Text

Transmittal of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Revision 1
	ML16032A167
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	01/28/2016
From:	Gatlin T; South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	RC-16-0008 TR00080-005, Rev. 1
	Download: ML16032A167 (72)
	v • d • e

Thomas D. Gatlin Vice President, Nuclear Operations SCS lrS803.345.4342 A SCANA COMPANY January 28, 2016 RC.-l16-0008 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir / Madam:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 TRANSMITTAL OF EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT FOR V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, REVISION 1

Reference:

Letter from T. D. Gatlin (VCSNS) to Document Control Desk (NRC),

"Transmittal of Updated Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Pages,"

dated August 13, 2015 [ML15229A089]

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G), acting for itself and as agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority is submitting one copy of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Revision 1.

This report is being provided in response to a conference call between VCSNS and the NRC on July 28, 2015 at 1300. In response to the conference call, VCSNS submitted the referenced letter which contained the following commitment: "Submit letter to NRC stating walkdowns have been completed and provide HCLPF results in Attachment B of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process report." This letter and Attachment I fulfill this commitment.

The referenced letter also contained a commitment to "Complete walkdowns of Inaccessible Items listed in Table 7.1 of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process report prior to end of fall 2015 refueling outage." This commitment was fulfilled in the fall 2015 refueling outage.

V.C.Summer Nuclear Station *P. O.Box 88.lJenkinsville, SC. 29065.* F(803) 941-9776 }*

Document Control Desk CR-i15-03436/CR-i12-01097 RC-1 6-0008 Page 2 of 2 The referenced letter contained three commitments. This letter fulfills two of these commitments as mentioned above. Attachment 2 reflects these changes.

Should you have any questions, please call Bruce L. Thompson at 803-931-5042.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on Thomas D. G in WLTITDG/ts Attachments:

I. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Revision 1 II. Regulatory Commitments c: (without attachment unless noted)

K. B. Marsh S. A. Byrne J. B. Archie N. S. Camns J. H. Hamilton J. W. Williams W. M. Cherry L. D. Wert (with attachment)

S. A. Williams (with attachment)

K. M. Sutton S. M. Wyman (with attachment)

NRC Resident Inspector

-NSRC . ...

RTS (CR-I15-03436/CR-12-01 097)

File (815.07)

,PRSF (RC-16-0008)

Document Control Desk Attachment I CR-i15-03436/ CR-12-01 097 RC-1 6-0 008 Page 1 of 69 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 Attachment I Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Revision 1

-'V SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT I NUCLEAR OPERATIONS NUCLEAR OPERATIONS COPY NO._____

ENGINEERING SERVICES TECHNICAL REPORT TR00080-005 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT FOR V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION REVISION 1 1/26/2016 DATE REVIWER/4 I/ g r/,I.

DATE APPROVAL AUTI4RT RECORD OF CHANGES

[APPROVAL CHANGE LE'IrIER TYPE CHANGE APPROVAL DATE CANCELLATION DATE ILETTER CHANGE TYPE CHANGE I DATE I CANCELLATION DATE

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose and Objective.................................................................................... 3 2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies ................................... 3 3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL............................................................... 4 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL ........................................................ 5 3.1.1 ESEL Development....................................................................... 6 3.1.2 Power Operated Valves................................................................... 7 3.1.3 Pull Boxes................................................................................. 7 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets..................................................................... 7 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators...................................................... 8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections ............................................... 8 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment That Is Not The Primary Means for FLEX Implementation.................................................................................... 8 4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)......................................................... 9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by SCE&G ........................................................... 9 4.2 Comparison to SSE................ ..... ......................................................... 11 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM).............................................................. 12 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected................................................................. 12 5.2 Method to Estimate ISRS ....................................................................... 13 6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach................................................................ 13 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used.............................................................. 14 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process ...................................................................... 14 6.2.1 Overview................................................................................. 14 6.2.2 Generic Screening Results.............................................................. 15 6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach.....,..................................................... 17 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach.................................................................... 17 Page 1 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information ..................................... 18 6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings........................................................ 18 6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process.................................................................... 23 6.5 Functional Evaluations of Relays .............................................................. 23 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes) ........................... 23 7.0 Inaccessible Item s .. . .............................................. ........... 26 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results ....................................................................... 27 8.1 Supporting Information ......................................................................... 27 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications ....................................................... 28 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule........................................................ 29 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments........................................................ 30 9.0 References .............................................................................................. 32 Attachments:

Attachment A: VCSNS Unit 1 ESEL............................................................ 35 Attachment B: ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation ............................... 51 Attachment C: Seismic Review Team ........................................................... 66 Page *2of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits, under 10 CFR Part 50, reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA).

Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 (VCSNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approachfor the Resolution of FukushimaNear-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable the NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The VCSNS FLEX response strategies for reactor core cooling and heat removal, reactor inventory control/long-term subcriticality, core cooling and heat removal (Modes 5 and

6) and containment function are summarized below. This summary is derived from the VCSNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and subsequent updates in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3a-e]. A simplified diagram of the fluid paths can be found in Figure 11 of the latest OIP [3e], "FLEX Strategy Conceptual Mechanical Diagram."

Reactor core cooling and heat removal is achieved via steam release from the Steam Generators (SGs) with SG makeup from the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (TDEFP) during FLEX Phase 1 with suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST).

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TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Maintaining core cooling and heat removal will rely upon the continued operation of the TDEFP, which is capable of feeding the steam generators as long as there is an ample steam supply to drive the TDEFP's turbine.

During Phase 2 and beyond, the reactor core cooling strategy is to connect and repower a Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (MDEFP) for injection into the steam generators in the event that the TDEFP fails or when ample steam is no longer available to drive the TDEFP's turbine. The Emergency Feed Water flow control valves and Main Steam (MS) Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are also required to provide reactor core heat-removal capability. The portable Phase 2 reactor core heat removal is achieved via the credited B.5.b connection or via the new FLEX mechanical connections located in the Intermediate Building. The Phase 2 strategy only requires manipulation of manual valves.

Reactor inventory control/long-term subcriticality strategy from normal operation and Modes 5 and 6 conditions consists of a portable reactor coolant system makeup pump taking suction from the Boric Acid Tanks and supplying borated water via Reactor Coolant System (RCS) make-up connections.

RCS inventory control relies upon shrink, passive reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and letdown via head-vents and/or PORVs. The reactor coolant pump seal leak-off is manually isolated to conserve inventory and maintain leak-off flow within the Reactor Building. To ensure SG continued heat removal capability, accumulator isolation valves are electrically closed during the cooldown to prevent nitrogen injection into the reactor coolant system.

There are no Phase 1 or Phase 2 FLEX actions to maintain containment integrity. Phase 3 entails repowering select reactor building cooling unit (RBCU) fans inside of containment using portable generators. Cooling water is provided via a portable pump with suction from the Service Water Pond discharging to new manually operated service water makeup connections to the RBCUs.

Necessary electrical components are outlined in the VCSNS FLEX OIP submittal [3e].

The strategy entails utilizing two portable 1MW generators to repower a 7.2 kV vital bus and subsequently repowering an MDEFP, 480 V motor control centers, an RBCU fan, vital batteries and associated chargers, as well as monitoring instrumentation required for core cooling, reactor coolant inventory, and containment integrity.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The ESEL for Unit 1 is presented in Attachment A. Development of the ESEL is documented in Westinghouse correspondence "V. C. Summer Unit 1 Expedited Seismic Equipment List" [19], whereas the final ESEL is documented in attachment 5 to Westinghouse Correspondence LTR-RAM-I-14-064, Revision 1 [20].

Page 4 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the latest VCSNS 0TP [3e]

in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049. The OIP provides the VCSNS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied uponi for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the VCSNS OIP [3e]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions.

Portable *ind pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the VCSNS OWP [3e].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the VCSNS OIP [3e] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2]

guidance are:

Structures (e.g. containment, reactor building, control building, auxiliary building, etc.)

Piping, cabling, conduit, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC), and their supports.

Manual valves, check valves, and rupture disks, except for manual valves that are required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies and are operated using reach rods.

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bk TR000 80-0 05 REVISION 1 o Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components (e.g., Reactor Vessel (RV) and internals, Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) and seals, etc.)

Very small passive components such as line-mounted strainers, accumulators, and orifices.

Portions of systems that are not used as transport mechanisms for delivering required flows, such as components beyond boundary valves.

Electrical equipment not specifically relied upon to perform the FLEX functions, such as power sources and distribution not directly supporting FLEX active components.

Controls for which plant procedures provide instructions for manual operation (in the event of control system, component, permissive, or interlock failures) that ensure performance of the FLEX function.

Portions of installed equipment (and FLEX connections) that are not relied upon in the FLEX strategy to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity (according to Section 3.2 within Reference 2, and Tables D-1 and D-2 within Reference 21).

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the VCSNS OIP [3a-e] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g.,

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of a single success path for the FLEX strategies supporting the core cooling and containment integrity FLEX functions.

Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits/branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc., as necessary. The P&IIDs were also used to determine the normal position of system valves and the valve positioning required in order to align the system in support of the FLEX functions. Isometric drawings were used to determine if any manual valves required to operate in support of the FLEX functions can be operated using reach rods, since manual valves with reach rods must be included on the ESEL.

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TR00080-005 REVISION 1 The electrical equipment required to support the mechanical components used in the FLEX strategies evaluated for the ESEL was evaluated for its inclusion on the ESEL using electrical drawings and the guidance in [2], Section 3.

3.1.2 Power Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] also notes that "functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the VCSNS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power operated valves:

Power operated valves that remain energized during the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) events (such as DC powered valves), were included on the ESEL.

Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation, as they would be de-energized.

Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation, as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs, as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables.

The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

Examples of termination cabinets on the VCSNS ESEL include the XPN-7 100 series.

Items #138 and 142-150 within Attachment A are several examples of termination cabinets included on the ESEL.

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TRO0 0080-00 5 REVISION 1 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

All main control board panels (XCP-6 100 series) fall in this category and are on the electrical ESEL for VCSNS. Examples within Attachment A include items 1#59, 61, 62, 66, 67, 177, 178, 179, 180, and 181.

3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes

"... FLEX connections necessary to implement the VCSNS OliP [3e] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate")."

Item 6 in Section 3.1 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment That Is Not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation The primary flow paths for the Steam Generator (SG) makeup, Emergency Feedwater (EFW) steam supply, and containment integrity FLEX strategies were used for ESEL development, while the alternate flow path for the RCS makeup FLEX strategy was used rather than the primary flow path. The alternate flow path for RCS makeup, a portable makeup pump, meets the requirements of NEI 12-06 for use following a seismic event; however, the electrical supply for the primary flow path for RCS makeup is not seismically qualified and thus cannot be credited.

The VCSNS OIP [3e] provides two redundant primary means for providing RCS Inventory Control. From the VCSNS OIP [3e], ". .. RCS inventory and reactivity control involve use of the station's installed Alternate Seal Injection (ASI) positive-displacement (PD) pump or an on-site portable Reactor Makeup FLEX pump, referred to as the FX RCS MU PUMP".

The VCSNS strategy for RCS inventory control and boration strategy is to utilize the ASI pump for RCS injection, if the pump is running immediately after the ELAP. This method allows for minimal operator action and prevents damage to the RCP seals. It could take up to an hour before an ELAP is declared. The Emergency Operating Page 8 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Procedures (LOP) have a step to identify if the ASI pump is running. If not, then the RCS makeup pump would be identified as the alternative/preferred method and made ready when manpower is available or before 17 hours1.967593e-4 days 0.00472 hours 2.810847e-5 weeks 6.4685e-6 months . The use of a portable RCS makeup pump to an identified RCS connection point is the VCSNS credited seismic strategy for RCS inventory control and boration.

The complete ESEL for VCSNS is presented in Attachment A.

4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by SCE&G The Rock Safe Shutdown Earthquake (S SE) Control Point is defined as top of competent rock at an approximate elevation of 350 feet, which is nominally 85 feet below plant grade elevation of 435 feet [4].

The GMRS plot and tabulated data for VCSNS are provided in Figure 4-1 and Table 4-1, respectively. Development of the VCSNS GMRS is documented in [4] and [25]. In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter and following the guidance in EPRI SPID [18], a Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) was performed using the 2012 CEUS Seismic Source Characterization for Nuclear Facilities [22], a Regional Seismic Catalog Correction [22], and updated EPRI Ground Motion Model for the CEUS [24].

GMRS at V.C. Summer 2.

1.5

.2 Cu I-C) 0 1.

0 Cu a-0 --GMRS C) a, 0.5 0.

0.1 1 10 100 Frequency, Hz Figure 4-1: GMRS for VCSNS [4]

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a TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table 4-1: GMRS for VCSNS [41 Freq. (Hz) GMRS (g) 100 3.68E-01 90 3.98E-01 80 4.50E-01 70 5.30E-01 60 6.29E-01 50 7.20E-01 45 7.53E-01 40 7.74E-01 35 7.84E-01 30 7.82E-01 25 7.67E-01 20 7.44E-01 15 6.92E-01 12.5 6.49E-01 10 5.90E-01 9 5.54E-01 8 5.15E-01 7 4.71E-01 6 4.24E-01 5 3.73E-01 4 3.19E-01 3 2.581E-01 2.5 2.22E-01 2 1.91E-01 1.5 1.50E-01 1.25 1.25E-01 1 9.81E-02 0.9 9.30E-02 0.8 8.67E-02 0.7 7.90E-02 0.6 7.01E-02 0.5 5.98E-02 0.4 4.79E-02 0.3 3.59E-02 0.2 2.39E-02 0.167 2.00E-02 0.125 1.50E-02 0.1 1.20E-02 Page 10 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 4.2 Comparison to SSE The SSE is defined in terms of a Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) and a design response spectrum. Table 4-2 shows the spectral acceleration values as a function of frequency for the 5% damped horizontal SSE. Figure 4-2 shows a comparison between the GMRS and SSE for VCSNS. In the 1 to 10 Hz part of the response spectrum, the GMRS exceeds the SSE. The GMRS also exceeds the SSE for frequencies above 10 Hz. In both frequency ranges, VCSNS screens in for a risk evaluation.

Table 4-2: SSE for VCSNS [4]

Fre . (Hz) 0.5 1 2.5 5 9 10 25 100 SA(() 0.08 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.29 0.26 0.15 0.15 SSE-GMRS Comparison for V.C. Summer 1.

0.8 0

0.6 S

U C, --GMRS

'U 0.4 --SSE 0

S 0.

Co 0.2 0.

0.1 1 10 100 Spectral frequency, Hz Figure 4-2: Comparison of VCSNS GMRS with SSE [4]

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TR00080-005 REVISION 1 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The RLGM was developed using Option 1 of EPRI Report 3002000704 [2] Section 4.

Under this option, the RLGM is equal to the SSE scaled up by a factor.

Per Section 4 of this report, the maximum GMRS/SSE spectral ratio between 1 and 10 Hertz is equal to 2.3 and occurs at 10 Hertz. Therefore, the RLGM/SSE scale factor is equal to 2.0, which is the upper limit. The SSE and RLGM ground response spectra are plotted in Figure 5-1. The control point for the RLGM is the top of the bedrock. The high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF) values reported herein are for reference to the top of bedrock control point.

For Condensate Storage Tank (CST, equipment ID XTK0008) only, the applied ground motion and HCLPF are based on the GMRS identified in Section 4 of this report. In that case, the GMIRS represents the RLGM per EPRI 3002000704 [2] Section 4, Option 2.

The CST is founded on a grade slab in the yard, and a soil-structure interaction analysis (SSI) was performed as part of the HCLPF analysis [1ilk].

The 5% damping RLGM horizontal GRS is provided in Table 5-1 and plotted in Figure 5-1. Note that the Vertical RLGM is 2/3 of horizontal RLGM.

Table 5-1: VCSNS Review Level Ground Motion Data at 5% Damping I [lib]

Frequency (Hz) Spectral Acceleration (g) 0.13 0.0122 0.55 0.2200 2.00 0.8000 6.00 0.8000 20.00 0.3000 40.00 0.3000 100.00 0.3000 Page 12 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 VCSNS Unit I RLGM and SSE Ground Response Spectra Horizontal Direction - 5% Damping - Applied at Rock 1.0000 i -- I I I il I / Damping:5% ;

//

i

J i

/ " I I / **

. 0 .1 o i .r /.

Ji / /

r /

fI 1

i

, / . :

0.01000

/ . :

I 0 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz*)

-. RLGM -U---SSE Figure 5-1 : Ground Response Spectra [11 ib]

5.2 Method to Estimate ISRS Plant design basis in-structure response spectra (ISRS) data are contained in plant specification SP-702-4461-00 [14]. SSE ISRS data in that document were digitized and scaled by a 2.0 factor to produce the RLGM seismic demand.

Generation of the design basis spectra is discussed in FSAR [5] Section 3.7. The SSE design basis ISRS obtained from SP-702-4461-00 are very conservative because they are based on 2% structural damping. This is because the SSE ISRS were obtained by scaling up the OBE ISRS with no credit taken for higher structural damping. A 2% damping level is conservative, but reasonable, for an OBE but is unrealistically low for beyond-SSE seismic loading. Therefore, when appropriate, the equipment HCLPF calculations for ESEP included a procedure to credit the benefit of higher effective structural damping. Further details on this topic are provided in supporting calculations [11 ].

6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach The ESEP goal is to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is Page 13 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 characterized as the PGA for which there is a HCLPF. The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA (= 0.30g). The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1) [6].

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [7].

6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used The seismic margins methodology of EPRI report NP-6041-SL [6] was applied for this effort. Use of this methodology comports with the EPRI 3002000704 Section 5. The primary tasks performed were:

Generic seismic screening per NP-6041-SL Table 2-4.

Performance of seismic walkdowns.

Item-specific screening via walkdown, review of design data, and performance of screening calculations.

Performance HCLPF calculations for screened-in equipment.

6.2 HCLPF Screening Process 6.2.1 Overview The seismic margins screening methodology of NP-6041-SL was applied. The primary steps for this screening process are:

1. Apply NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 to determine which equipment items and failure modes may be screened-out on a generic basis.

2. For each equipment item, perform a seismic walkdown to verify generic screening may be applied and to verify the item does not have any specific seismic vulnerabilities.

3. Verify anchorage capacity.

The generic screening criteria of Table 2-4 are dependent on the applied screening level and are applicable to equipment located within 40 feet of plant grade. For VCSNS ESEP project:

The peak 5% spectral acceleration of the RLGM is 0.80g. This level is on the boundary between the 1st and 2nd screening lanes of NP-6041-SL Table 2-4. As a Page 14 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 conservative bound the 1.2g screening criteria of Table 2-4 were applied (2nd screening lane).

A limited number of components in the RB were located above 40' from plant

-grade; all other equipment was located within 40' of plant grade.

For application to the ESEP, the differences between the 1st and 2nd screening lanes of NP-601-SL Table 2-4 are modest. Table 6-1 below summarizes application of Table 2-4 screening for the ESEP. Applied plant grade was Elevation 435'. This grade elevation was also used for screening under the seismic IPEEB [13]. Per the FSAR, this grade elevation is constant throughout the power block area.

After completion of the screening process, an item is either screened-out or screened-in.

The presumptive seismic capacity of a screened-out item exceeds the applied screening level and no further evaluation is needed. An item that is initially screened-in requires a HCLPF analysis to address the failure mode cited by the seismic review team (SRT). The HCLPF capacity may or may not be above the screening level.

6.2.2 Generic Screening Results Table 6-1 summarizes the generic screening results for the ESEL. Only the relevant equipment types are listed. Based on the generic screening:

HCLPF analyses are required for atmospheric storage tanks

Relay chaffer requires evaluation Other generic screening requirements were addressed by walkdown, design review and

anchorage verification. These assessments are documented in the screening evaluation work sheets (SEWS) [12].

Table 6-1: Summary of Generic Screening per NP-6041-SL Table 2-4, 1.2g Screening Level Generic Screening SreigRsl Equipment Type Criteria SreigRsl Active valves Note (f) applies. There are no extremely large extended operators on 2-inch or smaller piping. There are no MOVs on piping lines of 2 inch diameter or smaller in the scope.

Passive valves No evaluation required.

Heat exchangers Notes (h), (i) apply. There is only one small heat exchanger (TPP0008-Page 15 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table 6-1: Summary of Generic Screening per NP-6041-SL Table 2-4, 1.2g Screening Level Generic Screening SreigRsl Equipment Type CriteriaRsul HE1) on the ESEL. Anchorage and load path were verified by bounding calculations. Potential failure .-

modes of the heat exchanger body were addressed by walkdown and design review.

Atmospheric storage tanks Evaluation required. HCLPF analyses were performed for the atmospheric storage tanks.

Pressure vessels Notes (h), (i) apply. There is only one small pressure vessel (TPP0008-OR1) on the ESEL. Anchorage and load path were verified by bounding calculations. Potential failure modes of the vessel body were addressed by walkdown and design review.

Batteries and racks Note (k) applies. Batteries are in braced racks designed for seismic loads. A HCLPF analyses was performed for the battery rack anchorage.

Horizontal pumps No evaluation required.

Fans Notes (n1), (o) apply. Notes (n), (o) were addressed by walkdown and screening. Vibration isolators are not present for any fans in the scope.

Air handlers Notes (n), (o) apply. Notes (n), (o) were addressed by walkdown and screening. Vibration isolators are not present for any air handlers in the scope.

Active electrical power Notes (s) and (t) apply. Note (s) was addressed by walkdown and design distribution panels review. Items containing in-scope relays are identified on the ESEL and are evaluated for relay chatter.

Passive electrical power Note (s) applies. Note (s) was addressed by walkdown and design distribution panels review.

Transformers Notes (u) and (v) apply. The ESEL includes dry-type transformers. A design review verified coil restraint. Anchorage was verified by bounding calculations.

Battery chargers & inverters Note (w) applies. Per walkdown and design review, the items on the ESEL are solid state units. Anchorage was verified by bounding calculations.

Instrumentation and control Notes (s) and (t) apply. Note (s) was addressed by walkdown and design panels and racks review. Items containing in-scope relays are identified on the ESEL and are evaluated for relay Page 16 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table 6-1: Summary of Generic Screening per NP-6041-SL Table 2-4, 1.2g Screening Level Generic Screening SreigRsl Equipment Type Criteria SreigRsl chatter.

Temperature sensors; Note (x) applies. Note (x) was addressed by walkdown and design pressure and level sensors. review. Sensors in the scope were typically mounted in-line on piping.

Relevant notes fr'om NP-6041-SL Table 2-4

f. Evaluation recommended for MOVs in Pioing' lines of 2 inches diameter or less.

h. Margin evaluation only needs to consider anchorage and supports.

i, For vessels designed by dynamic analysis or equivalent static analysis enveloping vessel inertial and piping loading, only the anchorage and supports require evaluation. For vessels not meeting these criteria, all potential failure modes require evaluation.

k. Batteries mounted in braced racks designed for seismic loads or qualified by dynamic testing do not require evaluation. Rigid spacers between batteries and end restraints are required. Batteries should be tightly supported by side rails.

n. All units supported on vibration isolators require evaluation of anchorage.

o. Evaluation should focus on anchorage and supports.

a. Walkdown should be conducted to verify that the instruments are properly attached to the cabinets.

t. Relays, contactors, switches, and breakers must be evaluated for chatter and trip if functionality during strong shaking is recquired.

u. Anchorage evaluation required.

v. Liquid-filled transformers require evaluation of overpressure safety switches. The transformer coils should be restrained within the cabinet for diy transformers.

w. Solid state units require anchorage checks. Others require evaluation.

x. Insufficient data are available for screening guidelines. Emphasis should be on attachments.

6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns followed the guidance of NP-6041-.SL Section 2. Walkdowns were performed by two-person seismic review teams (SRTs) consisting of engineers with seismic experience. The SRT used NP-6041-SL Appendix F to evaluate item-specific equipment caveats. The SRT also recorded notes and took photographs of the item under review. A number of walkdown sessions were performed as indicated below. Reactor Building items were inspected during the week of April 21, 2014 and October 19, 2015. I1 Page 17 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Walkdown Date SRT Plant Support Week of January 13, 2014 John J. O'Sullivan (S&A) Jeremy Graham (SCE&G)

Stephane Damolini (S&A) Dan Goldston (SCE&G)

Week of February 24, 2014 John J. O'Sullivan (S&A) Jeremy Graham (SCE&G)

Seth Baker (S&A)

Week of April 21, 2014 John J. O'Sullivan (S&A) Eric Rumfelt (SCE&G)

Seth Baker (S&A) Courtney Tampas (SCE&G)

_________________Andrew Hall (SCE&G)

Week of October 19, 2015 John J. O' Sullivan (S&A) Jeremy Graham (SCE&G)

______________________Seth Baker (S&A) ______________ 1 Walkdown findings for each item are documented in screening evaluation work sheets (SEWS) [12]. The SEWS notes also identify evaluations and reviews performed to support screening. Brief resumes of SRT members are provided in Attachment C.

6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information New seismic walkdowns were performed for ESEL equipment. The results of the previous seismic margin evaluation, performed for the Seismic IPEEE program, were reviewed and used for background purposes only.

6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings The walkdown and screening results are summarized in the following tables:

0 Initially screened-in items selected for HCLPF analysis are listed in Table 6-2.

0 Recommended actions to resolve miscellaneous screening issues are listed in Table 6-3.

The actions listed in Table 6-3 are related to issues such as seismic housekeeping, potential seismic interaction, and issues related to equipment caveats. These issues are planned to be resolved through the plant corrective action process (see Section 8.2). For each item, the basis for anchorage screening is identified in the individual SEWS [12].

Project calculations [11] were created to support anchorage screening and contain bounding anchorage calculations for various equipment types.

A select group of ESEL items was initially screened-in based on anchorage. For each of these items, a detailed analysis of the anchorage capacity was performed. The items are identified in Section 6.5.

Page 18 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Table 6-2: Items Selected for IHCLPF Analysis No. ID Description Bldg Elev Basis for Selection (ft)

1. XTK0025 REFUELING WATER AB 412 Per NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 seismic capacity cannot be screened and HCLPF

____STORAGE TANK analysis is required for overall seismic capacity.

2. XPN6004 BOP INSTRUMENT PANEL CB 436 Floor embeds were visible along the front and rear edges of the line-up. The TRAIN A embedments do not extend the full length of XPN6004 and a shim plates were added. Because of the load path thru the shim and unique anchorage, the anchorage is not screened. Perform HCLPF analysis for anchorage.

3. XIBA-1A 125V DC DISTRIBUTION B1 412 Because the supported mass is relatively large the anchorage is not screened.

BUS 1A BATTERY Perform HCLPF analysis for anchorage. Analysis should address similar racks in the ESEP scope.

4. XMVC1DA2X 480V MCC XCM1DA2X B] 463 The MCC is tall and narrow and is expected to have a low natural frequency.

The base overturning load may be relatively large. Anchorage is not screened.

Perform HCLPF analysis for MCC anchorage. Analysis should address all the MCC's in the ESEP scope (for example, apply bounding loads).

5. XTK0008 CONDENSATE STORAGE YD 435 Per NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 seismic capacity cannot be screened and HCLPF TANK analysis is required for overall seismic capacity.

6. XAA0001A RB COOLING UNIT 1A RB 514 The item is a large custom air handling unit located more than 40' above grade.

NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 screening cannot be directly applied. HCLPF analysis needs to address anchorage, overall structural integrity and functionality.

7. XVTO3 164-SW DRPI COOLING UNIT RB 518 The item is an air operated valve (AOV) located more than 40' above grade.

INLET HDR ISOL VALVE NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 screening cannot be directly applied. HCLPF analysis is needed to address functionality. Analysis to be performed should address similar items in RB.

8. XVT03 169-SW DRPI COOLING UNIT RB 518 Conduit running along the wall is close to the bonnet. The clearance is 1.0".

OUTLET HDR ISOL VLV Because of the relatively high seismic input at high RB elevations and relatively small pipe diameter, analysis is required to verifyv acceptability of 1.0"

______________________________clearance.

Page 19 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Table 6-2: Items Selected for HCLPF Analysis No. ID Description Bldg Elev Basis for Selection (ft)

9. XVG03108B-SW RB COOLING UNIT 2A RB 518 The item is a motor operated valve (MOV) located more than 40' above grade.

INLET ISOLATION VLV NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 screening cannot be directly applied. HCLPF analysis is needed to address fbnctionality. Analysis to be performed should address similar items in RB.

Apply results to similar item:XVG03109B-SW.

10. DPN1HA BATTERY MAIN 11B 412 The cabinet is screened-in for ESEP relay chatter assessment. Evaluation of DISTRIBUTION PANEL chatter/trip of main breaker is required.

1HlA _ _Apply results to similar item DPN1HIB.

11. XSWlDA1 Class JR 480 V SWGR bus IB 463 The cabinet is screened-in for ESEP relay chatter assessment. Relay chatter XSWlDA1-ES needs to be evaluated for various relay. The HCLPF will be based on design basis seismic qualification testing of a switchgear assembly.

Apply results to similar item XSW1DA2.

12. XSW1DA Class lIE 7.2 kV SWGR bus JIB 463 The cabinet is screened-in for ESEP relay chatter assessment. Relay chatter XSWlDA-ES needs to be evaluated for various relay. The HCLPF will be based on design basis seismic qualification testing of a switchgear assembly.

Page 20 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table 6-3: Required Follow-up Actions to Resolve Screening Issues No. ID Description Bldg Elev Issue Actions (ft)

1. XVG0 1611lA-EW MvAlN FW'TO STM GEN A AB 436 A flexible electrical conduit attached to a Provide slack to preclude unacceptable HDR ISOL pressure tap on north side of operator has stress on attached line, lit appears that limited slack. The electrical connection slack is available and a relocation of the may be vulnerable to seismic motion of first support will suffice. VCSNS Work the valve. Order #1414403 has been written to perform rework.

2. IPV02000-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER A ABR 436 A small nozzle for a pressure tap on a Modifyi the handrail to provide sufficient POWER RELIIEF VALVE device attached to the valve is very close shake space. ECR 51004 has been issued to the adjacent hand rail. The valve to rework handrail.

motion is limited by nearby pipe support so banging of the rail on the nozzle is primary issue.

3. XBA-1A 125V DC DISTRIBUTION BUS lB 412 Battery rack with two rows and two tiers Modifyi rack to reduce front rail gaps (for lA BATTERY per row. Spacers are present on sides of example, install shims behind rail batteries. Gap at front rail varies from 0" attachment points to build out the rail).

to 1/4". ECR5 1010 has been initiated to resolve.

It appears that potential seismic the identified condition.

front/back motion of the batteries due to front rail gaps can be accommodated by flexibility of the bus bars. However, NP-6041-SL Appendix F guidance states that batteries should be "encased by rack framework" or shimmed to produced "close-fitting rails".

4. XBA-1B 125V DC DISTRIBUTION BUS IB 412 Battery racks similar to XBA-1A. Refer See actions for XBA-1A

___________1B BATTERY _____to notes for that item._________________

Page 21 of 67

TRO0 0080-0 05 REVISION 1 Table 6-3: Required Follow-uxp Actions to Resolve Screening Issues No. ID Description Bldg Elev Issue Actions (ft)

5. XVT02843B-MS MS HEADER B MOIST IB 436 Clearance to a nearby 3x3 angle post is a It appears the top of the 3x3 post can be COLLECTOR DRAIN VLV potential hazard. It is estimated that trimmed without adverse effects. Trim about 1/2" of motion along the pipe axial the 3x3 angle to preclude interaction.

direction would cause impact of bonnet ECR51010 has been initiated to resolve on corner of post and this is the critical the identified condition clearance.

6. XVG0161 1C-FW MvAIlN FW TO STM GEN C lB 436 A flexible electrical conduit attached to a Provide slack to preclude unacceptable HDR ISOL pressure tap on north side of operator has stress on attached line. It appears that minimal slack. The electrical connection slack is available and a minor appears to be vulnerable to seismic modification of the first support will motion of valve. suffice. VCSNS Work Order #14 14404 has been written to perform rework.

7. TPT03632 EF PUMIP SUCT I-DR DB 412 Tubing from pipe to PT is vulnerable to Either restrain the light or move the light PRESSURE TRANSMITTER impact fr'om a hanging light. The impact higher such that impact on tubing is on tubing near root valve IPT03632-HR- precluded. VCSNS Work Order EF appears possible. #1414405 has been written to perform rework.

8. XPN7200A Control Room Evacuation Panel IB 436 A tool locker is located behind the Move and/or restrain the locker such that (CREP A) cabinet, about 10" away. Locker is interaction is precluded. ECR51O1O has unanchored and is a potential interaction been initiated to resolve the identified hazard, condition

9. XVT03 164-SW DRPI COOLING UNIT INLET RB 518 The hand wheel on the operator is 0.25" Modify the handrail to preclude HTDR ISOL VALVE from a hand rail. Seismic shaking may interaction. ECR5 1010 has been initiated produce interaction, to resolve the identified condition Page 22 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process All HCLPF values were calculated using the conservative, deterministic failure margin (CDFM) criteria ofNP-6041-SL. CDFM analysis criteria are summarized in NP-6041-SL Table 2-5.

For structural failure modes, the HCLPF capacity is equal to the earthquake magnitude at which the strength limit is reached. For equipment functionality failure modes, experience data or available test response spectra (TRS) are typically used to define the HCLPF capacity. The methods of NP-6041-SL Appendix Q were applied for functionality evaluations.

6.5 Functional Evaluations of Relays Verification of functional capacity for equipment mounted within 40' of grade was addressed by application NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 generic screening criteria as described above. For equipment mounted higher than 40' above grade and for in-scope relays, the methods ofNP-6041-SL Appendix Q were applied for functionality evaluations. In those cases, the seismic capacity was based upon one of the following:

Test response spectra (TRS) from plant-specific seismic qualification reports.

Generic equipment ruggedness spectra (GERS) from EPRI report NP-5223-SL [9].

Experience based seismic capacity per the guidelines of EPRI TR-1019200 [8].

The ESEP relay functional evaluations are documented in a supporting calculation [11ii].

6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)

Table 6-4 lists HCLPF analysis results for screened-in items. The failure modes analyzed are identified. Project calculation documents that contain the detailed HCLPF calculations are also identified.

For the following discussion, define an "ESEP outlier" as an item whose HCLPF capacity is less than the RLGM. There are currently four ESEP outliers:

1. XSW1DA (relay chatter)

2. XSW1DA1 (relay chaffer)

3. XSW1DA2 (relay chatter, XSWlDA1 results are applicable)

4. XVT03 169-SW (functionality)

Note that for the CST, the applied ground motion and HCLPF are based on the GMRS.

The CST is founded on a slab-on-grade in the yard and a detailed soil-structure interaction analysis (S SI) was performed to develop realistic seismic demand. The GMRS has a horizontal PGA of 0.37g and the CST HCLPF is more than double that level (acceptable with large margin).

Page 23 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Relay Chatter Failure Modes Switchgear XSW1DA, XSWlDA1 and XSWlDA2 are ESEP-outliers with respect to relay chatter. Credit for operator action may resolve the relay chatter failure modes. The approach for resolution is discussed in Section 8.2.

Items with Functional or Structural Failure Modes The valve XVTO3 169-SW is located at a high elevation of the RB and application of a relatively large lateral seismic load was required. The failure mode is related to lateral seismic displacement of the valve. A modification for XVTO3 169-SW would involve providing more side-side shake space (currently 1" is available between the valve and a wall conduit). Alternatively, the supporting piping could be locally stiffened.

Tabulated HCLPF Values The HCLPF values for all ESEL items are tabulated in Attachment B. In general, the HCLPF for a screened-out item equals or exceeds the RLGM.

HCLPF > 0.30g HCLPF for screened-out items and failure modes Unless justified by calculations, the above HCLPF is applicable for screened-out items and covers all relevant failure modes.

For the items listed in Table 6-4, the listed HCLPF values and failure modes are controlling except for those items cited in Note 5. For those items, the functionality limit is lower than the anchorage HCLPF and is controlling.

Page 24 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table 6-4: HICLPF Analysis Results ID Description Bldg Elev (ft) HCLPF (g) Failure Mode Analyzed Reference (see [111)

XTK0025 REFUELING WATER AB 412 0.32 Anchorage, due to overturning moment. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-005

__________STORAGE TANK XPN6004 BOP INSTRUMENT CB 436 1.07 Anchorage, load path (see Note 5). 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-006 PANEL TRAIN A _____

XBA-1A 125V DC IB 412 1.16 Anchorage, concrete breakout (see Note 5). 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-006 DISTRIBUTION BUS 1A BATTERY DPN1HA BATTERY MAIN DISTR JIB 412 0.35 Functionality, including main breaker trip. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-009 PANEL 1HA XSWlDA CLASS IE 7.2 KV SWGR IB 463 0.20 Relay chatter. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-009 BUS XSWlDA-ES XSWlDA1 CLASS IE 480 V SWGR lB 463 0.24 Relay chatter. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-009 BUS XSWlDA1-ES XMC1DA2X 480V MCC XCM1DA2X JIB 463 0.38 Anchorage, embedment steel stress (see 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-006

___________Note 5). ____________

XAAO001A RB COOLING UNIT 1A RB 514 0.35 Overall structural integrity. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-008 XVT03164-SW DRPI COOLING UNIT RB 518 0.44 Functionality. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-010 INLET HDR ISOL VLV XVT03169-SW DRPI COOLING UNIT RB 518 0.24 Impaired functionality due to seismic 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-010 OUTLET HDR ISOL VLV interaction (impact with wall conduit).

XVGO3108B-SW RB COOLING UNIT 2A RB 518 0.82 Functionality. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-010 INLET ISOLATION VLV XTKOOO8 CONDENSATE YD 435 0.88 Sliding due to exceedance of base shear 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-004 STORAGE TANK (See Note 4) capacity.

Table 6-4 Notes

1. The listed HCLPF value is for comparison to the horizontal PGA at the bedrock surface.

2. The listed Reference is an S&A project calculation document.

3. Results for XSWlDA1 are applicable to XSWlDA2; results for DPN1HA are applicable to DPN1IHB.

4. For CST only, the applied ground motion and HCLPF are based on the GMIRS; the GMRS has a 0.37g horizontal PGA at rock.

5. Where Note 5 is cited, the screening limit for functionality is lower than the listed anchorage HCLPF.!

Page 25 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 7.0 Inaccessible Items Sufficient access was provided for all ESEL items and no additional walkdowns are required. Table 7-1 lists in-containment items that were accessed during the fall 2015 refueling outage, according to previous commitments [26]

TABLE 7.1 - INACCESSIBLE ITEMS TO BE ADDED TO ESEL ESEL Equipment Operating State' Item Normal Desired Notes/Comments Num ID Description State State 219 IL100477 SG AWD RGE LEVEL INDICATOR N/A N/A OIP 220 1LI00487 LEVELSG BINDICATOR WD RGE N/A N/A OIP 221 1L00497 22 L047 SG C WD LEVEL RANGE INDICATOR N/A N/A OIP 222 2221LT00477 ILT00477 SG LEVEL A WIDEXMTRN/NAD-001 RANGE N/NAD-2-1 223 2231LT00487 ILT00487 SG LEVEL B WIDEXMTRN/NAD-001 RANGE N/NAD-2-1 1 224 1LT00497 SG C WIDE RANGE N/NAD-001 224ILT00497 LEVEL XMTRNANAD-001 RCS WIDE RANGE 225 1P100402B PRESSURE N/A N/A OIP

_____ ~~~~INDICATOR__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

PT-402 RC WIDE 226 IPT00402 RNG. PRESS. N/A N/A D-302-604 TRANSMITTER RC LOOP A COLD LEG 227 ITE00410 TEMPERATURE N/A N/A D-302-601

_____ELEMENT RC LOOP A COLD 228 ITI00410 LEG TEMP N/A N/A OIP INDICATOR Page 26 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information VCSNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall VCSNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of a study [15] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there

[...] has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014 NT'Th 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [17] concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the G1-1 99 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in G1-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for VCSNS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NET letter [15] therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [17] also apply to VCSNS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [15] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms, which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

Safety factors applied in design calculations

Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs-Page 27 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1

Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations

Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra

Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications

Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis

Bounding requirements in codes and standards

Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)

Bounding testing requirements, and

Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. In order to complete the ESEP in an expedited amount of time, the RLGM used for the ESEP evaluation is a scaled version of the plant's SSE rather than the actual GMRS. To more fully characterize the risk impacts of the seismic ground motion represented by the GMRS on a plant specific basis, a more detailed seismic risk assessment (SPRA or risk-based SMA) is to be performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [18]. As identified in the VCSNS Seismic Hazard and GMRS submittal [4],

VCSNS screens in for a risk evaluation. The complete risk evaluation will more completely characterize the probabilistic seismic ground motion input into the plant, the plant response to that probabilistic seismic ground motion input, and the resulting plant risk characterization. VCSNS will complete that evaluation in accordance with the schedule identified in the NRC's May 9, 2014 letter [17].

8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications Insights from the ESEP identified the following four items where the HCLPF is below the RLGM and plant modifications will be made in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2] to enhance the seismic capacity of the plant.

1. 7.2KV Switchgear XSWlDA had a functional failure mode HCLPF for relay chatter below the RLGM. Modification of the FLEX Support Procedures to explicitly direct the operator(s) to reset the relays is planned.

2. 480V Switchgear XSWlDA1 had a functional failure mode HCLPF for relay chatter below the RLGM. Modification of the FLEX Support Procedures to explicitly direct the operator(s) to reset the relays is planned.

Page 28 of 67

b TR00080-005 REVISION 1

3. 480V Switchgear XSW1DA2 had a functional failure mode HCLPF for relay chatter below the RLGM. Modification of the FLEX Support Procedures to explicitly) direct the operator(s) to reset the relays is planned.

4. Service Water isolation valve XVT03 169-SW had a functional failure mode due to seismic spatial interaction with nearby conduit resulting in a HCLPF capacity below the RLGM. A modification is planned to provide additional seismic margin by either modifying the conduit or modifying piping system supports.

Additionally, during the screening process, the following five follow-up actions requiring modifications to resolve screening issues were identified. The screening issues are related to items such as seismic housekeeping, potential seismic interaction, and issues related to equipment caveats.

1. Main Steam Header Relief valve IPV02000-MS has a small nozzle for pressure tap located very close to adjacent handrail. A modification is planned to provide sufficient shake space.

2. 125V DC Distribution bus battery XBA-1A has a small gap between the battery cells and front rail of the rack. EPRI NP-6041 Appendix F recommends shimming all rails to a very close fit. A modification is planned to modify rack to reduce gaps.

3. 125V DC Distribution bus battery XBA-1B has a small gap between the battery cells and front rail of the rack. EPRI NP-6041 Appendix F recommends shimming all rails to a very close fit. A modification is planned to modify rack to reduce gaps.

4. Main Steam Header drain valve XVT02843B-MS has potential for seismic interaction with nearby steel angle pipe support. A modification is planned to trim the top of the nearby steel angle support to preclude potential seismic interaction.

5. Service water isolation valve XVTO3 164-SW has potential for seismic interaction with the hand wheel operator and nearby hand rail. A modification is planned to modify handrail to preclude seismic interaction.

8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule Plant modifications will be performed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [16], which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 2016, and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014. Section 8.4 contains the regulatory commitment dates to complete planned plant modifications as a result of ESEP. Referencing Section 8.4, Action Items 1, 2, 3, and 5 are expected to be complete by December 2015 to support FLEX Program Implementation. Action Items 4, 6, 7, and 9 are required to be performed during a refueling outage and are therefore expected to be completed by spring 2017. Action Item 8 is not required to be performed during a refueling outage, with the expected completion date being prior to December 2016.

Page 29 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments The following actions have been added to VCSNS Corrective Action Program as CR 01097 and CR-15-03436, and will be performed as a result of the ESEP.

Action Equipment Equipment,

ID Description Action Description Completion Date XSW1DA 7.2KV Modify FLEX Support December 2016 Switchgear Procedures to include operator actions to reset relays with HCLPF values less than the RLGM.

2XSWlDA1 480V Modify FLEX Support December 2016 Switchgear Procedures to include operator actions to reset relays with HCLPF values less than the RLGM.

3XSW1DA2 480V Modify FLEX Support December 2016 Switchgear Procedures to include operator actions to reset relays with HCLPF values less than the RLGM.

4 XVT03 169-SW DRPI Cooling Modify the seismic No later than the end Unit Outlet interaction to provide of the second Unit 1 Header sufficient shake space, or refueling outage after Isolation Valve modify piping system December 31, 2014

,supports such that HCLPF (Tentative Spring

> GMRS. :2017) 5 1PV02000-MS Main Steam Modify valve or handrail to December 2016 Header Power provide sufficient shake Relief Valve space.

6XBA-1A 125V DC Modify rack to reduce front No later than the end Distribution rail gaps. of the second Unit 1 Bus Battery refueling outage after December 31, 2014 (Tentative Spring 2017) 7XBA-1B 125V DC Modify rack to reduce front No later than the end Distribution rail gaps. of the second Unit 1 Bus Battery refueling outage after December 31, 2014 (Tentative Spring 2017)

Page 30 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Action Equipment

iDDe~ripionEquipment Actio AcionDescription Completion Date 8 XVT02843B-MS Main Steam Trim the steel angle post to No later than the end Header Drain mitigate potential seismic of the second Unit 1 Valve interaction, refueling outage after December 31, 2014 (Tentative Spring 2017) 9 XVT03 164-SW DRPI Cooling Modifyi the handrail to Unit Inlet mitigate potential seismic December 2016 Header interaction.

Isolation Valve 10 Various See Section 7.0 Complete walkdowns of Inaccessible Items listed in Completed During Table 7.1 prior to end of Fall 2015 Outage Fall 2015 refueling outage.

11 Various See Section 7.0 Submit letter to NRC stating walkdowns have February 1, 2016 1

been completed and HCLPF results in Attachment B remain valid.

12 N/A N/A Submit letter to NRC No later than 60 days stating all ESEP following completion Modifications, Actions 1 of the second Unit 1 through 9 of Section 8.4, refueling outage after are complete. December 31, 2014 (Tentative Spring

______________________________2017)

Page 31 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 9.0 References

1. NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al.,

"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3. and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident,"

March 12, 2012.

2. Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013. 3002000704.

3. Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 10OIP's

a. SCE&G Correspondence RC-13-0028, "Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-285 Operating License No. NPF-12 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company's Overall Integrated Plan as Required by March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," Attachment, "South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 Mitigation Strategies (FLEX) Overall Integrated Implementation Plan,"

Revision 0, February 28, 2013. (ADAMS Accession Number ML13063A150)

b. SCE&G's First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated August 28, 2013.

c. SCE&G's Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12,2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated February 27, 2014.

d. SCE&G's Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12,2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated August 28, 2014.

e. SCE&G Technical Report TRO0080-002, "FLEX Overall Integrated Plan (OWP)," Revision 1, October 2, 2014.

4. SCE&G Correspondence RC-14-0048, "Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 Docket No. 50-395 Operating License No. NPF-12 South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident" RC-14-0048, March 26, 2014. (ADAMS Accession Number ML14092A250)

Page 32 of 67

TRO0 0080-0 05 REVISION 1

5. Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Final Safety Analysis Report, dated May 2013.

6. A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. EPRI NP 6041

7. Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA. 1994, TR-103959

8. EPRI Report TR-1019200, Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009.

9. EPRI Report NP-5223-SL Rev. 1, Generic Seismic Ruggedness of Power Plant Equipment, August 1991.

10. Seismic Qualification Utility Group, Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment (SQUG-GIP), Revision 3.

11. Stevenson & Associates Calculations -

a. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-001 Rev. 2, In-structure RS Data for ESEP.

b. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-002 Rev. 2, Review Level Ground Motion for ESEP.

c. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-003 Rev. 1, Procedure to Determine RLGM In-Structure Seismic Demand for Equipment.

d. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-004 Rev. 1, HCLPF Seismic Capacity of Condensate Storage Tank.

e. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-005 Rev. 1, HCLPF Seismic Capacity of Refueling Water Storage Tank.

f. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-006 Rev. 0, HCLPF Seismic Capacity Evaluations for Selected Equipment.

g. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-007 Rev. 0, Anchorage Screening for ESEP.

h. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-008 Rev. 0, HCLPF Seismic Capacity Evaluation for Reactor Building Cooling Unit XAA0001A.

i. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-009 Rev. 0, Seismic Analysis of Relays for ESEP.

j. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-010 Rev. 0, HCLPF Seismic Analysis of Selected RB3 Equipment.

k. 13C4188-ESEP-CAL-011 Rev. 1, SSI Analysis of CST for GMIRS.

12. Stevenson & Associates Letter, 13C4188-LSC-016 Rev. 1, "V.C. Summer 1 Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEP - Transmittal of NP-6041-SL SEWS," October 28, 2015.

13. Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Engineering Services Technical Report TRO03 10-001, Individual Plant Examination for External Events, December 1998.

14. Specification Seismic Analysis, Testing And Documentation Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station - Unit 1, SP-702-4461-00 Rev. 5, May 17, 1972.

15. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for Page 33 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States",

March 12, 2014.

16. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations", April 9, 2013.

17. NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," May 9, 2014.

18. Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: February 2013. 1025287.

19. Westinghouse Correspondence LTR-SEE-II-13-95, Revision 1, "V. C. Summer Unit 1 Expedited Seismic Equipment List," October 2, 2014.

20. Westinghouse Correspondence LTR-RAM-I-14-064, Revision 1, "V.C. Summer Unit 1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report & Finalized Expedited Seismic Equipment List," December 4, 2014.

21. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document NEI 12-06, Revision 0, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide," August 2012.

(ADAMS Accession Number ML12242A378)

22. NRC, EPRI, DOE (2012). Central and Eastern United States Seismic Source Characterizationfor Nuclear Facilities, NRC Report NUJREG-2 115, EPRI Report 1021097, 6 Volumes.

23. EPRI (2014). Review of EPRI 1021097 Earthquake Catalogfor RJS Earthquakes in the Southeastern U. S. and Earthquakes in South CarolinaNear the Time of the 1886 Charleston Earthquake Sequence, transmitted by letter from J. Richards to NRC on August 28, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. [ML14260A209].

24. EPRI (2013). EPRI (2004, 2006) Ground-Motion Model (GMM) Review Project, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, Rept. 3002000717, June, 2 volumes.

25. SCE&G Letter, SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS (SCE&G) RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL JNFORMA TION ASSOCL4ATED WITH NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1, SEISMIC RE-EVALUATIONS dated November 12, 2014, RC-14-0 182.

26. SCE&G Letter, VIRGIL C> SUMMER NUCELAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 TRANSMITTAL OF UPDATED EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS PAGES dated August 13, 2015, RC-15-0133.

Page 34 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Attachment A VCSNS Unit 1 ESEL 1 SThe complete list of equipment investigated for inclusion in the ESEL is documented in Reference 20. Reference 20 includes the valve operating states, as well as rationales for exclusion for any component which was determined to be appropriate to exclude from the ESEL. A summary list of the components, which were ultimately determined to he appropriate for inclusion in the ESEL, is provided herein.

Page 35 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESEL Equipment Operating State1 Item Normal Desired Notes/Comments Num ,ID . .,Description

State State -,

TURB DRIVEN EF 1IFE03 525 PUMP DJSCH FLOW N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-085 ELEMENT SG AMTR DR EF 2 FT03531 PUMP DISCH HDR N/A N/A OIP, D-302-085 FLOW XMTR SG B MTR DREF 3I1FT03541 PUMP DIS CH HDR N/A N/A OTP, D-302-085 FLOW XMTR SG CMTR DR EF 4IFT03551 PUMP DISCH HDR N/A N/A OIP, D-302-085 FLOW XMTR STEAM GEN A EF 5 1FT03561 SUPPLY HEADER N/A N/A OIiP, D-302-085 FLOW XMTR STEAM GEN B EF 6 1FT03571 SUPPLY HEADER N/A N/A OWP, D-302-085 FLOW XMTR STEAM GEN C EF 7IFT03581 SUPPLY HEADER N/A N/A OTP, D-302-085 FLOW XMTR EF PUMP TURB 8 1FV02030-MS STEAM SUPPLY FLOW Closed Copend OIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 CONT VLV Coe OPER-EF PP TURB 9 IFV02030-O-MS STM SUP FLOW CONT N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 VLV SG AMTR DR EFOe 10 IFV03531-EF PUMP FLOW Open CloseDd0208 CONTROL VALVE Coe OPER-SG A MTR DR EF 11 - FV03531-O-EF PUMP FLOW CONT N/A N/A OIP, D-302-085 XVV SG ATURB DR EF 12 IFV03536-EF PUMP FLOW Open lopend OIIP, Page 14, D-302-085 CONTROL VALVE Coe OPER-SG A TURB DR 13 1IFV03536-O-EF EF PUMP FLOW CONT N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-085 VLV SG B MTR DR EF 14 IFV03541-EF PUMP FLOW Open Copend OWP, D-302-085 CONTROL VALVE Coe Page 36 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESE Equipment Operating State1 Item Normal Desired Notes/Comments Num *D I Description State .State OPER-SG B MTR DR EF 15 1IFV03541-O-EF PUMP FLOW CONT N/A N/A OIP, D-302-085 VLV SG B TURB DR EF 16 1FV354-EFPUV~i FLW Oen Open / OIP, Page 14, D-302-085 CONTROL VALVE Coe OPER-SG B TUR~B DR 17 1FV03546-.O-EF EF PUMP FLOW CONT N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-085 XVL 181FV03551-EFSG C MTR DR EF Oe PUM FLW Oen Closed OIP, D-302-085 CONTROL VALVE OPER-SG C MTR DR EF 19 TFV03551-O-EF PUMP FLOW CONT N/A N/A OIP, D-302-085 VLV SG C TURB DR EF 20 I1FV03556-EF PUMP FLOW Open Open /OIPg14D-0-8 CONTROL VALVE Coe OPER-SG C TURB DR 21 IFV03556-O-EF EF PUMP FLOW CONT N/A N/A OIW, Page 14, D-302-085 VTLV CONDENSATE 22 ILT03631 STORAGE TANK N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-085 LEVEL XMTR 23 1PS03504 MDEFP A SUCT PRESS NA NA OP 8 23 IPS03504 SW LO PRESS ALARM NA NA OP 8 TURB DR EF PUMP 24 IPS03524 SUCT LP ALARM N/A N/A OIP, Page 17, D-302-085 SWITCH SG A MAIN STEAM 25 TPT00474 HDR PRESS N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER SG A MAIN STEAM 26 IPT00475 HDR PRESS N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER SG A MAiN STEAM 27 IPT00476 HDR PRESS N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER SG B MAIN STEAM 28 IPT00484 HDR PRESS N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER Page 37 of 67

I' TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESEL, Equipment Operating State' Item Normal Desired Notes/Comments Num _ID ... "Description.* State State".,

SG B MAIN STEAM 29 TPT00485 HIDR PRESS N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER SG B MAIN STEAM 30 1PT00486 HDR PRESS N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER SG C MAIN STEAM 31 1PT00494 TJDR PRES S N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER SG C MAIN STEAM 32 I1PT00495 HDR PRESS N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER SG C MAIN STEAM 33 IPT00496 HDR PRESS N/A N/A D-302-011 TRANSMITTER STEAM GENERATOR 34 IiPT02000 A OUTLET PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-011 XMTR STEAM GENERATOR 35 IPT02000A A OUTLET PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-01 1 XMTR STEAM GENERATOR B 36 IPT02010 OUTLET PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-011 XMTR STEAM GENERATOR B 37 IPT02010A OUTLET PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-011 XMTR STEAM GENERATOR C 38 I1PT02020 OUThET PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-011 XMTR STEAM GENERATOR C 39 ILPT02020A OUTLET PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-01 1 XMTR EF PUMP TURBIN.E MS 40 1IPT02032 SUP HDR PRESS XMTR N/A N/A OIIP, Page 17, D-302-01 1 STEAM GEN AEF 41 IPT03563 SUPPLY HEADER N/A N/A D-302-085 PRESS XMTR STEAM GEN B EF 42 17PT03573 SUPPLY HEADER N/A N/A D-302-085 PRESS XMTR Page 38 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESEL Equipment Operating State' item Normal Desired Notes/Comments Num ID Description State State STEAM GEN C EF 43 IPT03583 SUPPLY HEADER N/A N/A D-302-085 PRESS XMvTR EF PUMP SUCT HDR 44 IPT03632 PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-085 TRANSMITTER EF PUMP SUCT HDR 45 J!PT03633 PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-085 TRANSMITTER EF PUMP SUCT HDR 46 IPT03634 PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-085 TRANSMITTER EF PUMP SUCT HIDR 47 I!PT03635 PRESSURE N/A N/A D-302-085 TRANSMITTER MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed, 48 IPV02000-MS A POWER RELIEF Closed Open, or ClIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 VALVE Throttled OPER-MAIN STEAM 49 IPV02000-O-MS HIDR A POWER RELIEF N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 VLV MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed, 50 IPV020 10-MS B POWER RELIEF Closed Open, or OIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 VALVE Throttled OPER-MAIN STEAM 51 IPV02010-O-MS HDRB POWER RELIEF N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-011 VLV MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed, 52 IPV02020-MS C POWER RELIEF Closed Open, or ClIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 VALVE Throttled OPER-MAIN STEAM 53 IPV02020-O-MS HDR C POWER RELIEF N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 VLV EMERGENCY 54 TPP0008 FEEDWATER PUMP N/A N/A OIP, Page 17, D-302-085 TURBINE EF PUMP TURBINE 55 TPP0008-HE1 LUBE OIL HEAT N/A N/A OIP, Page 17, D-302-085 EXCHANGER 56 TPP0008-OR1 EF PUMP LUBE TURBINE OIL RESERVOIR N/A N/A OWP, Page 17, D-302-085 Page 39 of 67

I, TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESEL "EqUipment "OperatingState' Item -*Normal Desired Notes/Comments

Num ID Description State State EF PUMP TURBINE 57 TPP0008-PP1 LUBE OIL ROTARY " *N/A N/A OJIP, Page 17, D-302-085 ....-

PUMP EF PUMP TURBINE 58 TPP0008-SC1 SPEED CONTROL N/A N/A OIP, Page 17, D-302-085 GOVERNOR--

EMERG FEED WATER 59 XPP0008 TURBINE DRIVEN N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-085 PUMP EMERGENCY 60 XPPO021A FEEDWATER PUMP A N/A N/A OJIP, D-302-085 CONDENSATE OJIP, Page 14, D-302-085, D-61XK08STORAGE TANK NA /A 302-101 62 XTK0025 STREFEIGE WTERK N/A N/A OlIP, Page 22, D-302-651 STORAGETAMGNK 63 XVG01611A-FW MAINF TORSTOGE Open Closed D-302-083 OPER-MAIIN FW TO 64 XVGO161 1A-O-FW ST E D SL N/A N/A D-302--083 65 XVG01611B-FW M BNF TORISTMGE Open Closed D-302-083 OPER-MAIN FW TO 66 XVG01611B-O-FW STGNHRSL N/A N/A D-302-083 67XVGO611C-FW MAIN FW TO STM GEN Opn Coe D-008 XVG011C-FWC 67 HDR ISOLOpn Coe D-003 68 XVG016 11C-O-FW OPER-MAIN FW TO N/A N/A D-302-083 STM GEN C HDR ISOL 69 XVM028O01A-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER Open Open orD-001 A ISOLATION VALVE Throttled D320 OPER-MAIN STEAM 70 XVM028O1A-O-MS HEADER A STOP N/A N/A D-302-011 VALVE 71 XVM02801lB-MS M~~AIN STEAM HEADER Open Open orD-001 B ISOLATION VALVE Throttled D320 OPER-MAIN STEAM 72 XVM02801B-O-MS HEADER B STOP N/A N/A D-302-011 VALVE MAIN STEAM HEADER Opn Open orD-0-1 73 XVM02801iC-MS C ISOLATION VALVE Opn ThrottledD-201 Page 40 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 ESLEquipment Operating State'

.Item "Normal Desired Notes/Comments

,Num ID *DesCription State, State OPER-MAIN STEAM 74 XVM02801C-O-MS HEADER C STOP N/A N/A D-302-01 1 VALVE EF PUMP TURBINEOpno 75 XVM1 1025-EF SPEED CONT Open Throttled OPg 4 1 GOVERNOR VLV MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 76 XVS02806A-MS Closed D-302-01 1 A SAFETY VALVE Open MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 77 XVS02806B-MS Closed D-302-01 1 A SAFETY VALVE Open __________

MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 78 XVS02806C-MS A AEYVLE Closed Opn D-302-01 1 XV020D-S A SAFETY VALVE Open __________

MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 80 XVS02806E-MS Closed D-302-011 A SAFETY VALVE Open MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 81 XVS02806E-MS Closed D-302-011 B SAFETY VALVE Open MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 82 XVS02806F-MS Closed D-302-O1 1 B SAFETY VALVE Open __________

MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 83 XVS02806H-MS Closed D-302-01 1 B SAFETY VALVE Open 84 XVS02806H-MS MANSEMHAE losed Cloe rD-302-01 1 B SAFETY VALVE Open MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 85 XVS02806I-MS Closed D-302-01 1 B SAFETY VALVE Open MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 86 XVS02806J-MS Closed D-302-01 1 C SAFETY VALVE Open MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 87 XVS02806K-MS Closed D-302-01 1 C SAFETY VALVE Open 88 XVS02806M-MS MANSEMHAE losed Cloe rD-302-011 C SAFETY VALVE Open MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 89 XVS02806M-MS Closed D-302-011 C SAFETY VALVE Open MAIN STEAM HEADER Closed or 90 XVS02806P-MS Closed D-302-01 1 C SAFETY VALVE Open MS HEADER A MOIST Closed, 91 XVT02843A-MS COLLECTOR DRAIN Open Open, or D-302-011 VLV Throttled Page 41 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESE Equipment Operating State' Item Normal Desired N otes/Comments Num lID Description State State OPER-MS HDR A 92 XVT02843A-O-MS MOIST COLLECTOR N/A N/A D-302-0l11 DRN VLV MS HEADER B MOIST Closed, 93 XVT02843B-MS COLLECTOR DRAIN Open Open, or D-302-011 VLV Throttled OPER-MS HDR B 94 XVT02843B-O-MS MOIST COLLECTOR N/A N/A D-302-01 1 DEN VLV MS HEADER C MOIST Closed, 95 XVT02843 C-MS COLLECTOR DRAiN Open Open, or D-302-01 1 VLV Throttled OPER-MS HDR C 96 XVT02843C-O-MS MOIST COLLECTOR N/A N/A D-302-01 1 DEN VLV EF PUMP TURB MAIN 97 XVT02865-MS STEAM TIHROTTLE Throttled Throttled OIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 VALVE OPER-EF PP TURB 98 XVT02865-O-MS MAIN STEAM N/A N/A OIP, Page 14, D-302-01 1 THROTTLE VLV MS HEADER A MOIST Closed, 99 XVT02877A-MS COLLECTOR DRAIN Open Open, or D-302-011 VLV Throttled MS HEADER C MOIST Closed, 100 XVT02877B-MS COLLECTOR DRAIN Open Open, or D-302-01 1 VLV Throttled SG A STEAM FLOW DP 101 IFT00475 XMRN/A N/A D-302-011 102 IFT00475A NARWRNE N/A N/A D-302-011 STEAM FLOW 103 I1FT00485 .SBSEMLWP N/A N/A D-302-011 XMTR 104 1FT00485A NARWRNE N/A N/A D-302-011 STEAM FLOW 105 IFT00495 SGCSEMFO P N/A N/A D-302-01 1 XMTR 106 IFT00495A NARWRNE N/A N/A D-302.-011 STEAM FLOW 107 TP1*03521 T BDEPESP N/A N/A E-302-085 HDR SUCT PRESS IND Page 42 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESEL .. . Equipment Operating State 1 ,

Item " Normal Desired . Notes/Comments Num ID* Description * .. State State TURBINE DR EF PUMP 108 IFT03525 DISCHARGE FLOW N/A N/A E-302-085 XMTR TURBINE DR EF PUMP 109 IPI03527 DISCHARGE PRESS N/A N/A E-302-085 IND SG AMTR DR EF 110 1FE03531 PUMP DISCH HDR N/A N/A E-302-085 FLOW ELEM STEAM GEN AEF 111 IFE03561 SUPPLY HEADER N/A N/A E-302-085 FLOW ELEM SG B MTR DREF 112 1FE03541 PUMP DISCH HDR N/A N/A E-302-085 FLOW ELEM STEAM GEN B EF 113 1FE03571 SUPPLY HEADER N/A N/A E-302-085 FLOW ELEM SG CMTR DR EF 114 IFE03551 PUMP DISCH HDR N/A N/A E-302-085 FLOW ELEM STEAM GEN C EF 115 1FE03581 SUIPPLY HEADER N/A N/A E-302-085 FLOW ELEM CONTAINMENT 116 TPI00950 PRESSURE, PRESSURE N/A N/A OTP, Page 27 INDI REACTOR BLDG 117 1T109201A AMBIENT TEMP N/A N/A OIP, Page 27 INDICATOR MOTOR DRIVEN EF 118 IPI03512 PUMP ASUCT PRESS N/A N/A D-302-085 IND 119 ff103525TDEFP DISCHARGE NA NA OPg 4 8 119 IFI03525FLOW INDICATOR N/ A OPag14D-005 REACTOR 120 IPT00950 CONTAINMENT N/A N/A OIP, Page 27 PRESSURE XMTR 121 ITE09201 RECOELDG TEP N/A N/A OW*,Page 27 122 XAA0001A RB COOLING UNIT lA N/A N/A OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 Page 43 of 67

TRO0 0080-00 5 REVISION 1 1

ESLEqUipment .Operating Stater Item =Normal :Desired ,Notes/Comments Num ID Descr'iption *State* State BATT &CHG ROOM 123 XAH-0024A AIR HANDLING UNIT N/A N/A 0IP, Page 46 A

BATT&CHG RM AIR 124 XFN0038A HANDLING UNIT A N/A N/A OIP, Page 46 SUIP FAN BATT&CHG RM All 125 XFNO038A-M UNIT A SUPPLY FAN N/A N/A OIP, Page 46 MOTOR BATTERY 126 XFN0039A EXHAUST ROOM FAN A N/A N/A OIP~, Page 46 BATTERY ROOM 127 XFN0039A-M EXHAUST FAN A N/A N/A OIP, Page 46 MOTOR REACTOR BLDG 128 XFN0064A COOLING UNIT 1A N/A N/A 0IP, Page 30, D-302-222 EMERG FAN 129 IYE40000 RBCU FAN XFN0O64A N/ NA 0TPg3,D-222 129 IYE40000 VIBRATION SENSOR N/ NA OPag3,D-022 SW PIPING RELIEF Closed 130 XVR13142A-SW VALVE Closed Open or 0IP, Page 30, D-302-222 SW BOOSTER PUMP A 131 IFE04466 DISCHARGE FLOW N/A N/A 0TP, Page 30, D-302-222 ELEM SW BOOSTER PUMP A 132 TFT04466 DISCHARGE FLOW N/A N/A 0TP, Page 30, D-302-222 XMTR SW BOOSTER PUMP A 133 IF104466 DISCHARGE FLOW N/A N/A 0Th, Page 30, D-302-222 IND RBCU 1A&2A CI SYS 134 XVBO311OA-SW SUPPLY ISOLATION Open Closed 0Th, Page 30, D-302-222 XVV OPER-RBCU 1A&2A CI 135 XVBO3110A-O-SW SYS SUPPLY ISOL VLV N/A N/A 0IP, Page 30, D-302-222 RB CLG UNIT 1AClsdo 136 XVR03146A-SW OUTLET HDR RELIEF Closed OI, Page 30, D-302-222 0Th VALVE Oe DRPI COOLING UNIT 137 XVT03164-SW INLET HDR ISOL Open Closed 0Th, Page 30, D-302-222 VALVE Page 44 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1

ESEL

Equipment, Operating, State1 Item " Normal Desired Notes/Comments Num. ,ID Description State 'State ... .

OPER-DRPI CLG UNIT 138 XVT03 164-0-SW INLET HDR ISOL N/A N/A OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 VALVE RB COOLING UNIT 2A 139 XVG03 108B-SW INLET ISOLATION Open Closed OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 XVV OPER-RB COOLING 140 XVG03108B-O-SW UNIT 2A INLET ISOL N/A N/A OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 VLV RB COOLING UNIT 2A 141 XVG03109B-SW OUTLET ISOLATION Open Closed OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 XVV OPER-RB COOLING 142 XVG03109B-O-SW UNIT 2A OUTLET ISOL N/A N/A OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 XVL DRPI COOLING UNIT 143 XVT03 169-SW OUTLET HDR ISOL Open Closed OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 VLV OPER-DRPI CLG UNIT 144 XVT03 169-0-SW OUTLET HDR ISOL N/A N/A OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 IVL RBCU 1A&2A CI SYS 145 XVG03111lA-SW RETURN ISOLATION Open Closed OIIP, Page 30, D-302-222 VLV OPER-RBCU 1A&2A CI 146 XVG03 11 1A-O-SW SYS RETURN ISOL N/A N/A OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 VLV RBCU SW RETURN 147 1TE04467 HEADER A TEMP N/A N/A OIP, Page 30, D-302-222 ELEMENT 148 1T104467 RBCU RETURN HDR A N/ NA 0TPg3,D-222 148 ITI04467TEMP INDICATOR NA N/ OIPg30D-222 SW PONT) RBCU RET 149 IFE04468 HDR A INLET FLOW N/A N/A 0TP, Page 30, D-302-222 ELEM SW POND RBCU RET 150 I1FT04468 I-DR A INLET FLOW N/A N/A 0IP, Page 30, D-302-222 XMTR 151 1F104468 RBCU RETURN HDR A NA NA OPg 0 2 151 IFI04468FLOW INDICATOR N/ NA OPag3,D-222 SW POND RBCU RET 152 TPT04528 HDR A INLET PRESS N/A N/A OWP, Page 30, D-302-222 XMTR Page 45 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESEL . .Equipmaent O perating State1 Item , Normal Desired NtsCmet Num _ ID ,.DescriPtion, State State ..

153 11P104528 SW FROM RBCU LOOP NA NA OPg 0 2 153 IPI04528 A PRESS INDICATOR / NA OPag30D-222 154 IFE00975 LOACLDEG N/A N/A E-302-691 FLOW ELEMENT 155 IFE00976 LOBCLDEG N/A N/A E-302-691 FLOW ELEMENT 156 I1FE00977 LOCCLDEG N/A N/A E-302-691 FLOW ELEMENT 17 AN91 120 VOLT VITAL AC NA /A E-206-005, E-206-054, E-206-DISTR PANEL 1, NSSS 062-SH 1 18 AN92 120 VOLT VITAL AC NA /A E-206-005, E-206-054, E-206-DISTR PANEL 2, NSSS 062-SH 1 19 AN93 120 VOLT VITAL AC NA /A E-206-005, E-206-054, E-206-DISTR PANEL 3, NSSS 062-SH 2 10 AN04 120 VOLT VITAL AC NA /A E-206-005, E-206-054, E-206-DISTR PANEL 4, NSSS 062-SH 2 11 ANO7 120 VOLT VITAL AC NA /A E-206-005, E-206-054, E-206-162 APN5907 2 OTVTLA N/A N/A E2605 5,E26 DISTR PANEL87,NSSS 062-SH 1 BATTERY MAIN 163 DPN1HA2 DISTRIBUTION PANEL N/A N/A E-206-005, E-206-062-SH 3 1HA 125V DC 164 DPNIHA1 DISTRIBUTION PANEL N/A N/A E-206-005, E-206-062-SH 3 1HA1 BATTERY MAIN 165 DPNIHB2 DISTRIBUTION PANEL N/A N/A E-206-005, E-206-062-SH 4 1HB 166 DP~lHB1 DC DISTRIBUTION NA N/ E20-5,E0662H4 166 DPN1HB 1 PANEL 1HB 1N/ N/ E-605,-2-0-S4 125VDC 167 XBA-1A 2 DISTRIBUTION BUS N/A N/A E-206-005 1A BATTERY 125V DC 168 XBA-1B 2 DISTRIBUTION BUS lB N/A N/A E-206-005 BATTERY 125V DC DISTRI BUS 169 XBC-1A 1A BATTERY N/A N/A E-206-005 CHARGER Page 46 of 67

~fr TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESEL Equipment Operating State 1

'Item Normal Desired Notes/Comments Num ID Descr'iption State State 125V DC DISTRI BUS lA-lB BACKUP 170 XBC-1A-1B BTEYCAGR N/A N/A E-206-005

("Swing charger")

171 XCP6103 MCB XCP-6103 N/A N/A E-0-8, 1MS-28-026, S h.

3-0-8, 1MS-28-026, Sh.4 172 XCP6104 MCB XCP-6104 N/A N/A E-0-8, 1MS-28-026, Sh.4 3-0-8, 1MS-28-026, Sh.4 173 XCP6106 MCB XCP-6106 N/A N/A E-0-8, 1MS-28-026, S h.

174 XCP6107 MCB XCP-6107 N/A N/A E-206-080, 1MS-28-026, Sb.

5, 1MS-28-026, Sh. 6 175 XCP6108 MCB XCP-6108 N/A N/A 0MS22 -2,S.,E26 176 CP610 MC XC-611 N/A N/A 1MS-28-026, Sh. 17, 1MS 176 CP61O MBXCP611 N/A N/A 026, Sb. 18, E-206-022 177 XCP6111 MCB XCP-6111 N/A N/A E-206-080, 1MS-28-026, Sh.

19, 1MS-28-026, Sh. 20 178 XCP6112 MCB XCP-6112 N/A N/A E21608, 1MS-28-026, Sh.2 E2168, 1MS-28-026, 2S b.

179 XCP6113 MCB XCP-6113 N/A N/A E23608, 1MS-28-026, S h.2 180 XCP6114 MCB XCP-6114 N/A N/A 1MS-28-026, Sb. 30, 1MS 026, Sb. 31 120 VAC VITAL BUS 10 E-206-005, E-206-054, E-206-181 XIT5901 KVUST91 N/A N/A 02S 12XT92KVA UPS XIT5901 / / 062-SH 1 120 VAC VITAL BUS 10 E-206-005, E-206-054, E-206-183 XIT93KV X1T290 P N/A N/A 02-H 120 VAC VITAL BUS 10 E-206-005, E-206-054, E-206-14XT94KVA UPS XIT5903 / / 062-SH 2 120 BS VC 10E-206-005, VIAL E-206-054, E-206-185 XIT59048OMCXM1D2 N/A N/A 04 185 MC1A2X 480VMCCXMCDA2X N/A N/A E-206-005, E-206-034, E-206-186 XMC1DA2Y 480V MCC XMC1DA2Y N/A N/A 04,E-206-005,-2-34, 187 XPN6001 BO ntuetPnl N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 1 Train A 188 XIPN6002 BO ntuetPnl N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 2 Train B Page 47 of 67

4 TRO0 0080-0 05 REVISION 1 ESLEqUipment *Operating State 1 Item Normal Desired NtsCmet Num ID Description State State 189 XPN6004 BO ntuetPnl N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 1 Train A 190 XiPN6005 BO ntuetPnl N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 2 Train B 191 XPN6020 ESF Load Sequence N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 1 Panel, Train A 192 XPN7001 Prcs & ak N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 1 Protection Set I 193 XPN7002 Prcs & ak N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 1 Protection Set II 194 XPN7003 Prcs & ak N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 2 Protection Set Ill 195 XPN7004 Prcs & ak N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 2 Protection Set IV 196 XPN7005 ~~Process I&C Rack Cont NA NA E2602S 197 XPN7005 rcs & akCn N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 1 Group 2 198 XPN7006 rcs & akCn N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 2

_______Group 3 SrolicSaes ProtactiontE2602S ,B28 1998 XPN7007yse abntTri N/A N/A E-094 6-S Solid State Protection E-206-062-SH 1 & 2, B-208-200 XPN7010yte SP) aie N/A N/A 09 SytrmabineBri 9 201 XPN7020 AuSafteguarSS) Cabinet N/A N/A E2602S Train A 202 XPN7034 Aux Safeguards Cabinet N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 4 Train B MAIN CONTROL 203 XN71O6BOARD 23 XN06TERMINATION N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 3, E-206-080 CAB INET XPN7106 MAIN CONTROL 204 XN71O7BOARD TERMINATION N/A N/A B-208-032-EF54 CABINET XPN7107 MAIN CONTROL 205XN71O8BOARD TERMINATION N/A N/A B-208-032-EF54 CABINET XPN7108 Page 48 of 67

TR00080-.005 REVISION 1 ESEL Equipment Operating State' Item' Normal Desired Notes/Comments Num ID Description State State Main Control Board 206 XPN71 13 Instrument Bus 2 Channel N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 1 D

MANBONTROL B-208-032-EF37A,B, B-20 8-07 XN14TERMINATION N/A N/A 032-EF38A,B, E-81 1-017, B-CABINET XPN71 14 208-032-EF39A,B MAIN CONTROL 28 XN19BOARD B-208-032-EF34A,B, B-208-TERMINATION NA /A 032-EF36A,B CABINET XPN71 19 MAIN CONTROL 209 XN7120BOARD 29 XN10TERMINATION N/A N/A E-811-017, B-208-032-EF54 CABINET XPN712O MAIN CONTROL 210 XN7121BOARD 20 XN11TERMINATION N/A N/A B-208-032-EF3 5A,B CABINET XPN7121 MANBONTROL B-208-032-EF34A,B, B-208-21 XN14TERMINATION N/A N/A 032-EF35A,B, B-208-032-CABINET XPN7124 EF36A,B, E-81 1-019 MAIN CONTROL 212 XN~l3OBOARD 22 XN10TERMINATION N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 4, E-206-080 CABINET XPN7130 Control Room Evacuation E-206-062-SH 3, E-206-042-213 XPN7200A PlCP) N/A N/A S Control Room Evacuation E-206-062-SH 4, E-206-042 214 XPN7200B PnlCRB) N/A N/A Si Control Room Evacuation 215 XPN7213 Panel (CREP) Process N/A N/A E-206-062-SH 4 Cabinet 26 XWA 2 Class IE 7.2 kV SWGR N/A N/A E-206-005, E-206-022 216 X~lDA2bus XSWlDA-ES 27 XSWlDA1 2 Class IE 48OV SWGR NA /A E-206-005, E-206-034, E-206-27bus XSW 1DA1-ES NA /A 047 28 XSWlDA2 2 Class lIE 480 V SWGR N/A N/A E-206-005, E-206-034, E-206-28bus XSWlDA2-ES 047 219 ILI00477 3 SG A WD RGE LEVEL N/A N/A OJIP, Page 20 1 INDICATOR Page 49 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 ESEL .- -... Equipment . perating State 1 .....

O."'..

Item _. - Normal Desired. Notes/Comments Num . ID - Description .State.. State.... . .

220 ]1,100487 3 SG B WD RGE LEVEL N/A N/A OlIP, Page 20 INDICATOR 221 ILI00497 3 SG CWD RANGE NA NA OP ae2 LEVEL INDICATOR NA NA OP ae2 222 ILT00477 3 SG AWIDE RANGE N/A N/A D-302-011 LEVEL XMTR 223 11LT00487 3 SG BWIDE RANGE N/A N/A D-302-011 LEVEL XMTR 224 ILT00497 3 SG CWIIDE RANGE N/A N/A D-302-011 LEVEL XMTR 225 IPI0402B3 RCS WIDE RANGE NA NA OP ae2 225 1P10402B 3 PRESURE INDICATOR NA NA OP ae2 226 iPT00402 3 PT-402 RC WIDE RNG. N/ NA D-0-4 1 PRESS. TRANSM!ITTER N/ NA D-064 RC LOOP A COLD LEG 227 ITE00410 3 TEMPERATURE N/A N/A D-302-601 ELEMENT 228 IT10041i0 3 RC LOOP A COLD LEG N/A N/A OIP, Page 20 iI TEMP INDICATOR Notes

1. The operating states for the equipment selected for inclusion on the ESEL can be found in Attachment 5 of Reference 20.

2. These components were identified to have lockout relays, which were considered in this analysis. For more information regarding the identification of these lockout relays, see tab "VCSNS Ut Elec ESEL Relay List" within Attachment 5 of Reference 20.

3. These components are part of an ESEL amendment discussed with the NRC [26] and are not included in Attachment 5 of Reference 20.

Page 50 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Attachment B ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation Page 51 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 HCLPF values are listed in Table B-i. These notes are applicable:

1. The listed HCLPF value is for comparison to the horizontal PGA at the bedrock surface.

2. Items covered by the NP-6041-SL "rule of the box" are identified in Table B-2. In each case, the HCLPF value for the parent item applies.

3. Results take credit for planned resolution of screening issues cited in Table 6-3.

4. For the CST only (XTKO008), the applied ground motion was based on the GMRS.

5. The "Class" value for each item refers to the equipment class per the SQUG-GIP [10].

Page 52 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL HCLPF Values No'. ID Description. Bldg Elev Class HCLPF (g), C*ontrolling Failure Mode

~(ft).

I IFE03561 STEAM GEN AEF SUPPLY HEADER FLOW ELEM AB 412 0 > 0.30 Screened 2 XMCIDA2Y 480V MCC XMCIDA2Y AB 412 1 >_0.30 Screened 3 IFT03561 STEAM GEN AEF SUPPLY HEADER FLOW XMTR AB 412 18 Ž_0.30 Screened 4 IPT03563 STEAM GEN AEF SUPPLY HEADER PRESS XMTR AB 412 18 >_0.30 Screened 5 XTKOO25 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK AB 412 21 0.32 Overturning moment capacity.

6 IFE04466 SW BOOSTER PUMP A DISCHARGE FLOW ELEM AB 436 0 >Ž0.30 Screened 7 IFE04468 SW POND RBCU RET HDR A INLET FLOW ELEM AB 436 0 _Ž0.30 Screened 8 IPVO2000-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER A POWER RELIEF VALVE AB 436 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 9 XVG01611A-FW MAIN FWTO STM GEN AHDR ISOL AB 436 7 Ž>0.30 Screened 10 XVS02806A-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER A SAFETY VALVE AB 436 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 11 XVS02806B-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER A SAFETY VALVE AB 436 7 Ž0.30 Screened 12 XVS02806C-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER A SAFETY VALVE AB 436 7 _>0.30 Screened 13 XVS02806D-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER A SAFETY VALVE ' AB 436 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 14 XVS02806E-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER A SAFETY VALVE AB 436 7 Ž>0.30 Screened 15 XVT02877A-MS MS HEADER A MOIST COLLECTOR DRAIN VLV AR 436 7 Ž__0.30 Screened 16 1FT04466 SW BOOSTER PUMP A DISCHARGE FLOW XMTR AB 436 18 Ž>0.30 Screened 17 IFT04468 SW POND RBCU RET HDR AINLET FLOW XMTR AB 436 18 Ž 0.30 Screened Page 53 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL HCLPF Values No. ID Description Bldg Elev Class HCLPF (g) Controlling Failure Mode (ft) 18 1PT00474 SG A MAIN STEAM HDR PRESS TRANSMITTER AB 436 18 Ž_0.30 Screened 19 IPT00475 SG A MAIN STEAM HDR PRESS TRANSMITTER AB 436 18 >_0.30 Screened 20 1PT00476 SG A MAIN STEAM HDR PRESS TRANSMITTER AD 436 18 >_0.30 Screened 21 IPTO2000 STEAM GENERATOR AOUTLET PRESSURE XMTR AB 436 18 >_0.30 Screened 22 IPT02000A STEAM GENERATOR A OUTLET PRESSURE XMTR AD 436 18 > 0.30 Screened 23 IPT04528 SW POND RBCU RET HDR A INLET PRESS XMTR AD 436 18 > 0.30 Screened 24 XVB031I0A-SW RDCU 1A&2A CI SYS SUPPLY ISOLATION VLV AD 463 8 >Ž0.30 Screened 25 XVGO31I11A-SW RDCU IA&2A CI SYS RETURN ISOLATION VLV AD 463 8 >__0.30 Screened 26 IPTO0950 REACTOR CONTAINMENT PRESSURE XMTR AB 463 18 >Ž0.30 Screened 27 ITE04467 RBCU SW RETURN HEA.DER ATEMP ELEMENT AB 463 19 >Ž0.30 Screened 28 APN590 1 120 VOLT VITAL AC DISTR_ PANEL 1, NSSS CD 436 14 _Ž0.30 Screened 29 APN5902 120 VOLT VITAL AC DISTR PANEL 2, NSSS CB 436 14 Ž_0.30 Screened 30 APN59O3 120 VOLT VITAL AC DISTR PANEL 3, NSSS CB 436 14 Ž 0.30 Screened 31 APN59O4 120 VOLT VITAL AC DISTR PANEL 4, NSSS CB 436 14 Ž__0.30 Screened 32 APN5907 120 VOLT VITAL AC DISTR PANEL 7, NSSS CB 436 14 Ž>0.30 Screened 33 APN5908 120 VOLT VITAL AC DISTR PANEL 8, NSSS CD 436 14 > 0.30 Screened 34 XIT5901 120 VAC VITAL BUS 10 KVA UPS XIT5901 CD 436 16 Ž>0.30 Screened Page 54 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL HCLPF Values No. . ID Description Bldg Elev Class HCLPF (g)

Controlling Failure Mode

~(.ft) 35 XIT59O2 120 VAC VITAL BUS 10 KVA UPS XUT5902 CB 436 16 > 0.30 Screened 36 XIT5903 120 VAC VITAL BUS 10OKVAULPS XIT5903 CB 436 16 >_0.30 Screened 37 XIT5904 120 VAC VITAL BUS 10 KVA UPS XIT5904 CB 436 16 >_0.30 Screened 38 XPN600 1 BOP Instrument Panel Train A CB 436 20 _>0.30 Screened 39 XPN6002 BOP Instrument Panel Train B CB 436 20 _>0.30 Screened 40 XPN6004 BOP Instrument Panel Train A CB 436 20 > 0.30 Screened 41 XPN6005 BOP Instrument Panel Train B CB 436 20 _>0.30 Screened 42 XPN6O2O ESF Load Sequence Panel, Train A CR 436 20 > 0.30 Screened 43 XPN700I Process I&C Rack Protection Set I CB 436 20 Ž_0.30 Screened 44 XIPN7002 Process I&C Rack Protection Set II CB 436 20 >Ž0.30 Screened 45 XPN7003 Process I&C Rack Protection Set III CB 436 20 >Ž0.30 Screened 46 XPN7004 Process I&C Rack Protection Set IV CB 436 20 _>0.30 Screened 47 XPN7005 Process I&C Rack Cont Group 1 CB 436 20 Ž0.30 Screened 48 XPN7006 Process I&C Rack Cont Group 2 CB 436 20 >_0.30 Screened 49 XPN7007 Process I&C Rack Cont Group 3 CB 436 20 Ž>0.30 Screened 50 XPN7O10 Solid State Protection System Cabinet Train A CB 436 20 Ž>0.30 Screened 51 XPN702O Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Cabinet Train B CR 436 20 _Ž0.30 Screened Page 55 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL HCLPF Values_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

No. ID 'Description Bldg Elev Class .HCLPF (g) Controlling Failure Mode

°* (ft) 52 XPN7034 Aux Safeguards Cabinet Train A CB 436 20 > 0.30 Screened 53 XPN7035 Aux Safeguards Cabinet Train B CB 436 20 > 0.30 Screened 54 XPN7106 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 _>0.30 Screened XPN7 106 55 XPN71O7 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 > 0.30 Screened

____ XPN7 107 56 XPNTI08 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 > 0.30 Screened XPN7 108 57 XPN71 13 Main Control Board Instrument Bus 2 Channel D CB 448 20 _Ž0.30 Screened 58 XPN71 14 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 _>0.30 Screened XPN71 14 59 XPN71 19 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 >Ž0.30 Screened XPN71 19 60 XPN7120 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 Ž_0.30 Screened XPN7 120 61 XPN7121 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 Ž0.30 Screened XPNT121 62 XPN7124 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 Ž>0.30 Screened XPN7 124 63 XPN7130 MAIN CONTROL BOARD TERMINATION CABINET CB 448 20 Ž 0.30 Screened XPN7 130 _____

64 XCP6103 MCB XCP-6103 CB 463 20 Ž__0.30 Screened 65 XCP6I04 MCB XCP-6 104 CB 463 20 Ž0.30 Screened 66 XCP6 106 MCB XCP-6 106 CB 463 20 Ž0.30 Screened Page 56 of 67

4.

TR00080-005 REVISION I Table B-i: ESEL HCLPF Values No. ID Description Bldg Elev Class HCLPF (g) = Controlling'Failurc Mode

?+(ft) ,_________________________.___

67 XCP6107 MCB XCP-61 07 CB 463 20 > 0.30 Screened 68 XCP6108 MCB XCP-6108 CB 463 20 > 0.30 Screened 69 XCP61I0O MCB XCP-6110 CB 463 20 > 0.30 Screened 70 XCP6111I MCB XCP-6111 CB 463 20 > 0.30 Screened 71 XCP6112 MCB XCP-6112 CB 463 20 > 0.30 Screened 72 XCP6113 MCB XCP-6113 CB 463 20 > 0.30 Screened 73 XCP6I14 MCB XCP-6114 CB 463 20 > 0.30 Screened 74 1PT03632 EF PUMP SUCT HDR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER DB 412 18 > 0.30 Screened 75 1PT03633 EF PUMP SUCT HDR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER DB 412 18 > 0.30 Screened 76 IPT03634 EF PUMP SUCT HDR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER DB 412 18 > 0.30 Screened 77 IPT03635 EF PUMP SUCT I-DR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER DB 412 18 > 0.30 Screened 78 IFE03525 TURB DRIVEN EF PUMP DISCH FLOW ELEMENT IB 412 0 > 0.30 Screened 79 IFE0354I SG BMTR DR EFPUMP DISCH HDR FLOW ELEM TB 412 0 > 0.30 Screened 80 1FE03571 STEAM GEN B EF SUPPLY HEADER FLOW ELEM lB 412 0 >Ž0.30 Screened 81 IFE03581 STEAM GEN CEF SUPPLY HEADER FLOW ELEM lB 412 0 >Ž0.30 Screened 82 TPP0008 EMERGENCY FEED WATER PUMP TURBINE LB 412 5 >0.30 Screened 83 XPP0008 EMERG FEEDWATER TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP lB 412 5 >0030 Screened Page 57 of 67

4 TROOO080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL IICLPF Values No .II Dscipio , Bldg: ,Elev.. Class HCLPF (g). Controlling Failuire Mode

(It) ______________-_____________

84 XPP002lA EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP A 11B 412 5 > 0.30 Screened 85 IFV02030-MS EF PUMP TURI3 STEAM SUPPLY FLOW CONT VLV lB 412 7 > 0.30 Screened 86 XVM1 1025-EF EF PUMP TURBINE SPEED CONT GOVERNOR VLV lB 412 7 > 0.30 Screened 87 XVRI3 I42A-SW SW PIPING RELIEF VALVE IB 412 7 > 0.30 Screened 88 XVT02865-MS EF PUMP TURE MAIN STEAM THROTTLE VALVE IB 412 7 >Ž0.30 Screened 89 DPN1HA BATTERY MAIN DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1HlA lB3 412 14 0.35 Functionality, including breaker trip.

90 DPN1HA1 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL LHAI IB 412 14 >Ž0.30 Screened 91 DPN1HB BATTERY MAIN DISTRIBUTION PANEL iRB lB 412 14 0.35 Functionality, including breaker trip.

92 DPN1HB I DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IHB1 lB 412 14 Ž0.30 Screened 93 XBA-1A 125V DC DISTRIBUTION BUS IA BATTERY lB 412 15 Ž_0.30 Screened 94 XBA-1B 125V DC DISTRIBUTION BUS lB BATT'ERY lB 412 15 >Ž0.30 Screened 95 XBC-lA I25V DC DISTRI BUS IA BATTERY CHA.RGER lB 412 16 _>0.30 Screened 96 XBC-1A-1B I25V DC DISTRI BUS IA-lB BACKUP BATTERY IB 412 16 Ž 0.30 Screened CHARGER ("Swing charger")

97 IFT03525 TURBINE DR EF PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW XMTR lB 412 18 Ž 0.30 Screened 98 IFT03531 SG AMTR DR EFPUMP DISCH HDR FLOW XMTR lB 41I2 18 Ž>0.30 Screened 99 1FT03541 SG BMTR DR EFPUMP DISCH HDR FLOW XMTR lB 412 18 Ž>0.30 Screened 100 IFT03551 SG CMTR DR EFPUMP DISCH HDR FLOW XMTR lB 412 18 Ž 0.30 Screened Page 58 of 67

TROOO080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL HCLIPF Values No. ID Description "" Bldg Elev Class HCIKPF (g)* Controlling~aihure Mode

- * .. (ft) 101 1FT03571 STEAM GEN BEF SUPPLY HEADER FLOW XMTR lB 412 18 > 0.30 Screened 102 1FT03581 STEAM GEN CEP SUPPLY HEADER FLOW XMTR lB 412 18 > 0.30 Screened 103 IP103512 MOTOR DRIVEN EF PUMP ASUCT PRESS IND lB 412 18 Ž_0.30 Screened 104 I1PI03521 TURB DR EFPPPEFSUP HDR SUCT PRESS IND lB 412 18 Ž__0.30 Screened 105 IPI03527 TURBINE DR EFPUMP DISCHARGE PRESS IND IB 412 18 Ž_0.30 Screened 106 1P503504 MvDEPP ASUCT PRESS SW LO PRESS ALARM lB 412 18 >Ž0.30 Screened 107 1P503524 TURD DR EF PUMP SUCT LP ALARM SWITCH lB 412 18 >Ž0.30 Screened 108 1PT02032 EF PUMP TURBINE MS SUP NDR PRESS XMTR lB 412 is Ž 0.30 Screened 109 11PT03573 STEAM DEN B EF SUPPLY HEADER PRESS XMTR lB 412 18 Ž 0.30 Screened 110 IPT03583 STEAMOGEN CEF SUPPLY HEADER PRESS XMTR IB 412 18 Ž 0.30 Screened 111 TPPOOO8-1-E1 EF PUMP TURBINE LUBE OIL HEAT EXCHANGER I]B 412 21 Ž 0.30 Screened 112 TPPOOO8-0R1 EP PUMP TURBINE LUBE OIL RESERVOIR TB3 412 21 >0.30

Ž Screened 113 IFE0353 1 SD A MTR DR EP PUMP DISCH NOR FLOW ELEM lB 423 0 Ž 0.30 Screened 114 IFV0353 1-EF SG A MTR DR EF PUMP FLOW CONTROL VALVE lB 423 7 >Ž0.30 Screened 115 TPV03536-EP SD A TURD DR EF PUMP FLOW CONTROL VALVE TB 423 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 116 1FV03541-EP SG B MTR DR EP PUMP PLOW CONTROL VALVE LB 423 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 117 IFV03546-EF SG B TURD DR EP PUMP FLOW CONTROL VALVE LB 423 7 Ž 0.30 Screened Page 59 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL HCLPF Values No. ID Description , Bldg Elev Class .HCLPF (g). Controlling Failure Mode

______ ...... _____________________(ft) 1S I8 FV03551-EF SG CMTR DR EFPUMP FLOW CONTROL VALVE IB 423 7 >_0.30 Screened 119 1FV03556-EF SG C TURB DR EF PUMP FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1l3 423 7 > 0.30 Screened 120 XrFN0039A BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN A IB 423 9 > 0.30 Screened 121 XAHOO24A BATT & CHO ROOM AIR HANDLING UNIT A LB 423 10 >Ž0.30 Screened 122 IFEO355 1 S0 C MTR DR EF PUMP DISCH HDR FLOW ELEM lB 424 0 >_0.30 Screened 123 IPV020 10-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER B POWER RELIEF VALVE IB 436 7 >Ž0.30 Screened 124 IPVO2020-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER C POWER RELIEF VALVE LB 436 7 >Ž0.30 Screened 125 XVG0161 1B-FW MAIN FW TO STM GEN B HDR ISOL lB 436 7 >Ž0.30 Screened 126 XVG01611C-FW MAIN FW TOSTM GEN CHDR ISOL LB 436 7 >Ž0.30 Screened 127 XVM02801A-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER A ISOLATION VALVE LB 436 7 Ž0.30 Screened 128 XVMO2801B-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER B ISOLATION VALVE LB 436 7 Ž0.30 Screened 129 XVM02801 C-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER C ISOLATION VALVE lB 436 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 130 XVSO28O6F-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER B SAFETY VALVE LB 436 7 Ž0.30 Screened 131 XVS028060-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER B SAFETY VALVE LB 436 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 132 XVS02806H-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER B SAFETY VALVE LB 436 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 133 XVS02806I-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER B SAFETY VALVE LB 436 7 Ž 0.30 Screened 134 XVS02806J-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER B SAFETY VALVE LB 436 7 Ž 0.30 Screened Page 60 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL HCLPF Values No. ID ., Description Bldg Elev Class HCLsPF (g) Contro1ling,-Failure Mode 135 XVS02806K-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER C SAFETY VALVE IB 436 7 >_0.30 Screened 136 XVS02806L-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER C SAFETY VALVE lB 436 7 _>0.30 Screened 137 XVS02806M-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER C SAFETY VALVE IB 436 7 _>0.30 Screened 138 XVS02806N-MS MAIN STEAMv HEADER C SAFETY VALVE lB 436 7 > 0.30 Screened 139 XVS02806P-MS MAIN STEAM HEADER C SAFETY VALVE IB 436 7 > 0.30 Screened 140 XVT02843A-MS MS HEADER A MOIST COLLECTOR DRAIN VLV lB 436 7 >: 0.30 Screened 141 XVT02843B-MS MS HEADER B MOIST COLLECTOR DRAIN VLV lB 436 7 > 0.30 Screened 142 XVT02843C-MS MS HEADER C MOIST COLLECTOR DRAIN VLV lB 436 7 >_0.30 Screened 143 XVT02877B-MS MS HEADER C MOIST COLLECTOR DRAIN VLV IB 436 7 >_0.30 Screened 144 I1PT00484 SG B MAIN STEAM HDR PRESS TRANSMITTER IB 436 18 >Ž0.30 Screened 145 1PT00485 SG B MAIN STEAM HDR PRESS TRANSMITTER IB 436 18 > 0.30 Screened 146 IPT00486 SG BMAIN STEAM HDR PRESS TRANSMITTER IB 436 18 _>0.30 Screened 147 IPT00494 SO C MAIN STEAM HDR PRESS TRANSMFITER IB 436 18 > 0.30 Screened 148 1PT00495 SG C MAIN STEAM HTDR PRESS TRANSMITTER IB 436 18 > 0.30 Screened 149 IPT00496 SG CMAIN STEAM HDR PRESS TRANSMITTER lB 436 18 Ž_0.30 Screened 150 IPT020 10 STEAM GENERATOR B OUTLET PRESSURE XMTR IB 436 18 _>0.30 Screened 151 IPTO2O1OA STEAM GENERATOR B OUTLET PRESSURE XMTR IB 436 18 Ž 0.30 Screened Page 61 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-I: ESEL HJCIPF Values No. " ID :.... Description. Bldg, -Elev, Class. HCLPF (g),, Controlling Failure Mode :

152 IPT02020 STEAM GENERATOR C OUTLET PRESSURE XMTR IB 436 18 >_0.30 Screened 153 IPT0202OA STEAM GENERATOR C OUTLET PRESSURE XMTR IB 436 18 >_0.30 Screened 154 XPN7200A Control Room Evacuation Panel (CREP A) IB 436 20 > 0.30 Screened 155 XPN7200B Control Room Evacuation Panel (CREP B) lB 436 20 > 0.30 Screened 156 XPN7213 Control Room Evacuation Panel (CREP) Process Cabinet IB 436 20 __>

0.30 Screened 157 XMCI1DA2X 480V MCC XMCIDA2X lB 463 1 >Ž0.30 Screened 158 XSWIDAI Class IE 480 V SWGR bus XSWlDA1-ES lB 463 2 0.24 Cited HCLPF is for relay chatter failure mode; other failure modes are screened and HCLPF > 0.30g.

159 XSW1DA2 Class IE 480 V SWGR bus XSWlDA2-ES lB 463 2 0.24 Cited HCLPF is for relay chatter failure mode; other failure modes are screened and IHCLPF > 0.30g.

160 XSWIDA Class IE 7.2 kV SWGR bus XSWl DA-ES lB 463 3 0.20 Cited HCLPF is for relay chatter failure mode; other failure modes are screened and HCLPF >Ž0.30g.

161 1FE00975 LOOP A COLD LEG FLOW ELEMENT RE 412 0 Ž 0.30 Screened 162 IFE00976 LOOP B COLD LEG FLOW ELEMENT RB 412 0 Ž 0.30 Screened 163 IFE00977 LOOP C COLD LEG FLOW ELEMENT RB 412 0 Ž_0.30 Screened 164 I1FT00475 SG ASTEAM FLOW DP XMTR RE 463 18 Ž_0.30 Screened 165 IFT00475A NARROW RANGE STEAM FLOW RE 463 18 Ž 0.30 Screened 166 1FT00485 SG BSTEAM FLOW DP XMTR RE 463 18 Ž>0.30 Screened 167 IFT00485A NARROW RANGE STEAM FLOW RE 463 18 Ž 0.30 Screened Page 62 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-i: ESEL HCLPF Values No. ID, Description Bldg Elev Class HCLPF (g) C3ontrolling Failure Mode

. ', (ft) __________________________

168 1FT00495 SG CSTEAM FLOW DP XMTR RB 463 18 >_0.30 Screened 169 IFT00495A NARROW RANGE STEAM FLOW RB 463 18 > 0.30 Screened 170 XAA000IA RB COOLING UNIT IA RB 514 10 0.35 Overall structural integrity.

171 IYE40000 RBCU FAN XFN0064A VIBRATION SENSOR RB 514 0 > 0.30 Screened 172 XVR03 I46A-SW RB CLG UNIT IA OUTLET HDR RELIEF VALVE RB 518 7 >Ž0.30 Screened 173 XVTO3 164-SW DRPI COOLING UNIT INLET HDR ISOL VALVE RB 518 7 0.44 Functionality 174 )rVTO3 169-SW DRPI COOLING UNIT OUTLET HDR ISOL VLV RB 518 7 0.24 Seismic interaction.

175 XVGO3 I08B-SW RB COOLING UNIT 2A INLET ISOLATION VLV RB 518 8 0.82 Functionality 176 XVGO3109B-SW RB COOLING UNIT 2A OUTLET ISOLATION VLV RB 518 8 0.82 Functionality 177 1TE09201 REACTOR BLDG TEMP ELEM RB 518 19 >0.30 Screened 178 ILT03631 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL XMTR YD 435 18 >Ž0.30 Screened 179 XTKOOO8 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK YD 435 21 0.88 Sliding due to exceedance of base shear capacity.

180 XCP6 109 MCB XCP-6109 CB 463 20 >Ž0.30 Screened 181 IPT00402 PT-402 RC WIDE RNG. PRESS. TRANSMITTER DB 427 18 >Ž0.30 Screened 182 1TEOO410 RC LOOP A COLD LEG TEMPERATURE ELEMENT RB 412 19 Ž 0.30 Screened 1

183 1LT00477 SG A WIDE RANGE LEVEL XMTR RB 436 18 Ž 0.30 Screened 184 ILT00487 SGB WIDE RANGE LEVEL XMTR RB 436 18 Ž 0.30 Screened Page 63 of 67

TRO0 0080-00 5 REVISION 1 tles s HCLPF (g) ,Controlling Failure Mode *

> 0.30 Screened Page 64 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 Table B-2: ESEL Rule-of-Box Items ID Description Bdlg Elev Parent (ft) _________

IFI03 525 TDEFP DISCHARGE FLOW INDICATOR CB 463 XCP6 103 IFI04466 SW BOOSTER PUMP A DISCHARGE CB 463 XCP6103 FLOW IND IFI04468 RBCU RETURN HDR A FLOW CB 463 XCP6 103 INDJICATOR IPI00950 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, PRESSURE CB 463 XCP6 103 INDI IPI04528 SW FROM RBCU LOOP APRESS CB 463 XCP6103 INDICATOR IT104467 RBCU RETURN HDR A TEMP GB 463 XCP6103 INDICATOR ITI09201 A REACTOR BLDG AMBIENT TEMP GB 463 XCP6 103 INDICATOR TPP0008-PPI EF PUMP TURBINE LUBE OIL ROTARY lB 412 TPP0008 PUMP TPPO008-SC1 EF PUMP TURBINE SPEED CONTROL lB 412 TPP0008 GOVERNOR XFN0038A-M BATT'&CHG RM AH UNIT A SUPPLY IB 423 XAH0024A FAN MOTOR XFN0039A-M BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN A lB 423 XFNO039A MOTOR XFN003 8A BATT7&CHG RM AIR HANDLING UNIT A IB 423 XAH-0024A SUP FAN XFN0064A REACTOR BLDG COOLING UNIT 1A RB 514 XAA0001A EMERG FAN ILI00477 SG A WD RGE LEVEL INDICATOR GB 463 XCP61 11 ILI00487 SG B WD ROE LEVEL INDICATOR GB 463 XCP6111 ILI0 0497 SG C WD RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR GB 463 XCP6 111 1

IPI00402B RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE CB 463 XCP6 109 INDICATOR IT100410 RC LOOP A COLD LEG TEMP GB 463 XCP6 109 INDICATOR Notes Valve operators on the ESEL are not listed above. The parent for each valve operator is the corresponding valve.

Page 65 of 67

TR000 80-005 REVISION 1 Attachment C Seismic Review Team Page 66 of 67

TR00080-005 REVISION 1 The SRT consisted of seismic engineers from Stevenson & Associates. Brief resumes for team members are provided below.

John J. O'Sullivan. P.E.

Mr. O'Sullivan is a Senior Consultant in the S&A Boston office. He has managed and led seismic walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments.

Mr. O'Sullivan has 25 years of seismic experience serving the nuclear industry. Mr. O'Sullivan has participated in numerous USI A-46 and IPEEE projects in response to the requirements of Generic Letters 87-02 and 88-20. He recently led the seismic fragility analysis effort for the Palo Verde station to industry standard ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009. Mr. O'Sullivan is a registered professional engineer (Massachusetts) and has a Master of Science in Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has received industry training as Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI 5-day SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, and Seismic Fragility training.

Stephane Damolini Mr. Damolini is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Boston office. In his five years at Stevenson &

Associates, he has performed multiple finite element analyses (including 3D building models and piping models) along with seismic fragility and HCLPF generation for structures, systems, and components. He also completed seismic walkdowns for the Seabrook and V.C. Summer nuclear stations. Mr. Damolini has a Master of Engineer in Civil/Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Master of Science in Civil Engineering and Construction from the t~cole Sp~ciale des Travaux Publics (the number one Civil Engineering school in France). Mr. Damolini has been a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer since 2011.

Seth Baker Mr. Baker is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Boston office. He has performed structural engineering analysis & design, finite element analysis, structural mechanics evaluations, seismic qualification managed and seismic walkdowns. Mvr. Baker has a Master of Science in Civil/Structural Engineering from Stanford University. He has received industry training as Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI 5-day SQUG training) and completed the EPRI training for NTTF 2.3 plant seismic walkdowns.

Page 67 of 67

NI Document Control Desk Attachment II CR-i15-03436/ CR-12-01 097 RC-1 6-0008 Page 1 of 1 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 Attachment II Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by SCE&G, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station in this document.. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. Bruce L. Thompson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing, (803) 931-5042.

Action # ° : Commitmerntl

Ii ; -*Due Date! Evenit .

1 Complete walkdowns of Prior to completion of Fall 2015 Inaccessible Items listed in Table Outage - Fulfilled by RC-16-0008.

7.1 of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process report prior to end of Fall 2015 refueling outage.

2 Submit letter to NRC stating February 1, 2016 - Fulfilled by walkdowns have been completed and RC-16-0008.

provide HCLPF results in Attachment B of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process report.

3 Submit letter to NRC stating all 60 days following completion of Expedited Seismic Evaluation the second Unit 1 refueling Process report Modifications, outage after December 31, 2014 Actions 1 through 9 of Section 8.4, (Tentative Spring 2017) are complete.