 Trip, center East Pen Loss of ability to power Unit 2 Bank 3 and 4 RI 3 for MCC 2XJ Partial PSWLXPX13 room) will pressurizer heaters from PSW will require sufficient (PSWLXPXt3 Close Compt2C extinguish heater capacity to be powered from the SSF.
Compt 2C) I_______ I______ I_______I______I_______ I__
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 116 of 182 Failure Mode andd Effects Analysi's..orkshe6et -
System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: _F. Calabrese______
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System _________
Date : 10/28/I11 Equipment: __ PSWPL2DC Breakers 17, 18 Rev. No. 0 Diagram 0-6700-02 Component Failure Failure Effects on Method of No Identification Function Mode Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects
( I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) 265 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load PXI3-4B is normally open, therefore PSW BKR # 17 power for PSW Fail Mechanical DC control Center breaker power to MCC 2XI will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) load center feeder Closed, Failure power status PSWLXPXI3-4B also has manual charging breaker to manual Partial unavailable to indication capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of (OEE-265-08) transfer switch Trip, PSW load lights (local & control power.
2PSWSXTRN004 Partial center MCR) will Loss of ability to power Unit 2 Bank 2 Group for MCC 2Xl Close PSWLXPXI3 extinguish C, Bank 3 and 4 pressurizer heaters from PSW (PSWLXPX 13 Compt 4B will require sufficient heater capacity to be Compt 4B) powered from SSF.
266 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V PSW Load PX13-2D is normally open, therefore PSW BKR # 18 power for PSW Fail Mechanical DC control Center breaker power to MCC 2XK will be unavailable.
(0-6700-02) load center feeder Closed, Failure power status PSWLXPXI3-2D also has manual charging breaker to manual Partial unavailable to indication capability to effect breaker closure upon loss of (OEE-265-09) transfer switch Trip, PSW load lights (local & control power.
2PSWSXTRN005 Partial center MCR) will Loss of ability to power Unit 2 Bank I for MCC 2XK Close PSWLXPX 13 extinguish fpressurizer heaters from PSW will require (PSWLXPX13 Compt 2D sufficient heater capacity to be powered from Compt 2D) SSF.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 117 of 182
. Failure Mode and Effects Analysi's o. h e ,
System:. Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: .... PSW Electrical System Date : 10/28/11 Equipment: ...........
PSWPL2DC Breakers 19, 20 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 1 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train: Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 267 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of DC power to None No impact to PSW. Consideration BKR # 19 control power for Fail Closed, Mechanical 27 relay will prevent of failures that could cause AC bus (0-6700-02) PSW load center Partial Trip, Failure the 600V load center undervoltage conditions concurrent UV relaying Partial Close PX! 3 from alarming with loss of DC power to (OEE-633-01) (27N) and bus on AC undervoltage undervoltage relay is not part of power monitor. conditions. FMEA basis.
PSWLXPX 13 Compt 5B 268 PSWPL2DC 125 V DC Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of DC power to None - until the No impact to PSW. This circuit BKR # 20 control power for Fail Closed, Mechanical micrologic trip units internal trip unit performs a communication, (0-6700-02) PSW load center Partial Trip, Failure external power supply battery is depleted. monitoring and display function.
micrologic trip Partial Close module prevents the Then indicating There is no impact to the units external units from performing lights and the functionality of the 600V Load power supply their communication, digital display on Center PX 13 breakers due to this module monitoring and display the micrologic unit failure.
PSWLXPX13 functions. itself will be lost.
Compt 4A
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 118 of 182 System: Protected Service Water___________
Prepared by F. Calabrese Subsystem:.N/A Date:
- _ 11/3/11 Equipment: .,_N/A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: N/A__
Method of No Component Function Failure Failure Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or on Train System .Failure Detection Remarks and(8)Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 269 Not Used 270 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 119 of 182 iK Failufre kode and Efet AniyiWdrkse System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem:.. PSW Electrical System Main, I Date : _____10/3111I__
Equipment: _-I PSWPL2DC, IPSWPL2DC Breakers Rev. No. ___o____0___
Diagram: 0-6700-03 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Id c(2) Mode Mechanism and/or(6)System Detection (i)i(4) (5) (7) (8) 271 IPSWPL2DC 125V DC power Loss of Electrical or 125VDC Power White and/or Operators will be unable to 125V DC distribution panel feeding output Mechanical unavailable to HPI Yellow lights in switch to PSW as primary Panelboard HPI Pumps IA & I B power - Failure Pumps IA & lB MCR indicating power source to operate HPI transfer switches complete transfer switch HPI switch pump IA and lB. However, (0-6700-03) I HPISXTRNOO I & 002 bus failure I PSWXTRN001 & position are lost switch has manual capability.
and vital I&C battery 002. MCR MATS functionality not impacted charger ATS indication of ATS ATSaswitchTlostdNocimiactotoAPS MCR indication of as discussed in 275 and 276.
I PSWSXTRNOOI & 002 switch lost. ATS switch lost 272 I PSWPL2DC 125V DC power Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Power White and/or Operators will be unable to 90A Main distribution panel feeding Fail Mechanical unavailable to HPI Yellow lights in switch to PSW as primary breaker HPI Pumps ]A & IB Closed, Failure Pumps IA & IB MCR indicating power source to operate HPI (0-6700-03) transfer switches Partial transfer switch HPI switch pump IA and IB. However, IHPISXTRNOOI & 002 Trip, I PSWXTRNOOI & position are lost switch has manual capability.
and vital I&C battery Partial 002. MCR MCR indication o ATS functionality not impacted charger ATS Close indication if ATS ATS switch lost as discussed in 275 and 276.
1PSWSXTRNOO I & 002 switch lost. No impact to PSW 273 I PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control power Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC White and/or No impact to PSW BKR # I for motor operated Fail Mechanical control power Yellow lights in functionality. Switch (0-6700-03) transfer switch Closed, Failure unavailable to Unit- MCR indicating IHPISXTRNOO has manual IHPISXTRN00I Partial I Electric Transfer switch position are capability. Also,I HPI train IB Trip, Switch lost can be used through alignment Partial IHPISXTRN00I switch IHPISXALGN00i and Close transfer switch IHPISXTRN002.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 120 of 182 Failure Mod an r"_________________________
System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: .......PSW Electrical System_____ Date: ___10/31/l_________
2, 6, 7 Equipment: _I PSWPL2DC Breakers Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Component FFailure Failure Effects on Train Method of No Function Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification Id f(2) Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (8)
(i)i(4) (5) (6) (7) 274 1PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC White and/or No impact to PSW functionality.
BKR #2 power for motor Fail Closed, Mechanical control power Yellow lights Switch 1HPISXTRN002 has manual (0-6700-03) operated transfer switch Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to Unit- in MCR capability. Also, HPI train IA can I HPPISXTRN002. Partial Close I Electric Transfer indicating be used through alignment switch Switch switch position IHPISXALGNOOI and transfer IHPISXTRN002 are lost switch IHPISXTRNOO1.
275 I PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or MCR indication of MCR indication No impact on ATS functionality.
BKR # 6 power for Unit-I Auto Fail Closed, Mechanical switch transfer or of switch Switch function is not dependant on (0-6700-03) Transfer Switch Partial Trip, Failure failure to transfer is transfer or dc power availability. Therefore, no I PSWSXTRN001, Partial Close lost failure to impact on PSW functionality.
provides MCR transfer is lost indication of switch transfer or failure 276 I PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or MCR indication of MCR indication No impact on ATS functionality.
BKR # 7 power for Unit-I Auto Fail Closed, Mechanical switch transfer or of switch Switch function is not dependant on Transfer Switch Partial Trip, Failure failure to transfer is transfer or dc power availability. Therefore, no (0-6700-03) 1PSWSXTRN002, Partial Close lost failure to impact on PSW functionality.
provides MCR transfer is lost indication of switch transfer or failure
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 121 of 182
........ .... ..... Failur~e M ode System: Protected Service Water_
Prepared by: _F. Calabrese Subsystem: N/A Date: 11/3/I1 Equipment: ___N/A Rev. No. 0 Diagram: N/A Component No Identification (1) (2) 277 Not Used 278 Not Used 279 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 122 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Workhe.e" System: .... Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem ..... PSW Electrical System__________ Date : 10/31/!11 Equipment: 2PSWPL2DC, 2PSWPL2DC Breakers Main, I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 280 2PSWPL2DC 125V DC power Loss of Electrical or DC Control Power White and/or Operators will be unable to switch 125V DC distribution panel output Mechanical unavailable to HPI Yellow lights in to PSW as primary power source to Panelboard feeding HPI Pumps power- Failure Unit-2 Pumps A & MCR indicating operate HPI pump IA and IB.
2A & 2B transfer complete B, Xtr Switches switch position However, switch has manual (0-6700-03) switches bus failure 2PSWXTRN001 & are lost capability. No impact to PSW 2HPISXTRN001 & 002 002 281 2PSWPL2DC 125V DC power Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Power. White and/or Operators will be unable to switch 90A Main distribution panel Fail Closed, Mechanical unavailable to HPI Yellow lights in to PSW as primary power source to breaker main breaker feeding Partial Trip, Failure Pumps IA & 1B. MCR indicating operate HPI pump IA and I B.
HPI Pumps 2A & 2B Partial Close transfer switch: switch position However, switch has manual (0-6700-03) transfer switches I PSWXTRNOOI & are lost capability. No impact to PSW 2HPISXTRN001 & 002 002 282 2PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC White and/or No impact to PSW functionality.
BKR # I power for motor Fail Closed, Mechanical control power Yellow lights in Switch 2HP1SXTRN00I has manual (0-6700-03) operated transfer Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to Unit 2 MCR indicating capability. Also, HPI train 2B can switch Partial Close Electric Transfer switch position be used through alignment switch 2HPISXTRN001 Switch are lost 2HPISXALGN001 and transfer 2HPISXTRN001 switch 2HPISXTRN002.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 123 of 182 Failure Mode aid Effects, AnalysisWorksheetý System:.. Protected Service Water Prepared by: __F. Calabrese Subsystem:_ PSW Electrical System Date :Rv.N. Il/0/
Equipment: ....2PSWPL2DC Breakers 2, 3, 4 Rev. No. -0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 283 2PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC: White and/or No impact to PSW functionality. Switch BKR # 2 power for motor Fail Closed, Mechanical control power Yellow lights in 2HPISXTRN002 has manual capability.
operated transfer Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to MCR indicating Also, HPI train 2A can be used through (0-6700-03) switch Partial Close Unit 2 Electric switch position alignment switch 2HPISXALGN001 and 2HPISXTRN002 Transfer Switch are lost transfer switch 2HPISXTRN001.
2HPISXTRN001 284 2PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC None. No impact to PSW. Although 125VDC BKR # 3 power for Unit-2 Fail Closed, Mechanical control power is connected to OPSWSXTRN006, the (0-6700-03) Manual Transfer Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to switch does not use DC power for any Switch, Partial Close Unit-2 manual function.
OPSWSXTRN006, Transfer Switch (see item # 166) OPSWSXTRN006 285 2PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of control None if aligned No impact to PSW-14 valve BKR#4 power for Manual Fail Closed, Mechanical power locks to 2XPSWB-4C functionality if 600V power source is (0-6700-03)
Transfer Switch Partial Trip, Failure transfer switch aligned to 2XPSWB-4C and therefore, Partial Close Loss of valve position OPSWSXTRN007, into the "normal" no impact to PSW.
(see item # 148) position PSW may be unavailable if 600V power 2XPSWB-4C indication in MCR if aligned source is aligned to 3XPSW-5A as PSW-to 3XPSW-5A 14 valve has no power. See Item No.
305 for additional information.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 124 of 182 Failu're Mode and Effecits Analy's'l Woheet,,
System: __Protected Service Water____________
Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Pare Date : ___: F. Calae Il/i/l I________
Equipment: ...2PSWPL2DC Breakers 5, 6, 7_ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Method of Failure Identification (I) (2)System Mode Mechanism Detection Remarks and Other Effects d(e (2) at) (3) (4) (5) Sy(7) (8) 286 2PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or Loss of control None if aligned to No impact to PSW pump room BKR # 5 power for Manual Fail Closed, Mechanical power locks 2XPSWA-3E exhaust fan functionality if 600V (0-6700-03) Transfer Switch Partial Trip, Failure transfer switch Loss of local exhaust fan power source is aligned to OPSWSXTRN008, Partial Close into the indication if aligned to 2XPSWA-3E and therefore, no (see item # 149) "normal" position 3XPSW-IDPi impact to PSW.
2XPSWA-3E PSW Primary and/or PSW unavailable if 600V power Booster Pump Bearing source is aligned to 3XPSW-ID Temperature Alarms in as PSW pump room exhaust fan MCR. is unavailable.
287 2PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or MCR indication MCR indication of switch No impact on ATS functionality.
BKR # 6 power for Unit-2 Fail Closed, Mechanical of switch transfer or failure to Switch function is not dependant (0-6700-03) Auto Transfer Switch Partial Trip, Failure transfer or transfer is lost on dc power availability.
2PSWSXTRN001, Partial Close failure to Therefore, no impact on PSW provides MCR transfer is lost functionality.
indication of switch transfer or failure 288 2PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or MCR indication MCR indication of switch No impact on ATS functionality.
BKR # 7 power for Unit-2 Fail Closed, Mechanical of switch transfer or failure to Switch function is not dependant Auto Transfer Switch Partial Trip, Failure transfer or transfer is lost on dc power availability.
(0-6700-03) 2PSWSXTRN602, Partial Close failure to Therefore, no impact on PSW provides MCR transfer is lost functionality.
indication of switch transfer or failure
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 125 of 182
>~Failure.M'ode adEfcsAnalysis Worksheet, System: .... Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: N/A_______________ Date : ____11/3/Il___1 __
Equipment: _N/A____ -- _______ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: N/A__ _
Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No (I) Identification (dntfiato Function (3) auie Mode Mechanism Effects and/or on Tr System Failure Detection() Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 289 Not Used 290 Not Used 291 Not Used
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 126 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Ana.........ksheetv
- System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_________
Date : __ 11/1/11 Equipment: _.....
3PSWPL2DC, 3PSWPL2DC Breakers Main, I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 292 3PSWPL2DC 125V DC power Loss of Electrical or 125VDC Power White and/or Operators will be unable to 125V DC distribution panel feeding output Mechanical unavailable to HPI Yellow lights in switch to PSW as primary Panelboard HPI Pumps 3A & 3B power- Failure Pumps 3A & 3B MCR indicating power source to operate HP!
transfer switches complete transfer switch HPI switch pump 3A and 3B. However, (0-6700-03) 3HPISXTRN001 & 002 bus failure 3PSWXTRN001 & position are lost switch has manual capability.
and vital I&C battery 002. MCR MCR indication of ATS functionality not impacted charger ATS indication of ATS ATS switch lost as discussed in 296 and 297.
3PSWSXTRN00A& 002 switch lost. No impact to PSW 293 3PSWPL2DC 125V DC power Fail Open, Electrical or 125VDC Power White and/or Operators will be unable to 90A Main distribution panel main Fail Mechanical unavailable to HPI Yellow lights in switch to PSW as primary breaker breaker feeding HPi Closed, Failure Pumps IA & IB MCR indicating power source to operate HP!
Pumps 3A & 3B transfer Partial transfer switch HPI switch pump 3A and 3B. However, (0-6700-03) switches 3HPISXTRN001 Trip, I PSWXTRNOOI & position are lost switch has manual capability.
& 002 and vital I&C Partial 002. MCR MCR indication of ATS functionality not impacted battery charger ATS Close indication if ATS ATS switch lost. as discussed in 296 and 297.
3PSWSXTRN00 &h002 switch lost. No impact to PSW 294 3PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control power Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC White and/or No impact to PSW BKR # I for motor operated Fail Mechanical control power Yellow lights in functionality. Switch transfer switch Closed, Failure unavailable to Unit 3 MCR indicating 3HPISXTRNOOI has manual (0-6700-03) 3HPISXTRN001 Partial Electric Transfer switch position are capability. Also, HP! train 3B Trip, Switch lost can be used through alignment Partial 3HPISXTRN001 switch 3HPISXALGN001 and Close transfer switch 3HPISXTRN002.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A
.Page 127 of 182 Failure Mod'e and-fet An£L System: _Protected Service Water__by: Prepared F. Calabrese Subsystem:_. PSW Electrical System P Date :___ili1/1I______
2, 6, 7 Equipment: _3PSWPL2DC Breakers Diagram: ...... 0-6700-03 Rev. No. .0 No Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 295 3PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or PSW 125V DC White and/or No impact to PSW functionality.
BKR # 2 power for motor Fail Closed, Mechanical control power Yellow lights in Switch 3HPISXTRN002 has manual operated transfer Partial Trip, Failure unavailable to Unit 3 MCR indicating capability. Also, HPI train 3A can (0-6700-03) switch Partial Close Electric Transfer switch position be used through alignment switch 3HPISXTRN002 Switch are lost 3HPISXALGN001 and transfer 3HPISXTRN002 switch 3HPISXTRNOOI.
296 3PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or MCR indication of MCR indication oi No impact on ATS functionality.
BKR # 6 power for Unit-3 Fail Closed, Mechanical switch transfer or switch transfer or Switch function is not dependant on Auto Transfer Switch Partial Trip, Failure failure to transfer is failure to transfer dc power availability. Therefore, no (0-6700-03) 3PSWSXTRN001, Partial Close lost is lost impact on PSW functionality.
provides MCR indication of switch transfer or failure 297 3PSWPL2DC 125 V DC control Fail Open, Electrical or MCR indication of MCR indication ol No impact on ATS functionality.
BKR # 7 power for Unit-3 Fail Closed, Mechanical switch transfer or switch transfer or Switch function is not dependant on Auto Transfer Switch Partial Trip, Failure failure to transfer is failure to transfer dc power availability. Therefore, no (0-6700-03) 3PSWSXTRN002, Partial Close lost is lost impact on PSW functionality.
provides MCR indication of switch transfer or failure
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 128 of 182 Syte: < Failume~1ode and Effects"AnaifYs Wokshee' System: Protected Service Water Prepared by: F. Calabrese '
Subsystem: _N/A Date : .11/3/11 Equipment: _N/A - Rev. No. 0 Diagram: N/A Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of (oIeniicto c ation Function Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and(8)Other Effects
() (2)(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 298 Not Used 299 Not Used
QSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 129 of 182
.. dFaure vode~and Efects~naIl. ks . "**lb >'W System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem:__ __ _N/A Date : _ 9/22/11l Equipment: PSW Primary Pump (OPSWPU0002) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A-1. 1
- Effects on Component FFailure ailure Mechanism andor oTrain Method of Failure (I)
(o) d3) (dnt2iato (3)
Functio Mode (5) s m
"* *System()() Detection Remarks and Other Effects*
(2) (4) (6) (7)
Fail to Start Mechanical or Inadequate Control room Electrical Failure Flow and indications via OAC pressure to inject to S/Gs. or Main Control Boards'*. Cannot inject to a pressurized steam generator without PSW Indications on the Primary Pump Operating. PSW Control Panel Booster Pump may deliver some located inthe PSW flow to a depressurized S/G Pump Room'. however operation insuch a OPSWPU0002 Pumps raw water to Fails lineup has not been analyzed.
Mechanical or Inadequate See above. Alternate system is SSF.
300 each unit's Steam During Electrical Failure Flow and (OFD- 131 A-1.1) Generators Operation pressure to inject to S/Gs.
Fails to stop Electrical Failure Excessive flow See above. OPSW-14 (min flow valve) will on to SIG, maintain minimum flow to command possible prevent pump running at shutoff overpressure of head.
piping (if pump OPSW-14 (min flow valve) may minimum flowv also be operated manually to valve fails to restore flow control to prevent operate). damage to equipment.
OPSWPT0003 Primary Pump Suction Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO03 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 130 of 182
..,Failure.Mode and EffectsA*aJ*i*
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem : N /AD ate_9/22/11 Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: _ PSW Booster Pump (OPSWPUO001) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 13 1A-1. 1
,= Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Syslem Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
Fail to Start Mechanical or Inadequate Control room Electrical Failure NPSH operate to indications OAC or Main via Inadequate NPSH to operate PSW Primary Pump Control Boards primary pump without the booster pump operating therefore there the Possible loss of Indications on the system will not meet its design cooling water Control Panel function and the SSF must be used to HPIPMCs. located in the PSW as an alternate in the event of this Damage to Pump Room. failure.
Provides adequate HPIPs without NPSH to the PSW motor cooling. Primary Pump will The High Pressure Service Water Primary Pump not start due to (HPSW) System could supply OPSWPU0001 interlock, cooling water to the HPIPMCs 301 Provides cooling depending on the availability of the (OFD-I 3 IA-1. 1) water to the High Fails Mechanical or Inadequate See above Elevated Water Service Tank Pressure Injection During Electrical Failure NPSH to (EWST)
Pump Motor Coolers Operation operate (HPIPMCs) Primary Pump Fails to stop Electrical Failure Damage to See above OPSW- 14 (min flow valve) will on pump without maintain minimum flow to prevent command min. flow. pump running at shutoff head.
OPSW-14 (min flow valve) may also be operated manually to restore flow control to prevent damage to equipment.
'OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2).
0ý! I.L ý,,, -
OSC-10008, Rev. .1 Appendix A Page 131 of 182
~Faifi"ý'ý i~* de andAýIftei~s~n ý¶i*W kiffi1- - Ir System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW Primary Pump Discharge Check Valve PSW-4 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.1 c Failure Effects on Train and/or *Method Failure of R No. Component Function Failure Identification Mode Mechanism System Detection Remarks and Other Effects deic(2) ni i(4) (5) (6) .(7) (8)
Potential water hammer Except in case of disk separation (column separation Control or pump stop / restart, no effect collapse) on pump restart room on system design function during Fail Mechanical in event both primary indications design operation. Possible water and booster pumps are via OAC or hammer effects with pump stopped). Possible Main stop/restart. Possible foreign foreign material effects Control material effect (most likely at downstream if failure Boards'. downstream PSW-FEOOOI flow includes disk separation. element).
OPSWVA0004 Prevents backflow 302 through the PSW Control (OFD- 13 IA-I.l) System room Fail Mechanical Loss of Flow at Primary indications Primary pump inoperable, SSF Closed Failure Pump Discharge via OAC or system must be operated as Main alternate.
Control Boards'.
Mid-Fail Mechanical Reduced Flow / pressure Depending on level of flow Failure anomalies See above restriction, primary pump may be Travel Failure anomalies inoperable.
OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-000 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2).
I
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 132 of 182 Failure Mode and ffecAii.. .""j .t "or1 "e System: Protected Service Water (PSW)
Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 92/
OPSW-7 Equipment: PSW Primary Pump Bvypass Check Valve Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.1 No. Component Function Mode Failure Mechanism Effects on Train Method of (I) Identification (3)Mode and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (4) (6) (7) (8)
Main effect would be reduced Short circuit performance of primary pump and primary pump possible system damage requiring flow, loss of pump Control room primary pump shutdown.
Fail Open Mechanical Failure discharge pressure indications via Manual closure of OPSW-3 will and flow to SG's. OAC or Main mitigate the effects during normal Possible foreign Control Boards'. operation however would have material effects on similar effects to "fail closed" when loss of valve disk. only the booster pump is operating if not re-opened.
OPSWVA0007 Prevents backflow No effect during normal system 303 through the PSW operation. When only the booster (OFD-131A-1.I) System pump is operating, the only Fail Closed Mechanical Failure None None discharge flow path would be through the non-operating PSW Primary Pump and HPI motor cooler lines. This is not a credited alignment.
Reduced flow as indicated by Depending on level ofbackflow, Fail Mid' Mechanical Failure Flow / pressure Control Room primary pump may be inoperable Travel anomalies indicator OPSW- prim pum ay be inoperable FT-0001 - shown (see fall open and fail closed above).
on OAC1.
OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-0001 PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 133 of 182
~>K Failure Mode. ad Effects AnaIJ W40ksheet v System: Protected Service Water (PSW)
Subsystem: _____N/A________
Prepared by: William Watkins Date : 921 Equipment: PSW Test Line Check Valve - OPSW-13 R Diagram: OFD-131A-1.
Effects on MehdoFilr No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
No effect on system design function Fail Open Mechanical Failure None None during design operation. Will eliminate one Auxiliary Building flood prevention barrier.
Depending on system alignment and the number of S/G's being supplied Prevents backflow and "fail closed" may have differing back-pressure to the effects. Fail closed while serving at PSW System while Inability to Inability to control least one unit at full design flow may testing PSW with the use flow as indicated not have an immediate effect OPSWVA0013 CCW Intake Pumps Fail Closed Mechanical Failure minimum by Control Room however at reduced flows or no units 304 operating flow line indicator OPSW- being served "fail closed" is likely to (OFD-131A-I.I) (PSW.14) FTOOO1. Erratic cause primary pump failure. Some flow indication'. recovery may be possible by closing Provides an Auxiliary PSW-28 and throttling PSW-l5 to Flood Isolation divert minimum flow to the test Feature sump however this is not a credited alignment.
Inability to control Fail id- Fow / flow as indicated Flow b Conteo Depending on the level of flow Travel Mechanical Failure pressure indicator OPSWo restriction primary pump may be anomalies FTo I. Erratic inoperable (see fail closed above).
flow indication OPSWFT-000 I PSW Total Flow Indication to U2 MCR or 1,2,3PSW-FT'000 I A SG' and 1,2,3PSWFTOO02 'B SO' PSW Flow Indicators to respective Unit MCR ifsupplying SG (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 134 of 182 Failure Mode an'd Effect Anairis Woksheet .
System: Protected Service Water (PSW)
N/A Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem:
Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: PSW Minimum Flow Throttle Valve - 0PSW-14 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13iA-1. I Effects on No. Component Failure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Function Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
System (7) (8)
Inadequate Inability to control Fail full open would prevent the flow to S/0's flow as indicated PSW System from performing its or HPIPMCs. by Control Room design function. PSW-14 has the Fail Open Mechanical or indicator OPSW- capability to be manually operated Electrical Failure Primary and FT000 I. using the handwhcl on the booster pumps Limitorque operator. Some level of run at or above control using this valve and/or Ensures the PSW runout flow. OPSW-12 may be possible.
Pumps have Possible pump Inability OPSWVA0014 required m inim um d ah a e l wa to nicontrol ae 305flw urig lldeadheaded flow as indicated (OFD.131A-l.l) flow during all condition, by Control Room conditions requiring Mechanical or indicator OPSW-PSW Pump Fail Closed Electrical Failure FT0001 ' or See Remarks Below operationpr s u easa pressure indicated by OPSWPT0004'.
Flow / pressure Similar to "Fail Depending on the level of flow Fail Mid- Mechanical or anomalies Closed" Above restriction primary pump may be Travel Electrical Failure inoperable (see fail closed - remarks below and fail open above).
Fail Closed: Depending on system alignment and the number of S/G's being supplied "fail closed" may have differing effects. Fail closed while serving at least one unit at full design flow may not have an immediate effect however at reduced flows or no units being served "fail closed" is likely to cause primary pump failure. PSW-14 has the capability to be manually operated using the handwheel on the Limitorque operator. Some level of recovery using this valve and/or PSW-12 may be possible.
'OPSWPT0004 Primary Pump Discharge Pressure indication to OAC (OPSWPOO04 local panel) or OPSWFT-000 I PSW Total Flow Indication to Unit 2 Control Room (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 135 of 182 Failu'e Mod and Effe 6s Anals Wokbe System : Protected Service W ater (PSW ) SPrepared P e a e by:y William il a Watkins ak n S ubsystem : .. .. . ........... N /AD ate_:_9/22/11 Date : 9/22111I Equipment: Unit I PSW Header Isolation Valve - IPSW-6 (EMO Ooerated Gate Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.2 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of (I) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Depending on No effect on system design function downstream valve during design operation to Unit I alignments and S/G's. In the event of spurious possible internal opening when not operating PSW to Mechanical or leakage through Periodic Testing Unit I, flow would be restricted by Fail Open Electrical valves, Condensate normally closed downstream valves.
Failure grade water could propagate to the lake The possibility of Condensate grade Provides PSW Header via the min-flow water propagating to the lake is high Isolation to Unit I path. Note that PSW- improbable due to the number of Steam Generators 14 is normally open. failures and misalignments required.
I PSWVA0006 (S/Gs) when system is Fail Closed Mechanical or PSW System Inability to IPSW-6 has the capability to be 306 in standby mode. Electrical Inoperable to Unit I establish flow as manually operated using the (OFD-131A-I.2) Operators will open Failure indicated by handwheel on the Limitorque this valve from the Control Room operator. Some level of recovery MCR to allow PSW indicator IPSW- may be possible if valve can be System flow to the FT0001I' and operated with handwheel.
Unit I S/Gs IPSW-FT0002'.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Possible PSW Inability to Depending on the level of flow Travel Electrical System Inoperable to control flow as restriction PSW may be inoperable Failure Unit I indicated by to Unit 1. IPSW-6 has the capability Control Room to be manually operated using the indicator I PSW- handwheel on the Limitorque FT0001' and operator. Some level of recovery IPSW-FT0002'. may be possible using handwheel.
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on IUBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC- 10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 136 of 182 S - 9
- ..... Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. Worksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/I1 Equipment: PSW to SG I A Header Check Valve - IPSW-9 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A- 1.2 Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) ()()(6)
(3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed PSW Possible discovery allow SG pressure back to normally flow control by piping external closed PSW flow control valves valves, temperature causing no immediate detrimental anomaly. effects.
PSWVA0009 Provides a P - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 307 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD3037 A-.2) isolation feature SG IA. indicated by through SG IB (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator IPSW- heat removal depending on specific FT0001 '. event conditions).
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies as Depending on level of flow Travel System, indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to IA SG. Refer to "fail SG IA. indicator IPSW- closed" above.
FTooo I.
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on IUBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 137 of 182 Failuire Mode and Effecis Analyiis W19'rksh6it C .unn D . t A Q ;,. 111.t- MQUA Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: -_/________ Date :
v 9/22/11 Rev. No. 0 Equipment: to SG11*1IBA -Header PSWn'FlT'- I I)
Check Valve IPSW- I I r%;
~,o~I4A,5I. S., S ~
Effects on Component Function FFailure Mfchnis T n Method of No. Identification Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)(7 System (7) s (8)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure normally, system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed PSW Possible allow SG pressure back to normally flow control discovery by closed PSW flow control valves valves.:, piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects.
anomaly.
IPSWVAOOI I Provides a PSW - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 308 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD-131A-1.2) isolation feature SG l1B. indicated by through SG IA (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator I PSW- heat removal depending on specific FT0002 . event conditions).
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to IB SG. Refer to "fail SG lB. indicator IPSW- closed" above.
FTO002'.
uigital uisplay in unit I Lontrol Koom on IUI (RKeference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 138 of 182
- Failure Modeand Effects Analysis Works°hee.
System: Protected Service Water (PSW)
Prepared by: bAWilliam Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 2/28/12 Equipment: PSW to U I HPI Pump Mtr Bearing Coolers Chk Valve IPSW-21 RI Rev. No. .*____. _ I_______
Diagram: OFD- 131 A- 1.2 Effects on Method of No.
No. Identification Component ()Mode Function Failure (5 Failure Mechanism ytmDjcinRemarks Train: and/or Failure and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection(8
()()(6) ()(8)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure N/A(PSW Event) N/A (PSW Event)
Inadequate HPI Failure open while supplying HPI Motor Cooling as pump motor coolers from LPSW or None (PSW indicated by HPI HPSW~backup could cause back
- Event) Pump Motor leakage to the PSW System and Bearing Cooling interruptfflow to the HPI Pump Back-Leakage Flow or Bearing motor coolers, rendering HPI pumps from LPSW or Temperature inoperable. Some recovery may be HPSW during Alarms - possible if immediate action is taken otherevents indications to close manual valves.
Provides a PSW - available in the IPSWVA0021 LPSW/HPSW Control Rooms 309 (OFD-131A-1.2) boundary isolation and locally in the feature HPIP Room.
Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit I HPI Pump HPI Pump Motor coolers can also to Unit I HPI motor bearing be supplied from the LPSW or pump motor flow/temperature HPSW System however this is not coolers alarms .. credited in a PSW event.
unavailable Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit I HPI Pump Depending on event and failure Travel to Unit I HPI motor bearing position, similar effects as described pump motor flow/temperature for "fail open" and "fail closed" coolers alarms '. could be expected.
unavailable RI HPI Motor Bearing Cooling Flow and upper / lower bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed to Unit I OAC (Reference 3. 10). I
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 139 of 182 Failure Mode andIEffct Ana " o System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/1)
Equipment: PSW to SGI A Flow Control Valve - IPSW-22 (Solenoid Onerated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-1.2 Component Failure Effects on Method of No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit I (closing PSW-6 from MCR) or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing IPSW-8 to isolate control PSW as indicated by flow to the I A SG). These actions flow to ]A Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown indicator I PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FT0001 ' event ofspurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit I, flow would be restricted by normally closed IPSWVA0022 High flow control to upstream and downstream valves.
3 (OFD 131 A- 1.2) the Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on event and das indicated by circumstances, adequate control of aprovidePSW adequate as inted Control by Room PSW flow to IA S/G may be flow to IA indicator IPSW- possible by controlling IPSW-23 SG. FT0001' flow control bypass or IPSW-26 manual bypass.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to failure, operators may be required to controlPSW as indicated by isolate flow to IA S/G as described flow to IA indicator IPSW- in "fail open" or provide additional SG. flow as described in "fail closed" FT00O Ii shown above.
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on I UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 140 of 182 SFaiih er e Sreita System: Protected Servýice Water (PSW)
Subsystem: N/A Prepared by: William Watkins Equipment: PSW to SG IA Flow Control Bypass Valve -IPSW-23 (EMO Operated Date : 9/22/I11 Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13lA-l.2 N. Component FucinFailure Failure Mechanism Effects Train on and/or Method Failureof No. identification Function Mode eRemarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) a O)neE c Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit I (closing PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing IPSW-8 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the IA SG). These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to IA indicator IPSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the S6. FT0001'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit I, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves.
IPSWVA0023 Low flow control to 31 the Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD- 131 A-I1.2) Unit I A SG Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by circumstances, adequate control of control PSW Control Room PSW flow to IA S/G may be flow to IA indicator IPSW- possible by controlling IPSW-22 or SG. FTrom1i. manual bypass IPSW-26. This is particularly true early in the event.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to IA Control Room isolate flow to IA S/G as described SG. indicator IPSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FTOOO I. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Uigital uisplay in unit I Control Room on IUBI (RKeference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 141 of 182
..... .. ...... " FailureeeMode and Effel.ts Ana.y-.I
.. .*or.F _._.._..
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG IB Flow Control Valve I PSW-24 (Solenoid Onerated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A- 1.2 Effects on Method of No. () Component Identification Function
()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism (5 Train and/or ytmDtcinRemarks Failure and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
System (7)()
Detection (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit I (closing PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing IPSW-10 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the I B SG) These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to IB indicator I PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FT0002'. event ofspurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit I, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves.
IPSWVA0024 High flow control to 312 (OFD-131A-1.2) the Unit IB SG Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on event and Electrical Failure circumstances, adequate control of provide as indicated by flow to B / maybe adequate PSW Control Room flow to IB indicator IPSW- possible by controlling IPSW-25 SG. FT0002'. flow control bypass or IPSW-28 Manual Bypass.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control PSW isolate flow to I B S/G as described flow to IB indicator oPSW-in "fail open" or provide additional SG. FT0002o. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on IUBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 142 of 182 2.7 ~ Failure M~earni Effe' -- &See System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem : N/ADate_9/22/11 Date : 9/22/IlI Equipment: PSW to SG I B Fiow Control Bypass Valve IPSW-25 (EMO Operated Valve)
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A- 1.2 Effects on Method of No. I) Component Identification Function
()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism (5 TrainytmDtcinRemarks and/or Failure and Other Effects
(!)() (3) ()(5) System Detection (2) (4) 7 (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit I (closing PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing I PSW-10 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to I B SO). These actions will adequate PSW Control Room prevent unacceptable cooldown rates flow to iB indicator IPSW- due to excessive flow. In the event SO. FT0002'. of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit I, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves.
I1PSWVA0025 Low flow control to 313 (OFD- 1A-12) the f nitr to Fail Closed Mechanical or Depending on event and (OFD- 131A-.2) the Unit I B SG Electrical Failure Inability to Flow anomalies circumstances, adequate control of control oPSW as indicated by PSW flow to IB S/O may be flowIB Control Room flow to I B indicator IPSW- possible by controlling IPSW-24 or SG. FT0002'. I PSW-28 Manual Bypass. This is particularly true early in the event.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to IB Control Room isolate flow to I B S/G as described SO. indicator IPSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT00021 . flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digital Display in Unit I Control Room on I UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 143 of 182 FjailrMoe4 System Proectd. Sr.ie.Wte (P5W Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: Unit 2 PSW Header Isolation Valve 2PSW-6 (EMO Operated Gate Valve)
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: - OFD- 13 1A-2.2 No. Component Identification Function Failure Failure Effects on Train and/or Method of Failure Mode Mechanism System Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or No effect on system design function Electrical Depending on during design operation to Unit 2 Failure downstream valve S/G's. In the event of spurious alignments and possible opening when not operating PSW to internal leakage through Unit 2, flow would be restricted by valves, Condensate grade Periodic Testing normally closed downstream valves.
water could propagate to the lake via the min-flow The possibility of Condensate grade Provides PSW path. Note that PSW-14 water propagating to the lake is high Header Isolation to is normally open. improbable due to the number of Unit 2 Steam failures and misalignments required.
Generators (S/Gs) 2PSWVA0006 when system is in Fail Closed Mechanical or PSW System Inoperable Inability to 2PSW-6 has the capability to be 314 standby mode. Electrical to Unit 2 establish flow as manually operated using the (OFD-13 1A-2.2) Operators will open Failure indicated by handwheel on the Limitorque this valve from the Control Room operator. Some level of recovery MCR to allow PSW indicators 2PSW- may be possible if valve can be System flow to the FT0001' and operated with handwheel.
Unit 2 S/Gs 2PSW-FT0002 .
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Possible PSW System Inability to control Depending on the level of flow Travel Electrical Inoperable to Unit 2 flow as indicated restriction PSW may be inoperable Failure by Control Room to Unit 2. 2PSW-6 has the capability indicators 2PSW- to be manually operated using the FT0001' and handwheel on the Limitorque 2PSW-FT0002'. operator. Some level of recovery may be possible using handwheel.
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 144 of 182 I.
. .. ,-t " .: .* . Fail C'w t , D + + AQ
- III D UI Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 2A Header Check Valve 2PSW-9 Rev. No. 0 Diaeram: OFD-131 A-2-2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8) detc3(6) (7) (_)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure PSW normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed flow Possible allow SG pressure back to normally control valves, discovery by closed PSW flow control valves piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects.
anomaly.
2PSWVA0009 Provides a PSW - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 315 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD-13IA-2.2) isolation feature SG 2A. indicated by through SG 2B (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator 2PSW- heat removal depending on specific FTOO01'. event conditions).
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 2A SG. Refer to "fail SG 2A. indicator 2PSW- closed" above.
FTO00I'.
Digital *isplay in unit 2 Control Room on 2UB I (Keterence .. 2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 145 of 182
-;~Failure Modid~and Effect Anlyi r he~e System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 2B Header Check Valve 2PSW-I 1 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131 A-2.2 Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure PSW normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed PSW Possible allow SG pressure back to normally flow control discovery by closed PSW flow control valves valves, piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects.
anomaly.
2PSWVAOOI I Provides a PSW - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 316 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD-131A-2.2) isolation feature SG 2B. indicated by through SO 2A (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate Indicator 2PSW- heat removal depending on specific FT0002'. event conditions).
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 2B SG. Refer to "fail SG 2B. Indicator 2PSW- closed" above.
FTOO2'.
'Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 146 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects Analysisy Wo"ksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: -NA Date : 2/28/12 Equipment: PSW to U2 HPI Pump Mtr Bearing Coolers Chk Valve 2PSW-21 Ri Rev. No. _____i______
Diagram: OFD-131A-2.2 Failure Effects on Method of Failure No. Component Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
(6)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure N/A (PSW Event) N/A (PSW Event)
Inadequate HPI Failure open while supplying HPI Motor Cooling as pump motor coolers from LPSW or None (PSW indicated by HPI HPSW backup could cause back Event) Pump Motor leakage to the PSW System and Bearing Cooling interrupt flow to the HPI Pump Back-Leakage Flow or Bearing motor coolers, rendering HPI pumps from LPSW or Temperature inoperable. Some recovery may be HPSW during Alarms - possible if immediate action is taken other events indications to close manual valves.
Provides a PSW - available in the 2PSWVA0021 LPSW/HPSW Control Rooms 317 (OFD-13 IA-2.2) boundary isolation and locally in the feature HPIP Room.
Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 2 HPI Pump HPI Pump Motor coolers can also to Unit 2 HPI motor bearing be supplied from the LPSW or pump motor flow/temperature HPSW System however this is not coolers alarms'. credited in a PSW event.
unavailable Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 2 HPI Pump Depending on event and failure Travel to Unit 2 HPI motor bearing position, similar effects as described pump motor flow/temperature for "fail open" and "fail closed" coolers alarms'. could be expected.
unavailable HPI~Puma Motor Bearinq Coolin*x Flow and uinner / .[...-..~-...-.----.~
lower hearina temneratmtre sare monitoredl aind alarmed to tlnit *20AC ' (Reference - U.lOV.
RI HPI Pumn Motor Bearing Cooling Flow and upper lower bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed to Unit 2 OAC (Reference 3 10) I I
.OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 147 of 182 System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem:__- N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 2A Flow Control Valve 2PSW-22 f Solenoid Operated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-i 31 A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. () Component Identification Function
()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism (5 Train and/or ytmDtcinRemarks Failure and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (6) (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR) or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-8 to isolate control PSW as indicated by flow to the 2A SG). These actions flow to 2A Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown FT0ooo2PSW-Indicator . event due rates to excessive of spurious opening In the flow.when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves.
318 2PSWVA0022 High flow control to Fail Closed Mechanical orevent and (OFD-813 A-2.2) the Unit 2A SG Electrical Failure Inability to Flow anomalies circumstances, adequate control of provide as indicated PSW flow to 2A S/G may be adequate PSW Control Room flow to 2A Indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-23 So.to 2i . flow control bypass or 2PSW-26 manual bypass.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control flow toPSW2A ainted Control Room by isolate flow to 2A S/G as described Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional SG. FTO001'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 148 of 182 Failure anidEffei~tsAaly& ý
-Mode rk-he System: Protected Service Water (PSW)
Subsystem: _________ N/A__ Prepared by: William Watkins Equipment: PSW to SG IA Flow Control Bypass Valve 2PSW-23 (EMO Operated Date : 9/22/1 i Valve Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure (I) Identification (3) Mode (5) System Detection (2) (4) (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-8 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the 2A SG). These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to 2A Indicator 2PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FT0001'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed 2PSWVA0023 Low flow control to________ upstream and downstream valves.
319 the Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD-3IA2.2) Unit 2 A SG Electrical Failure Inability to circumstances, adequate control of control PSW Control Room PSW flow to 2A S/G may be flow to 2A Indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-22 or SG. FT0001i'. manual bypass 2PSW-26. This is particularly true early in the evenL Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 2A Control Room isolate flow to 2A S/G as described SG. Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT0001I'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 149 of 182
..FaiureT o1 5 e and Effects Analyss Wo t,;
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 2B Flow Control Valve 2PSW-24 (Solenoid Operated Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-10 to isolate control PSW as indicated by flow to the 2B SG) These actions flow to 2B Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown Indicator 2PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the S. FT0002'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves.
30 2PSWVAO024 High flowv control to FalCoe Mchnalr 320 theDUnit.2B2SthFail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on event and Electricalprovide as indicated by circumstances, adequate control of adequate PSW Control Room PSW flow to 2B S/G may be flow to 2B Indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-25 SG. FT0002'. flow control bypass or 2PSW-28 Manual Bypass.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control PSW aintr d by isolate flow to 2B S/G as described flow o 2B Control Room flow to 2B Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional SG. FT0002'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UB I (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 150 of 182 Failure Modeand Effeets A.naI*yiWoisee.4.:> .
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : : 9/22/11!
2PSW-25 (EMO Onerated Valve)
Equipment: PSW to SG 2B Flow Control Bypass Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13 IA-2.2 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or .Failure Identification (3) Mode (5)Remarks and Other Effects (2)(6) (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 2 (closing 2PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 2PSW-I 0 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to 2B SG). These actions will adequate PSW Control Room prevent unacceptable cooldown rates flow to 2B indicator 2PSW- due to excessive flow. In the event SG. FT0002'. of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 2, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves.
2PSWVA0025 Low flow control to 321 Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD-131 A-2.2) the Unit 2 B SG Electrical Failure Inability to dtd b circumstances, adequate control of flow toPSW control 2B Control Roomy indicatd R PSW flow to 2B S/G may be indicator 2PSW- possible by controlling 2PSW-24 or SG. Ft0002'. 2PSW-28 Manual Bypass. This is particularly true early in the event Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 2B Control Room isolate flow to 2B S/G as described SG. Indicator 2PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT0002'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digital Display in Unit 2 Control Room on 2UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 151 of 182 Failur Mode and 9ffects nalvsisyW . h ;K.
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem : .- - N /A _D ate_:_9/22/11 Date: 9/22/ il Equipment: Unit 3 PSW Header Isolation Valve 3PSW-6 (EMO Operated Gate Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-3.2 N. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Effects Train on and/or Method of Failure MehdfFalr No. Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
(6) (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Depending on Electrical downstream valve No effect on system design function Failure alignments and during design operation to Unit 3 possible internal S/G's. In the event of spurious leakage through opening when not operating PSW to valves, Condensate eUnit 3, flow would be restricted by grade waterond Periodic Testing normally closed downstream valves.
propagate to the The possibility of Condensate grade Provides PSW Header lake via the min- water propagating to the lake is high Isolation to Unit 3 flow path. Note that improbable due to the number of Steam Generators PSW-14 is normally failures and misalignments required.
(S/Gs) when system is open.
322 3PSWVA0006 in standby mode. Fail Closed Mechanical or PSW System Inability to 3PSW-6 has the capability to be (OFD-l 3 IA-3.2) Operators this valve will fromopen the Electrical Inoperable to Unit 3 establish flow as manually operated using the handwheel MCR to allow PtW Failure indicated by on the Limitorque operator. Some 3PSW-FT0001 level of recovery may be possible if System flow to the and 3PSW- valve can be operated with handwheel.
Unit 3 S/Gs FT0002'.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Possible PSW Inability to Depending on the level of flow Travel Electrical System Inoperable control flow as restriction PSW may be inoperable to Failure to Unit 3 indicated by Unit 3. 3PSW-6 has the capability to be 3PSW-FT0001 manually operated using the handwheel and 3PSW- on the Limitorque operator. Some FT0002'. level of recovery may be possible using handwheel.
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 152 of 182 Failure~lode, System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9'/21 1 Equipment: PSW to SG 3A Header Check Valve 3PSW-9 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-!31 A-3.2 Component Failure Effects on Method of No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design to upstream undetected until function during design operation.
normally system testing. Failure open when not operating.
closed PSW Possible PSW would allow SG pressure flow control discovery by back to normally closed PSW valves. piping external temperature flow control valves causing no anomaly. immediate detrimental effects.
Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect 3PSWVAO009 Provides a PSW - Inoperable to establish flow as PSW System heat removal from 323 EFW boundary SG 3A. indicated by the RCS through SG 3B (PSW to (OFD-13IA-3.2) isolation feature Control indicatorRoom 3 PSW- aasnl single SG may or may Qmyo a not o
FTO OOI.r provided adequate heat removal depending on specific event conditions).
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 3A SG. Refer to SG 3A. indicator 3PSW- "fail closed" above.
FTOOO1'.
Digitl~ Display inlU~I unt. Controlrj KoUo on.)Ui5i t~eterencc .)
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 153 of 182
- .Failure Mode and Effects Ana ys . OK . ... .. .
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 3B Header Check Valve 3PSW-1 I Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131 A-3.2 Effects on No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)()()
System (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure Back leakage May remain No effect on system design function to upstream undetected until during design operation. Failure PSW normally system testing. open when not operating PSW would closed flow Possible allow SG pressure back to normally control valves, discovery by closed PSW flow control valves piping external causing no immediate detrimental temperature effects.
anomaly.
3PSWVAO0I1 Provides a PSW - Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW System Inability to Failure closed does not affect PSW 324 EFW boundary Inoperable to establish flow as System heat removal from the RCS (OFD- 131 A-3.2) isolation feature SG 3B. indicated by through SG 3A (PSW to a single SG Control Room may or may not provided adequate indicator 3PSW- heat removal depending on specific FTO002'. event conditions).
Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure Possible PSW Flow anomalies Depending on level of flow Travel System as indicated by restriction, PSW flow may be Inoperable to Control Room inadequate to 3B SG. Refer to "fail SG 3B. indicator 3PSW- closed" above.
FT0002'.
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 154 of 182
- '*"*': i~ ii '* * : Failure"'Mq'de, a*anlEffects Analysis ,Worksh-eet, -. i .-. ,.:. : ,
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 2/28/12 RI.
Equipment: PSW to U3 HPI Pump Mtr Bearing Coolers Chk Valve 3PSW-21 Rev. No. I Diagram: OFD- 131 A-3.2 N. Component FucinFailure Failure Mechanism Effects Train on and/or Method Meodt'aurof Failure No. Identification Mode Syilem Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical Failure N/A (PSW Event) N/A (PSW Event)
Inadequate HPI Failure open while supplying HPI Motor Cooling as pump motor coolers from LPSW or None (PSW indicated by HPI HPSW backup could cause back Event) Pump Motor leakage to the PSW System and Bearing Cooling interrupt flow to the HPI Pump Back-Leakage Flow or Bearing motor coolers, rendering HPI pumps from LPSW or Temperature inoperable. Some recovery may be HPSW during Alarms - possible if immediate action is taken other events indications to close manual valves.
Provides a PSW - available in the 3PSWVA0021 LPSW/HPSW Control Rooms' 325 (OFD- 131 A-3.2) and locally in the boundary isolation feature HPIP room.
Fail Closed Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 3 HPI Pump HPI Pump Motor coolers can also to Unit 3 HPI motor bearing be supplied from the LPSW or pump motor flow/temperature HPSW System however this is not coolers alarms'. credited in a PSW event.
unavailable Fail Mid- Mechanical Failure PSW supply Unit 3 HPI Pump Depending on event and failure Travel to Unit 3 HPI motor bearing position, similar effects as described pump motor flow/temperature for "fail open" and "fail closed" coolers alarmst. could be expected.
unavailable RI HPI Pump Motor Bearing Cooling Flow and upper / lower bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed to Unit 3 OAC (Reference 3.10). I
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 155 of 182 Failur~eModean Effects Ala~i 'orksheet ýiLX System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins S ubsy stem : N /A_D ate_:_9/2 2/11I Date : 9/22/I Equipment: PSW to SO 3A Flow Control Valve 3PSW-22 (Solenoid Operated Valve Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-131A-3.2 Effects on No. Component Functi FFailure ailure Mechanism Train andor Method of No. Identification (3) Mode (5) System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)()
System(8) )
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 3 (closing 3PSW-6 from MCR) or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 3PSW-8 to isolate control PSW as indicated by flow to the 3A SG). These actions flow to 3A Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown SG. indicator 3PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the FT0001s. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 3, flow would be restricted by normally closed High flow control to upstream and downstream valves.
3PSWVA0022 326 the Fail Closed Mechanical or . Depending on event and (OFD13 1A3.2) Unit 3 A SG Electrical Failure Inability to Flow anomalies circumstances, adequate control of provide as indicated by flow to 3A / may be adequate PSW Control Room flow to 3A indicator 3PSW- possible by controlling 3PSW-23 SG. FT0001. flow control bypass or 3PSW-26 manual bypass.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control PSW Control Room isolate flow to 3A S/G as described flow to 3A indicator 3PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional SG. FTro flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2).
QSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 156 of 182 Failure Moade C *
.JOUIa l
- D
- + AC IVL4~R J'.
I'-
III #
VT aV. -* X DIZ111 IT Subsystem: N/A Prepared by: William Watkins Equipment: PSW to SG 3A Flow Control Bvyass Valve 3PSW-23 (EMO Operated Date : 9/22/11 Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-13 IA-3.2 Component FFailure Effects on Method of No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
System 7()
(7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 3 (closing 3PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 3PSW-8 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to the 3A SG). These actions adequate PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to 3A indicator 3PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the SG. FTromOI. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 3, flow would be restricted by normally closed 3PSWVA0023 Low flow control to upstream and downstream valves.
327 the Fail Closed Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on event and (OFD-13 A-3.2) Unit 3 A SG Electrical Failure Inability to n ae circumstances, adequate control of cirumsancsideuatecotrobo control PSW Control Room PSW flow to 3A S/G may be flow to 3A indicator 3PSW- possible by controlling 3PSW-22 or SG. FTOOO11. manual bypass particularly true3PSW-26.
early in theThis is event.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 3A Control Room isolate flow to 3A S/G as described SG. Indicator 3PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FTOOOI. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digita Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 157 of 182
- j,<,. .:., i 7 "
..,*.'
- w. Failur*eM de andMdEffects An is orksheet ,I. .'.
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem : _ __ N/ADate_9/22/11 Date : 9/22/IlI Equipment: PSW to SG 31 Flow Control Valve 3PSW-24 (Solenoid Operated Valve)
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A-3.2 Effects on No. Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of Failure Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
_ (6)
Fail Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Open Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 3 (closing 3PSW-6 from MCR or by Flow anomalies manually closing 3PSW-I0 to isolate Inability to as indicated by flow to the 3B SG) These actions control PSW Control Room will prevent unacceptable cooldown flow to 3B SG. indicator 3PSW- rates due to excessive flow. In the FT0002'. event of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 3, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves.
328 3PSWVA3224 High flow control to Fail Mechanical or Depending on event and Fo nmle (OFD- 13 IA-3.2) the Unit 31 SG Closed Electrical Failure Inability to F anomales circumstances, adequate control provide Control Room of PSW flow to 3B S/G may be adequate PSW indicator 3PSW- possible by controlling 3PSW-25 flow to 3B SG. FT0002'. flow control bypass or 3PSW-28 Manual Bypass.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by failure, operators may be required to control PSW Control Room isolate flow to 3B S/G as described in"fail open" or provide additional flow to 3B SG. indicator 3PSW- flow as described in"fail closed" FT0002'. shown above.
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UB I (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 158 of 182 rFailure Mode a nd Effets iýna*I DA Wo kshr Ie it , *g[
- System: Protected Service Water (PSW)
Prepared by: / _William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to SG 3B Flow Control Bypass Valve 3PSW-25 (EMO Operated Valve)
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 131 A-3.2 CmoetFailure Effects on Method of No. Component Function Fire Failure Mechanism EfeTs on Methodo Identification Mode Train andor Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) ý..- (6)
System (7) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Failure open during a PSW event Electrical Failure may require isolation of PSW to Unit 3 (closing 3PSW-6 from MCR or by Inability to Flow anomalies manually closing 3PSW-10 to isolate provide as indicated by flow to 3B SG). These actions will adequate PSW Control Room prevent unacceptable cooldown rates flow to 3B indicator 3PSW- due to excessive flow. In the event SG. FTO002'. of spurious opening when not operating PSW to Unit 3, flow would be restricted by normally closed upstream and downstream valves.
329 (OFD- 131 A-3.2) the Unit 3 B SG Fail Closed Mechanical or Depending on event and Electrical Failure Inability to as indicated by circumstances, adequate control of control P asControl Room PSW flow to 3B S/G may be flowto 3B indicator 3PSW- possible by controlling 3PSW-24 or so. FT0002'. 3PSW-28 Manual Bypass. This is particularly true early in the event.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Flow anomalies Depending on valve position at Travel Electrical Failure control PSW as indicated by failure, operators may be required to flow to 3B ControliRoom isolate flow to 3B S/G as described SG. indicator 3PSW- in "fail open" or provide additional FT0002'. flow as described in "fail closed" shown above.
Digital Display in Unit 3 Control Room on 3UBI (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 159 of 182 S~j ~Fa ilur lode and Efetse WAualyiy Workseet System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: _ _ _ N/A Date: 9/22/I I Equipment: 'A' HPI BWST Suction Valve 1,2.3HP-0024 (EMO Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- 10I A- 1.3. 2.3. 3.3 Effects on Component Function FFailure ailure Mechanism Train and/or Method of No. Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
(6) (7__(_)
Fail Mechanical or None (if Valve position This valve is normally closed to Open Electrical Failure aligned to indicator lights isolate the BWST from the HPI BWST) in MCR. pump suction. Failure in the open position during PSW operation would not have an effect if the HPI pumps were operating and aligned to the BWST.
1,2,3HP VA0024 Swaps HPI suction Fail Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to align BWST to HPI 330 (OFD-IOIA-I.3, from the LDST to Closed Electrical Failure align BWST to indicator lights, pump suction from MCR.
2.3, 3.3) the BWST HPl Pump flow anomalies, Depending on the event and Suction. pump indications circumstances, HP-24 or HP-25 may (over temp. etc) be opened using the Limitorque in MCR. operator handwheel.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Same as "fail Depending on valve position and Travel Electrical Failure align BWST to closed" percent open, consequences of "fail HPT Pump. open" and "fail closed" above are Suction. applicable.
The PSW electrical system provides an alternate power source to HP-24. This calculation only addresses the failure of HP-24 during a PSW event.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 160 of 182
- FailureM~ode.andlEffects2 Analyss Worksheet :
System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: _NA Date: 9/22/I I Equipment: Train A' HPI Disch. Header Isolation Valve 1.2.3HP-0026 (EMO Valve¢ Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD- I 1A- 1.4, 2.4. 3.4 No. Copnn ucinFiue Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Effects on Mthdo Method of Identification Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
(6)
Fail Open Mechanical or Inability to Valve position This normally closed valve controls Electrical Failure control flow to indicator lights, RCS injection from HPI through RCS system pressure Train 'A'. Inability to throttle the or flow valve may require shutdown of the indication in HPI pump. Some level of control MCR. may be possible using the Limitorque manual operator to throttle HP-26 or by closing HP-26 and manually opening / throttling HP-122.
1,2,3HPVA0026 Provides full HPI Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Valve position This normally closed valve controls 331 (OFD-IOIA-l.4, 2.4. Injection flow to Electrical Failure establish flow indicator lights, RCS injection from HPI through flow Train 'A'. Inability to open the 3.4) System Loop A to RCS pumpanomalies, indications valve would require shutdown of the (over temp. etc) HPI pump. Some level of control in MCR. may be possible using the Limitorque manual operator to open/throttle HP-26 or by manually opening/throttling HP-I122.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Same as "fail Depending on valve position and Travel Electrical Failure control HPI closed" percent open, consequences of "fail full flow to open" and "fail closed" above are RCS. applicable.
The PSW electrical system provides an alternate power source to HP-26. This calculation only addresses the failure of HP-26 during a PSW event.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 161 of 182
~.-
.:.* .*:- ..... Y , FailureMode andEffects.An .i" v W e*.
System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: 'William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date: 9/22/II Equipment: RCP Seal Flow Outlet Isolation Valve 1.2,3HP-0139 (EMO Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-. .A- 4-. 434 Effects on Component Failure . Method of Identification Function Failure Mechanism Train and/or Mode Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (3) (5) System (7)
(2) (4) 46) (8)
Fail Open Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely isolate HPI Electrical Failure control RCP indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Flow can be seal flow from RCP seal flow manually isolated using Limitorque HPI indication in handwheel or by manually closing MCR'. IHP-138.
This normally open Fail Closed Mechanical or None Valve position RCP seal flow can be controlled by valve shall be capable Electrical Failure indicator lights, throttling bypass valve IHP- 140 1,2,3HP VA0139 of being closed from (PSW event) RCP seal flow (this is credited during a PSW the MCR using PSW (OFD- 101 A-i .4, 2.4. power prior to re- indication in event). Therefore, there will be no 3.4) MCR1 . significant impact due to fail closed establishing seal during a PSW event.
injection via HP-140 (see Item 333 below) Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Although not credited, manual Travel Electrical Failure control RCP indicator lights, operation to close HP-I139 using the seal flow from RCP seal flow Limitorque operator or by manually HPI indication in closing I HP-138 if possible would MCR'. allow RCP seal flow control using HP-140.
1,2.3HP-139 receives power from the PSW electrical system and is only credited for EMO operation in PSW events. Manual operation is credited in other events.
1,2,3HPI-FT0075 (RCP Seal Injection Header Flow) alarms (STATALARM) in the respective control room.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 162 of 182 Failure AnalyiseN System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date :92211 Equipment: RCP Seal Flow Control Bypass Valve 1.2.3HP-0140 (EMO Valve) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-101A-1.4. 2.4. 3.4 Effects on Method or No. Identification Function Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (8)
(6)dnicain(
Fail Open Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely control HPI Electrical Failure remotely indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Some control control HPI RCP seal flow may be possible by manually flow to RCP indication in operating the valve handwheel or by seals. MCR'. using the downstream individual RCP seal line throttle valves. Note that these actions are not credited to This normally closed mitigate PSW events.
valve shall be capable Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely control HPI 1,2,3HP VA 0140 of being opened and Electrical Failure remotely indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Some control 333 (OFD-lO0A-1.4, 2.4, throttled from the control HPI RCP seal flow may be possible by manually 3.4) MCR using PSW flow to RCP indication in operating the valve or downstream power to re-establish seals. MCR1 . individual RCP seal line throttle seal injection valves (in conjunction with opening HP-139). Note that these actions are not credited to mitigate PSW events.
Fail Mid- Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Inability to remotely control UPI Travel Electrical Failure remotely indicator lights, flow to RCP seals. Similar effects as control HPI RCP seal flow "fail open or fail closed above" flow to RCP indication in seals. MCR'.
1,2,3H-P-140 receives power from the PSW electrical system and is only credited for EMO operation in PSW events. Manual operation is credited in other events.
' 1,2,3HPI-FT0075 (RCP Seal Injection Header Flow) alarms (STATALARM) in the respective control room.
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 163 of 182 FailureMode and E .t.
System: HPI System (PSW Interface) Prepared by: . William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/I I Equipment: HPI PumDs (A & B Only) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-IOIA-I.3. 2.3. 3.3 tFailure Failure Method of No. ()Identification Component Function Mode Mode(4 Mechanism Effects on Train and/or System (Mech)aetetio Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1I)() (3) ()(5) (6) Detection()
(7))(8)
Fail to Start Mechanical Inadequate Flow to RCS & RCP Control room or Seal Injection indicator light.
Electrical Reduced or Failure Absent Flow /
Pressure Indication in HPI Pump operation is credited in a MCR'. PSW event and Pumps 'A' or 'B' Fails During Mechanical Inadequate Flow to RCS & RCP Control Room receives alternate power from the Operation or Seal Injection Indicator Light. PSW electrical system. The pumps Electrical MCR Flow / are operated independently and I,2,3HPIPU000I HPI Pump Failure Pressure either pump can perform the design 1.2,3HPIPU0002 *A indication functions. Therefore redundancy 334D decreasing. exists with respect to the pumps.
OFD-IOIA-.3. HPI Pump deHowever the PSW electrical system 2.3, 3.3 "B" Fails to stop Electrical Possible RCS overpress. Control Room is not single failure proof and an on command Failure Pump failure to stop on Indicator Light. electrical failure within the system command could be mitigated by Indication of (See Item # I, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, closing downstream isolation continued flow / 27) could restrict pump operations valves. This would stop HPI pressure in in which case the SSF RCMU injection and possibly seal MCR'. Pump would be used.
cooling. The HPI pump's minimum flow will protect the HPI pumps by flowing through the LDST and back to the HPI pump suction header.
'HPI Injection Flow and Seal Injection Flow are monitored and alarmed in the respective control room (reference 3.10, Section 4.4)
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 164 of 182
~>Failure Node-a System: RCS System (PSW Interface)
Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/1I Equipment: RC HIot Leg and Vessel High Point Vent Valves Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-IOOA- 1.I. 2.1. 3.1 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Series Isolation A Hot Fail Open Mechanical or Uncontrolled RCS RCS pressure Valves are in series and both are required Leg High Point Vents Electrical Depressurization indication, valve to establish a vent path therefore a single 1-ihPntV ents Failure position indication, failure at the actual valves would not lead 1.2,3RCVA0155 (both valves in or other RCS to uncontrolled venting. Loss of electrical 1,2,3RCVA0156 series fail open) indications (PZR power would result in valve failing closed OFD-IOOA-I.1. 2.1, 3. / Provides a vent level etc) shown in and inability to use valve in its design path to exhaust MCR. function during a PSW event. PSW Series Isolation B Hot non-condensible electrical system provides alternate power.
Leg High Point Vents gases and/or 335 1,2.3RCVA0157 steam from the 1,2,3RCVA0158 RCS that could Fail Closed Mechanical or Inability to Valve position Failure of either valve in the closed OFD-IOOA-I. 1.2.1, 3. inhibit natural Electrical perform venting indication, no RCS position would restrict the ability to vent circulation core Failure system response as from the respective loop or from the cooling indicated in MCR vessel.
Reactor Vessel High Fail Mid- Mechanical Inability (or Valve position Mechanical failure is the only credible Point Vents Travel Failure restricted ability) indication, means for a mid-travel failure.
1,2.3RCVA0159 to perform venting, unexpected RCS Uncontrolled venting would not occur due 1,2.3RCVAO160 response as to single failure (i.e. valves in series).
OFD-IOOA-I /, 2.1. 3.1 indicated in MCR General comments on operability of RC vent valves. Although not credited for single failure during a PSW event, failure affecting one set of valves may still allow operability using the other sets for letdown and the unaffected loop for heat removal through natural circulation. Unavailability of all 3 sets during a PSW event due to single failure in the PSW electrical system (See Item # 83, 84, 94, 107, 108, 109 for Unit I, 125, 127, 132, 145, 150, 151 for Unit 2, 169, 170, 182, 192, 193, 194 for Unit 3) would remove/ render the PSW System unavailable (removing letdown capability affects the HPI injection / RCP seal injection and removing venting capability would affect natural circulation and S/G heat removal operations).
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 165 of 182 and -,-As2nal's jWol~heet&
System: PSW (Pump Room Ventilation) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/ADate: 9/22/Il Equipment: PSW Pump Room Ventilation Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-1 16G-3.1 Effects on Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train Method of Failure No. Mode and/or Detection Remarks and Other Effects (o. Identification (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
(6)
Fail On Electrical Failure Electrical None No Effect Failure Maintains (Running)
OPSWAHEF009 acceptable Fail Off Mechanical or Fail Off PSW Primary and PSW System Inoperable. PSW 336 OFD- I 16G-3.1 environment in the (Not Electrical Failure (Not / or Booster Pump pump room will quickly exceed PSW Pump Room Running) Running) Bearing allowable temperatures resulting Temperature in equipment shutdown and/or Alarms' in MCR. damage.
From a mechanical perspective, the only credible failure would occur at the PSW Pump Room fan. A single failure in the associated electrical power or start circuit would render the fan inoperable (See Items 133, 149, 171). There is no capability to operate the PSW System without pump room ventilation.
Furthermore, continued operation of equipment within the PSW Pump Room (particularly the primary and booster pump) without ventilation operable could rapidly result in heat up of the pump room and immediate adjacent areas beyond design basis temperatures. Temperature effects due to operation of the PSW primary and booster pump without ventilation has not been analyzed.
'The PSW Primary Pump and Booster Pump motor inboard and motor outboard bearings as well as the pump inboard and pump outboard bearings are monitored and alarm to the Unit 2 OAC. The alarms have an "alarm" and "shutdown setpoint. Therefore in the event of PSW Pump Room ventilation failure, operators will have warnings to allow action to prevent equipment damage (Reference 3.2).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 166 of 182 Failu're Mode and Effets Analy, is Vork~heet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW Building Heating and Ventilation Rev. No. 0-Diagram: OFD-lI 16M-1.8 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Identification (I)()()()(5) Mode System Detection Remarks and(8)cio Other Effects (2) (4) (6) (7) (8)
PSW Building Safety Fail Mechanical or Building Temperature Limited effect except in "fail on" Related Heating and Running Electrical Failure Overheat Alarm (Control of heaters during hot conditions.
Ventilation Room OAC)'
Various Fans, Mechanical or No Temperature Dampers, Heater Fail to Start Ventilation Alarm (Control PSW System inoperable without Coils, Fan Motors Maintains acceptable Electrical Failure (overheat) Room OAC)' PSW building heat / ventilation.
337sFa envrMiromntains aethbe Mecanca.o 337 Train A environment in the Failure No Temperature PSW Building During Mechanical or Ventilation Alarm (Control PSW System inoperable without Operation Electrical Failure Roo OA PSW building heat / ventilation.
(Redundant trains) Fl f A failure of a single component in OFD-1 16M-1.8 au 0 Mechanical or Inadequate Teither Train A or Train B QA- I Individual Electrical Failure Ventilation Room AC)r Ventilation System should not Components Room OAC)* defeat the ventilation function.
tnc raw Builuing rteaing and ventiuation is not single railure proorano failure unoeruesign conauttonswouiu renaeruie rPw System moperaole. Ine rw ouiding neaung and ventilation system can meet its design function with only one of two trains operable however redundancy was included in the design only to maintain system availability during maintenance on one train. Due to the high degree of redundancy and robust design, the system is likely to retain some level of operability in most conditions following failure of any single component. In some cases, failure in the associated electrical power system would prevent the system from operating (See Item No. 58, 60 and 61)
One temperature transmitter is located in each PSW battery room and one is located in the (common) transformer area. These transmitters alarm to the OAC and are detailed in OSC-9689, Rev. 0. Other methods of detection include discovery during operator rounds.
Note that the PSW building air conditioning system is non-safety related and is not credited for PSW operation.
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 167 of 182 Failure Mode and Effects A.,nalysis W.6rsheet.
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: N/A Date : 9/22/11 Equipment: PSW to HPI Pump CoolinE Filters (Cuno Filters) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: OFD-l31A-1.2. 2.2, 3.2 No. opoetFunction Component aiue Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Effects on Method of Failure Identification Mode Detection Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System (7) (8)
(6)
Plugging Mechanical Loss of or Inadequate HPI HPI Pump Motor coolers can reduced Motor Cooling as also be supplied from the cooling to indicated by HPI LPSW or I-PSW System HPI motor Pump Motor however this is not credited in a coolers Bearing Cooling PSW event.
Flow or Bearing Temperature Alarms - indications 1,2,3PSW-FLOOOI available inthe 3P8 Filter PSW water to Control Rooms' and OFD-131A- HPI motor coolers. locally in the HPIP 1.2. 2.2, 3.2 room.
Leakage Mechanical Same a "Plugging" HPI Pump Motor coolers can above also be supplied from the LPSW or -PSW System however this is not credited ina PSW event.
RCP Motor Bearing Cooling Flow and upper / lower bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed to respective Unit OAC (Reference 3.10 HPI DBD).
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 168 of 182
, .... .Failure
- ."e:" Analysis Mode and Effects, I.:.
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: William Watkins Subsystem: _ N/A Date : 9/22/1 1 Equipment: _ Rev. No. 0 Diagram:
Effects on Method of No. Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) (_ )
339 through Not Used 399
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 169 of 182 Failure Mode and Efet nlsi okhe System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: I/1 8/2012 Equipment: B6T-8. B7T-3(5), PSWLXPX13-IA(IC). XPSW-2B(4B)(4C) Rev. No. 0 Diagram:_0-6700, 0-6707, 0-6707-01
- Effects on Method of No.
(o. Component Identification Function
()Mode Failure Failure Mechanism (5 TrainytmDtcin and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1)(2) M3)de4 (5) .System Detection Rmrs (8)
(2)_(4) (6) (7) O rf 400 B6T-8 Spare N/A
_ _ (0-6700) 401 B7T-3 Spare N/A (0-6700) 402 B7T-5 Spare N/A (0-6700) 403 PSWLXPX13 - IA Spare N/A (0-6707) 404 PSWLXPXI3 - IC Spare N/A (0-6707) 405 XPSW - 2B Spare N/A
. __ (0-6707-01) 406 XPSW -4B Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 407 XPSW - 4C Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 1
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 170 of 182 FailureModeand Effects Analy~is Worksheet :
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:. PSW Electrical System _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: XPSW-5C(5D), IXPSW-2A(2C)(3B)(5A)(5B)(5C) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6707-01. 0-6701 Effects on Method of No. Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) 408 XPSW - 5C Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 409 XPSW- 5D Spare N/A (0-6707-01) 410 1XPSW-2A Spare N/A (0-6701) 411 1XPSW - 2C Spare N/A (0-6701) 412 IXPSW-3B Spare N/A (0-6701) 413 IXPSW-5A Spare N/A (0-6701) 414 1XPSW - 5B Spare N/A (0-6701) 1 1 415 1XPSW.- 5C Spare N/A (0-6701) 1
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 171 of 182 de Eali. AnalysisMorksheet.
dkffe~cts System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: fPSW Electrical System Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: IXPSW-5D(5E). I KPSW-6(7)(8) 2XPSWA-2C(3B)(3C) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-670 1, 0-6704, 0-6702 No. Component FucinFailure Failure Mechanism *Effects Train on and/or Failureof Method Identification Function Mode Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) __
416 IXPSW 5D Spare N/A (0-6701) 417 ]XPSW--5E Spare N/A (0-6701) 418 IKPSW-6 Spare N/A (0-6704) 419 IKPSW-7 Spare N/A (0-6704) 420 I KPSW - 8 Spare N/A (0-6704) 421 2XPSWA - 2C Spare N/A (0-6702) 422 2XPSWA - 3B Spare N/A (0-6702) 423 2XPSWA - 3C Spare N/A (0-6702)
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 172 of 182 System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:.., PSW Electrical System _ _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: 2XPSWB-4B(5D), 2KPSW-6(8), 3XPSW-2B(2D)(4D)(5B) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6702, 0-6705, 0-6703 Effects on Method of No. Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure 1)(2) Identification (3) Mode (4) (5) System Detection(8 Remarks and Other Effects
()()(6) (7) (8) 2XPSWB - 4B Spare N/A 424 (0-6702) 425 2XPSWB 51D Spare N/A (0-6702) 426 2KPSW - 6 Spare N/A (0-6705) 427 2KPSW - 8 Spare N/A (0-6705) 428 3XPSW - 2B Spare N/A
- _ (0-6703) 429 3XPSW - 2D Spare N/A (0-6703) 430 3XPSW - 4D Spare N/A (0-6703) 431 3XPSW - 5B Spare N/A 431___
_ (0 -6703) N/A
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 173 of 182 11 ý,
I k- . I I.: , Failure, "Aloile'aiinid Effects Aniýýýkw6rksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) II Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date: .1/18/2012 Equipment: 3XPSW-5C(5D). 3KPSW-6(8), PSWLXDCOI-3BI(3B2)(3B8)
Rev. No. 0 Diagram: .
0-6701 O-6706 O-Ai7nQ-n I
..... I ..... I .......
Comonnt aiur Effects on Method of No. Identification Component Function Mode Failure Failure Mechanism Tri"ndo Train and/or aiueRemarks and Other Effects Failure (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(I) (2) (3)
(6) "_(7) (8) 432 3XPSW - 5C Spare N/A (0-6703) 433 3XPSW- 5D Spare N/A (0-6703) 434 3KPSW-6 Spare N/A (0-6706) 435 3KPSW- 8 Spare N/A (0-6706) 436 PSWLXDCOI - 3 B 1 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 437 PSWLXDCOI - 31B2 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 438 PSWLXDCOI - 3 B8 Spare N/A (0-6700-01) 1 1
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 174 of 182
.. > >Faiilure Mode and *ffects An-,sTl Yorksee tt*
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date :1 1/1:8/2012 Equipment: PSWPL IDC- !0(11 )( 12)(I 5)(16)(22)(23)(24) Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Effects on Method of No. Component Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Train and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection (8)
(6) (7) 439 PSWPLIDC- 10 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 440 PSWPLI DC - I I Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 441 PSWPLIDC- 12 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 442 PSWPLIDC- 15 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 443 PSWPL IDC - 16 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 444 PSWPLIDC-22 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 445 PSWPLIDC - 23 Spare N/A (0-6700-02) 446 PSWPLIDC-24 Spare N/A
, (0-6700-02)
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 175 of 182 Failure Mode D #- # .4 C " U/ f. DC11/1
.,33t lla U l. ýL.tt
ý " i iv otý a i. a Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: PSWPL2DC Breakers 5.7.9,10,11, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-02 Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No. Component Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection Remarks and Other Effects Identification (1) (2) (3)(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PSWPL2DC - 5 N/A 4487 (0-6700-02)
SP2D SpareN/
448Spr PSWPL2DC - 7 N/A (0-6700-02) 449 PSWPL2DC - 9 N/A 450 PSWPL2DC (0-6700-02) - 1 Spr Spare (0-6700-02) 452 PSWPL2DC- 10 N/A (0-6700-02)re 452 PSWPL2DC-212 (0-6700-02) Sar N/A 453 PSWPL2DC - 22 N/A (0-6700-02)
N/A 455 454 PSWPL2DC- --223 PSWPL2DC N/A
_______(0-6700-02)
(0-6700-02) Spe 456 PSWPL2DC - 24 N/A (0-6700-02)
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 176 of 182 Failure Mode and'Effects A.A*" She.
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System ________
Equipment: IPSWPL2DC Breakers 3.4,5.8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 De: N Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Component Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of No. Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection R a r
((2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 457 I PSWPL2DC - 3 N/A (0-6700-03) S 458 IPSWPL2DC - 4 N/A (0-6700-03) 459 1PSWPL2DC - 5 N/A (0-6700-03) 460 I PSWPL2DC - 8 N/A (0-6700-03) 461 I PSWPL2DC - 9 N/A (0-6700-03) 462 IPSWPL2DC -10 N/A (0-6700-03) 463 I PSWPL2DC - I I N/A (0-6700-03) 464 1PSWPL2DC - 12 N/A (0-6700-03) 465 I PSWPL2DC - 13 N/A (0-6700-03) 466 1PSWPL2DC - 14 N/A
- (0-6700-03)
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 177 of 182 Failure"M d.A ayivokh System: Protected Service Water (PSW)
Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: .......PSW Electrical System Date : 1/182012......
Breakers 15 thru 24 Equipment: I PSWPL2DC Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Failure Remarks and Other Effects Identification Mode Mechanism and/or System Detection
((2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 467 1PSWPL2DC - 15S N/A (0-6700-03) 468 IPSWPL2DC - 16 N/A (0-6700-03) 469 1PSWPL2DC - 17 N/A (0-6700-03) 470 IPSWPL2DC - 18 N/A (0-6700-03) 471 I PSWPL2DC - 19 N/A (0-6700-03) 472 1PSWPL2DC - 20 N/A (0-6700-03) 473 I PSWPL2DC - 21 N/A
- (0-6700-03) 474 IPSWPL2DC - 22 N/A (0-6700-03) 475 IPSWPL2DC- 23 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 476 I PSWPL2DC - 24 N/A (0-6700-03)
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 178 of 182
, Fai"ur e M,*de and Effects"Ana'l& ors et; System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:. PSW Electrical System_ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: 2PSWPL2DC Breakers 8 thru 16 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No. Component Function Failure Failure Effects on Train Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (8)
(4) (5) (6) (7) 477 2PSWPL2DC - 8 N/A (0-6700-03) 478 2PSWPL2DC - 9 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 479 2PSWPL2DC - 10 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 480 2PSWPL2DC - II Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 481 2PSWPL2DC - 12 N/A (0-6700-03) 482 2PSWPL2DC - 13 rN/A (0-6700-03) 483 2PSWPL2DC- 14 N/A Spare (0-6700-03) 484 2PSWPL2DC - 15 N/A (0-6700-03) Spare 485 2PSWPL2DC- 16 N/A (0-6700-03) Spr
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 179 of 182 Failure Mo6de andlfcts Anal . Wo'rkshee 0
System Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: ...........
PSW Electrical System Date: 1/18/2012 Equipment: 2PSWPL2DC Breakers 17 thru 24 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 No. ComponentiFunction Failure Failure Effects on Train "Method of Remarks and Other Effects (1) Identification (3) Mode Mechanism and/or System Failure Detection (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7(8) 486 2PSWPL2DC - 17 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 487 2PSWPL2DC - 18 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 488 2PSWPL2DC- 19 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 489 2PSWPL2DC -20 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 490 2PSWPL2DC - 21 N/A 491 2PSWPL2DC - 22 N/A (0-6700-03) 492 2PSWPL2DC - 23 N/A (0-6700-03) 493 2PSWPL2DC - 24 N/A
_ (0-6700-03)
OSC-10008, Rev. I Appendix A Page 180 of 182
- dEffectsA"naly Mode an.Failure qWorks ee.
System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: _PSW Electrical System _ Date : 1/18/2012 Equipment: 3PSWPL2DC Breakers 3.4.5.8.9,10.11 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Effects on Method of No. C) Component Function Failure Failure Mechanism (5 Train and/or Failure (1I) Identification (2) (3) Mode (4) (5) SytmDtcin ystem Detection(8 Remarks and Other Effects (6) (7)((8) 494 3PSWPL2DC - 3 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 495 3 PSWPL2DC - 4 N/A (0-6700-03) 496 3PSWPL2DC - Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 497 3PSWPL2DC - 8 N/A (0-6700-03) 498 3PSWPL2DC - 9 N/A (0-6700-03) 499 3PSWPL2DC - 10 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 500 3PSWPL2DC - I I N/A (0-6700-03) Spare
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 181 of 182
..Falure'Modeand Efects Analysis Worksheet System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by: Frank Calabrese Subsystem:.PSW Electrical System Date: 1/18/2012 Equipment: 3PSWPL2DC Breakers 12 thru 19 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 Effects on Method of No. () Identification Component ()Mode Function Failure (5 Failure Mechanism TrainytmDtcin and/or Failure Remarks and Other Effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
System (7)
Detection (8) 502 3PSWPL2DC- 12 N/A (0-6700-03) 502 3PSWPL2DC - 13 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) .
503 3PSWPL2DC- 14 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 504 3PSWPL2DC - 15 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 505 3PSWPL2DC- 16 N/A (0-6700-03) 506 3PSWPL2DC - 17 N/A Spare (0-6700-03) 507 3PSWPL2DC - 18 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 508 3PSWPL2DC- 19 N/A (0-6700-03)
Spare
OSC-10008, Rev. 1 Appendix A Page 182 of 182
.Vi Falu&re Mode and Effects A a ss rkshe:,t System: Protected Service Water (PSW) Prepared by:: Frank Calabrese Subsystem: PSW Electrical System_ Date: 1/18/2012 Equipment: 3PSWPL2DC Breakers 20 thru 24 Rev. No. 0 Diagram: 0-6700-03 N. Component FucinFailure Failure Mechanism Effects Train on and/or Failureof Method No. Identification Function Mode (5) Systes Dete Remarks and Other Effects
(!) (2) (3) (4) (5) System Detection()
(6) (7)((8) 509 3PSWPL2DC - 20 N/A (0-6700-03) 510 3PSWPL2DC - 21 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 511 3PSWPL2DC - 22 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 512 3PSWPL2DC - 23 Spare N/A (0-6700-03) 513 3PSWPL2DC - 24 Spare N/A (0-6700-03)
Attachment (1) - OE Search Results The OE Search Results information is available for inspection onsite at the Oconee Nuclear Station.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis For Standby. Shutdown Facility