ML19329C325

Applicants' Argument Supporting Its Proposal for Expediting Antitrust Hearing Process.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19329C325
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse, Perry
Issue date:	04/21/1975
From:	Reynolds W CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE, TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8002130690
Download: ML19329C325 (19)

Text

. April 21, 1975 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i In the Matter of )

)

T9E TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and )

idE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING )

COMPANY )

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, ) Docket Nos. 50-1460 Unit 1)

) 50-440A

) 50-441A THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING )

COMPANY, ET AL., )

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

APPLICANTS' ARGUMENT IN SUf? ORT OF ITS PROPOSAL FOR EXPEDITING THE ANTITRUST HEARING PROCESS

1. The City of Cleveland (" City"), by_ memorandum dated March 21, 1975, and the Department of Justice (" Depart-ment") and Nuclea: Regulatory Commission Staff ("NRC S' 'f" ) ,

by separate memoranda dated April 7, 1975, have taken excep-tion to Applicants' proposal for an early hearing on the nexus issue to be resolved in the present proceeding. Essentially, opposition to the procedure recommended by Applicants is based on the arguments that Applicants' suggestion is without clear precedent, that it deprives the claimants of an opportunity to introduce evidence on the anticompetitive " situation" which has been said to exist, and that it is really a subterfuge to obtain a premature hearing on the question of appropriate 1

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__ i remedies. None of these contentions, however, provides a legitimate basis for deferring any longer the necessary resolution of the nexus issue.

2. In formulating this proposal for expediting the present antitrust hearing, Applicants are fully cogni-zant of the fact that the approach they have suggested is a novel one. Even so, the Commission's pronouncements in other similar-type proceedings provide ample support for dealing here with the nexus issue in the manner articulated.

It was stated in Waterford,l/ for example, that * ** "if it becomes apparent at any point that no meaningful nexus can be shown, all or part of the proceeding should be summarily disposed of" (RAI-73-9 at p. 621; emphasis added). This statement clearly anticipates a procedure whereby the nexus issue can be isolated and heard prior to a full-blown evi-dentiary hearing on the allegations of anticompetitive conduct.

3 Indeed, such a procedure is contemplated by the NRC's statutory grant of authority to conduct antitrust review in connE7 tion with pending applications for nuclear facilities.

Under Section 105c of the Atomic Energy Act, the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction in this area is confined to an 1/ See In the Matter of Louisiana Power & Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Generating Station, Unit 3),

Docket No. 50-328A, Memorandum and Order of September 28, 1973, CLI-73-25, RAI-73-9-619 (referred to herein as "Waterford").

examination into whether "ac ~sities under" the particular nuclear licenses being sought "would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws * * *"

(42 U.S.C. 2135c (5)). As the legislative history makes clear:

• *

• antitrust review would con-sider the contractual arrangements and other factors governing how the proposed clant would be owned and its outout used. *** No oroader scope of review is contemolated.

• *

• We do not consider such a licensing proceeding as an appro-

- priate forum for wideranging scrutiny of general industry affairs essen-tially unconnected under review.

with the plangj

[ Emphasis added.]-

4. It is, therefore, perfectly appropriate, and, indeed, procedurally desirable, for the Licensing Board, in discharging its antitrust review responsibility, to ascertain at an early stage in the hearing process whether the matters in controversy come within the jurisdictional parameters of its legislative grant. In this regard, the fundamental issue is whether there exists a " meaningful nexus" between the alleged anticompetitive situation, on the one hand, and the activities under the designated nuclear license, on the other hand. Waterford, February 23, 1973, RAI-73-2, at p. 49 If this question deserves a negative response, the various 2/ Hearings on Prelicensing Antitrust Review of Nuclear

. Power Plants Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

(" Hearings"),-91st Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, at p. 366 (1969-1970).

See also Hearings, Pt. 1, at pp. 97, 144, 145 and 238; Pt. 2 at 365-366, 532 and 625 t

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allegat.'ons of misconduct set forth in the Department's advice' letter and in the petitions to intervene are not en-titled to scrutiny in this forum. See Section 2.714(b) of the Commission's Restructured Rules of Practice. That is not to say that the complaining parties cannot fully air their grievances in a federal court. It is simply to affirm ,

a general principle applicable to this as well as other govern-ment agencies having limited antitrust jurisdiction, which

'is that the administrative hearing on allegations of anti-competitive behavior is dependent in each case upon first

satisfying "the requirement of a reasonable nexus between the l activities challenged and the activities furthered by the application [pending before the particular agency]." City of Lafayette, Louisiana v Securities Exchange Commission, 454 F.2d 941, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971), affirmed, Gulf States Utilities Co. v Federal Power Commission, 411 U.S. 747 (1973);

and see Northerr. California Power Agency v Federal Power Com-mission, D.C. Cir.. No. 73-1765, decided March 6, 1975 5 In ordel for the Board to examine fully whether that nexus requirement has been met in the present proceeding, Applicants have agreed -- for purposes of resolving the juris-dictional question only -- to assume'arguendo the existence of.an.anticompetitive situation in the relevant geographic and product markets which is equivalent to the " situation" that 0

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would have been established at an evidentiary hearing if the opposing parties had been able to prove the affirmative of each of the first ten matters-in-controversy specified in the Board's Prehearing Conference Order Nc. 2. This approach is similar to the one adopted in Waterford, supra, where the Board was able to avoid an extended evidentiary hearing on th" allegations of anticompetitive behavior, and could move directly to the remedy phase of the hearing, be-cause the Waterford applicant agreed to assume arguendo both the existence of a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws and a nexus between that situation and activities under the nuclear facility in question.

6. The Department (p. 5) and the NRC Staff (pp. 3-4) argue that the procedure followed in Waterford is so rigid that it provides no support for Applicants' proposal in the present proceeding. Such a reading of the Commission's Water-ford discussion on this poinc is myopic. The assumption arguendo proposal adopted in that proceeding was explicitly described as but one " example" of an appropriate procedure to "substantially reduce the time and scope of the hearing" (RAI-73-9, at p. 622). And in that context, the Commission there declared that parties to an antitrust proceeding,"should be alert to any initiatives which could efficiently advance the. proceeding to a proper and satisfactory conclusion" (ibid; emphasis added).

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7. Applicants' present proposal responds to that directive. The " initiative" here differs from the one uti-lized in Waterford only in that the assumptions arguendo of these Applicants are limited to the anticompetitive sit-uation, leaving in dispute the jurisdictional question of nexus. But conceptually this distinction is of no import.

The effort here, unlike Waterford, is not to jump directly to the remedy phase of the hearing. To the contrary, Appli-cants' argument is that the Board is without jurisdiction to consider remedies at all in this proceeding. The assump-tions arguendo are directed to isolating that jurisdictional issue, and that jurisdictional issue alone. It is the pre-cise procedure which was suggested by this Board's earlier order of July 25, 1974 (p. 6).

8. Admittedly, by adopting this procedure, the Board will deny the City, the Department and the NRC Staff an opportunity to present evidentiary material 1:t support of their claims of anticompetitive conduct. This, however, is no cause for objection: Applicants' assumptions arguendo accept as proved for present purposes the very issues which the complaining parties urged upon the Board. In essence, Applicants have stated that they are willing to assume arguendo the best case that the opposing. parties could have proved with regard to the existence of a " situation inconsistent

with the antitrust laws." And, if, as the Department argues (p. 6), it can indeed be said that " Applicants' assumptions arguendo, standing alone, are insufficient to establish a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws," then there is all the more reason to eliminate now the empty exercise of lengthy fact presentations which concededly are going to fall short of establishing an anticompetitive situation.

9 It is equally important to keep in mind that, under Applicants' proposal, the claimants are deprived of an opportunity to make their detailed factual presentation enly if the Board determines that it lacks jurisdiction to scrutinize the allegations made. And, of course, that is 1 as it should be! To suggest, as do the Department (p. 7) and the NRC Staff (pp. 4-5), that a meaningful consideration

.of the jurisdictional question can only follow a full evi-dentiary hearing on the alleged anticcmpetitive " situation",

flies in the face of the Commission's own mandate -- i.e.,

that the matter of nexus can properly be considered "at any point" in the antitrust review process. See Waterford, suora, RAI 73-9, at' p. 621. Moreover, such a suggestion undermines the basic nexus concept, since it would have the Board under-take a lengthy inquiry into the very matters which might-well fall outside the limited scoce of its antitrust juris-

. diction. The most judicious way to proceed, therefore, is to examine nexus first.

I d-o

10. If the Board should decide that nexus does exist, Applicants' submission contemplates a full-blown contested hearing on the assertions of anticompetitive conduct. There is no legitimate cause for concern in this regard that Applicants will withdraw their assumptions ar-guendo in the event of an adverse ruling on the nexus ques-tion. It is generally accepted practice both in adminis-trative and judicial proceedings that a litigant who accepts the pleadings against him as true for purposes of attacking jurisdiction can, if he loses, contest those same pleadings when the case is heard on the merits. Applicants' proposal simply follows this procedure.

11. The issue then is squarely posed: will the activities under the requested Davis-Besse and Perry li-censes create or maintain the anticompetitive situation which Applicants have assumed arguendo to exist. Those activities include, by virtue of Applicants' proposed license conditions,1/

affording to requesting entities access to nuclear power from these facilities, together with sufficient transmission ,

and back-up services to make access meaningful, and an op-portunity to wheel-in equivalent amounts of power from al-ternate sources when the nuclear plan *s ase down for emergency or maintenance reasons.

3/ See Exhibit A to Applicants' Proposal For Expediting The Antitrust Hearing Process, dated March 14, 1975

12. The Department (p. 4) and the NRC Staff (p. 8) strenuously object to the fact that Applicants have " uni-laterally" agreed that their present nuclear licenses shall be so conditioned. It is, however, not at all uncommon, in connection with the separate NRC environmental and safety hearings, for example, for an applicant itself to condition its license application in some fashion. The underlying purpose for taking such a step here is not the remedial one suggested by the other parties; instead, the proposed con-ditions are intended to provide meaningful definition to the phrase " activities under the license." By the terms thereof, Applicants are now unequivocally committed to pro-viding requesting entities the opportunity for access to these nuclear units, together with back-up services.S/

13 The fact that the Department (p. 6) and the NRC Staff (pp. 7-8) may find these license conditions "un-acceptable" is, in the present context, of little consequence.

The proposed conditions continue to describe activities under these nuclear licenses, with or without the approval of the ,

other parties. Whether or not the conditions might also be 4/ The Department seems to suggest that the Applicants' offer of access is somehow defective because it contemplates

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that access will be granted upon " mutually agreed-upon" terms (p. 9). This formulation, however, is similar to language used in conditions imposed upon nuclear licenses for other plants -- conditions which the Department has itself proposed as being acceptable. Indeed, Applicants are aware of no license conditions which take the alternative approach of providing that access shall be upon terms dictated solely by either the Applicant or the requesting entity.

sufficient to " remedy" some anticompetitive situation (if the existence of one is ever proved), is, of course, a different sort of inquiry. In that separate context, the acceptance by the Department and the NRC Staff of Applicants' proposed license conditions may well have relevance. But, t' hat is not now a matter before this Board -- the question of adequate remedies is off in the future (if at all). The issue here is not whether the " activities under the nuclear license" will remedy an anticompetitive situation; rather, it is whether those licensed activities will create or main-tain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. If the answer to the latter question is negative, the former inquiry regarding remedies is eliminated altogether for this Board.

14. While the Department (p. 4) and the NRC Staff i (p. 7) insist that the jurisdictional inquiry must proceed on the basis that the license to be issued will be without conditions, this assertion is groundless. Indeed, in its initial Waterford decision (RAI-73-2, at p. 49), the Commission examined the nexus question at the pleading stage of the pro-ceeding with specific reference to the conditions then pro-posed for the nuclear license. And, more recently in In the Matter of Kansas Gas & Electric Comcany and Kansas City Power and-Light Comoany (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1),

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DocketRNo. 50-482A, the entire nexus discussion was in terms of a nuclear license which contained conditions, not in terms of one subject to " unconditioned issuance" (Depart-ment Ans., p. 4).

15 Similarly here, in order to obtain a meaning-ful hearing on nexus, the license conditions must be taken into account by the Board as the true measure of the "ac-C/

tivities under the nuclear license."' It is within this framework that Applicants are now advancing their jurisdic-

[ tional argument. The position, simply stated, is that the S/ The Department makes the surprising statement "that license conditions cannot be framed at all until the detailed nature, scope and anticompetitive effect of a situation in-i consistent have been determined" (p. 8). Yet, time and again we have seen the Department negotiate, frane and accept very specific license conditions well before tne Department, or anyone else, has had an opportunity to focus on the " detailed nature, scope and anticompetitive effect of a situation in-consistent." These conditions have then served as the prin-cipal predicate for a recommendation in the Department's advice letter against having an antitrust hearing in connec-tion with an application for a nuclear license.

Moreover, it should again be pointed out that the license conditions proposed by Applicants in this proceeding

.are not designed to be remedial in nature. Contrary to what the City, the Department and the NRC Staff are arguing, these license conditions have not been framed in response to, or as a cure for, some particular anticompetitive " situation".

It is, of course, Applicants' firm belief -- notwithstanding

' the assumptions arguendo -- that no such " situation" actually exists. What Applicants' proposed license conditions do 1s, as: stated above, help to define the " activities under the license" to be issued for Davis-Besse 1 and for Perry 1 and 2.

Clearly, license' conditions serving this purpose can be framed at any time,.without regard to the nature and scope of some alleged anticompetitive " situation". Whether or not additional license conditions might also be warranted later on for re-

. medial purposes is a consideration which this Board can properly address.only4 1f it is first determined that the licensed ac-i tivities under the existing conditions will create or maintain

.a situation. inconsistent with the antitrust laws -- that is, only if a " meaningful nexus" is first found to exist.

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.. -_. . . - . - - . - -.. - =-. - .- _ . . . - . . . _ . . . . . _

" activities under" these nuclear licenses, as conditioned, l will neither. create an anticompetitive situation nor contri-bute in any respect to the maintenance of that " situation" which has been identified by the Board's first ten matters-

in-controversy -- as to which the assumptions arguendo apply.

In sum, the construction and operation of these nuclear units in accordance with the terms specified in Applicants'

. proposed license conditions bears no relationship whatsoever to the claimed antitrust violations, even assuming arguendo

that they are accurate. There thus exists no meaningful

nexus on which to predicate jurisdiction for purposes of pursuing in this forum an inquiry into the allegations of anticompetitive behavior.

16. The City, the Department and the NRC Staff re-spond to this jurisdictional argument by essentially side-

! stepping the real issue. They assert that the absence of an offer by Applicants in their proposed license conditions to furnish to requesting entities third-party wheeling services provides the necessary nexus to the existing anticompetitive .

situation (as assumed arguendo). But the wheeling across l Applicants' transmission lines of power generated from other sources'is not an " activity under,the. nuclear license."

Whether Applicants agree or refuse to wheel has nothing what-soever'to do with the operation of the Davis-Besse and Perry f

plants.. It relates, instead, solely to remote sources of

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, power not generated by Applicants and to the use of Appli-i cants' 3xisting transmission facilities for purposes of transferring that power to some designated drop-off point.

The fact that Applicants might refuse to wheel $s perhaps an. element of the alleged anticompetitive situation. But there is no meaningful relationship between that refusal and the reccgnised activities under the nuclear licenses.k/

17. In essence, the claimants' argument with respect to third-party wheeling goes, once again, to the

remedy question, not the threshold question of jurisdiction.

The contention is that the Board should impose on Applicants a third-party wheeling requirement, not because it is a  ;

legitimate " activity under the nuclear license", but because it will purportedly provide a means of remedying the alleged anticompetitive situation._ In essence, the City, the De-partment and the NRC Staff seek to make Applicants' trans-mission lines common carriers of electric energy. This is, of course, directly contrary to the legislative intent under-lying Section 105c of the Atomic Energy Act. The congres- ,

sional concern-with regard to nuclear plants was confined to the question of " access" to nuclear power. As pointed 6/ As the Commission observed in Waterford, consideration of denials of access to transmission systems " link [ing]

non-nuclear facilities and [which] had been constructed long

, before application for an [NRC] license" (RAI-73-9, at p. 621),

l has little' relevance to the nuclear plant or to any activities under the nuclear license.

e 4

out in Waterford, "the requirement in Section 105 for pre-licensing review reflects a basic congressional concern over access to power produced by nuclear facilities" (RAI-73-9, at p. 620). Indeed, the Department itself eschewed 7 any broader interpretation of the " remedies" contemplated ,

1 under the Act. As the then Assistant Attorney General, [

l Antitrust Division, stated at the hearings:

We think that for some time to come the " access" issue will be predominant: In what circumstance '

and to what extent is the appli-cant for a Commission license obliged to raake available to other electric utilities an opportunity to participate in the economic advantages of scale made possible by the nuclear unit? [ Hearings, Pt. 1, at p. 145.]

18. Thus, any discussion with regard to third-party wheeling as an appropriate remedy to impose in proceedings of this sort overreaches the permissible bounds of adminis-trative antitrust authority. It is, moreover, clearly pre-mature for this Board to give any consideration to the remedy question at this stage of the hearing. Even more to the point for present purposes, however, is the fact that ref-erences to Applicants'_ refusals to wheel power do not shed any meaningful light on the jurisdictional question. To resolve the nexus issue, this Board's inquiry is confined solely to whether " activities under the nuclear license would l

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1 s create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws" (42 U.S.C. 52135c (5)). And, not even the City, the Department and the NRC Staff have gone so far as to suggest that there are any such activities associated with the construction and operation of Davis-Besse Unit 1 and Perry Units 1 and 2 which would relate in any respect to Applicants' refusal to wheel power generated from out-side sources.1I 19 For the foregoing reasons, Applicants submit that their motion to proceed directly to a hearing on the nexus question in accordance with their proposal'for expe-diting the hearing process should be granted. The fact that this request is not submitted under Section.2.749 of the Commission's Rules of Practice provides no basis to reject it. As the Commission declared in Waterford, supra, RAI-73-9, at p. 621, the-nexus question can be isolated for separate consideration "at any point" in the antitrust hearing process 7/ The NRC Staff does state that it views the phrase

" activities under the license" to embrace, among other things, "the integration of such.a facility into an effective bulk power supply system" (p. 7). To the extent that this is the Staff's_ view, it is clearly-in direct conflict with the under-standing which Congress had of the phrase " activities under the license." Moreover, it is worth noting that heretofore

-the NRC Staff has never suggested in connection with the en-vironmental and safety reviews of nuclear plant applications that it views as an activity under the nuclear license "the integration of such a facility into an effective bulk power supply system." Indeec, its participation to date in NRC

! . proceedings involving' permit applications to construct and operate nuclear plants suggests just the opposite viewpoint.

either by utilising the provisions of 10 C.F.R. 2.749 "or 3

bl any other approoriate means" (emphasis added). Appli-cants have followed the latter course. While the Department seems to infer the jurisdictional issue presented here has

already been disposed of by the Board's ruling on Appli-cants' motion for summary judgment against AMP-Ohio, any

such inference is incorrect. Consideration of the AMP-Ohio

-summary judgment motion was held in abeyance pending com-pletion of discovery. Document discovery is now virtually 6 completed and, in light of Applicants' assumptions arguendo, it is believed that the nexus issue is ripe for resolution.

Applicants urge that consideration of this important matter I

not be deferred any longer.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE By: t ,_ 1 0 m. _ot _

Wm. Bradford Reynolds (

Gerald Charnoff Counsel for Applicants l

Dated: April 21, 1975

I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and )

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING )

COMPANY )

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, ) Docket Nos. 50-346A Unit 1) ) 50-440A

) 50-441A THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING )

COMPANY, ET AL., )

(Perry Nuc1 car Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing

" Applicants' Argument In Support Of Its Proposal For Expe-diting The Antitrust Hearing Process" were served upon those persons listed on the attached Service List, by hand delivering the same to those persons located in the Wash-ington, D. C. area and by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to all others, on this 21st day of April, 1975 SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE g

By: d D db_Q A %Cd-.

Wm. Bradforc\Reynolds \

Counsel for Applicants Dated: April 21, 1975

. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Defore the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of ) .

)

THE TOLEDO EDISCH COMPANY and )

• THS CLEVELAUD ELECTRIC ) -

ILLUMINATIUG COL *PAHY )

. ) .

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power ,) Docket Nos. 50-346A Station, Unit 1) ) 50-440A

) 50-441A

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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC )

ILLUMidATING COMPANY, ET AL. )

) -

(Perry Nuclear Pcuer Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) ~

)- . .

SERVICE LIST - . .

Douglas V. Rigler, Esq. Mr. Chase R. Stephens Chairman, Atomic Safety and Docketing & Service Section Licensing Board U.S'. Nuclear Res;ulatory Commissi6n Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh 1717 H Street, N.W.

and Jacobs Washington, D. C. 20006 Schanin Building ~

815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.

Washingt on, ' D. C. 20006 '

' Office of General Counsol Regulation John H. Brebbia, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa hinGton, D. C. 20555 Alston, Miller & Gaines 20006 Robert J. Verdisco, Esq.

s irg n C Office of General Counsel y - -

Regulation A ic Sa t- nd ensing

-U.S. Nuclear Reg:ulatory Cemmission Board Panel Washington, D. ~C . 2055_a U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 P s'A h, %

.. Office of General Counsel i Regulation

. Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissf.cn Board Panel Washington, D. C. 20555 U.S. Nuclcar Regulatory Commission ,

Washington, D. C. 20555 e

e

Joseph J. Saunders, Esq. Leslic IIcnry, Eng.

Steven M. Charno, Esq. Fuller, Henry,llodge & Snyder

. . Antitruct D1 vision 300 Madison Avenue -

Department of Juntice Toledo, Ohio 43604 Washington, D. C. 20530

. Thomas A. Kayuha, Esq.

Melvin G. Berger, Esq. Ohio Edison Company Antitruct Division 47 North Main Street

• Department of Juctico - Akron, Ohio 44308

. Washington, D. C. 20530 '

Thomac J. Munsch, Esq.

Reuben Goldberg, Esq. General Attorney

_ David C. Hj elmfelt, Esq. Duquesne Light Company 1700 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 435 Sixth Avenue

'1ashington, D. C. 20006 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Frank R. Clokey, Esq. Lavid Olds, Esq.

Special Assistant Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay '

Attorney General Union Trust Building Room 219 Box 2009 Towne House Apartments Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105 ,

John Lansdale, Esq.

Mr. Raymond Kudukia. Cox, Langford & Brown

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Director of Utilities 21 Dupont Circle, N.W.

City of Cleveland Washington, D. C. 20036 1201-Lakeside Avenue ,

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 .Wallace L. Duncan, Esq.

Jon T. Brown, Esq.

Herbert R. Whiting, Director Duncan, Broun a Palmcr

. Robert D. Hart, Eng. '1700 Pennsylvania Ave., N.U.

Department of Law Washington, D. C. 20006 1201 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 4411'4 Edward-A. Matto, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General John C. Engle, President Chief, Antitrust Section AMP-0, Inc. 30 East Broad Street, 15th Floor Mu'aicipal BuildinC Columbus, Ohio 43215 20 High Strcot - --

Hamilton, Ohio 45.012 Richard M. Firestone, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General Donald H. Hauser, Esq. Antitrust Section Corporate Solicitor ' 30 E. Broad Street, 15th Floor

'The Cleveland Electric Columbus, Ohio 43215 Illuminating Company ..

55 Public Square -

Deborah P. Highsmith, Esq.

Cleveland,.Chio 44101 Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Section 30 East Broad Street, 15th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215 Christopher R. Schraff, Esq.

. , Ascistant / torney General Environmer .1 Law Section 361 East Broad Street, 3th Floor Columbus; aio 43215