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05000247/FIN-2012005-012012Q4Indian PointInadequate Corrective Actions regarding operational controls of the steam generator blowdown valve radiation bypass switchThe inspectors identified a Green, NCV of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, because Entergy personnel did not adequately identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with maintenance procedures and activities that adversely impact the steam generator (SG) safety function to remove decay heat. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not implement adequate corrective actions to address existing procedure deficiencies regarding operational controls on the steam generator blowdown (SGBD) valve radiation bypass switch. Entergys corrective actions included identifying and placing a hold on instructions directing use of the radiation bypass switch; implementing operator training; and identifying previous occurrences of the condition which resulted in the plant being placed in an unanalyzed condition. Entergy personnel entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP2-2013-0191. This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, maintenance procedures inappropriately allowing operation of the SGBD valve radiation bypass switch could adversely impact the SG safety function to remove decay heat. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design of a mitigating system that maintained its functionality. Specifically, failure of the SGBD isolation valves to close would cause loss of SG water level because the remaining motor driven auxiliary boiler feedwater pump would exceed its design flow rate. However, given the time available, existing procedures, and operator training on isolating the SGBD flowpaths, either from the control room or locally, SG decay heat removal functionality was maintained. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program because Entergy staff did not thoroughly evaluate this problem such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of condition. Specifically, Entergy staff did not properly evaluate the use and impact of the radiation bypass switch for the SGBD isolation when considering allowable configurations of the auxiliary feedwater system.
05000247/FIN-2012005-022012Q4Indian PointLicensee-Identified ViolationTechnical specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage , in part requires RCS operational leakage shall be limited to no pressure boundary leakage. With pressure boundary leakage as a result of two through wall defects identified on the RCS as reported to the NRC in LER 05000247/2012-003-00, and as described in Section 4OA3, TS 3.4.13 requires the plant be shutdown within 6 hours. Contrary to TS 3.4.13, RCS operational leakage existed between April 2010 and March 2012, but Entergy did not implement actions to place the plant in a shutdown condition. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-1733. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Loss of Coolant Accident Initiators, because after reasonable assessment of the degradation, the finding could not exceed the leak rate for a small LOCA; and could not have likely affected other systems used to mitigate a LOCA resulting in a total loss of their function.
05000247/FIN-2012004-012012Q3Indian PointInadequate Operability Evaluation of Non-conforming Safety Related BatteriesThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because Entergy personnel did not adequately implement procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Section 5.1, to assess the operability of safety related station batteries on June 4, 2012. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not appropriately determine the impact on operability as a result of inadequate surveillance testing of the 21, 22 and 24 station batteries. Entergy staff re-performed the operability determination, identified the issues as nonconforming and implemented compensatory measures. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-4009. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, after inspectors questioned the operability determination, the non-conforming condition was identified and resulted in the station batteries being declared operable with required compensatory measures, revising calculations and implementing a modification to reduce battery load. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance with the Decision Making attribute because Entergy personnel did not use conservative assumptions in decision making with regards to the non-conservative testing of safety related batteries and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action.
05000247/FIN-2012004-022012Q3Indian PointInadequate Test Control of Safety Related BatteriesThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because Entergy did not assure that all testing required to demonstrate safety related batteries will perform satisfactorily was identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, temperature compensation for battery discharge testing was performed incorrectly which caused errors in the battery capacity calculations. Entergy staff immediately reviewed historical test results to confirm the batteries remained operable. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-5338. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition, it was similar to Example 2c of NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that the test control inadequacies affected multiple batteries and the issue was repetitive. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources Component, because Entergy did not ensure that complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the battery discharge test procedures did not ensure that temperature compensation was correctly applied to provide accurate capacity calculations.
05000247/FIN-2012004-042012Q3Indian PointInadequate Operability Evaluation of 22 Static Inverter with a Degraded Frequency MeterThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because Entergy staff did not adequately implement procedure EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process, section 5.1, to assess the operability of the 22 static inverter due to a degraded frequency meter on September 7, 2012. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not adequately evaluate the impact of the degraded meter on the operability of the static inverter. This condition caused the inverter to be inoperable. As a result of inspector questions, Entergy staff immediately declared the static inverter inoperable and replaced the frequency meter. Entergy staff entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-5620. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the degraded frequency meter resulted in the static inverter being declared inoperable on September 10, 2012 to replace the frequency meter. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance with the Decision Making attribute because Entergy personnel did not make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained. Specifically, Entergy did not obtain interdisciplinary input and reviews in resolving degraded 22 static inverter frequency meter.
05000247/FIN-2012004-032012Q3Indian PointInadequate Procedure Guidance to Maintain 22 ABFP Governor Oiler LevelOn July 17, 2012, the inspectors identified that there was no visible oil level in the 22 ABFP governor oiler resevoir, which called into question the adequate lubrication of the governor bearing assembly and operability of the 22 ABFP. Entergy staff immediately added oil to the oiler reservoir and documented the condition in CRIP2- 2012-4631. Subsequently, Entergy determined the pump was operable based on an operability evaluation documented in CR-IP2-2011-5447, on November 2, 2011, for a similar condition. This evaluation determined that the pump remained capable of performing its intended function, since the oiler wick within the reservoir remained saturated. In addition, Entergy determined the pump was operable, because the wick was wet upon discovery, which indicated it had recently flowed oil to the governor bearing assembly. The governor oiler utilizes a wick feed oiler with an internal cotton wick which when saturated in oil, flows oil to the governor bearing assembly. The oiler design results in a flow of 2 to 5 drops per hour, which correlates to approximately 6 to 15 ounces per month. However, when the reservoir is empty, the wick becomes un-saturated and no oil flows. Once the oil passes through the governor bearing, it accumulates in the governor sump, where through periodic (every 6 months) preventive maintenance (PM), it is drained, measured and recorded to prevent excessive oil accumulation in the sump, which could adversely affect the governor or pump operation. On July 19, 2012, inspectors again identified that there was no visible oil level in the governor oiler, and that the oilers wick did not come in contact with the bottom of the reservoir as designed. Entergy immediately added oil to the oiler reservoir, adjusted the wick and documented the conditions in CR-IP2-2012-4756 & 4757. On July 25, 2012, the inspectors again identified no visible oil level in the reservoir. Entergy staff immediately added oil to the reservoir and documented the condition in CR-IP2-2012-4803. The NRCs recurrent identification of empty oiler reservoirs, resulted in Entergys initiation of a special log (2-12-079) to verify twice daily that (1) the reservoir oil level is visible, (2) the wick is saturated in oil, (3) entry of the action into operations logs, and (4) track all oil additions with the CAP. As a result of implementing the special log, the inspectors noted oil addition to the oiler increased from approximately twice a month, to daily. In addition, Entergy drained the governor sump using the PM procedure, on August 31, 2012, to prevent excess accumulation of oil in the sump and to compare the recorded volume of oil with the 10 ounces collected during the most recent PM performed on July 30, 2012. The oil collected was 8.5 ounces, which was determined by Entergy to be a volume within the range expected for a month. The inspectors noted that Entergys operability evaluations for the July 19 and July 25, 2012 conditions also referenced the November 2011 evaluation documented in CR-IP2- 2011-5547. The inspectors noted that the evaluation recommended that during oil replenishment, oil addition be maintained at about half way within the reservoir to preclude a siphon effect on the oiler. However, no corrective actions were assigned to implement this recommendation. Furthermore, the evaluation stated that the oilers oil consumption rate was within the expected range. However, the inspectors identified that this was contrasted by the governor sump draining results obtained on August 31, 2012. Specifically, based on 1999 correspondence between Entergy and the oilers vendor Dresser-Rand, Entergy should have expected adding oil to the oiler more frequently and collecting 36 90 ounces of oil during the periodic PM. During the oil additions that followed each event, the inspectors identified that procedure 2-SOP-AFW-001 was referenced for these oil additions, but only required the operator to verify governor oiler level is visible. Hence, the oil added was not quantified nor was an expected level in relation to the wick, specified in this procedure. The inspectors also identified that Entergy staff controlled the wick adjustment with engineering guidance, instead of an established procedure. Entergy initiated CR-IP2-2012-5711, to evaluate the overall condition of the 22 ABFP governor oiler. The evaluation determined that the monitoring of component and equipment operating parameters was less than adequate. Corrective actions included changing the design of the oiler to a gravity feed style oiler; revising the system monitoring criteria to include tracking governor oil consumption; changing the PM frequency from 6 months to 3 months; and evaluating the past operability of the pump as a result of not having the desired vendor-recommended flow rate to the governor bearing assembly (to be performed under CR-IP3-2012-2400). This issue will be tracked as a URI, because Entergys assessment of the impact of inadequate lubrication of the 22 ABFP governor bearing assembly on the past operability of the 22 ABFP with regard to being able to perform its intended safety function for its specified mission time of 29 hours is needed to determine whether the identified performance deficiency is more-than-minor. This information to be developed is tracked in Entergys CAP under CR-IP3-2012-2400.
05000247/FIN-2012003-022012Q2Indian PointAn LER for an Inoperable Main Steam Safety Valve Was Not Submitted When RequiredThe inspectors identified a Severity Level lV, NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), because Entergy personnel did not provide a written licensee event report (LER) to the NRC within 60 days of identifying during testing that MS-46D, main steam line safety valve, was inoperable and in a condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specification (TS). Entergy personnel adjusted the valves lift setpoint to within the TS operability limit, repaired and tested the valve before plant startup. Entergy staff entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-3320 and CR-IP2-2012-4153. The inspectors determined that the failure to provide a written LER within 60 days was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. This violation involved not making a required report to the NRC and is considered to impact the regulatory process. Such violations are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. Using the NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report, example (d)(9), the NRC determined this violation is more than minor and is categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process with no underlying technical violation that would be considered more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, a cross-cutting aspect is not assigned to this violation.
05000247/FIN-2012003-012012Q2Indian PointForeign Materials Control Procedure Not Followed Resulting in Degraded 21 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal PackageA self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified because Entergy personnel did not follow procedure 0-PMP-401-RCS, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Package Inspection, to prevent foreign material from entering the 21 reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal package. Specifically, during the March 2010 refueling outage, Entergy personnel did not follow procedure 0-PMP-401-RCS and implement the foreign material exclusion procedural controls which resulted in a degraded 21 RCP seal package. Entergy personnel subsequently replaced the 21 RCP seal package and entered this issue into the CAP as condition report (CR)-IP2-2011-5052. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was that Entergy staff did not follow procedure 0-PMP-401-RCS to prevent foreign material from entering the 21 RCP seal assembly. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the foreign material introduced into the 21 RCP seal package resulted in an increase in the likelihood of tripping the 21 RCP due to further potential for degradation of the 21 RCP seal package. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the foreign material had the potential to further damage the seal package and result in a more significant safety concern. Using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for RCS leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices attribute because Entergy personnel did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures.
05000247/FIN-2011003-012011Q2Indian PointEntergy Did Not Identify and Correct a Performance Deficiency During an Emergency Preparedness DrillThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plan, paragraph (b)( 14), because Entergy staff did not properly identify an emergency response deficiency which occurred during a drill. Specifically, during the operator training scenario conducted on January 25, 2011, the training staff did not identify that the Offsite Communicator had not contacted all offsite authorities, as required by the IPEC Emergency Plan (EP), thereby preventing the deficient performance from being placed in the corrective action program and remediated. This issue was entered into Entergy\'s CAP as CR-IP22011- 3498. This finding is more than minor because it affected the Emergency Response Organization attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone to ensure that Entergy personnel are capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, Section 4.14 and Sheet 1, Failure to Comply, the inspectors determined that the failure to comply with an aspect of the Emergency Plan related to drill and exercise assessment (10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)) was a Planning Standard (PS) problem. Per Section 4.14.2.1 of Appendix B, states a critique that fails to identify any PS weakness during a limited facility interaction drill where there is a limited team of evaluators (e.g., facility table-top training drill, operator training simulator drill, individual facility training drill) is a green finding. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making attribute because Entergy Personnel did not communicate decisions and the basis for decisions to personnel who have a need to know the information in order to perform work safely, in a timely manner.
05000247/FIN-2011003-022011Q2Indian PointInadequate Monitoring of Maintenance Rule In-Scope Service Water Pump and Circulating Water Pump Bay StructuresThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, because Entergy personnel did not monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and components, as defined in paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 50.65, are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. Specifically, between August 25, 2004 and May 19, 2011, Entergy personnel did not monitor the condition of the service water pump (SWP) and circulating water pump (CWP) bays in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the SWP and CWP bays remained capable of fulfilling their intended function. This issued was entered into Entergy\'s CAP as CR-IP22011- 2006. This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the condition could have resulted in the loss of function due to degrading concrete material properties of structures and systems designed to mitigate design basis events. This finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Entergy personnel evaluated the condition of the SWP and CWP bays and determined these structures continued to meet the licensing basis requirements, with reduced margin, and thus remained operable for design loads inclusive of site extreme environmental conditions. Using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function, was not a loss of barrier function, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices attribute because Entergy personnel did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel follow procedures when Entergy staff documented a preventive maintenance (PM) task as complete when the work had not been performed.
05000247/FIN-2011003-032011Q2Indian PointInadequate Operability Evaluation for Degraded Pressurizer Modulating Heater Group ControllerThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix S, Criterion V Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because Entergy personnel did not adequately implement Procedure EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process, to assess the operability of the pressurizer modulating heater group. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not adequately evaluate a degraded condition identified with the modulating heater group controller and the impact on the modulating heater group operability. This resulted in the modulating heater being inoperable between August 18, 2010 and January 19, 2011, and an unplanned entry into a Technical Specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.4.9, Pressurizer. This issued was entered into Entergy\'s corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP2-2011-3493. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the inadequate procedure implementation resulted in the pressurizer modulating heater group being inoperable for approximately five months and an unplanned entry into a TS LCO. Using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the CAP attribute because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problems associated with the pressurizer modulating heater group controller such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. This includes properly classifying, prioritizing, and evaluating for operability and reportability conditions adverse to quality.
05000247/FIN-2011003-042011Q2Indian PointInaccurate 21 Static Inverter AC Output VoltmeterThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because Entergy personnel did not assure that adequate test instrumentation was available and used for 21 inverter surveillance tests. Specifically, between April 4, 2010, and July 13, 2011, the 21 inverter alternating current (AC) output voltage meter was used for TS surveillance tests without adequately addressing its degraded condition, which resulted in recording inaccurate and non-conservative TS surveillance test results. This issue was entered into Entergy\'s CAP as CR IP2-2011-03468. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the objective to ensure the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (Le., core damage). Specifically, the degraded meter resulted in inaccurate and nonconservative TS surveillance results from April 4, 2010, to July 13, 2011. Using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not related to a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function because the control room instrument bus provided reasonable assurance that the requirements of the TS surveillance tests were met, and the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external events. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making attribute because Entergy personnel did not use conservative assumptions in decision making. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not use appropriate assumptions regarding the inverter performance expectations during the 2010 to 2012 cycle considering actual performance during the 2008 to 2010 Cycle.
05000219/FIN-2011003-012011Q2Oyster CreekFailure to perform acceptance inspection of contractor work results in damage to safety related instrument cableThe inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, lnspection, when Exelon did not conduct a post maintenance inspection of work accomplished by a contractor on main steam isolation valve (MSIV), V-1-10, which resulted in heat damage to the valve position indication cabling causing a ground on the cable and the receipt of a half scram. Exelon\'s corrective actions included replacement of the damaged cable, performance of a work group evaluation and revising the main steam insulation work orders to include a caution to not install insulation on top of cabling. The finding was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone of equipment performance to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of a Class I cable. Additionally, this finding is similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 4.a, in that an evaluation required by procedures was not performed and resulted in a failure in the system. The inspectors evaluated the risk of this finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (green) because it did not result in an actual loss of function of the MSIV or the reactor protection system. The inspectors determined that this performance deficiency did not involve a cross cutting aspect as it occurred 4 years earlier and is not indicative of current licensee performance.
05000247/FIN-2011002-012011Q1Indian PointMain Steam System Configuration Control Procedure Not Adequate to Ensure Closure of MS-55DThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because Entergy procedure 2-COL-18.1, Main Steam and Reheat System, was not adequate to ensure closure of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) bypass stop valve MS-55D. Specifically, between April 10, 2010 and September 12, 2010, procedure 2-COL-18.1 did not provide adequate instructions to operators to ensure MS-55D was closed, which resulted in MS-55D being left partially open, and unable to isolate the 24 steam generator (SG) during accident conditions. Entergy personnel took immediate corrective actions to close MS-55D. This issue was entered into Entergys CAP as condition reports (CRs) IP2-2010-05694 and IP2-2010-06745. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the inadequate procedure resulted in the manual 3-inch MSIV bypass stop valve MS-55D for the 24 SG being left partially open for approximately five months. Based on NRC senior reactor analyst review, it was determined that operators could have isolated the other three SGs with their MSIVs and steamed them to remove decay heat and depressurize the plant using their atmospheric dump valves, while isolating the 24 SG further down the main steam system at the turbine bypass and stop valves. Therefore, using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of the safety function given the operators ability to isolate the other SGs and the 24 SG with the turbine bypass and stop valves. Additionally, the finding was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined there was no cross-cutting issue associated with the finding because the performance deficiency did not reflect Entergy\'s current performance. Specifically, the procedure change occurred more than three years ago and was outside the current assessment period.
05000247/FIN-2011002-022011Q1Indian PointNotification Process for State/Local Authorities During a Simulator ScenarioFollowing the emergency declaration of an Alert by operators during a simulator drill scenario on January 25, 2011, the operators entered emergency plan implementing procedure IP-EP-210, Central Control Room, Attachment 9.1, Shift Manager/Plant Operations Manager (Emergency Director) Checklist. The IPEC Emergency Plan, Section E, Notification Methods and Procedures, paragraph 1.b.5, requires in part that an immediate notification (within 15 minutes) of an Alert is made by the Shift Manager or his designee to the New York State and Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, and Orange Counties. The emergency plan implementing procedure checklist directs the Shift Manager to complete a New York State (NYS) Radiological Emergency Data Form and have a control room Offsite Communicator email and fax the data form to the offsite authorities. The Offsite Communicator must then confirm receipt of the information by offsite authorities. NRC regulations, specifically 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), require in part that procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations. The drill scenario simulated one county not being present during the initial notification call via the radiological emergency communication system (RECS). The Offsite Communicator provided the event notification to NYS and the counties that were present on the line. The NRC inspectors observed that during the drill the Offsite Communicator did not implement additional communication measures to ensure the county, not present during the initial notification, received the event notification via fax. The inspectors observed that not affirming receipt of the notification by the county would not be consistent with IPEC Emergency Plan Section E in ensuring the licensee notifies all state and local authorities. The inspectors also observed that Entergy evaluators did not address this issue during the simulator scenario critique. The inspectors questioned Entergy personnel regarding their views during the simulator scenario and the expected operator response. The inspectors concluded additional information is required from Entergy staff related to their assessment regarding the adequacy of the procedure IP-EP-210, Attachment 9.1 and operator training with regard to the implementation of that procedure. Prior to completion of this inspection, Entergy personnel revised the Control Room Initial Notification Checklist (Form EP-4) to provide direction to operators in the event initial notifications are not able to be completed for required state and local authorities.
05000247/FIN-2011002-032011Q1Indian PointEntergy Personnel Did Not Identify a Leak on the 25 Service Water Pump PipingThe inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because Entergy personnel did not promptly identify and correct an adverse condition related to a service water (SW) pipe leak. Specifically, on October 29, 2010, NRC inspectors identified a leak on the base weld of the 25 SW pipe vacuum breaker which required subsequent evaluation and repair by Entergy personnel to restore operability of the 25 service water pump (SWP). This issue was entered into Entergys CAP as CR IP2-2010-6620. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the 25 SW pipe weld leak challenged the capability and the reliability of the SWP, and the pump was declared inoperable by Entergy personnel to conduct repairs. Using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not related to a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the CAP attribute because Entergy personnel did not implement a CAP with a low threshold for identifying issues, specifically, identifying a leak on the 25 SWP piping.
05000247/FIN-2009003-012009Q2Indian PointInadequate Design Change Package for Installation of Main Boiler Feed Pump Control System TubingThe inspectors documented a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance because Entergy engineers did not provide adequate guidance in a design change package for installation of tubing in the 21 main boiler feedwater pump (MBFP) control system that eventually led to the tubing failure and an unplanned trip of the reactor plant. Entergys design change procedure required that instructions delineating installation precautions be provided in the design change package. Entergys corrective actions included repairing the affected tubing, identifying and replacing similar tubing on the 22 MBFP, and examining Unit3 MBFPs to identify the extent of the condition. Entergy staff placed this issue into the corrective action program and performed a root cause analysis. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected its objective to limit the likelihood of events that affect plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. Specifically, the incorrectly installed MBFP control tubing resulted in a loss of the 21 MBFP and, ultimately, a reactor trip due to low steam generator water level. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using the Phase 2 Indian Point Unit 2 risk-informed inspection notebook, in accordance with IMC0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The inspectors determined there was no cross-cutting issue associated with the finding because the performance deficiency did not reflect current licensee performance. Specifically, the performance deficiency occurred several years ago and was outside the current assessment period, and procedures have since been improved in the design control, work control and vendor control processes that reduced the likelihood of vendors working one quipment without sufficient training or work instructions.
05000247/FIN-2009003-022009Q2Indian PointLicensee-Identified ViolationSection 4OA5.2, on January 7, 2009, following installation and post work testing of an additional backup nitrogen supply to the ADVs, Entergy personnel identified that surveillance tests for the nitrogen backup supplies to the ADVs were never performed contrary to TS surveillance requirement 3.3.4.2.The inspectors determined this constituted a violation of TS 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown, which includes the TS surveillance requirement to verify that the nitrogen backup supply control circuit and transfer switch to the steam generator ADVs are capable of performing their intended function. Contrary to this requirement, Entergy personnel did not verify the functionality of the control circuitry associated with the nitrogen backup supply to the ADVs. The inspectors determined this issue was of very low safety significance (Green) per SDP Phase 1 screening because the safety function of the ADVs was not lost. Specifically, the inspectors determined the remote shutdown function for the steam generator requires only one ADV to be operable. All four ADVs were capable of being operated with the normal station air supply. Entergy personnel entered the issues into the corrective action program as CR-IP2-2009-00062, -00069, -00077, -00137, and -00983
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