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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 54998 | 26 August 2020 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Failure of Air Conditioner Compressor Head Gasket | The following is a synopsis of the information received from the supplier. On August 26, 2020, H. B. Robinson Generating Station, Unit 2 experienced a failure during post maintenance testing of a newly installed air conditioning compressor, which serves one of the Control Room HVAC units. Robinson plant contacted QualTech (the supplier) on September 22, 2020, detailing the findings of their investigation which indicated an incorrect head gasket had been installed, allowing high pressure gas to discharge to the low pressure side. QualTech NP reviewed the investigation and agrees, the incorrect gasket was installed. The root cause was determined to be an improper dedication plan of the gaskets, not recognizing the delta between the 'left' and 'right' head gaskets. QualTech has taken action to revise the dedication plan. This is the only compressor unit of this model sold. No other similar failures have been reported. QualTech believes this to be an isolated case. For further information contact: Tim Franchuk Quality Assurance Director QualTech NP, Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division (513) 528-7900 x176 | HVAC | |
| ENS 51611 | 6 October 2015 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | En Revision Imported Date 2/11/2019 | EN Revision Text: POTENTIAL PART 21 INVOLVING A200 SERIES STARTERS The following is excerpted from a report submitted by QualTech NP, Nuclear Division, Curtiss-Wright Corporation: Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) reported to QTNP (QualTech NP) that they have had eight Cutler Hammer A200 series starter failures since September 15, 2008. The failures would remain in the operated/energized contact state with power removed for some period of time. All starters impacted with this failure were continuously energized. The concern was that if tripped, that the main contacts would not open to protect the motor. Testing was performed by Eaton Industrial Controls Division after receiving defective samples from PG&E. The test report from Eaton was received by QTNP for further review and evaluation. On October 6, 2015 QTNP determined that the Cutler Hammer A200 series starter failures may be reportable and an extent of condition review needed to be done. The root cause was a silicon based mold release that remained on the molded parts and would come between the moving (magnet) & fixed armatures. When heated for an extended period of time, this material would become sticky causing anywhere from a minor delay in opening, up to a frozen closed condition. Cutler Hammer has determined that the silicone mold release was first introduced into the manufacturing facility in May, 2008, due to a shortage of the Zinc Stearate Mold release that was traditionally used. The silicon based mold release was periodically used until October 2012. According to Cutler Hammer, anything made after January 1, 2013 should definitely be silicon mold release free. Thus any starters/contactors of the CH A200 series manufactured between May 2008 & December 31 , 2012 could have this concern. This failure has only been reported for continuously energized applications. The end user should evaluate their applications for this potential failure mechanism. QTNP has notified North Anna, H. B. Robinson, Diablo Canyon, and Hatch.
PDMS material has been identified in the Eaton A200 series starters/contactors with date code T4115 (41st week of 2015) which is outside the range of May 2008 to December 2012 that were originally identified in NRC Event Number 51611 from 2015. This resulted in a few instances where the starter did not immediately open when the power was removed. Notified R2DO (Masters), R4DO (Werner), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email | ||
| ENS 51053 | 7 May 2015 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Potential Part 21 Involving Struthers Dunn Relays with Contact Resistance Greater than One Ohm | The following is excerpted from a report submitted by QualTech NP, Nuclear Division, Curtiss-Wright Corporation: Subject: PSEG reported failures for Struthers Dunn 219BBX200 relays related to greater than 1 ohm contact resistance. Two relays were evaluated by Exelon Power Labs. Of these, one had a failure consisting of a contact resistance greater than one ohm. Struthers Dunn has also provided an evaluation in this regard and does not agree with the failure mode as inferred in the Exelon Power Labs report. Lab and OEM report key difference: The Power Labs' Report(s) shows fiberglass fiber(s) embedded into gold plated contacts on one relay believed to result in a contact resistance greater than one Ohm (1.7 Ohm Max). The second relay, from stock, had evidence of fiberglass present but was not considered to have affected functionality. The Struthers Dunn evaluation suggests that the fiber embedded on the gold contact is not at the mating point of the contacts and should not impact operability. Struthers Dunn also indicates that the relay's application is operating below their minimum current. Discussion: The actuator board on the evaluated relays is manufactured from a printed circuit board (PCB) type fiber board. The fibers from the edges of the board could become airborne. (. . . ) this specific board material was utilized beginning in March 2010. Since there have been no prior reports of this issue, it is possible that the 2010 material change introduced a foreign materials exclusion (FME) concern. Since then, and solely for those relays manufactured in the USA, the material changed again in November 2014 and was incorporated into the products starting January 2015. The newest version of the actuator board is a molded material that does not contain fiberglass fibers. Struthers Dunn relays with base part numbers 219, 236, 237, and 255 have the common PCB type fiber board. This fiber board was used in relays with date code 1009 through 1452 with or without letter suffix (where the letter indicates made outside of the USA). Customer Input: 1st 219 series relay failed due to contact issue, considered a random failure & discarded. 2nd 219 series relay failed due to contact resistance & sent to Exelon Power Labs. Five parts from inventory bench tested. One had high resistance and it was sent to Power Labs Note: All parts provided were 100% functionally tested for contact resistance during dedication process and passed testing at QTNP. Vendor Input: Struthers Dunn has, since 2010, experienced only one field complaint (PSE&G) on continuity issues related to fiberglass on these 219 relays. The material change to ULTEM 2300 was considered an ongoing quality/process improvement process to reduce potential defects proactively. Over the four years using this PCB type material, 13,000 relays were sold. Struthers Dunn has also questioned the application having current below the manufacturer's recommended value of 50mA, requiring bifurcated contacts. Please see their attached report and current product catalog for details. Recommendation: The root cause of the failure is inconclusive. Exelon Power Labs said 'The irregular contact surface patterns in conjunction with the presence of the embedded fiberglass fibers are the most likely cause of the excessive resistance. This finding is considered to be a manufacturing defect.' While the manufacturer sees the failure as a misapplication of its product and that the fiber 'was not located at the 'mating point' of the 2 contacts so therefore has no effect on the performance of the contacts or relay.' QualTech NP recommends an application review for the named relays. A review of the Exelon Power Labs reports and the vendor's report should also be completed by the utility to evaluate the impact on the safety function. | ||
| ENS 50480 | 22 September 2014 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Notification - Discrepancy Between Qualification Report and Installation Instructions | The following information was obtained from the vendor via facsimile: To whom it may concern: This letter is issued to provide notification of a documentation defect concerning QualTech NP Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connectors (Gen 3 QDC). Specifically, there is a discrepancy concerning o-ring replacement between the 1/2 Inch Gen 3 QDC Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23009-14, through Revision B) and the Instructions for Installation (EGS-TR-23066-04, Revision Original), the 3/4 Inch Gen 3 QDC Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23067-01, Revision A) and the 1-1/2 Inch Gen 3 QDC Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23068-01, Revision A). Section 5.0 of the 1/2 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23009-14, through Revision B) states in part that 'whenever the connector is disconnected after one week or more installed service, the used o-ring must be discarded and a new o-ring installed prior to reconnection.' Contrary to this requirement, Section 9.0 of the Instructions for Installation (EGS-TR-23066-04, Revision Original) states in part that, 'whenever the QDC is disconnected after one week or more installed service, it is recommended that the o-ring be discarded and a new o-ring installed prior to reconnection. This action, while not mandatory, will maintain the o-ring seal in a superior condition' and Section 6.0 of both the 3/4 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23067-01, Revision A) and 1-1/2 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23068-01, Revision A) states in part that, 'whenever the connector is disconnected after one week or more, it is recommended that the used o-ring be discarded and a new o-ring installed prior to reconnection.' To prevent confusion and inconsistency between the 1/2 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23009-14), the 3/4 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23067-01), the 1-1/2 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23068-01) and the Instructions for Installation (EGS-TR-23066-04), the documents have been revised to require that the o-ring must be discarded and a new o-ring installed prior to reconnection. The new revision level of each document is as follows: - EGS-TR-23067-01, Revision B - 3/4 Inch Qualification Report - EGS-TR-23068-01, Revision B - 1-1/2 Inch Qualification Report - EGS-TR-23066-04, Revision A - Instructions for Installation The revised Qualification Reports and the Instructions for Installation have been or will be distributed to all customers who have received 1/2 Inch, 3/4 Inch, and/or 1-1/2 Inch Gen 3 QDC connectors. Should any Gen 3 QDC connectors be currently installed in service, it is required that a determination be made as to whether or not the connector has been disconnected after one week of installed service and if the o-ring was replaced. If the o-ring was replaced, no further action is required. If the connector was disconnected and the o-ring was not replaced, the o-ring must be discarded and a new o-ring installed. QualTech NP will provide replacement o-rings, free of charge, to customers who identify replacement o-rings are required for Gen 3 QDC connectors that have been installed in service. As a point of interest, please note that this notification does not apply to the original EGS QDC connectors (Gen 1 QDC). QualTech/EGS QDC connectors certified to Qualification Reports PEI-TR-880701-04, Revision A (1/2 Inch Gen 1 QDC), EGS-TR-913601-01. Revision B (3/4 Inch Gen 1 QDC) and/or EGS-TR-913602-01, Revision B (1-1/2 Inch Gen 1 QDC) are not impacted by this notification as these Qualification Reports require the o-ring be discarded and replaced if the connector is disconnected after one week of installed service. If you require additional details or would like to discuss this further please contact the undersigned or Tony Gill (QualTech NP Quality Assurance Manager) at 256-924-7438 (office), 256-426-4558 (mobile) or tgill@curtisswright.com. Jim Tumlinson Products Engineering Manager QualTech NP, Huntsville Operations Curtiss-Wright Corporation 256-924-7429 (office) 256-425-8037 (mobile) jtumlinson@curtisswright.com
The following information was obtained from the vendor via facsimile: To whom it may concern: This letter provides for the formal close out of notification QTHuntsville 10 CFR 21-2014-05. The initial notification was made on September 22, 2014 . All corrective actions have been completed and revised documents have been provided to customers of Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connectors (Gen 3 QDC) and 3/8 Inch QDC. The corrective actions include revision of the following documents to clarify O-ring replacement: EGS-TR-23067-01 - 3/4 Inch Qualification Report EGS-TR-23068-01 - 1-1/2 Inch Qualification Report EGS-TR-23066-04 - Instructions for Installation (Gen 3 QDC) EGS-TR-23062-0002-01 - 3/8 Inch QDC Qualification Report EGS-TR-23062-04 - 3/8 Inch QDC Generic Qualification Report EGS-TR-23062-06 - Instructions for Installation (3/8 Inch QDC) The revised Qualification Reports and the Instructions for Installation have been distributed to all customers who have received 1/2 Inch, 3/4 Inch and/or 1-1/2 Inch Gen 3 QDC connectors as well as the customers for 3/8 Inch QDC connectors. Based on the above information and corrective actions, this Part 21 file is considered closed. If you would like to discuss this further, please contact the undersigned or Tony Gill (QualTech NP Quality Assurance Manager) at 256-924-7438 (office), 256-426-4558 (mobile) or tgill@curtisswright.com. Jim Tumlinson Products Engineering Manager QualTech NP, Huntsville Operations Curtiss-Wright Corporation 256-924-7429 (office) 256-425-8037 (mobile) jtumlinson@curtisswright.com Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Hopper), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Hay), Part 21 Group (email) | ||
| ENS 50015 | 9 April 2014 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Potential Defect in General Electric Type Cr120Ad Control Relays | The following information was received via fax: This letter is being issued by QualTech NP, Huntsville, AL, to provide an initial notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) Cooper Nuclear Station concerning a potential defect in General Electric Type CR120AD control relays. A failure analysis revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was a flaw or defect in the start wrap of the magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windings directly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings. This failure is classified as infant mortality, which is similar to the failure mode identified in the 10 CFR part 21 30 day report (accession number 9706190261) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear. Investigation of documents dating back to 1997 revealed that the manufacturer issued an informal recommendation to detect infant mortality in these relays by performing burn-in testing and mechanical cycle aging of the relay. QualTech NP, in conjunction with NPPD, determined that the risk of infant mortality can be mitigated by subjecting these relays to a 100 hour burn-in and performance of 100 mechanical cycles prior to installation. It has been confirmed that only two orders, with two units each, for this particular relay are affected. Both orders have been shipped to Nebraska Public Power District as requested by purchase orders 4500149953 and 4500142705. All subject relays shall be subjected to a 100 hour bum-in and exposed to 100 mechanical cycles or returned to QualTech NP for replacement. Additional details will be provided in the formal written report. Please contact Matthew Thelen at 256-924-7441 (office) or mthelen@curtisswright.com for additional information. Matthew Thelen Project Manager QualTech NP Huntsville Operations a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company http://qualtechnp.cwfc.com
(File No.: QTHuntsville 10CFR21-2014-01) To whom it may concern: This letter is being issued by QuaiTech NP, Huntsville Operations to provide a final notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) Cooper Nuclear Station concerning a potential defect in General Electric Type CR120AD control relays. Replacement relays have been provided to NPPD. All required dedication procedures at QualTech NP have been revised to include a 100 hour burn-in and 100 mechanical cycles in an effort to detect infant mortality. No further actions are required at this time. This 10CFR part 21 file is closed. Notified R2DO (Bonser), R4DO (Whitten) and NRR Part 21 Group via email. | ||
| ENS 49911 | 12 March 2014 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Allen Bradley Type 700Rtc Relay Spuriously De-Energizing | This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications. On 10/17/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months. These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations. The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing. The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendor's maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years. Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the malfunction of these relays, until long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less, The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014. Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47063 | 15 July 2011 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Potential Defect in Qualtech Np Safety Related Motor Control Center Buckets | The following information was received via facsimile from QualTech NP: This letter is issued to provide initial notification of a potential defect in QualTech NP safety related MCC (Motor Control Center) buckets, which were commercial grade dedicated at our Cincinnati facility. On June 9, 2011, TVA Watts Bar Unit 2 notified QualTech NP of a failure on a transformer module associated with an indicator light on the MCC bucket. Based on our investigations, QualTech NP has identified quality and performance issues relating to the 480 VAC input (primary side) portion of the subject indicating light. The light in question has shown the potential to flash/arc internally on the primary winding side of the built in transformer and create a substantial fault current. This fault current not only disables the light but can be large enough to trip the upstream circuit breaker, thus disabling all associated safety related circuitry. The issues appear to revolve around inconsistent and poor quality fabrication methods employed during manufacturing, primarily with how the wires were wrapped in critical areas of the primary and how they were routed and attached to the termination points. The recommended corrective action for existing safety related MCC buckets is to replace the indicator light and transformer module with a newly qualified acceptable substitute. The new indicator light and transformer module will go through a series of dedication inspections and tests to ensure that a similar failure does not occur. Based on review of our records, Tennessee Valley Authority is the only customer to have these defective modules.
QualTech NP conducted failure analyses to determine the root cause. Based on the results of our investigations, QualTech NP has determined that this failure represents a defect in a basic component as defined by 10CFR21. The failure analyses concluded that all of the failure modes encountered were due to manufacturing defects associated with the soldering and handling of the wire strands in the vicinity of the line terminals. QualTech NP has established a corrective action plan to replace all of these components known to be installed in safety-related applications. We are currently in the process of evaluating a suitable replacement. Based on review of our records, Tennessee Valley Authority is the only customer to have these defective modules. We have been in close communications with TVA on this issue. The specific component is Model Number 9001KP5R31, manufactured by Square D. R2DO (Desai) and the Part 21 Group notified. | ||
| ENS 46401 | 16 September 2010 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 Report - Ups Motherboard Failed Pre-Service Inspection | The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from QualTech NP dated November 8, 2010. This letter provides notification per regulation 10 CFR Part21 concerning the discovery through testing and evaluation of (4) four UPS System motherboards that reported to have failed pre-service inspection prior to installation into a UPS system at Southern Nuclear- Farley Station Unit 1 TDAFWP UPS 'B' Section. Trentec (now known as QualTech NP) provided these safety related motherboards for installation on a UPS system manufactured by (OEM) Dependable Power System. The (4) four questionable motherboards were returned to QualTech NP for testing and evaluation to determine operability of their safety function including fit, form and function for use within the UPS System. Southern Nuclear Condition Report, CR2010109013, states 'Motherboard (DPS 20050061, SN 354, Trentec Tag # 7T55201 SN01) with different valued resistors and or different locations than original motherboard...' QualTech NP developed a new dedication plan (DPS2010.0 Rev.1) to evaluate the returned motherboards for fit, form and function. The plan involves visual inspection verification - QualTech NP compared the returned boards to DPS BOM lists to identify any differences; and functional performance verification - the functionality of the items were verified by performance testing as factory Go/No Go board tests using a UPS system to the parameters defined in the existing referenced dedication plans. Visual inspection of the motherboards found one resistor installed in the wrong location. Performance testing of motherboards found the resistor installed in the wrong location affected the safety function of the UPS system. The motherboard with the resistor installed in the wrong location failed to operate during performance testing. The motherboard was reworked by original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who removed the resistor in question and re-installed it in the correct location. The repaired motherboard was performance tested and found acceptable for safety function for use within the UPS system. QuaITech NP has reviewed its customer project / PO files and has determined the dedicated UPS system (2) and these motherboards with Date Code 2007 have only been provided to Southern Nuclear-Farley Station Unit 1 & 2 (total quantity- 4). Southern Nuclear- Farley Station Unit 1 & 2 has two (2) motherboards in service. QualTech NP has addressed the dedication and testing of motherboards by the developing a new dedication plan (DPS2010.0 Rev. 1). Southern Nuclear has reviewed and approved this new plan. QuaITech NP's conclusion is that the resistor in the wrong location on the motherboard caused the UPS system not to operate during performance testing and established the equipment would not perform its intended safety function. After rework, relocation of the resistor, and retesting the UPS system became operable and was performing its safety related function. QualTech NP has completed testing, evaluation, and repair of motherboards, no further action is required. |