ENS 53997: Difference between revisions
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| emergency class = Non Emergency | | emergency class = Non Emergency | ||
| notification date = 04/13/2019 02:04 | | notification date = 04/13/2019 02:04 | ||
| retracted = Yes | |||
| notification by = Scott Christos | | notification by = Scott Christos | ||
| NRC officer = Donald Norwood | | NRC officer = Donald Norwood | ||
| event date = 04/12/2019 18:15 CDT | | event date = 04/12/2019 18:15 CDT | ||
| last update date = | | last update date = 05/24/2019 | ||
| title = | | title = En Revision Imported Date 5/28/2019 | ||
| event text = At approximately 1815 CDT on April 12, 2019, High Energy Line Break (HELB) Door-410A in the Reactor Building was discovered in the closed position. HELB Door-410B was previously closed for maintenance. Either Door-410A or Door-410B must be open to support the current HELB analyses. With both doors closed, this is considered an unanalyzed condition resulting in the loss of a post-HELB safe shutdown path. | | event text = EN Revision Text: HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK DOOR FOUND IN INCORRECT POSITION RESULTING IN LPCI AND CORE SPRAY BEING INOPERABLE | ||
At approximately 1815 CDT on April 12, 2019, High Energy Line Break (HELB) Door-410A in the Reactor Building was discovered in the closed position. HELB Door-410B was previously closed for maintenance. Either Door-410A or Door-410B must be open to support the current HELB analyses. With both doors closed, this is considered an unanalyzed condition resulting in the loss of a post-HELB safe shutdown path. | |||
With Door-410A and Door-410B closed, LPCI [Low Pressure Coolant Injection] and Core Spray injection valves in both divisions are no longer considered available. | With Door-410A and Door-410B closed, LPCI [Low Pressure Coolant Injection] and Core Spray injection valves in both divisions are no longer considered available. | ||
This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. | This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. | ||
The condition was resolved at approximately 1845 CDT on April 12, 2019 when Door-410A was blocked open. The health and safety of the public was not affected by this condition. | The condition was resolved at approximately 1845 CDT on April 12, 2019 when Door-410A was blocked open. The health and safety of the public was not affected by this condition. | ||
The NRC Resident has been notified. | The NRC Resident has been notified. | ||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2019/ | * * * RETRACTION FROM JESSE TYGUM TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1330 EDT ON 5/24/19 * * * | ||
Event Notification (EN) #53997, made on 4/13/2019, is being retracted. An engineering evaluation completed subsequent to this event analyzed the discovered condition with both Door-410A and Door-410B being closed. The engineering evaluation determined that the environmental conditions present with both Door-410A and Door-410B closed would not have impacted the availability of both divisions of the LPCI (Low Pressure Coolant Injection) and Core Spray injection valves nor would it have resulted in the loss of a post-HELB safe shutdown path. Therefore, this condition did not meet the criteria for an 8-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety or per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. | |||
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |||
The licensee also notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer. Notified R3DO (Cameron). | |||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2019/20190528en.html#en53997 | |||
}}{{unit info | }}{{unit info | ||
| Unit = 1 | | Unit = 1 | ||
Latest revision as of 08:30, 28 May 2019
| Where | |
|---|---|
Monticello  Minnesota (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+2.82 h0.118 days <br />0.0168 weeks <br />0.00386 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Scott Christos 02:04 Apr 13, 2019 |
| NRC Officer: | Donald Norwood |
| Last Updated: | May 24, 2019 |
| 53997 - NRC Website
| |
Monticello with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |