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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56958 | 13 December 2023 00:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 - Interim Report for Oil Filled Capacitors | The following is a synopsis of information that was provided by AMETEK Solidstate Controls Inc. via email: This component (07-020139-10) is a 13 micro-Farad AC oil filled capacitor. During operation in an inverter, oil may be visible on, around, or dripping from the capacitor or its mounting bracket or tray. If allowed sufficient time, enough oil will leak from the capacitor that it will short internally and fail. Time required for the failure could be greater than the recommended 10-year preventative maintenance cycle for this part. AMETEK Solidstate Controls has not been able to determine a definitive cause of the failure, but is working to do so. These capacitors are generally part of a larger capacitor bank. The failure would result in a reduction of output voltage that is directly proportional to the number of capacitors in the bank that fail. Any single capacitor failure would be less than a 3 volt decrease in output voltage. Users of these capacitors should visually inspect any equipment containing the capacitor part number stated above for evidence of an oil leak. A review of the output voltage for the parent equipment for any consistent decrease in voltage of 0-3V may serve as an indication of capacitor failure. The user should notify AMETEK Solidstate Controls if any oil is observed during inspection. Corrective actions should be established by May 2024. Affected plants are not listed.
FINAL REPORT FOR OIL FILLED CAPACITORS AMETEK Solidstate Controls Inc, (SCI) has completed their evaluation of the deviation described in their interim report submitted on February 9, 2024, and concluded that there was no way of recreating the potential defect and no evidence of a broad defect with the general design, manufacture, or use of the capacitor. However, they identified hypothesized causes of the failure and corrective actions to mitigate failure risks. AMETEK SCI also identified the end users that may be potentially affected. The affected plants are Duke Energy; Oconee and Catawba, TVA; Browns Ferry and Watts Bar; Georgia Power, Vogtle 1 and 2; Dominion; Surry; and South Texas Nuclear Operating Company. Notified R2DO(Miller), R4DO(Josey) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email) | ||
| ENS 55453 | 9 September 2021 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Nonconforming Relay Led to Failures of Battery Chargers | The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail: Component Description: AMETEK Part Number 07-740108-00, K306 relay, used in the float/equalize circuit of AMETEK Battery Chargers. The relay is a solid-state timer manufactured by Omron with manufacturer part number H3CR-A-AC100-240/DC100125. Problem You Could See: AMETEK was notified of a condition of a nonconforming K306 relay that led to failures of battery chargers. AEP DC Cook reported a single failure of a K306 Float/Equalize timer relay in a controlled environment where the relay failed to transfer from float to equalize and caused the DC output to fail. Transferring the battery charger to equalize mode is always a manual operation and the float/equalize function is typically used after an outage or a discharge test in order to bring the batteries back to full charge. Before performing a discharge test, the charger should be put in equalize mode. AMETEK was not able to evaluate this specific instance of failure, but it was determined the circuit does not meet the minimum contact current rating. As a result, the operation of the relay may be unreliable and the charger may experience a loss of output when equalize is initiated, failing to charge the batteries. The failed relay was installed in 2017 and was original to the equipment. Effect on System Performance: If the charger fails to transfer between float and equalize, the equalize light may turn on, the charger output will fail, voltage will drop below float voltage or to 0, and there will be no charging capabilities. An alarm will indicate Low DC voltage in the event the charger does not transfer between float and equalize. The charger will restart after the AC input breaker is cycled Off and On. The relay should be replaced if the charger output is lost. Other alarm(s) may be included with the design: - Battery Discharge Alarm - Low Current Alarm The battery will charge with float voltage, but will take longer than with equalize voltage (~8-24 hours after charging current stabilizes). The safety impact is a loss of battery charger output after an event where the float/equalize button is utilized and does not retransfer to equalize for charging. If the charger fails to transfer and the output is lost prior to a safety event, the battery may not be at full capacity for a shutdown. Each utility will need to evaluate the application of the battery charger and the battery it is charging. Affected Entities: Alabama Power Company; Arkansas Nuclear One; Atomic Energy of Canada; Constellation Energy; Consumer's Power, Palisades; Dominion - Kewaunee; Dominion Energy; Dominion Inc.; Duke Energy; Duke Power Co.; EM Test (Switzerland) GMBH; Engine Systems; Ergytech Inc.; Exelon; Exelon Generation Co.; First Energy; Formosa Nextech Co.; Framatome Technologies; Georgia Power; Indiana Michigan Power Co.; Millstone Nuclear Power Station; Niagara Mohawk; NPP Krsko; Progress Energy; TVA; TVA Watts Bar; Ulysses - Taiwan Power; and Ulysses System Development. Ametek Contact: Ametek Solidstate Controls Client Services group, 1-800-222-9079 or 614-846-7500, extension 1. | ||
| ENS 55167 | 1 April 2021 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Interim Report - Failure of Ametek 300V, 250A Clamp Diodes | The following is a synopsis of a Part 21 interim report received by email: COMPONENT DESCRIPTION - 300V, 250 A clamp diodes with Vishay/International Rectifier part numbers IN3737 and IN3737R and Ametek part numbers 07-600250-00 and 07-600251-00, respectively. Diode failures occurred in 20kVA Inverters, Ametek part number 85-VC0200-41 with serial numbers C84733-0211 and C84733-0511. Two failed diodes returned for evaluation were manufactured in India in 2004. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED - TVA has experienced 5 diode failures since November of 2017. The diode failures experienced at TVA resulted in alarms for abnormal conditions and equipment alarms for fan failure, inverter fuse blown, and inverter failure. The equipment will transfer to bypass when a diode fails. POTENTIAL CAUSE - Diodes installed in the TVA equipment were shorted in most cases and degraded in one instance. Only two of the shorted diodes were sent to AMETEK SCI for evaluation. While the precise cause of this failure is unknown, diode failures are generally attributed to transient voltage spikes and overheating. TVA did indicate there have not been any transient events on the DC bus that could have caused this failure. The inverters at TVA are loaded below 50%. This could contribute to increased heat and stress on the diodes due to increased current draw. However, test data from the original testing of the equipment at no load did not show elevated temperatures on the diodes. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE - Failures described above could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source which could result in potential loss of load. EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL DEFECT - AMETEK is sending the parts to the original manufacturer for further evaluation with the intent to obtain more insight on the interior condition of the diodes. The targeted completion date for this evaluation of the two diodes returned is June 1, 2021.
What is being classified as a 'minor adjustment' is being made to the notification originally submitted on 4/1/2021. All diodes TVA identified as failed were shorted. None were degraded. Notified R2DO (Miller) and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group.
The following excepts provide a synopsis of information provided by AMETEK in the final report. ... The failure was caused by electrical overstress, but the specific root cause is indeterminate. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: A diode failure could occur and will result in the equipment transferring to bypass, a loss of output voltage, blown fuses, and unexpected alarms such as fan failure, inverter fuse blown, and inverter failure alarms. There are no conclusive warning signs that a failure is imminent, or detection method for predicting an approaching failure. CAUSE: Diodes that failed in the TVA equipment were shorted according to the summaries provided by TVA. Only two of the shorted diodes were sent to AMETEK SCI for evaluation. The condition of all other diodes is unknown. While the precise cause of this failure is unknown, diode failures are generally attributed to transient voltage spikes and overheating. TVA did indicate there have not been any transient events on the DC bus that could have caused this failure. Additionally, AMETEK sent a representative to the site to review the equipment and operating conditions. The field service technician concluded that there were no abnormalities apparent in the operating conditions or the equipment itself. According to TVA, the inverters at TVA are loaded below 50%. The AMETEK field service representative determined load was at 25% of full load during the site visit in August of 2021. This could contribute to increased heat and stress on the diodes due to increased current draw. However, there was no indication of overheating of the diode at no load or 25% of unit C84733- 0511 (1-II). All diodes were within acceptable temperature conditions on the equipment evaluated. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: Failures described above could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source which could result in potential loss of load. ACTION REQUIRED: AMETEK Solidstate Controls recommends that each facility evaluate the potential risk and performs replacement as determined necessary. Evaluation could include oscilloscope measurements across the diodes and temperature measurements of the diodes and the equipment. Voltage readings from the oscilloscope measurement should not exceed the rating of the diode. Temperatures should be compared to original test data and should not exceed 100ø C. Recent evaluations have been unable to pinpoint a failure mode and there are no conclusive connections to previous failures. Only the failures provided in this report have surfaced for the subject part numbers and the failure rate has been low. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: AMETEK Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements and spare parts for your application as needed. Please contact our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1- 614-846-7500, extension 1. Notified R2DO (Miller) and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group. | ||
| ENS 54520 | 11 February 2020 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Report - Ametek 85-Rp2675-01 Power Supply Mounting Hardware | The following is a synopsis of a Part 21 report received by email: SUMMARY - AMETEK Solidstate Controls recently discovered a concern with the structural integrity of the 85-RP2675-01 Rack Mounted Power supply. While qualifying a replacement part for an obsolete breaker, the left panel of the power supply came loose after the hardware had sheared during the seismic simulation testing of the qualification. The loss of structural integrity of the power supply led to internal shorting and a premature stoppage of the simulation testing. PROBLEM - During a seismic event, a structural failure of the power supply enclosure resulting in a loss of output could occur. At this point, it is suspected that the failure is related to a variation in the components that increased strain on the power supply enclosure, and it is indeterminate if there is a widespread deviation. It is also possible that the cause of the failure is attributed to inadequately sized hardware that supports the bottom panel of the power supply. In the current design, there are 3 #10-32 machine screws through each of the side panels that fasten to the bottom panel to support the transformer. AMETEK is unable to identify the actual structural support of power supplies in the field. In the recent testing performed, no support was provided under the power supply during the testing. If there is support in the end application from the bottom of the power supply, there may not be a structural concern as the connection screws would not be exposed to the same forces. In this instance, the power supply had been exposed to a peak acceleration of approximately 4.8 giga second. It should also be noted that acceptable results have been obtained in previous seismic tests and changes have not been made to the structure of the power supply since its initial design in 1996. ACTION RECOMMENDED - At this time, there are no actions to take as the evaluation is ongoing. The next step is to determine if the screws are likely to become overstrained with enough seismic force. To do this, AMETEK is repeating the test with two new power supplies. One power supply will not have any changes made to the structure while the second power supply will be enhanced to improve its seismic withstand capabilities. The enhancement is an increase in the size of the hardware to 1/4 inch bolts that connects the side panels to the bottom panel through 5/16 inch through holes with a nut and washers. In combination, these changes will increase the force required to shear the hardware (and) reduce the force on the bolt itself by allowing some movement to dampen the forces during a seismic event. While AMETEK believes this solution will be suitable, it has not been validated with a follow up seismic simulation test. Additionally, AMETEK is unable to determine the criticality of the applications the power supplies are installed in and if the safety function is required to be maintained during a seismic event, which will determine the need to take corrective actions. A report of the next seismic test results will follow upon completion as a final evaluation. The current expected date for completion is May, 2020. For questions or clarifications in the meantime, please contact Ethan Salsbury, Quality Director, at 1-614-410-6293.
The following is an update of a Part 21 report received by email: ACTION RECOMMENDED - AMETEK does not consider this to be a likely failure based on these test results. Additionally, AMETEK is unable to determine the criticality of the applications the power supplies are installed in and if the safety function is required to be maintained during a seismic event, which will determine the need to take corrective actions. The following enhancements can be applied to power supplies in operation: - Add a #10-32 nut to each of the six (6) mounting screws to avoid any lateral movement of the sheet metal parts that would lead to potential elongation or striping of the fastener. - Add support to the bottom of the transformer to prevent horizontal forces on the support screws Although recent testing did not result in a similar failure, AMETEK is taking actions to enhance the design of the power supply. On new power supplies, the mounting hardware will use ¬" bolts that connect the side panels to the bottom panel through 5/16" through holes with a nut and washers. In combination, these changes will increase the force required to shear the hardware reduce the force on the bolt itself by allowing some movement to dampen the forces during a seismic event. Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), and R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email. | ||
| ENS 53816 | 7 January 2019 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | En Revision Imported Date 2/1/2019 | EN Revision Text: PART 21 - COMPONENTS PROVIDED AS SAFETY-RELATED SPARE PARTS WITHOUT BEING DEDICATED AMETEK Solidstate Controls (SCI) is providing this report in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 as notice of a process defect that resulted in components being provided as safety-related spare parts without being dedicated. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: Lack of evidence of dedication testing for AMETEK Solidstate Controls Safety-Related Operational Spare Parts Kits provided with SCI equipment CAUSE: In October 2018, NextEra Seabrook notified SCI of a part number discrepancy with a safety-related fuse that was provided with an operational spare parts kit with an equipment order. After further investigation, it was determined that dedication testing was not performed on the operational spare parts kits provided with the equipment on various jobs in recent years. Generally, spare parts are ordered separately from equipment and a process is in place to direct the parts to quality for commercial grade dedication testing. In this instance, the parts were ordered as a line item on the sale and the parts in question were selected from inventory without being routed through quality for commercial grade dedication. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Evidence of dedication testing is not available for operational spare parts kits which were provided with equipment orders, however, there are no functional concerns with the components provided on these orders. The parts would have been selected at the same time as the parts that were installed in the systems. Additionally, for the commercial grade items provided, there is no history of failure during dedication testing performed by AMETEK either in equipment or during bench testing. ACTION REQUIRED: Aside from printed circuit boards, the parts supplied as operational spare parts will need to be dedicated. AMETEK SCI recommends returning the untested items and will work with (the customer) to arrange returns and retesting. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of AMETEK SCI's Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079, 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332, or mark.shreve@ametek.com. The non-dedicated parts were supplied to Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Seabrook Station, and North Anna Power Station. In addition, non-dedicated parts were also supplied to the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant in Slovenia and the Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan.
The following was received via email from Ametek: After further evaluation, (Ametek) has determined that additional kits are impacted by this issue, but the same customer list and POs apply. No additional customers are impacted and a corrected notification will be provided to customers that have been previously identified. R1DO (Bickett) and R2DO (Lopez) were notified. Part 21 Reactors Group was notified via email. | ||
| ENS 53529 | 1 May 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Notification - Potential Defect in Ac Voltage Sense Board | COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: 277VAC Voltage Sense Board. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: In May of 2018, AMETEK Solidstate Controls (SCI) experienced failures during preventative maintenance with the 80-210833-90 AC Voltage Sense board during the startup of a unit. While the failures were experienced on commercial equipment, a version of the AC Voltage Sense printed circuit board is used in safety-related equipment as well. CAUSE: The failure of the AC Voltage Sense Boards is caused by the opening of the 100 OHM 2W R7 metal oxide resistor, AMETEK SCI part number 03-804103-00, due to insufficient peak power withstand capability for the application. In all instances of failures experienced, the peak inrush power dissipation during startup caused the 2W metal oxide resistor to open. Failures have been limited to the metal oxide resistor. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: If the 100 OHM, 2W metal oxide resistor in the R7 position (PN: 03-804103-00) of the AC Voltage Sense board experiences peak power above its rating and opens, the AC Voltage Sense board may fail. This failure could cause a false low AC voltage alarm and an inoperable high AC voltage alarm condition. During steady state operation, the resistor will not be exposed to power dissipation significant enough to impact the resistor. This potential defect and 10 CFR 21 notification applies to SCI safety-related 277VAC version of the AC Voltage Sense printed circuit board: 80-9210842-90 - PCB ASSY, VLT SENSE 277VAC, 1PH. ACTION RECOMMENDED: The R7 metal oxide resistor is being replaced in the 80-9210842-90 version of the AC voltage sense printed circuit board with a wire-wound resistor (PN: 03-804103-10). The AC Voltage Sense Board will be revised to revision level 'I'. AMETEK recommends replacing any prior revisions of the 277VAC AC Voltage Sense boards at the earliest convenience. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: If you wish to replace the 277 VAC AC Voltage Sense Board with the latest revision, AMETEK Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@AMETEK.com. AFFECTED CUSTOMERS The list below identifies all AMETEK Solidstate Controls customers who have purchased the printed circuit board 80-9210842-90 since 2008. Any purchases prior to 2008 should have been replaced according to the recommended preventative maintenance schedule and, therefore are not applicable to this 10 CFR 21 notification. China Nuclear, Edison Material Supply, Energy Northwest, Jade Dragon Trading, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Company Limited, KRSKO, Exelon Business Services - Braidwood Warehouse, Exelon Business Services - Braidwood/ Byron Generating Station, Georgia Power Company - Vogtle 1 & 2, Shenzhen Chance New Energy Scientific Instrument Co. | ||
| ENS 50545 | 16 October 2014 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Insufficient Spot Weld on Wire Wound Resistor | The following information was excerpted from a facsimile from AMETEK Solidstate Controls: Ohmite 5 watt, 470 ohm wire wound resistor with component Date Code 1201 is mounted on a printed circuit board installed in power supplies manufactured by Ametek Solidstate Controls. Component Description: Ohmite 5 watt, 470 ohm wire wound resistor with Date Code 1201 Problem You Could See: Internal open - (100 hour burn-in performed) Probable Cause: Insufficient spot weld on the wire wound resistor Effect on System Performance: Resistor opens Action Required: Notify NRC and affected utilities. Prepare replacements. Ametek Solidstate Controls Corrective Action Taken: Notified affected utilities of the potential defect and advised that the power supplies be returned to our factory. Further corrective action will be to install new boards with unaffected resistors, retest, perform 100 hour burn in and return. Person notifying the NRC: Mr. Robert George, Director of Quality, 875 Dearborn Drive, Columbus, OH 43085, Telephone: (614) 846-7500
The affected plants are Waterford, Indian Point and Salem. Notified R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Ayres), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Allen) and Part 21 group via email. | ||
| ENS 47741 | 14 March 2012 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Part 21 - Potential Defect on Arvan Electrical Terminal Blocks | The following information was provided by facsimile: COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: Arvan electrical terminal blocks, part number MS27212-x-xx, Revision P, sizes -3-xx and -5-xx. any length; Ametek Solidstate Controls part number 03-120608-00. Only lots purchased from 2010 to present are of concern. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: A mottled or marbled appearance, vertical cracks and/or a slim void/flow line on a cut section of the terminal block, CAUSE: The manufacturer's investigation revealed that an improper application of acetone agent, which ensures proper bonding/blending of materials, was not properly monitored and resulted in intermittent inadequate blending. Not every lot or complete batch run is affected. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: Cracks and/or voids in the material could be exploited should a seismic event occur. ACTION REQUIRED: We have no known failures of these terminal block products in our systems. We believe the failure rate has been extremely low and the risk is minimal. Each operating facility will need to evaluate the potential risk to their operation. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: If you wish to replace the terminal blocks in your systems, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 614-846-7500 ext. 6260. The nuclear sites identified by the licensee to have these potentially defective parts are: Beaver Valley, Ginna, Harris, Hatch, VC Summer, Watts Bar, Braidwood, Byron, Cook, Davis Besse, Prairie Island, Arkansas Nuclear One, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, and South Texas Project. | ||
| ENS 42551 | 4 May 2006 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 Notification Involving Potential Defect in Aerovox Capacitor | The following information was provided via email: COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: 13uF X 1000V AC capacitors, SCI P/N 07-020139-00, Aerovox P/N H94S1013A0BA, manufactured between January 2004 and December 2004. Capacitors can be either installed in Ametek Solidstate Controls UPS equipment or provided as a spare part. The components are schematically identified as C805, C815, or C705. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: The capacitor failures due to this defect will occur early in the operating life of the device. There are no warning signs that a failure is imminent, or detection method for predicting an approaching failure. CAUSE: The investigation has revealed that the capacitor failures (date codes 0408 and 0436) were due to manufacturing defects. A failure analysis by Aerovox revealed that a foil tab connecting the capacitor winding to the internal terminal became pinched between the lid and the can during the seaming operation. Within the first year of operation, the insulation covering the connecting tab was cut through. This resulted in terminal to case short. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: The failures described above, could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source. The resulting failure could result in a potential damage to the load. ACTION REQUIRED: The observed failure rate of this component is very low at 0.06% (2 out of 3336 units manufactured between 1/1/04 and12/31/04.) Aerovox has implemented corrective actions to preclude further failures. Based upon the Aerovox evaluation, Ametek Solidstate Controls believes if a defect was present in a capacitor, the likelihood of a failure should occur early in the operating life. We feel the failure rate has been extremely low and the risk is minimal. Each operating facility will need to evaluate the potential risk to their operation. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: If you wish to replace the capacitors Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mrs. Jean Falor of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6230. jean.falor@ametek.com. Rudimentary listing of stations that received this component installed in equipment or as a spare part: - Installed in equipment: Oconee, McGuire, Watts Bar, Browns Ferry, STP, Beaver Valley, San Onofre, Nine Mile Point and TMI. - Spare part: St. Lucie, Palo Verde, Surry, Turkey Point, Diablo Canyon, Harris, Crystal River, Robinson and Comanche Peak. - International: Korea Hydro, Nuklearna Elec Vrbina, China Nuclear, Laguna Verde and Electrobras. |