ENS 53204: Difference between revisions
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| utype = GE-1, GE-3, GE-3 | | utype = GE-1, GE-3, GE-3 | ||
| cfr = 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) | | cfr = 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) | ||
| emergency class = Non Emergency | | emergency class = Non Emergency | ||
| notification date = 02/12/2018 13:47 | | notification date = 02/12/2018 13:47 | ||
| retracted = Yes | |||
| notification by = Sarah Kish | | notification by = Sarah Kish | ||
| NRC officer = Mark Abramovitz | | NRC officer = Mark Abramovitz | ||
| event date = 02/12/2018 12:00 CST | | event date = 02/12/2018 12:00 CST | ||
| last update date = | | last update date = 10/11/2019 | ||
| title = | | title = En Revision Imported Date 10/14/2019 | ||
| event text = On February 12, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specifications (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornado generated missiles, Dresden Station identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. Tornado generated missiles could strike the Unit 2, Unit 2/3, and Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator main fuel oil tank vents. This could result in crimping of the vents, which would affect the ability of the main fuel oil tanks to perform their function if a tornado would occur. | | event text = EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR TORNADO GENERATED MISSILES | ||
On February 12, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specifications (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornado generated missiles, Dresden Station identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. Tornado generated missiles could strike the Unit 2, Unit 2/3, and Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator main fuel oil tank vents. This could result in crimping of the vents, which would affect the ability of the main fuel oil tanks to perform their function if a tornado would occur. | |||
This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | ||
This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion' per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. | This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion' per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. | ||
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification. | The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification. | ||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/ | * * * RETRACTION ON 10/11/19 AT 1031 EDT FROM SAMANTHA COSENZA TO BETHANY CECERE * * * | ||
The purpose of this notification is to retract event notification 53204 made on February 12, 2018, for Dresden Station. Additional review determined that the current design of all three Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Main Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Vents is consistent with the licensing basis for Dresden Station. There was no non-conformance of Dresden's tornado missile protection design, and the EDGs were operable at the time the event notification was made. | |||
Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The ENS 53204 report is being retracted. | |||
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification." | |||
Notified R3DO (Hills). | |||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2019/20191014en.html#en53204 | |||
}}{{unit info | }}{{unit info | ||
| Unit = 2 | | Unit = 2 | ||
| type = | | type = | ||
| Scram code = N | | Scram code = N | ||
| Reactor critical = Y | | Reactor critical = Y | ||
| Initial power = 100 | | Initial power = 100 | ||
| Initial reactor mode = Power Operation | | Initial reactor mode = Power Operation | ||
| Current power = 100 | | Current power = 100 | ||
| Current reactor mode = Power Operation | | Current reactor mode = Power Operation | ||
}}{{unit info | }}{{unit info | ||
| Unit = 3 | | Unit = 3 | ||
| type = | | type = | ||
| Scram code = N | | Scram code = N | ||
| Reactor critical = Y | | Reactor critical = Y | ||
| Initial power = 100 | | Initial power = 100 | ||
| Initial reactor mode = Power Operation | | Initial reactor mode = Power Operation | ||
| Current power = 100 | | Current power = 100 | ||
| Current reactor mode = Power Operation | | Current reactor mode = Power Operation | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{ENS-Nav}}[[Category:Power Reactor]] | {{ENS-Nav}}[[Category:Power Reactor]] | ||
Latest revision as of 06:30, 15 October 2019
| Where | |
|---|---|
Dresden  Illinois (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-4.22 h-0.176 days <br />-0.0251 weeks <br />-0.00578 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Sarah Kish 13:47 Feb 12, 2018 |
| NRC Officer: | Mark Abramovitz |
| Last Updated: | Oct 11, 2019 |
| 53204 - NRC Website
| |
Dresden with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |