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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | ||
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS | |||
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 13, 2001 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-11: THEFTS OF PORTABLE GAUGES | |||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
:All portable gauge licensees. | : | ||
All portable gauge licensees. | |||
==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
:The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to | : | ||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform | |||
responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauges. | addresses of recent incidents of thefts of portable gauges, and to remind licensees of their | ||
responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauges. It is expected that recipients | |||
will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as | will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as | ||
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. | appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new | ||
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. | NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. | ||
==Description of Circumstances== | ==Description of Circumstances== | ||
:In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State | : | ||
In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State licensees | |||
reported a total 156 thefts of portable gauges. Fifty-one occurred in the States of Texas and | |||
Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas | Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas | ||
vulnerable to theft. | vulnerable to theft. Only 40 percent of gauges reported stolen were reported as having been | ||
recovered. Two of the 156 events involved attempts to sell the stolen gauges. In both of these | |||
cases the gauge was returned to the owner. In another two events, gauges were found in | |||
scrap metal when radiation monitors alarmed. In one event, only the source rod was found. In | |||
the other case, the gauge was found intact. | |||
In 83 percent of the thefts from vehicles, the vehicles were parked at locations other than the | |||
licensees facilities or job sites. Of these cases, gauges were most frequently stolen from | |||
vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). | vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). In most of the cases involving the theft of | ||
gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were | gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were | ||
locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by.The following are examples of some typical cases. | locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by. | ||
The following are examples of some typical cases. | |||
Case 1: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen from the back of a company truck | |||
parked at overnight lodging in Brownsville, Texas. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) | |||
Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered | Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered | ||
the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the | the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the | ||
Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. | Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. The gauge case had been secured to the bed of the truck | ||
by chains. The security chains had been cut and the gauge and the operator's tool box stolen. | |||
A police report was promptly filed with the Brownsville Police Department. | |||
Case 2: A moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truck. The truck was located at | |||
the home of an employee of the licensee in Homestead, Florida. The gauge contained 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Americium-241 and 0.23 GBq (6.1 mCi) of Cesium-137. The licensee notified | |||
police and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control. The Homestead Police prepared a press | |||
the gauge | release and offered a reward for the return of the gauge. A private individual reported finding | ||
damaged. | the gauge four days later, on July 6, 1999. The licensee stated that the gauge was not | ||
damaged. It was determined that the employee did not follow procedures that require gauges | |||
be stored at the licensee's facility. | be stored at the licensee's facility. | ||
Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) | Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of | ||
Americium-241 and 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) of Cesium-137. The gauge was taken from the bed of a | |||
pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight | pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight | ||
and 0600 a.m. | and 0600 a.m. The gauge was stored in an approved transportation package and was secured | ||
to the vehicle by a chain. | to the vehicle by a chain. The chain was cut and both the gauge and case were taken. The | ||
licensee notified the police of the theft. | licensee notified the police of the theft. | ||
Case 4: | Case 4: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen when the pickup truck it was chained to | ||
was stolen from the home of an employee. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) | |||
Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in | Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in | ||
its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truck. | its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truck. The truck was stolen early | ||
on the morning of April 19, 2001. | on the morning of April 19, 2001. The theft was reported to the Tempe, Arizona, Police and a | ||
reward was offered. | reward was offered. | ||
Discussion | Discussion: | ||
Thefts involving portable gauges appear to be occurring most frequently when gauges are | |||
stored in vehicles parked in a non-work area. In addition to considering deterrents to thefts | |||
such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material | such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material | ||
should extend to ways to minimize the threat of theft. | should extend to ways to minimize the threat of theft. The requirements for control and security | ||
of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. | of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. Control and security | ||
requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of | requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of | ||
Transportation (DOT) regulations.The | Transportation (DOT) regulations. | ||
The NRCs analysis of five years of theft data for portable gauges indicates that a large number | |||
of gauges are stolen from trucks, even when they are secured with chains. To help reduce the | |||
number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1) | number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1) | ||
Line 110: | Line 144: | ||
areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge | areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge | ||
user training, to increase awareness of this problem.NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy ( | user training, to increase awareness of this problem. | ||
NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy (Federal | |||
Register Notice 79139, dated December 18, 2000, regarding improper disposal of sources). | |||
Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of | Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of | ||
moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,000. This IN notice requires no specific action or written response. | moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,000. This IN notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about | ||
appropriate regional office./RA/Donald A. | the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the | ||
appropriate regional office. | |||
/RA/ | |||
Donald A. Cool, Director | |||
Division of Industrial and | |||
Medical Nuclear Safety | Medical Nuclear Safety | ||
Office of Nuclear Material Safety | |||
and Safeguards | |||
2. | Attachments: | ||
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices | |||
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
===Technical Contact:=== | ===Technical Contact:=== | ||
# | ===Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS=== | ||
(301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.gov | |||
#ML011920238 TEMPLATE NO.: #NRC =052 DOCUMENT NAME:g:\pettijohn\in2001.wpd *See previous concurrence | |||
OFC MSIB-B* MSIB-B* Editor* MSIB-A* IMNS | |||
NAME SPettijohn FBrown EKraus JHickey DCool | |||
DATE 6/8/2001 6/19/2001 6/11/01 6/19/2001 7/10/2001 | |||
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | |||
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
_____________________________________________________________________________________ | |||
Information Date of | |||
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to | |||
_____________________________________________________________________________________ | |||
2001-08, Update on the Investigation of 06/06/01 All medical licensees. | |||
Supplement 1 Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy | |||
Overexposures | |||
2001-08 Treatment Planning System 06/01/01 All medical licensees. | |||
Errors Result in Deaths of | |||
Overseas Radiation Therapy | |||
Patients | |||
2001-03 Incident Reporting 04/06/01 All industrial radiography | |||
Requirements for Radiography licensees. | |||
Licensees | |||
2001-01 The Importance of Accurate 03/26/01 All material licensees. | |||
Inventory Controls to Prevent | |||
the Unauthorized Possession | the Unauthorized Possession | ||
of Radioactive | of Radioactive Material | ||
2000-22 Medical Misadministrations 12/18/00 All medical use licensees | |||
Caused by Human Errors authorized to conduct gamma | |||
Involving Gamma Stereotactic stereotactic radiosurgery | |||
Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE) treatments. | |||
Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE) | |||
2000-19 Implementation of Human Use 12/05/2000 All medical use licensees. | |||
Research Protocols Involving | |||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory | |||
Commission Regulated | Commission Regulated | ||
Materials | |||
2000-18 Substandard Material Supplied 11/29/2000 All 10 CFR Part 50 licensees and | |||
by Chicago Bullet Proof applicants. | |||
Systems All category 1 fuel facilities. | |||
All 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and | |||
applicants. | |||
2000-16 Potential Hazards Due to 10/5/2000 All licensees that process | |||
Volatilization of Radionuclides unsealed byproduct material. | |||
2000-15 Recent Events Resulting in 9/29/2000 All radiography licensees. | |||
Whole Body Exposures | |||
Exceeding Regulatory Limits | |||
Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | |||
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
_____________________________________________________________________________________ | |||
Information Date of | |||
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to | |||
operations and have certified that | ______________________________________________________________________________________ | ||
2001-10 Failure of Central Sprinkler 06/28/01 All holders of licenses for nuclear | |||
Company Model GB Series power, research, and test | |||
Fire Sprinkler Heads reactors and fuel cycle facilities | |||
2001-09 Main Feedwater System 06/12/01 All holders of operating licenses | |||
Degradation in Safety-Related for pressurized water nuclear | |||
ASME Code Class 2 Piping power reactors, except those who | |||
Inside the Containment of a have permanently ceased | |||
Pressurized Water Reactor operations and have certified that | |||
fuel has been permanently | fuel has been permanently | ||
removed from the reactor | removed from the reactor vessel | ||
2001-08 Update on the Investigation of 06/06/01 All Medical Licensees | |||
Supplement 1 Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy | |||
Overexposures | |||
subject to Section 73.56 of Title | 2001-08 Treatment Planning System 06/01/01 All medical licensees | ||
Errors Result in Deaths of | |||
Overseas Radiation Therapy | |||
Patients | |||
2001-07 Unescorted Access Granted 05/11/01 All holders of nuclear reactor | |||
Based on Incomplete and/or operating licenses who are | |||
Inaccurate Information subject to Section 73.56 of Title | |||
10, of the Code of Federal | 10, of the Code of Federal | ||
Regulations (10 CFR 73.56), | Regulations (10 CFR 73.56), | ||
Personnel Access Authorization | |||
Requirements of Nuclear Power | |||
Plants. | |||
2001-06 Centrifugal Charging Pump 05/11/01 All holders of operating licenses | |||
Thrust Bearing Damage not for nuclear power reactors, Detected Due to Inadequate except those who have | |||
Assessment of Oil Analysis permanently ceased operations | |||
Assessment of Oil Analysis | |||
Results and Selection of Pump and have certified that fuel has | |||
permanently | Surveillance Points been permanently removed from | ||
the reactor vessel | |||
______________________________________________________________________________________ | |||
OL = Operating License | |||
CP = Construction Permit}} | |||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Latest revision as of 05:46, 24 November 2019
ML011920238 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Issue date: | 07/13/2001 |
From: | Cool D NRC/NMSS/IMNS |
To: | |
Pettijohn S, NMSS/IMNS, 415-6822 | |
References | |
IN-01-011 | |
Download: ML011920238 (6) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 13, 2001 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-11: THEFTS OF PORTABLE GAUGES
Addressees
All portable gauge licensees.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform
addresses of recent incidents of thefts of portable gauges, and to remind licensees of their
responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauges. It is expected that recipients
will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State licensees
reported a total 156 thefts of portable gauges. Fifty-one occurred in the States of Texas and
Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas
vulnerable to theft. Only 40 percent of gauges reported stolen were reported as having been
recovered. Two of the 156 events involved attempts to sell the stolen gauges. In both of these
cases the gauge was returned to the owner. In another two events, gauges were found in
scrap metal when radiation monitors alarmed. In one event, only the source rod was found. In
the other case, the gauge was found intact.
In 83 percent of the thefts from vehicles, the vehicles were parked at locations other than the
licensees facilities or job sites. Of these cases, gauges were most frequently stolen from
vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). In most of the cases involving the theft of
gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were
locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by.
The following are examples of some typical cases.
Case 1: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen from the back of a company truck
parked at overnight lodging in Brownsville, Texas. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)
Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered
the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the
Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. The gauge case had been secured to the bed of the truck
by chains. The security chains had been cut and the gauge and the operator's tool box stolen.
A police report was promptly filed with the Brownsville Police Department.
Case 2: A moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truck. The truck was located at
the home of an employee of the licensee in Homestead, Florida. The gauge contained 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Americium-241 and 0.23 GBq (6.1 mCi) of Cesium-137. The licensee notified
police and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control. The Homestead Police prepared a press
release and offered a reward for the return of the gauge. A private individual reported finding
the gauge four days later, on July 6, 1999. The licensee stated that the gauge was not
damaged. It was determined that the employee did not follow procedures that require gauges
be stored at the licensee's facility.
Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of
Americium-241 and 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) of Cesium-137. The gauge was taken from the bed of a
pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight
and 0600 a.m. The gauge was stored in an approved transportation package and was secured
to the vehicle by a chain. The chain was cut and both the gauge and case were taken. The
licensee notified the police of the theft.
Case 4: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen when the pickup truck it was chained to
was stolen from the home of an employee. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)
Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in
its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truck. The truck was stolen early
on the morning of April 19, 2001. The theft was reported to the Tempe, Arizona, Police and a
reward was offered.
Discussion:
Thefts involving portable gauges appear to be occurring most frequently when gauges are
stored in vehicles parked in a non-work area. In addition to considering deterrents to thefts
such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material
should extend to ways to minimize the threat of theft. The requirements for control and security
of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. Control and security
requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations.
The NRCs analysis of five years of theft data for portable gauges indicates that a large number
of gauges are stolen from trucks, even when they are secured with chains. To help reduce the
number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1)
requiring gauges to be locked in covered vehicle compartments, (2) not parking vehicles in
areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge
user training, to increase awareness of this problem.
NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy (Federal
Register Notice 79139, dated December 18, 2000, regarding improper disposal of sources).
Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of
moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,000. This IN notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about
the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the
appropriate regional office.
/RA/
Donald A. Cool, Director
Division of Industrial and
Medical Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Technical Contact:
Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS
(301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.gov
- ML011920238 TEMPLATE NO.: #NRC =052 DOCUMENT NAME:g:\pettijohn\in2001.wpd *See previous concurrence
OFC MSIB-B* MSIB-B* Editor* MSIB-A* IMNS
NAME SPettijohn FBrown EKraus JHickey DCool
DATE 6/8/2001 6/19/2001 6/11/01 6/19/2001 7/10/2001
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2001-08, Update on the Investigation of 06/06/01 All medical licensees.
Supplement 1 Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy
2001-08 Treatment Planning System 06/01/01 All medical licensees.
Errors Result in Deaths of
Overseas Radiation Therapy
Patients
2001-03 Incident Reporting 04/06/01 All industrial radiography
Requirements for Radiography licensees.
Licensees
2001-01 The Importance of Accurate 03/26/01 All material licensees.
Inventory Controls to Prevent
the Unauthorized Possession
of Radioactive Material
2000-22 Medical Misadministrations 12/18/00 All medical use licensees
Caused by Human Errors authorized to conduct gamma
Involving Gamma Stereotactic stereotactic radiosurgery
Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE) treatments.
2000-19 Implementation of Human Use 12/05/2000 All medical use licensees.
Research Protocols Involving
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Regulated
Materials
2000-18 Substandard Material Supplied 11/29/2000 All 10 CFR Part 50 licensees and
by Chicago Bullet Proof applicants.
Systems All category 1 fuel facilities.
All 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and
applicants.
2000-16 Potential Hazards Due to 10/5/2000 All licensees that process
Volatilization of Radionuclides unsealed byproduct material.
2000-15 Recent Events Resulting in 9/29/2000 All radiography licensees.
Whole Body Exposures
Exceeding Regulatory Limits
Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
______________________________________________________________________________________
2001-10 Failure of Central Sprinkler 06/28/01 All holders of licenses for nuclear
Company Model GB Series power, research, and test
Fire Sprinkler Heads reactors and fuel cycle facilities
2001-09 Main Feedwater System 06/12/01 All holders of operating licenses
Degradation in Safety-Related for pressurized water nuclear
ASME Code Class 2 Piping power reactors, except those who
Inside the Containment of a have permanently ceased
Pressurized Water Reactor operations and have certified that
fuel has been permanently
removed from the reactor vessel
2001-08 Update on the Investigation of 06/06/01 All Medical Licensees
Supplement 1 Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy
2001-08 Treatment Planning System 06/01/01 All medical licensees
Errors Result in Deaths of
Overseas Radiation Therapy
Patients
2001-07 Unescorted Access Granted 05/11/01 All holders of nuclear reactor
Based on Incomplete and/or operating licenses who are
Inaccurate Information subject to Section 73.56 of Title
10, of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR 73.56),
Personnel Access Authorization
Requirements of Nuclear Power
Plants.
2001-06 Centrifugal Charging Pump 05/11/01 All holders of operating licenses
Thrust Bearing Damage not for nuclear power reactors, Detected Due to Inadequate except those who have
Assessment of Oil Analysis permanently ceased operations
Results and Selection of Pump and have certified that fuel has
Surveillance Points been permanently removed from
the reactor vessel
______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit