Information Notice 2001-11, Thefts of Portable Gauges: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 07/13/2001
| issue date = 07/13/2001
| title = Thefts of Portable Gauges
| title = Thefts of Portable Gauges
| author name = Cool D A
| author name = Cool D
| author affiliation = NRC/NMSS/IMNS
| author affiliation = NRC/NMSS/IMNS
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 9: Line 9:
| docket =  
| docket =  
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person = Pettijohn S L, NMSS/IMNS, 415-6822
| contact person = Pettijohn S, NMSS/IMNS, 415-6822
| document report number = IN-01-011
| document report number = IN-01-011
| document type = NRC Information Notice
| document type = NRC Information Notice
| page count = 6
| page count = 6
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555July 13, 2001NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-11: THEFTS OF PORTABLE GAUGES
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 13, 2001 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-11: THEFTS OF PORTABLE GAUGES


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:All portable gauge licensees.
:
All portable gauge licensees.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to informaddresses of recent incidents of thefts of portable gauges, and to remind licensees of their
:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform


responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauges. It is expected that recipients
addresses of recent incidents of thefts of portable gauges, and to remind licensees of their
 
responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauges. It is expected that recipients


will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as
will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as


appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new


NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
:In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State licenseesreported a total 156 thefts of portable gauges. Fifty-one occurred in the States of Texas and
:
In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State licensees
 
reported a total 156 thefts of portable gauges. Fifty-one occurred in the States of Texas and


Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas
Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas


vulnerable to theft. Only 40 percent of gauges reported stolen were reported as having been
vulnerable to theft. Only 40 percent of gauges reported stolen were reported as having been
 
recovered. Two of the 156 events involved attempts to sell the stolen gauges. In both of these
 
cases the gauge was returned to the owner. In another two events, gauges were found in


recovered. Two of the 156 events involved attempts to sell the stolen gauges. In both of these
scrap metal when radiation monitors alarmed. In one event, only the source rod was found. In


cases the gauge was returned to the owner. In another two events, gauges were found in
the other case, the gauge was found intact.


scrap metal when radiation monitors alarmed.  In one event, only the source rod was found.  In
In 83 percent of the thefts from vehicles, the vehicles were parked at locations other than the


the other case, the gauge was found intact.In 83 percent of the thefts from vehicles, the vehicles were parked at locations other than thelicensees' facilities or job sites. Of these cases, gauges were most frequently stolen from
licensees facilities or job sites. Of these cases, gauges were most frequently stolen from


vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). In most of the cases involving the theft of
vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). In most of the cases involving the theft of


gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were
gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were


locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by.The following are examples of some typical cases.
locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by.
 
The following are examples of some typical cases.
 
Case 1: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen from the back of a company truck


Case 1:  A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen from the back of a company truckparked at overnight lodging in Brownsville, Texas. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)
parked at overnight lodging in Brownsville, Texas. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)
Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered
Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered


the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the
the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the


Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. The gauge case had been secured to the bed of the truck
Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. The gauge case had been secured to the bed of the truck
 
by chains. The security chains had been cut and the gauge and the operator's tool box stolen.


by chains.  The security chains had been cut and the gauge and the operator's tool box stolen.
A police report was promptly filed with the Brownsville Police Department.


A police report was promptly filed with the Brownsville Police Department. Case 2: A moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truck. The truck was located atthe home of an employee of the licensee in Homestead, Florida.  The gauge contained 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Americium-241 and 0.23 GBq (6.1 mCi) of Cesium-137.  The licensee notified
Case 2: A moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truck. The truck was located at


police and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control. The Homestead Police prepared a press
the home of an employee of the licensee in Homestead, Florida. The gauge contained 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Americium-241 and 0.23 GBq (6.1 mCi) of Cesium-137. The licensee notified


release and offered a reward for the return of the gauge. A private individual reported finding
police and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control. The Homestead Police prepared a press


the gauge four days later, on July 6, 1999. The licensee stated that the gauge was not
release and offered a reward for the return of the gauge. A private individual reported finding


damaged. It was determined that the employee did not follow procedures that require gauges
the gauge four days later, on July 6, 1999. The licensee stated that the gauge was not
 
damaged. It was determined that the employee did not follow procedures that require gauges


be stored at the licensee's facility.
be stored at the licensee's facility.


Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) ofAmericium-241 and 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) of Cesium-137. The gauge was taken from the bed of a
Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of
 
Americium-241 and 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) of Cesium-137. The gauge was taken from the bed of a


pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight
pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight


and 0600 a.m. The gauge was stored in an approved transportation package and was secured
and 0600 a.m. The gauge was stored in an approved transportation package and was secured


to the vehicle by a chain. The chain was cut and both the gauge and case were taken. The
to the vehicle by a chain. The chain was cut and both the gauge and case were taken. The


licensee notified the police of the theft.
licensee notified the police of the theft.


Case 4: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen when the pickup truck it was chained towas stolen from the home of an employee. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)
Case 4: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen when the pickup truck it was chained to
 
was stolen from the home of an employee. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)
Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in
Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in


its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truck. The truck was stolen early
its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truck. The truck was stolen early


on the morning of April 19, 2001. The theft was reported to the Tempe, Arizona, Police and a
on the morning of April 19, 2001. The theft was reported to the Tempe, Arizona, Police and a


reward was offered.
reward was offered.


Discussion
Discussion:
Thefts involving portable gauges appear to be occurring most frequently when gauges are


:Thefts involving portable gauges appear to be occurring most frequently when gauges arestored in vehicles parked in a non-work area. In addition to considering deterrents to thefts
stored in vehicles parked in a non-work area. In addition to considering deterrents to thefts


such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material
such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material


should extend to ways to minimize the threat of theft. The requirements for control and security
should extend to ways to minimize the threat of theft. The requirements for control and security


of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. Control and security
of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. Control and security


requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of
requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of


Transportation (DOT) regulations.The NRC's analysis of five years of theft data for portable gauges indicates that a large numberof gauges are stolen from trucks, even when they are secured with chains. To help reduce the
Transportation (DOT) regulations.
 
The NRCs analysis of five years of theft data for portable gauges indicates that a large number
 
of gauges are stolen from trucks, even when they are secured with chains. To help reduce the


number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1)
number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1)
Line 110: Line 144:
areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge
areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge


user training, to increase awareness of this problem.NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy (FederalRegister Notice 79139, dated December 18, 2000, regarding improper disposal of sources).
user training, to increase awareness of this problem.
 
NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy (Federal
 
Register Notice 79139, dated December 18, 2000, regarding improper disposal of sources).


Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of
Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of


moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,000. This IN notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions aboutthe information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the
moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,000. This IN notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about


appropriate regional office./RA/Donald A. Cool, DirectorDivision of Industrial and
the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the
 
appropriate regional office.
 
/RA/
                                              Donald A. Cool, Director
 
Division of Industrial and


Medical Nuclear Safety
Medical Nuclear Safety


===Office of Nuclear Material Safety===
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
  and Safeguards


Attachments:1.  List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
and Safeguards


2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS        (301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.gov


#ML011920238TEMPLATE NO.: #NRC =052DOCUMENT NAME:g:\pettijohn\in2001.wpd     *See previous concurrenceOFCMSIB-B*MSIB-B*Editor*MSIB-A*IMNSNAMESPettijohnFBrownEKrausJHickeyDCoolDATE6/8/20016/19/20016/11/016/19/20017/10/2001 Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
===Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS===
                    (301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.gov
 
#ML011920238                          TEMPLATE NO.: #NRC =052 DOCUMENT NAME:g:\pettijohn\in2001.wpd *See previous concurrence
 
OFC        MSIB-B*             MSIB-B*           Editor*         MSIB-A*         IMNS
 
NAME        SPettijohn            FBrown            EKraus          JHickey        DCool
 
DATE          6/8/2001            6/19/2001          6/11/01        6/19/2001      7/10/2001
 
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information                                      Date of
 
Notice No.          Subject                      Issuance  Issued to
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2001-08,      Update on the Investigation of  06/06/01    All medical licensees.
 
Supplement 1  Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy
 
Overexposures
 
2001-08        Treatment Planning System        06/01/01    All medical licensees.
 
Errors Result in Deaths of


_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of
Overseas Radiation Therapy


===Notice No.        SubjectIssuanceIssued to===
Patients


_____________________________________________________________________________________2001-08, Supplement 1Update on the Investigation ofPatient Deaths in Panama,
2001-03        Incident Reporting              04/06/01    All industrial radiography


===Following Radiation Therapy===
Requirements for Radiography                licensees.
Overexposures06/06/01All medical licensees.2001-08Treatment Planning SystemErrors Result in Deaths of


===Overseas Radiation Therapy===
Licensees
Patients06/01/01All medical licensees.2001-03Incident ReportingRequirements for Radiography


Licensees04/06/01All industrial radiography
2001-01        The Importance of Accurate      03/26/01    All material licensees.


licensees.2001-01The Importance of AccurateInventory Controls to Prevent
Inventory Controls to Prevent


the Unauthorized Possession
the Unauthorized Possession


of Radioactive Material03/26/01All material licensees.2000-22Medical MisadministrationsCaused by Human Errors
of Radioactive Material
 
2000-22        Medical Misadministrations      12/18/00    All medical use licensees
 
Caused by Human Errors                       authorized to conduct gamma
 
Involving Gamma Stereotactic                stereotactic radiosurgery


===Involving Gamma Stereotactic===
Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE)                   treatments.
Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE)12/18/00All medical use licenseesauthorized to conduct gamma


stereotactic radiosurgery
2000-19        Implementation of Human Use      12/05/2000  All medical use licensees.


treatments.2000-19Implementation of Human UseResearch Protocols Involving
Research Protocols Involving
 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory


===U.S. Nuclear Regulatory===
Commission Regulated
Commission Regulated


Materials12/05/2000All medical use licensees.2000-18Substandard Material Suppliedby Chicago Bullet Proof
Materials


Systems11/29/2000All 10 CFR Part 50 licensees andapplicants.
2000-18        Substandard Material Supplied    11/29/2000  All 10 CFR Part 50 licensees and


All category 1 fuel facilities.
by Chicago Bullet Proof                      applicants.


===All 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and===
Systems                                      All category 1 fuel facilities.
applicants.2000-16Potential Hazards Due toVolatilization of Radionuclides10/5/2000All licensees that processunsealed byproduct material.2000-15Recent Events Resulting inWhole Body Exposures


Exceeding Regulatory Limits9/29/2000All radiography licensees.
All 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and


______________________________________________________________________________________OL = Operating License
applicants.


CP = Construction PermitAttachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICES
2000-16        Potential Hazards Due to        10/5/2000  All licensees that process


_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of
Volatilization of Radionuclides              unsealed byproduct material.


===Notice No.         SubjectIssuanceIssued to===
2000-15        Recent Events Resulting in      9/29/2000  All radiography licensees.
______________________________________________________________________________________2001-10Failure of Central SprinklerCompany Model GB Series


Fire Sprinkler Heads06/28/01All holders of licenses for nuclearpower, research, and test
Whole Body Exposures


reactors and fuel cycle facilities2001-09Main Feedwater SystemDegradation in Safety-Related
Exceeding Regulatory Limits


===ASME Code Class 2 Piping===
Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
Inside the Containment of a


Pressurized Water Reactor06/12/01All holders of operating licensesfor pressurized water nuclear
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


power reactors, except those who
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information                                        Date of


have permanently ceased
Notice No.              Subject                    Issuance  Issued to


operations and have certified that
______________________________________________________________________________________
2001-10          Failure of Central Sprinkler    06/28/01    All holders of licenses for nuclear
 
Company Model GB Series                      power, research, and test
 
Fire Sprinkler Heads                        reactors and fuel cycle facilities
 
2001-09          Main Feedwater System            06/12/01    All holders of operating licenses
 
Degradation in Safety-Related                for pressurized water nuclear
 
ASME Code Class 2 Piping                    power reactors, except those who
 
Inside the Containment of a                  have permanently ceased
 
Pressurized Water Reactor                    operations and have certified that


fuel has been permanently
fuel has been permanently


removed from the reactor vessel2001-08Supplement 1Update on the Investigation ofPatient Deaths in Panama,
removed from the reactor vessel


===Following Radiation Therapy===
2001-08          Update on the Investigation of  06/06/01    All Medical Licensees
Overexposures06/06/01All Medical Licensees2001-08Treatment Planning SystemErrors Result in Deaths of


===Overseas Radiation Therapy===
Supplement 1      Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy
Patients06/01/01All medical licensees2001-07Unescorted Access GrantedBased on Incomplete and/or


Inaccurate Information05/11/01All holders of nuclear reactoroperating licenses who are
Overexposures


subject to Section 73.56 of Title
2001-08          Treatment Planning System        06/01/01    All medical licensees
 
Errors Result in Deaths of
 
Overseas Radiation Therapy
 
Patients
 
2001-07          Unescorted Access Granted        05/11/01    All holders of nuclear reactor
 
Based on Incomplete and/or                  operating licenses who are
 
Inaccurate Information                      subject to Section 73.56 of Title


10, of the Code of Federal
10, of the Code of Federal


Regulations (10 CFR 73.56),
Regulations (10 CFR 73.56),
"Personnel Access Authorization
                                                              Personnel Access Authorization
 
Requirements of Nuclear Power
 
Plants.
 
2001-06          Centrifugal Charging Pump        05/11/01    All holders of operating licenses


===Requirements of Nuclear Power===
Thrust Bearing Damage not                   for nuclear power reactors, Detected Due to Inadequate                  except those who have
Plants."2001-06Centrifugal Charging PumpThrust Bearing Damage not


===Detected Due to Inadequate===
Assessment of Oil Analysis                   permanently ceased operations
Assessment of Oil Analysis


===Results and Selection of Pump===
Results and Selection of Pump               and have certified that fuel has
Surveillance Points05/11/01All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, except those who have


permanently ceased operations
Surveillance Points                          been permanently removed from


and have certified that fuel has
the reactor vessel


been permanently removed from
______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License


the reactor vessel}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 05:46, 24 November 2019

Thefts of Portable Gauges
ML011920238
Person / Time
Issue date: 07/13/2001
From: Cool D
NRC/NMSS/IMNS
To:
Pettijohn S, NMSS/IMNS, 415-6822
References
IN-01-011
Download: ML011920238 (6)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 13, 2001 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-11: THEFTS OF PORTABLE GAUGES

Addressees

All portable gauge licensees.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addresses of recent incidents of thefts of portable gauges, and to remind licensees of their

responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauges. It is expected that recipients

will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State licensees

reported a total 156 thefts of portable gauges. Fifty-one occurred in the States of Texas and

Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas

vulnerable to theft. Only 40 percent of gauges reported stolen were reported as having been

recovered. Two of the 156 events involved attempts to sell the stolen gauges. In both of these

cases the gauge was returned to the owner. In another two events, gauges were found in

scrap metal when radiation monitors alarmed. In one event, only the source rod was found. In

the other case, the gauge was found intact.

In 83 percent of the thefts from vehicles, the vehicles were parked at locations other than the

licensees facilities or job sites. Of these cases, gauges were most frequently stolen from

vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). In most of the cases involving the theft of

gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were

locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by.

The following are examples of some typical cases.

Case 1: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen from the back of a company truck

parked at overnight lodging in Brownsville, Texas. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)

Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered

the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the

Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. The gauge case had been secured to the bed of the truck

by chains. The security chains had been cut and the gauge and the operator's tool box stolen.

A police report was promptly filed with the Brownsville Police Department.

Case 2: A moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truck. The truck was located at

the home of an employee of the licensee in Homestead, Florida. The gauge contained 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Americium-241 and 0.23 GBq (6.1 mCi) of Cesium-137. The licensee notified

police and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control. The Homestead Police prepared a press

release and offered a reward for the return of the gauge. A private individual reported finding

the gauge four days later, on July 6, 1999. The licensee stated that the gauge was not

damaged. It was determined that the employee did not follow procedures that require gauges

be stored at the licensee's facility.

Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of

Americium-241 and 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) of Cesium-137. The gauge was taken from the bed of a

pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight

and 0600 a.m. The gauge was stored in an approved transportation package and was secured

to the vehicle by a chain. The chain was cut and both the gauge and case were taken. The

licensee notified the police of the theft.

Case 4: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen when the pickup truck it was chained to

was stolen from the home of an employee. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)

Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in

its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truck. The truck was stolen early

on the morning of April 19, 2001. The theft was reported to the Tempe, Arizona, Police and a

reward was offered.

Discussion:

Thefts involving portable gauges appear to be occurring most frequently when gauges are

stored in vehicles parked in a non-work area. In addition to considering deterrents to thefts

such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material

should extend to ways to minimize the threat of theft. The requirements for control and security

of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. Control and security

requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT) regulations.

The NRCs analysis of five years of theft data for portable gauges indicates that a large number

of gauges are stolen from trucks, even when they are secured with chains. To help reduce the

number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1)

requiring gauges to be locked in covered vehicle compartments, (2) not parking vehicles in

areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge

user training, to increase awareness of this problem.

NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy (Federal

Register Notice 79139, dated December 18, 2000, regarding improper disposal of sources).

Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of

moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,000. This IN notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about

the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the

appropriate regional office.

/RA/

Donald A. Cool, Director

Division of Industrial and

Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Technical Contact:

Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS

(301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.gov

  1. ML011920238 TEMPLATE NO.: #NRC =052 DOCUMENT NAME:g:\pettijohn\in2001.wpd *See previous concurrence

OFC MSIB-B* MSIB-B* Editor* MSIB-A* IMNS

NAME SPettijohn FBrown EKraus JHickey DCool

DATE 6/8/2001 6/19/2001 6/11/01 6/19/2001 7/10/2001

Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2001-08, Update on the Investigation of 06/06/01 All medical licensees.

Supplement 1 Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy

Overexposures

2001-08 Treatment Planning System 06/01/01 All medical licensees.

Errors Result in Deaths of

Overseas Radiation Therapy

Patients

2001-03 Incident Reporting 04/06/01 All industrial radiography

Requirements for Radiography licensees.

Licensees

2001-01 The Importance of Accurate 03/26/01 All material licensees.

Inventory Controls to Prevent

the Unauthorized Possession

of Radioactive Material

2000-22 Medical Misadministrations 12/18/00 All medical use licensees

Caused by Human Errors authorized to conduct gamma

Involving Gamma Stereotactic stereotactic radiosurgery

Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE) treatments.

2000-19 Implementation of Human Use 12/05/2000 All medical use licensees.

Research Protocols Involving

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission Regulated

Materials

2000-18 Substandard Material Supplied 11/29/2000 All 10 CFR Part 50 licensees and

by Chicago Bullet Proof applicants.

Systems All category 1 fuel facilities.

All 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and

applicants.

2000-16 Potential Hazards Due to 10/5/2000 All licensees that process

Volatilization of Radionuclides unsealed byproduct material.

2000-15 Recent Events Resulting in 9/29/2000 All radiography licensees.

Whole Body Exposures

Exceeding Regulatory Limits

Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

______________________________________________________________________________________

2001-10 Failure of Central Sprinkler 06/28/01 All holders of licenses for nuclear

Company Model GB Series power, research, and test

Fire Sprinkler Heads reactors and fuel cycle facilities

2001-09 Main Feedwater System 06/12/01 All holders of operating licenses

Degradation in Safety-Related for pressurized water nuclear

ASME Code Class 2 Piping power reactors, except those who

Inside the Containment of a have permanently ceased

Pressurized Water Reactor operations and have certified that

fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor vessel

2001-08 Update on the Investigation of 06/06/01 All Medical Licensees

Supplement 1 Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy

Overexposures

2001-08 Treatment Planning System 06/01/01 All medical licensees

Errors Result in Deaths of

Overseas Radiation Therapy

Patients

2001-07 Unescorted Access Granted 05/11/01 All holders of nuclear reactor

Based on Incomplete and/or operating licenses who are

Inaccurate Information subject to Section 73.56 of Title

10, of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR 73.56),

Personnel Access Authorization

Requirements of Nuclear Power

Plants.

2001-06 Centrifugal Charging Pump 05/11/01 All holders of operating licenses

Thrust Bearing Damage not for nuclear power reactors, Detected Due to Inadequate except those who have

Assessment of Oil Analysis permanently ceased operations

Results and Selection of Pump and have certified that fuel has

Surveillance Points been permanently removed from

the reactor vessel

______________________________________________________________________________________

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit