Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56326 | 30 January 2023 15:30:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Concurrent Report - News Release | Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) experienced a "condition upset" for which they issued a news release. Following are details from the news release provided by the licensee via email: NFS Experiences Condition Upset On January 30, 2023, at 1030 EST, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. experienced a condition upset during routine inventory activities. Local ambulance services were contacted as a precautionary measure to ensure proper response to employees affected by the upset. Two employees were transported for further evaluation, while three were evaluated onsite and released. No impact to the facilities, the public, or the environment occurred. This report is being made per the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (c).
Following are details from an updated news release provided by the licensee via email: NFS Experiences Minor Chemical Reaction On January 30, 2023, at 1030 EST, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. experienced a minor chemical reaction during routine inventory activities in a contained area of the plant. Five employees were exposed to fumes. Two employees were transported by ambulance to the Unicoi County Hospital for further evaluation, and have been released. Three were evaluated on site and released. They were wearing appropriate personal protective equipment. Out of an abundance of caution, NFS activated its emergency response organization (ERO) at the beginning of the event to ensure appropriate response was initiated as details were gathered. The ERO is comprised of representatives from across the site. NFS was not evacuated, and no impact to the facilities, the public, or the environment occurred. Notified Fuels Group, R2DO (Miller), and NMSS Events Notification via email. | ||
| ENS 56149 | 5 October 2022 19:00:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(2) | Degradation of Safety Items | The following information was provided by the licensee via e-mail: NFS (Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.) evaluated a degraded Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS) in accordance with the documented Integrated Safety Analysis. During this review, the event was determined to be NON-REPORTABLE as additional controls were available and performance criteria maintained. However, during the detailed review of past performance, when the IROFS that was available in this scenario failed, the redundant IROFS would have been degraded. There were no actual radiological or other nuclear safety consequences to the public, workers, or the environment. The Senior Resident Inspector and Region II staff were notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The plant was shutdown pending repair or implementation of compensating measures. | ||
| ENS 55902 | 18 May 2022 18:50:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Criticality Accident Alarm System Speakers Disabled | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On May 18, 2022, at approximately 1450 (EDT), an electrical switch for the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) legacy speakers was noted to be out of its normal position. A functional redundant speaker system is installed in the main processing plant and laboratory. As a consequence of the switch being out of position, in the highly unlikely event that the CAAS had actuated, the alarm would not have been annunciated in areas outside of the main processing area and laboratory where there are no redundant speakers. Compliance was restored at approximately 1500 (EDT) when the switch was placed back in its normal position. The system was subsequently tested and confirmed to be operational. The most recent audibility test of the speaker system had been performed on May 13, 2022, at approximately 1100 (EDT). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector on May 18, 2022, at approximately 1625 (EDT). There were no actual nuclear safety consequences. The potential consequence was that, in the event of a nuclear criticality accident, evacuation could have been delayed for those personnel outside of the main processing area where redundant speakers have not been installed. | ||
| ENS 55841 | 12 April 2022 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: Two contract employees admitted to being involved in the use, sale, or possession of a controlled substance. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55712 | 25 January 2022 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(4), SNM fire or explosion | Chemical Reaction and Fire in Bottle Containing Cleaning Material | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On January 25, 2022, at approximately 0830 EST, a chemical reaction occurred in a 2-liter bottle of cleanup material. The contents were observed smoldering which then resulted in a small fire inside a process enclosure. The container was damaged in the fire, releasing contents to the enclosure. The NFS Fire Brigade responded and successfully extinguished the fire inside the enclosure upon identification. No equipment damage was identified outside of the process enclosure. There were no personnel injuries, exposures, or contamination and no releases to the environment as a result of this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 55218 | 27 April 2021 21:30:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Concurrent Report - Immediate Report to the Texas Department of State Health Services | Low level waste shipment bound for WCS ((Waste Control Specialists)), Andrews, Texas was involved in a minor traffic accident. The trailer sustained light damage to the rear of the trailer. No damage to the shipment contents was identified during visual inspection. Driver was released by the officer working the accident. Accident occurred near Dallas, Texas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 55127 | 8 March 2021 15:21:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness-For-Duty Report | The licensee made the following telephone notification in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(2)(b), to report a significant fitness-for-duty event under 10 CFR 26.75(e)(1). A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54473 | 13 January 2020 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Alcohol Discovered in Cafeteria | Six bottles of flavoring extracts (rum, peppermint, lemon, and almond) containing varying amounts of alcohol content (12 -84 percent) were located in the NFS onsite cafeteria. The items were turned over to NFS Security for control and disposition as necessary. NFS Security and the Plant Superintendent conducted an additional search of the cafeteria and did not identify any additional items. There was no indication that the items had been utilized for consumption by any onsite personnel. A problem was entered in the site Problem Identification Resolution Correction System (PIRCS) for reference (P78223). The cafeteria is located inside the protected area. The event was terminated at 1200 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 54255 | 4 September 2019 07:46:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(1) | Unplanned Contamination Event | The following was received via e-mail: On September 4, 2019, at approximately 0346 EDT, a glass component failed, resulting in an unplanned contamination event. The release was limited to an area inside of the Radiologically Controlled Area. This area is designed for radiological work. There has been no personnel contamination. Airborne radioactivity samples are below action levels. Cleanup and Decontamination activities were safely and promptly initiated, but due to the complexity and space constraints of the system components, normal access to the area is not likely be restored within 24 hours. There has been no exposures or releases to the environment or public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following retraction information was obtained from the licensee via email: The unplanned contamination event was decontaminated to levels that did not require access to be restricted by imposing additional radiological controls within 24 hours, so the event did not require a report per 10CFR70.50(b)(1)(i). The NRC resident inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt), NMSS Events Notification (email), and Fuels Group (email). | ||
| ENS 54218 | 13 August 2019 20:00:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Criticality Accident Alarm System Speaker Failure | At approximately 1320 (EDT) one speaker in the Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) area was identified as not operating when a series of Public Address (PA) announcements were made. Strobe lights, however, were functioning in the area. At 1430 compensatory measures were established to limit access in the affected area to only those personnel with radio communication with the alarm room. At 1600 the system was tested and it was confirmed that the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) was not audible in the LEU area. No other areas were effected. On August 13, 2019 at approximately 1726, full compliance was restored when the speaker was replaced and satisfactorily retested. The most recent audibility test of this area had been satisfactorily performed on August 6, 2019 at approximately 1100. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector on August 13, 2019 at approximately 1653. | ||
| ENS 53624 | 26 September 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty - Discovery of Kombucha Tea Inside the Protected Area | An unopened (sealed) container of Herbal Tea (Kombucha) was found in a refrigerator located within a common office break area inside the protected area. Kombucha Tea is a fermented tea, which contains at least 0.5 percent alcohol by volume. Alcohol is a prohibited item per the requirements of 10 CFR Part 26.719(1). The incident was entered into the NFS corrective action program and an investigation is in progress The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. NFS Event (PIRCS) Number: 67184. | ||
| ENS 53573 | 29 August 2018 04:00:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Concurrent Report for an Offsite Notification Made to the State of Tennessee | This is a concurrent report of a 24-hour report that was made to the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regarding an unauthorized storm water discharge. As permitted by the State of Tennessee, emulsified vegetable oil was being injected into ground water wells located on the North Site of NFS property. At approximately 11:00 (EDT), Environmental Safety was notified of a cloudy oil substance that was observed in the west storm water ditch. Injections were immediately ceased and immediate corrective actions were implemented. Oil absorbent pads and socks were deployed and samples were collected. Before noon on 8/29/2018, the cloudy substance was observed at the discharge of the storm water ditch into Martins Creek. Because of the discoloration observed at the entrance to Martins Creek, this event required a 24-hour notification to TDEC (made at 16:15 on. 8/29/18) and a five day written report will be submitted. Analysis of the grab samples indicated no radioactive material release. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 53502 | 11 July 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(1) | Unplanned Contamination Event | On July 11, 2018, at approximately 0645 (EDT) a radiological spill occurred in Building 333 Uranium Metal Dissolution area due to a glass column leak. This area is controlled as a Radiologically controlled Area. Cleanup and evaluation activities were initiated, but later suspended when it was determined the column had failed and additional evaluation for structural stability was necessary prior to safely performing additional recovery and decontamination activities. There were no radiological or chemical exposures. There were no releases to the environment or public areas. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 53384 | 4 May 2018 15:45:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Concurrent Report for an Offsite Notification Made to the State of Tennessee | This is a concurrent report of a 24-hour report that was made to the state of Tennessee regarding a break in the main fire water loop due to construction activities. The fire loop is fed by city water. The fire water pipe break was isolated by closing isolation valves upstream of the break. A portion of the water and dirt from the excavation flowed into a nearby storm water drainage system. This drainage system has a storm gate which was closed prior to the event to contain the dirt and water. The dirt is still contained in the storm water system located within the protected area of NFS. The dirt is currently being removed from the storm water system. The storm gate will remain closed until the dirt removal activity has been completed. Potential health and safety consequences to the workers, the public and the environment: "There are no actual safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. The potential consequence was a slightly elevated but less than the 10 CFR 20 Table 2 limits of contaminated liquid effluent from a construction accident. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Fire watches have been established for the areas affected by the fire loop break. No criticality controls were affected by this event. | ||
| ENS 52512 | 25 January 2017 22:45:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Policy Violation | A contract employee had a prohibited item in the Protected Area. The employee's access to the site has been restricted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 52405 | 1 December 2016 18:31:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty - Policy Violation | A Supervisor employee failed to report for completion of random testing following notification. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 52404 | 1 December 2016 15:14:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Office Area Alarm Audibility Disabled | On December 1, 2016, at 1014 hours (EST), the speakers for a portion of the bottom floor of Building 305, office and lunch room areas, were inadvertently disabled during construction activities to remove obsolete equipment. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is not processed, handled, or stored within the areas where the speaker system was disabled; however, these areas require evacuation in the unlikely event of a nuclear criticality accident as described in the NFS (Nuclear Fuel Services) Emergency Plan. There were no actual radiological or other nuclear safety consequences. The potential consequence was that in the event of a nuclear criticality accident, evacuation could have been delayed for those personnel within these areas with a resultant increase of postulated doses. Additionally, awareness of a fire event could have been delayed for these same personnel. A series of compensatory actions were taken including restricting access to the affected areas to essential personnel, and establishing radio communications between the personnel in these areas and the personnel continuously monitoring the alarm station panel. On December 1, 2016, at approximately 1159 hours (EST), full compliance was restored by repairing a disabled cable in the speaker circuit and by successfully performing a speaker system test in the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector on. December 1, 2016. | ||
| ENS 52358 | 9 November 2016 16:15:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Insufficient Alarm Audibility | On November 9, 2016, at approximately 1115 hours (EST), the speaker system in Buildings 302, 303, and 306 West was identified as non-operational while performing a functional test of the system. This speaker system is designed to annunciate alarms generated from the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) required by 10CFR70.24, alarms generated from the Fire Alarm Control Panel and Public Address System announcements. Additional functional testing identified that no redundant speakers could adequately provide speaker coverage for all affected areas of these buildings. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is processed, handled, or stored within the areas where the speaker system failed; these areas require evacuation in the unlikely event of a nuclear criticality accident as described in the NFS Emergency Plan. There were no actual radiological or other nuclear safety consequences. The potential consequence was that in the event of a nuclear criticality accident, evacuation could have been delayed for those personnel within these areas with a resultant increase of postulated doses. Additionally, awareness of a fire event could have been delayed for these same personnel. A series of compensatory actions were taken including implementing a plant-wide stop-movement of SNM, limiting access to the affected areas to essential personnel, and establishing radio communications between the personnel in these areas and the personnel continuously monitoring the alarm station panel. On November 9, 2016, at approximately 1725 hours (EST), full compliance was restored by repairing a damaged cable and by successfully performing a speaker system test in the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector on November 9, 2016. NFS Event Number: 55579 | ||
| ENS 52190 | 17 August 2016 21:39:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Failure of a Speaker in an Area Potentially Requiring Personnel Evacuation | On August 17, 2016 at approximately 1739 hours (EDT), one speaker in Building 120 was identified as non-operational while performing a functional test of the system. This speaker is designed to annunciate alarms generated from the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) required by 10CFR70.24, alarms generated from the Fire Alarm Control Panel, and Public Address System announcements. Additional functional testing identified that no redundant speaker could adequately provide speaker coverage for all affected areas of this building. Special Nuclear Materials are not processed, handled, or stored within the area where the speaker failed; however, this area requires evacuation in the unlikely event of a nuclear criticality accident as described in the NFS Emergency Plan. There were no actual radiological or other nuclear safety consequences. The potential consequence was that in the event of a nuclear criticality accident, evacuation could have been delayed for those personnel within Building 120 with a resultant increase of postulated doses. A series of compensatory actions were taken to restore compliance including installation of a temporary speaker and limiting equipment operation to limit background noise. On August 18, 2016, at approximately 1100 hours (EDT), full compliance was restored as demonstrated by successfully performing a speaker test in the affected area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector on August 18, 2016. | ||
| ENS 51767 | 4 March 2016 02:23:00 | 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1) | Contaminated Radioactive Material Shipment | On March 3, 2016, at approximately 1745 (EST), a radioactive material shipment was received at NFS from the Westinghouse Electric Company in Hopkins, South Carolina. Receipt contamination and radiation surveys were completed at approximately 1905. Results indicated removable surface contamination on two of the nine radioactive material packages that exceeded the criteria of the cited regulations. The radioactive material shipment left the Westinghouse Electric Company facility at 1300 (EST) on March 3, 2016. It was received at the NFS receiving facility at approximately 1745 on March 3, 2016. Surface contamination and radiation surveys were initiated immediately upon receipt. Removable surface contamination in excess of 10 CFR 20.1906(d) limits was verified to be present on the external surface of two of the nine shipping containers in the shipment at 1905. Contamination was controlled at the receiving facility and successfully decontaminated below criteria of 10 CFR 20.1906(d) by approximately 2030 on March 3, 2016. This was an exclusive shipment. The alpha contamination measured 4278 dpm/100 sq. cm. and 6345 dpm/100 sq. cm., respectively. The licensee informed Westinghouse who is conducting an investigation into this incident. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On 3/4/2016, NFS made an event report to the NRC Operations Center regarding receipt of containers with removable contamination that exceeded the criteria of the cited regulations. Based on a recent determination by NRC that the materials of concern are considered to be low toxicity alpha emitters, the contamination limits for low toxicity alpha emitters were not exceeded. Therefore, NFS is retracting the event report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rich) and NMSS Events Notification via email. | ||
| ENS 50954 | 4 April 2015 15:51:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(1) | Unplanned Contamination Event | On April 4,2015, at approximately 1151 (EDT), a chemical reaction occurred in a 2-liter bottle of cleanup materials. The bottle was located in a storage rack. The chemical reaction caused the bottle to breach, releasing some of the contents into the immediate area around the storage rack. There were no individuals in the area where the bottle was stored when the breach occurred. The area has been roped off and is in the process of being cleaned up. There were no personnel injuries or exposures. The event is currently being investigated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is also making a courtesy notification for an unplanned chemical reaction in accordance with Information Notice 97-23. Additionally, on April 7, 2015, the area was cleaned up and access restrictions were removed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS EO (Habighorst), IRD (Grant) and NMSS Events Notification (E-mail). | ||
| ENS 50912 | 20 March 2015 16:30:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(3) | Unplanned Medical Treatment | A nuclear operator sustained a laceration to the right hand on a piece of metal flashing while working in a radiological controlled area onsite. The individual was transported to the onsite NFS medical facility for treatment. Radiological surveys of the individual taken at the onsite medical facility indicated no contamination. The individual was subsequently transported to an area hospital for further medical care. Follow-up radiological surveys performed in areas where the injury occurred, in the vehicle used for onsite transport, and in the onsite medical facility also indicated no contamination. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 50748 | 21 January 2015 15:40:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(4), SNM fire or explosion | Unplanned Fire in Building 110 R&D Laboratory Ventilation Hood | During calcining of a water-rinsed polypropylene cartridge filter, flames were observed at the top of the furnace door. The flames were contained in ventilation hood H-103. The flames lasted for 5-10 minutes, always limited to the top of the furnace door. The glass in the sash for hood H-103 broke, most likely from the heat of the flame. The glass is spider-webbed, but contained in the sash. The testing in the hood has been stopped and the hood and furnace have been tagged out of service. There were no actual consequences due to this event. Potential consequences could have involved worker exposure and/or environmental releases. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 50577 | 29 October 2014 07:00:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(1) | Unanalyzed Condition Due to Material in a Thermocouple Housing | While performing troubleshooting on a thermocouple, uranium-bearing material was found inside the sealed housing containing the wiring block for the thermocouple. A very small amount (less than one ounce) of wet paste-like material was removed from the housing for analysis. The leak appears to be low concentration material that has penetrated the enclosed thermocouple well. The material was contained within the housing; however, the electrical conduit exiting the housing connects to an electrical panel that is an unfavorable geometry. Potential health and safety consequences: "No actual safety consequences occurred due to this event. The potential consequences would result if a sufficient volume of HEU solution were to leak through the thermocouple well and drain through the electrical conduit into an unfavorable geometry electrical panel, which could under worst case conditions lead to a criticality accident. The leaked material was contained within the instrument housing and no personnel exposures resulted. Sequence of occurrences leading to the event: "The integrity of a thermocouple well failed allowing a very small quantity of low concentration material to enter the housing containing the thermocouple connections. The leak was identified during troubleshooting operational issues with the system. At this point, the failure mechanism of the thermocouple well is unknown. Additional actions taken in response to the event: Similar systems are being inspected to determine if additional failures are present. Also, corrective actions to include modification of the unfavorable geometry electrical panels that have not been previously modified are underway to eliminate this failure pathway. What is the safety significance of the event? Low safety significance due to limited quantity as well as geometry of container. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 50233 | 26 June 2014 03:48:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(1) | Unplanned Contamination Event | Event Text: At approximately 2348 hours (ET) on June 25, 2014, an employee dropped a container of radioactive material solution after removal from a glove box enclosure. The 2-liter poly container split, releasing contents to the floor and surrounding equipment. Operations in the area were placed in a safe condition at the time of the event, radiological controls implemented for personnel protection, and decontamination initiated. Extensive surface contamination surveys were performed to facilitate decontamination and the area was released to normal access by 1615 hours (ET) on June 26, 2014. At this time, the additional radiological controls implemented at the time of the event were removed. At 0245 hours (ET) on June 27, 2014, contamination was discovered to be weeping out of some facility and equipment surfaces in the area of the earlier spill. Radiological controls were reestablished, decontamination efforts resumed, and enhanced monitoring implemented. Since the cumulative time for access restrictions exceeded 24 hours, this is being reported to the (NRC) Operations Center under 10 CFR 70.50 (b)(1). There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or the environment. There were no actual safety consequences to the workers. The potential safety consequences to the workers include exposure to uranyl nitrate solution. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The radioactive material solution was Uranyl Nitrate containing 540 grams of Uranium-235. | ||
| ENS 50208 | 17 June 2014 23:00:00 | Part 70 App A (A)(4) | Items Relied on for Safety (Irofs) Bypassed | At approximately 1900 hours (EDT) on June 17, 2014, an employee was observed improperly operating two (2) spring return valves identified as Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) and Safety Related Equipment (SRE). The spring return valves were observed to be 'propped' open. These spring return valves were intended to be manually operated to prevent (a chemical solution) from overfilling a column, spilling to the floor, and causing an acute chemical exposure. No actual overflow occurred. Although the operator was observing and monitoring the filling of the column, the operation of the spring return valves was improper. Operations in the area have been placed in a safe condition and an investigation is underway. This condition was determined to be reportable at 0910 (Eastern Time) on June 18, 2014. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or the environment. There were no actual safety consequences to the workers. The potential safety consequences to the workers include exposure to (a hazardous chemical) solution. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region 2. NFS Event (PIRCS) No. - P44298 | ||
| ENS 49998 | 4 April 2014 17:15:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Criticality Accident Evacuation Alarm Not Audible in Certain Areas Outside the Material Handling Area | At approximately 1315 hours (Eastern Daylight Time) on April 4, 2014, while testing the audibility of the criticality accident evacuation alarm in the Building locker room, a report was made that the alarm could not be heard in an office trailer restroom. Subsequent testing confirmed the evacuation alarm could not be heard in the office trailer restroom when the fan was running. Safety management personnel were notified of the problem and other restrooms were tested. Testing revealed that the alarm was not able to be heard in three (3) additional office trailer restrooms. All affected restrooms were posted with signs indicating the areas are not to be occupied pending resolution of the audibility issue. It should be noted that the restrooms are located outside of the material processing areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. See similar event EN #49848. | ||
| ENS 49848 | 21 February 2014 13:39:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Audibility of Alarm System | A report was made to the facility Corrective Action Program (PIRCS) at 0839 (EST) on 2/21/2014 regarding difficulty hearing plant announcements and alarms in the recently renovated Building 110B restroom. Testing of the Public Address (PA) system confirmed that the PA system was difficult to hear. The speakers associated with the PA system are also used for annunciating the site criticality accident alarm evacuation warning. Subsequent testing of the criticality evacuation alarm indicated the alarm was difficult to hear as well. Safety management personnel were notified of the problem and the restroom was locked and posted with signs indicating the area was not to be occupied, pending resolution of the audibility issue. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 50260 | 17 October 2013 16:15:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(3) | Transport of Potentially Contaminated Individuals for Offsite Medical Treatments | Based on discussions with NRC on 7/7/2014 at 0800 EDT, it was determined that two (2) previous unplanned medical treatment cases should have been reported to the NRC Operations Center. The unplanned medical treatment cases occurred on 10/17/2013 and 10/29/2013 and involved injured and potentially contaminated individuals. The individuals were injured at the NFS facility and transported to local medical facilities. Due to the extent of the injuries, a full survey for potential contamination on the individuals could not be performed prior to being transported to the offsite medical facilities. Due to the inability to perform full surveys, NFS Medical and Radiological Staff, along with the medical facilities, implemented effective contamination control measures prior to the individuals arriving at the medical facilities, preventing the spread of potential contamination. On 10/17/2013 and 10/29/2013, respectively, NFS determined that reports to the NRC Operations Center were not required; however, notification to the NRC should have been made within 24-hours of the potentially contaminated individuals being transported to the medical facilities. Follow-up surveys and analysis by NFS Radiological Control staff did not identify spreadable radioactive contamination on the individuals or the medical facilities. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or environment. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the workers involving exposures to radiation or radioactive materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 49368 | 20 September 2013 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Supervisor Tested Positive for Alcohol on a for Cause Test | A facility supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a for-cause fitness for duty test. The supervisor's access to the facility has been restricted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48228 | 23 August 2012 23:45:00 | 10 CFR 74.57 | Material Control and Accountability Alarm Resolution | 10 CFR 74.57 (f)(2) requires notification within 24 hours that a Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) alarm resolution procedure has been initiated. In the Solvent Extraction Area of Building 333, the input minus output value exceeded the MC&A limit. Because the alarm investigation procedure has been initiated, this notification is being made. There was no material loss and the issue was resolved on 8/24/2012. MC&A process monitoring tests for material balance were run as specified by applicable procedures and requirements. Based on the test results for Building 333 solvent extraction area, the test limit was exceeded. The investigation was completed and the alarm was resolved on 8/24/2012. There was no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 47620 | 23 January 2012 15:40:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(3) | Medical Treatment of a Potentially Contaminated Individual at Onsite Facility | 10 CFR 70.50 (b)(3) requires a twenty-four hour report of an event that requires unplanned medical treatment at a medical facility of an individual with spreadable radioactive contamination on the individual's clothing or body. An individual's fingers were potentially exposed to HF (hydrogen fluoride). The potential HF exposure was believed to be caused by a pin hole in a glove-box glove. The glove was replaced and other glove-box gloves were inspected. The individual's fingers were rinsed and calcium gluconate cream was applied in the Radiological Control Area (RCA). As a precautionary measure, the individual was sent to the on-site medical area (within the Owner Controlled Area) for review/observation. Minor radioactive contamination, below minimum detectable activity (MDA) for the equipment, was removed from the individual's fingers at the medical area. The radioactive contamination was below radioactive release limits. In addition, at the medical area, the individual's finger was irrigated with water and additional calcium gluconate cream was applied. The individual was monitored and then released by medical personnel. No evidence of HF exposure was observed. The licensee is making this report on a voluntary basis due to the ambiguous nature of the regulation (10 CFR 70.50 (b)(3)). It should be noted that Part 50 guidance as well as internal licensee guidance refers to medical treatment at off-site medical facilities. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47578 | 9 January 2012 16:55:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Report to Offsite Government Agencies and Press Release Due to a Chemical Spill Onsite | The licensee reported that approximately 300 gallons of nitric acid spilled in the bulk chemical storage outdoor area from a storage tank. The nitric acid spilled into a dike that surrounds the tank. The leak was isolated and it is believed that no acid breached the dike and entered the environment. Due to fumes from the acid, the licensee shut down production activities and evacuated non-essential personnel from nearby buildings. The licensee is currently remediating the spill and evaluating when to permit personnel normal access to the onsite areas that were evacuated. This event did not involve any radiological material and did not meet emergency declaration criteria. There was no offsite impact from this event. Site security was maintained throughout. No injuries have been reported. The cause of the spill is still being investigated. This event is being reported to the NRC Operations Center as a "Concurrent Report" because the licensee has notified state, county, and local authorities and will be making a press release. The licensee has also notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Region 2 (Pelchat). | ||
| ENS 47060 | 14 July 2011 21:04:00 | 10 CFR 74.57 | Initiation of Material Control and Accounting Resolution Procedure | 10CFR74.57(f)(2) requires notification within 24 hours that an MC&A (Material Control and Accounting) alarm resolution procedure has been initiated. In the solvent extraction area of Building 333, the input minus output value exceeded the MC&A limit. Because the alarm investigation procedure has been initiated, this notification is being made. There is no indication that a material loss has occurred. MC&A process monitoring tests for material balance were run as specified by applicable procedures and requirements. Based on the test results for the Building 333 solvent extraction area, the test limit was exceeded. An investigation is currently underway to resolve the issue. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 46851 | 13 May 2011 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1) | Shipping Container Contamination Level Exceeds the Surface Contamination Limits | The following information was received by e-mail: Empty (Model) LR-230 shipping containers received from off-site where one (1) LR-230 had removable surface contamination above limits for alpha/beta activity on the outer surface of the container (~7,800 dpm/100 sq cm alpha and 13,300 dpm/100 sq cm beta). The LR-230 shipping containers are used to transport uranyl nitrate (<5.0 wt % U-235). Contamination was not related to container integrity. Contamination appears to be related to minor drips during unloading. Areas have been successfully decontaminated. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 46608 | 10 February 2011 22:02:00 | 10 CFR 74.57 | Material Control and Accountability (Mc&A) Alarm Resolution | 10 CFR 74.57 (f) (2) requires notification within 24 hours that an MC&A alarm resolution procedure has been initiated. In the solvent extraction area of Building 333, the input minus output value exceeded the MC&A limit. Because the alarm investigation procedure has been initiated, this notification is being made. There is no indication that a material loss has occurred. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2 and the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 46284 | 27 September 2010 17:41:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(1) | Unusual Buildup of Material in Aluminum Centrifuge Area | During the unloading of centrifuges in the Building 333 U-Aluminum centrifuge area, a crusty buildup of material (~1/8" thick) was observed on the inside of the centrifuge 'jacket' that contains the centrifuge bowl. The buildup was also observed on the underside of the centrifuge lid ('cake pan'). This level of material buildup was unusual and had not been previously observed. It should be noted that some dusting or spattering had been previously observed. The system is designed with drains on the bottom that are designed to prevent the accumulation of liquid within the centrifuge 'jacket'. There is also a requirement to inspect the 'jacket' when solution is observed draining from the overflows. This was considered an unanalyzed or improperly analyzed condition because the mechanism for buildup of this extent was not considered in the safety analysis (i.e. there was no indication of buildup provided by the overflows). The following corrective actions were taken: 1) operations in the affected area were suspended; 2) the area was posted to maintain the integrity of the as-found conditions; 3) the area was inspected by safety personnel; 4) the issue was entered into the internal Problem Identification, Resolution, and Correction System (PIRCS); 5) an Unusual Incident Evaluation was performed; 6) calculations were performed with bounding conditions; 7) photographs were taken of the equipment; 8) the system was scanned to determine U-235 mass (~46 grams U-235); 9) material samples were taken and delivered to the laboratory for analysis; and 10) an investigation has been initiated. There were no control or control system failures. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. No degradations or failures have been identified. The system is currently in a safe and stable condition. An investigation has been initiated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 46086 | 12 July 2010 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Electrical Fault Disabled Public Address System Which Supports Various Alarm Annunciators | At approximately 1200 hours (EST) on 7/12/2010, an electrical fault was identified in the fire alarm system. This fault disabled the public address portion of the system which supports annunciation of plant alarms including the following: fire alarm, criticality alarm, take-cover alarm, (carbon dioxide) discharge alarms. Trouble shooting of the problem is continuing. There is no impact to actual detection, suppression, etc. systems. Compensatory measures include the following: stop SNM handling and movement, fire patrols, restriction of hot work, notification to facility personnel, evacuation of nonessential personnel from production areas, fire brigade on standby and radios provided to fire brigade officers and some fire brigade members. It is believed that the condition was associated with heavy rainfall and possible water intrusion. There were no actual safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment associated with the event. Potential consequences to workers, the public, or the environment are mitigated by compensatory measures. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The public address portion of the plant alarm system was restored on 7/13/2010. It appears that recent rain storms caused some wiring to develop short circuits. These short circuits were corrected. The system is continuing to be monitored and wiring may be identified that requires replacement. It was confirmed that the criticality alarm portion of the plant alarm system was not impacted during the recent outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (Seymour), NMSS EO (Hiltz) , Fuels Grp (Email) | ||
| ENS 46079 | 8 July 2010 18:33:00 | 10 CFR 74.57 | Material Control and Accountability (Mc&A) Alarm Actuation | 10 CFR 74.57 (f) (2) requires notification within 24 hours that an MC&A alarm resolution procedure has been initiated. The input minus output value exceeded the limit in the Solvent Extraction Area of Building 333. The input minus output value has been resolved. There is no indication that a material loss has occurred. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. An input minus output process monitoring material balance was calculated for the Building 333 Solvent Extraction Area as specified by applicable procedures and requirements. The input minus output value exceeded the limit. An investigation was initiated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Similar EN #46064. | ||
| ENS 46064 | 1 July 2010 23:18:00 | 10 CFR 74.57 | Material Control and Accountability (Mc&A) Alarm Actuation | 10 CFR 74.57(f)(2) requires notification within 24 hours that an MC&A alarm resolution procedure has been initiated. Because the alarm investigation has been initiated, this notification is being made. There is no indication that a material loss has occurred. Material processing operations related to this alarm have been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The investigation from the MC&A alarm resolution procedure has been successfully completed. No material loss occurred, and the alarm was caused by the material being held up in the process. Notified R2DO (Widmann), NMSS EO (Pstrak), and Fuels OUO Group via email. | ||
| ENS 45642 | 21 January 2010 00:35:00 | Part 70 App A (A)(4) | Potentially Overpressurized Uf6 Cylinders | UF6 cylinders are in storage. The cylinders consist of 1s/2s, hoke tubes, and 5A cylinders. The UF6 is contained in the cylinders, which are in DOT shipping containers (20PF1 and 6M containers). Calculations were performed that indicated that the theoretical pressure in some of the cylinders exceeds the service pressure (200psi) and some exceed the hydrostatic test pressure (400psi). DOE literature indicates that the burst pressure for a 5A cylinder is (approximately) 8,000 psi. The age of the cylinders is 1950s (to) 1980s. The potential pressure in the cylinders is estimated to be by liberation of fluorine gas in the cylinders. Access to the areas has been restricted. The path forward consists of further analysis, evaluation, and understanding of the issue. The cylinders potentially contain fluorine gas. There were no actual safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. The potential consequences are minimal due to restricted access to the areas and the stable condition of the cylinders (i.e., cylinders, shipping containers, building containment). UF6 cylinders, shipping containers, building containment provide mitigation. Area sprinklers and smoke detection also provide mitigation. Area security cameras provide assistance for monitoring. Security fire patrols (have been) implemented. Other compensatory measures are being considered that include providing uncharged fire hoses to the areas. Licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
These are additional compensatory actions that have been and will be put in place: 1. Verified operability of smoke detection 2. Verified operability of sprinkler system 3. Established fire patrol inspection. (minimum of 1 inspection per hour) 4. Restricted access 5. Hot work restriction in the restricted areas 6. Verified Fire Brigade members on each shift. (minimum of 5 members each shift) 7. Staging one (1) 150 pound dry chemical extinguisher 8. Staging a fire response vehicle 9. Briefing plant superintendent on status with a superintendent turnover each shift. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes), NMSS EO (Smith), and IRD (Gott).
With regard to the compensatory actions listed in the e-mail dated January 20, 2010, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) is modifying its commitment to have at least five Fire Brigade members on each shift. Thus, compensatory action No. 6 is being replaced with the following compensatory action: NFS has developed a specific pre-fire response plan for the areas where the UF6 cylinders are stored. This plan has been reviewed with the Erwin City Fire Chief. NFS plans to provide one trained Fire Brigade member on each shift who will coordinate the Erwin Fire Department response to a fire incident involving a UF6 cylinder. Notified R2DO (Sykes), NMSS EO (Smith), and IRD (Gott).
Following an extensive review by both NFS and independent experts, the analysis of the issue of UF6 cylinders in storage is now complete. The analysis concluded that the likelihood of a release from the cylinders is low, but even if a release were to occur, the consequences to workers, the public, and the environment would be low. Therefore, the additional compensatory actions that have been in place since January 20, 2010, are being discontinued. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Franke), NMSS EO (McCartin), IRD (McDermott), and Fuels OUO Group via E-mail. | ||
| ENS 45601 | 31 December 2009 10:17:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Temporarily Suspend Certain Process Areas | A press release is being issued by NFS (Nuclear Fuels Services). NFS is implementing organizational, facility and management changes that will ensure an even more stringent level of safety controls and processes at the facility. During the implementation, NFS will temporarily stand down certain process areas. NFS developed these changes following consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to ensure that the highest levels of safety commitment, culture and compliance are in place for licensed operational processes. NFS is making these specific changes following a recent NRC review. Suspended operations include production operations, the Commercial Development Line and the down blending facility. These facilities will be brought back on line pending a third-party review and NRC review of the safety improvement implementations. Other areas of the plant will continue to operate. | ||
| ENS 45497 | 14 November 2009 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(4), SNM fire or explosion | Fire in Process Glove Box | On Saturday November 14, 2009 at approximately 0730 there was a heated high pressure release from the 5A/5B UF6 cylinder in the CDL facility Sublimation Station 3. At the time of the upset, the operators were in the process of preparing the cylinder for sublimation. They had just satisfactorily performed the valve leak checks (SOP 409 Section 56 step 5.3) and were performing the cylinder pressure test (SOP 409 Section 56 step 5.4). The cylinder was not being heated. The upset occurred when the cylinder valve was opened (step 5.4.7) to vent the cylinder to column 1D01. The release ruptured the connective teflon tubing that was enclosed in braided stainless steel. When flame was observed the operator actuated the CO2 release valve and extinguished the flame. The subsequent damage appears to be limited to: 1). Braided teflon tubing, 2). Singed area on lexan cover of the enclosure, 3). Possible leak on the inlet and outlet side of the eductor. Of note, column 1D01 was filled with DI water in preparation for startup. The solution should have a clear appearance but has been discolored by the upset. It appears to have been blackened, possibly from burning Teflon. As of 1200 PM the following actions have been taken to place the system in a safe condition: 1. Building 333 personnel were notified of the event and the 301/333 door was posted with caution. 2. Immediate area is roped off. 3. All involved personnel have received incident report forms for completion. 4. A firewatch has been posted (ISA requirement as cylinder contains >7.2 kgs UF6) 5. Supervisor verified valves on UF6 cylinder are shut. 6. Nasal smears taken on all affected personnel (7 dpm max; below action limit of 90). 7. High volume air sample taken with no elevated activity identified. 8. Area sampled for HF with a Draegor Tube (negative). 9. Verified no increase on room CAM (continuous air monitor). 10. Subsequent NCS (nuclear criticality safety) evaluation identified no concerns or NCS reportability issues. 11. System has been locked out of service with operational locks and appropriate signage placed on sublimation station #3. 12. Solution on the floor from the enclosure P traps has been cleaned up. 13. The enclosure overflow traps have been filled. 14. The CO2 gage has been verified functional and operations personnel are in the process of replacing the spent CO2 cylinder. 15. NDA has scanned the NaF trap (no elevated levels found). 16. Plant Superintendent took photos of equipment damage. 17. HP verified no damage to gloves. 18. Sublimation station #1 & 2 have been tagged 'Not Authorized for Use.' 19. All proper notifications made. 20. Plant Superintendent is in the process of developing a timeline of events. No actual exposures occurred to the workers, the public, and environment. Potential UF6 exposure to workers. However, no loss of containment occurred. No other structures, systems, or equipment components in the area were affected. Safety systems are operational. All sublimation stations have been taken out-of-service pending investigation results. The event is terminated. No declared emergency class. Notifications were made to the local county Emergency Management Coordinator and the Town of Erwin Fire Department. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 45446 | 13 October 2009 04:00:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(1) | Nitrous Oxide (Nox) Generation Rate Higher than Expected After Aluminum Fines Were Introduced | Bldg 333's U-Aluminum Bowl Cleaning system is designed to remove uranium from centrifuge bowls by circulating nitric acid through the bowls. The system has historically produced NOx (nitrous oxide, etc) during the nitric acid dissolution process. Safety controls designated as Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) include a NOx detection system (IROFS BPF-43) with sensors located at the nitric acid knockout column's siphon break potential NOx release point if process ventilation fails and at employee working level. On October 13, 2009, NFS began using the Bowl Cleaning system to dissolve U-Al fines (very small particles of U-AI) rather than adding them to the normal dissolver column. The fines were loaded into strainers and placed directly into the bowls to be dissolved with nitric acid. After the dissolution process began, the Operator noticed that the temperature of the system was increasing and that NOx (in the form of a brown cloud) was beginning to form inside the Bowl Cleaning station containment vessels. The system was shutdown. The Nox detector designated as an IROFS alarmed and the facility was evacuated. Immediate corrective actions included building, and health and safety personnel re-entry in SCBA to validate shutdown conditions and remote monitoring of Nox levels in Bldg 333. Based on re-entry data and remote Nox detector readings, Nox levels inside the building (outside of containment) were not significant. Laboratory analysis of similar U-AI fines material was conducted October 14-October 16. It behaved in the laboratory in the same manner as what was observed during the operational event. Based on the lab testing, a Nox generation rate specific for the fines material was estimated. Based on engineering calculations, it was determined that the Nox generation for the fines was significantly higher than the previously analyzed Nox generation for the U-AI ingots. The previous Nox evaluation for the U-Al Bowl Cleaning station resulted in an intermediate occupational consequence. Using the generation rate specific for the fines results in high occupational consequences. On October 19, 2009, based on the revised Nox generation rate, it was determined that insufficient lROFS were in place and that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 were not met. a) Radiological Hazards involved including: High- enrichment Uranium: quantity Approx 1,000 g; Isotope: U-235 quantity Approx 710 g b) Chemical Hazards involved including: Chemical: Nox gas; Quantity: Approx. 1.85 lbs. c) Discuss the actual or potential health and safety consequences to the workers, the public, and the environment, including relevant chemical and radiation data for actual personnel exposures to radiation or radioactive materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials. Include in the discussion below the concentration of chemicals and duration of exposure, if any: Potential worker and public exposure to Nox. Process ventilation and Nox detection worked as designed. No actual exposure to workers or the public were recorded. d) Discuss the sequence of occurrences leading to the event, including degradation or failure of structures, systems, equipment, components and activities of personnel relied on to prevent potential accidents or mitigate their consequences: See above. e) Discuss whether the remaining structures, systems, equipment components, and activities of personnel relied on to prevent potential accidents or mitigate their consequences are available and reliable to perform their function: IROFS BPF-43 is in place and functioned correctly during the event. Operating personnel responded to the alarm as specified in the operating procedure and evacuated the facility. External conditions affecting the event: None. Additional actions taken in response to the event: Discussed situation with Operations, Safety management and with the NRC Resident Inspector. The U-Al Bowl Cleaning system is currently not operating.
The "(nitrous oxide, etc)" in the first paragraph of the original report is updated to state "(NO, NO2, etc)." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Henson) and NMSS EO (Rubenstone) via email. | ||
| ENS 45179 | 30 June 2009 20:00:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) | Safety Equipment Failure of the Criticality Alarm System | The public address system (criticality accident alarm) was impaired for a portion of the Building 310 warehouse and a subcontractor trailer. The cause of the impairment was determined to be the result of a contractor drilling into a public address system speaker wire while installing fire protection components in the Building 310 warehouse. This created an electrical short which rendered the speakers inoperable for a portion of the Building 310 warehouse and a subcontractor trailer. The speaker wire was obscured from view by a structural beam. The system was repaired, tested, and placed back into service by 1721 hours (EDT) on 6/30/2009. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | ||
| ENS 44890 | 4 March 2009 19:40:00 | Part 70 App A (C) 10 CFR 70.74 APP. A | Glovebox Overflow Drains May Be Inadequate to Perform Their Safety Function | Many gloveboxes in the processing areas are equipped with overflow drains to prevent solution from exceeding an unsafe depth. These overflow drains are sized to accommodate the credible flow rates into the associated gloveboxes. During the generation of set-point analyses for overflow drains in a new process area, questions arose regarding how the drain discharge flow rates are calculated. To resolve these questions, NFS performed field tests using a glovebox on 2/26/2009 and 2/27/2009. Initial results of these tests indicated that the discharge flow rates are sensitive to drain weir height and glovebox floor flatness. This caused NFS to question the ability of the drains to perform their intended function. NFS, therefore, generated a plant-wide list of all potentially affected gloveboxes and suspended operations in them on 2/27/2009. Uranium-bearing materials were removed from the gloveboxes and all of the affected gloveboxes were tagged out of service. Engineering evaluations of the affected gloveboxes were performed and proceeded through 3/4/2009. As a result of Engineering evaluations, it was determined that in some instances a single drain alone was not capable of maintaining a solution depth to within design parameters in some localized areas within the glovebox. Modifications are being made to the drains to restore their functionality. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or the environment. The potential criticality consequences to the workers were low due to the conservatisms included in the analyses. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee will issue a press release to summarize the results of NRC Special Inspection Report No. 2009-007. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Bjorkman) and Fuels Grp via email. | ||
| ENS 44887 | 3 March 2009 05:00:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(2) | Degradation of Item Relied on for Safety (Irofs) | Area F is part of the solvent extraction uranium recovery process. The solvent extraction process removes usable uranium and strips out impurities from the solution. An organic solvent and nitric acid are used as part of this process. Column-0F13 is a strip column which has organic solvent flowing into the bottom and usable uranium/nitric acid entering from the top. After passing down through the solvent, the nitric acid exits Column-0F13 from the bottom, into feed Column-0G04. Column-0G04 then feeds into evaporator Column-0G05. If solvent were to enter Column-0G05 and begin reacting with the heated nitric acid while the system was closed (i.e., no vent relief) then a potential overpressurization or 'red oil' accident could occur. The scenario assumes that the reaction continues (self-heating) even though the heaters are shut off. IROFS FAF-19 consists of flow switch FS-0F13, located in Column-0F13, which is interlocked to PUMPMT-0F19. This IROFS is in place to prevent a red oil accident by isolating organic solvent in-flow to evaporator Column 0G05 (via feed Column 0G04) upon loss of solvent-nitric acid interface in strip Column 0F13. If flow switch FS-0F13 senses loss of Column 0F13 interface, PUMPMT-0F19 shuts off which stops flow into Column 0G04 and thus into Column-0G05. The equipment associated with IROFS FAF-19 is designated as Safety Related Equipment (SRE) and is functionally tested monthly. The regularly scheduled SRE Test was performed on March 3, 2009, and the purpose of the test is to demonstrate that the flow switch will fall when interface is lost and thus will shut off PUMPMT-0F13. The test failed because the flow switch did not fall, so the pump did not stop (PIRCS Problem #17584). Though there are defense in depth factors such as procedural requirements for operators to verify that no solvent is present in feed Column-0G04 prior to operation of evaporator Column-0G05, it was determined that IROFS FAF-19 was degraded and that the performance criteria of 10CFR70.61 were not met. IROFS FAG-12 is an open vent that is credited as an additional control that is in place to prevent overpressurization due to self-heating. However IROFS FAF-19 is also required to be available in order to the performance criteria. Previous SRE testing of the flow switch in January 2009 identified a potential problem with the flow switch sticking. As follow-up to that occurrence, the area process engineer reduced the SRE testing frequency from semi-annual to its current frequency of monthly in order to provide better indication if a problem was developing. Area F is currently in a safe condition and is operating under approved compensatory measures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44848 | 12 February 2009 17:15:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(3) | Contaminated Worker Sent to Offsite Hospital for Treatment | Operator was changing a filter in a glove box when he noticed liquid on his sleeve. Safety Department was notified and operator was found to be contaminated above limits. Decontamination attempts were unsuccessful due to nitric acid burn on forearm. Several small holes/cuts in rubber glovebox glove were identified. Operator was sent to medical facility for further evaluation. Operator was treated for second degree burns at medical facility and released. There were no exposures from licensed material. There were no actual consequences to the public or environment. Personal protective equipment was used by the worker. Emergency safety shower was available and utilized. Locker room shower was also available and utilized. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | ||
| ENS 44740 | 23 December 2008 12:49:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(2) | Degraded Safety Equipment | Area 600 uses a flammable gas as part of its operation. IROFS (Items Relied On For Safety) FIRE6-6 is a control that prevents the flammable gas from exiting the main process equipment and being released into an attached glovebox. FIRE6-6 makes use of a dual door system in which only one (1) door is allowed to be open at a time and the chamber between the doors is purged when both doors are closed. The accident scenario of concern is release of the flammable gas into the glovebox where it could mix with oxygen, creating a potential for an explosion inside Building 302. Additionally, IROFS FIRE6-8, 6-1 and 6-9 ensure an inert gas purge occurs prior to opening the main process equipment to the glovebox and are also credited as IROFS. The equipment associated with FIRE6-6 is designated as Safety Related Equipment (SRE) and is functionally tested annually. The regularly scheduled SRE Test was performed on December 23, 2008, and the purpose of the test is to demonstrate that each door remains closed while the other door is opened. The test failed because when the first door was opened, the second door also opened slightly (approximately one (1) inch). Though there are mitigating factors such as potential dilution of the flammable gas through the glovebox ventilation system, it was determined that IROFS FIRE6-6 was degraded and that the performance criteria of 10CFR70.61 were not met. A similar event was reported to the NRC (#44584) on October 21, 2008 for similar equipment in Bldg 302. However, the cause of the previous IROFS failure was due to a blocked speed controller which failed to bleed off air. The blocked speed controlled is unrelated to the current IROFS failure. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES: Potential explosion in a glovebox and release of radiological material and exposure to the worker. No actual explosion or radiological exposure occurred. SEQUENCE OF OCCURRENCES: The event occurred due a degraded IROFS that was discovered during a periodic functional test. Initial investigation indicates an airline solenoid valve is leaking by. ACTIONS TAKEN: Operations has closed the flammable gas supply for Area 600 Bldg 303 until the equipment associated with FIRE6-6 is fixed and the SRE test passes. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44700 | 5 December 2008 09:27:00 | 10 CFR 70.50(b)(1) | Unplanned Contamination | During a transfer of uranyl nitrate, solution entered a column overflow. Less than one (1) liter of solution leaked from a fitting on the overflow line and contaminated process equipment primarily in an area inaccessible to personnel. The event is being reported because decontamination could not be completed within 24-hours. The area was isolated and personnel access was restricted. Cleanup activities were initiated and decontamination was performed in areas accessible to personnel. Decontamination of remaining areas (are) ongoing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |