NRC-2009-0485, 2009/11/06-Intervenor-Exhibit 16-U.S. NRC, Draft Policy Statement on Safety Culture, 74Federal Register 57525, 57528
| ML102160762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2009 |
| From: | Mahowald P R Rulemaking, Directives, and Editing Branch, Prairie Island Community Council |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML102160759 | List:
|
| References | |
| 50-282-LR, 50-306-LR, ASLBP 08-871-01-LR-BD01, NRC-2009-0485, RAS 18361 | |
| Download: ML102160762 (5) | |
Text
57525 Federal Register/Vol. 74, No. 214/Friday, November 6, 2009/Notices 1 Throughout this document, the phrase licensee and certificate holders includes licensees, certificate holders, permit holders, authorization holders, holders of quality assurance program
approvals and applicants for a license, certificate, permit, authorization, or quality assurance program approval.
2 Throughout this document, the terms safety or nuclear safety, security or nuclear security, and safety culture are used. These terms refer to matters that are related to NRC-
regulated activities, including radiation protection, safeguards, material control and accounting, physical protection, and emergency preparedness. . Closed10:30 a.m.-12 p.m. Management topics and status of data; analysis; Open1 p.m.-2:30 p.m. Tour and facilities maintenance; Closed2:30 p.m.-6:30 p.m. Cybersecurity, EPO, LSC status and Executive Session.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009 Closed8:30 a.m.-12 p.m. Project overview and Project Management status; Closed1:30 p.m.-6 p.m. Technical Progress, Development, R&D support.
Executive Session
Thursday, December 3, 2009 Closed8:30 a.m.-12 p.m. Executive Session, report writing, Close Out report.
Reason for Closing:
The proposal contains proprietary or confidential material including
technical information; financial data, such as
salaries; and personal information
concerning individuals associated with the
proposals. These matters are exempt under 5
U.S.C. 552b(c) and (6) of the Government in
the Sunshine Act.
Dated: November 3, 2009.
Susanne Bolton, Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. E9-26784 Filed 11-5-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2009-0485]
Draft Safety Culture Policy Statement:
Request for Public Comments AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
ACTION: Issuance of draft safety culture policy statement and notice of
opportunity for public comment.
DATES: Comments are requested 90 days from the date of this Federal Register Notice. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is able to assure
consideration only for comments
received on or before this date. Please
refer to the SUPPLEMENTARYINFORMATION section for additional information
including questions for which the NRC is requesting comment.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Please include Docket ID NRC-2009-0485 in the subject line of your comments. Comments submitted in
writing or in electronic form will be
posted on the NRC Web site and on the
Federal rulemaking website
Regulations.gov. Because your
comments will not be edited to remove
any identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against including
any information in your submission that you do not want to be publicly disclosed.
The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments
received from other persons for
submission to the NRC inform those
persons that the NRC will not edit their
comments to remove any identifying or
contact information, and therefore, they
should not include any information in
their comments that they do not want
publicly disclosed.
Federal Rulemaking Web site:
Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for documents filed under Docket ID
NRC-2009-0485. Address questions
about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher
301-492-3668; e-mail Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. Mail comments to:
Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking and Directives
Branch (RDB), Division of
Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, Mail Stop: TWB
B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by fax to RDB at (301) 492-
3446. FORFURTHERINFORMATIONCONTACT
- Alexander Sapountzis, Office of
Enforcement, Mail Stop O-4 A15A, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Alexander.Sapountzis@nrc.gov.
SUMMARY
- The NRC is issuing a draft policy statement that sets forth the
Commissions expectation that all
licensees and certificate holders 1 establish and maintain a positive safety
culture that protects public health and
safety and the common defense and security when carrying out licensed activities. The Commission defines
safety culture as that assembly of
characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors
in organizations and individuals which
establishes that as an overriding
priority, nuclear safety and security
issues 2 receive the attention warranted by their significance. The Commission
also considers nuclear safety and security issues to be equally important in a positive safety culture. The
importance of treating safety and
security in an equal manner within NRCs regulatory framework is clearly evident in our mission and strategic
goals. Experience has shown that certain
organizational characteristics and
personnel attitudes and behaviors are
present in a positive safety culture.
These include, but are not limited to, individuals demonstrating ownership
and personal responsibility for
maintaining safety and security in their
day-to-day work activities; the
implementation of processes for
planning and controlling work activities
such that safety and security are
maintained; a work environment in
which personnel feel free to raise safety
and security concerns without fear of
retaliation; prompt and thorough
identification, evaluation, and
resolution of nuclear safety and security
issues commensurate with their
significance; the availability of the
resources needed to ensure that safety
and security are maintained; decision-
making processes that protect safety and
security; clearly defined roles and
responsibilities for maintaining safety
and security; and the seeking out and
implementation of opportunities to
improve safety and security. The NRC
expects its licensees and certificate
holders to foster these characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors in their
organizations and among individuals
who are overseeing or performing
regulated activities commensurate with
the safety and security significance of
their activities and the nature and
complexity of their organization and
functions.
The NRC is requesting comments on the draft safety culture policy statement and associated questions. SUPPLEMENTARYINFORMATION
- (1) Background The Commission has long expressed its expectations for safety culture in
previous policy statements. In 1989, the
Commission published its Policy
Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant Operations (54 FR 3424; January 24, 1989) to make clear the
Commissions expectations of utility
management and licensed operators
with respect to the conduct of
operations. The policy statement stated, the phrase safety culture refers to a
very general matter, the personal
dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in any activity which has a bearing on the safety of
nuclear power plants. The policy
statement further stated that the
Commission issued the policy statement
to help foster the development and
maintenance of a safety culture at every
facility licensed by the NRC. VerDate Nov<24>2008 18:23 Nov 05, 2009Jkt 220001PO 00000Frm 00079Fmt 4703Sfmt 4703E:\FR\FM\06NON1.SGM06NON1 mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES6 57526 Federal Register/Vol. 74, No. 214/Friday, November 6, 2009/Notices In 1996, the Commission published a policy statement, Freedom of
Employees in the Nuclear Industry to
Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of
Retaliation (61 FR 24336; May 14, 1996), to set forth its expectations that
licensees and other employers subject to
NRC authority will establish and
maintain safety-conscious environments
in which employees feel free to raise
safety concerns, both to their
management and to the NRC, without
fear of retaliation. This policy statement
applied to NRC-regulated activities of
all licensees and their contractors and
subcontractors. A safety conscious work
environment is an important attribute of
safety culture and is one of the safety
culture characteristics in the draft safety
culture policy statement.
The importance of a positive safety culture for activities involving civilian
uses of radioactive materials and other
potential hazards has been
demonstrated by a number of
significant, high-visibility events world-
wide that have occurred in the 20-year
period since the Commission published
its 1989 policy statement addressing
safety culture in nuclear power plants.
The events occurred across multiple
industries including at nuclear power
plants, fuel cycle facilities, and in other
industries such as chemical processing
plants and aerospace. Examples of
nuclear industry events include those
that occurred at the Davis-Besse Nuclear
Power Station and the Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station. Workers at the
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
discovered a cavity in the reactor
pressure vessel head caused by boric
acid corrosion. The corrosion developed
over a period of several years but was
not discovered before the cavity
developed. The licensees analysis of
the event identified weaknesses in the
stations safety culture as the root cause
of the event. It particularly noted that
management prioritized production
over safety. At the Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station, personnel
behaviors adverse to the security of the
plant were identified, specifically, inattentiveness by security officers.
Other licensees have had recurring problems resulting in violations of NRC
regulations. Through a Commission
confirmatory order, a fuel cycle facility
licensee committed to having a third-
party assessment of its safety culture to
determine the causes of its continuing
problems in order to establish
appropriate corrective actions. The
third-party assessment identified
weaknesses in areas important to safety
culture. In addition, weaknesses in the safety culture of licensees and certificate
holders have contributed to unscheduled events or incidents that the Commission has determined to be
significant from the standpoint of public
health and safety. Examples linked to
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals associated with weak safety cultures
include inadequate procedures;
procedures not being followed;
inadequate supervision; decision-
making that does not ensure that safety
and security are maintained; and
ineffective problem identification, evaluation, and resolution. They have
included medical misadministrations (such as giving iodine-131 to lactating
females that resulted in the uptake by
their infants and multiple events
associated with prostate brachytherapy
treatment) and overexposures arising
from the loss of control of radiography
or well logging sources.
(2) Statement of Policy It is the Commissions policy that a strong safety culture is an essential
element for individuals, both internal to
the NRC and external, performing or
overseeing regulated activities. As such, the NRC will include appropriate means
to monitor safety culture in its oversight
programs and internal management
processes. The NRC defines safety
culture as that assembly of
characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors
in organizations and individuals, which
establishes that as an overriding
priority, nuclear safety and security
issues receive the attention warranted
by their significance. Further, it is
important for all organizations to
provide personnel in the safety and
security sectors with an appreciation for
the importance of each, emphasizing the
need for integration and balance to
achieve optimized protection. Safety
and security activities are closely
intertwined, and it is critical that
consideration of these activities be
integrated so as not to diminish or
adversely affect either safety or security.
A safety culture that accomplishes this
would include all nuclear safety and
security issues associated with NRC-
regulated activities including radiation
protection, safeguards, material control and accounting, physical protection, and emergency preparedness issues
among the issues that receive attention
as a matter of priority.
The Commissions regulations are designed to protect both the public and
workers against radiation hazards from
the use of radioactive materials. The
Commissions scope of responsibility includes regulation of commercial nuclear power plants; research, test, and
training reactors; nuclear fuel cycle
facilities; medical, academic, and industrial uses of radioactive materials; and the transport, storage, and disposal
of radioactive materials and wastes. The
Commission carries out these
responsibilities in numerous ways
including through such regulatory
activities as inspecting licensed and
certified facilities and activities;
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating
information about operational safety
and security; investigating nuclear
incidents; and developing policy and
providing direction on safety and
security issues.
The Commission believes that, because licensees and certificate holders
use or provide services related to the
use of radioactive material, they bear the
primary responsibility for safely
handling and securing these materials. It
is, therefore, each licensees and
certificate holders responsibility to
develop and maintain a positive safety
culture which establishes that nuclear
safety issues and nuclear security
issues, as an overriding priority, receive
the attention warranted by their
significance. Therefore, licensees and
certificate holders should foster a
positive safety culture in their
organizations and among individuals
who are overseeing or performing
regulated activities. However, as the
regulatory agency, the Commission has
an independent oversight role (through
inspection and assessment processes)
including addressing licensees and
certificate holders performance related
to areas important to safety culture.
(3) Safety Culture Concept In 1991, as a result of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the International
Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG)
emphasized the concept of safety
culture for the nuclear industry in its
report, INSAG-4, Safety Culture.
INSAG is an advisory group to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The INSAG-4 definition of
safety culture is, that assembly of
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding
priority, nuclear plant safety issues
receive the attention warranted by their
significance.
Implied in the INSAG definition of safety culture is the recognition that
every organization is continually faced
with resolving conflicts among its goals for cost, schedule, and quality (or safety). The organizations members (groups and individuals) also face
conflicts among different goals in
performing their jobs. Management
establishes the framework (management
systems, programs, processes) and
communicates its priorities for resolving VerDate Nov<24>2008 18:23 Nov 05, 2009Jkt 220001PO 00000Frm 00080Fmt 4703Sfmt 4703E:\FR\FM\06NON1.SGM06NON1 mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES6 57527 Federal Register/Vol. 74, No. 214/Friday, November 6, 2009/Notices conflicts among different goals.
Members of the organization work
within that framework and are
influenced by managements priorities, but they have their own beliefs and
attitudes about what is important and
make individual choices on how to
proceed when faced with multiple
competing goals. The INSAG definition
emphasizes that in a positive safety
culture, the goal of maintaining nuclear
safety receives the highest priority in
the organizations and individuals
decision-making and actions when
faced with a conflict with other
organizational or individual goals.
The Commission modified the INSAG definition of safety culture which refers
to nuclear plant safety. The
Commission is strongly committed to
promoting positive safety cultures
among its nuclear reactor licensees;
however, the Commission regulates
many other organizations and processes
involving civilian uses of radioactive
materials. These regulated activities
include industrial radiography services;
hospitals, clinics and individual
practitioners involved in medical uses
of radioactive materials; research and
test reactors; large-scale fuel fabrication
facilities; as well as nuclear power
plants. The Commission also regulates
the construction of new facilities where
operations will involve radioactive
materials with the potential to affect
public health and safety and the
common defense and security.
Therefore, by revising the INSAG
definition of safety culture to replace
nuclear plant safety with nuclear
safety, the Commission is emphasizing
that it expects all of its licensees and
certificate holders to place the highest
priority on nuclear safety commensurate
with the risks inherent in the regulated
activities.
The Commission also modified the INSAG definition to adequately capture
or communicate the equal importance of
nuclear security and nuclear safety in a
positive safety culture. Following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Commission increased its attention
to the important role of security in
regulated facilities whose operations
can have an impact on public health
and safety. The Commission issued
orders enhancing security at its NRC-
regulated facilities to further ensure
public health and safety and the
common defense and security. One of
the insights gained from the greater
emphasis on security is the importance
of incorporating security considerations
into a safety culture and effectively
managing the safety and security interface. In general, the safety and
security interface refers to the organizational and individual awareness that the functions and goals of safety
and security must be considered
together so that actions to achieve either
set of functions and goals do not inadvertently compromise the other.
Therefore, to emphasize the equal
importance of nuclear security and
nuclear safety in a positive safety
culture, the Commission has added
nuclear security to the safety culture
definition. The NRCs modified INSAG
definition is provided in the Statement
of Policy section above.
(4) Stakeholder Outreach The Commissions February 28, 2009, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)-COMGBJ-08-0001, A
Commission Policy Statement on Safety
Culture, (ML080560476) stated in part
that the staff should, as part of its public
stakeholder outreach, reach out to all
types of licensees and certificate
holders. In the development of the draft
policy statement, the NRC staff sought
insights and feedback from
stakeholders. This was accomplished by
providing information in a variety of
forums such as stakeholder organization
meetings, newsletters, and
teleconferences and by publishing
questions in Federal Register Notices entitled Safety Culture Policy
Statement: Public Meeting and Request
for Public Comments (ML090260709) that were related to the Commissions SRM. In addition, a significant stakeholder outreach activity was
accomplished by a public workshop
held on February 3, 2009, at NRC
Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.
The staff reviewed and considered the
stakeholder feedback derived from these
different forums and incorporated it into
the development of the draft policy
statement and recommendations.
(5) Safety and Security Culture In SRM-COMGJB-08-0001, the Commission also considered whether publishing the NRCs expectations for
safety and security culture is best
accomplished in one safety/security
culture statement or in two separate
statements, one each for safety and
security, while still considering the
safety and security interface.
Based on a variety of sources including document reviews and
stakeholder feedback, the Commission
concluded there is no one definitive
view of this issue, but the results
weighed heavily toward a single policy
statement to be titled a Safety Culture
Policy Statement. Document reviews
and stakeholder feedback suggested that
a single policy statement (1) builds on
the fact that safety and security have the same ultimate purpose of protecting people and the environment from
unintended radiation exposure and (2)
encourages attention to the ways safety
and security interface. For these
reasons, the Commission determined
that the term safety culture should
include both safety and security.
Safety and security have been the primary pillars of NRCs regulatory
programs. However, in the current
heightened threat environment, there
has been a renewed focus on security, and the staff has implemented a number
of efforts to enhance security and
strengthen the safety and security
interface. It is important to understand
that both safety and security share a
common purpose of protecting public
health and safety. In todays environment, safety and security activities are closely intertwined, and it
is critical that consideration of these
activities be integrated so as to
complement each other and not
diminish or adversely impact either
safety or security. Further, it is important for licensees and certificate holders to provide personnel in the
safety and security sectors with an
appreciation for the importance of each, emphasizing the need for integration
and balance to achieve optimized
protection. The importance of both
safety and security in an equal and
balanced manner within NRCs
regulatory framework is clearly evident
in the Commissions mission and
strategic goals.
While many safety and security activities complement each other or are
synergistic, there remain areas where
potential conflicts may arise. It is then
imperative that mechanisms be
established to resolve these potential
conflicts to assure the adequate
protection of public health and safety
and promote the common defense and
security. Hence, safety and security
have implications for each other in
connection with all aspects of nuclear
activities.
One potential challenge is the way in which individuals involved in safety
and security activities approach the goal
of risk mitigation and protection of
public health and safety. The safety staff
is typically focused on preventing errors
that would result in an inadvertent
accident while the security staff is focused on preventing deliberate attacks
or diversion of certain materials that
could cause harm. Another challenge is that the organization/facility must ensure that the existence of motivated
and capable persons with ill intent is
recognized and that the importance of
nuclear security to prevent such persons
from unauthorized access is understood. VerDate Nov<24>2008 18:23 Nov 05, 2009Jkt 220001PO 00000Frm 00081Fmt 4703Sfmt 4703E:\FR\FM\06NON1.SGM06NON1 mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES6 57528 Federal Register/Vol. 74, No. 214/Friday, November 6, 2009/Notices To manage these potential conflicts of challenges, the Agency has recently
issued regulations on the safety/security
interface. An overarching safety culture
policy statement which encompasses
security supports and further enhances
those regulations.
Based on the above considerations, the Commission concluded that a single
policy statement would accomplish its
goal that, as an overriding priority, safety issues and security issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. Although, in some cases, issues relating to security might be
handled differently than issues related
to safety. A single policy statement
recognizes there is one overarching
culture in an organization; however, safety and security functions and goals must be treated equally within that overarching safety culture.
(6) Characteristics of a Positive Safety Culture Experience has shown that certain organizational attributes and personnel
attitudes and behaviors are present in a
positive safety culture. Therefore, in
2006, when the NRC implemented an enhanced reactor oversight process (ROP) that more fully addressed safety
culture, it identified and incorporated
safety culture components that are
overarching characteristics of a positive
safety culture. The NRC based its
development of the safety culture
components on a review of a variety of
sources of information including the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations;
the IAEA; the Nuclear Energy Agency; the regulatory approaches of other domestic and international
organizations; and the organizational
behavior, safety culture, and safety
climate research literature. The
Commission presented drafts of the
safety culture components and aspects
in frequent public meetings and
modified them in response to
stakeholder feedback.
For the purpose of this policy statement, the NRC modified the ROP
safety culture components (termed
safety culture characteristics) to
explicitly address security in the safety
culture characteristics descriptions, create a more generic description for
each safety culture characteristic that would apply to the range of NRC licensees and certificate holders, and
maintain all the safety culture concepts
in the safety culture components. The
staff presented the draft safety culture
characteristics for stakeholder comment
in a February 3, 2009, public workshop
and on the NRCs public safety culture
Web site (http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
regulatory/enforcement/safety-culture.html
). Although the safety culture characteristics themselves are
applicable to all licensees and certificate
holders, there may be other examples
that more specifically address the
unique characteristics of a licensees or
certificate holders environment (i.e.,
unique for medical and industrial
applications, operating reactors, research and test reactors, fuel cycle
facilities, and new reactor construction
environments). Hence, the Commission
recognizes that these safety culture
characteristics are not all inclusive;
other characteristics and attitudes in
organizations and individuals may be indicative of a positive safety culture.
However, the Commission expects its
licensees and certificate holders to
consider the extent to which these
characteristics and attitudes are present
in their organizations and among
individuals who are overseeing or
performing regulated activities and to
take steps, if necessary, to foster a
positive safety culture commensurate
with the safety and security significance
of activities and the nature and
complexity of the licensees or
certificate holders organization and
functions.
The following characteristics that are indicative of a positive safety culture, are relevant across the broad range of
activities carried out by the nuclear
industry, the Agreement States and the
NRC, and address the importance of
nuclear safety and security:
- Personnel demonstrate ownership for nuclear safety and security in their
day-to-day work activities by, for
example, ensuring that their day-to-day
work activities and products meet
professional standards commensurate
with the potential impacts of their work
on safety and security. They proceed
with caution when making safety- or
security-related decisions and question
their assumptions, especially when
faced with uncertain or unexpected conditions, to ensure that safety and
security are maintained.
- Processes for planning and controlling work ensure that individual contributors, supervisors, and work
groups communicate, coordinate, and
execute their work activities in a
manner that supports safety and
security. For example, individuals and
work groups communicate and
cooperate during work projects and
activities to ensure their actions do not
interact with those of others to adversely affect safety or security. In addition, managers and supervisors are
accessible to oversee work activities, including those of contractors or vendors, and they challenge work activities and work products that do not
meet their standards.
- The organization maintains a safety conscious work environment in which personnel feel free to raise safety and security concerns without fear of
retaliation. For example, claims of
harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated consistent with the regulations
regarding employee protection. If an
instance of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination for raising a safety or security concern is identified, corrective actions are taken in a timely
manner. *The organization ensures that issues potentially impacting safety or security
are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected, commensurate with their significance.
- The organization ensures that the personnel, equipment, tools, procedures, and other resources needed to assure safety and security are
available. For example, training is
developed and implemented or accessed
to ensure personnel competence.
Procedures, work instructions, design documentation, drawings, databases, and other job aids and reference materials are complete, accurate, and
up-to-date.
- The organizations decisions ensure that safety and security are maintained.
For example, production, cost, and
schedule goals are developed, communicated, and implemented in a
manner which demonstrates that safety and security are overriding priorities.
- Roles, responsibilities, and authorities for safety and security are
clearly defined and reinforced. For example, personnel understand their roles and responsibilities in maintaining
safety and security. Programs, processes, procedures, and organizational
interfaces are clearly defined and
implemented as designed. Leaders at all
levels of the organization consistently
demonstrate that safety and security are
overriding priorities.
- The organization maintains a continuous learning environment in
which opportunities to improve safety
and security are sought out and
implemented. For example, individuals are encouraged to develop and maintain current their professional and technical
knowledge, skills, and abilities and to
remain knowledgeable of industry
standards and innovative practices.
Personnel seek out and implement
opportunities to improve safety and
security performance. VerDate Nov<24>2008 18:23 Nov 05, 2009Jkt 220001PO 00000Frm 00082Fmt 4703Sfmt 4703E:\FR\FM\06NON1.SGM06NON1 mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES6 57529 Federal Register/Vol. 74, No. 214/Friday, November 6, 2009/Notices (7) Implementation of Policy This policy statement describes areas important to safety culture, but it does
not address how the nuclear industry, the Agreement States, and the NRC
should establish and maintain a positive
safety culture in their organizations. The
nuclear industry, the Agreement States, and the NRC differ in their size and
complexity, infrastructure, and
organizational frameworks. Therefore, a single approach for establishing and maintaining a positive safety culture is
not possible. Nevertheless, the
Commission expects that nuclear safety
and security issues receive the attention
warranted by their significance, and all
organizations consider and foster the
safety culture characteristics (commensurate with the safety and security significance of activities and
the nature and complexity of their
organization and functions) in carrying
out their day-to-day work activities and
decisions.
Questions for Which NRC Is Seeking Input (1) The draft policy statement provides a description of areas
important to safety culture, (i.e., safety
culture characteristics). Are there any
characteristics relevant to a particular type of licensee or certificate holder (if so, please specify which type) that do
not appear to be addressed?
(2) Are there safety culture characteristics as described in the draft
policy statement that you believe do not
contribute to safety culture and, therefore, should not be included?
(3) Regarding the understanding of what the Commission means by a
positive safety culture, would it help
to include the safety culture
characteristics in the Statement of
Policy section in the policy statement?
(4) The draft policy statement includes the following definition of safety culture: Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors in organizations and
individuals which establishes that as an
overriding priority, nuclear safety and
security issues receive the attention
warranted by their significance. Does
this definition need further clarification
to be useful?
(5) The draft policy statement states, All licensees and certificate holders should consider and foster the safety
culture characteristics (commensurate
with the safety and security significance
of activities and the nature and
complexity of their organization and
functions) in carrying out their day-to-
day work activities and decisions.
Given the diversity among the licensees and certificate holders regulated by the NRC and the Agreement States, does
this statement need further clarification?
(6) How well does the draft safety culture policy statement enhance
licensees and certificate holders
understanding of the NRCs expectations that they maintain a safety culture that includes issues related to
security?
(7) In addition to issuing a safety culture policy statement, what might the
NRC consider doing, or doing
differently, to increase licensees and
certificate holders attention to safety culture in the materials area?
(8) How can the NRC better involve stakeholders to address safety culture, including security, for all NRC and
Agreement State licensees and
certificate holders?
To ensure efficient consideration of your comments, please identify the
specific question numbers with your comments when applicable. When commenting, please exercise caution
with regard to site-specific security-
related information. Comments will be
made available to the public in their
entirety. Personal information such as
your name, address, telephone number, and e-mail address will not be removed
from your submission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of October 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Cynthia A. Carpenter, Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E9-26816 Filed 11-5-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2009-0192; Docket No. 50-244; Renewed License No. DPR-18]
In the Matter of EDF Development, Inc.;
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC (R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant);
Order Superseding Order of October 9, 2009, Approving Application
Regarding Proposed Corporate
Restructuring I R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC (Ginna, LLC or the licensee) is the
holder of Renewed Facility Operating
License No. DPR-18 which authorizes
the possession, use, and operation of the
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna).
The facility is located at the licensees
site in Ontario, New York. The
operating license authorizes the licensee
to possess, use, and operate Ginna.
II By letter dated January 22, 2009, as supplemented on February 26, April 8, June 25, July 27, October 15, October 19, October 25 (two letters), October 26, and
October 28, 2009 (together, the
Application), Constellation Energy
Nuclear Group, LLC (CENG), on behalf
of the licensee and EDF Development, Inc. (EDF Development) (together, the
applicants), requested that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the
Commission), pursuant to Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
50.80, consent to the indirect license
transfers that would be effected by the
indirect transfer of control of CENGs
ownership and operating interests in
Ginna. The actions being sought are a
result of certain proposed corporate
restructuring actions in connection with
a planned investment by EDF
Development whereby it would acquire
a 49.99% ownership interest in CENG
from Constellation Energy Group, Inc.
(CEG), the current 100% owner of
CENG. EDF Development is a U.S.
corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Delaware and a wholly-
owned subsidiary of E.D.F. International
S.A., a public limited company
organized under the laws of France, which is in turn a wholly-owned
subsidiary of E
'lectricite
'de France S.A., a French limited company.
Following the closing of the transfer of ownership interests in CENG to EDF
Development, EDF Development will
hold a 49.99% ownership interest in
ownership interest in CENG through
two new intermediate parent
companies, Constellation Nuclear, LLC
and CE Nuclear, LLC, formed for non-
operational purposes. In addition, Constellation Nuclear Power Plants, Inc., which is currently an intermediate
holding company between CENG and
Ginna, LLC and Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Station, LLC, will convert to a
Delaware limited liability company by
operation of law and become
Constellation Nuclear Power Plants, LLC, and will exist as an intermediate
holding company between CENG and Ginna, LLC, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, and Calvert Cliffs Nuclear
Power Plant, LLC by merger. No
physical changes to the facilities or
operational changes are being proposed
in the application.
Approval of the transfer of the license is requested by the applicants pursuant
to 10 CFR 50.80. Notice of the request
for approval and opportunity for a
hearing was published in the Federal Register on May 6, 2009 (74 FR 21013).
No hearing requests or petitions to VerDate Nov<24>2008 18:23 Nov 05, 2009Jkt 220001PO 00000Frm 00083Fmt 4703Sfmt 4703E:\FR\FM\06NON1.SGM06NON1 mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES6