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| number = ML12039A113
| number = ML12039A113
| issue date = 02/01/2012
| issue date = 02/01/2012
| title = 2011 Annual Operating Report for the Kansas State University Triga Mark Ii Nuclear Reactor
| title = 2011 Annual Operating Report for the Kansas State University Triga Mark II Nuclear Reactor
| author name = Geuther J A
| author name = Geuther J
| author affiliation = Kansas State Univ
| author affiliation = Kansas State Univ
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Jeffrey Geuther, Ph.D.Nuclear Reactor Facility Manager 3002 Rathbone Hall Kansas State University 66506 US NRC Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 K STATE Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering 3002 Rathbone Hall Manhattan, KS 66506 -5205 785-532-5610 Fax: 785-532-7057 1 February 2012  
{{#Wiki_filter:Jeffrey Geuther, Ph.D.
Nuclear Reactor Facility Manager KSTATE 3002 Rathbone Hall                                                         Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering Kansas State University 66506                                              3002 Rathbone Hall Manhattan, KS 66506 -5205 785-532-5610 US NRC                                                                      Fax: 785-532-7057 Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 1 February 2012


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
2011 Annual Operating Report for the Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Nuclear Reactor (Facility License # R-88, Facility Docket # 50-188)To Whom It May Concern: This document serves as the annual operating report for the Kansas State University (KSU) nuclear reactor. This document satisfies requirements in facility Technical Specifications (TS) 6.11 .e.The report is divided into paragraphs addressing specific items listed as requirements in the Technical Specifications.
2011 Annual Operating Report for the Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Nuclear Reactor (Facility License # R-88, Facility Docket # 50-188)
Sincerely, Jeey A. Geuther, Ph.D.Nuclear Reactor Facility Manager Kansas State University Attachments:
To Whom It May Concern:
: 1. Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Reactor Annual Report, CY 2011 2. 1OCFR50.59 Screening Forms Cc: Spyros Traiforos, Project Manager, NRC A 0 ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Reactor Annual Report, CY 2011 Introduction The Kansas State University Nuclear Reactor Technical Specifications (TS) require a routine written report to be transmitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission within 60 days after completion of the first calendar year of operating, and at intervals not to exceed twelve months thereafter, providing the following information:
This document serves as the annual operating report for the Kansas State University (KSU) nuclear reactor. This document satisfies requirements in facility Technical Specifications (TS) 6.11 .e.
TS.6.11.e.
The report is divided into paragraphs addressing specific items listed as requirements in the Technical Specifications.
1 -TS.6.11 .e.2 -TS.6.11 .e.3 -TS.6.1L.e.4
Sincerely, Jeey A. Geuther, Ph.D.
-TS.6.11 .e.5 -TS.6.11.e.6
Nuclear Reactor Facility Manager Kansas State University Attachments:
-TS.6.11 .e.7 -TS.6.11.e.8
: 1. Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Reactor Annual Report, CY 2011
-A brief narrative summary of operating experience (including experiments performed), changes in facility design, performance characteristics, and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period; and results of surveillance tests and inspections.
: 2. 10CFR50.59 Screening Forms Cc: Spyros Traiforos, Project Manager, NRC A0
A tabulation showing the energy generated by the reactor (in megawatt-hours).The number of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, including the reason thereof and corrective action, if any, taken.Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed during the period, including the effects, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.A summary of each change to the facility or procedures, tests, and experiments carried out under the conditions of 10.CFR.50.59.
 
A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee as measured at or before the point of such release or discharge.
ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Reactor Annual Report, CY 2011 Introduction The Kansas State University Nuclear Reactor Technical Specifications (TS) require a routine written report to be transmitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission within 60 days after completion of the first calendar year of operating, and at intervals not to exceed twelve months thereafter, providing the following information:
A description of any environmental surveys performed outside the facility.A summary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant exposure, and a brief summary of the results of radiation and contamination surveys performed within the facilty.This information is transmitted in this report, in sections separated by TS clause. This report covers January 2011 -December 2011.Page 1 of 7 ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT TS.6.1 I.e.1 -A brief narrative summary of operating experience (including experiments performed), changes in facility design, performance characteristics, and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period; and results of surveillance tests and inspections.
TS.6.11.e. 1 -   A brief narrative summary of operating experience (including experiments performed), changes in facility design, performance characteristics, and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period; and results of surveillance tests and inspections.
Calendar year 2011 (CY201 1) was a year that highlighted the success of the recovery efforts following a personnel exposure incident on 9/22/10. (For reference see the NRC Special Inspection Report 50-188/2010-202).
TS.6.11 .e.2 -   A tabulation showing the energy generated by the reactor (in megawatt-hours).
In particular, the dose to personnel was kept very low in 2011 versus 2010. This statement would be true even if the exposure incident on 9/22/10 was removed from the dose tally. For example, on 6/30/10, prior to the exposure incident, the total year-to-date dose to the staff was 442 person-mrem DDE, versus 81 person-mrem DDE one year later on 6/30/11. Therefore the procedural changes that were made to correct the deficiencies noted in the Special Inspection Report were very successful not only in preventing recurrence of an unanticipated exposure, but in improving overall radiation safety at the facility.On 6/24/11, an Unusual Event was declared due to an air monitoring system alarm for high radioiodine.
TS.6.11 .e.3 -   The number of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, including the reason thereof and corrective action, if any, taken.
The alarm was suspected to be false alarm, but due to disagreement between several channels of secondary indication and uncertainty as to whether there really was high radioiodine, an Unusual Event was declared an hour after the alarm as a matter of conservatism while efforts continued to verify the alarm. Ultimately, it was determined that the alarm was due to miscalibration of the instrument, which had been calibrated earlier in the day. Therefore, there was no fuel damage or release of radioactive materials.
TS.6.1L.e.4 -   Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed during the period, including the effects, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.
The operations of the facility during CY2011 were normal, with many hours of class support, tours, and training, and research support primarily related to semiconductor neutron detectors.
TS.6.11 .e.5 -  A summary of each change to the facility or procedures, tests, and experiments carried out under the conditions of 10.CFR.50.59.
There were no new experiments.
TS.6.11.e.6 -   A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee as measured at or before the point of such release or discharge.
The NRC routine annual inspection during the summer of 2011 yielded no findings.TS.6.1 1.e.2 -A tabulation showing the energy generated by the reactor (in megawatt-hours).
TS.6.11 .e.7 -  A description of any environmental surveys performed outside the facility.
The monthly total energy generated by the KSU reactor is recorded in Table 1. The same data is shown as a bar chart in Figure 1. The total MWh of operation was virtually unchanged from the prior year, increasing from 56 MWh to 57 MWh.Page 2 of 7 ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT Table 1 -Energy generated by the KSU Triga Mark II reactor by month for CY 2011.Month MWh January 1.56 February 5.31 March 6.67 April 8.08 May 3.17 June 3.07 July 1.60 August 6.12 September 1.40 October 12.29 November 5.28 December 2.83 MWh per Month 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 January February March April -,.7/07_711 May ///'June July 'August /September October / />> November December Ir Figure 1 -Energy generated by the KSU Triga Mark II reactor by month for CY 2010.Figure 2 shows the percentage of hours of reactor operation for various purposes, i.e., research support, training, education, etc. The percentage of hours for training appears small, because operator training was often performed when the reactor was being operated for another purpose, such as research support. The plot demonstrates that the reactor is operated in accordance with our stated primary functions:
TS.6.11.e.8 -  A summary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant exposure, and a brief summary of the results of radiation and contamination surveys performed within the facilty.
education; research support (e.g., irradiation);
This information is transmitted in this report, in sections separated by TS clause. This report covers January 2011 - December 2011.
operator training; and demonstration (e.g., tours).Page 3 of 7 ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT 0%0 Maintenance and Testing GTours and Outreach eTraining 36%8%4%M Education 0 Research 31%N Other Figure 2 -KSU reactor hours, based on purpose of operation.
Page 1 of 7
TS.6.1 I.e.3 -The number of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, including the reason thereof and corrective action, if any, taken.Inadvertent SCRAMS and Emergency Shutdowns Operator error -RO attempted to downrange NMP-1000, causing scram at low power 4/22/11 Period scram Operator error 4/30/11 Period scram Operator error 5/23/11 Period scram Operator did not set pulse interlock prior to switching to PULSE mode.Operator selected "Test" instead of "Reset" 5/24/11 HV / percent power scram when resetting instrument 5/24/11 Linear power scram Unknown cause 6/24/11 AMS alarm False indication of failed fuel (iodine)8/16/11 Period scram Operator error 9/13/11 Linear power scram Operator error -channel locked into low range As a result of the AMS alarm on 6/24/11, the AMS detector head that alarmed high was sent out for recalibration.
 
The technician who calibrated the instrument reported that two chips were loose, which may have caused the unusual reading that lead to the false alarm.The neutron activation analysis laboratory was also checked to identify the source of a Cs- 137 peak, which seemed to corroborate the AMS iodine alarm, but was ultimately determined to be part of the background spectrum.
ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT TS.6.1 I.e.1 - A brief narrative summary of operating experience (including experiments performed), changes in facility design, performance characteristics, and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period; and results of surveillance tests and inspections.
The source of the Cs-137 was not identified.
Calendar year 2011 (CY201 1) was a year that highlighted the success of the recovery efforts following a personnel exposure incident on 9/22/10. (For reference see the NRC Special Inspection Report 50-188/2010-202). In particular, the dose to personnel was kept very low in 2011 versus 2010. This statement would be true even if the exposure incident on 9/22/10 was removed from the dose tally. For example, on 6/30/10, prior to the exposure incident, the total year-to-date dose to the staff was 442 person-mrem DDE, versus 81 person-mrem DDE one year later on 6/30/11. Therefore the procedural changes that were made to correct the deficiencies noted in the Special Inspection Report were very successful not only in preventing recurrence of an unanticipated exposure, but in improving overall radiation safety at the facility.
Page 4 of 7 ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT TS.6.11 .e.4 -Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed during the period, including the effects, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.Two large electrical projects took place during 2011. The first was the installation of an emergency diesel generator.
On 6/24/11, an Unusual Event was declared due to an air monitoring system alarm for high radioiodine. The alarm was suspected to be false alarm, but due to disagreement between several channels of secondary indication and uncertainty as to whether there really was high radioiodine, an Unusual Event was declared an hour after the alarm as a matter of conservatism while efforts continued to verify the alarm. Ultimately, it was determined that the alarm was due to miscalibration of the instrument, which had been calibrated earlier in the day. Therefore, there was no fuel damage or release of radioactive materials.
The generator installation provides backup power to some reactor systems, but does not replace any existing backup power source, so it does not adversely affect safety in any way.The second project is the upgrade to the building power supply, including the installation of new breakers and a transformer in Room 14 of Ward Hall (adjacent to the 0' level of the reactor bay). This project has not yet affected reactor operations in any way, although in early 2012 the reactor AC power will be switched to the new system.TS.6.1 1.e.5 -A summary of each change to the facility or procedures, tests, and experiments carried out under the conditions of 1OCFR-50.59.The following changes were carried out under 10CFR-50.59.
The operations of the facility during CY2011 were normal, with many hours of class support, tours, and training, and research support primarily related to semiconductor neutron detectors. There were no new experiments.
* Locked gate added to perimeter fence* Dosimetry guidance added to Procedure OP-19* Radiation safety guidance added to Procedure OP-26* Breaker lockout requirement added to Management Order SOS-3, Cooling Tower Maintenance.
The NRC routine annual inspection during the summer of 2011 yielded no findings.
* Emergency diesel generator added as backup AC power source for security system.None of the above changes were determined to have a significant impact on the safety analysis.
TS.6.1 1.e.2 - A tabulation showing the energy generated by the reactor (in megawatt-hours).
Copies of the 10CFR-50.59 screening checklists that were performed to accept the changes are attached to this report.TS.6.1 1.e.6 -A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee as measured at or before the point of such release or discharge.
The monthly total energy generated by the KSU reactor is recorded in Table 1. The same data is shown as a bar chart in Figure 1. The total MWh of operation was virtually unchanged from the prior year, increasing from 56 MWh to 57 MWh.
On three occasions, the contents of the sump were discharged to the secondary cooling loop. Per procedure, the radioisotope inventory and concentration were calculated prior to discharge, showing both to be well below the limits in 1OCFR-20: Avg. Limit* Total Concentration (pICi / Volume Total Activity Isotope (pCi / mL) mL) (mL) Released (pCi)3H 1.23E-05 1.OOE-02 1.31E+02 14C 7.15E-06 3.OOE-04 1.06E+07 7.59E+01 32p 4.59E-06 9.OOE-05 4.88E+01*1OCFR-20, App.B Page 5 of 7 ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT The only other discharges beyond the facility boundary were HVAC condensate discharges to the sanitary sewer. Since the Kansas State University average water usage is 750,000 gallons per day, it is nearly impossible to exceed 1OCFR20 limits for effluent concentration at the KSU reactor. The HVAC condensate measured concentration levels were all approximately at background levels, which is expected, since the HVAC condensate water is never circulated through or near the reactor core.I TS.6.1 1.e.7 -A description of any environmental surveys performed outside the facility.Monthly radiation surveys are performed within the facility to verify that radiation levels remain safe when at full-power operation.
Page 2 of 7
These surveys indicate that the dose rate at the inside surface of the reactor dome does not exceed the hourly dose limit to members of the public of 2 mR / h, as set forth in 1 OCFR-20, which indicates that the outside dose cannot exceed this limit.TS.6.1 1.e.8 -A summary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant exposure, and a brief summary of the results of radiation and contamination surveys performed within the facilty.Following an exposure incident on 9/22/10, the reactor procedures were reviewed and revised where necessary to strengthen the radiation protection posture of the facility.This action has resulted in an observed five-fold decrease in both the maximum dose received by an individual and the total person-rem of dose to the reactor staff. The highest annual dose received by any worker in 2011 was 51 mrem DDE. This does not include records from the month of December, which are not yet available.
 
Last year, the highest dose for any worker was 223 mrem. The total person-rem of dose to the reactor staff during the 11 month period from from 1/01/11 to 11/30/1 1was 158 mrem, compared to 764 mrem from 1/01/10 to 11/30/10.
ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT Table 1 - Energy generated by the KSU Triga Mark II reactor by month for CY 2011.
A table showing the number of workers receiving given amounts of dose is presented below.Table 2 -Summary of total occupational dose received by KSU reactor workers from 12/01/2010  
Month         MWh January           1.56 February         5.31 March             6.67 April             8.08 May               3.17 June             3.07 July               1.60 August           6.12 September         1.40 October         12.29 November         5.28 December         2.83 MWh per Month 0       2       4       6       8     10       12     14     16 January February March April                               -,.7/07_711 May         ///'
-11/30/2011.
June July       '
Only workers with more than three months of employment are included.mrem DDE LDE SDE (0,50] 9 9 7 (50, 100] 1 1 3 (100, 150] 0 0 0 (150, 200] 0 0 0 (200, 250] 0 0 0>250 0 0 0 Visitor dose at the KSU TRIGA reactor facility is measured using Civil Defense self-indicating pocket dosimeters, with an indication range from 0-200 mR. Self-indicated pocket dosimeter readings suffer from imprecision due to parallax error, sometimes resulting in negative values or readings above the true value. In 2011, several dosimeters readings were incorrectly entered into the record systems, such that the dosimeter Page 6 of 7 ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT exposure reading and dosimeter ID number were reversed.
August     /
Aberrant results were checked against visitor dose records from the same tour, and were not included in these data if it appeared that the unusual values were from improper data entry or a dropped dosimeter.
September October                             /                 */>>
0 E z 10000 1000 100 10 1<=0 (0,1] (1,21 (2,51 (5,101 (10,201 (20,501 >50 Exposure [mR]Figure 3 -Visitor dose records from CY 2011. 5 abnormal records removed after checking against other records from the same visit.All radiation surveys and contamination surveys conducted at the facility in 2010 were nominal.This concludes the 2011 Annual Report for the Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Nuclear Reactor.Page 7 of 7 SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2 Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE Experiment Procedure 1 DATE 1/19/2011 DESCRIPTION Add locked gate to east side of security fence to allow generator Installation  
November December Ir Figure 1 - Energy generated by the KSU Triga Mark II reactor by month for CY 2010.
-reactor staff to maintain key control.SCREENING:
Figure 2 shows the percentage of hours of reactor operation for various purposes, i.e.,
The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
research support, training, education, etc. The percentage of hours for training appears small, because operator training was often performed when the reactor was being operated for another purpose, such as research support. The plot demonstrates that the reactor is operated in accordance with our stated primary functions: education; research support (e.g., irradiation); operator training; and demonstration (e.g., tours).
SSC Affected SSC Design function Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)
Page 3 of 7
NA NA NA NA SAFETY ANAL YSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGA TION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMAN INTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS:
 
Effect on facility security is negligible since gate will remain locked and reactor staff will maintain key control. The minimum distance that a member of the public could get to the reactor during an accident scenario will remain the same, so the SAR analyses are all still valid.PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE: 1/19/2011 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT 0 Maintenance and 0%                              Testing GTours and Outreach 36%
S M M5ATTACHMENT2 On a! 7/0506 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE Op erating Procedure 19 DATE 5/24/11 DESCRIPTION Add dosimetry guidance to OP-19 SCREENING:
eTraining 8%
The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
4%     MEducation 0 Research 31%
SSC Affected SSC Design function Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)
N Other Figure 2 - KSU reactor hours, based on purpose of operation.
NA NA NA NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGATION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMANINTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS: PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE: 05/24/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
TS.6.1 I.e.3 - The number of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, including the reason thereof and corrective action, if any, taken.
SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2 Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE Operating Procedure 26 1 DATE 5/10/11 DESCRIPTION Add radiatiori safety guidance to OP26 SCREENING:
Inadvertent SCRAMS and Emergency Shutdowns Operator error - RO attempted to downrange NMP-1000, causing scram at low power 4/22/11       Period scram                   Operator error 4/30/11       Period scram                   Operator error 5/23/11       Period scram                   Operator did not set pulse interlock prior to switching to PULSE mode.
The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
Operator selected "Test" instead of "Reset" 5/24/11       HV / percent power scram       when resetting instrument 5/24/11       Linear power scram             Unknown cause 6/24/11       AMS alarm                     False indication of failed fuel (iodine) 8/16/11       Period scram                   Operator error 9/13/11       Linear power scram             Operator error - channel locked into low range As a result of the AMS alarm on 6/24/11, the AMS detector head that alarmed high was sent out for recalibration. The technician who calibrated the instrument reported that two chips were loose, which may have caused the unusual reading that lead to the false alarm.
SSC Affected SSC Design function I Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)
The neutron activation analysis laboratory was also checked to identify the source of a Cs- 137 peak, which seemed to corroborate the AMS iodine alarm, but was ultimately determined to be part of the background spectrum. The source of the Cs-137 was not identified.
NA NA NA NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & A CCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGA TION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMAN INTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS: PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE: 05/10/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
Page 4 of 7
SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2 Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE SOS-3, Cooling tower DATE 02/10/2011 maintenance DESCRIPTION Include orders to lock out breaker prior to checking belt tension SCREENING:
 
The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT TS.6.11 .e.4 - Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed during the period, including the effects, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.
SSC Affected SSC Design function Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)
Two large electrical projects took place during 2011. The first was the installation of an emergency diesel generator. The generator installation provides backup power to some reactor systems, but does not replace any existing backup power source, so it does not adversely affect safety in any way.
NA NA NA NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGA TION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMAN INTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS: PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE: 02/10/2011 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
The second project is the upgrade to the building power supply, including the installation of new breakers and a transformer in Room 14 of Ward Hall (adjacent to the 0' level of the reactor bay). This project has not yet affected reactor operations in any way, although in early 2012 the reactor AC power will be switched to the new system.
SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2 Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE Diesel Generator DATE 10/1/11 DESCRIPTION Add a diesel generator as a backup power source for the security system.SCREENING:
TS.6.1 1.e.5 - A summary of each change to the facility or procedures, tests, and experiments carried out under the conditions of 10CFR-50.59.
The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
The following changes were carried out under 10CFR-50.59.
SSC Affected SSC Design function I Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)
* Locked gate added to perimeter fence
NA NA NA NA SAFETYANALYSIS  
* Dosimetry guidance added to Procedure OP-19
& ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGA TION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMAN INTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS: PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE:_10/1/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.Evaluation  
* Radiation safety guidance added to Procedure OP-26
-The diesel generator provides backup power to the security system following loss of onsite power. The addition of the generator does not reduce or inhibit availability of existing sources of backup power to the system, and therefore does not reduce system effectiveness.}}
* Breaker lockout requirement added to Management Order SOS-3, Cooling Tower Maintenance.
* Emergency diesel generator added as backup AC power source for security system.
None of the above changes were determined to have a significant impact on the safety analysis. Copies of the 10CFR-50.59 screening checklists that were performed to accept the changes are attached to this report.
TS.6.1 1.e.6 - A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee as measured at or before the point of such release or discharge.
On three occasions, the contents of the sump were discharged to the secondary cooling loop. Per procedure, the radioisotope inventory and concentration were calculated prior to discharge, showing both to be well below the limits in 10CFR-20:
Avg.         Limit*     Total Concentration     (pICi / Volume     Total Activity Isotope     (pCi / mL)       mL)       (mL)     Released (pCi) 3H       1.23E-05     1.OOE-02                 1.31E+02 14C       7.15E-06     3.OOE-04   1.06E+07     7.59E+01 32p       4.59E-06     9.OOE-05                 4.88E+01
                                                              *10CFR-20, App.B Page 5 of 7
 
ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT The only other discharges beyond the facility boundary were HVAC condensate discharges to the sanitary sewer. Since the Kansas State University average water usage is 750,000 gallons per day, it is nearly impossible to exceed 10CFR20 limits for effluent concentration at the KSU reactor. The HVAC condensate measured concentration levels were all approximately at background levels, which is expected, since the HVAC condensate water is never circulated through or near the reactor core.
I TS.6.1 1.e.7 - A description of any environmental surveys performed outside the facility.
Monthly radiation surveys are performed within the facility to verify that radiation levels remain safe when at full-power operation. These surveys indicate that the dose rate at the inside surface of the reactor dome does not exceed the hourly dose limit to members of the public of 2 mR / h, as set forth in 10CFR-20, which indicates that the outside dose cannot exceed this limit.
TS.6.1 1.e.8 - A summary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant exposure, and a brief summary of the results of radiation and contamination surveys performed within the facilty.
Following an exposure incident on 9/22/10, the reactor procedures were reviewed and revised where necessary to strengthen the radiation protection posture of the facility.
This action has resulted in an observed five-fold decrease in both the maximum dose received by an individual and the total person-rem of dose to the reactor staff. The highest annual dose received by any worker in 2011 was 51 mrem DDE. This does not include records from the month of December, which are not yet available. Last year, the highest dose for any worker was 223 mrem. The total person-rem of dose to the reactor staff during the 11 month period from from 1/01/11 to 11/30/1 1was 158 mrem, compared to 764 mrem from 1/01/10 to 11/30/10. A table showing the number of workers receiving given amounts of dose is presented below.
Table 2 - Summary of total occupational dose received by KSU reactor workers from 12/01/2010 -
11/30/2011. Only workers with more than three months of employment are included.
mrem     DDE         LDE     SDE (0,50]       9           9       7 (50, 100]       1           1       3 (100, 150]       0           0       0 (150, 200]       0           0       0 (200, 250]       0           0       0
                                    >250       0           0       0 Visitor dose at the KSU TRIGA reactor facility is measured using Civil Defense self-indicating pocket dosimeters, with an indication range from 0-200 mR. Self-indicated pocket dosimeter readings suffer from imprecision due to parallax error, sometimes resulting in negative values or readings above the true value. In 2011, several dosimeters readings were incorrectly entered into the record systems, such that the dosimeter Page 6 of 7
 
ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT exposure reading and dosimeter ID number were reversed. Aberrant results were checked against visitor dose records from the same tour, and were not included in these data if it appeared that the unusual values were from improper data entry or a dropped dosimeter.
10000 1000 0
100 E        10 z
1
                    <=0       (0,1]   (1,21   (2,51   (5,101 (10,201 (20,501 >50 Exposure [mR]
Figure 3 - Visitor dose records from CY 2011. 5 abnormal records removed after checking against other records from the same visit.
All radiation surveys and contamination surveys conducted at the facility in 2010 were nominal.
This concludes the 2011 Annual Report for the Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Nuclear Reactor.
Page 7 of 7
 
SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2                                                           Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness                                     Page 1 of 3 TITLE               Experiment Procedure1          DATE                   1/19/2011 DESCRIPTION Add locked gate to east side of security fence to allow generator Installation - reactor staff to maintain key control.
SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
SSC Affected         SSC Design function       Failure Mode(s)         Accident scenario(s)
NA                       NA                       NA                       NA SAFETY ANAL YSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGA TION                                     YES     NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident               X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident                   X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth                                             X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC                                 X HUMAN INTERFACE                                                                     YES     NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa                                           X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions                                           X Adversely affect time response of required actions                                             X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSEDCHANGE                                                YES       NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification                                                 X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis                   X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution                             X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity                                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions                             X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions                           X COMMENTS: Effect on facility security is negligible since gate will remain locked and reactor staff will maintain key control. The minimum distance that a member of the public could get to the reactor during an accident scenario will remain the same, so the SAR analyses are all still valid.
PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther                                       DATE:     1/19/2011 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
 
S M M5ATTACHMENT2                                                             On a! 7/0506 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness                                     Page 1 of 3 TITLE               Op eratingProcedure19            DATE                   5/24/11 DESCRIPTION         Add dosimetry guidance to OP-19 SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
SSC Affected         SSC Design function         Failure Mode(s)         Accident scenario(s)
NA                       NA                       NA                       NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & ACCIDENTRESPONSE/MITIGATION                                       YES       NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident               X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident                   X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth                                             X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC                                 X HUMANINTERFACE                                                                       YES       NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa                                           X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions                                           X Adversely affect time response of required actions                                             X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE                                               YES       NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification                                                 X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis                   X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution                             X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity                                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions                             X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions                           X COMMENTS:
PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther                                       DATE:     05/24/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
 
SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2                                                           Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness                                     Page 1 of 3 TITLE               OperatingProcedure26          1DATE                  5/10/11 DESCRIPTION         Add radiatiori safety guidance to OP26 SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
SSC Affected       SSC Design function     I   Failure Mode(s)       Accident scenario(s)
NA                       NA                       NA                     NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & A CCIDENTRESPONSE/MITIGA TION                                     YES     NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident               X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident                   X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth                                             X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC                                 X HUMAN INTERFACE                                                                     YES       NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa                                           X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions                                           X Adversely affect time response of required actions                                             X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE                                               YES       NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification                                                 X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis                   X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution                             X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity                                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions                           X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions                         X COMMENTS:
PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther                                       DATE:   05/10/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
 
SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2                                                           Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness                                     Page 1 of 3 TITLE               SOS-3, Cooling tower             DATE                 02/10/2011 maintenance DESCRIPTION         Include orders to lock out breaker prior to checking belt tension SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
SSC Affected         SSC Design function         Failure Mode(s)       Accident scenario(s)
NA                       NA                       NA                     NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGATION                                      YES     NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident               X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident                   X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth                                             X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC                                 X HUMAN INTERFACE                                                                     YES       NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa                                           X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions                                           X Adversely affect time response of required actions                                             X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE                                               YES       NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification                                                 X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis                   X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution                             X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity                                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions                           X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions                         X COMMENTS:
PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther                                       DATE:   02/10/2011 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
 
SOM     5 ATTACHMENT Evaluation                  2 of Change, Program   Effectiveness                           Original Page 17/05/06 of 3 TITLE               Diesel Generator               DATE                   10/1/11 DESCRIPTION Add a diesel generator as a backup power source for the security system.
SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.
SSC Affected         SSC Design function I Failure Mode(s)             Accident scenario(s)
NA                       NA                       NA                     NA SAFETYANALYSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGA TION                                       YES       NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident               X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident                   X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth                                             X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC                                 X HUMAN INTERFACE                                                                     YES       NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa                                           X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions                                           X Adversely affect time response of required actions                                             X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE                                               YES       NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification                                                 X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis                   X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution                     X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity                                   X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions                           X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions                         X COMMENTS:
PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther                                       DATE:_10/1/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.
Evaluation - The diesel generator provides backup power to the security system following loss of onsite power. The addition of the generator does not reduce or inhibit availability of existing sources of backup power to the system, and therefore does not reduce system effectiveness.}}

Latest revision as of 08:38, 12 November 2019

2011 Annual Operating Report for the Kansas State University Triga Mark II Nuclear Reactor
ML12039A113
Person / Time
Site: Kansas State University
Issue date: 02/01/2012
From: Geuther J
Kansas State University
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML12039A113 (13)
v • d • e


Text

Jeffrey Geuther, Ph.D.

Nuclear Reactor Facility Manager KSTATE 3002 Rathbone Hall Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering Kansas State University 66506 3002 Rathbone Hall Manhattan, KS 66506 -5205 785-532-5610 US NRC Fax: 785-532-7057 Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 1 February 2012

Subject:

2011 Annual Operating Report for the Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Nuclear Reactor (Facility License # R-88, Facility Docket # 50-188)

To Whom It May Concern:

This document serves as the annual operating report for the Kansas State University (KSU) nuclear reactor. This document satisfies requirements in facility Technical Specifications (TS) 6.11 .e.

The report is divided into paragraphs addressing specific items listed as requirements in the Technical Specifications.

Sincerely, Jeey A. Geuther, Ph.D.

Nuclear Reactor Facility Manager Kansas State University Attachments:

1. Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Reactor Annual Report, CY 2011
2. 10CFR50.59 Screening Forms Cc: Spyros Traiforos, Project Manager, NRC A0

ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Reactor Annual Report, CY 2011 Introduction The Kansas State University Nuclear Reactor Technical Specifications (TS) require a routine written report to be transmitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission within 60 days after completion of the first calendar year of operating, and at intervals not to exceed twelve months thereafter, providing the following information:

TS.6.11.e. 1 - A brief narrative summary of operating experience (including experiments performed), changes in facility design, performance characteristics, and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period; and results of surveillance tests and inspections.

TS.6.11 .e.2 - A tabulation showing the energy generated by the reactor (in megawatt-hours).

TS.6.11 .e.3 - The number of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, including the reason thereof and corrective action, if any, taken.

TS.6.1L.e.4 - Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed during the period, including the effects, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.

TS.6.11 .e.5 - A summary of each change to the facility or procedures, tests, and experiments carried out under the conditions of 10.CFR.50.59.

TS.6.11.e.6 - A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee as measured at or before the point of such release or discharge.

TS.6.11 .e.7 - A description of any environmental surveys performed outside the facility.

TS.6.11.e.8 - A summary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant exposure, and a brief summary of the results of radiation and contamination surveys performed within the facilty.

This information is transmitted in this report, in sections separated by TS clause. This report covers January 2011 - December 2011.

Page 1 of 7

ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT TS.6.1 I.e.1 - A brief narrative summary of operating experience (including experiments performed), changes in facility design, performance characteristics, and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period; and results of surveillance tests and inspections.

Calendar year 2011 (CY201 1) was a year that highlighted the success of the recovery efforts following a personnel exposure incident on 9/22/10. (For reference see the NRC Special Inspection Report 50-188/2010-202). In particular, the dose to personnel was kept very low in 2011 versus 2010. This statement would be true even if the exposure incident on 9/22/10 was removed from the dose tally. For example, on 6/30/10, prior to the exposure incident, the total year-to-date dose to the staff was 442 person-mrem DDE, versus 81 person-mrem DDE one year later on 6/30/11. Therefore the procedural changes that were made to correct the deficiencies noted in the Special Inspection Report were very successful not only in preventing recurrence of an unanticipated exposure, but in improving overall radiation safety at the facility.

On 6/24/11, an Unusual Event was declared due to an air monitoring system alarm for high radioiodine. The alarm was suspected to be false alarm, but due to disagreement between several channels of secondary indication and uncertainty as to whether there really was high radioiodine, an Unusual Event was declared an hour after the alarm as a matter of conservatism while efforts continued to verify the alarm. Ultimately, it was determined that the alarm was due to miscalibration of the instrument, which had been calibrated earlier in the day. Therefore, there was no fuel damage or release of radioactive materials.

The operations of the facility during CY2011 were normal, with many hours of class support, tours, and training, and research support primarily related to semiconductor neutron detectors. There were no new experiments.

The NRC routine annual inspection during the summer of 2011 yielded no findings.

TS.6.1 1.e.2 - A tabulation showing the energy generated by the reactor (in megawatt-hours).

The monthly total energy generated by the KSU reactor is recorded in Table 1. The same data is shown as a bar chart in Figure 1. The total MWh of operation was virtually unchanged from the prior year, increasing from 56 MWh to 57 MWh.

Page 2 of 7

ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT Table 1 - Energy generated by the KSU Triga Mark II reactor by month for CY 2011.

Month MWh January 1.56 February 5.31 March 6.67 April 8.08 May 3.17 June 3.07 July 1.60 August 6.12 September 1.40 October 12.29 November 5.28 December 2.83 MWh per Month 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 January February March April -,.7/07_711 May ///'

June July '

August /

September October / */>>

November December Ir Figure 1 - Energy generated by the KSU Triga Mark II reactor by month for CY 2010.

Figure 2 shows the percentage of hours of reactor operation for various purposes, i.e.,

research support, training, education, etc. The percentage of hours for training appears small, because operator training was often performed when the reactor was being operated for another purpose, such as research support. The plot demonstrates that the reactor is operated in accordance with our stated primary functions: education; research support (e.g., irradiation); operator training; and demonstration (e.g., tours).

Page 3 of 7

ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT 0 Maintenance and 0% Testing GTours and Outreach 36%

eTraining 8%

4% MEducation 0 Research 31%

N Other Figure 2 - KSU reactor hours, based on purpose of operation.

TS.6.1 I.e.3 - The number of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, including the reason thereof and corrective action, if any, taken.

Inadvertent SCRAMS and Emergency Shutdowns Operator error - RO attempted to downrange NMP-1000, causing scram at low power 4/22/11 Period scram Operator error 4/30/11 Period scram Operator error 5/23/11 Period scram Operator did not set pulse interlock prior to switching to PULSE mode.

Operator selected "Test" instead of "Reset" 5/24/11 HV / percent power scram when resetting instrument 5/24/11 Linear power scram Unknown cause 6/24/11 AMS alarm False indication of failed fuel (iodine) 8/16/11 Period scram Operator error 9/13/11 Linear power scram Operator error - channel locked into low range As a result of the AMS alarm on 6/24/11, the AMS detector head that alarmed high was sent out for recalibration. The technician who calibrated the instrument reported that two chips were loose, which may have caused the unusual reading that lead to the false alarm.

The neutron activation analysis laboratory was also checked to identify the source of a Cs- 137 peak, which seemed to corroborate the AMS iodine alarm, but was ultimately determined to be part of the background spectrum. The source of the Cs-137 was not identified.

Page 4 of 7

ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT TS.6.11 .e.4 - Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed during the period, including the effects, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.

Two large electrical projects took place during 2011. The first was the installation of an emergency diesel generator. The generator installation provides backup power to some reactor systems, but does not replace any existing backup power source, so it does not adversely affect safety in any way.

The second project is the upgrade to the building power supply, including the installation of new breakers and a transformer in Room 14 of Ward Hall (adjacent to the 0' level of the reactor bay). This project has not yet affected reactor operations in any way, although in early 2012 the reactor AC power will be switched to the new system.

TS.6.1 1.e.5 - A summary of each change to the facility or procedures, tests, and experiments carried out under the conditions of 10CFR-50.59.

The following changes were carried out under 10CFR-50.59.

  • Locked gate added to perimeter fence
  • Dosimetry guidance added to Procedure OP-19
  • Radiation safety guidance added to Procedure OP-26
  • Breaker lockout requirement added to Management Order SOS-3, Cooling Tower Maintenance.

None of the above changes were determined to have a significant impact on the safety analysis. Copies of the 10CFR-50.59 screening checklists that were performed to accept the changes are attached to this report.

TS.6.1 1.e.6 - A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee as measured at or before the point of such release or discharge.

On three occasions, the contents of the sump were discharged to the secondary cooling loop. Per procedure, the radioisotope inventory and concentration were calculated prior to discharge, showing both to be well below the limits in 10CFR-20:

Avg. Limit* Total Concentration (pICi / Volume Total Activity Isotope (pCi / mL) mL) (mL) Released (pCi) 3H 1.23E-05 1.OOE-02 1.31E+02 14C 7.15E-06 3.OOE-04 1.06E+07 7.59E+01 32p 4.59E-06 9.OOE-05 4.88E+01

  • 10CFR-20, App.B Page 5 of 7

ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT The only other discharges beyond the facility boundary were HVAC condensate discharges to the sanitary sewer. Since the Kansas State University average water usage is 750,000 gallons per day, it is nearly impossible to exceed 10CFR20 limits for effluent concentration at the KSU reactor. The HVAC condensate measured concentration levels were all approximately at background levels, which is expected, since the HVAC condensate water is never circulated through or near the reactor core.

I TS.6.1 1.e.7 - A description of any environmental surveys performed outside the facility.

Monthly radiation surveys are performed within the facility to verify that radiation levels remain safe when at full-power operation. These surveys indicate that the dose rate at the inside surface of the reactor dome does not exceed the hourly dose limit to members of the public of 2 mR / h, as set forth in 10CFR-20, which indicates that the outside dose cannot exceed this limit.

TS.6.1 1.e.8 - A summary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant exposure, and a brief summary of the results of radiation and contamination surveys performed within the facilty.

Following an exposure incident on 9/22/10, the reactor procedures were reviewed and revised where necessary to strengthen the radiation protection posture of the facility.

This action has resulted in an observed five-fold decrease in both the maximum dose received by an individual and the total person-rem of dose to the reactor staff. The highest annual dose received by any worker in 2011 was 51 mrem DDE. This does not include records from the month of December, which are not yet available. Last year, the highest dose for any worker was 223 mrem. The total person-rem of dose to the reactor staff during the 11 month period from from 1/01/11 to 11/30/1 1was 158 mrem, compared to 764 mrem from 1/01/10 to 11/30/10. A table showing the number of workers receiving given amounts of dose is presented below.

Table 2 - Summary of total occupational dose received by KSU reactor workers from 12/01/2010 -

11/30/2011. Only workers with more than three months of employment are included.

mrem DDE LDE SDE (0,50] 9 9 7 (50, 100] 1 1 3 (100, 150] 0 0 0 (150, 200] 0 0 0 (200, 250] 0 0 0

>250 0 0 0 Visitor dose at the KSU TRIGA reactor facility is measured using Civil Defense self-indicating pocket dosimeters, with an indication range from 0-200 mR. Self-indicated pocket dosimeter readings suffer from imprecision due to parallax error, sometimes resulting in negative values or readings above the true value. In 2011, several dosimeters readings were incorrectly entered into the record systems, such that the dosimeter Page 6 of 7

ATTACHMENT 1 KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY TRIGA MARK II REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT exposure reading and dosimeter ID number were reversed. Aberrant results were checked against visitor dose records from the same tour, and were not included in these data if it appeared that the unusual values were from improper data entry or a dropped dosimeter.

10000 1000 0

100 E 10 z

1

<=0 (0,1] (1,21 (2,51 (5,101 (10,201 (20,501 >50 Exposure [mR]

Figure 3 - Visitor dose records from CY 2011. 5 abnormal records removed after checking against other records from the same visit.

All radiation surveys and contamination surveys conducted at the facility in 2010 were nominal.

This concludes the 2011 Annual Report for the Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Nuclear Reactor.

Page 7 of 7

SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2 Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE Experiment Procedure1 DATE 1/19/2011 DESCRIPTION Add locked gate to east side of security fence to allow generator Installation - reactor staff to maintain key control.

SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.

SSC Affected SSC Design function Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)

NA NA NA NA SAFETY ANAL YSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGA TION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMAN INTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSEDCHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS: Effect on facility security is negligible since gate will remain locked and reactor staff will maintain key control. The minimum distance that a member of the public could get to the reactor during an accident scenario will remain the same, so the SAR analyses are all still valid.

PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE: 1/19/2011 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.

S M M5ATTACHMENT2 On a! 7/0506 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE Op eratingProcedure19 DATE 5/24/11 DESCRIPTION Add dosimetry guidance to OP-19 SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.

SSC Affected SSC Design function Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)

NA NA NA NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & ACCIDENTRESPONSE/MITIGATION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMANINTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS:

PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE: 05/24/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.

SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2 Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE OperatingProcedure26 1DATE 5/10/11 DESCRIPTION Add radiatiori safety guidance to OP26 SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.

SSC Affected SSC Design function I Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)

NA NA NA NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & A CCIDENTRESPONSE/MITIGA TION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMAN INTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS:

PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE: 05/10/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.

SOM 5 ATTACHMENT 2 Original 7/05/06 Evaluation of Change, Program Effectiveness Page 1 of 3 TITLE SOS-3, Cooling tower DATE 02/10/2011 maintenance DESCRIPTION Include orders to lock out breaker prior to checking belt tension SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.

SSC Affected SSC Design function Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)

NA NA NA NA SAFETYANAL YSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGATION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMAN INTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS:

PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE: 02/10/2011 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.

SOM 5 ATTACHMENT Evaluation 2 of Change, Program Effectiveness Original Page 17/05/06 of 3 TITLE Diesel Generator DATE 10/1/11 DESCRIPTION Add a diesel generator as a backup power source for the security system.

SCREENING: The following guidance provides criteria to screen the proposed change from further assessing need for NRC review. If the change does not affect (1) a design function of SSC, (2) a method of performing or controlling design function, (3) evaluation for demonstrating the design function will be accomplished, then it is not necessary to continue the evaluation.

SSC Affected SSC Design function I Failure Mode(s) Accident scenario(s)

NA NA NA NA SAFETYANALYSIS & ACCIDENT RESPONSE/MITIGA TION YES NO Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would initiate an accident X Decrease SSC design function reliability when failure would mitigate accident X Reduce redundancy, reliability or defense in depth X Add or delete an automatic or manual design function of an SSC X HUMAN INTERFACE YES NO Convert an automatic feature to manual or vice versa X Adversely affect ability to perform required actions X Adversely affect time response of required actions X INTERFACE OUTSIDE THE PROPOSED CHANGE YES NO Degrade seismic or environmental qualification X Affect method of evaluation used to establish design basis or safety analysis X Introduce an unwanted or previously unreveiwed system or material interaction X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on electrical distribution X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects structural integrity X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on environmental conditions X (Not described in SAR) indirect effects on other SAR design functions X COMMENTS:

PERFORMED BY: J A Geuther DATE:_10/1/11 If any of the above answers are YES, then proceed to the EVALUATION section.

Evaluation - The diesel generator provides backup power to the security system following loss of onsite power. The addition of the generator does not reduce or inhibit availability of existing sources of backup power to the system, and therefore does not reduce system effectiveness.

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