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 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 568387 November 2023 17:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual HeatAuxiliary Feedwater System InoperableThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 07, 2023 at 1200 EST, it was discovered that all pumps in the Auxiliary Feedwater system were inoperable due to the loss of control power to the 'B' train Emergency Feedwater (EFW) flow control valve which supplies the 'D' steam generator. The redundant 'A' train EFW control valve for the 'D' steam generator remains functional, as well as the capability of the Auxiliary Feedwater system to supply all steam generators. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The 'A' and 'B' EFW Flow Control Valves are arranged in a series configuration for each Steam Generator. Failure of any of the 8 EFW Flow Control Valves to meet its Surveillance Requirements will render all EFW Pumps inoperable per tech specs.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
ENS 5664530 July 2023 19:26:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Due to LOW Main Turbine ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC Control (EHC) Oil LevelThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On July 30, 2023 at 1526 EDT, with unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to low main turbine electro-hydraulic control oil level. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat removal is being accomplished using the steam dumps in steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency Feedwater actuated due to low-low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Main Turbine
Decay Heat Removal
Main Condenser
ENS 565562 June 2023 18:30:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFITNESS-FOR-DUTY Report

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On June 2, 2023, a blind specimen provided to a laboratory did not analyze as expected. The specimen reported a false negative for amphetamines and a false positive for opiates. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(c)(2) and 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 0909 EDT ON JUNE 22, 2023 FROM ANDREW CORRETTE TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

Follow-up investigation by an independent Health and Human Services laboratory confirmed that the blind specimen in question was analyzed correctly. The error is thought to have occurred during the preparation of the blind specimen, prior to delivery to the site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R1DO (Eve) and FFD Group (email)

ENS 565656 May 2023 19:52:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationActuations of Reactor Protection SystemThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 05/06/2023, at 1552 (EDT) with Seabrook Unit 1 in Mode 3 at zero percent power, while performing digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'E' stopped withdrawing. In response, the reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS). Subsequently, at 2253 while continuing to perform digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'C 'stopped inserting. Reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the RPS. The RPS responded as designed during both events, and both actuations are being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.Reactor Protection System
ENS 5656412 April 2023 15:07:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationAutomatic Actuation of "B" Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Power SequencerThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 12, 2023, with Seabrook Station Unit 1 in Mode 6 at zero percent power, a valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) emergency power sequencer occurred due to a loss of power to the 'B' train emergency bus. The 'B' EDG was removed from service for scheduled maintenance during this time. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of the 'B' EDG emergency power sequencer. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.Emergency Diesel Generator
ENS 5598912 July 2022 14:51:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseInadvertent Siren ActivationThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1051 EDT on July 12, 2022, Seabrook Station received report of inadvertent siren activation. Local authorities have been contacted to apprise them of inadvertent activation of sirens. No press release is planned at this time. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The inadvertent activation involved one group of nine (9) sirens in the Seabrook Beach area. The cause of the activation is under investigation.
ENS 5580428 March 2022 14:25:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsProhibited Substance Discovered within the Protected AreaA non-licensed employee possessed a prohibited substance (alcohol) within the Protected Area. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold pending results of an investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5538428 July 2021 17:45:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFitness for Duty ReportA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 547406 June 2020 13:20:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Reactor Trip When Group One, Bank 'B' Control Rods Inserted Into the CoreAt 0920 (EDT), with the unit in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to group 1 of control rod bank 'B' fully inserting into the core. All systems responded normally post trip. Operations has stabilized the plant in mode 3 at NOP/NOT (normal operating pressure and temperature). Decay heat removal is being accomplished via the steam dumps in the steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency feedwater actuated due to low low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The plant response to the trip was uncomplicated. All safe shutdown equipment is available. There were no reliefs or safeties actuated during the transient. The licensee manually tripped eight days ago for the same condition. See EN #54731.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Decay Heat Removal
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 5473129 May 2020 18:03:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Trip Due to Rod Bank Unexpectedly InsertingAt 1403 EDT, with the unit in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to Group 1 of Control Rod Bank 'B' unexpectedly inserting. All systems responded normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3 at 557 degrees Fahrenheit. Decay heat removal is being accomplished via the steam dumps in the steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency feedwater actuated due to low low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR (b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Decay Heat Removal
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 545696 March 2020 02:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessPlanned Plant Computer Outage for System UpgradeOn March 05, 2020, at 2100 EST, the site commenced a planned upgrade of the main plant computer system (MPCS). During this upgrade, the normal computer data will not be available to the emergency response facilities, but compensatory capabilities will be in place. The scheduled duration for the MPCS upgrade is 96 hours. Since the compensatory measures will be in place in excess of 72 hours, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5389725 February 2019 12:04:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFitness-For-Duty - Licensee Supervisor Confirmed Positive for AlcoholA non-licensed, licensee supervisory employee failed a for-cause FFD test for alcohol. The individual's authorization for site access has been denied. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5385431 January 2019 15:30:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFalse Negative Indicated on a Fitness for Duty Blind Quality Assurance TestOn 1/31/2019, the Medical Review Officer for Seabrook was notified of an error made by the HHS (Health and Human Services) certified lab resulting in a false negative Fitness for Duty quality assurance test result. The test lab, Quest Diagnostics-Norristown, was provided an adulterated sample specimen that was part of a blind performance test, which tested negative. This false negative test result will be investigated and the results reported as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 537601 October 2018 05:00:0010 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LERInvalid Specified System ActuationThis 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). At 0147 (EST) on October 1, 2018, Seabrook Unit 1 was in Mode 3 shutdown, when an invalid Reactor Protection System actuation occurred due to a high Source Range detector. All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into Seabrook's corrective action program for resolution. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Source Range detector which gave the invalid input has been replaced.Reactor Protection System
ENS 5271829 April 2017 22:44:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level Signal and Feedwater IsolationAt 1844 (EDT) on 04/29/2017, while the unit was in a low power condition exiting from a refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped following a P-14 signal (Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level) and a resulting feedwater isolation signal. All control rods were verified to be fully inserted. The cause of the ('B') steam generator high level is currently being investigated. Emergency feedwater actuated at 1845 due to a low-low water level in steam generator 'D'. Plant equipment response is being evaluated and the plant is stabilized in Mode 3 with decay heat removal through the steam dump system to the condensers. There was no release and the emergency feedwater system has been restored to standby. The event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Decay Heat Removal
Control Rod
Emergency Feedwater System
05000443/LER-2017-001
ENS 522887 October 2016 20:20:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFitness for Duty Report - Discovery of Prohibited SubstanceThis report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b). At 1620 EDT today, a prohibited substance (marijuana) was identified inside the protected area. The substance was obviously very old, so is surmised to be from a preoperational period. The item (a small remainder, or butt, of a marijuana joint) is currently under the control of the site security department and will be turned over to local law enforcement for disposal. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5193216 May 2016 07:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessSeismic Monitoring System Out of Service for Planned Upgrade

At 0300 EDT on May 16, 2016, Seabrook Station's seismic monitoring instrumentation will be removed from service for a planned upgrade to the Seismic Monitoring Control Panel and its accelerometers. Modifications are expected to be complete on May 27, 2016. Proceduralized compensatory measures are in place and have been communicated to applicable emergency response decision makers. This preplanned action is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/26/16 AT 2049 EDT FROM MIKE TAYLOR TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

At 2045 EDT on 5/26/16, the seismic monitoring system was returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).

ENS 517652 March 2016 18:12:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationValid Actuation of Emergency FeedwaterOn 3/2/2016, (at) 1312 hours EST, while in the process of a plant cooldown, a valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system (EFW) occurred when B steam generator levels were reduced to 20 (percent). The lowering level was a result of the unanticipated tripping of the start up feed pump on low condensate storage level while it was the feed source to the steam generators. The start up feed pump was restarted and feed flow had been restored when the actuation took place. The EFW flow was secured per procedure and the start up feed pump remains the feed source to the steam generators. This is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Emergency Feedwater System
05000443/LER-2016-002
ENS 517622 March 2016 07:53:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Turbine Trip Causing a Reactor Trip

The turbine tripped for an unknown cause followed by a reactor trip. All systems are functioning as designed. Operators have transitioned out of the EOP (Emergency Operating Procedure) network into normal operating procedures. The plant is stable in mode 3. All control rods fully inserted during the trip and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Emergency Feedwater actuation occurred to restore steam generator levels. The plant expects to make a press release. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1043 EST ON 3/2/16 FROM BARRY BRADBURY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee will not issue a press release for this event. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook).

Steam Generator
Feedwater
Control Rod
05000443/LER-2016-001
ENS 5081712 February 2015 18:30:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsViolation of Fitness for Duty PolicyThis event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 26.719 because a non-licensed licensee supervisor violated the fitness for duty policy. The individual's access has been terminated. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.
ENS 505137 October 2014 16:20:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseInadvertent Siren ActuationAt approximately 1230 EDT on October 7, 2014, Seabrook Station was notified by Rockingham County Dispatch that an inadvertent activation of the Public Alert Notification System (PANS) sirens in Newtown, NH occurred at 1220 EDT. The activation was caused by an apparent human error during procedure review by a town of Newton employee. The sirens sounded, reset, and are functional. This event is being reported as it may generate media interest. No press release is planned at this time. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and Region I have been notified.
ENS 499791 April 2014 04:26:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Trip Due to Electrical IssueAt 0026 on 04/01/2014, following the turbine shutdown and removal of the main generator from service in preparation for refueling outage 16, Seabrook had a reactor trip and all control rods were fully inserted. The trip was caused by an electrical issue that caused 345 KV bus 6 to deenergize and power was lost to the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UATs). The in-house busses transferred to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) supplies and the momentary loss of power to in-house Bus 1 caused 2 reactor coolant pumps to trip, generating a 2 loop loss of flow reactor trip signal. The exact cause of the initiating electrical issue is being investigated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Emergency feedwater actuated at 0035 due to a low low water level in steam generator 'C'. Plant equipment response is being evaluated and the plant is stabilized in Mode 3 with decay heat removal through the steam dump system to the condensers. There was no release and the emergency feedwater system is being restored to standby. The event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Decay Heat Removal
Control Rod
Emergency Feedwater System
ENS 4841316 October 2012 23:20:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class DeclarationUnusual Event Declared Due to Earthquake Felt On-Site

An Unusual Event was declared at 1920 EDT, HU1 - Earthquake felt in the plant (Control Room), and confirmed by calling the Manchester Dispatch Office. Post event walkdowns indicate no reports of damage at the station. Walkdowns of station structures and systems continue. Plant is stable in Mode 5 planned refueling outage. No adverse impacts to shutdown cooling. The station seismic monitor is currently out of service for a scheduled calibration. The licensee is exiting a refueling outage. The earthquake was felt by the site at 1914 EDT. The United States Geological Survey website indicates that an earthquake of magnitude 4.0 centered 3 miles west of Hollis Center, Maine occurred at this time. The licensee is currently in a Train 'B' system outage. All Train 'A' systems are functioning as required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. No media or press release is anticipated at this time. The Headquarters Operations Officer has notified other FEDS (FEMA, DHS, DHS NICC and Nuclear SSA via email).

* * * UPDATE FROM SEAN RILEY TO PETE SNYDER AT 0212 ON 10/17/12 * * * 

The Unusual Event was terminated at 0149 EDT. Initiating condition was HU-1 due to the earthquake felt at the plant and confirmed by calling Manchester Dispatch Office. Information obtained by seismic monitoring system confirmed no additional escalation warranted. Site walkdown of key systems revealed no damage from the earthquake. All systems required for the current mode of operation were not adversely affected and remain in operation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Welling), NRR (Bahadur), IRD (Grant) and other FEDS (FEMA, DHS, DHS NICC and Nuclear SSA via email).

Shutdown Cooling
ENS 483631 October 2012 08:24:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessEmergency Response Data System Is Unavailable for Service

Seabrook personnel determined that the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is unavailable due to a malfunction of its process computer. The condition occurred around 0430 EDT today after a plant electrical bus was de-energized and subsequently reenergized during a maintenance activity. The plant is presently in a refueling outage with the reactor vessel defueled. Following repair of the process computer, Seabrook expects to return ERDS to service later today. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), loss of emergency preparedness capabilities, for loss of the ERDS function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MIKE TAYLOR TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1333 EDT ON 10/1/12 * * *

The ERDS system has been returned to service. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Schmidt).

Emergency Response Data System
ENS 4831015 September 2012 00:25:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Water Level(At) 2025 (EDT) reactor tripped on 'C' Steam Generator Low Low Level due to feed water regulating valve failing closed due to a 7300 process cabinet card failure. Control Room entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. Emergency Feedwater actuated due to the Low Low Steam Generator Level. All other plant equipment functioned as expected. Plant is being stabilized in mode 3. Emergency News Manager will update the states and local media. NRC Resident Inspector was notified at 2045 (EDT). The trip was uncomplicated and all rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves. Electrical buses are powered by offsite power.Steam Generator
Feedwater
ENS 4802113 June 2012 17:43:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class DeclarationUnusual Event After an Ammonium Hydroxide Spill in the Admin Building

Seabrook declared an Unusual Event (HU3 - hazard or other conditions affecting plant safety) due to a spill of one gallon of ammonium hydroxide in the stockroom area of the Administration Building. No reports of injured individuals (were received) at this time. No plant or equipment damage occurred. The lower level of the Administration Building is evacuated. Personnel in SCBAs (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) are mitigating the spill. The Administration Building is in the Protected Area adjacent to the Turbine Building. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State. Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC, DOE, USDA, and HHS.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1747 ON 6/13/2012 FROM ED LYONS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

At 1343 (EDT) on 6/13/12 an Unusual Event was declared due to a reported Ammonium Hydroxide spill in a storeroom on the first floor of the Administration Building. At 1357 (EDT) the State of NH was notified and at 1401 the State of Massachusetts was notified of the Unusual Event using the State Notification Fact Sheet. The delay to the State of Massachusetts notification was due to issues with the dedicated phone system. At 1422 the NRC was notified of the Unusual Event using the Event Notification Worksheet. This initial notification reported a one gallon spill of Ammonium Hydroxide. Additionally there were no reported injuries and no impact to plant equipment. Further investigation revealed that the spill amount is 1-2 pints out of a 1 gallon container and the initial report of no injuries was validated. The concentration of the Ammonium Hydroxide is 25.5%. The spill was confined to a small area of the store room on the first floor of the Administration Building. The spill had no impact on plant equipment used for normal operation. Initial cleanup by plant personnel is complete and external services have been notified to complete the final spill cleanup. Seabrook Station is terminating the Unusual Event. Seabrook Station will continue to investigate and resolve the issues with the dedicated state notification phone system. Currently we have a troubleshooting team which has verified backup communications via the commercial phone lines is available. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1730 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State. Notified R1DO (Gray), NRR ((Howe), IRD (Grant), DHS, FEMA, NICC, DOE, USDA, and HHS.

ENS 4791711 May 2012 09:15:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessBrief Loss of the Emergency Notification System PhoneAt approximately 0515 EDT today, Seabrook experienced a brief loss of the Emergency Notification System (ENS). The ENS was inoperable for approximately four minutes due to an unknown cause. During this time, commercial telephone lines were available as a means of communication with the NRC. A subsequent communications check using the ENS phone was satisfactory. This event is being reported as an eight-hour notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of offsite ENS communications capability. Investigation into the cause continues and will be documented via the corrective action process. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4739531 October 2011 22:00:0010 CFR 21.21General Electric Cr-120B Relays Supplied by National Technical Systems Fail Bench TestOn October 31, 2011, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC completed a 10 CFR 21 evaluation of a condition associated with General Electric (GE)-CR-120B relays supplied by National Technical Systems, Inc. and intended for use at Seabrook. Six (6) Quality Level 1 GE-CR-120B relays failed bench testing. During bench testing, the subject relays failed to reset when de-energized. An evaluation was performed to determine the applications where these relays could have been and were installed and to determine if the failure of the subject relays could result in a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21.3. The evaluation concluded that there is one safety significant application relative to the failure of the GE-CR-120B relays to reset in the Seabrook Diesel Air Handling System (DAH). Each DAH system train (includes one supply fan and one exhaust fan per train) has one relay that provides a start permissive for the ventilation fans. An analysis of the failure of a GE-CR-120B relay in the DAH system determined that, if the relays were installed, the condition could create a substantial safety hazard due to a subsequent loss of the emergency power function. Therefore, this report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification will be made to the NRC within 30 days pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii). No actual safety consequences resulted from this condition because the GE-CR-120B relays were not installed in the plant in this safety significant application. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 473276 October 2011 16:26:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Water LevelAt 1226 (EDT) today, Seabrook experienced an automatic reactor trip on low steam generator water levels. The low steam generator levels resulted following a trip of one of the two operating main feed pumps. Main feed pump 'A' tripped on low suction pressure while a condensate pump was being returned to service following maintenance on the pump. The emergency feedwater system actuated automatically and recovered steam generator levels. All systems actuated and functioned as designed. The wide range level indication on steam generator 'C' indicated erratically and was declared Inoperable. The plant is stable and being maintained in Mode 3. The station plans to cool the plant to Mode 5 for a previously planned forced outage. This notification provides a four-hour report for an actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor is critical and an eight-hour report for a valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system. All rods fully inserted. Emergency feedwater has been secured and placed in standby and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves. Electrical systems are in a normal shutdown alignment. There is nothing unusual or not understood and all systems functioned as required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Emergency Feedwater System
05000443/LER-2011-002
ENS 4670228 March 2011 15:43:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class DeclarationUnusual Event Declared Due to Smoke Coming from an Elevator Control Cabinet

At 1129 EDT on 03/28/11, smoke was detected coming from an elevator power supply transformer in the "B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) vault. The licensee declared a Unusual Event at 1143 EDT. At 1146 EDT the fire brigade responded and found smoke only and no flame. The smoke stopped when the cabinet was de-energized. At 1158 EDT, the fire was proven to be out when the cabinet was opened. No fire fighting extinguishing agents were used. There was no damage to other plant equipment and no personnel injuries. At 1151 EDT, the licensee notified the States of New Hampshire and Massachusetts and at 1209 EDT, activated their Technical Support Center (TSC). The plant was operating at 100% power and remained stable during and after the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF MCNALLY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1341 EDT ON 03/28/11 * * *

At 1243 EDT on 03/28/11, the Unusual Event was terminated. Subsequent investigation has revealed that no plant equipment damage beyond a power transformer that supplies an equipment elevator occurred. There was no indication of (visible) flame (smoke only) and no personnel injuries as a result of the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell), NRR EO (Cheok), IRD (Morris).

Residual Heat Removal
ENS 4624713 September 2010 13:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification for Discharge of 200 Gal Untreated Sanitary WaterAt 0900 (EDT) this morning, Seabrook Station experienced leakage of approximately 200 gallons of untreated sanitary water to the storm drain system, which discharges to the circulating water system. Since Seabrook is not authorized to discharge untreated sanitary water, this event has been reported to the town of Seabrook and will be reported to the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services and the Environmental Protection Agency. The preliminary apparent cause of the leak was a failure of the sanitary lift station discharge pumps to start automatically, which resulted in untreated sanitary water overflowing into the storm drain system. The leak was stopped by restarting the sanitary lift station discharge pumps. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for an event related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been or will be made." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Circulating Water System
ENS 4586923 April 2010 12:07:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseFatality of Licensee EmployeeAn FPLE Seabrook employee experienced a medical emergency on site and was transported offsite for care. Subsequent notification was received from the hospital that the employee had passed away. OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) was notified at 0848 (EDT) on 4/23/2010, under 29 CFR 1904, of the fatality of an employee caused by an apparent heart attack while at work. The employee was entering into the Protected Area when she experienced the medical emergency, and as such the employee was not radiologically contaminated when transported offsite. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4573826 February 2010 04:15:00Other Unspec ReqmntDiscovery of an After-The-Fact Unusual EventThis is a one-hour report for the discovery of a condition that briefly met the emergency action level (EAL) for an Unusual Event but did not warrant declaration of an emergency classification. A detailed review of the conditions that existed at approximately 2315 EST on February 25 during a winter storm determined that the winds reached a speed of approximately 94 miles per hour for approximately four seconds. This wind speed exceeded the EAL value of greater than or equal to 90 miles per hour. However, because the condition cleared within approximately four seconds, a declaration of an Unusual Event would not have been warranted. The information examined during this detailed review was not the wind speed indication displayed in the control room and used by the operators for evaluating Emergency Action Levels. The additional analysis, which was performed following the winter storm, used data obtained by Engineering. The control room indication remained below 90 miles per hour at all times. This event is a one-hour report based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 for a condition that met an emergency plan EAL and the basis for the emergency classification no longer existed at the time of discovery. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification and good neighbor notifications will be made to (the State of) New Hampshire and Massachusetts.
ENS 4566427 January 2010 12:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessElectrical Power Temporarily Removed from the Emergency Operations Facility for Maintenance

This is an eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(viii). Seabrook Station will be implementing a modification to improve reliability of the electrical system serving the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Specifically, the existing manual transfer switch between the backup power diesel generator and the EOF building will be replaced with an automatic transfer switch. This work will require that the main power feed to the EOF building be removed for a period of approximately 3 hours today. During this time, a secondary power feed will remain in service which can supply some building loads. A second 3-hour period of 'partial power' may be necessary to complete the job; it is currently anticipated that this second 'partial power' period, if needed, will occur tomorrow, January 28. Power to all EOF loads will be available in between the two 3-hour periods discussed above. In addition, should an emergency be declared during one of the 3-hour periods, full power to the facility can be restored within approximately 2 hours. As a compensatory measure, the TSC will perform the key planning standard functions assigned to the EOF during the two 'partial power' time periods should the EOF be unable to do so; this includes offsite dose projections, development of protective action recommendations and offsite notifications. Emergency plan implementing procedures for the TSC contain the instructions necessary for TSC responders to perform functions. During the 2-day period that this work is being performed, there will be no backup power source for the EOF. All work associated with this switch upgrade will be performed in an expeditious manner consistent with the goal of minimizing EOF unavailability. All EOF responders have been briefed on this work and expected contingent actions. This job will start at approximately 0730 am this morning. We anticipate that all work will be completed by sometime tomorrow afternoon. We will provide a notification update upon completion of the job. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MIKE TAYLOR TO JOE O'HARA AT 1738 ON 01/27/10 * * *

Seabrook station has completed the installation of the automatic transfer switch at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). There is no planned work affecting EOF availability. Notified R1DO(Hansell).

ENS 454032 October 2009 02:39:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationUnit Experienced a Valid Rps Actuation During Plant Cooldown on Low Steam Generator LevelsOn Thursday, October 1, 2009 @ 2239 hrs EDT Seabrook Station Unit 1 was in Mode 4 in the process of removing feedwater heating and raising steam generator levels during a plant cooldown. A valid actuation of the reactor protection system occurred when both the A and C steam generator (SG) levels were reduced to the SG low level reactor trip setpoint of less than 20%. This occurred twice on both the A and C steam generators approximately 10 minutes apart. Steam generator levels have since been restored to normal operating levels and plant is now in Mode 5. This is reportable under 50.72 (b)(3)(iv) as an event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The reactor trip breakers were open and the emergency feedwater system removed from service when the event occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Emergency Feedwater System
ENS 4522927 July 2009 11:52:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessTechnical Support Center Removed from Service for Upgrades

On Monday, July 27, 2009, at 0752, Seabrook Station is temporarily relocating its Technical Support Center (TSC) from the permanent location on the 75 foot level of the Control Building (CB) to an alternate location in the Online/Outage Control Center (OCC). This relocation is necessary to allow for installation of new equipment and upgrading of existing equipment in the TSC. The site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has been notified of the modifications and has been instructed on the planned compensatory measure to be implemented during the temporary relocation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the relocation activities. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to loss of the emergency response facility. Seabrook Station will provide updates as necessary and will advise the NRC of the restoration of the permanent TSC. The State of New Hampshire has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARK HANSEN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1635 ON 7/30/09 * * *

On Thursday. July 30. 2009. Seabrook Station completed modifications of its Technical Support Center (TSC) and has restored the TSC permanent location on the 75 foot level of the Control Building (CB) to service. The permanent TSC was declared operable at 1456 on Thursday July 30, 2009. The site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has been notified that the modifications to the permanent TSC have been completed, that compensatory measures are no longer necessary and that TSC personnel are to report to the permanent TSC in the case of a plant emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified that the permanent TSC has been restored to service. The State of New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have been notified. Notified R1DO (A. Dimitriadis).

ENS 4410327 March 2008 23:07:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseFatality of Licensee EmployeeOSHA was notified at 2055 on 3/17/08, under 29 CFR 1904, of the fatality of an employee caused by an apparent heart attack while at work. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4392120 January 2008 04:02:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip Following Turbine Trip

Initiating alarm received was a Turbine Trip. All on site buses 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 swapped to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer power supplies. Bus 3 did not swap as expected. The station has entered a Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 (a) 72 hour action statement for offsite power distribution with 345 kV Bus 3 unavailable. All safety systems operated correctly. The station continues to troubleshoot the initiating cause of the Turbine Trip. The plant is stable in Mode 3. During the swap of non safety buses to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) tripped. Following the loss of power to the RCPs the reactor stabilized in natural circulation. A Pressurizer PORV cycled following the trip. One RCP was restarted to restore forced circulation. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as expected on the trip and were subsequently secured. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. The current decay heat removal path is Start-up Feedwater supplying water to the Steam Generators steaming to the Condenser Steam Dumps. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 0348 ON 1/20/08 FROM FORREST TO HUFFMAN * * * 

The licensee has indication of a differential voltage fault on the C phase of the 345 kV line that feeds the Unit Auxiliary Transformer and the generator step-up transformers. The licensee also wanted to ensure that the report reflected the specified system actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater.

Steam Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
Decay Heat Removal
Control Rod
05000443/LER-2008-001
ENS 4384918 December 2007 12:39:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseHydraulic Fluid Spill OnsiteOn 12/18/07 at 0739, the Control Room was notified of an approximate 50 gallon oil spill onsite. The spill appears to have originated from a broken hydraulic fluid line on a nearby crane. The spill is contained and did not reach any storm drain or body of water. The spill is reportable to the State of New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services in accordance with State regulation. The NRC Resident has been notified of the event. This incident did not impact plant operations and there were no radiological materials involved.
ENS 4364617 September 2007 09:59:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification to Local Law EnforcementOn 9/17/07 at 0559, an accidental discharge of a security officer's firearm occurred while conducting shift turnover and arming functions in the Station's security guard house. The officer was injured in the right leg below the knee and at this time, the injury is believed to be non-life threatening. The officer has been transported to a local hospital for treatment. No plant systems have been affected. The local NRC resident has been informed of the event. Local law enforcement (Seabrook Police and New Hampshire State Police) has also been notified and is onsite providing investigative assistance.
ENS 4282031 August 2006 19:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required ShutdownPlant Required Shutdown Due to 'A' and 'B' Edg Inoperable.On August 31, 2006 at 1530 EST Seabrook Station initiated a plant shutdown in accordance with TS 3.8.1.1 Action (f). On August 28, 2006 the Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was removed from service for planned maintenance. During the planned maintenance, an emergent issue (suspected diode failure on the control circuitry) was discovered. That required starting the Train 'B' EDG in accordance with the provisions of TS 3.8.1.1 Action (b). During the start of the Train 'B' EDG a voltage control anomaly was discovered that required the Train 'B' EDG to also be declared inoperable. With two EDG's inoperable, TS 3.8.1.1 requires a plant shutdown. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as the initiation of plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The Station currently has all three offsite power supplies and the Supplemental Emergency Power System operable. The licensee is in the process of shutting down and is currently at 60% power at a 20%/hr ramp rate with the intention of entering Mode 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Emergency Diesel Generator
ENS 4268430 June 2006 23:49:00Other Unspec Reqmnt24 Hour License Condition Report - Main Steam Isolation Valve Inoperable Greater than 4 HoursFPL Energy Seabrook has discovered a condition that was prohibited by the Technical Specifications. This report is being made pursuant to License Condition 2.G of the Seabrook Station Operating License. On July 3 at 0615, it was determined that a MSIV had been inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by the Technical Specifications. On June 30 at 1949, an alarm was received indicating a problem with the MSIV. A troubleshooting and repair plan was developed and the MSIV repaired on July 1 at 1559. Subsequent examination of the failed control module found that it was nonfunctional and that the MSIV had been inoperable since receipt of the alarm on June 30 at 1949. Since the Technical Specification allowed outage time for an inoperable MSVI is 4 hours, the MSIV being inoperable for approximately 20 hours constitutes a violation of the Technical Specifications. The Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.Main Steam Isolation Valve
ENS 4266022 June 2006 10:20:00Other Unspec Reqmnt24 Hour License Condition Report of Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical SpecificationAt 0620 today, FPL Energy Seabrook discovered that the plant was in it condition prohibited by the technical specifications. At approximately 1900 yesterday, June 21, one of the two train-B vital battery chargers was removed from service, rendering the charger inoperable. This condition went unrecognized until 0620 this morning (June 22). Seabrook Station Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 permits two hours to restore a battery Changer to operable status, otherwise, the plant must shutdown to hot standby within the next 6 hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. In this event, the train-B full-capacity battery charger was inoperable for approximately 12.5 hours, exceeding the time permitted by the technical specifications. During the period the charger was inoperable, the redundant battery charger in train B and both train-A battery chargers remained in service and operable. This notification is being made as a 24-hour report in accordance with license condition 2.G of the Seabrook Station operating license. Investigation into the circumstances of the event are ongoing. The normal battery charger had been removed from service for normal maintenance and testing. A backup battery charger was placed on the battery which permitted the licensee to continue normal plant operations without entering the two hour TS LCO for 3.8.2.1. During the maintenance and testing of the primary battery charger, the backup battery charger was also rendered inoperable resulting in no battery charger for the affected battery bank. The licensee stated that at 0726 EDT on 6/22/06, the battery charger was restored to service and the technical specification exited. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 423978 March 2006 13:00:00Other Unspec Reqmnt24-Hour Condition of License Report Due to Failure to Submit Ts Required Exposure ReportAt 0800 on March 8, 2006, FPL Energy Seabrook discovered a failure to comply with administrative Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.2.a. This TS requires submittal of a radiation occupational exposure report by March 1 of each year. On March 8, FPL Energy Seabrook discovered that the report for 2005 had not been submitted and, consequently, failed to meet the March 1st submittal date specified by TS 6.8.1.2.a. This condition is being reported in accordance with the Seabrook Station Facility Operating License, condition 2.G, which requires a 24-hour notification of any violations of section 2.C.(2) of the operating license (FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.05000443/LER-2006-002
ENS 4217830 November 2005 08:24:00Other Unspec ReqmntInverter Inoperable for Greater than Allowed Time Per Technical SpecificationsThis report is being made pursuant to the requirements of License Condition 2.G of the Seabrook Station Operating License. Inverter 1F was inoperable for greater than the 24 hours allowed by Technical Specification 3.8.3.1.h. The inverter was inoperable for a total of 35 hours 59 minutes. The inverter was declared to be inoperable at 0323 on November 29, 2005 and was not returned to operable status until 1522 on November 30, 2005, this exceeded the 24 hour TS limit. The NRC approved a Notice of Enforcement Discretion at 0220 on November 30, 2005, which allowed an extension of 18 hours (until 2123 11/30/05). The inverter was declared operable prior to the expiration of the extension. This event will be documented in a License Event Report pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4200219 September 2005 11:22:0010 CFR 26.73, ApplicabilityFitness for Duty

A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/20/05 TO CORRECT ERROR * * *

The text should read: A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 418247 July 2005 14:17:00Other Unspec ReqmntLicense Condition Report Due to Exceeding Technical Specification Inoperability TimeFPL Energy Seabrook Station has discovered that a condition existed that was prohibited by the Technical Specifications. The Train B Containment Building Spray Pump (CBS) was inoperable for a period of time longer than permitted by the Technical Specifications. A failed relay driver board would have prevented the Train B CBS pump from automatically starting in response to high containment pressure. Following an LOP coincident with a high containment pressure, the initial start signal from the Train B EDG emergency power sequencer would not have initiated a CBS pump start, but an automatic start signal generated at a later time in the LOP sequence would have started the pump. The failed relay driver board only inhibited automatic starting of the Train B CBS pump. The Train B EDG remained capable of providing power to other Train B loads including the automatic start of the CBS pump at the later sequence. This event is being reported in accordance with Seabrook Station Operating License condition 2.G as a failure to operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. The licensee discovered the condition during surveillance testing and the condition has been repaired. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 416551 May 2005 15:09:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Due to Main Turbine High VibrationSeabrook Station initiated a Manual Reactor Trip during initial start of the main turbine following a refueling outage. Turbine vibrations elevated to the automatic trip setpoint during initial increase to normal operating speed. The reactor was manually tripped to allow breaking main condenser vacuum and reduce main turbine speed. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods (fully) inserted and decay heat removal is via the main condenser steam dumps. Emergency feedwater (EFW) pump actuation occurred because of lowering steam generator level due to the reactor trip. Steam generator level control was maintained using EFW. Condenser vacuum was broken until the turbine vibration alarms cleared and was then restored, allowing the condenser to be used for dumping steam. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Main Turbine
Decay Heat Removal
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 4159313 April 2005 08:50:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationDuring Core Reload Reactor Trip Breakers OpenedThe plant is in Mode 6 (Refueling) and core reload is in progress with the reactor trip breakers open; both trains of solid state protection system are in the operate mode. While restoring a line up to place the 'D' steam generator on recirculation, a path was opened that allowed the 'B' steam generator to transfer water to the 'D' steam generator. This alignment lowered the 'B' steam generator to its low-low set point level. This initiated a reactor trip signal (RPS). With the reactor trip breakers open and the reactor core reload in progress, no components actuated as a result of the signal. If the emergency feedwater system had been in service, this would have resulted in equipment actuation. This is an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The resident inspector has been notified.Steam Generator
Emergency Feedwater System
ENS 415635 April 2005 01:36:0010 CFR 26.73, ApplicabilityFitness for Duty ReportA non-licensed contract supervisor was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during for-cause testing. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.