ML13030A449

Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief

ML13030A449
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	01/30/2013
From:	Cottingham A, Ginsberg E Nuclear Energy Institute
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
RAS 24058, 50-361-CAL, 50-362-CAL, ASLBP 13-924-01-CAL-BD01
Download: ML13030A449 (49)

Text

January 30, 2013 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of: )

)

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-361-CAL &

) 50-362-CAL (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, )

Units 2 and 3) )

NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(a), the Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. (NEI) hereby moves the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) for leave to file the attached brief as amicus curiae in this proceeding. 1 The attached brief discusses the use of confirmatory action letters as part of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection and enforcement process.

NEI believes that this brief complements the parties filings in response to the Boards request for briefs on the legal and factual issues presented in this case, and would assist the Board in determining whether the confirmatory action letter issued to Southern California Edison Company (SCE) constitutes a de facto license amendment.

Under NRC practice, non-parties may file amicus briefs on appropriate issues in proceedings before the Board. 2 NEI seeks leave to participate as an amicus curiae in this 1

In accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b), counsel for NEI certifies that she made a sincere effort to contact counsel for the other parties in the proceeding, explain to them the issues raised in this motion, and seek their consent to the submittal of an NEI amicus brief. Counsel for SCE has authorized NEI to state that SCE does not oppose NEIs motion for leave to file as amicus curie. Counsel for the NRC Staff indicated that the NRC takes no position on NEIs motion for leave to file as amicus curie. Counsel for Friends of the Earth (FOE) indicated that FOE plans to oppose NEIs motion.

2 Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-862, 25 NRC 144, 150-51 (1987); Gen. Pub.

Utils. Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 161 (1996); see also Order (Conference Call Summary and Directives Relating to Briefing) at 5 (Dec. 7, 2012) (allowing Natural Resources Defense Counsel to participate as amicus curiae).

proceeding because the NRC Staffs use of confirmatory action letters is an important feature of the NRCs regulatory process to address issues associated with compliance, and often has the effect of encouraging licensees to expedite corrective or other actions in response to particular regulatory issues. As such, the resolution of questions relating to the NRCs use of confirmatory action letters is important to the commercial nuclear industry as a whole.

NEI is the Washington-based policy organization responsible for representing the commercial nuclear energy industry on generic regulatory, legal, and technical issues. NEI has a clear and direct interest in ensuring that the Commission applies the appropriate legal standard for determining whether a confirmatory action letter constitutes a de facto license amendment. 3 Further, NEI is in a unique position to address the adverse policy implications that could result from expanding or misapplying that standard in a manner that discourages the use of confirmatory action letters in the future.

Offering NEIs perspective on the NRCs use of confirmatory action letters through its participation in this proceeding as amicus curiae will not prejudice or unduly burden any other participant, or delay the proceeding. As an amicus, NEI necessarily takes the proceeding as it finds it and does not propose to inject any new issues into the proceeding. 4 3

NEIs members include all entities licensed by the NRC to operate commercial nuclear power plants, as well as nuclear plant designers, major architect-engineer firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, universities, and other organizations and entities involved in the nuclear industry.

4 See La. Energy Servs. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-4, 45 NRC 95, 96 (1997).

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For the foregoing reasons, NEI respectfully requests that the Board accept its accompanying brief amicus curiae.

Respectfully submitted, Ellen C. Ginsberg Anne W. Cottingham Nuclear Energy Institute 1201 F Street, N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20004 Phone: 202-739-8000 E-mail: ecg@nei.org E-mail: awc@nei.org COUNSEL FOR THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, INC.

Dated in Washington, D.C.

this 30th day of January 2013 3

January 30, 2013 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of: )

)

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-361-CAL &

) 50-362-CAL (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, )

Units 2 and 3) )

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, INC.

IN RESPONSE TO THE NRC ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARDS BRIEFING ORDERS I. INTRODUCTION On November 8, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) requested that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) consider, among other things, whether the March 27, 2012 confirmatory action letter issued to Southern California Edison (SCE) regarding degradation of steam generator tubes at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Units 2 and 3 constitutes a de facto license amendment. 1 The Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. (NEI) agrees with SCE that confirmatory action letters play an important role in the NRCs inspection and enforcement programs. Moreover, the resolution of the significant legal and regulatory question posed in this proceeding has generic implications because the Boards decision may establish a precedent affecting all NRC licensees.

NEI therefore submits this brief as amicus curiae in response to the Board request for briefing of this issue. NEIs brief focuses on the appropriate legal standard for determining whether a 1

S. Cal. Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-12-20, 76 NRC __, slip op. at 1-2, 5 (Nov. 8, 2012).

confirmatory action letter constitutes a de facto license amendment. We also address the policy and practical implications of expanding or misapplying that legal standard. Finally, we discuss herein other available avenues for public participation on issues addressed in a confirmatory action letter, whose use would not adversely affect the NRC Staffs inspection and enforcement process. We respectfully request that the Board consider NEIs generic concerns and take them into account in deciding this matter.

NEI, a not-for-profit corporation under Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code, is the Washington-based policy organization representing the commercial nuclear energy industry before the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government on generic regulatory, legal, and technical issues. NEIs members include all entities licensed by the NRC to operate commercial nuclear power plants, nuclear plant designers, major architect-engineer firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, universities, and other organizations and entities involved in the nuclear industry. As such, NEI has a clear and direct interest in this proceeding, and can provide a useful perspective on the important role that confirmatory action letters play as part of the NRCs inspection and enforcement program.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE As the Commission explained in CLI-12-20, SONGS Units 2 and 3 are currently shut down as SCE evaluates the cause of a steam generator tube leak that led to Unit 3s shutdown. 2 On March 23, 2012, SCE submitted a letter to the NRC identifying specific regulatory commitments that SCE planned to undertake to address steam generator tube issues at each unit. 3 2

SONGS, CLI-12-20, slip op. at 2.

3 See Letter from Peter T. Dietrich, Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer, SCE, to Elmo E. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV, NRC, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, Steam Generator Return-to-Service Action Plan, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Attachment 1, Steam Generator Return-to-Service Action Plan (Mar. 23, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12086A182 (Attach. 1).

2

On March 27, 2012, the NRC Staff issued a confirmatory action letter to SCE, documenting SCEs commitment to perform those actions prior to restarting the reactors. 4 On June 18, 2012, Friends of the Earth (FOE) filed an intervention petition and hearing request challenging the restart of SONGS Units 2 and 3. 5 FOEs request focused primarily on a claim that SCEs 2010 and 2011 steam generator replacements violated 10 C.F.R. § 50.59. 6 In passing, however, FOE also requested that the Commission recognize the current confirmatory action letter process as a license amendment proceeding under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309. 7 In CLI-12-20, the Commission referred to the NRC Staff, for its consideration as a petition under 10 C.F.R. § 2.206, the portion of the petition arguing that SCEs steam generator replacements violated 10 C.F.R. § 50.59. 8 The Commission also referred a portion of the petition to the Board to consider: (1) whether the confirmatory action letter issued to SCE constitutes a de facto license amendment that would be subject to a hearing opportunity; and (2) if so, whether the petition meets the standing and contention admissibility requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309. 9 By orders dated December 7 and 21, 2012, the Board directed the parties to address these and certain other legal and factual issues in briefs. 10 4

Letter from Elmo E. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV, NRC, to Peter T. Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, SCE, Confirmatory Action Letter - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, Commitments to Address Steam Generator Tube Degradation (Mar. 27, 2012),

available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12087A323 (Attach. 2).

5 Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing by Friends of the Earth at 1 (June 18, 2012) (Friends of the Earth Petition).

6 Id. at 2.

7 Id.

8 SONGS, CLI-12-20, slip op. at 3-4.

9 Id. at 4-5.

10 Order (Directing Parties to Brief Additional Issue) at 2 (Dec. 21, 2012); Order (Conference Call Summary and Directives Relating to Briefing) at 5-7 (Dec. 7, 2012); see also Order (Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petitioners Motion for Clarification and Extension) at 5 (Dec. 20, 2012).

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III. DISCUSSION A. Confirmatory Action Letters Are a Useful and Well-Established Part of the NRCs Inspection and Enforcement Program The NRCs inspection and enforcement authority over the agencys licensees derives from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. 11 NRC regulations implementing this statutory authority are set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart B, Procedure for Imposing Requirements by Order, or for Modification, Suspension, or Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties. In addition to conducting inspections and investigations, the NRC may take various enforcement actions for regulatory violations, up to and including modifying, suspending, or revoking licenses. 12 In certain circumstances, the NRC also may impose civil penalties. 13 As the Commissions Enforcement Policy explains, the NRC uses administrative actions, such as confirmatory action letters, to supplement its enforcement program. 14 The Enforcement Policy makes clear that [t]he NRC expects licensees and other persons subject to the Commissions jurisdiction to adhere to any obligations and commitments resulting from administrative actions and will consider issuing additional Orders, as needed, to ensure compliance. 15 The Enforcement Policy specifies that a confirmatory action letter is a letter confirming a licensees or contractors agreement to take certain actions to remove significant concerns 11 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2236, 2282; Atomic Energy Act §§ 161, 186, 234.

12 42 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2232, 2236, Atomic Energy Act §§ 161, 182, 186; 10 C.F.R. § 2.202.

13 42 U.S.C. § 2282, Atomic Energy Act § 234; 10 C.F.R. § 2.205.

14 NRC, Office of Enforcement, NRC Enforcement Policy at 23 (June 7, 2012) (NRC Enforcement Policy)

(excerpt included as Attach. 3).

15 Id.

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regarding health and safety, safeguards, or the environment. 16 NRCs Enforcement Manual Section 3.5 further provides that confirmatory action letters are issued to licensees to emphasize and confirm a licensees agreement to take certain actions in response to a specific safety issue or concern. 17 Unlike an order, confirmatory action letters do not themselves create legally-binding commitments other than reporting requirements. 18 As such, confirmatory action letters are generally used to confirm that a licensee will adhere to existing requirements. 19 For example, confirmatory action letters may be issued to confirm compliance with equipment maintenance or root cause analysis requirements. 20 In addition, confirmatory action letters may also be issued to confirm a voluntary, temporary suspension of licensed activities or, as in the instant circumstance, confirm a licensees agreement to obtain prior NRC approval before resuming licensed activities. 21 As such, a confirmatory action letter is a flexible and valuable regulatory tool that allows the NRC Staff to address issues in a timely and efficient manner while continuing to evaluate whether any further action is necessary and appropriate. 22 B. Confirmatory Action Letters Are Part of NRCs Normal Inspection and Enforcement Process, Separate and Distinct from License Amendments Confirmatory action letters are issued pursuant to the NRCs normal inspection and enforcement process. Because they merely confirm an agreement to comply with existing 16 Id. at 68.

17 NRC, Office of Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enforcement Manual, Rev. 7 at 3-29 (Oct. 1, 2010) (NRC Enforcement Manual) (excerpt included as Attach. 4).

18 Id. at 3-31.

19 Id. (explaining that confirmatory action letters may be used to confirm that a licensee will adhere to existing provisions).

20 Id. at 3-30.

21 Id.

22 A confirmatory action letter, however, does not preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action for any violation of a regulatory requirement that may have prompted the confirmatory action letter. Id. at 3-32.

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regulations, confirmatory action letters are separate and distinct from the license amendment process. Commission case law makes clear that the NRC Staffs approval of a licensees actions will only be considered a de facto license amendment if the approval grants the licensee greater operating authority beyond the authority already granted under the existing license and NRC regulations. 23 In determining whether a confirmatory action letter issued to a licensee grants the licensee any greater operating authority, NRC precedent establishes that the Board should accept the confirmatory action letter at face value. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board did just that in response to the Massachusetts Attorney Generals challenge to a 1989 confirmatory action letter issued to the Seabrook Station that documented the licensees agreement to review certain failures that occurred during a low-power natural circulation test, institute short-term corrective actions to address any deficiencies identified, identify and schedule long-term corrective actions, and obtain NRCs concurrence before restarting the reactor. 24 Without addressing the specifics of NRCs confirmatory action letter issued to SCE, NEI notes that, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Manual, a properly-issued confirmatory action letter does not grant a licensee greater operating authority. Rather, a confirmatory action letter confirms that a licensee will be implementing specific commitments within the scope of the existing license and NRC regulations, such as confirming equipment maintenance or a root cause evaluation. Those commitments involve actions that are already authorizedand in fact requiredby NRC regulations and the existing license. 25 The Atomic Safety and Licensing 23 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-96-13, 44 NRC 315, 326 (1996) (citations omitted).

24 Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-28, 30 NRC 271, 276 (1989), affd, ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225 (1990).

25 NRC Enforcement Manual at 3-30; see also 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action).

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Appeal Board made clear in the Seabrook proceeding (cited above) that the NRC Staffs issuance of a confirmatory action letter was an enforcement action taken to ensure compliance with NRC regulations and an existing license. As such, the NRC Staffs enforcement action was independent of, and immaterial to, any subsequent Commission licensing determination. 26 Thus, any confirmatory action letter that merely documents a licensee commitment to adhere to existing regulatory requirements is not granting action for which a license amendment would be required.

Similarly, a confirmatory action letter issued to confirm a licensees agreement to obtain prior NRC approval before resuming licensed activities does not involve granting a licensee greater operating authority. 27 To the contrary, such a confirmatory action letter documents a licensees temporary agreement to lessnot greater operatingauthority. As the Commission observed in the Perry proceeding:

That the Staff may wish to verify in advance that a proposed revision [to a licensees reactor vessel specimen withdrawal schedule] conforms to the required technical standard does not make Staff approval a license amendment. By merely ensuring that required technical standards are met, the Staffs approval does not alter the terms of the license, and does not grant the Licensee greater operating authority. Such a review indeed enforces license requirements. As an enforcement policy matter, the Staff may wish to police some licensee-initiated changes before they go into effect. To insistas the Intervenors dothat the NRC Staff may never require prior approval for any change or activity without effecting some sort of major licensing action, would frustrate the agencys ability to monitor licensees and enforce regulations. 28 26 Seabrook, ALAB-940, 32 NRC at 237.

27 See NRC Enforcement Manual at 3-30.

28 Perry, CLI-96-13, 44 NRC at 328-29; see also In re Three Mile Island Alert, Inc., 771 F.2d 720, 730 (3rd Cir.

1985) (Section 189(a) is not implicated when the Commission enters an order lifting a suspension so that a licensee may operate under existing authority during the course of an enforcement proceeding.); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ([T]he lifting of a license suspension does not fall within any of the enumerated categories of Commission action for which a hearing must be held.).

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In sum, the Commission has clearly held that a confirmatory action letter documenting a licensee commitment to obtain NRC approval before engaging in activities that are already authorized by an existing license does not grant a licensee greater operating authority, and should not be considered a license amendment.

C. Departing from Existing Precedent and the Enforcement Process Would Discourage Confirmatory Action Letters and Adversely Affect the NRCs Regulatory Process To find that a confirmatory action letter functions as a de facto license amendment would not only be contrary to Commission precedent, but also would undermine NRCs inspection and enforcement program. 29 Conflating a confirmatory action letter with a license amendment is likely to discourage the NRCs use of this regulatory tool in the future, undermining the agencys discretion to select the enforcement action that best fits the circumstances at hand. 30 For example, the NRC Staff may be reluctant to issue a confirmatory action letter if it knows that a license amendment proceeding may need to be completed before the terms of the confirmatory action letter are accorded finality. In that regard, the NRC Staff often uses confirmatory action letters to more quickly reach agreement with the licensee on the action necessary to resolve the significant safety concerns in issue. Even uncontested license amendment proceedings often last a year or more. Accordingly, treating a confirmatory action letter as a license amendment would be inconsistent with the NRCs interests in the expeditious resolution of safety issues and would add no concomitant benefit.

29 Because a confirmatory action letter does not establish legally-binding requirements other than reporting requirements, issuance of such a letter would not excuse a licensee from compliance with any applicable NRC requirements.

30 See Alaska Dept of Transp. & Pub. Facilities (Confirmatory Order Modifying License), CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 409-10, reconsideration denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004).

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Further, treating a confirmatory action letter as a license amendment would likely lead to a more adversarial relationship between the NRC Staff and licensees during the inspection and enforcement process. As the Commission has explained in the context of confirmatory orders:

We believe that public health and safety is best served by concentrating inspection and enforcement resources on actual field inspections and related scientific and engineering work, as opposed to the conduct of legal proceedings. This consideration calls for a policy that encourages licensees to consent to, rather than contest, enforcement actions. Such a policy would be thwarted if licensees which consented to enforcement actions were routinely subjected to formal proceedings possibly leading to more severe or different enforcement actions. Rather than consent and risk a hearing on whether more drastic relief was called for, licensees would, to protect their own interests, call for a hearing on each enforcement order to ensure that the possibility of less severe action would also be considered. The end result would be a major diversion of agency resources from project inspections and engineering investigations to the conduct of hearings. 31 This logic applies equally with respect to confirmatory action letters. If confirmatory action letters could be treated as license amendments, licensees would be less likely to reach agreement with the Staff because of their interest in avoiding a lengthy, often highly adversarial, and expensive license amendment proceeding.

If a confirmatory action letter were treated as a license amendment, the NRC Staff could resort to issuance of a confirmatory order (which has only limited hearing rights). 32 However, orders are considered to reflect the agencys view that more serious issues must be addressed.

Orders also are more difficult to change than confirmatory action letters. The result could be a 31 Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 441-42 (1980).

32 See Alaska Dept of Transp., CLI-04-26, 60 NRC at 411 (holding that a petitioner may not use the hearing process to seek additional measures beyond those set out in a confirmatory order).

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diversion of NRC Staff resources from ensuring safety to implementing the more complicated administrative process associated with issuance of orders. 33 In summary, treatment of a confirmatory action letter as a license amendment would discourage both licensees and the NRC Staff from using this tool, to the detriment of potentially quicker and more effective resolution of safety concerns.

D. NRCs 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 Process Provides Members of the Public Ample Opportunity to Address Issues Covered in a Confirmatory Action Letter Members of the public have a process for contesting the adequacy of the action licensees agree to take and which is set forth in a confirmatory action letter. Section 2.206(a) of the Commissions regulations provides any person with the opportunity to request the institution of a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or for any other action as may be proper.

Notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Commission have identified 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 as a viable alternative to an adjudicatory proceeding. 34 Thus, if a member of the public desires enforcement of more stringent or different restrictions than the NRC Staff has already imposed in a confirmatory action letter, Section 2.206 provides for such an opportunity.

33 See NRC Enforcement Manual at 3-31 (suggesting that if a licensee did not agree to the commitments in a confirmatory action letter, the NRC Staff would likely issue an order).

34 See Bellotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (A petition is not a futile gesture, for the Commission may not deny it arbitrarily.); Alaska Dept of Transp., CLI-04-26, 60 NRC at 407 n.35 (indicating that if an individual believes that NRC has not gone far enough to remedy a safety concern, then they are free to file a Section 2.206 petition); Marble Hill, CLI-80-10, 11 NRC at 442 ([T]he NRC already provides a separate procedure, under 10 C.F.R. 2.206, for any interested person to seek enforcement actions beyond those adopted.).

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IV. CONCLUSION For purposes of determining whether a confirmatory action letter constitutes a de facto license amendment, the Board should apply the informed and well-established legal standard set forth in the Perry proceeding. Under the Commissions standard in Perry, a confirmatory action letter is not a de facto license amendment because it does not granted a licensee any greater operating authority. 35 To allow otherwise would contravene Commission precedent, undermine NRCs inspection and enforcement program, discourage NRC licensees from agreeing to expedited action memorialized in a confirmatory action letter, and discourage the NRC Staff from issuing confirmatory action letters. The facts in this case do not justify such a rejection of Commission precedent. Additionally, 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 currently provides members of the public with ample opportunity to advance issues of concern whether or not a confirmatory action letter is issued.

Respectfully submitted, Ellen C. Ginsberg Anne W. Cottingham Nuclear Energy Institute 1201 F Street, N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20004 Phone: 202-739-8000 E-mail: ecg@nei.org E-mail: awc@nei.org COUNSEL FOR THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, INC.

Dated in Washington, D.C.

this 30th day of January 2013 35 Perry, CLI-96-13, 44 NRC at 326 (citations omitted).

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January 30, 2013 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of: )

)

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-361-CAL &

) 50-362-CAL (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, )

Units 2 and 3) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that copies of the Nuclear Energy Institute Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and the Amicus Curiae Brief of the Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. in Response to the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards Briefing Orders have been served via the Electronic Information Exchange this 30th day of January 2013.

Ellen C. Ginsberg Nuclear Energy Institute 1201 F Street, N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20004 Phone: 202-739-8000 E-mail: ecg@nei.org

Appendix of Attachments Supporting Amicus Curiae Brief of the Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. in Response to the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards Briefing Orders

1. Letter from Peter T. Dietrich, Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer, Southern California Edison, to Elmo E. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV, NRC, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, Steam Generator Return-to-Service Action Plan, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (Mar. 23, 2012).

2. Letter from Elmo E. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV, NRC, to Peter T. Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Southern California Edison, Confirmatory Action Letter - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, Commitments to Address Steam Generator Tube Degradation (Mar. 27, 2012).

3. Excerpt of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Enforcement, NRC Enforcement Policy (June 7, 2012).

4. Excerpt of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enforcement Manual, Rev. 7 (Oct. 1, 2010).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Peter T. Dietrich EDISON' Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer An EDISON INTERNATIONAL l. Company March 23 , 2012 Elmo E. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1600 East Lamar Blvd.

Arlington, Texas 76011-4511

Subject:

Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Steam Generator Return-to-Service Action Plan San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

Dear Mr. Collins:

The purpose of this letter is to describe the actions Southern California Edison (SCE) is taking with respect to steam generator tube issues at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). As you know, SONGS Units 2 and 3 are currently shutdown as we inspect and analyze the causes of steam generator tube wear issues. Our top priority is to protect the health and safety of the public by understanding the causes of these issues and taking corrective actions to address those causes.

As part of the normal end-of-cycle steam generator tube inspections performed following the first cycle of operation, all of the tubes in both Unit 2 steam generators were inspected using eddy current inspection technology. More detailed eddy current inspections of tubes were performed in areas exhibiting signs of wear in accordance with SCE's Steam Generator Program Requirements (SGPR) which are consistent with Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines. Unanticipated wear was identified in a number of tubes adjacent to steam generator retainer bars, and this wear was determined to be the result of retainer bar contact with the tubes. The tube with the most significant wear indication in the Unit 2 steam generators was pressure tested in accordance with the SGPR. The results demonstrated that the tube met the steam generator leakage and structural performance criteria as required by Technical Specifications. No tubes on Unit 2 were found to have failed these criteria .

With respect to Unit 3, a leaking steam generator tube was identified by SCE on January 31, 2012, and the unit was promptly shut down before Technical Specification leakage limits were exceeded, with no public health or safety consequences. All of the tubes in both Unit 3 steam generators were inspected using eddy current inspection technology. Indications of the same type of wear adjacent to the retainer bars found in Unit 2 were identified in Unit 3.

In addition, subsequent inspections and testing in Unit 3 identified a number of steam generator tubes that did not meet the leakage and structural performance criteria as required by Technical Specifications. SCE has identified the wear mechanism that caused the tube leak as tube-to-tube interaction, and further testing , analysis, and corrective actions to address this wear mechanism are underway.

P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92672 (949) 368-6255 PAX 86255 Fax: (949) 368-6 183 Pete.Dietrich@sce.com

Elmo E. Collins Regional Administrator ~1ar c h 23, 201 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspections of the Unit 2 steam generator tubes have not shown the wear associated with tube-to-tube interaction seen in the Unit 3 steam generators. We will continue to assess the data obtained from Unit 3 for applicability to Unit 2 and will take necessary corrective actions.

SCE commits to complete the following actions as indicated for each unit:

Actions for Unit 2

1. The mechanisms causing steam generator tube wear in Unit 2 have been identified, and all tubes for which testing indicated wear in excess of SGPR and EPRI guidelines have been plugged. SCE also plugged all tubes adjacent to the retainer bars, whether worn or not, as a preventive measure. SCE has documented these issues in its Corrective Action Program (CAP) for analysis and resolution.

2. SCE will determine the causes of the tube-to-tube interactions that resulted in steam generator tube wear in Unit 3, and will implement actions in accordance with the CAP to prevent loss of integrity due to these causes in the Unit 2 steam generator tubes. Once these actions have been determined, SCE will establish a protocol of inspections and/or operational limits for Unit 2, including plans for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections.

3. Prior to entry of Unit 2 into Mode 2, SCE will , in a joint meeting, provide the NRC the results of our assessment of Unit 2 steam generators, the protocol of inspections and/or operational limits including schedule dates for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections, and the basis for SCE 's conclusion that there is reasonable assurance, as required by NRC regulations, that the unit will operate safely.

4. Both prior to and after entry of Unit 2 into Mode 2, the protocol and inspection time frames described in Action 2 above will be adjusted, as necessary, to account for the results of ongoing inspections and analyses of the causes of tube-to-tube interactions in the Unit 3 steam generators. NRC will be notified of any proposed changes to this protocol.

Actions for Unit 3

5. SCE will complete in-situ pressure testing of tubes with potentially significant wear indications in accordance with the EPRI Steam Generator In-Situ Pressure Test Guidelines and will plug tubes in accordance with those guidelines.

6. SCE will plug all tubes with wear indications in excess of SGPR and EPRI guidelines as well as perform preventive plugging or take other corrective actions to address retainer bar-related tube wear in Unit 3.

7. SCE will determine the causes of tube-to-tube interaction and implement actions in accordance with the Corrective Action Program to prevent recurrence of loss of integrity in the Unit 3 steam generator tubes while operating.

8. SCE will establish a protocol of inspections and/or operational limits for Unit 3, including plans for a mid-cycle shutdown for inspections. The protocol is intended to minimize the progression of tube wear, and ensure that tube wear will not progress to the point of degradation that could cause tubes to not meet leakage and structural strength test criteria.

Elmo E. Collins Regional Administrator March 23 , 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

9. Prior to entry of Unit 3 into Mode 4, SCE will , in a joint meeting, provide the NRC the results of our assessment of Unit 3 steam generators, the protocol of inspections and/or operational limits including schedule dates for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections, and the basis for SCE's conclusion that there is reasonable assurance, as required by NRC regulations , that the unit will operate safely.

We will proceed deliberately and conservatively to implement these steps, always bearing in mind that safety is our first priority. We will also keep the NRC informed of our progress and of the results of our tests and analyses. , "Commitment List" contains the commitments made in this letter.

Please do not hesitate to contact me or Mr. Richard St Onge at 949 368-6240 should you require any further information.

Attachments: As stated.

cc: NRC Document Control Desk R. Hall, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 G. G. Warnick, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 and 3

Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Attachment 1 ATTACHMENT 1 COMMITMENT LIST Steam Generator Return-to-Service Action Plan The following list identifies those actions committed to by Southern California Edison (SCE) for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal are described only for information and are not regulatory commitments .

No. Commitment Due Date Actions for Unit 2 1 The mechanisms causing steam generator tube wear in Unit 2 Complete have been identified, and all tubes for which testing indicated wear in excess of SGPR and EPRI guidelines have been plugged. SCE also plugged all tubes adjacent to the retainer bars, whether worn or not, as a preventive measure. SCE has documented these issues in its Corrective Action Program (CAP) for analysis and resolution .

2 SCE will determine the cause(s) of the tube-to-tube Prior to entry of interactions that resulted in steam generator tube wear in Unit Unit 2 into Mode 2 3, and will implement actions in accordance with the CAP to prevent loss of integrity due to these potential causes in the Unit 2 steam generator tubes. Once these actions have been determined, SCE will establish a protocol of inspections and/or operational limits for Unit 2, including plans for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections.

3 Prior to entry of Unit 2 into Mode 2, SCE will , in a joint Prior to entry of meeting, provide the NRC the results of our assessment of Unit 2 into Mode 2 Unit 2 steam generators, the protocol of inspections and/or operational limits including schedule dates for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections, and the basis for SCE's conclusion that there is reasonable assurance, as required by NRC regulations, that the unit will operate safely.

4 Both prior to and after entry of Unit 2 into Mode 2, the protocol Ongoing and inspection time frames described in Action 2 above will be adjusted, as necessary, to account for the results of ongoing inspections and analyses of the causes of tube-to-tube interactions in the Unit 3 steam generators. NRC will be notified of any proposed changes to this protocol.

Actions for Unit 3 5 SCE will complete in-situ pressure testing of tubes with Prior to entry of potentially significant wear indications in accordance with the Unit 3 into Mode 4 EPRI Steam Generator In-Situ Pressure Test Guidelines and will plug tubes in accordance with those guidelines.

Page 1 of 2

Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Attachment 1 No. Commitment Due Date 6 SCE will plug all tubes with wear indications in excess of Prior to entry of SGPR and EPRI guidelines as well as perform preventive Unit 3 into Mode 4 plugging or take other corrective actions to address retainer bar-related tube wear in Unit 3.

7 SCE will determine the cause(s) of tube-to-tube interaction Prior to entry of and implement actions in accordance with the Corrective Unit 3 into Mode 4 Action Program to prevent recurrence of loss of integrity in the Unit 3 steam generator tubes while operating.

8 SCE will establish a protocol of inspections and/or operational Prior to entry of limits for Unit 3, including plans for a mid-cycle shutdown for Unit 3 into Mode 4 inspections. The protocol is intended to minimize the progression of tube wear, and ensure that tube wear will not progress to the point of degradation that could cause tubes to not meet leakage and structural strength test criteria.

9 Prior to entry of Unit 3 into Mode 4, SCE will , in a joint Prior to entry of meeting, provide the NRC the results of our assessment of Unit 3 into Mode 4 Unit 3 steam generators, the protocol of inspections and/or operational limits including schedule dates for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections, and the basis for SCE's conclusion that there is reasonable assurance, as required by NRC regulations, that the unit will operate safely.

Page 2 of 2 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I V 1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511 March 27, 2012 CAL 4-12-001 Mr. Peter Dietrich Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92674-0128

SUBJECT:

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER - SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3, COMMITMENTS TO ADDRESS STEAM GENERATOR TUBE DEGRADATION

Dear Mr. Dietrich:

On January 31, 2012, your staff at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 3 performed a rapid shutdown because of indications of a steam generator tube leak on the 3E88 steam generator. Following extensive testing of 100 percent of the steam generator tubes in both Unit 3 steam generators, your staff identified unexpected wear caused by steam generator tubes rubbing against each other, as well as against retainer bars. Additional in-situ pressure testing of 129 steam generator tubes was performed for the tubes that exhibited the most wear.

Your staff identified that eight steam generator tubes in the Unit 3 3E88 steam generator had failed the pressure test. Failure of the in-situ pressure test is an indication that, for certain design basis events, such as a main steam line break, these steam generator tubes may not be able to maintain design structural integrity. You are continuing to evaluate these results to develop corrective actions for the Unit 3 steam generators.

SONGS Unit 2 was shutdown at the time of this event for a regularly scheduled refueling outage, and planned testing of 100 percent of the steam generator tubes was already in progress. Testing results on Unit 2 showed unexpected wear at retainer bars similar to the Unit 3 results, but did not show any wear from tubes rubbing against each other. Based on these results, your staff identified 6 tubes requiring plugging, and 186 additional tubes that were plugged as a precautionary measure. Evaluation for additional plugging or other corrective actions is continuing for Unit 2, based on ongoing evaluations of Unit 3 testing results.

P. Dietrich For both Units 2 and 3, this was the first cycle of operation with new replacement steam generators. Unit 2 replaced its steam generators in January 2010, and Unit 3 in January 2011.

Each steam generator has 9,727 steam generator tubes.

On March 23, 2012, you sent NRC a letter describing the actions you were committing to take prior to returning Units 2 and 3 to power operation (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML12086A182). In a phone conversation on March 26, 2012, I confirmed with you the commitments as described in your letter. This Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) confirms that SONGS Unit 2 will not enter Mode 2, and SONGS Unit 3 will not enter Mode 4 (as defined in the technical specifications), until the NRC has completed its review of your actions listed below. The permission to resume power operations will be formally communicated to you in written correspondence.

Actions for Unit 2

1. Southern California Edison Company (SCE) will determine the causes of the tube-to-tube interactions that resulted in steam generator tube wear in Unit 3, and will implement actions to prevent loss of integrity due to these causes in the Unit 2 steam generator tubes. SCE will establish a protocol of inspections and/or operational limits for Unit 2, including plans for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections.

2. Prior to entry of Unit 2 into Mode 2, SCE will submit to the NRC in writing the results of your assessment of Unit 2 steam generators, the protocol of inspections and/or operational limits, including schedule dates for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections, and the basis for SCEs conclusion that there is reasonable assurance, as required by NRC regulations, that the unit will operate safely.

Actions for Unit 3

3. SCE will complete in-situ pressure testing of tubes with potentially significant wear indications in accordance with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Steam Generator In-situ Pressure Test Guidelines and will plug tubes in accordance with those guidelines.

4. SCE will plug all tubes with wear indications in excess of your Steam Generator Program Requirements (SGPR) and EPRI guidelines as well as perform preventive plugging or take other corrective actions to address retainer bar-related tube wear in Unit 3.

5. SCE will determine the causes of tube-to-tube interaction and implement actions to prevent recurrence of loss of integrity in the Unit 3 steam generator tubes while operating.

6. SCE will establish a protocol of inspections and/or operational limits for Unit 3, including plans for a mid-cycle shutdown for inspections. The protocol is intended to minimize the progression of tube wear, and ensure that tube wear will not progress to the point of degradation that could cause tubes not to meet leakage and structural strength test criteria.

P. Dietrich 7. Prior to entry of Unit 3 into Mode 4, SCE will submit to the NRC in writing the results of your assessment of Unit 3 steam generators, the protocol of inspections and/or operational limits, including schedule dates for a mid-cycle shutdown for further inspections, and the basis for SCEs conclusion that there is a reasonable assurance, as required by NRC regulations, that the unit will operate safely.

This CAL will remain in effect until the NRC has (1) reviewed your response to the actions above, including responses to staffs questions and the results of your evaluations, and (2) the staff communicates to you in written correspondence that it has concluded that SONGS Units 2 and 3 can be operated without undue risk to public health and safety, and the environment.

Issuance of this CAL does not preclude the issuance of an order formalizing the above commitments or requiring other actions on the part of SCE; nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement actions for violations of NRC requirements that may have prompted the issuance of this letter. Failure to take the actions as described in this CAL may also result in an order if the NRC determines that failure to meet that action would result in a loss of reasonable assurance of the protection of public health and safety, and the environment.

Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2232), you are required to:

(1) Notify me immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above; (2) Notify me if for any reason you cannot complete the actions and your proposed alternatives; and (3) Notify me in writing when you have completed the actions addressed in this Confirmatory Action Letter.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's regulations a copy of this letter, and any response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the ADAMS, accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

P. Dietrich Please contact Ryan Lantz at (817) 200-1173 if you have any questions concerning this letter.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Elmo E. Collins Regional Administrator Docket No.: 50-361, 50-362 License No.: NPF-10, NPF-15 cc: Electronic Distribution

P. Dietrich Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Art.Howell@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Tom.Blount@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Greg.Warnick@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (John.Reynoso@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/D (Ryan.Lantz@nrc.gov)

SONGS Administrative Assistant (Heather.Hutchinson@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/D (David.You@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/D (Brian.Parks@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)

NRR PLBIV (Michael.Markley@nrc.gov)

Project Manager (Randy.Hall@nrc.gov)

Acting Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Ryan.Alexander@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Regional State Liaison Officer (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

ACES (R4-RA-ACES.nrc.gov)

Director, NRR (Eric.Leeds@nrc.gov)

Director, DORL, NRR (Michele.Evans@nrc.gov)

Deputy Director, DORL, NRR (Louise.Lund@nrc.gov)

Director, DE, NRR (Patrick.Hiland@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, NRR, SGCE (Gloria.Kulesa@nrc.gov)

DEDO (Martin.Virgilio@nrc.gov)

Regional Administrator, Region I (Bill.Dean@nrc.gov)

Regional Administrator, Region II (Victor.McCree@nrc.gov)

Acting Regional Administrator, Region III (Cynthia.Pederson@nrc.gov)

OEMail Resource OEDO (Lydia.Chang@nrc.gov)

File located: S:\DRP\DRPDIR\_SONGS SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials RL Publicly Avail Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials RL DRP: PBD/BC ACES DRS: D DRP: D NRR RLantz HGepford TVegel KKennedy ELeeds

/RA/ /RA via Email/ /RA via Email/ /RA/ /RA via Email/

3/26/12 3/26/12 3/26/12 3/26/12 3/26/12 RIV: RA ECollins

/RA/

3/27/12 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax NRC Enforcement Policy June 7, 2012 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Enforcement Washington, DC 20555-00

NRC Enforcement Policy NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY CONTENTS PREFACE ............................................................................................................................. 3

1.0 INTRODUCTION

.................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Purpose .............................................................................................................. 5 1.2 Applicability......................................................................................................... 5 1.3 Statutory Authority .............................................................................................. 6 1.4 Regulatory Framework........................................................................................ 6 1.5 Adequate Protection Standard ............................................................................ 6 1.6 Responsibilities....7 2.0 NRC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS ....................................................................... 7 2.1 Identification of Violations .............................................................................. 8 2.2 Assessment of Violations ............................................................................... 8 2.2.1 Factors Affecting Assessment of Violations ........................................ 8 2.2.2 Severity Levels ................................................................................. 10 2.2.3 Operating Reactor Assessment Program ......................................... 11 2.2.4 Exceptions to Using Only the Operating Reactor Assessment Program ....................................................................... 11 2.2.5 Export and Import of NRC-Regulated Radioactive Material and Equipment ................................................................................. 12 2.2.6 Construction ..................................................................................... 12 2.3 Disposition of Violations ............................................................................... 13 2.3.1 Minor Violation.................................................................................. 13 2.3.2 Non-Cited Violation .......................................................................... 13 2.3.3 Notice of Violation ............................................................................ 15 2.3.4 Civil Penalty ..................................................................................... 15 2.3.5 Orders .............................................................................................. 22 2.3.6 Demand for Information.................................................................... 23 2.3.7 Administrative Actions ...................................................................... 23 2.3.8 Reopening Closed Enforcement Actions .......................................... 23 2.3.9 Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ................................................. 23 2.3.10 Commission Notification and Consultation on Enforcement Actions . 24 2.4 Participation in the Enforcement Process..................................................... 24 2.4.1 Predecisional Enforcement Conference............................................ 25 2.4.2 Regulatory Conference..................................................................... 25 2.4.3 Alternative Dispute Resolution.......................................................... 26 3.0 USE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION .......................................................... 26 3.1 Violations Identified during Extended Shutdowns or Work Stoppages.......... 27 3.2 Violations Involving Old Design Issues......................................................... 27 1

NRC Enforcement Policy 3.3 Violations Indentified Due to Previous Enforcement Actions ........................ 28 3.4 Violations Involving Certain Discrimination Issues........................................ 28 3.5 Violations Involving Special Circumstances ................................................. 29 3.6 Use of Discretion in Determining the Amount of a Civil Penalty ................... 29 3.7 Exercise of Discretion To Issue Orders ....................................................... 30 3.8 Notices of Enforcement Discretion for Operating Power Reactors and Gaseous Diffusion Plants ............................................................................. 30 3.9 Violations Involving Certain Construction Issues........................................... 31 4.0 ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS ................................ 32 4.1 Considerations in Determining Enforcement Actions Involving Individuals ... 33 4.2 Notices of Violation and Orders to Individuals .............................................. 34 4.3 Civil Penalties to Individuals......................................................................... 35 4.4 Confirmatory Orders to Individuals ............................................................... 35 5.0 PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ................................................................................ 35 6.0 VIOLATION EXAMPLES ..................................................................................... 35 6.1 Reactor Operations ...................................................................................... 36 6.2 Fuel Cycle Operations ................................................................................. 37 6.3 Materials Operations ................................................................................... 40 6.4 Licensed Reactor Operators ....................................................................... 43 6.5 Facility Construction (10 CFR Part 50 and 52 Licensees and Fuel Cycle Facilities) ..................................................................................................... 46 6.6 Emergency Preparedness ........................................................................... 47 6.7 Health Physics ............................................................................................. 48 6.8 Transportation ............................................................................................. 52 6.9 Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report ......................................................................................................... 53 6.10 Discrimination .............................................................................................. 57 6.11 Reactor, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Fuel Facility, and Special Nuclear Material Security ..................................... 59 6.12 Materials Security ........................................................................................ 61 6.13 Information Security .................................................................................... 65 6.14 Fitness for Duty............................................................................................ 65 7.0 GLOSSARY .......................................................................................................... 67 8.0 TABLE OF BASE CIVIL PENALTIES ............................................................... 72 9.0 INTERIM ENFORCEMENT POLICIES .............................................................. 73 9.1 Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) .. 73 9.2 Enforcement Discretion for the Minimum Days Off Requirements of

§ 26.205(d)(3) .............................................................................................. 76 2

NRC Enforcement Policy facility or location). When the NRC, at the time of the enforcement conference, identifies additional peripheral or minor corrective action still to be taken, the licensee may be given credit in this area, as long as the licensees actions addressed the underlying root cause and are considered sufficient to prevent recurrence of the violation and similar violations.

Corrective action for violations involving discrimination should normally be considered comprehensive only if the licensee takes prompt, comprehensive corrective action that (1) appropriately addresses the broader environment for raising safety concerns in the workplace and (2) provides a remedy for the particular discrimination at issue.

If the corrective action is judged to be prompt and comprehensive, an NOV normally should be issued with no associated civil penalty. If the corrective action is judged to be less than prompt and comprehensive, the NOV normally should be issued with a base civil penalty.

In response to violations of 10 CFR 50.59, corrective action should normally be considered prompt and comprehensive only if the licensee makes a prompt decision on operability and does either of the following:

1. makes a prompt evaluation under 10 CFR 50.59 if it intends to maintain the facility or procedure in the as-found condition

2. promptly initiates corrective action consistent with Criterion XVI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, if it intends to restore the facility or procedure to the final safety analysis report (FSAR) description

d. In view of the circumstances of the violation, should the NRC exercise enforcement discretion to either escalate or mitigate the amount of the civil penalty?

As discussed in Section 3.6, Use of Discretion in Determining the Amount of a Civil Penalty, discretion may be exercised by either escalating or mitigating the amount of the civil penalty determined after applying the civil penalty adjustment factors to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflects all relevant circumstances of the particular case.

However, in no instance will a civil penalty for any one violation exceed the statutory daily limit.

2.3.5 Orders An Order is a written NRC directive to modify, suspend, or revoke a license; to cease and desist from a given practice or activity; or to take such other action as may be proper (see 10 CFR 2.202, Orders). Orders may be issued in lieu of, or in addition to, civil penalties, as appropriate, for Severity Level I, II, and III violations. Unless a separate response is warranted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, Notice of Violation, the NRC does not need to issue an NOV in addition to the Order when the NOV is based on violations described in the Order. Orders are made immediately effective, without prior opportunity for a hearing, whenever the NRC determines that the public health, safety, interest, or common defense and security so requires, 22

NRC Enforcement Policy or if the violation or conduct causing the violation is willful. In such cases, the Order may provide, for stated reasons, that the proposed action be immediately effective pending further action. Otherwise, the Agency grants a prior opportunity for a hearing on the Order.

The NRC may also issue Orders to nonlicensees, including contractors and subcontractors, holders of NRC approvals (e.g., certificates of compliance, early site permits, standard design certifications, or applicants for any such approvals), and to employees of any of the foregoing and to licensed individuals, such as licensed reactor operators, and nonlicensed individuals.

2.3.6 Demand for Information The Commission may also issue a demand for information (DFI) (see 10 CFR 2.204) to determine whether an Order under 10 CFR 2.202 should be issued or whether other action should be taken.

2.3.7 Administrative Actions The NRC also uses administrative actions, such as confirmatory action letters, notices of deviation, and notices of nonconformance, to supplement its enforcement program. These administrative actions are explained in the Enforcement Manual and defined in the glossary of this Policy. The NRC expects licensees and other persons subject to the Commissions jurisdiction to adhere to any obligations and commitments resulting from administrative actions and will consider issuing additional Orders, as needed, to ensure compliance.

2.3.8 Reopening Closed Enforcement Actions Under special circumstances (e.g., when the NRC receives significant new information indicating that an enforcement sanction was incorrectly applied), the Agency may consider, on a case-by-case basis, reopening a closed enforcement action to increase or decrease the severity of a sanction or to correct the record.

Special circumstances include but are not limited to (1) a situation where persons provided incomplete or inaccurate information that would have been considered material to the NRCs disposition of a case, (2) information was deliberately withheld or obscured, or (3) the licensee made errors in calculations that would not have normally been reviewed by the NRC. Special circumstances do not normally include the discovery of additional information that was reasonably available to the NRC at the time the Agency made its initial enforcement decision unless the Commission determines that action is necessary to ensure that the facility provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the public and is in accord with the common defense and security.

2.3.9 Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Enforcement guidance memoranda (EGM) are used to provide the NRC staff with temporary enforcement guidance, including, in some instances, enforcement discretion, when the criteria specified in the EGM are met. EGM normally describe the situation that has occurred that requires the use of such guidance, as well as the length of time the EGM will be in effect. For a list of current EGM, see Appendix A of the NRC Enforcement Manual.

23

NRC Enforcement Policy

3. A licensee violates the requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, but the violation is unrelated to the behavior observation program and does not amount to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation; or

4. Failures to appropriately implement any of the requirements (e.g., work hours, waivers, self declarations, or fatigue assessment) of 10 CFR Part 26, Subpart I that are not isolated or that demonstrate programmatic weaknesses in implementation.

7.0 GLOSSARY This glossary, while not exhaustive, contains many of the terms commonly used throughout the NRC enforcement process.

Activity Area refers to the area of NRC-licensed activity that a licensee (or other person) engages in (e.g., radiography, reactor operations).

Actual Consequences include such effects as actual onsite or offsite releases of radiation, onsite or offsite radiation exposures, accidental criticality, core damage, loss of significant safety barriers, and loss of control of radioactive material.

Adverse Action is any action that may adversely impact the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment including but not limited to a failure to receive a routine annual pay increase or bonus; demotion or arbitrary downgrade of a position; transfer to a position that is recognized to have a lesser status or be less desirable (e.g., from a supervisory to nonsupervisory position); failure to promote; overall performance appraisal downgrade; verbal or written counseling, or other forms of constructive discipline.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) refers to a variety of processes that emphasize creative, cooperative approaches to handling conflicts in lieu of adversarial procedures.

Mediation and arbitration are the most widely recognized processes. The NRCs ADR program uses mediation rather than arbitration (i.e., the parties develop mutually agreeable corrective actions rather than being obligated by an arbitrators decision).

Apparent Violation is a violation of regulatory requirements that is being considered for escalated enforcement action.

Careless Disregard refers to situations in which an individual acts with reckless indifference to at least one of three things: (1) the existence of a requirement, (2) the meaning of a requirement, or (3) the applicability of a requirement. Careless disregard occurs when an individual is unsure of the existence of a requirement, the meaning of a requirement, or the applicability of the requirement to the situation, but nevertheless proceeds to engage in conduct that the individual knows may cause a violation. Although aware that the action might cause a violation, the individual proceeds without first ascertaining whether a violation would occur.

67

NRC Enforcement Policy Civil Penalty is a monetary penalty that may be imposed for violations of (1) certain specified provisions of the AEA or supplementary NRC rules or Orders, (2) any requirements for which a license may be revoked, or (3) reporting requirements under Section 206 of the ERA.

Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) is a letter confirming a licensees or contractors agreement to take certain actions to remove significant concerns regarding health and safety, safeguards, or the environment.

Confirmatory Order is an Order that confirms the commitments made by a license or individual to take certain actions. Before issuance of the Confirmatory Order, the licensee or individual and the NRC mutually agree on the terms of the Order.

Contractor, as used in this Policy, includes vendors who supply products or services to be used in an NRC-licensed facility or activity.

Corrective Action Program is a licensees process for tracking, evaluating, and resolving deficiencies.

Deliberate Misconduct occurs when an individual voluntarily and intentionally (1) engages in conduct that the individual knows to be contrary to a requirement, procedure, instruction, contract, purchase order, or policy of a licensee, applicant for a license, or a contractor or subcontractor of a licensee or applicant for a license or (2) provides materially inaccurate or incomplete information to a licensee, applicant for a license, or a contractor or subcontractor of a licensee or applicant for a license.

Demand for Information (DFI), as defined in 10 CFR 2.204, requires a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission to respond with specific information for the purpose of enabling the NRC to determine whether an Order should be issued or whether other action should be taken.

Discrimination, as described in 10 CFR 10 CFR 50.7 (or similar provisions in 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 52, 60, 61, 63, 70, 71, 72, and 76), is the taking of an adverse action against an employee because the employee engaged in certain protected activities.

Escalated Enforcement Actions include Severity Level I, II, and III NOVs; NOVs associated with an inspection finding that the SDP evaluates as having low to moderate (white) or greater safety significance; civil penalties; NOVs to individuals; Orders to modify, suspend, or revoke NRC licenses or the authority to engage in NRC-licensed activities; and Orders issued to impose civil penalties.

Event, as used in this Policy, means (1) an occurrence characterized by an active adverse impact on equipment or personnel, readily obvious by human observation or instrumentation, or (2) a radiological impact on personnel or the environment in excess of regulatory limits, such as an overexposure, a release of radioactive material above NRC limits, or a loss of radioactive material. For example, an equipment failure discovered through a spill of liquid, a loud noise, the failure of a system to respond properly, or an annunciator alarm would be considered an event; a system discovered to be inoperable through a document review would not. Similarly, if a licensee discovers, through quarterly dosimetry readings, that employees had been 68 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT MANUAL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Enforcement Revision 7 Washington, DC 20555-0001 October 1, 2010

Table of Contents ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... I-1 CHAPTER 1 Responsibilities and Authorities ..................................................................................... 1-1 CHAPTER 2 Dispositioning Noncompliances ..................................................................................... 2-1 CHAPTER 3 Non-Cited Violations and Non-Escalated Actions ......................................................... 3-1 CHAPTER 4 Escalated Enforcement Actions ...................................................................................... 4-1 CHAPTER 5 Exercise of Discretion ..................................................................................................... 5-1 CHAPTER 6 Wrongdoing ..................................................................................................................... 6-1 CHAPTER 7 Reactor Operations .......................................................................................................... 7-1 CHAPTER 8 Miscellaneous Materials Enforcement Activities........................................................... 8-1

ABSTRACT The NRC Enforcement Manual (Manual):

• is the primary source of guidance regarding agency policy and procedures for NRC staff implementing the enforcement program

• contains procedures, requirements, and background information that are essential to those who develop or review enforcement actions for the NRC

• provides guidance consistent with the Enforcement Policy The enforcement program was developed to implement the Enforcement Policy which supports the agencys overall safety and security mission, i.e., to protect the public health and safety and provide for the common defense and security. To emphasize the importance the Commission places on this mission, two major goals of the enforcement program are (1) to emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements, and (2) to encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations.

NOTE:

The guidance provided in this manual has been written to be consistent with the Enforcement Policy. Because it is a policy statement, the Commission may deviate from the Enforcement Policy and its implementing procedures, as appropriate, under the circumstances of a particular case. In such cases, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that agency decisions have a reasonable basis, and prohibits a decision that is arbitrary or capricious. The Enforcement Policy is revised periodically to reflect current Commission direction. Before deciding on a specific enforcement action for enforcement issues which were identified prior to the effective date of a policy revision, the staff will consider the guidance from both the previous version of the Policy and the revised version, and typically will apply the more lenient of the two policy versions.

The Manual applies to the enforcement activities of the Office of Enforcement (OE), the Regional Offices, the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), New Reactors (NRO),

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS), Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs (FSME), Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), International Programs (OIP), and all other special teams or task forces involved in enforcement activities. It also applies to the enforcement role of the Office of the General Counsel (OGC), with particular emphasis placed on the Associate General Counsel for Hearings, Enforcement, and Administration, and the Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement.

1

Abstract Most enforcement actions are initiated from the Regional Offices; therefore, this Manual has been structured to reflect that the Regional Offices, for the most part, initiate, recommend, or issue enforcement actions. However, all offices that conduct inspections and determine compliance should follow the guidance in this Manual.

Program offices, such as NRR, NMSS, or NSIR, that take the lead for an enforcement action, assume the responsibilities of both the Program Office and the Regional Office for that action.

In such cases, the Program Office should follow the guidance applicable to both the Program Office and the Regional Office.

The Manual is a living document and is maintained on the NRC Enforcement Web site. It can also be found on the NRCs public Web site, www.nrc.gov (Select Electronic Reading Room, then Document Collections, then click on Enforcement Docs under Related Information select Enforcement Guidance). Changes to the Manual are contained in Change Notices posted in the Change Notice Index on the Enforcement Web site. Enforcement Policy changes are also documented annually in the NRC Enforcement Program Annual Report.

Questions or comments about this manual should be sent to John R. Wray, Senior Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement at john.wray@nrc.gov.

2

Table of Contents Introduction and Overview The Enforcement Process ........................................................................................................................ I-2 Overview of the Enforcement Process..................................................................................................... I-2 Enforcement ............................................................................................................................................. I-3 The Enforcement Component of the Reactor Oversight Program ........................................................ I-4 Enforcement Actions Involving Individuals ........................................................................................... I-5 Statute of Limitations ............................................................................................................................... I-5

CHAPTER 3 NON-CITED VIOLATIONS AND NON-ESCALATED ACTIONS Chapter 3 provides information regarding:

• the preparation and processing of non-cited violations (NCVs) and various non-escalated enforcement actions

• the timeliness goals (included in the general discussion for each sanction) 3-1

Table of Contents 3.1 Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) ........................................................................................................ 3-4 3.1.1 NCVs for Power Reactor Licensees ............................................................................................... 3-4 3.1.2 Circumstances Resulting in Consideration of an NOV (vs. an NCV) for Power Reactor Licensees3-5 3.1.3 Circumstances Resulting in Consideration of an NOV (vs. an NCV) for All Other Licensees . 3-11 3.1.4 Issuing an NCV When Criteria in Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy are met for Issuing an NOV ............................................................................................................................................... 3-15 3.1.5 NCV Coordination and Review .................................................................................................... 3-16 3.1.6 NCV Signature Authority ............................................................................................................. 3-16 3.1.7 Licensee Denial of NCV ............................................................................................................... 3-17 3.2 Non-Escalated Notice of Violation (NOV) .................................................................................. 3-18 3.2.1 Preparing a Non-Escalated NOV Action ..................................................................................... 3-18 3.2.2 Issuing a Non-Escalated NOV Beyond the Criteria in Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy3-21 3.2.3 Non-Escalated NOV Coordination and Review........................................................................... 3-21 3.2.4 Non-Escalated NOV Signature Authority ................................................................................... 3-23 3.2.5 Licensee Notification, Mailing, and Distribution for Non-Escalated NOVs .............................. 3-23 3.2.6 Licensee Response to a Non-Escalated NOV .............................................................................. 3-24 3.3 Notice of Deviation (NOD) .......................................................................................................... 3-26 3.3.1 Preparing an NOD Action ............................................................................................................ 3-26 3.3.2 Licensee Notification, Mailing, and Distribution for NODs ....................................................... 3-27 3.4 Notice of Nonconformance (NON) ............................................................................................. 3-27 3.4.1 Preparing a NON Action .............................................................................................................. 3-28 3.4.2 Notification, Mailing, and Distribution of NONs ........................................................................ 3-29 3.5 Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) .............................................................................................. 3-29 3.5.1 Noncompliance with CALs ........................................................................................................... 3-31 3.5.2 Preparing a CAL ........................................................................................................................... 3-32 3.5.3 CAL Coordination and Review..................................................................................................... 3-33 3.5.4 CAL Signature Authority ............................................................................................................. 3-34 3.5.5 Licensee Notification, Mailing, and Distribution for CALs ........................................................ 3-34 3.5.6 CAL Tracking Responsibilities..................................................................................................... 3-35 3.5.7 Closing Out CALs ......................................................................................................................... 3-35 3.5.8 Press Releases for CALs ............................................................................................................... 3-36 3-2

Non-Cited Violations and Non-Escalated Actions Chapter 3 b). When the examples of a particular nonconformance are numerous, sufficient examples should be cited to convey the scope of the nonconformance and to provide a basis for assessing the effectiveness of the corrective actions.

Normally three to five examples is adequate.

5. A request for the vendor or certificate holder to provide a response which includes a description of the actions taken or planned to correct the nonconformances, the actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence, and the date when the corrective actions were or will be completed.

D. Cover letters that transmit inspection reports and NONs should be prepared using the appropriate form in Appendix B.

3.4.2 Notification, Mailing, and Distribution of NONs Vendors or certificate holders are normally sent NONs at the time an inspection report is issued.

NONs are made available to the Public in accordance with agency procedures.

3.5 Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)

A. Confirmatory Action Letters (CALs) are letters issued to licensees or vendors to emphasize and confirm a licensee's or vendor's agreement to take certain actions in response to specific issues. The NRC expects licensees and vendors to adhere to any obligations and commitments addressed in a CAL.

B. CALs should only be issued when there is a sound technical and/or regulatory basis for the desired actions discussed in the CAL.

1. CALs must meet the threshold defined in the Enforcement Policy, i.e., "to remove significant concerns about health and safety, safeguards, or the environment."

NOTE:

The level of significance of the issues addressed in a CAL should be such that if a licensee did not agree to meet the commitments in the CAL, the staff would likely proceed to issue an order.

2. CALs should be limited to those cases where the issues involved clearly meet the threshold described in the preceding paragraph.

C. Even though a CAL by definition confirms an agreement by the licensee to take some described action, it may, at times, require some negotiation with the licensee prior to issuance.

1. The licensee must agree to take the action.

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2. Once a CAL is agreed upon, the licensee is expected to take the documented actions and meet the conditions of the CAL.

D. A CAL may be issued when a materials licensee is violating a particular license condition, but the license condition prescribes neither the action nor the timeliness for restoring compliance as would be prescribed by a reactor licensee's technical specification action statement.

1. A CAL would be useful in this type of situation to confirm compensatory actions which, if implemented, would ensure safety such that an immediate suspension of licensed activities might not be necessary.

2. The use of a CAL in this situation is generally reserved for materials licensees.

3. A NOED would be the appropriate tool for reactor licensees and gaseous diffusion plants if the issue is addressed by a license or certificate condition.

NOTE:

CALs are flexible and valuable tools available to the staff to resolve licensee issues in a timely and efficient manner, e.g., when an order is warranted to address a specific issue, a CAL is a suitable instrument to confirm initial, agreed upon, short-term actions covering the interval period prior to the actual issuance of the order.

E. CALs may be issued to confirm the following types of actions (note that this is not an exhaustive list):

• In-house or independent comprehensive program audit of licensed activities

• Correction of training deficiencies, e.g., radiological safety, etc.

• Procedural improvements

• Equipment maintenance

• Equipment operation and safety verification

• Voluntary, temporary suspension of licensed activities

• Licensees agreement to NRC approval prior to resumption of licensed activities

• Root cause failure analyses

• Improved control and security of licensed material F. On occasion, licensees elect to submit letters to the NRC addressing actions that they intend to take in reaction to safety issues.

1. Depending on the significance of the issues involved, the staff may elect to issue a brief CAL accepting the licensees letter and commitments; however, this practice should not be routine.

2. CALs should be limited to those cases where the issues involved clearly meet the threshold for issuing a CAL discussed above.

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Non-Cited Violations and Non-Escalated Actions Chapter 3 G. CALs may be used to confirm that a licensee will adhere to existing provisions.

1. CALs should not be used to remove an individual from, or restrict his or her ability to perform, licensed activities. Such action normally requires an order, not only to ensure enforceability, but because individual rights are affected and the opportunity for a hearing must be given both to the licensee and the affected individual.

NOTE:

The issuance of an order, in lieu of a CAL, should be considered whenever there is a need to ensure that a legally binding requirement is in place. Orders must be coordinated between the regional office, the appropriate program office, OGC, and OE.

2. Orders should be issued instead of CALs in the following situations:

a). When it is apparent that the licensee will not agree to take certain actions that the staff believes are necessary to protect public health and safety and the common defense and security; b). When there is an integrity issue; c). When there is some likelihood that a licensee may not comply with a CAL commitment; or d). When the staff has concluded that the CAL will not achieve the desired outcome.

3.5.1 Noncompliance with CALs A. CALS do not establish legally binding commitments with the exception of the reporting provisions contained in Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended (AEA) and its implementing regulations which require a licensee to notify the NRC when:

1. The licensees understanding of its commitments differs from what is stated in a CAL;

2. The licensee cannot meet the corrective actions schedule; and

3. The licensees corrective actions are completed.

B. Failure to provide the reports required by Section 182 of the AEA may be treated like any other violation of a legally binding requirement.

C. Failure to meet a commitment in a CAL can be addressed through; 3-31

Non-Cited Violations and Non-Escalated Actions Chapter 3

1. An NOD;

2. An order where the commitments in a CAL would be made NRC requirements; and

3. A Demand For Information (DFI) where the licensee's performance, as demonstrated by the failure to meet CAL commitments, does not provide reasonable assurance that the NRC can rely on the licensee to meet the NRC's requirements and protect public health and safety or the common defense and security.

D. Issuance of a CAL does not preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action for violations of regulatory requirements that may have prompted the issuance of the CAL.

Such enforcement action is intended to:

1. Emphasize safe operation in compliance with regulatory requirements; and

2. Clarify that the CAL process is not a routine substitute for compliance.

E. The NRC would not normally take additional enforcement action for those violations that continue after a CAL has been issued where compensatory actions have been accepted by the NRC and taken by the licensee in accordance with its commitments.

3.5.2 Preparing a CAL A. CALs should be prepared using the appropriate form in Appendix B and should include the following elements:

1. A brief discussion of the specific issues with which the NRC has concern, including how and when they were identified.

2. A brief statement summarizing NRC/licensee communication on the agreed-upon actions.

a). The statement should include when the communication took place, the names and positions of the principal individuals involved in the communication, and whether the communication took place in a telephone conversation or a face-to-face meeting.

b). Face-to-face meetings should also include the location of the meeting (i.e.,

regional office, licensee's facility).

3. A clear description of the agreed-upon actions and where warranted and appropriate, the date(s) when actions will be completed.

4. A statement that requires the licensee to provide written notification to the NRC if its understanding of the relevant issues and commitments differ from what is stated in the CAL.

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5. A statement that requires the licensee to provide written notification to the NRC if for any reason it cannot complete the actions within the specified schedule. It should also require that the licensee inform the NRC of the modified schedule.

6. A statement that requires the licensee to provide written notification to the NRC if it intends to change, deviate from, or not complete any of the documented commitments, prior to the change or deviation.

7. A statement that requires the licensee to provide the NRC with written confirmation of completed actions.

8. A statement that issuance of the CAL does not preclude issuance of an order formalizing the commitments in the CAL or requiring other actions nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action for violations of NRC requirements that may have prompted the issuance of the CAL.

9. A statement that failure to meet the commitments in a CAL may result in an order if the licensees performance, as demonstrated by the failure to meet CAL commitments, does not provide reasonable assurance that the NRC can rely on the licensee to meet the NRCs requirements and protect public health and safety or the common defense and security.

10. A statement that the letter and any licensee response will be made available to the Public.

11. Citation of the regulation implementing Section 182 of the AEA and authorizing the required responses to the CAL by the licensee.

3.5.3 CAL Coordination and Review A. CALs should be coordinated and reviewed according to the following guidelines:

1. CALs issued by the region must be coordinated with the appropriate program office by telephone prior to issuance.

a). Unless NMSS requests, CALs issued to materials licensees do not require NMSS concurrence.

b). CALs issued to reactor licensees must be concurred on by the Director, NRR.

c). Because NSIR is responsible for coordinating security assessment activities across the spectrum of NRC licensees, CALs issued to NRC licensees which include security-related provisions, must be concurred on by the Director, NSIR.

2. Regional Enforcement Coordinators should be consulted before the region issues a CAL.

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