RBG-46049, Submittal of Revisions to Emergency Implementing Procedures
| ML023510335 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/2002 |
| From: | King R Entergy Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response |
| References | |
| G9.20.6, G9.5, RBF1-02-0199, RBG-46049 | |
| Download: ML023510335 (48) | |
Text
~-En tergy Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station 5485 U S Highway 61 P 0 Box 220 St Francisville, LA 70775 Tel 225 336 6225 Fax 225 635 5068 Rick J. King Director Nuclear Safety Assurance December 11, 2002 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 License No. NFP-47 Submittal of Revisions to Emergency Implementing Procedures File No.:
G9.5, G9.20.6 RBG-46049 RBF1-02-0199 Ladies and Gentlemen:
Pursuant 10CFR50 Appendix E, Section V, enclosed is Emergency Implementing Procedure (EIP) 2-001 Revision 12, "Classification of Emergencies." In accordance with 10CFR50.54(q),
the changes to this procedure do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.
If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Barry Allen at (225)-378 3310.
Sincerely, RJK/dnl enclosure
-AO65 N
Submittal of Revision to the RBS Emergency Implementing Procedure December 11, 2002 RBG-46049 RBF1-02-0199 Page 2 of 2 cc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2)
Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Senior Resident Inspector P. 0. Box 1050 St. Francisville, LA 70775
SEntergy Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Benc Station 5485 U S Higtivay 61 P 0 Box 220 St Francisvil!e LA 70775 Te' 225 336 6225 Fax 225 635 5068 Rick J King Oi,ec~cr Nuclear Safety Assurance December 11, 2002 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
River Bend Station - Unit I Docket No. 50-458 License No. NFP-47 Submittal of Revisions to Emergency Implementing Procedures File No.:
G9.5, G9.20.6 RBG-46049 RBFI-02-0199 Ladies and Gentlemen:
Pursuant I OCFR50 Appendix E,Section V, enclosed is Emergency Implementing Procedure (EIP) 2-001 Revision 12, "Classification of Emergencies." In accordance with 10CFR50.54(q),
the changes to this procedure do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.
If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Barry Allen at (225)-378 3310.
Sincerely, RJK/dnl enclosure
--T
Submittal of Revision to the RBS Emergency Implementing Procedure December 11, 2002 RBG-46049 RBFI-02-0199 Page 2 of 2 cc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2)
Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Senior Resident Inspector P. 0. Box 1050 St. Francisville, LA 70775
- G12.23.2 VUp
=W ENTERGY RIVER BEND STATION STATION SUPPORT MANUAL
- EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
- CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES PROCEDURE NUMBER:
- EIP-2-001 REVISION NUMBER:
- 12 Effective Date:
- NOV 21 200Z NOTE: SIGNATURES ARE ON FILE.
- INDEXING INFORMATION RECEIVED DOCUgENT CONT ROL REFERENCE USE
TABLE OF CHANGES LETTER DESIGNATION DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TRACKING NUMBER EIP-2-001 REV-12 PAGE 1 OF 43
TABLE OF CONTENTS SEC TIO N........................................................................................................................
PA G E N O.
1 PURPOSE
........................................................ 3 2
REFERENCES
..................................................... 3 3
DEFINITIONS
..................................................... 3 4
RESPONSIBILITIES
................................................. 5 5
GENERAL
........................................................ 6 6
PROCEDURE......................................................
7 7
DOCUMENTATION
................................................. 8 ATTACHMiENT I - MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS.....................
9 ATTACHMENT 2 - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT.............................................
15 ATTACHM ENT 3 - ALERT.....................................................................................................
22 ATTACHMENT 4 - SITE AREA EMERGENCY.......................................................................
29 ATTACHMENT 5 - GENERAL EMERGENCY....................................................................
39 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE 2 0F43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 2 OF 43
I PURPOSE 1.1 This procedure provides guidelines for properly classifying emergencies.
2 REFERENCES 2.1 River Bend Station (RBS) Emergency Plan 2.2 EIP-2-002, Classification Actions 2.3 EIP-2-018, Technical Support Center 2.4 NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines: 10CFR50.72 and 50.73 3
DEFINITIONS AFFECTING SAFE SHUTDOWN: An event in progress has adversely affected functions that are necessary to bring the plant to and maintain it in the applicable HOT or COLD SHUTDOWN condition. Plant condition applicability is determined by Technical Specification LCOs in effect.
ALERT: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fraction of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION - a classification that arranges accidents in order of increasing severity and initiates an effective course of action and protective measures to safeguard the public and plant personnel. The four emergency classifications, listed in order of increasing severity, are:
Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency GENERAL EMERGENCY: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 3 OF 43
degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.
IMMINENT - Mitigation actions have been ineffective and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NOUE): Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occur.
POtENTIAL - Mitigation actions are not effective and trended information indicates that the parameters are outside desirable bands and not stable or improving.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of RBS personnel and the public.
Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.
SITE BOUNDARY - For classification and dose projection purposes, the site boundary is the area defined as exclusion area or exclusion zone in 10CFR100.3(a) which is a boundary of approximately 3,000 feet from the RBS reactor.
SUSTAINED - Greater than or equal to 15 minutes in duration.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT
- 1. Any unplanned reactor trip from criticality.
- 2. Automatic turbine runback > 25% thermal power.
- 3. Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load.
- 4. Thermal power oscillations> 10%.
- 1. A planned reactor trip in which the expected post-trip response did not occur.
EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 4 OF 43
- 2. Any event resulting in an automatic ESF actuation or any event requiring a manual initiation of these systems where automatic initiation would likely have occurred.
- 3. Any unplanned turbine-generator power change in excess of 100 MWe in less than one (1) minute other than a momentary spike due to grid disturbance or a manually initiated runback.
- 4. Any unplanned main turbine or main feedwater pump trip which results in a turbine-generator power change in excess of 100 MWe.
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.
4 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1.
Operations Shift Manager (OSM) - It is the responsibility of the OSM to:
4.1.1.
Recognize and properly classify emergency conditions, and 4.1.2.
Assume the responsibilities of the Recovery Manager (RM) and Emergency Director (ED) until relieved by the designated Emergency Director.
4.2 Control Room Supervisor (CRS) - It is the responsibility of the CRS to assume the responsibility of the OSM if the OSM becomes incapacitated.
4.3 Designated Emergency Director - The designated Emergency Director is responsible for: 1) assisting the OSM as requested, and 2) if the emergency is classified as an Alert or higher, relieve the OSM of the Recovery Manager/Emergency Director duties and responsibilities as soon as practical.
EIP-2-OO1 REV - 12 PAGE 5 0F43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 5 OF 43
5 GENERAL 5.1 Anytime Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) or Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) are initiated, this procedure should be reviewed to determine if an emergency action level has been reached.
5.2 This procedure, with Attachment 1 through Attachment 5, is a guideline for classifying emergencies. In a situation not covered by the Emergency Action Levels in Attachments I - 5, the OSM (Recovery Manager/Emergency Director) must use his best judgment in determining the appropriate emergency classification. Attachment 1 is a matrix that is useful in EAL determination and classification. The Emergency Action Levels in Attachments 2 - 5 are consistent with the definitions and initiating conditions in the RBS Emergency Plan, (LC #03 101).
5.3 For Emergency Action Levels based on plant instrumentation, the indication shall be a valid indication. When all indications for a certain parameter have been lost, the Emergency Director should use his best judgment and other plant indications to classify the emergency (e.g., loss of level trend on all RPV level instrumentation).
EIP-2-OO1 REV - 12 PAGE 6 OF 43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 6 OF 43
6 PROCEDURE 6.1 Anytime an event occurs which has the potential of causing or resulting in a hazard to personnel, onsite or offsite, the Emergency Director:
6.1.1.
Should review Attachment 1 to determine the EAL and classification to use. Use Attachments 2 - 5 to actually determine if the condition should be classified as an emergency.
6.1.2.
Shall classify the emergency and implement EIP-2 002, Classification Actions.
6.2 "
The General Manager - Plant Operations or designated alternate shall:
6.2.1.
Immediately upon being notified of a classified emergency, provide assistance to the OSM as requested.
6.2.2.
If the emergency is classified as an Alert or higher, relieve the OSM as soon as practical, of the responsibilities of Recovery Manager and Emergency Director in accordance with EIP-2-018, Technical Support Center.
6.3 Declaration of an emergency class'.is not required if:
- 1. The event or condition which met an EAL threshold no longer exists at the time of discovery AND "
- 2.
The event or condition was due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification.
6.3.2.
Reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72 are applicable and the guidance of NUREG-1022 should be applied.
6.3.3.
The State and local agencies should be notified in accordance with the arrangements made between the licensee and offsite organizations.
EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 7 OF 43
6.4 When two or more Emergency Action Levels are determined, declaration will be made on the highest classification level for the plant.
7 DOCUMENTATION None EIP-.OO1 REV 12 PAGE 8 OF 43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12
MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS AII ACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 6 REV - 12 PAGE 9 OF 43 EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY A.
REACTOR Exceeding Primary coolant Inability to Loss of 2 of 3 COOLANT primary coolant leak rate greater maintain reactor fission product BOUNDARY system leak rate than 50 GPM with water level barriers with a DEGRADATION Technical reactor water (Known loss of potential loss of Specification temperature > 200 coolant accident third barrier (Tech. Spec.
Degrees F greater than EAL 2 (Page 39) 3.4.5)
EAL 2 (Page 22) makeup pump EAL 3 (Page 17) capacity)
EAL 1 (Page 29)
B.
ABNORMAL Fuel damage Severe loss of fuel Degraded core Loss of 2 of 3 CORE indication clad with possible loss fission product CONDITION EAL 2 (Page 16)
EAL I (Page 22) of coolable barriers with a AND FUEL geometry potential loss of DAMAGE EAL 2 (Page 29) third barrier EAL 2 (Page 39)
C.
STUCK OPEN Failure of an Unisolable steam Steam line break Loss of 2 of 3 SAFETY SRV to close in line break inside outside fission product RELIEF VALVE operational containment containment barriers with a OR STEAM modes 1, 2 or 3 EAL 3 (Page 22) without isolation potential loss of LINE BREAK third barrier EAL 4 (Page 17)
EAL 3 (Page 30)
EAL 2 (Page 39)
EIP-2-001
ATTACHMENT I PAGE 2 OF 6 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EIP-2-001 REV-12 PAGE 10 0F43 EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY D.
LOSS OF Loss of 2 of 3 CONTAIZ4MENT fission product INTEGRITY barriers with a potential loss of third barrier EAL 2 (Page
- 39)
E.
LOSS OF Loss of functions Loss of functions Other plant SHUTDOWN needed to maintain needed to bring the conditions exist FUNCTIONS, plant in cold reactor from hot that make DECAY HEAT shutdown (5200 shutdown to cold release of large RE1MLOYAL Degrees F) shutdown amounts of EAL 7 (Page 23)
EAL 6 (Page 31) radioactivity in a short time possible EAL 4 (Page
- 42)
F. REACTOR Transient requiring Transient requiring PROTECTION operation of operation of SYSTE9M shutdown systems shutdown systems FAILURE with failure of the with failure of the automatic reactor automatic reactor protection systems protection systems to initiate and to initiate and complete a scram.
complete a scram.
Manual Scram Manual Scram Methods are Methods are not successful.
successful.
EAL 8 (Page 24)
EAL 7 (Page 32)
EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 10 OF 43
ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 3 0F6 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA 1 GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT I
I EMERGENCY EMERGENCY G.
ABNORMAL RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT OR RADIATION LEVELS Radiological effluent technical requirements limit exceeded (Tech.
EAL I (Page 15)
OR Significant loss of accident assessment capability or loss of effluent monitoring capability requiring or resulting in shutdown (Tech.
Spec. 3.3.3.1 &
Tech. Reqs.
EAL 7 (Page 18)
Unexpected high radiation levels or high airborne radioactivity, or contamination levels indicating severe degradation in the control of radioactive materials EAL 4 (Page 23)
OR Radiological effluents greater than 10 times Technical Requirements Instantaneous limits (Tech.
Reqs. TR 3.11.1 or TR3.11.2)
EAL 12 (Page 26)
Actual or potential radioisotope concentrations at the Site Boundary corresponding to 50 mrem/hour DDE (monitored for a 30 minute period), or 250 mrem CDE Thyroid (Dose for a I hour exposure with conditions lasting 30 minutes or more)
OR 500 trem/hour DDE (monitored for a 2 minute period) or 2500 nirem CDE Thyroid (Dose for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> exposure with conditions lasting 2 minutes or more)
EAL 11 (Page 34)
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to I Rem Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE); or, 5 Rem thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE), for a I hour exposure at the Site Boundary under actual meteorological conditions EAL 1 (Page 39)
OR Other plant conditions exist that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time possible EAL 4 (Page 42)
H.
FIRE Fire within the Fire potentially Fire Any major protected area affecting safety compromising internal or lasting more than systems (Pre-fire the function of a external events 10 minutes strategy may be safety system which could following used in this cause massive implementation of determination)
EAL 9 (Page 34) common damage fire suppression EAL 10 (Page to plant systems measures
- 25) resulting in imminent danger EAL6 (Page 18) to the public EAL 5 (Page 43)
EIP-2-0O1 REV-12 PAGEI1OF43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 11 OF 43
MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS AI iALtl-tILiN I I PAGE 4 OF 6 EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY I. ELECTRIC OR Total loss of offsite Loss of offsite Loss of offsite Other plant POWER power or loss of power and loss of power and loss of conditions exist FAILURE onsite AC power all onsite AC all onsite AC that make capability power for less power for more release of large EAL 5 (Page 17) than 15 minutes than or equal to amounts of EAL5(Page 23) 15 minutes radioactivity in a EAL 4 (Page 33 1) short time OR EAL 4 (Page 31) possible Loss of all onsite OR EAL 4 (Page DC power for Loss of all vital
J. CONTROL Evacuation of Evacuation of Loss of physical ROOM main control main control control of EVACUATION room anticipated room and control facility or required with of shutdown control of systems not EAL 3 (Page shutdown at established at
- 42) remote shutdown remote shutdown panels panels in 15 EAL 16 (Page minutes 28)-
EAL 15 (Page
- 38)
K.LOSS OF Significant loss of' Loss of most or Loss of most or
- MONITORS, main control room all annunciators all annunciators ALARMS, OR communications in main control in main control COMMUNICATIONS capability room for more room for more than 15 minutes.
than 15 minutes.
EAt 8 (Page 19)
(Transient has not (Plant transient OR occurred) initmted or in Significant loss of EAL 11 (Page progress while Signficat los ofannunciators are accident assessment
- 25) lost.)
capability or loss of effluent monitoring EAL 10 (Page capability requiring
- 34) or resulting in shutdown (Tech.
Spec. 3.3.3.1 or Tech. Reqs.
EAL 7 (Page 18)
EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGEI2OF43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 12 OF 43
MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS ATTACHMENT I PAGE 5 OF 6 EIP-2-OO1 REV-Il PAGE 130F43 EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY L.
FUEL Fuel handling Major damage to HANDLING accident with spent fuel in ACCIDENT release of containment or radioactivity to fuel building(e.g.,
containment or large object fuel building damages fuel or water loss below EAL 9 (Page 24) fuel level)
EAL 8 (Page 32)
M. HAZARDS TO Other hazards Other hazards Other hazards Other plant PLANT-being experienced being experienced being experienced conditions exist OPERATIONS or projected which or projected which or projected with that make release have the potential have a significant plant not in cold of large amounts for endangering potential for shutdown of radioactivity in the plant affecting plant EAL 14 (Page 37) a short time EAL 11 (Page 20) safety possible OR EAL 15 (Page 28)
EAL 4 (Page 42)
Other plant OR conditions exist Any major that warrant internal or increased external events awareness on the which could cause part of the plant massive common operating staff or damage to plant State and/or Local systems resulting offsite authorities in imminent EAL 13 (Page 21) danger to the public EAL 5 (Page 43)
EIP-2-001 REIV-12 PACE 13 OF 43
MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS PAGE 6 OF 6 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGEJ4OF43 EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY N.
NATURAL Unusual natural Severe natural Severe natural Any major internal EVENTS events near site phenomenon event near site or external events EAL 10 (Page 20) experienced being experienced which could cause beyond or projected with massive common Notification of plant not in cold damage to plant Unusual Event shutdown systems resulting in levels EAL 13 (Page 37) imminent danger to EAL 14 (Page 27) the public EAL 5 (Page 43)
- 0.
SECURITY Security threat Ongoing security Security threat Loss of physical THREATS EAL 9 (Page 19) compromise involving control of facility EAL"9 (PageA19) 13 (Page 27) imminent loss of EAL 3 (Page 42)
EAL 1 physical control of the plant.
EAL 12 (Page 37)
P.
OTHERS Inability to Other plant Other plant Other plant change operating conditions that conditions exist conditions exist that Modes when warrant that warrant make release of large required by precautionary activation of amounts of Technical activation of emergency radioactivity in a Specifications emergency response facilities short time possible EAL 12 (Page 21) response facilities and monitoring EAL 4 (Page 42)
EAL 17 (Page 28) teams EAL 16 (Page 38)
Q.
MULTIPLE Loss of 2 of 3 fission FISSION product barriers with PRODUCT a potential loss of BARRIER third barrier FAILURE EAL 2 (Page 39)
EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 14 OF 43
Al kAt:1t+/-r1Mr, I Z PAGE I OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition
- 1. Radiological Effluent Technical
- 1. HIGH alarm on any of the following Requirements Limit Exceeded (Tech.
three Radiation release paths:
- a. Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust High Alarm Monitor No. IRMS-RE6A/6B Set point RMI I Channel No. 1006 8.64E-5 uCi/cc RM11 Channel No. 4006 8.51E+2 uCi/sec "RM 11 Channel No. 5006 2.01E-5 uCi/cc "b. Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust High Alarm Monitor No. 1RMS*RE5A/5B Set point RM1 1 Channel No. 1005 5.88E-4 uCi/cc RM11 Channel No. 4005 1.64E+3 uCi/sec RM1 1 Channel No. 5005 5.29E-4 uCi/cc
- c. Main Plant Exhaust High Alarm Monitor No. 1RMS*RE125/126 Set point RMI 1 Channel No. 1125 6.64E-4 uCi/cc RM11 Channel No. 4125 1.63E+4 uCil/sec RM1P 1 Channel No. 1126 2.44E-4 uCi/cc AND Summation of grab samples indicate that Technical Requirement limits have been exceeded OR (1 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
REV-12 PAGE 15 OF 43 EIP-2-001
AlI TACHMENT 2 PAGE 20F7 Emergency A(
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ction Level Initiating Condition
- 1. Continued Radiological Effluent Technical Requirements Limit Exceeded (Tech.
- 2.
Fuel Damage Indication
- 2.
Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor HIGH Alarm Monitor No. 1RMS-RE 107 RM11 Channel No. 1107 AND Isolation valve (1LWS-AOV257) fails to close (Upon valid signal)
- 3.
Cooling Tower Blowdown Effluent Monitor HIGH Alarm Monitor No. IRMS-RE108 RM11 Channel No. 1108 AND Confirmed by grab sample
- 1. Offgas pretreatment radiation monitor indicates an increase of 1100 mR/hr in 30 minutes (Monitor D17-R604 on 1H13*P600)
- 2.
Offgas pretreatment radiation monitor reading greater than 5000 mR/hr OR
- 3.
Laboratory analysis of coolant sample indicates greater than or equal to 4 uCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE16OF43 REV - 12 PAGE 16 OF 43 A 1 TACH31ENT 2 PAGE 2 OF 7 EIP-2-001
AI IACHiXlh 1 2 PAGE 3 OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition Item 1-3 Modes 1, 2, & 3
- 3.
Exceeding Primary Coolant System Leak Rate Technical Specification (Tech. Spec. 3.4.5)
- 1. Any verified pressure boundary LEAKAGE OR
- 2.
5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE OR 3.2430gpm total LEAKAGE (averaged over any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period)
OR Mode 1 Only
- 4.
2 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE increase within any period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or less
- 4.
Failure of an SRV to Close in Relief valve open as indicated by SRV Operational Modes 1, 2, or 3 solenoid indicating lights, acoustic monitors, main steam line flows, or additional verification AND All attempts have been made to close the valve (AOP-0035)
- 5.
Total Loss of Offsite Power or Loss of
- 1. Loss of power to 1RTX-XSRIE, IRTX Onsite AC Power Capability XSRIF, IRTX-XSRIC, and IRTX-XSRlD preferred station transformers OR
- 2.
Loss of Division I and II diesel generators functional capabilities FIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE17OF43 EIFP-2-001l REV - 12 PAGE 17 OF 43
ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 4 OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level
- 6. Fire Within the Protected Area Lasting More Than 10 Minutes Following Implementation of Fire Suppression Measures
- 7.
Significant Loss of Accident Assessment Capability or Loss of Effluent Monitoring Capability Requiring or Resulting in Shutdown (Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.1 & Tech. Reqs. TR 3.3.11.2 or TR 3.3.11.3)
Initiating Condition
- 1. Fire exists within the Protected Area (not affecting safety systems) for more than 10 minutes following implementation of fire suppression measures AND Reported by plant personnel or fire brigade leader to the Main Control Room OR
- 2. Fire exists within the Protected Area (not affecting safety systems) for more than 10 minutes following implementation of fire suppression measures AND Valid fire detection device alarm within the Protected Area
- 1. Radiation monitoring instrumentation less than minimum channels operable requirement of Technical Requirements resulting in shutdown (TR 3.3.11.2 or TR 3.3.11.3) and respective LCO actioni statement(s) time(s) have been exceeded OR
- 2.
Accident monitoring instrumentation less than minimum channels operable requirement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 requiring plant shutdown and respective LCO action statement(s) time(s) have been exceeded EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE 18 0F43 FIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 18 OF 43
Al I ACH.MENdT 2 PAGE 5OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level
- 8. Significant Loss of Main Control Room Communications Capability 9
Security Threat Initiatin2 Condition
- 1. Loss of 3 of the following:
- a. Bell lines into the Control Room
- b. NRC FTS lines to the Control Room
- c. ESP Computer Notification System
- d. Emergency Preparedness Radio OR
- 2.
Loss of
- a. Plant telephone system AND
- b. Gaitronics system EIP-2-001 REV -12 PAGE 19 OF 43
- 1. A definite or perceived site specific threat or possibility of sabotage. Intensive communications and/or threat assessments are taking place.
AND Threat assessment indicates the site specific threat is credible (valid) as determined by the Security Shift Supervisor.
- 2. 'A serious and/or obvious site specific threat event indicated by any of the following:
- a. Adversaries are observed.
- b. There is an obvious danger to life.
c.' There is a major security contingency that warrants an intensive security effort.
Initatin CniACHion
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level
- 10. Unusual Natural Events Near Site
- 11.
Other Hazards Being Experienced or Projected Which Have the Potential For Endangering the Plant. Hazard observed or notification is received by the Main Control Room:
ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 6 OF 7 Initiatine Condition
- 1. Receipt of annunciators "Seismic Event High" (P680-02A-C06)
AND "Seismic Tape Recording System Start" (P680-02A-D06)
- 2.
Flood with water level greater than 96 feet MSL and increasing OR
- 3. A tornado is observed to cross the site boundary OR
- 4. Sustained onsite winds measured at 74-89 m.Aphiearcatcaho uuularrf
- 1. An onsite aircraft crash or unusual aircraft activity over station OR
-2. An onsite train derailment OR
- 3. An onsite or near-site explosion OR 4.
An onsite or near-site flammable or toxic gas release that threatens versonnel OR
- 5.
A turbine rotating component failure causing rapid plant shutdown OR
- 6.
As determined by the OSM (Recovery Manager/Emergency Director)
REV-12 PAGE 20 OF 43 EIP-2-001
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 7 OF 7 Initiating Condition
- 12.
Inability to Change Operating Modes Any time the plant cannot be brought to the When Required by Technical required operating MODE within the Specifications allowable action statement time.
- 13.
Other Plant Conditions Exist That Observation of event or report received by Warrant Increased Awareness on the Part the OSM (Recovery Manager/Emergency of the Plant Operating Staff or State Director) and/or Local Offsite Authorities REV-12 PAGE 21 OF 43 EIP-2-001
A F4 ACHlEN 1[3 PAGE 1 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition
- 1. Severe Loss of Fuel Clad
- 1. Offgas pre-treatment radiation monitor reading greater than 50,000 mR/hr OR
- 2. Very high coolant activity as determined by sample analysis of 300 uCi/gm equivalent I 131 OR
- 3. Main steam line radiation monitor exceeds isolation alarm set point
- 2. Primary Coolant Leak Rate Greater Total drywell LEAKAGE greater than 50 Than 50 gpm With Reactor Water gpm Temperature > 200 Degrees F
- 3. Unisolable Steam Line Break Inside Abnormally low reactor pressure vessel Containment pressure indication after MSIV closure AND Average drywell temperature greater than 145 Degrees F AND High drywell to containment differential pressure greater than 1.68 psid EIP-2-001 REV-12 PAGE 22 OF43
At IALkHME41 N
J PAGE 2 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level
- 4. Unexpected High Radiation Levels or High Airborne Radioactivity, or Contamination Levels Indicating Severe Degradation in the Control of Radioactive Materials Initiating Condition
- 1.
Alarm of area radiation monitors and confirmation of readings greater than 1,000 times normal level OR
- 2.
Alarm of DRMS (Digital Radiation Monitoring System) airborne ventilation monitors and confirmation of readings Sgreater than 1,000 times normal levels
- 5. Loss of Offsite Power and Loss of All Loss of power to IRTX-XSR1E, 1RTX Onsite AC Power For Less Than 15 XSR1F, 1RTX-XSR1C, and 1RTX-XSR1D Minutes preferred station transformers AND Loss of Division I and II diesel generators functional capabilities
- 6. Loss of All Onsite 125V DC Power For Less than 105 VDC on IENB*SWGOIA Less Than 15 Minutes and IENB*SWGO1B distribution buses Mode 4
- 7. Loss of Functions Needed to Maintain Loss of all shutdown and alternate shut Plant in Cold Shutdown (< 200 Degrees down cooling modes of RHR loops A and B F) and other alternate shutdown cooling modes (Refer to Tech. Specs. 3.4.9, 3.4.10, 3.9.8 or 3.9.9)
EIP-2-001 REV-12 PAGE 23 OF 43
A I fACHNMEN f 3 PAGE 3 OF 7 Emergency Action Level
- 8. Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure of the automatic reactor protection systems to initiate and complete a scram. Manual Scram Methods are successful.
- 9. Fuel Handling Accident With Release of Radioac~tivity to Containment or Fuel Building Initiating Condition Indication that more than one control rod has not been fully inserted following a valid scram signal AND Manual SCRAM methods are successful in inserting all control rods 1.
Observation of a fuel handling accident in the upper fuel pool area or fuel building AND HIGH radiation alarm in the upper fuel pool area or fuel building Containment Monitor Nos. IRMS-RE 140 and/or 141 High Set point RM1 1 Channel No. 1140 8.20 E+1 mR/hr RM11 Channel No. 1141 8.20 E+1 mR/hr Fuel Building Monitor Nos. 1 RMS-RE 192 and/or 193 RMI1 Channel No. 1192 mR/hr RM1 I Channel No.
E+1 mR/hr High Set point 8.20 E+l 1193 1.23 REV-12 PAGE 24 OF43 ALERT I
- 2.
Fuel Building Airborne Effluent Monitor No. 1RMS*RE5A (MID RANGE) (LC
- 09535) in Alert Alert Set point RM-1I1 Channel No. 2005 3.38 E-3 uCi/ml EIP-2-001
ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 4 OF7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition
- 10. Fire Potentially Affecting Safety A fire potentially affecting safety systems Systems (Pre-Fire Strategy May be Used in This Determination)
- 11.
Loss of Most or All Annunciators in As determined from direct observation and Main Control Room For More Than 15 the OSM(Recovery Manager/ Emergency Minutes Director) determines loss is significant; plant is not shutdown AND Transient has not occurred EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 25 OF 43
ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 5 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition
- 12.
Radiological Effluents Greater Than 10
- 1. Alarm on any of the following three Times Technical Requirements radiation release paths:
Instantaneous Limits (Tech. Reqs.
- a. Radwaste building ventilation exhaust Mid-range Monitor High Alarm Set point No. 1RMS-RE6A 5.70 E-4 uCi/cc RM 11 Channel No. 2006
- b. Fuel building ventilation exhaust Mid-Range Monitor Alert Alarm Set point No. 1RMS*RE5A 3.38 E-3 uCi/cc RM1 1 Channel No. 2005
- c. Main plant exhaust Mid-Range Monitor Alert Alarm Set point No. 1RMS*RE125 4.38 E-3 uCi/cc RMI 1 Channel No. 2125 OR
- 2. Liquid radwaste effluent monitor (IRMS REI07, RM11 channel no. 1107) High alarm (liquid effluent determined to be greater than 10 times the Technical Requirement limit as verified by grab sample)
AND Isolation valve (1LWS-AOV257) fails to close OR
- 3. Cooling tower blowdown monitor (IRMS RE108, RM11 Channel No. 1108) HIGH alarm, (Blowdown water activity is determined to be greater than 10 times the Technical Requirement limit as verified by grab sample)
EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE26OF43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 26 OF 43
ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 6 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition
- 13.
Ongoing Security Compromise RBS Safeguard contingency event that results in adversaries inside the protected area, but not in control over shutdown capability or vital islands.
- 14. Severe Natural Phenomena Experienced
- 1. Receipt of annunciators "Seismic Event Beyond Notification of Unusual Event High-High" (P680-02A-B06)
Levels AND "Seismic Tape Recording System Start"
"(P680-02A-D06)
AND Amber light(s) on panel NBI-101 OR
- 2.
Flooding with water level greater than 97 feet MSL and increasing I
- 3.
A tornado strikes the facility that does not result in another Alert level initiating condition OR 4,
Sustained onsite winds measured at 90-99 mph REV - 12 PAGE 27 OF 43 EIP-2-001
ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 7 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level hnitiating, Condition
- 15. Other Hazards Being Experienced or Projected Which Have a Significant Potential For Affecting Plant Safety
- 1. Aircraft impact on the reactor, diesel generator, control, fuel, or auxiliary building OR
- 2. Missile impact on facility with resulting damage OR
- 3.
Known explosion at facility resulting in major damage to plaht structures or equipment as determined by the OSM(Recovery Manager/ Emergency Director)
OR 4.
Uncontrolled entry of toxic or flammable gases into facility area OR I5. Main turbine failure causing casing penetration (Missile generation)
- 16. Evacuation of Main Control Room As determined by the OSM(Recovery Anticipated or Required with Control of Manager/Emergency Director)
Shutdown at Remote Shutdown Panels
- 17. Other Plant Conditions That Warrant As determined by the OSM (Recovery Precautionary Activation of Emergency Manager/Emergency Director)
Response Facilities EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 28 OF 43 EmerRency Action Level Initiating Condition
ATTACHMvE.NT 4 PAGE 1 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level
- 1. Inability to Maintain Reactor Water Level (Known Loss of Coolant Accident Greater Than Makeup Pump Capacity)
- 2.
Degraded Core With Possible Loss of Coolable Geometry Initiating Condition EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE29OF43 Low reactor water level indication less than Level 1 (-143 inches) (or cannot be determined)
AND HIGH drywell to containment differential pressure greater than 1.68 psid AND Inability to restore reactor water level above Level 1 (-143 inches)
Reactor water level at or below top of active fuel (equal to or less than -162 inches) as indicated by reading on fuel zone level indicator AND Very high coolant activity as determined by sample analysis (greater than or equal to 300 uCi/gm equivalent of 1-131)
Emer~~~~~~enTT CH EN AcinLvl4ita odto EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 29 OF 43
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level
- 3. Steam Line Break Outside Containment Without Isolation ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 2 OF 10 Initiatini Condition
- 1. Flow indicated in an individual main steam line. Failure of steam line to isolate AND HIGH main steam line tunnel ambient temperature alarm AND HIGH main steam line tunnel differential temperature alarm OR
- 2.
Flow indicated in an individual main steam line. Failure of steam line to isolate AND HIGH turbine building area temperature alarms OR
- 3.
RCIC steam line failure to isolate AND Any of the following temperature alarms:
- a. HIGH main steam line tunnel ambient temperature
- b. HIGH RCIC area ambient temperature alarm
- c. HIGH main steam line tunnel
- differential temperature alarm
- d. HIGH RCIC equipment area differential temperature alarm EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE300F43 EIP-2-001 RRV - 12 PACE -In01F 43
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 3 OF 10 Initiating Condition
- 4.
Loss of Offsite Power and Loss of All Loss of power to IRTX-XSRIE, IRTX Onsite AC Power For More Than or XSRIF, lRTX-XSRlC and lRTX-XSRlD Equal to 15 Minutes preferred station transformers AND Loss of Division I and II diesel generators functional capabilities
- 5. Loss of All Vital Onsite 125V DC Less than 105 VDC on IENB*SWGO1A Power For More Than 15 Minutes and IENB*SWG1B distribution buses for more than 15 minutes Item 1 - 2 Mode 3
- 6.
Loss of Functions Needed to Bring the
- 1.
Inability to depressurize the reactor Reactor From Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown OR
- 2.
Main condenser not available as heat sink AND Loss of all shutdown and alternate shutdown cooling modes of RHR Loops A and B and other alternate shutdown cooling modes AND Loss of RCIC function to remove heat from the RPV.
EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 31 OF 43
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 4 OF 10 Initiating Condition
- 7.
Transient requiring operation of Indication that more than one control rod has shutdown systems with failure of the not been fully inserted following a valid automatic reactor protection systems to scram signal initiate and complete a scram. Manual AND Scram Methods are not successful.
Manual Scram methods have failed
- 8.
Major Damage to Spent Fuel in Containment or Fuel Building (e.g.,
Large Object Damages Fuel or Water Loss Below Fuel Level)
- 1. Observation of event causing major structural damage to spent fuel assembly in the upper fuel pool areas or fuel building AND HIGH radiation alarm in the upper fuel pool area or fuel building Containment Monitor Nos. IRMS-RE 140 and/or 141 RM11 Channel No. 1140 RM11 Channel No. 1141 High Set point 8.20 E+1 mR/hr 8.20 E+1 mR/hr Fuel Bldg. Monitor Nos. IRMS-RE 192 and/or 193 RM11 Channel No. 1192 RM11 Channel No. 1193 High Set point 8.20 E+l mR/hr 1.23 E+l mR/hr Fuel Bldg. Effluent Monitor No.
1RMS*RE5A (LC #09535)
High Set point RMI 1 Channel No. 2005 8.9 E-2 uCi/ml (8 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE32OF43 REV - 12 PAGE 32 OF 43 EIP-2-001
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level
- 8.
Continued Major Damage to Spent Fuel in Containment or Fuel Building (e.g.,
Large Object Damages Fuel or Water Loss Below Fuel Level)
ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 5 OF 10 InitiatinR Condition
- 2.
LOW water level in spent fuel pool or upper fuel storage pool below normal, and unable to restore normal level AND HIGH radiation alarm in upper fuel pool area or fuel building Containment Monitor Nos. 1RMS-RE140 and/or 141 RMI1 Channel No. 1140 RM11 Channel No. 1141 High Set point 8.20 E+1 mR/hr 8.20 E+1 mR/hr Fuel Bldg. Monitor Nos. IRMS-RE192 and/or 193 RM1I Channel No. 1192 RM11 Channel No. 1193 High Set point
- 8.20 E+1 mR/hr 1.23 E+1 mR/hr AND HIGH alarm on fuel building ventilation or main plant exhaust radiation monitor Fuel Building Monitor No. 1RMS*RE5A RMI I Channel No. 2005 High Alarm Set point 8.90 E-2 uCi/ce Main Plant Exhaust Monitor No. 1RMS*RE125 RMlI Channel No. 2125 High Alarm Set point 1.37 E-2 uCi/cc EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE33OF43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 33 OF 43
ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 6 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition
- 9.
Fire Compromising the Function of a Safety System Any fire within the Protected Area that defeats the capability of all operable trains of a safety system (loss of function).
- 10. Loss of Most or All Annunciators in As determined from direct observation and Main Control Room For More Than 15 the OSM(Recovery Manager/Emergency Minutes Director) determines loss is significant; plant is not shutdown AND "Plant transient initiated or in-progriss while annunciators are lost
- 11.
Actual or potential radioisotope
- 1. Containment post-accident radiation monitors concentrations at the Site Boundary in ALERT alarm corresponding to 50 mreni/hour DDE (monitored for a 30 minute 1RMS*RE16A/B period), or 250 mrem CDE Thyroid RMI I Channel No. 1016,2016 (Dose for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> exposure with Alert Set point 1.00 E+3R/hr conditions lasting 30 minutes or more)
OR 500 mrem/hour DDE (monitored for a 2 minute period) or 2500 mrem CDE Thyroid (Dose for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> exposure with conditions lasting 2 minutes or more)
- 2. Post-accident effluent radiation monitor confirms noble gas release rates corresponding to:
- a. 3.5 E+5 uCi/sec noble gas and the release is expected to last at least 30 minutes OR
- b. 3.5 E+6 uCi/sec noble gas and the (11 CONTINUED ON NEXT release is expected to last at least 2 PAGE) minutes EIP-2-001 RV-2 PG 4F3 RRV - 12 PAGE 14 OF 43 EIP-2-001
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level
- 11.
Continued Actual or potential radioisotope concentrations at the Site Boundary corresponding to 50 mrem/hour DDE (monitored for a 30 minute period), or 250 mrem CDE Thyroid (Dose for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> exposure with conditions lasting
- 30. minutes or more)
" "-OR 500 mrero/hour DDE (monitored for a 2 minute period) or 2500 mrem CDE Thyroid (Dose for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> exposure with conditions lasting 2 minutes or more)
(11 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 7 OF 10 Initiating Condition EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE35OF43 OR 3
Grab samples and laboratory analysis confirm release levels of:
- a. 450 uCi/sec 1-131 equivalent and the release is expected to last at least 30 minutes OR
- b. 4500 uCi/sec 1-131 equivalent and the release is expected to last at least 2 minutes OR
- 4. Radiation monitoring teams report radiation or iodine concentration readings at the site boundary corresponding to:
- a. Greater than 50 mreno/hour for a 30 minute period OR
- b. Greater than 500 mrem/hour for a 2 minute period OR
- c. 1.69E-8 uCi/cc 1-131 equivalent and the release is expected to last at least 30 minutes OR
- d. 1.8E-7 uCi/cc 1-131 equivalent and the release is expected to last at least 2 minutes EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 35 OF 43
SITE AREA EMERGENCY ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 8 OF 10 Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition I 1 Continued OR 5 Dose projections, calculated using adverse meteorology, indicate 50 mrem/hour TEDE or 250 mrem/hour CDE Thyroid at the Site Boundary with conditions lasting at least 30 minutes OR 500 mrem/hour TEDE or 2500 mrem/hour CDE Thyroid at the Site Boundary with conditions lasting at least 2 minutes EIP-2-0O1 REV-12 PAGE 36 0F43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 36 OF 43
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level
- 12. Security Threat Involving Imminent Loss of Physical Control of the Plant
- 13.
SevereNatural Event Near Site Being Experienced or Projected With Plant Not in Cold Shutdown ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 9 OF 10 Initiating Condition I1. Intrusion into a RBS plant vital area by a hostile force.
- 1. Receipt of annunciators "Seismic Event High-High" (P680-02A-B06)
AND "Seismic Tape Recording System Start" (P680-02A-D06)
AND Red light(s) on panel NBI-101 OR 2.
Flooding with water level greater than 98 feet MSL OR
- 3.
Sustained winds equal to or greater than 100 mph onsite
- 14. Other Hazards Being Experienced or Projected With Plant Not in Cold Shutdown
- 1. Aircraft crash causing damage or fire in containment, auxiliary, control, fuel, or diesel generator buildings OR
- 2.
Missile impact or explosion causes loss of functions needed for cold shutdown OR
- 3.
Uncontrolled entry of toxic or flammable gases into:
- a. Main Control Room AND
- b. Remote shutdown panel rooms ETP-2-OO1 RFV-12 PAGF37OF43 2
Other RBS security events that involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public as determined from the RBS Safeguards Contingency Plan and reported by the RBS security shift supervision.
Initiatine Condition RV.V = 12 PAGR 17 OF 43 RTP-2=fil
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 10 OF 10 Initiating Condition
- 15.
Evacuation of Main Control Room and As determined by the OSM(Recovery Control of Shutdown Systems Not Managei/Emergency Director)
Established at Remote Shutdown Panels in 15 Min.
- 16. Other Plant Conditions Exist that As determined by the OSM(Recovery Warrant Activation of Emergency Manager/Emergency Director)
Response Facilities and Monitoring Teams EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 38 OF 43
GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 1 OF 5 Initiatin2 Condition
- 1. Effluent Monitors Detect Levels Corresponding to I Rem Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) or 5 Rem Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) for a 1 Hour exposure at the Site Boundary Under Actual Meteorological Conditions
- 2.
Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers With a Potential Loss of Third Barrier
- 1. Dose rate calculation for noble gas and iodine release rates corresponding to I REM Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) or 5 Rem thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) in a I hour period OR
- 2.
Radiation monitoring teams report radiation readings of 1 R/hour or more at the Site Boundary OR
- 3.
Radiation monitoring teams report iodine concentration readings at the Site Boundary of 1.3E-6 uCi/cc 1-131 equivalent and the release is expected to last 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or longer
- 1. Containment post-accident radiation monitor greater than 1E4 R/hour 1RMS*RE16A,16B RM1I Channel No. 1016,2016 OR
( 2 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EIP-2-0O1 REV-12 PAGE39OF43 47 Emergency Action Level Initiatinja Condition REV - 12 PAGE 39 OF 43 EIP-2-001
ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 2 OF5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level
- 2. Continued Loss of 2 of 3 Fissi6n Product Barriers With a Potential Loss of Third Barrier Initiating Condition OR
- 3.
Loss of RCS pressure boundary and containment integrity with potential loss of fuel cladding as indicated by:
- a. LOCA with inability to isolate break AND
- b. Indication that all containment penetrations are not closed AND
- c. Reactor water level below top of active fuel (equal to or less than -162 inches) on the fuel zone level indicator and decreasing OR (2 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EIP-2-flO1 REV-12 PAGE400F43
- 2. Loss of fuel cladding and RCS pressure boundary with potential loss of containment as indicated by:
- a. Indication of fuel cladding failure by HIGH RCS activity greater than 300 uCi/gm 1-13 1, or water level below the top of active fuel (equal to or less than
-162 inches) on the fuel zone level indicator with indications of fuel damage AND
- b. LOCA with inability to isolate break AND
- c. HIGH drywell temperature (330 degrees F), or sustained containment pressure greater than 15 psig RIP-2-00!
RFRV - 12 PAQV, 40 OF 43
ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 3 OF 5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition
- 2.
Continued Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers With a Potential Loss of Third Barrier EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE41OF43
- 4.
Loss of containment integrity and fuel cladding with potential loss of RCS pressure boundary as indicated by:
- a. Indication that all containment penetrations are not closed AND
- b. Indication of fuel cladding failure by HIGH RCS activity greater than 300 uCi/gm 1-13 1, or water level below the top of active fuel (equal to or less than
-162 inches) on the fuel zone level indicator with indications of fuel damage AND
- 5.
Other indications of loss of two of the following with potential loss of the third:
- b. RCS pressure boundary
- c. Containment integrity EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 41 OF 43
ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 4 OF 5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the RBS Main Control Room.
- 3.
Loss of Physical Control of Facility
- 4.
Other Plant Conditions Exist That Make Release of Large Amounts of Radioactivity in a Short Time Possible a Transient (e.g., loss of offsite power)
"plis failure of requisite core shiifdown systems (e.g., scram) that could lead to core melt in several hours with containment failure likely. Transient more severe if reactor recirculation ATWS trip does not function.
b Small or large LOCA with failure of ECCS to perform leading to core melt degradation or melt in minutes to hours. Loss of containment integrity may be imminent.
c Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt within several hours without containment boundary.
d Shutdown occurs but requisite Decay Heat Removal Systems (e.g., RHR) or non-safety heat removal systems are rendered unavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur within about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with subsequent containment failure.
EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE42OF43
- 2.
All Onsite 125 VDC Power Lost AND Conditions are expected to remain in excess of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />
- 1. LOCA and water level below top of the active fuel, (-162 inches on Fuel Zone Monitor)
AND All onsite and offsite AC power lost AND All vital onsite 125 VDC power lost AND Suppression pool cooling has not been initiated following a 30 minute time lapse OR IFTP-2-001 RFV - 12 PAGE 42 OF 43
GENERAL EMERGENCY ATTACHMENT 5 FAGE 5 OF 5 Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition
- 5.
Any Major Internal or External Events As determined by the OSM (Recovery Which Could Cause Massive Common Manager/Emergency Director)
Damage to Plant Systems Resulting in Imminent Danger to the Public.
EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE43OF43 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 43 OF 43