ML102160770

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Intervenor-Exhibit 19-Nuclear Safety Culture/Site Wide Stand Down - Required Briefing by Department Managers - January 2009
ML102160770
Person / Time
Site: Prairie Island  Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/31/2009
From: Mahowald P
- No Known Affiliation, Prairie Island Community Council
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
Shared Package
ML102160759 List:
References
50-282-LR, 50-306-LR, ASLBP 08-871-01-LR-BD01, RAS 18361
Download: ML102160770 (7)
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Text

Nuclear Safety Culture/Site Wide Stand Down -

Required Briefing by Department Managers January 2009

Purpose:

This is intended to be a discussion between department managers and their department employees about the Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment conducted through Utilities Service Alliance (USA) last summer and the Site-Wide Stand Down conducted on Monday, Jan. 5. The discussion should communicate and reinforce the importance and relevance of the corporate nuclear safety policy (CP0017), the Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and expectations for all site employees.

Management Expectations:

Department managers shall conduct the briefing by Jan. 31,2009, for all employees in his/her department.

The briefing should be led by the department manager with supervisors assisting.

Department managers should invite one of the following to sit in and observe the discussion: Mike Wadley, Joel Sorensen, Scott N orthard, Kelli Huxford, Lisa Kuehl or Deb Albarado.

The briefing should be participative by asking questions to engage people in discussion. This briefing sheet should be used to drive discussion and is not intended to just be read aloud to the group. A copy of the Picture ofXcellence is on page 4, which should be referred to during the briefing.

This briefing is intended to take approximately 50 minutes to conduct but groups are allowed to extend the briefing if applicable discussion warrants.

Hand out prior to the meeting a feedback form to each participant (see page 5). These forms should be given to the department manager at the end of the meeting and then turned into John Erickson at the next PERG.

Key Talking Points 1

  • What is "Nuclear Safety Culture"?

An organization's values and behaviors - modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members - that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority.

  • CP 0017, Nuclear Safety Culture Based on Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and describes essential attributes for a healthy nuclear safety culture.

Also sets forth expectation for a safety conscious work environment (SCWE).

  • Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment (Report finalized Oct. 22,2008)

Purpose of the assessment: To determine to what degree a station has a strong nuclear safety culture, a healthy respect for nuclear safety and that the nuclear safety is not compromised by production priorities.

Utilities Service Alliance (USA) process.

Team was comprised of internal and external industry peers.

Inputs included:

  • Information from survey conducted prior to the assessment
  • Review of site data including KPIs, audits, previous assessments, CAP data, etc.
  • On-site meeting observations and interviews during assessment week.

Key Positive Attributes:

  • Station personnel generally perceive a strong commitment to nuclear safety and have a high level of trust in their senior management team.
  • Personnel generally feel free to raise issues and perceive that management is open to having their decisions challenged.
  • Operating Experience (OE) is valued and utilized; accessed from many different sources.

Key Performance Detractors:

  • Organizational alignment is challenged
  • D-15 meetings are not totally effective in aligning and engaging the workforce around station performance shortfalls and improvement initiatives.
  • Workforce planning has not been fully effective
  • Since the transition to Xcel Energy, there is a lot of frustration around filling open positions.
  • The roles and responsibilities of engineering are not clear.
  • There is a lack of confidence in station processes
  • The workforce does not adequately appreciate the association of following process with Principle 5, Nuclear technology is recognized as special and umque.
  • A culture of prevention has not been fully embraced
  • The organization spends most of its time reacting to versus preventing events.
  • Praine Island Site-Wide Stand Down Gan. 5,2009)

Other Independent Performance Assessments conducted in 2008

  • Configuration Management Assessment 2
  • Reactivity Management Assessment
  • INPO Mid-Cycle Focused Self Assessment
  • Organizational Effectiveness Assist Visit
  • Management and Safety Review Committee (MSRC)
  • Independent Human Performance Assessment What others say
  • We have taken our eye off Human Performance improvements.
  • No oversight
  • No integrated plan
  • We do not coach to expected standards.
  • We do not us Pre-J ob Briefs effectively.
  • We lack a clear picture of excellence in human performance.
  • We miss learning opportunities from our performance shortfalls.
  • We do not hold individuals/managers/organization accountable.
  • We all understand improvement is needed, but the lower in the organization, the more likely we believe someone else needs to improve performance.

Regulatory Perception: Our behavior does not demonstrate that we understand the significance or the uniqueness ofnuclear power, nor do we appear to respect the power of the reactor.

Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture

1. Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety.
2. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety.
3. Trust permeates the organization.
4. Decision-making reflects safety first.
5. Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique.
6. A questioning attitude is cultivated.
7. Organizational learning is embraced.
8. Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination.

Expectations

  • Respect each other regardless of position.
  • Respect others for their position
  • Readily coach and be willing to be coached.
  • Ask questions and expect answers.
  • Use and embrace procedures as a tool for success.
  • If procedures are incorrect, stop, and get them changed.
  • Stop if you have questions about a task or procedure step and get answers.
  • Write a work request and an action request for equipment problems.
  • Be accountable: Do what we say we will do and be responsible for results.
  • Embrace learning
  • Do not be a victim
  • Be a team member.
  • Key messages include:

3

I am part of the problem.

I must be part of the solution.

Questions to help generate discussion

  • Do you agree or disagree with the Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment and the other 2008 assessment conclusions (what others say, what the regulatory perception is of our station)?
  • Who can really fix culture?
  • Who can really fix human performance?
  • What can we do to improve nuclear safety and human performance in our group?
  • What do you think about the expectations laid out during the Jan. 5 Site-Wide Stand Down?
  • How will we meet these expectations?

4

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5

Employee Feedback on Nuclear Safety Culture/Site-Wide Stand Down Briefing by Department Managers January 2009 Department Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Department Manager conducting briefing: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Rate the overall effectiveness of the briefing.

I 1 (bad) I 2 I 3 I 4 5 (good)

The information provided during this briefing is useful to me.

Yes No If No, what could be done to make the briefing more effective?

6

Briefing successes Areas for improvement 7

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