Text

Submittal of Revisions to Emergency Implementing Procedures
	ML023510335
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	12/11/2002
From:	King R; Entergy Operations
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
	G9.20.6, G9.5, RBF1-02-0199, RBG-46049
	Download: ML023510335 (48)
	v • d • e

N Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station 5485 U S Highway 61 P 0 Box 220

~-En tergy St Francisville, LA 70775 Tel 225 336 6225 Fax 225 635 5068 Rick J. King Director Nuclear Safety Assurance December 11, 2002 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 License No. NFP-47 Submittal of Revisions to Emergency Implementing Procedures File No.: G9.5, G9.20.6 RBG-46049 RBF1-02-0199 Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant 10CFR50 Appendix E, Section V, enclosed is Emergency Implementing Procedure (EIP) 2-001 Revision 12, "Classification of Emergencies." In accordance with 10CFR50.54(q),

the changes to this procedure do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.

If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Barry Allen at (225)-378 3310.

Sincerely, RJK/dnl enclosure

-AO65

Submittal of Revision to the RBS Emergency Implementing Procedure December 11, 2002 RBG-46049 RBF1-02-0199 Page 2 of 2 cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2)

Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Senior Resident Inspector P. 0. Box 1050 St. Francisville, LA 70775

--T Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Benc Station 5485 U S Higtivay 61 P 0 Box 220 St Francisvil!e LA 70775 SEntergy Te' 225 336 6225 Fax 225 635 5068 Rick J King Oi,ec~cr Nuclear Safety Assurance December 11, 2002 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

River Bend Station - Unit I Docket No. 50-458 License No. NFP-47 Submittal of Revisions to Emergency Implementing Procedures File No.: G9.5, G9.20.6 RBG-46049 RBFI-02-0199 Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant I OCFR50 Appendix E,Section V, enclosed is Emergency Implementing Procedure (EIP) 2-001 Revision 12, "Classification of Emergencies." In accordance with 10CFR50.54(q),

the changes to this procedure do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.

If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Barry Allen at (225)-378 3310.

Sincerely, RJK/dnl enclosure

Submittal of Revision to the RBS Emergency Implementing Procedure December 11, 2002 RBG-46049 RBFI-02-0199 Page 2 of 2 cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2)

Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Senior Resident Inspector P. 0. Box 1050 St. Francisville, LA 70775

G12.23.2 VUp - =W ENTERGY RIVER BEND STATION STATION SUPPORT MANUAL

EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES PROCEDURE NUMBER: *EIP-2-001 REVISION NUMBER: *12 Effective Date:

NOV 21 200Z NOTE: SIGNATURES ARE ON FILE.

INDEXING INFORMATION RECEIVED REFERENCE USE DOCUgENT CONT ROL

TABLE OF CHANGES LETTER DESIGNATION DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TRACKING NUMBER EIP-2-001 REV- 12 PAGE 1 OF 43

TABLE OF CONTENTS SEC TION ........................................................................................................................ PA GE N O .

1 PURPOSE ........................................................ 3 2 REFERENCES ..................................................... 3 3 DEFINITIONS ..................................................... 3 4 RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................. 5 5 GENERAL ........................................................ 6 6 PROCEDURE ...................................................... 7 7 DOCUMENTATION ................................................. 8 ATTACHMiENT I - MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS ..................... 9 ATTACHMENT 2 - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ............................................. 15 ATTACHM ENT 3 - ALERT ..................................................................................................... 22 ATTACHMENT 4 - SITE AREA EMERGENCY ....................................................................... 29 ATTACHMENT 5 - GENERAL EMERGENCY .................................................................... 39 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 2 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV- 12 PAGE 2 0F43

I PURPOSE 1.1 This procedure provides guidelines for properly classifying emergencies.

2 REFERENCES 2.1 River Bend Station (RBS) Emergency Plan 2.2 - EIP-2-002, Classification Actions 2.3 EIP-2-018, Technical Support Center 2.4 NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines: 10CFR50.72 and 50.73 3 DEFINITIONS AFFECTING SAFE SHUTDOWN: An event in progress has adversely affected functions that are necessary to bring the plant to and maintain it in the applicable HOT or COLD SHUTDOWN condition. Plant condition applicability is determined by Technical Specification LCOs in effect.

ALERT: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fraction of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION - a classification that arranges accidents in order of increasing severity and initiates an effective course of action and protective measures to safeguard the public and plant personnel. The four emergency classifications, listed in order of increasing severity, are:

Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency GENERAL EMERGENCY: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 3 OF 43

degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

IMMINENT - Mitigation actions have been ineffective and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NOUE): Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occur.

POtENTIAL - Mitigation actions are not effective and trended information indicates that the parameters are outside desirable bands and not stable or improving.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of RBS personnel and the public.

Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

SITE BOUNDARY - For classification and dose projection purposes, the site boundary is the area defined as exclusion area or exclusion zone in 10CFR100.3(a) which is a boundary of approximately 3,000 feet from the RBS reactor.

SUSTAINED - Greater than or equal to 15 minutes in duration.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT

1. Any unplanned reactor trip from criticality.

2. Automatic turbine runback > 25% thermal power.

3. Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load.

4. Thermal power oscillations> 10%.

TRANSIENT

1. A planned reactor trip in which the expected post-trip response did not occur.

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 4 OF 43

2. Any event resulting in an automatic ESF actuation or any event requiring a manual initiation of these systems where automatic initiation would likely have occurred.

3. Any unplanned turbine-generator power change in excess of 100 MWe in less than one (1) minute other than a momentary spike due to grid disturbance or a manually initiated runback.

4. Any unplanned main turbine or main feedwater pump trip which results in a turbine-generator power change in excess of 100 MWe.

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

4 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1. Operations Shift Manager (OSM) - It is the responsibility of the OSM to:

4.1.1. Recognize and properly classify emergency conditions, and 4.1.2. Assume the responsibilities of the Recovery Manager (RM) and Emergency Director (ED) until relieved by the designated Emergency Director.

4.2 Control Room Supervisor (CRS) - It is the responsibility of the CRS to assume the responsibility of the OSM if the OSM becomes incapacitated.

4.3 Designated Emergency Director - The designated Emergency Director is responsible for: 1) assisting the OSM as requested, and 2) if the emergency is classified as an Alert or higher, relieve the OSM of the Recovery Manager/Emergency Director duties and responsibilities as soon as practical.

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 55 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV - 12 PAGE 0F43

5 GENERAL 5.1 Anytime Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) or Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) are initiated, this procedure should be reviewed to determine if an emergency action level has been reached.

5.2 This procedure, with Attachment 1 through Attachment 5, is a guideline for classifying emergencies. In a situation not covered by the Emergency Action Levels in Attachments I - 5, the OSM (Recovery Manager/Emergency Director) must use his best judgment in determining the appropriate emergency classification. Attachment 1 is a matrix that is useful in EAL

""- determination and classification. The Emergency Action Levels in Attachments 2 - 5 are consistent with the definitions and initiating conditions in the RBS Emergency Plan, (LC #03 101).

5.3 For Emergency Action Levels based on plant instrumentation, the indication shall be a valid indication. When all indications for a certain parameter have been lost, the Emergency Director should use his best judgment and other plant indications to classify the emergency (e.g., loss of level trend on all RPV level instrumentation).

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE EIP-2-OO1 REV 12- PAGE 66 OF OF 43 43

6 PROCEDURE 6.1 Anytime an event occurs which has the potential of causing or resulting in a hazard to personnel, onsite or offsite, the Emergency Director:

6.1.1. Should review Attachment 1 to determine the EAL and classification to use. Use Attachments 2 - 5 to actually determine if the condition should be classified as an emergency.

6.1.2. Shall classify the emergency and implement EIP-2 002, Classification Actions.

6.2 " The General Manager - Plant Operations or designated alternate shall:

6.2.1. Immediately upon being notified of a classified emergency, provide assistance to the OSM as requested.

6.2.2. If the emergency is classified as an Alert or higher, relieve the OSM as soon as practical, of the responsibilities of Recovery Manager and Emergency Director in accordance with EIP-2-018, Technical Support Center.

6.3 Declaration of an emergency class'.is not required if:

1. The event or condition which met an EAL threshold no longer exists at the time of discovery AND "

2. The event or condition was due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification.

6.3.2. Reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72 are applicable and the guidance of NUREG-1022 should be applied.

6.3.3. The State and local agencies should be notified in accordance with the arrangements made between the licensee and offsite organizations.

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 7 OF 43

6.4 When two or more Emergency Action Levels are determined, declaration will be made on the highest classification level for the plant.

7 DOCUMENTATION None EIP-2-001 REV - 12 EIP-.OO1REV 12 PAGE 8 OF 43

AII ACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 6 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY A. REACTOR Exceeding Primary coolant Inability to Loss of 2 of 3 COOLANT primary coolant leak rate greater maintain reactor fission product BOUNDARY system leak rate than 50 GPM with water level barriers with a DEGRADATION Technical reactor water (Known loss of potential loss of Specification temperature > 200 coolant accident third barrier (Tech. Spec. Degrees F greater than EAL 2 (Page 39) 3.4.5) EAL 2 (Page 22) makeup pump EAL 3 (Page 17) capacity)

EAL 1 (Page 29)

B. ABNORMAL Fuel damage Severe loss of fuel Degraded core Loss of 2 of 3 CORE indication clad with possible loss fission product CONDITION EAL 2 (Page 16) EAL I (Page 22) of coolable barriers with a AND FUEL geometry potential loss of DAMAGE EAL 2 (Page 29) third barrier EAL 2 (Page 39)

C. STUCK OPEN Failure of an Unisolable steam Steam line break Loss of 2 of 3 SAFETY SRV to close in line break inside outside fission product RELIEF VALVE operational containment containment barriers with a OR STEAM modes 1, 2 or 3 EAL 3 (Page 22) without isolation potential loss of LINE BREAK third barrier EAL 4 (Page 17) EAL 3 (Page 30)

EAL 2 (Page 39)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 9 OF 43

ATTACHMENT I PAGE 2 OF 6 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY D. LOSS OF Loss of 2 of 3 CONTAIZ4MENT fission product INTEGRITY barriers with a potential loss of third barrier EAL 2 (Page 39)

E. LOSS OF Loss of functions Loss of functions Other plant SHUTDOWN needed to maintain needed to bring the conditions exist FUNCTIONS, plant in cold reactor from hot that make DECAY HEAT shutdown (5200 shutdown to cold release of large RE1MLOYAL Degrees F) shutdown amounts of EAL 7 (Page 23) EAL 6 (Page 31) radioactivity in a short time possible EAL 4 (Page 42)

F. REACTOR Transient requiring Transient requiring PROTECTION operation of operation of SYSTE9M shutdown systems shutdown systems FAILURE with failure of the with failure of the automatic reactor automatic reactor protection systems protection systems to initiate and to initiate and complete a scram. complete a scram.

Manual Scram Manual Scram Methods are Methods are not successful. successful.

EAL 8 (Page 24) EAL 7 (Page 32)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE PAGE 10 10 OF0F43 43 EIP-2-001 REV-12

ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 3 0F6 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA 1 GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT I I EMERGENCY EMERGENCY G. ABNORMAL Radiological Unexpected high Actual or Effluent monitors RADIOLOGICAL effluent technical radiation levels or potential detect levels EFFLUENT OR requirements limit high airborne radioisotope corresponding to RADIATION exceeded (Tech. radioactivity, or concentrations at I Rem Deep LEVELS Reqs. TR 3.11.1 or contamination the Site Boundary Dose Equivalent TR 3.11.2) levels indicating corresponding to (DDE); or, 5 Rem severe 50 mrem/hour thyroid EAL I (Page 15) degradation in the DDE (monitored Committed Dose OR control of for a 30 minute Equivalent radioactive period), or 250 (CDE), for a I Significant loss of materials mrem CDE hour exposure at accident Thyroid (Dose the Site Boundary assessment EAL 4 (Page 23) for a I hour under actual capability or loss OR exposure with meteorological of effluent conditions lasting conditions monitoring Radiological 30 minutes or capability effluents greater EAL 1 (Page 39) more) requiring or than 10 times OR resulting in Technical OR shutdown (Tech. Requirements Other plant 500 trem/hour Spec. 3.3.3.1 & Instantaneous conditions exist DDE (monitored Tech. Reqs. limits (Tech. that make release for a 2 minute TR 3.3.11.2 or Reqs. TR 3.11.1 of large amounts period) or 2500 TR 3.3.11.3) or TR3.11.2) of radioactivity in nirem CDE a short time EAL 7 (Page 18) EAL 12 (Page Thyroid (Dose possible

26) for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months exposure with EAL 4 (Page 42) conditions lasting 2 minutes or more)

EAL 11 (Page 34)

H. FIRE Fire within the Fire potentially Fire Any major protected area affecting safety compromising internal or lasting more than systems (Pre-fire the function of a external events 10 minutes strategy may be safety system which could following used in this cause massive implementation of determination) EAL 9 (Page 34) common damage fire suppression EAL 10 (Page to plant systems measures 25) resulting in imminent danger EAL6 (Page 18) to the public EAL 5 (Page 43)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 11 OF 43 PAGEI1OF43 EIP-2-0O1 REV-12

AI iALtl- tILiN I I PAGE 4 OF 6 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY I. ELECTRIC OR Total loss of offsite Loss of offsite Loss of offsite Other plant POWER power or loss of power and loss of power and loss of conditions exist FAILURE onsite AC power all onsite AC all onsite AC that make capability power for less power for more release of large EAL 5 (Page 17) than 15 minutes than or equal to amounts of EAL5(Page 23) 15 minutes radioactivity in a EAL 4 (Page 331) short time OR EAL 4 (Page 31) possible Loss of all onsite OR EAL 4 (Page DC power for Loss of all vital 42) less than 15 onsite 125V DC minutes power for more EAL6(Page23) than 15 minutes EAL 5 (Page 31)

J. CONTROL Evacuation of Evacuation of Loss of physical ROOM main control main control control of EVACUATION room anticipated room and control facility or required with of shutdown control of systems not EAL 3 (Page shutdown at established at 42) remote shutdown remote shutdown panels panels in 15 EAL 16 (Page minutes 28)- EAL 15 (Page 38)

K.LOSS OF Significant loss of' Loss of most or Loss of most or MONITORS, main control room all annunciators all annunciators ALARMS, OR communications in main control in main control COMMUNICATIONS capability room for more room for more than 15 minutes. than 15 minutes.

EAt 8 (Page 19) (Transient has not (Plant transient OR occurred) initmted or in Significant loss of EAL 11 (Page progress while Signficat ofannunciators los are accident assessment 25) lost.)

of capability or loss effluent monitoring EAL 10 (Page capability requiring 34) or resulting in shutdown (Tech.

Spec. 3.3.3.1 or Tech. Reqs. TR 3.3.11.2 or TR 3.3.11.3)

EAL 7 (Page 18)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 12 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGEI2OF43

ATTACHMENT I PAGE 5 OF 6 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY L. FUEL Fuel handling Major damage to HANDLING accident with spent fuel in ACCIDENT release of containment or radioactivity to fuel building(e.g.,

containment or large object fuel building damages fuel or water loss below EAL 9 (Page 24) fuel level)

EAL 8 (Page 32)

M. HAZARDS TO Other hazards Other hazards Other hazards Other plant PLANT- being experienced being experienced being experienced conditions exist OPERATIONS or projected which or projected which or projected with that make release have the potential have a significant plant not in cold of large amounts for endangering potential for shutdown of radioactivity in the plant affecting plant EAL 14 (Page 37) a short time EAL 11 (Page 20) safety possible OR EAL 15 (Page 28) EAL 4 (Page 42)

OR Other plant conditions exist Any major that warrant internal or increased external events awareness on the which could cause part of the plant massive common operating staff or damage to plant State and/or Local systems resulting offsite authorities in imminent EAL 13 (Page 21) danger to the public EAL 5 (Page 43)

EIP-2-001 REIV- 12 PACE 13 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-Il PAGE 130F43

PAGE 6 OF 6 MATRIX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EVENT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL CATEGORY EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY N. NATURAL Unusual natural Severe natural Severe natural Any major internal EVENTS events near site phenomenon event near site or external events EAL 10 (Page 20) experienced being experienced which could cause beyond or projected with massive common Notification of plant not in cold damage to plant Unusual Event shutdown systems resulting in levels EAL 13 (Page 37) imminent danger to the public EAL 14 (Page 27)

EAL 5 (Page 43)

0. SECURITY Security threat Ongoing security Security threat Loss of physical compromise 27) involving control of facility THREATS "EAL"99 (Page EAL 19)

(PageA19) 13 (Page imminent loss of EAL 3 (Page 42)

EAL 1 physical control of the plant.

EAL 12 (Page 37)

P. OTHERS Inability to Other plant Other plant Other plant change operating conditions that conditions exist conditions exist that Modes when warrant that warrant make release of large required by precautionary activation of amounts of Technical activation of emergency radioactivity in a Specifications emergency response facilities short time possible EAL 12 (Page 21) response facilities and monitoring EAL 4 (Page 42)

EAL 17 (Page 28) teams EAL 16 (Page 38) ________

Q. MULTIPLE Loss of 2 of 3 fission FISSION product barriers with PRODUCT a potential loss of BARRIER third barrier FAILURE EAL 2 (Page 39)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 14 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGEJ4OF43

Al PAGE I OFI Z7 kAt:1t+/-r1Mr, NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

1. Radiological Effluent Technical 1. HIGH alarm on any of the following Requirements Limit Exceeded (Tech. three Radiation release paths:

Reqs. TR 3.11.1 or TR 3.11.2)

a. Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust High Alarm Monitor No. IRMS-RE6A/6B Set point RMI I Channel No. 1006 8.64E-5 uCi/cc RM11 Channel No. 4006 8.51E+2 uCi/sec "RM11 Channel No. 5006 2.01E-5 uCi/cc "b. Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust High Alarm Monitor No. 1RMS*RE5A/5B Set point RM1 1 Channel No. 1005 5.88E-4 uCi/cc RM11 Channel No. 4005 1.64E+3 uCi/sec RM1 1 Channel No. 5005 5.29E-4 uCi/cc

c. Main Plant Exhaust High Alarm Monitor No. 1RMS*RE125/126 Set point RMI 1 Channel No. 1125 6.64E-4 uCi/cc RM11 Channel No. 4125 1.63E+4 uCil/sec RM1P 1 Channel No. 1126 2.44E-4 uCi/cc AND Summation of grab samples indicate that Technical Requirement limits have been exceeded OR (1 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

EIP-2-001 REV- 12 PAGE 15 OF 43

AlI TACHMENT 2 PAGE 20F7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency A(ction Level Initiating Condition 2 OF 72 1 TACH31ENT PAGE A

1. Continued 2. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor HIGH Alarm Radiological Effluent Technical Requirements Limit Exceeded (Tech. Monitor No. 1RMS-RE 107 Reqs. TR 3.11.1 or TR 3.11.2) RM11 Channel No. 1107 AND Isolation valve (1LWS-AOV257) fails to close (Upon valid signal)

OR

3. Cooling Tower Blowdown Effluent Monitor HIGH Alarm Monitor No. IRMS-RE108 RM11 Channel No. 1108 AND Confirmed by grab sample

2. Fuel Damage Indication 1. Offgas pretreatment radiation monitor indicates an increase of 1100 mR/hr in 30 minutes (Monitor D17-R604 on 1H13*P600)

OR

2. Offgas pretreatment radiation monitor reading greater than 5000 mR/hr OR

3. Laboratory analysis of coolant sample indicates greater than or equal to 4 uCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131 EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 16 OF 43 PAGE16OF43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12

AI IACHiXlh 1 2 PAGE 3 OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition Item 1-3 Modes 1, 2, & 3

3. Exceeding Primary Coolant System 1. Any verified pressure boundary LEAKAGE Leak Rate Technical Specification (Tech. Spec. 3.4.5)

OR

2. 5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE OR 3.2430gpm total LEAKAGE (averaged over any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period)

OR Mode 1 Only

4. 2 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE increase within any period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or less

4. Failure of an SRV to Close in Relief valve open as indicated by SRV Operational Modes 1, 2, or 3 solenoid indicating lights, acoustic monitors, main steam line flows, or additional verification AND

- All attempts have been made to close the valve (AOP-0035)

5. Total Loss of Offsite Power or Loss of 1. Loss of power to 1RTX-XSRIE, IRTX Onsite AC Power Capability XSRIF, IRTX-XSRIC, and IRTX-XSRlD preferred station transformers OR

2. Loss of Division I and II diesel generators functional capabilities EIFP-2-001l REV - 12 PAGE 17 OF 43 FIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE17OF43

ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 4 OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

6. Fire Within the Protected Area Lasting 1. Fire exists within the Protected Area (not More Than 10 Minutes Following affecting safety systems) for more than 10 Implementation of Fire Suppression minutes following implementation of fire Measures suppression measures AND Reported by plant personnel or fire brigade leader to the Main Control Room OR

2. Fire exists within the Protected Area (not affecting safety systems) for more than 10 minutes following implementation of fire suppression measures AND Valid fire detection device alarm within the Protected Area

7. Significant Loss of Accident 1. Radiation monitoring instrumentation less Assessment Capability or Loss of than minimum channels operable requirement Effluent Monitoring Capability of Technical Requirements resulting in Requiring or Resulting in Shutdown shutdown (TR 3.3.11.2 or TR 3.3.11.3) and (Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.1 & Tech. Reqs. TR respective LCO actioni statement(s) time(s) 3.3.11.2 or TR 3.3.11.3) have been exceeded OR

2. Accident monitoring instrumentation less than minimum channels operable requirement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 requiring plant shutdown and respective LCO action statement(s) time(s) have been exceeded FIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE 1818 OF 0F4343

Al I ACH.MENdT 2 PAGE 5OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level Initiatin2 Condition Initatin CniACHion

8. Significant Loss of Main Control 1. Loss of 3 of the following:

Room Communications Capability

a. Bell lines into the Control Room

b. NRC FTS lines to the Control Room

c. ESP Computer Notification System

d. Emergency Preparedness Radio OR

2. Loss of

a. Plant telephone system AND

b. Gaitronics system 9 Security Threat 1. A definite or perceived site specific threat or possibility of sabotage. Intensive communications and/or threat assessments are taking place.

AND Threat assessment indicates the site specific threat is credible (valid) as determined by the Security Shift Supervisor.

OR

2. 'A serious and/or obvious site specific threat event indicated by any of the following:

a. Adversaries are observed.

b. There is an obvious danger to life.

c.' There warrantsis a major security contingency that an intensive security effort.

EIP-2-001 REV -12 PAGE 19 OF 43

ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 6 OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level Initiatine Condition

10. Unusual Natural Events Near Site 1. Receipt of annunciators "Seismic Event High" (P680-02A-C06)

AND "Seismic Tape Recording System Start" (P680-02A-D06)

OR

2. Flood with water level greater than 96 feet MSL and increasing OR

3. A tornado is observed to cross the site boundary OR

4. Sustained onsite winds measured at 74-89 m.Aphiearcatcaho uuularrf

11. Other Hazards Being Experienced or 1. An onsite aircraft crash or unusual aircraft Projected Which Have the Potential For activity over station Endangering the Plant. Hazard observed or notification is received by the Main Control Room:

OR

-2. An onsite train derailment OR

3. An onsite or near-site explosion OR

4. An onsite or near-site flammable or toxic gas release that threatens versonnel OR

5. A turbine rotating component failure causing rapid plant shutdown OR

6. As determined by the OSM (Recovery Manager/Emergency Director)

EIP-2-001 REV- 12 PAGE 20 OF 43

ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 7 OF 7 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

12. Inability to Change Operating Modes Any time the plant cannot be brought to the When Required by Technical required operating MODE within the Specifications allowable action statement time.

13. Other Plant Conditions Exist That Observation of event or report received by Warrant Increased Awareness on the Part the OSM (Recovery Manager/Emergency of the Plant Operating Staff or State Director) and/or Local Offsite Authorities EIP-2-001 REV- 12 PAGE 21 OF 43

A F4 ACHlEN 1[3 PAGE 1 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

1. Severe Loss of Fuel Clad 1. Offgas pre-treatment radiation monitor reading greater than 50,000 mR/hr OR

2. Very high coolant activity as determined by sample analysis of 300 uCi/gm equivalent I 131 OR

3. Main steam line radiation monitor exceeds isolation alarm set point

2. Primary Coolant Leak Rate Greater Total drywell LEAKAGE greater than 50 Than 50 gpm With Reactor Water gpm Temperature > 200 Degrees F

3. Unisolable Steam Line Break Inside Abnormally low reactor pressure vessel Containment pressure indication after MSIV closure AND Average drywell temperature greater than 145 Degrees F AND High drywell to containment differential pressure greater than 1.68 psid EIP-2-001 REV- 12 PAGE 22 OF43

At IALkHME4 N1 J PAGE 2 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

4. Unexpected High Radiation Levels or 1. Alarm of area radiation monitors and High Airborne Radioactivity, or confirmation of readings greater than 1,000 Contamination Levels Indicating Severe times normal level Degradation in the Control of Radioactive Materials OR

2. Alarm of DRMS (Digital Radiation Monitoring System) airborne ventilation monitors and confirmation of readings Sgreater than 1,000 times normal levels

5. Loss of Offsite Power and Loss of All Loss of power to IRTX-XSR1E, 1RTX Onsite AC Power For Less Than 15 XSR1F, 1RTX-XSR1C, and 1RTX-XSR1D Minutes preferred station transformers AND Loss of Division I and II diesel generators functional capabilities

6. Loss of All Onsite 125V DC Power For Less than 105 VDC on IENB*SWGOIA Less Than 15 Minutes and IENB*SWGO1B distribution buses Mode 4

7. Loss of Functions Needed to Maintain Loss of all shutdown and alternate shut Plant in Cold Shutdown (< 200 Degrees down cooling modes of RHR loops A and B F) and other alternate shutdown cooling modes (Refer to Tech. Specs. 3.4.9, 3.4.10, 3.9.8 or 3.9.9)

EIP-2-001 REV- 12 PAGE 23 OF 43

A IfACHNMEN f 3 PAGE 3 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

8. Transient requiring operation of Indication that more than one control rod I

shutdown systems with failure of the has not been fully inserted following a valid automatic reactor protection systems to scram signal initiate and complete a scram. Manual Scram Methods are successful. AND Manual SCRAM methods are successful in inserting all control rods

9. Fuel Handling Accident With Release of 1. Observation of a fuel handling accident in Radioac~tivity to Containment or Fuel the upper fuel pool area or fuel building Building AND HIGH radiation alarm in the upper fuel pool area or fuel building Containment Monitor Nos. IRMS-RE 140 and/or 141 High Set point RM1 1 Channel No. 1140 8.20 E+1 mR/hr RM11 Channel No. 1141 8.20 E+1 mR/hr Fuel Building Monitor Nos. 1RMS-RE 192 and/or 193 High Set point RMI1 Channel No. 1192 8.20 E+l mR/hr RM1 I Channel No. 1193 1.23 E+1 mR/hr OR

2. Fuel Building Airborne Effluent Monitor No. 1RMS*RE5A (MID RANGE) (LC

09535) in Alert Alert Set point RM-1I1 Channel No. 2005 3.38 E-3 uCi/ml EIP-2-001 REV- 12 PAGE 24 OF43

ATTACHMENT PAGE 4 OF73 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

10. Fire Potentially Affecting Safety A fire potentially affecting safety systems Systems (Pre-Fire Strategy May be Used in This Determination)

11. Loss of Most or All Annunciators in As determined from direct observation and Main Control Room For More Than 15 the OSM(Recovery Manager/ Emergency Minutes Director) determines loss is significant; plant is not shutdown AND Transient has not occurred EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 25 OF 43

ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 5 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

12. Radiological Effluents Greater Than 10 1. Alarm on any of the following three Times Technical Requirements radiation release paths:

Instantaneous Limits (Tech. Reqs. TR 3.11.1 or TR 3.11.2) a. Radwaste building ventilation exhaust Mid-range Monitor High Alarm Set point No. 1RMS-RE6A 5.70 E-4 uCi/cc RM 11 Channel No. 2006

b. Fuel building ventilation exhaust Mid-Range Monitor Alert Alarm Set point No. 1RMS*RE5A 3.38 E-3 uCi/cc RM1 1 Channel No. 2005

c. Main plant exhaust Mid-Range Monitor Alert Alarm Set point No. 1RMS*RE125 4.38 E-3 uCi/cc RMI 1 Channel No. 2125 OR

2. Liquid radwaste effluent monitor (IRMS REI07, RM11 channel no. 1107) High alarm (liquid effluent determined to be greater than 10 times the Technical Requirement limit as verified by grab sample)

AND Isolation valve (1LWS-AOV257) fails to close OR

3. Cooling tower blowdown monitor (IRMS RE108, RM11 Channel No. 1108) HIGH alarm, (Blowdown water activity is determined to be greater than 10 times the Technical Requirement limit as verified by grab sample)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 26 OF 43 PAGE26OF43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12

ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 6 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

13. Ongoing Security Compromise RBS Safeguard contingency event that results in adversaries inside the protected area, but not in control over shutdown capability or vital islands.

14. Severe Natural Phenomena Experienced 1. Receipt of annunciators "Seismic Event Beyond Notification of Unusual Event High-High" (P680-02A-B06)

Levels AND "Seismic Tape Recording System Start"

"(P680-02A-D06)

AND Amber light(s) on panel NBI-101 OR

2. Flooding with water level greater than 97 feet MSL and increasing I OR

3. A tornado strikes the facility that does not result in another Alert level initiating condition OR 4, Sustained onsite winds measured at 90-99 mph EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 27 OF 43

ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 7 OF 7 ALERT Emergency Action Level hnitiating, Condition EmerRency Action Level Initiating Condition

15. Other Hazards Being Experienced or 1. Aircraft impact on the reactor, diesel Projected Which Have a Significant generator, control, fuel, or auxiliary building Potential For Affecting Plant Safety OR

2. Missile impact on facility with resulting damage OR

3. Known explosion at facility resulting in major damage to plaht structures or equipment as determined by the OSM(Recovery Manager/ Emergency Director)

OR Uncontrolled entry of toxic or flammable

4. gases into facility area OR I5. Main turbine failure causing casing penetration (Missile generation)

16. Evacuation of Main Control Room As determined by the OSM(Recovery Anticipated or Required with Control of Manager/Emergency Director)

Shutdown at Remote Shutdown Panels

17. Other Plant Conditions That Warrant As determined by the OSM (Recovery Precautionary Activation of Emergency Manager/Emergency Director)

Response Facilities EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 28 OF 43

ATTACHMvE.NT 4 PAGE 1 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition EN Emer~~~~~~enTT odto AcinLvl4ita CH

1. Inability to Maintain Reactor Water Low reactor water level indication less than Level (Known Loss of Coolant Accident Level 1 (-143 inches) (or cannot be Greater Than Makeup Pump Capacity) determined)

AND HIGH drywell to containment differential pressure greater than 1.68 psid AND Inability to restore reactor water level above Level 1 (-143 inches)

2. Degraded Core With Possible Loss of Reactor water level at or below top of active Coolable Geometry fuel (equal to or less than -162 inches) as indicated by reading on fuel zone level indicator AND Very high coolant activity as determined by sample analysis (greater than or equal to 300 uCi/gm equivalent of 1-131)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 29 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE29OF43

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 2 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiatini Condition

3. Steam Line Break Outside Containment 1. Flow indicated in an individual main steam Without Isolation line. Failure of steam line to isolate AND HIGH main steam line tunnel ambient temperature alarm AND HIGH main steam line tunnel differential temperature alarm OR

2. Flow indicated in an individual main steam line. Failure of steam line to isolate AND HIGH turbine building area temperature alarms OR

3. RCIC steam line failure to isolate AND Any of the following temperature alarms:

a. HIGH main steam line tunnel ambient temperature

b. HIGH RCIC area ambient temperature alarm

c. HIGH main steam line tunnel

- differential temperature alarm

d. HIGH RCIC equipment area differential temperature alarm EIP-2-001 RRV - 12 PACE -In01F43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE300F43

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 3 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

4. Loss of Offsite Power and Loss of All Loss of power to IRTX-XSRIE, IRTX Onsite AC Power For More Than or XSRIF, lRTX-XSRlC and lRTX-XSRlD Equal to 15 Minutes preferred station transformers AND Loss of Division I and II diesel generators functional capabilities

5. Loss of All Vital Onsite 125V DC Less than 105 VDC on IENB*SWGO1A Power For More Than 15 Minutes and IENB*SWG1B distribution buses for more than 15 minutes Item 1 - 2 Mode 3

6. Loss of Functions Needed to Bring the 1. Inability to depressurize the reactor Reactor From Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown OR

2. Main condenser not available as heat sink AND Loss of all shutdown and alternate shutdown cooling modes of RHR Loops A and B and other alternate shutdown cooling modes AND Loss of RCIC function to remove heat from the RPV.

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 31 OF 43

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 4 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

7. Transient requiring operation of Indication that more than one control rod has shutdown systems with failure of the not been fully inserted following a valid automatic reactor protection systems to scram signal initiate and complete a scram. Manual AND Scram Methods are not successful. Manual Scram methods have failed

8. Major Damage to Spent Fuel in 1. Observation of event causing major Containment or Fuel Building (e.g., structural damage to spent fuel assembly in Large Object Damages Fuel or Water the upper fuel pool areas or fuel building Loss Below Fuel Level) AND HIGH radiation alarm in the upper fuel pool area or fuel building Containment Monitor Nos. IRMS-RE 140 and/or 141 High Set point RM11 Channel No. 1140 8.20 E+1 mR/hr RM11 Channel No. 1141 8.20 E+1 mR/hr Fuel Bldg. Monitor Nos. IRMS-RE 192 and/or 193 High Set point RM11 Channel No. 1192 8.20 E+l mR/hr RM11 Channel No. 1193 1.23 E+l mR/hr Fuel Bldg. Effluent Monitor No.

1RMS*RE5A (LC #09535)

High Set point RMI 1 Channel No. 2005 8.9 E-2 uCi/ml (8 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 32 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE32OF43

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 5 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level InitiatinR Condition

8. Continued 2. LOW water level in spent fuel pool or upper fuel storage pool below normal, and unable Major Damage to Spent Fuel in to restore normal level Containment or Fuel Building (e.g., AND Large Object Damages Fuel or Water HIGH radiation alarm in upper fuel pool area Loss Below Fuel Level) or fuel building Containment Monitor Nos. 1RMS-RE140 and/or 141 High Set point RMI1 Channel No. 1140 8.20 E+1 mR/hr RM11 Channel No. 1141 8.20 E+1 mR/hr Fuel Bldg. Monitor Nos. IRMS-RE192 and/or 193 High Set point RM1I Channel No. 1192

8.20 E+1 mR/hr RM11 Channel No. 1193 1.23 E+1 mR/hr AND HIGH alarm on fuel building ventilation or main plant exhaust radiation monitor Fuel Building Monitor No. 1RMS*RE5A RMI I Channel No. 2005 High Alarm Set point 8.90 E-2 uCi/ce Main Plant Exhaust Monitor No. 1RMS*RE125 RMlI Channel No. 2125 High Alarm Set point 1.37 E-2 uCi/cc EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 33 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE33OF43

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 6 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

9. Fire Compromising the Function of a Any fire within the Protected Area that Safety System defeats the capability of all operable trains of a safety system (loss of function).

10. Loss of Most or All Annunciators in As determined from direct observation and Main Control Room For More Than 15 the OSM(Recovery Manager/Emergency Minutes Director) determines loss is significant; plant is not shutdown AND "Planttransient initiated or in-progriss while annunciators are lost

11. Actual or potential radioisotope 1. Containment post-accident radiation monitors concentrations at the Site Boundary in ALERT alarm corresponding to 50 mreni/hour DDE (monitored for a 30 minute 1RMS*RE16A/B period), or 250 mrem CDE Thyroid RMI I Channel No. 1016,2016 (Dose for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months exposure with Alert Set point 1.00 E+3R/hr conditions lasting 30 minutes or more)

OR 500 mrem/hour DDE (monitored for a 2 minute period) or 2500 mrem CDE Thyroid (Dose for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months exposure with conditions lasting 2 minutes or more)

OR

2. Post-accident effluent radiation monitor confirms noble gas release rates corresponding to:

a. 3.5 E+5 uCi/sec noble gas and the release is expected to last at least 30 minutes OR

b. 3.5 E+6 uCi/sec noble gas and the (11 CONTINUED ON NEXT release is expected to last at least 2 PAGE) minutes EIP-2-001 RRV - 12 PAGE 144F3 OF 43 EIP-2-001 RV-2 PG

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 7 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition OR

11. Continued 3 Grab samples and laboratory analysis confirm release levels of:

Actual or potential radioisotope concentrations at the Site Boundary a. 450 uCi/sec 1-131 equivalent and the corresponding to 50 mrem/hour DDE release is expected to last at least (monitored for a 30 minute period), or 30 minutes 250 mrem CDE Thyroid (Dose for a 1 OR hour exposure with conditions lasting b. 4500 uCi/sec 1-131 equivalent and the

30. minutes or more) release is expected to last at least

" "-OR 2 minutes 500 mrero/hour DDE (monitored for a 2 minute period) or 2500 mrem CDE Thyroid (Dose for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months exposure with conditions lasting 2 minutes or more)

OR

4. Radiation monitoring teams report radiation or iodine concentration readings at the site boundary corresponding to:

a. Greater than 50 mreno/hour for a 30 minute period OR

b. Greater than 500 mrem/hour for a 2 minute period OR

c. 1.69E-8 uCi/cc 1-131 equivalent and the release is expected to last at least 30 minutes OR

d. 1.8E-7 uCi/cc 1-131 equivalent and the release is expected to last at least 2 minutes (11 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 35 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE35OF43

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 8 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition I1 Continued OR 5 Dose projections, calculated using adverse meteorology, indicate 50 mrem/hour TEDE or 250 mrem/hour CDE Thyroid at the Site Boundary with conditions lasting at least 30 minutes OR 500 mrem/hour TEDE or 2500 mrem/hour CDE Thyroid at the Site Boundary with conditions lasting at least 2 minutes EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE PAGE 36 36 OF 0F43 43 EIP-2-0O1 REV-12

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 9 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition Initiatine Condition

12. Security Threat Involving Imminent I1. Intrusion into a RBS plant vital area by a Loss of Physical Control of the Plant hostile force.

OR 2 Other RBS security events that involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public as determined from the RBS Safeguards Contingency Plan and reported by the RBS security shift supervision.

13. SevereNatural Event Near Site Being 1. Receipt of annunciators "Seismic Event Experienced or Projected With Plant Not High-High" (P680-02A-B06) in Cold Shutdown AND "Seismic Tape Recording System Start" (P680-02A-D06)

AND Red light(s) on panel NBI-101 OR Flooding with water level greater than 98

2. feet MSL OR

3. Sustained winds equal to or greater than

. 100 mph onsite

14. Other Hazards Being Experienced or 1. Aircraft crash causing damage or fire in Projected With Plant Not in Cold containment, auxiliary, control, fuel, or Shutdown diesel generator buildings OR

2. Missile impact or explosion causes loss of functions needed for cold shutdown OR

3. Uncontrolled entry of toxic or flammable gases into:

a. Main Control Room AND

b. Remote shutdown panel rooms RTP-2=fil RV.V =12 PAGR 17 OF 43 ETP-2-OO1 RFV-12 PAGF37OF43

ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 10 OF 10 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

15. Evacuation of Main Control Room and As determined by the OSM(Recovery Control of Shutdown Systems Not Managei/Emergency Director)

Established at Remote Shutdown Panels in 15 Min.

16. Other Plant Conditions Exist that As determined by the OSM(Recovery Warrant Activation of Emergency Manager/Emergency Director)

Response Facilities and Monitoring Teams EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 38 OF 43

ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 1 OF 5 GENERAL EMERGENCY 47 Emergency Action Level Initiatin2 Condition Condition Emergency Action Level Initiatinja

1. Effluent Monitors Detect Levels 1. Dose rate calculation for noble gas and Corresponding to I Rem Deep Dose iodine release rates corresponding to I REM Equivalent (DDE) or 5 Rem Thyroid Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) or 5 Rem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) for a thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) 1 Hour exposure at the Site Boundary in a I hour period Under Actual Meteorological Conditions OR

2. Radiation monitoring teams report radiation readings of 1 R/hour or more at the Site Boundary OR

3. Radiation monitoring teams report iodine concentration readings at the Site Boundary of 1.3E-6 uCi/cc 1-131 equivalent and the release is expected to last 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or longer

2. Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers 1. Containment post-accident radiation monitor With a Potential Loss of Third Barrier greater than 1E4 R/hour 1RMS*RE16A,16B RM1I Channel No. 1016,2016 OR

( 2 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 39 OF 43 EIP-2-0O1 REV-12 PAGE39OF43

ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 2 OF5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

2. Continued 2. Loss of fuel cladding and RCS pressure boundary with potential loss of containment Loss of 2 of 3 Fissi6n Product Barriers as indicated by:

With a Potential Loss of Third Barrier

a. Indication of fuel cladding failure by HIGH RCS activity greater than 300 uCi/gm 1-13 1,or water level below the top of active fuel (equal to or less than

-162 inches) on the fuel zone level indicator with indications of fuel damage AND

b. LOCA with inability to isolate break AND

c. HIGH drywell temperature (330 degrees F), or sustained containment pressure greater than 15 psig OR

3. Loss of RCS pressure boundary and containment integrity with potential loss of fuel cladding as indicated by:

a. LOCA with inability to isolate break AND

b. Indication that all containment penetrations are not closed AND

c. Reactor water level below top of active fuel (equal to or less than -162 inches) on the fuel zone level indicator and decreasing OR (2 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

RIP-2-00! RFRV - 12 PAQV, 40 OF 43 EIP-2-flO1 REV-12 PAGE400F43

ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 3 OF 5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

2. Continued 4. Loss of containment integrity and fuel cladding with potential loss of RCS pressure Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers boundary as indicated by:

With a Potential Loss of Third Barrier

a. Indication that all containment penetrations are not closed AND

b. Indication of fuel cladding failure by HIGH RCS activity greater than 300 uCi/gm 1-13 1, or water level below the top of active fuel (equal to or less than

-162 inches) on the fuel zone level indicator with indications of fuel damage AND

c. High RCS pressure greater than 1100 psig OR

5. Other indications of loss of two of the following with potential loss of the third:

a. Fuel cladding

b. RCS pressure boundary

c. Containment integrity EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 41 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV- 12 PAGE41OF43

ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 4 OF 5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

3. Loss of Physical Control of Facility Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the RBS Main Control Room.

4. Other Plant Conditions Exist That Make 1. LOCA and water level below top of the Release of Large Amounts of active fuel, (-162 inches on Fuel Zone Radioactivity in a Short Time Possible Monitor)

AND a Transient (e.g., loss of offsite power) All onsite and offsite AC power lost "plisfailure of requisite core shiifdown systems (e.g., scram) that AND could lead to core melt in several All vital onsite 125 VDC power lost hours with containment failure AND likely. Transient more severe if Suppression pool cooling has not been reactor recirculation ATWS trip initiated following a 30 minute time lapse does not function.

OR b Small or large LOCA with failure of 2. All Onsite 125 VDC Power Lost ECCS to perform leading to core melt degradation or melt in minutes AND to hours. Loss of containment integrity may be imminent. Conditions are expected to remain in excess of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months c Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt within several hours without containment boundary.

d Shutdown occurs but requisite Decay Heat Removal Systems (e.g., RHR) or non-safety heat removal systems are rendered unavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur within about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months with subsequent containment failure.

IFTP-2-001 RFV - 12 PAGE 42 OF 43 PAGE42OF43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12

ATTACHMENT 5 FAGE 5 OF 5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition

5. Any Major Internal or External Events As determined by the OSM (Recovery Which Could Cause Massive Common Manager/Emergency Director)

Damage to Plant Systems Resulting in Imminent Danger to the Public.

EIP-2-001 REV - 12 PAGE 43 OF 43 EIP-2-OO1 REV-12 PAGE43OF43

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