ML25336A302

Enclosure 4: HI-2210970 - HI-STAR 330 Safety Analysis Report Revision 1 Changed Pages (Non-proprietary)

ML25336A302
Person / Time
Site:	07109397
Issue date:	12/02/2025
From:	Holtec
To:	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
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ML25336A297	List: ML25336A298 ML25336A300 ML25336A302 ML25336A309
References
3155004, EPID L-2022-NEW-0002
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HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 1-8 requirements for raw materials, welding specifications & weld inspections and factory acceptance testing.

The material for the DBS is selected to be an ASTM pressure vessel grade steel with welding performed to Section IX. All DBS external welds are subject to visual examination by production staff qualified for such examination. The structural acceptance criteria for the HI-STAR 330 packaging parts are guided by the goal of providing large margins under all performance modes.

Unless otherwise specified, cask surfaces may be coated for surface preservation purposes, including corrosion prevention. Coating shall be chosen based on expected service conditions and shall be appropriate for exposure to radiation as well as environmental exposure. The coating material and performance requirements are described in Chapter 2 of this SAR.

The free drop event postulated in 10CFR71.73 is an uncontrolled lowering of the package from 9 meters onto an essentially unyielding surface in the orientation expected to result in the maximum damage. [

Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390

]

b.

Secondary Containers The Liner Tank is defined as the rectangular vessel that conforms to the internal dimensions of the cask as illustrated in the licensing drawings. The Liner Tank is designed to provide an environmentally sequestered enclosure for radioactive NFW during transportation. Two Liner Tank typesFour waste packages (Types A, B, and C, and D) are analyzed for the HI-STAR 330 Package. Each waste package type is qualified to a certain total maximum activity and specific activity level. The design details, illustrated in the drawing package in Section 1.3, indicate that all Liner Tanks are of similar construction and geometry. The distinguishing feature of each type of Liner Tank is the thickness of its walls. Each type of Liner Tank is designed to either accommodate the dimensions of a specific type of LTC used for loading its radioactive contents, or be used without an LTC but with increased shielding thickness of its top cover and bottom plates. The steel plate construction of the Liner Tanks provides shielding of gamma radiation, with greater plate thicknesses coinciding with better shielding for contents with higher specific activities.

The Liner Tanks are rectangular steel weldments with a steel lid. The walls, top cover and bottom of the Liner Tanks are orthogonal with each other and are manufactured to dimensions with controlled tolerances. The rectangular geometry provides stability during transport conditions and the steel provides structural strength and rigidity. These attributes render the Liner Tanks structurally rugged under the routine and normal conditions of transportation in 10 CFR 71.71, including short-term loading/unloading conditions. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 1-11 1.2.2 below. The maximum gross transport weight of the HI-STAR 330 Package, including the top impact absorber assembly, is to be marked on the packaging nameplate.

1.2.1.3 Containment Features As discussed in Subsection 1.2.1 and shown in the Licensing drawing package, the HI-STAR 330 Containment boundary is defined by a thick steel alloy weldment of a rectangular box profile with a gasketed heavy walled Closure Lid with a bolted design to provide convenient installation and retrieval of the waste package stored in it. The Containment Boundary is designed to maintain its structural integrity under all routine, normal and hypothetical accident conditions. In particular, the gasketed joint is designed to ensure protection against leakage of radioactive materials in the aftermath of the Design Basis events postulated in this SAR.

Leakage testing of the Closure Lid (containment) inner seal and the gasketed joint shall be in accordance with ANSI N14.5 [8.1.4] as specified in Chapter 8 of this SAR.

1.2.1.4 Gamma Shielding Features The principal function of the HI-STAR 330 cask package is to ensure that it attenuates the radiation emitted by the Liner Tanks contents to the levels required under the part 71 regulations. The HI-STAR 330 Package is equipped with appropriate shielding to minimize personnel exposure. The HI-STAR 330 Packaging ensures the external radiation standards of 10CFR71.47 under exclusive shipment are met when loaded with the Liner Tank and contents whose radiation emission rate is at or below that analyzed in this SAR. The attenuation of gamma radiation occurs through three sequential metal masses in the body of the HI-STAR package. for waste package Types A through D:

1. The initial attenuation of the gamma radiation emitted by the contents is provided primarily by the steel mass of the Liner Tanks, LTCs (top and bottom plates, if LTCs are used), tertiary containers (if required), and self-shielding of the metallic waste.

2. The Containment Boundary, a high integrity alloy steel weldment, provides the second gamma attenuation barrier in the package. The Containment Boundary is designed to withstand all design basis events postulated in the SAR without suffering any degradation in its gamma shielding function.

3. The Dose Blocker Structure (DBS), as shown in the Licensing drawing, is a steel weldment that envelopes the Containment Boundary and provides the last stage in attenuation of the radiation emitted by the casks contents. The DBS is designed to ensure that it will not detach from the cask body under any postulated Design Basis accident events and that the physical damage sustained from design basis impact events postulated in the SAR will be minimal and confined to the local region of impact.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 1-12 The drawing package in Section 1.3 provides additional information on the configuration of gamma shielding features.

1.2.1.5 Criticality Control Features There are no criticality control features in the HI-STAR 330 Package. The limited quantities of fissile materials in the package contents in Table 7.1.2 qualifies the HI-STAR 330 for exemption from classification as a fissile material package per 10 CFR 71.15. Chapter 6 contains additional details.

1.2.1.6 Lifting and Tie-Down Devices As shown in the Licensing drawing in Section 1.3, permanently imbedded trunnions on opposite sides of the cask body provide the means for a symmetrical lift of the package. Trunnions are conservatively qualified with increased stress margins for lifting and handling of critical loads in compliance with NUREG-0612 as specified in Chapter 8. Lifting trunnions are designed in accordance with 10CFR71.45 and NUREG-0612. Testing of trunnions is in accordance with ANSI N14.6 [1.2.2]. As is evident from the Licensing drawing, the trunnion must project out sufficiently to provide sufficient shoulder for the lift rigging to engage it. The projection length of the trunnions is limited so that they are prevented by the impact absorbers (crushable attachments) from engaging with any surface during the 30ft drop scenario. This precludes the possibility for local penetration of the containment by the trunnions under this scenario. The trunnion is also prevented from being driven directly into the containment boundary during the postulated puncture bar impact by the increased protruding diameter of the trunnion, which creates a step that transfers all forces into the dose blocker plate.

Lifting of the HI-STAR 330 Package requires the use of external handling devices. Standard rigging (e.g., slings) are typically utilized when the cask is to be lifted and handled in its upright orientation. There are no transport or loading operations that require tilting or other manipulation of the casks orientation. The cask user shall ensure that all lifting equipment as well as its appurtenances used to lift and handle the HI-STAR 330 meet appropriate specifications.

Figure 1.23.31 provides an example illustration of a package in a transport configuration. The cask trunnions are used as attachment points for tie-down on two sides of the cask body, which along with the buttressed supports on the sides and ends of the transport frame prevent excessive vertical or lateral movement of the cask during normal transportation.

1.2.1.7 Heat Transfer Features The HI-STAR 330 Package provides effective heat dissipation for safe transport of the Liner Tank described in Subsection 1.2.1. The radioactive materials decay heat is passively dissipated without any mechanical or forced cooling. The temperature of the contents is dependent on the decay heat and the heat dissipation capabilities of the cask.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 1-24 1.3 Engineering Drawings This section contains a HI-STAR 330 Drawing Package prepared under Holtecs QA Program.

This drawing package contains the details of the safety features considered in the analysis documented in this SAR.

The manufacturing of the HI-STAR 330 components is required to be in strict compliance with the Drawing Package in this section.

The following HI-STAR 330 System Licensing Drawings are provided in this section:

Drawing Number Description Rev.

12482 HI-STAR 330 Type B/C Waste Transport Cask 65 12596 Liner Tanks and Cassettes 21 18092 Tertiary Container for HI-STAR 330 0

[Drawings Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390]

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 REF-1 Chapter 1 References The following generic industry and Holtec produced references may have been consulted in the preparation of this document. Where specifically cited, the identifier is listed in the SAR text or table.

[1.0.1]

Regulatory Guide 7.9, "Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packaging for Radioactive Material", Revision 2, USNRC, March 2005.

[1.0.2]

10CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials", Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, Washington, D.C.

[1.0.3]

49CFR173, "Shippers - General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings",

Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, Washington, D.C.

[1.1.1]

IAEA Safety Standards, Safety Requirements, No. SSR-6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012 Edition.

[1.2.1]

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code",

Section III, Div. 1, Subsection NB (2013)

[1.2.2]

ANSI N14.6-1993, "Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 Kg) or More", June 1993.

[1.2.3]

NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 1980.

[1.2.4]

Regulatory Guide 7.11, "Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inches (0.1m)", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June 1991. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-2 2.1 Structural Design 2.1.1 Discussion This subsection presents the essential characteristics of the principal structural members and systems that are important to the safe operation of the HI-STAR 330 package. These members are the containment system components together with those parts that render the radiation shielding function in the cask to protect the package in the event of a hypothetical accident condition (HAC) set forth in (§71.73).

2.1.1.1 Cask The structural functions of the cask in the transport mode are:

To serve as a penetration and puncture barrier.

To provide a high-integrity containment system.

To provide a structurally robust support for the radiation shielding components.

The containment space (or space within the containment boundary as identified in the drawing package in Section 1.3 and described in Section 1.2) is the heart of the package.

ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB is used as the reference Code for the design and construction of the HI-STAR 330 containment system.

2.1.1.2 Liner Tank Liner Tank provides secondary packaging for the contents and is fitted into the HI-STAR 330 cask.

The Liner Tank walls, including the top and bottom plates, serve as dose blocker parts.

The specific structural requirements of the Liner Tank, germane to its function as the waste container, are further discussed in this SAR chapter.

2.1.1.3 Liner Tank Cassettes Liner Tank Cassettes (LTC) are loaded into the Liner Tanks. Only the top and bottom plates of the LTC are classified as dose blocker parts. The specific structural requirements of the LTC are further discussed in this SAR chapter.

In what follows, explicit design criteria for the components of the transport package and essential appurtenances are presented.

2.1.1.4 Tertiary Containers As discussed in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, Tertiary Containers may be used to transport high activity waste in conjunction with the Liner Tanks and LTCs that require additional shielding to achieve the radiation dose limits set forth in 10CFR71. The tertiary containers serve only shielding function to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-3 and specific requirements for these containers are discussed further in this Chapter.

2.1.2 Design Criteria The HI-STAR 330 Transport package is characterized by the following attributes that differentiate it from casks used to transport the spent nuclear fuel:

(i)

The package is fissile-exempt (i.e., little fissile material) and therefore criticality control is not relevant to the Casks design criteria.

(ii) The internal heat generation in the package is negligible; therefore, there is little elevation of the metal temperature of the Containment Boundary above the ambient.

(iii) Because the contents are metallic waste, there is no safety imperative to use an inert gas atmosphere around the waste (plain air suffices).

(iv) Because there is no risk of a criticality event, internal deformations inside the cask are not a concern. Therefore, there is no safety imperative to employ traditional impact absorbers to deal with the accident scenarios of 10CFR71.73.

ASME Code Section III, Subsection NB, which is espoused in Regulatory Guide 7.6 [2.1.1], is the reference Code for structural qualification of the package under Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC). The structural qualification of the trunnions for normal handling follows the provisions in NUREG-0612 [1.2.3] and Subsection NF of the Code for material specifications.

The various ASME Code Sections invoked in this SAR for stress analysis and material properties data are listed in reference [2.1.2] through [2.1.5]. Loading conditions and load combinations for transport are defined in Regulatory Guide 7.8 [2.1.6]. Consistent with the provisions of these documents, the central objective of the structural requirements presented in this section is to ensure that the HI-STAR 330 package possesses sufficient structural capability to maintain the integrity of the Containment Boundary under both normal and hypothetical accident conditions of transport articulated in Reg. Guide 7.6. The following table provides a synoptic matrix to demonstrate the explicit compliance with the seven regulatory positions with respect to the Containment Boundary stated in Regulatory Guide 7.6. The table below lists the guidance from Reg. Guide 7.6 and HI-STAR 330s compliance/alternatives thereto.

Conformance with Reg. Guide 7.6 Provisions on the structural requirements for HI-STAR 330 Containment Boundary

1. Material properties, design stress intensities, and fatigue curves are obtained from the ASME Code.

As there are no significant cyclic loads on the HI-STAR 330 package, fatigue is not critical for this package.fatigue curves of the ASME Code are not utilized. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-4 Conformance with Reg. Guide 7.6 Provisions on the structural requirements for HI-STAR 330 Containment Boundary

2. Under NCT, the limits on stress intensity are those limits defined by the ASME Code for primary membrane and for primary membrane plus bending for Level A conditions.

This guidance is fully complied with; see Table 2.1.2A1.

3. Perform fatigue analysis for NCT using ASME Code Section III methodology (NB) and appropriate fatigue curves.

There are no significant cyclic loads; hence a fatigue analysis is not warranted.

4. The stress intensity Sn associated with the range of primary plus secondary stresses under normal conditions should be less than 3Sm where Sm is the primary membrane stress intensity from the ASME Code.

This guidance is fully complied with; see Table 2.1.12A.

5. Buckling of the containment vessel should not occur under normal or accident conditions.

This guidance is fully complied with; inelastic material model used in the comprehensive FE model is capable of predicting buckling behavior.

6. Under HAC, the values of primary membrane stress intensity should not exceed the lesser of 2.4Sm and 0.7Su (ultimate strength), and primary membrane plus bending stress intensity should not exceed the lesser of 3.6Sm and Su.

This guidance is fully complied with; see Table 2.1.2A1.

7. The extreme total stress intensity range should be less than 2Sa at 10 cycles as given by the appropriate fatigue curves.

This guidance is fully complied with.

2.1.2.1 Loading and Load Combinations In addition to handling loads, 10CFR71 and Regulatory Guide 7.6 define two loading conditions that must be considered for qualification of a transport package. These are defined as Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC).

1. Handling Loads The lifting trunnions in the HI-STAR 330 cask are subject to specific limits set forth in NUREG-0612 [1.2.3]. More specifically, only four trunnions (one load path) shall meet the factor of safety of 5 10 against ultimate, as required by NUREG-0612 while subject to the lifted load that includes an appropriate dynamic load amplifier.

2. Normal Conditions of Transport Loads (§71.71)

The normal conditions of transport loads that warrant structural evaluation are:

a. Reduced external pressure 25 kPa (3.5 psia).

b. Increased external pressure 140 kPa (20 psia). to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-5

c. Free drop from 0.3-meter (1-foot) height in the most vulnerable orientation onto an essentially unyielding horizontal surface (henceforth called the 1-foot drop event).

d. Normal vibratory loads incidental to transport.

e. Normal operating conditions (pressure and temperature).

f. Water spray test

g. Penetration test

h. Compression test Since the normal internal pressure loading for the HI-STAR 330 is less than 5 psig (35 kPa), the small reduced external pressure (internal overpressure) loading noted in (a) will not influence the structural integrity of the HI-STAR 330 package.

To envelope loading ((b) above), a bounding external pressure analysis is performed and is labeled as Load Case E in Table 2.1.1. Further, the analyzed external pressure loading on the cask bounds the loading due to the cask immersion under the water head of 15 m (50 ft) applicable for the HAC loads.

The normal operating conditions (e) is bounded by the Design Pressure in Table 1.2.1 which indicates that the Package does not merit designation as a pressure vessel. The 1-foot drop event (c) is labeled as Load Case B in Table 2.1.1. Vibratory loads (d) transmitted to the HI-STAR 330 package by the transport vehicle will produce negligibly small stresses in comparison with stresses that will be produced by the accident condition loadings described previously.

Fatigue considerations due to mechanical vibrations are further discussed in Section 2.6.

Water spray test and penetration test ((f) and (g) above) are not applicable to the HI-STAR 330 package. The water spray test, which simulates exposure to rainfall of approximately 5 cm per hour for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, is not structurally significant to the HI-STAR 330 cask. This is because the HI-STAR 330 package is quite massive, and therefore it has a large thermal inertia. As a result, the package will have a slow thermal response to external temperature changes, such as the water spray test. Since the water spray test will not cause a sudden change in temperature leading to large thermal strains, it poses no significant risk to the containment boundary system or the shielding capabilities of the HI-STAR 330 package. The minimum thickness of material between the outside surface of the package and the nearest point on the containment boundary system is at least 2 inches and hence the penetration test does not pose any threat to the package.

Lastly, a compression test (h) using a load equal to the greater of the following two conditions is considered for the HI-STAR 330 analysis:

(i) The equivalent of 5 times the weight of the package; or (ii) The equivalent of 13 kPa (2 lbf/in2) multiplied by the vertically projected area of the package.

3. Hypothetical Accident Condition Loads (§71.73)

These sequenced loads pertain to hypothetical accident conditions. Specifically, they are: to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-6

a. Free Drop of 9-m (30 ft)

b. Puncture

c. Engulfing fire @ 800ºC (1475ºF)

d. Immersion in 15-m (50 ft) head of water.

a.

Free Drop Labeled as Load Case C in Table 2.1.1, the free drop accident consists of a free fall of the loaded package from a height of 9 meters on to an essentially unyielding surface in any credible orientation that would inflict maximum damage to the package. Six such candidate adverse orientations have been selected and listed in Table 2.1.1 as those requiring safety analyses.

b.

Puncture Denoted as Load Case D in Table 2.1.1, this event consists of a 1-m (40-in) free drop onto a stationary and vertical mild steel bar of 15 cm (6 in) diameter. The bar is assumed to be of such a length as to cause maximum damage to the cask. The package is assumed to drop in the worst-case orientation(s) with the penetrant force being applied at the location that can cause maximum damage to the cask.

The above loading events may occur under the so-called hot (maximum ambient temperature) or cold condition at -40ºC (-40ºF). In the latter thermal state, the effects of brittle fracture must also be evaluated.

c.

Fire Fire is not a mechanical loading event; its chief consequence is to challenge the integrity of the neutron shielding material. The results are presented in Chapter 3. Based on the temperature changes established in Chapter 3, an evaluation is performed to demonstrate that the fire event does not compromise the structural integrity of the containment boundary. This case is labeled as Load Case F in Table 2.1.1.

d.

Immersion The bounding external pressure loading, in support of the normal conditions of transport, is considered to envelope the pressure corresponding to the cask immersion under 15-m (50 ft.) water head. This case is labeled Load Case E in Table 2.1.1. The external pressure evaluation for the containment boundary is extremely conservative due to the fact that the normal service Level A stress limits are imposed for this loading condition.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-9

[

Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390

]

e. Applicable minimum allowable stress intensity limits for the containment system, including cask lid locking system, are obtained from the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB [2.1.1]. The limiting allowable stress intensity values are given in Tables 2.1.3 through 2.1.6.

Allowable stresses and stress intensities are calculated using the data provided in the ASME Code,Section II, Part D [2.1.6] and Tables 2.1.2A and 2.1.2B. Tables 2.1.3 through 2.1.6 provide numerical values of stress intensities, as a function of temperature, for the cask containment system materials.

Throughout this chapter, the term Sm and Su denote the design stress intensity and ultimate strength, respectively. Property values at intermediate temperatures that are not reported in the tables are obtained by linear interpolation as allowed by paragraph NB-3229 of the ASME Code.

Terms relevant to the analyses are extracted from the ASME Code (Figure NB-3222-1) as follows.

Symbol Description Notes Pm Average primary stress across a solid section.

Excludes effects of discontinuities and concentrations.

Produced by pressure and mechanical loads.

PL Average stress across any solid section.

Considers effects of discontinuities but not concentrations.

Produced by pressure and mechanical loads, including inertia earthquake effects.

Pb Primary bending stress.

Component of primary stress proportional to the distance from the centroid of a solid section. Excludes the effects of discontinuities and concentrations. Produced by pressure and mechanical loads, including inertia earthquake effects.

Pe Secondary expansion stress.

Stresses, which result from the constraint of free-end displacement. Considers effects of discontinuities but not local stress concentration. (Not applicable to casks.)

Q Secondary membrane plus bending stress.

Self-equilibrating stress necessary to satisfy continuity of structure. Occurs at structural discontinuities. Can be caused by pressure, mechanical loads, or differential thermal expansion. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-14 Specific Code paragraphs in NB-3000 of Section III, Subsection NB of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) [2.1.5] that are cited herein are used for the design of the containment system of the HI-STAR 330 Package.

Table 2.1.8 lists each major structure, system, and component (SSC) of the HI-STAR 330 Packaging, along with its function, and applicable code or standard. The drawing package in Section 1.3 identifies whether items are Important to Safety (ITS) or Not Important to Safety (NITS); the identification is carried out using the guidance of NUREG/CR-6407, Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components. Table 8.1.3 lists some alternatives to the ASME Code where appropriate. Table 8.1.2 provides applicable sections of the ASME Code and other documents for Material Procurement, Design, Fabrication, and Inspection, and Testing pursuant to the guidance in NUREG-2216 1617 [2.1.9].

All materials and sub-components that do not constitute the containment system in the HI-STAR 330 cask are procured to a recognized national consensus standard. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-15 TABLE 2.1.1 STRUCTURAL LOADING EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR HI-STAR 330 Loading Case Loading Constituent Part Stress/Strength Limit Comment 1

A Lifting and handling of Cask Cask Lifting Trunnions Factor of safety of 5 10 against ultimate strength per NUREG-0612 when considering non-redundant load path Minimum strength values from the drawing package in Section 1.3 are used.

2 A

Lifting and handling of Cask Containment System The primary membrane plus bending stress intensity shall be less than 1.5 times the ASME code stress intensity Per Subsection NB 3

A Lifting and handling of Closure lid Closure Lid Lift Points Same as #1 above Per NUREG-0612 4

A Lifting and handling of Closure Lid Closure Lid Plate Same as # 2 above Same as #2 above 5

B Free drop from 0.3 meters Cask body & lid, depending on the orientation of drop

1. Containment system must meet Level A stress intensity limits per Subsection NB.

2. Closure Lid Bolting: The Closure lid bolting must meet the acceptance criteria per Table 2.1.2B.

3. The DBS components must not detach from the cask or suffer substantial loss of material causing the Part 71 normal condition dose limits to be exceeded.

This loading condition corresponds to the Part 71 normal condition.

[

Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390

]

6 C

Free drop from 9 meters Cask body & lid, depending on the orientation of drop

1. Containment system must meet Level D stress intensity limits per Subsection NB.

2. Closure Lid Bolting: The Closure lid This loading corresponds to the Part 71 hypothetical accident condition.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-17 TABLE 2.1.2A: STRESS INTENSITY LIMITS FOR DIFFERENT SERVICE CONDITIONS FOR SECTION III CLASS 1 PRESSURE VESSELS (ELASTIC ANALYSIS PER NB-3220)

Stress Category Level A Level D Primary Membrane, Pm Sm Lesser of 2.4Sm and 0.7Su (for austenitic, high nickel-alloys and copper-nickel alloys) and 0.7Su (for ferritic)2 Local Membrane, PL 1.5Sm 150% of Pm Limit Membrane plus Primary Bending 1.5Sm 150% of Pm Limit Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending 1.5Sm 150% of Pm Limit Membrane plus Primary Bending plus Secondary 3Sm N/A Average Primary Shear (Section in pure shear) 0.6Sm 0.42Su Notes:

1. Fatigue analysis (as applicable) also includes peak stress (denoted by F in the nomenclature of the ASME Code [2.1.1]).

1.

This criteria is applicable specifically to ferritic materials.

Governed by NB-3227.2 or F-1331.1(d) of the ASME Code,Section III (NB or Appendix F) to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-25 2.2 Materials This section provides the mechanical properties used in the structural evaluations. The properties include, as appropriate, yield strength, ultimate strength, modulus of elasticity, weight density, and coefficient of thermal expansion. The property values are presented for temperature for which structural calculations are performed.

2.2.1 Structural Materials 2.2.1.1 Containment System The nickel alloy and low-alloy steels used in the HI-STAR 330 packaging are SA-203E and SA-350 LF3, respectively. The material properties (used in structural evaluations) of SA-203 E and SA-350 LF3 are given in Table 2.2.1.

The cask closure lid bolting is made from precipitation hardened (PH) steel, namely SA-564/705 630 (H1025). The material properties used for structural evaluations are given in Table 2.2.2.

Properties of steel, which are not included in any of the tables at the end of the section, are weight density and Poissons ratio. These properties are assumed constant for all structural analyses. The values used are shown in the table below.

Property Value Weight Density, kg/m3 (lb/in3) 7,833 (0.283) 8,0277,750 (0.290280) (for Stainless Carbon Steel)

Poisson's Ratio 0.30 2.2.1.2 Trunnion Materials The HI-STAR 330 cask has a total of four lifting trunnions, as shown in the licensing drawings in Section 1.3. Each trunnion is comprised of a solid steel shaft embedded into the cask side walls comprising dose blocker structure. The governing material properties for the trunnion material are listed in Table 2.2.3.

2.2.1.3 Dose Blocker Structure The DBS is made of carbon steel components. The DBS girdles the containment system, and it is designed to provide gamma shielding and physical protection to the transport package. The necessary structural properties for the DBS are provided in Table 2.2.4.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-26 2.2.1.4 Weld Material All weld filler materials utilized in performing Containment Boundary welds (as defined in the licensing drawings), will comply with the provisions of the appropriate ASME Code Subsection (e.g., cited paragraphs of Subsection NB and with applicable paragraphs of Section IX). All Dose Blocker Structure welds will be made using weld procedures that meet the requirements of ASME Section IX. The minimum tensile strength of the weld wire and filler material (where applicable) will be equal to or greater than the tensile strength of the base metal listed in the ASME Code.

2.2.1.5 Closure Lid Seals The containment integrity of the HI-STAR 330 package relies on a closure lid system with elastomeric seals, as shown in the licensing drawings in Section 1.3.

[

Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390

]

2.2.1.6 Impact Absorber Components (Crushable Attachments)

The impact absorbers (crushable attachments) are made of aluminum bars or plates to comply with minimum characteristics summarized in Table 8.1.5, which are strategically connected to the cask exterior (see Figure 2.3.63). The primary function of these impact absorbers is to deform and absorb the impact energy during the critical drop events. They also serve to mitigate the impact severity and limit the g-load on the cask and its contents. The necessary structural properties for the impact absorbers are provided in Tables 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.

2.2.2 Nonstructural Materials 2.2.2.1 Insulation Board As shown in the licensing drawings in Section 1.3, a thin layer of thermal insulation board is incorporated in the cask closure lid and at strategic locations in the cask body to protect the closure lid seals against high temperatures during the design basis fire accident. The insulation board is pre-heated prior to installation as needed to remove any residual, combustible organic binders. The thermal properties of the insulation board are given in Section 3.2. The structural evaluations for to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-27 the HI-STAR 330 package do not take any credit for the insulation board as a load bearing member, and therefore its strength properties are not important to safety.

2.2.3 Effects of Radiation on HI-STAR 330 materials The general physical effects of radiation of metals by fast neutrons and other high-energy particles are summarized in the following table taken from a DOE Handbook on Material Science [2.2.1].

General Effect of Fast Neutron Irradiation on Metals Property Increases Property Decreases Yield Strength Tensile Strength Nil Ductility Temperature (NDT)

Youngs Modulus (Slight)

Hardness High Temperature Creep Rate (During Irradiation)

Ductility Stress-Rupture Strength Density Impact Strength Thermal Conductivity The HI-STAR 330 containment boundary is composed primarily of nickel/low alloy steel, which has a proven history of use in the nuclear industry. The contents of HI-STAR 330 are classified as fissile-exempt, and therefore the casks materials will not be subject to appreciable neutron fluence. Gamma radiation damage to stainless steel does not occur until the fluence level reaches 1018 rads or more. The 5040-year gamma fluence (assuming design basis for 50 40 years without radioactive decay) from the waste transported in the HI-STAR 330 package reduces significantly as it penetrates through cask components. Therefore, there is no risk of degradation of the containment system due to gamma fluence from the casks waste package.

2.2.4 Packaging Coatings and Consumable Chemical Products The information provided in this section identifies paints/coatings, lubricants and adhesives that may be applied to the HI-STAR 330 Package. Products identified in this section may be substituted by equivalent products meeting the specified acceptance criteria established in the table below.

The coatings, lubricants and adhesives identified are commercially available products with years of proven performance. Chemically identical products with different names are permitted.

Alternative products may be determined to be equivalent with consideration of manufacturer recommendation. Products that have had proven performance in similar applications, environments and/or operating conditions may also be permitted. Products shall be applied in accordance with the manufacturers recommendation or as approved by Holtec. The following critical characteristics are ranked in order of importance to guide in the selection of equivalent products:

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-33 TABLE 2.2.1: MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF CONTAINMENT COMPONENTS Temperature oC (oF)

SA-350 LF3 and /SA-203 E for Cask Containment Boundary SA-350 LF3 SA-350 LF3/SA-203 E SA-203 E Sy Su E

Sy Su

-73.30 (-100) 258.6 (37.5) 482.6 (70.0) 19.72 (28.6) 275.8 (40.0) 482.6 (70.0) 37.78 (100) 258.6 (37.5) 482.6 (70.0) 19.03 (27.6) 11.7 (6.5) 275.8 (40.0) 482.6 (70.0) 93.33 (200) 235.8 (34.3) 482.6 (70.0) 18.68 (27.1) 12.06 (6.7) 252.3 (36.6) 482.6 (70.0) 148.89 (300) 228.9 (33.2) 482.6 (70.0) 18.41 (26.7) 12.42 (6.9) 244.1 (35.4) 482.6 (70.0) 204.4 (400) 220.6 (32.0) 482.6 (70.0) 18.07 (26.2) 12.78 (7.1) 235.8 (34.2) 482.6 (70.0) 260 (500) 209.6 (30.4) 482.6 (70.0) 17.72 (25.7) 13.14 (7.3) 224.1 (32.5) 482.6 (70.0)

Definitions:

Sy =

Yield Stress MPa (ksi)

Su =

Ultimate Stress MPa (ksi)

=

Coefficient of Thermal Expansion, cm/cm-ºC x 10-6 (in./in. per degree F x 10-6)

E =

Youngs Modulus MPa x 104 (ksi x 103)

Notes:

1.

Source for Sy values is Table Y-1 of [2.1.4].

2.

Source for Su values is Table U of [2.1.4].

3.

Source for values is material group 1 in Table TE-1 of [2.1.4].

4.

Source for E values is material group C B in Table TM-1 of [2.1.4].

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-34 TABLE 2.2.2: MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF CLOSURE LID BOLT MATERIAL SA-564/705 630 (630 (H1025 Condition)

Temperature, ºC (ºF)

Sy Su E

38 (100) 999.5 (145.0) 1068.7 (155) 19.5 (28.3) 11.16 (6.2) 93.3 (200) 924.4 (134.1) 1068.7 (155) 19.1 (27.8) 11.34 (6.3)

Definitions:

Sm = Design stress intensity MPa (ksi)

Sy = Yield Stress MPa (ksi)

= Mean Coefficient of thermal expansion (in./in. per degree F x 10-6)

Su = Ultimate Stress MPa (ksi)

E = Young's Modulus MPa x 104 (psi x 106)

Notes:

1.

Source for Sy values is Table Y-1 of [2.1.4].

2.

Source for Su values is Table U of [2.1.4].

3.

Source for values is Table TE-1 of [2.1.4]. Values for are for H1075 condition in lieu of H1025 condition.

4.

Source for E values is Table TM-1 of [2.1.4].

5.

SA-705 630 and SA-564 630 (both UNS No. S17400) have the same chemistry requirements and are considered equivalent for the intended application.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-35 TABLE 2.2.3: MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF TRUNNION MATERIAL SA-479 S21800 Temperature, ºC (ºF)

Sy Su E

38 (100) 344.74 (50.0) 620.5 (90) 17.65 (25.6) 15.5 (8.6) 66 (150) 293.72 (42.6) 620.5 (90) 17.5 (25.4) 15.8 (8.8) 93 (200) 267.5 (38.8) 620.5 (90) 17.3 (25.1) 16.2 (8.9)

Definitions:

Sy =

Yield Stress MPa (ksi)

Su =

Ultimate Stress MPa (ksi)

=

Coefficient of Thermal Expansion, cm/cm-ºC x 10-6 (in./in. per degree F x 10-6)

E =

Youngs Modulus MPa x 104 (ksi x 103)

Notes:

1.

Source for Sy values is Table Y-1 of [2.1.4].

2.

Since Source forthe Su values for SA479 S21800 are not listed inis Table U of [2.1.4], an equivalent alloy design. S31803 is used to obtain the ultimate strengths from this Table. Note that the ultimate strength values reported aabove are more limiting than the values reported in the critical characteristics Table 8.1.5.

3.

Source for values is material group 3 in Table TE-1 of [2.1.4].

4.

Source for E values is material group I in Table TM-1 of [2.1.4].

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-36 TABLE 2.2.4: MECHANICAL PROPERTIES DOSE BLOCKER STRUCTURE Temperature

ºC (ºF)

SA-516 Grade 70 or A516 Gr 70 Sy Su E

38 (100) 262.0 (38.0) 482.6 (70.0) 11.7 (6.5) 20.17 (29.26) 93.3 (200) 239.9 (34.8) 482.6 (70.0) 12.06 (6.7) 19.86 (28.8) 149 (300)148.9 (500) 231.7 (33.6)231.7 (33.6) 482.6 (70.0)482.6 (70.0) 12.42 (6.9)12.42 (6.9) 19.51 (28.3)19.51 (28.3)

Definitions:

Sy =

Yield Stress, MPa (ksi)

=

Mean Coefficient of thermal expansion, cm/cm-ºC x 10-6 (in/in-ºF x 10-6)

Su =

Ultimate Stress, MPa (ksi)

E =

Youngs Modulus, MPa x 104 (psi x 106)

Notes:

1.

Source for Sy values is Table Y-1 of [2.1.4].

2.

Source for Su values is Table U of [2.1.4].

3.

Source for values is material group 1 in Table TE-1 of [2.1.4].

4.

Source for E values is Carbon steels with C less than or equal to 0.30% in Table TM-1 of [2.1.4].

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-37 TABLE 2.2.5: MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF ALUMINUM (IMPACT ABSORBERS)

Item & Property Category Primary Properties1Average Value Lower Bound Upper Bound Sy (Lower Bound/Upper Bound) 96.5 (14.0) / 165.5 (24.0) 165.5 (24.0)

Su (Lower Bound/Upper Bound) 220.6 (32.0) / 344.7 (50.0) 344.7 (50.0)

Secondary Properties2 E

6.759 (9.810) 22.3 (12.4)

Temperature, ºC (ºF)

Sy Su E

-29 to 38 (-20 to 100) 241.3 (35.0) 289.6 (42.0) 6.90 (10.0) 22.3 (12.4) 66 (150) 238.6 (34.6) 289.6 (42.0) 22.9 (12.7) 93 (200) 232.4 (33.7) 289.6 (42.0) 6.6 (9.6) 23.4 (13.0)

Definitions:

Sy =

Yield Stress MPa (ksi)

Su =

Ultimate Stress MPa (ksi)

=

Coefficient of Thermal Expansion, cm/cm-ºC x 10-6 (in./in. per degree F x 10-6)

E =

Youngs Modulus MPa x 104 (ksi x 103)

Notes:

1.

1.

Tensile strength and yield strength are considered primary properties that directly bear upon the structural response of the package. Therefore, the specified properties are critical for the package safety analysis. Source for Lower and Upper Bound Sy, Su are based on Table 8.1.5.

2.

The elastic modulus for aluminum alloy is a stable property, and it is not subject to significant variations. Source for Lower and Upper Bound Sy, Su are based on Table 8.1.5.

2.

Source for values is Table TE-2 of [2.1.4] at temperature of 38oC (100oF). to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-38

3.

Source for E value of impact absorber materials is Table TM-2 of [2.1.4] at an averagefor temperature of 65.5oC (150oF). It is noted from TM-2 table that E value variation between different grades of aluminum is negligible.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-41 2.3 Fabrication and Examinations The HI-STAR 330 non-fuel waste transport cask, as shown in the licensing drawings in Section 1.3, is a stainless carbon steel and alloy steel weldment of rectangular cross section. The inner walls and baseplate of the cask are fabricated of alloy steel (SA-517/A514) qualified to Subsection NB of the ASME code. The closure lid is a monolithic plate made of the same material and also procured to ASME Section III Subsection NB specifications. The inner walls, inner baseplate, and closure lid constitute the Containment Boundary of the cask. The cask outer walls and bottom plates, as well as the closure lid outer plate, constitute the Dose Blocker Structure (DBS), which is made from austenitic stainless steel (Type 304)carbon steel. The DBS components provide a prophylactic envelope around the containment system to protect it from environmental hazards as well as direct impact during an accident event. The DBS materials are procured to ASME Section II specifications.

As can be seen from manufacturing sequence of the cask pictorially illustrated in Figures 2.3.1 through 2.3.3, the fabrication steps are straight forward. The major manufacturing steps necessary to complete the casks fabrication are outlined below. The sequence of steps may be altered to improve fabricability or manufacturing efficiency. Welding and NDE requirements are specified on the licensing drawings in Section 1.3. A change in the raw material product form may also necessitate alteration in the steps:

i.

Flatten and cut all plate sections and check mating parts for fit up.

ii.

Assemble and weld the intermediate dose blocker walls.

iii.

Assemble and weld the containment walls, using the dose blocker walls as a constraint to control weld distortion.

iv.

Assemble and weld the containment and dose blocker base plates, and closure flange.

v.

Apply high strength weld overlay to the closure flange sealing surfaces, andsurfaces and machine seal grooves.

vi.

Install and weld the lifting trunnions to the dose blocker walls.

vii.

Assemble and install the machined closure lid, with sealing surface weld overlay applied.

viii.

Install impact absorbers to the exterior of the cask.

ix.

Perform leak test.

The following additional steps to insure high quality welds are employed in the manufacturing of HI-STAR 330 cask:

i.

The guidance of Reg Guide 1.31 [2.3.1] is followed to insure that there is sufficient quantity of delta-ferrite phase in the weld metal to protect against crack propagation.

ii.

All weld procedures are qualified to Section IX of the ASME code. In-process inspection of finished welds is provided in Chapter 8.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-46 2.5 Lifting and Tie-down Standards 2.5.1 Lifting Devices This subsection presents analysis methodologies and acceptance criteria for all lifting operations applicable to the transport of a HI-STAR 330 package to demonstrate compliance with requirements of 10CFR 71.45 [1.0.2] and NUREG-0612 [1.2.3].

In terms of the structural acceptance criteria, NUREG-0612 [1.2.3] is determined to be more stringent than the 10CFR 71.45. NUREG-0612 is therefore considered for the analysis of lifting points (or attachments) that are part of the HI-STAR 330 transport package in this SAR.

Accordingly, the lifting attachments that are part of the cask must meet the following stress criteria to comply with NUREG-0612 stress limits:

(1) Redundant Lift: A lifting member or lift point (lifting interface on the cask) is considered as load-path redundantredundant load if an alternative load path is determined to exist to prevent uncontrolled lowering of the equipment (or accidental drops). Lift points should have a design safety factor of five (5) times with respect to the material ultimate strength considering a single load path (i.e. only half the total number of lift points must be considered).

(2) Non-Redundant Lift: A lifting member or lift point (lifting interface on the cask) is considered as non-redundant if its failure would result in an uncontrolled lowering of the equipment (or accidental drops) is considered a Non-Redundant Lift. Lift points should have a design safety factor of ten (10) times with respect to the material ultimate strength considering both the load paths (i.e. all the lift points must be considered).

The aforementioned criteria ensure a safe handling of heavy loads in critical regions within nuclear power plants.

The evaluation of the adequacy of the lifting devices entails careful consideration of the applied loading and associated stress limits. The load combination D+H, where H is the handling load, is the generic case for all lifting adequacy assessments. The term D denotes the dead load. Quite obviously, D must be taken as the bounding value of the dead load of the component being lifted.

In all lifting analyses considered in this document, the handling load H is assumed to be equal to 0.15D. In other words, the inertia amplifier during the lifting operation is assumed to be equal to 0.15g. Thus, the apparent dead load of the component for stress analysis purposes is D* = 1.15D.

Unless otherwise stated, all lifting analyses in this chapter use the apparent dead load, D*, in the lifting analysis.

Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all stress results for lifting devices are presented in dimensionless form, as safety factors, defined as SF, where:

SF = (Allowable Stress Intensity in the Region Considered)/(Computed Maximum Stress Intensity to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-47 in the Region)

The analysis details are presented in [2.6.4].

2.5.1.1 Cask Trunnion Analysis The HI-STAR 330 package is provided with four Lifting Trunnions on the cask side walls to perform vertical lifting of the cask. The licensing drawings in Section 1.3 showsshow the location of the Lifting Trunnions. It is further noted that all four trunnions shall be used for vertical lifting of the transport package at any time. As discussed in Section 8.1.2.4, all four trunnions are considered in the lifting analysis.

The trunnion material properties is are identifiedlisted in Table 2.2.38.1.5. The trunnion material is identified in the licensing drawings in Section 1.3. The embedded trunnion is analyzed as a cantilever beam subjected to a line load applied at the centerline of the interfacing lifting device.

A strength of materials approach is used to represent the trunnion as a cantilever beam with a circular cross section. The bending moment and shear force at the root of the trunnion cantilever is compared against allowable stress limit. The contact region between the trunnion and the surrounding package wall plate material subject to bearing type stresses, are evaluated for three times the lifted load and the structural adequacy is verified against the material yield strength.

The contact region between the trunnion and the surrounding package wall plate material is also evaluated to demonstrate satisfaction of ASME Level A stress limits [2.1.5].

Minimum safety factors are summarized in Table 2.5.1.

2.5.1.2 Cask Closure Lid and BaseplateCask During Lifting and Cask Closure Lid Lifting 2.5.1.2.1 Baseplate Cask During Lifting During lifting of a loaded HI-STAR 330 the containment baseplate is subject to amplified dead load, D*, from the Liner Tank and its internals. To analyze this condition, the baseplate and a portion of the containment shell is modeled using the ANSYS finite element code [2.6.2] and a static lifting analysis is performed. The weight of the closure lid is included in the FE model. The load case considers the loads from the fully loaded Liner Tank and the self-weight of the baseplate.

In this load case, the 15% amplifier is applied to the lifted load.

The results from the analysis of the top-end lift are summarized in Table 2.5.2, where the minimum safety factors for components in the load path are computed using the ASME Level A allowable stress intensities from Table 2.1.3.

2.5.1.2.2 Closure Lid Lifting Attachment The closure lid contains lid lifting lugs used to move the lid over and onto the closure flange of the cask. The lid lifting lugs are adequately sized to meet allowable stresses in accordance with NUREG-0612 requirements (which are more severe than 10CFR71.45(a) requirements). Strength to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-48 of materials based calculations are performed to demonstrate safety compliance of the lid lifting lugs.

Minimum safety factors are summarized in Table 2.5.3.

2.5.1.22.5.1.3 Failure of Lifting Devices 10CFR71.45 also requires that the lifting attachments permanently attached to the cask be designed in a manner such that a structural failure during lifting will not impair the ability of the transportation package to meet other requirements of Part 10CFR71. The ultimate load carrying capacity of the lifting trunnions is governed by the cross section of the trunnion external to the cask rather than by any section within the cask. Loss of the external shank of the lifting trunnion will not cause loss of any other structural or shielding function of the HI-STAR 330 cask; therefore, the requirement imposed by 10CFR71.45(a) is satisfied.

2.5.2 Tie-Down Devices

[

Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390

]

2.5.3 Safety Evaluation of Lifting and Tie-Down Devices Cask lifting and tie-down devices have been considered in Subsections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, respectively. More importantly their designs have been shown to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR71.45. All calculated safety factors for the caskcask lifting and tie-down devices are greater than 1.0.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-49 TABLE 2.5.1: RESULTS FOR CASK TRUNNION ANALYSIS Item Calculated Value Safety Factor Bending Moment in Trunnion - kip-in (kN-m) 373.75 (42.23) 1.215 Shear Force in Trunnion - kip (kN) 74.75 (332.5) 3.6375 Bearing Stress in Trunnion hollow ShaftDose Blocker Side Plate (Comparison with Yield Strength in Compression) - ksi (MPa) 14.2322.03 (98.14154.91) 2.391.55 Note:

Safety factors for the trunnions reported in this table are computed based on the requirements of NUREG-0612 [1.2.3]. The bearing stress safety factor is based on 3 times the lifted load and compared against the material yield strength.

TABLE 2.5.2: RESULTS FOR BASEPLATE DURING CASK LIFTING Item

Value, psi (MPa)

Limit, psi (MPa)

Minimum Safety Factor Containment Walls 585 (4.033) 34,950 (240.9) 59.7 Base Plate, Membrane Bending Stress 508508 (3.3.502503) 34,950 (240.9) 68.868.8 The stress limit is established in Table 2.1.3.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-50 TABLE 2.5.3: RESULTS FOR CLOSURE LID LIFTING ATTACHMENTS Item Value, psi (MPa)

Limit, psi (MPa)

Minimum Safety Factor Tensile Stress in Lifting Attachment 1,586 (10.94) 9,000 (62.05) 5.67 Shear Stress in Lifting Attachment 2,225 (15.34) 5,193 (35.80) 2.33 Stress in the attachment weld 3,005 (20.78) 4,039 (27.85) 1.34 Note:

Safety factorfactors reported in this table are calculated based on the requirements fromof NUREG-0612 [1.2.3].

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-51 2.6 Routine and Normal Conditions of Transport In this section, the HI-STAR 330 package, when subjected to the normal conditions of transport (listed as load case B in Table 2.1.1) are analyzed. A comprehensive 3-D finite element analysis of the package, using Q.A.-validated codes (see Appendix 2.A), is utilized for its structural qualification. A 3-D finite element model of the HI-STAR 330 cask along the Liner Tank and Liner Tank Cassette has been prepared and assembled into a package system to analyze both the Normal and Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport drops.

The loading cases listed in Table 2.1.1 include both static and dynamic conditions. For static loading conditions, the cask is analyzed using simplified yet conservative strength of material based approach. A more rigorous finite element (FE) analysis is conducted using computer code ANSYS [2.6.2] when necessitated. For dynamic loading scenarios involving impacts (transport package drops pursuant to 10CFR71), the state of the art numerical analysis code LS-DYNA is used. Appendixces 2A and 2B provides the QA validation of the LS-DYNA code for evaluating the drop events.

2.6.1 Description of the Finite Element Model

[

Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390

]

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-57 a) The Liner Tank walls are not subject to gross deformation under the top and bottom end drops.

b) The Liner Tank top lid and baseplate remain connected to the tank walls when subject to critical side drop accidents. In other words, the evaluations demonstrate the base welds and the top closure bolts remain structurally adequate.

c) The LTC corner tie-rods are shown not to buckle under the NCT drops. The LTC top and bottom plates remain in place under the critical NCT limiting end drops.

It is therefore demonstrated that the Liner Tanks and LTCs remain functional following the NCT drops.

2.6.4 Compression As discussed in Subsection 2.1.2, an evaluation is performed for the compression test. The HI-STAR 330 cask is subjected to a load corresponding to the compression test and an FE based analysis is performed to determine the corresponding stresses in the cask containment components.

The results of this evaluation are summarized in Table 2.6.3. It is clearly demonstrated that large safety factors exist in the cask containment boundary components under the compression loading.

2.6.5 Fatigue Considerations Regulatory Guide 7.9 [2.6.5] suggests consideration of fatigue due to cyclic loading under normal conditions of transport. Considerations of fatigue of individual components of the package, associated with long-term exposure to vibratory motion during normal conditions of transport, are presented below:

Cask Fatigue Considerations

i.

Atmospheric to Normal Service Pressure Cycle Since the operating pressure in the cask HI-STAR 330 is very low (~xxx psi), the potential for pressure fluctuation is insignificant.. Therefore, this condition is not applicable to thethe fatigue expenditure to this conditionpressure fluctuations is not credible.

ii.

Normal Service Pressure Fluctuation Since the pressure in the cask is very low, the pressure fluctuation is insignificant.

Therefore, this condition is not applicable to the HI-STAR 330 cask.

iii.

Temperature Difference - Startup and Shutdown The temperature fluctuations during startup and shutdown are very low in the HI-STAR 330 cask. Therefore, the fatigue expenditure to temperature fluctuations is not to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-58 credible.Therefore, this condition is not applicable to the HI-STAR 330 cask.

iiiv.

Temperature Difference - Normal Service The temperature difference between adjacent components of the HI-STAR 330 during normal services is very small as this is a non-fuel waste cask. Therefore, the fatigue expenditure to temperature fluctuations is not credible.Therefore, this condition is not applicable to the HI-STAR 330 cask.

iv.

Mechanical Loads Mechanical loadings of appreciable cycling occur in the HI-STAR 300 Package only during transportation. The stress cycling under transportation conditions is considered significant if the stress intensity amplitude is greater than Sa corresponding to 106 cycles.

It, therefore, follows that the stress intensity range that exempts the cask is 25,000 psi (172.4MPa).

Inertia loads typically associated with rail transport will produce stress intensity ranges in the cask that are a small fraction of the above limits. Therefore, the potential for large fatigue expenditure in the cask materials, under transportation conditions, is not credible.

In conclusion, the cask does not require fatigue evaluation under the exemption criteria of the ASME Code.The extent of fatigue expenditure in the HI-STAR 330 Transport Package due to vibration of the package during transport will be negligible because of the large section modulus of the cask structure and small inertia loads associated with transportation. The structural stiffness of the HI-STAR 330 Transport Package, including its welds, is evidenced by its ability to withstand the inertia loads from the hypothetical accident condition (free drop from 9 meters) analyzed in Section 2.7. The vibration loads, which are a small fraction of the accident condition loads, can therefore be reasonably expected to produce cyclic stresses that are well below the endurance strength of the cask structural members and its welds.

Fatigue Analysis of the Cask Containment Walls To provide quantitative evidence, the induced stress in the containment shell (at its minimum cross section) under the dead weight of the HI-STAR 330 cask is compared against the endurance limit of SA-203 steel. Table 2.6.5 addresses the fatigue assessment for the containment walls under normal conditions of transport.

Fatigue Analysis of the Cask Closure Lid, Closure Lid Bolts and the Conning Flange Internal Threads The cask closure lid for the HI-STAR 330 package is not subject to significant load fluctuations under normal operations. During HI-STAR 330 package normal transportation, however, the to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-59 closure lid may be subject to some inertial loads. The inertial loads on the closure lid are significantly lower than the loads representative of the free drops analyzed in Sections 2.6 and 2.7.

On the other hand, the bolts securing the closure lid to the top flange is subject to pre-loading (pre-stress). The maximum tensile stress range, developed in the cask closure bolts during normal operating conditions, occurs during the bolt preloading operation. As a result of bolt preloading, the cask containment flange internal threads are also subject to stresses which warrants a fatigue assessment. The fatigue assessment of the closure lid bolting and the corresponding internal threads in the containment flange is documented in [2.6.4].

The summary results for the fatigue assessment of the containment wall, the closure lid bolts and the containment flange are presented in Table 2.6.5.

Since the fatigue life for the cask containment walls and the flange internal threadsboundary is expected to be very high, it is concluded that the mechanical vibration effects are essentially ineffective as causative mechanisms for the loss of fatigue endurance capacity of the HI-STAR 330 Transport Package. HoweveThe r, fatigue calculations for the containment walls, closure lid bolts and the containment closure flange internal threads are conservatively performed in [2.6.4]

and the results are summarizedpresented in Table 2.6.5.

2.6.6 Vibration During transportation vibratory motions may result in low-level stress cycles in the package due to beam-like or plate-type deformation modes. If any of the package components have natural frequencies in the flexible range (i.e., below 33 Hz), or near the flexible range, then resonance may amplify the low level input into a significant stress response. Strength of materials based calculations are performed to establish that vibrations are not an issue in transport of the HI-STAR 330.

When in a horizontal position, the HI-STAR 330 cask is supported over a considerable length of the DBS. Conservatively considering the HI-STAR 330 as a uniform beam with both ends free, and assuming the total mass of the internals and its contents moves with the cask, a computation of the lowest natural frequency of the structure during transport provides a result in the rigid range.

(See calculation package [2.6.4]).

The drum mode frequency of the containment boundary side wall, assuming that it acts as a rectangular plate with simply supported edges, is also in the rigid range based on calculations performed in [2.6.4].

Based on these frequency calculations, it is concluded that vibration effects are inconsequential to the structural integrity of the HI-STAR 330 package.

TABLE 2.6.1

SUMMARY

RESULTS FOR THE CASK EXTERNAL PRESSURE LOADING to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-60 Component Stress Type Allowable Stress Intensity -

ksi/MPa Induced Stress Intensity-ksi/MPa Safety Factor Closure Lid Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending 35.04.95/240.971.3 5.19/35.8 6.743 Containments Wall Plate Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending 35.0/241.334.95/24 0.97 25.09/173

.0 1.3439 Base Plate Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending 35.0/241.334.95/24 0.97 10.87/74.

95 3.22 to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-62 Simulation Component Stress Category Induced Stress MPa/ksi Allowable Stress MPa/ksi Safety Factor Reference Top End Drop Closure Lid Bolts Primary Membrane Stress IntensityAverage Service Stress 42302.9 6 (6261.53) 666 (96.6) 1.585

[2.6.3]

Primary Bending Stress IntensityMaximum Service Stress 62632.2 7 (91.70.9) 999 (144.9) 1.5859 Containment Wall +

Baseplate + Top Flange+

Closure Lid Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 110.3 103.4 (1615) 157.9 (22.9) 1.5343 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 20112.4 3 (30.829.2) 237.2 (34.4) 1.1218 Secondary Stress Intensity 417.8399.2 (60.657.9) 473.7 (68.7) 1.1319 Containment Weld Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 119.7 (17.36) 142.1 (20.61) 1.19 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 146.6 (21.26) 213.5 (30.96) 1.46 Secondary Stress Intensity 213.7 (31) 426.3 (61.83) 1.99 Bottom End Drop Closure Lid Bolts Average Service StressPrimary Membrane Stress Intensity 39342.0 (5749.6) 666 (96.6) 1.9569 Maximum Service StressPrimary Bending Stress Intensity 434.4383.3 (6355.6) 999 (144.9) 2.6130 Containment Wall +

Baseplate + Top Flange+

Closure Lid Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 117 88.3 (1712.8) 157.9 (22.9) 1.3579 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 186.2172.4 (2725) 237.2 (34.4) 1.2738 Secondary Stress Intensity 433.7423.4 (6261.94) 473.7 (68.7) 1.0912 Containment Weld Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 104.1 (15.1) 142.1 (20.61) 1.36 to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-63 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 189.7 (27.52) 213.5 (30.96) 1.13 Secondary Stress Intensity 276.0 (40.03) 426.3 (61.83) 1.54 Side Drop (Long Side)

Closure Lid Bolts Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 413.7 (60) 666 (96.6) 1.61 Primary Bending Stress Intensity 461.9 (67) 999 (144.9) 2.16 Containment Wall +

Baseplate + Top Flange+

Closure Lid Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 117 (17) 157.9 (22.9) 1.35 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 151.7 (22) 237.2 (34.4) 1.56 Secondary Stress Intensity 410.2 (59.5) 473.7 (68.7) 1.15 TABLE 2.6.2 (CONTINUED)

SUMMARY

RESULTS FOR THE CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY COMPONENTS - GOVERNING NCT DROPS to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-64 Simulation Component Stress Category Induced Stress MPa/ksi Allowable Stress MPa/ksi Safety Factor Reference Side Drop (Long Side)

Closure Lid Bolts Average Service Stress 468.8 (68) 666 (96.6) 1.42

[2.6.3]

Maximum Service Stress 530.9 (77) 999 (144.9) 1.88 Containment Wall +

Baseplate + Top Flange+

Closure Lid Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 131.1 (19.02) 157.9 (22.9) 1.20 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 173.1 (25.1) 237.2 (34.4) 1.37 Secondary Stress Intensity 424.2 (61.6) 473.7 (68.7) 1.12 Containment Weld Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 134.9 (19.56) 142.1 (20.61) 1.05 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 182.8 (26.52) 213.5 (30.96) 1.17 Secondary Stress Intensity 374.8 (54.36) 426.3 (61.83) 1.14 Side Drop (Short Side)

Closure Lid Bolts Average Service StressPrimary Membrane Stress Intensity 355.872.3 (5451.6) 666 (96.6) 1.87 Maximum Service StressPrimary Bending Stress Intensity 461469.9 5 (6768.1) 999 (144.9) 2.1613 Containment Wall +

Baseplate + Top Flange+

Closure Lid Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 137.91 (1920) 157.9 (22.9) 1.2115 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 18265.5 0 (26.4) 237.2 (34.4) 1.3043 Secondary Stress Intensity 413.7 (60) 473.7 (68.7) 1.15 Containment Weld Primary Membrane Stress Intensity 114.3 (16.58) 142.1 (20.61) 1.24 Primary Membrane +

Bending Stress Intensity 189.2 (27.44) 213.5 (30.96) 1.13 Secondary Stress Intensity 388.7 (56.38) 426.3 (61.83) 1.10 to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-65 TABLE 2.6.3: RESULTS FOR COMPRESSION TEST Loading Component Stress Type Allowable Stress ksi (MPa)1 Stress intensity ksi (MPa)

Safety Factor Uniform Pressure on top lid, 160 psi Closure Lid Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending 34.9535.0 (240.971.3) 5.28 (36.40) 6.62 Containments Wall Plate Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending 34.9535.0 (240.971.3) 4.00 (27.59) 8.74 Base Plate Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending 34.95.0 (240.971.3) 1.52 (10.47) 23.0 1 The stress limits are established in Table 2.1.3. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-66 TABLE 2.6.4: KEY FE MODEL DATA Item Value Weight of the Cask Contents (Loaded Waste Package)

Refer to Table 1.1.1 of this SAR Cask Inside Dimensions Cask Outside Dimensions Total Number of Elements (including Liner Target)

>1,340467,000 Total Number of Nodes

>1,650796,000 TABLE 2.6.5: RESULTS FOR FATIGUE ASSESSMENT Component Effective Stress Intensity Amplitude ksi (MPa)

Number of Cycles Closure Lid Bolt 172.6191.24 (1,319,190) 20050 Containments Wall Plates 8.868.856 (61.61.061)

> < 1x1081x108 Closure Flange Internal Threads 19.6821.18 (135.146.07)

> < 1x1051x105 to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-81

3. Long Side Drop The package drops with its longitudinal axis vertically orientated. The primary impact is considered on the larger package surface in order to maximize the bending in the containment wall.

4. Short Side Drop The package drops with its longitudinal axis horizontally orientated. The primary impact is considered on the short surface to maximize the loading on the sealing zone and bolts.

5. C.G.O.C. (Primary Impact with Top End Corner)

The center-of-gravity of the package is directly above and aligned with the initial contact point at the cask top end.

6. C.G.O.C. (Primary Impact with Bottom End Corner)

The center-of-gravity of the package is directly above and aligned with the initial contact point at the cask bottom end.

7. Oblique Drop on Top Lid (a.k.a. SlapdownIncline)

The model is oriented such that the loads will act onto the impact absorbers edge and will tend to separate it away from the cask. To maximize the loading on the closure containment sealing, the top corner is chosen for the impact event.Top corner is chosen for the impact event.The package orientation w.r.t the impact target corresponds to the quarter-scale package oblique top-down drop [2.6.6]

8. Sensitivity Simulation Same as Drop orientation 1 with lower bound material strength properties for the impact absorbers per Table 8.1.5.

Additionally, the 9-m (30-ft) drop with C.G.O.C (primary impact with top end corner) followed by a 1-m puncture drop and 9-m3 (30-ft) drop with cask bottom end drop followed by a 1-m puncture drop analyses are also performed and presentedthe key safety results are discussed in Section 2.7.2.

As discussed earlier, the structural integrity of the HI-STAR 330 containment boundary components under the HAC drops is evaluated using the component stress intensity (i.e., two times maximum shear stress) results obtained from the analyzed drop events. Figures 2.7.1 through 2.7.11 13 show the typical stress results for the HAC drop simulations. Table 2.7.1 summarizes the key results for all the critical 30-ft (9-m) HAC drop conditions.

Figures 2.7.4 5and 2.7.5 show the extent of local deformation in the cask DBS for the limiting CGOC top and bottom end drop accidents, respectively. It can be seen from the simulation results,results that the deformation of the cask is minimal due to the provision of the impact absorber material. The simulation results also demonstrate that there is no gross failure or separation of the dose blocker components from the cask body.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-82 Figure 2.7.11 shows that the opening between the closure lid and the top flange subsequent to the governing top end drop accident. Since the opening, subsequent to the critical drop accident, is less than the useful springback of the seals, the joint is demonstrated to be leaktight.

In addition, the Liner Tank is evaluated to meet the specified acceptance criteria, as documented in the calculation [2.6.4]. Specifically, it is demonstrated that:

a) the Liner Tank walls are not subject to gross failure under the top and bottom end drops; b) the Liner Tank top lid and baseplate remain connected to the tank walls when subject to the critical side drop accidents.

It is therefore demonstrated that the Liner Tank satisfies the structural acceptance criteria for the HAC drops.

As previously noted, the top and bottom plate of the LTCs are also credited for shielding under accident conditions. However, a relocation of those plates is considered in the shielding analyses, i.e. no credit is taken any more for the corner tie-rods. Therefore, no structural acceptance criterion for the LTC during the hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) is applied.

Figure 2.7.12 shows the physical state of the cask after the end of puncture drop onto the corner impact absorber event. It is observed that the strongback plate assembly remains attached to the cask after the puncture drop event.

Figure 2.7.13 shows the physical state of the cask after the end of top CGOC followed by puncture drop event. It is observed that there is no significant damage to the dose blocker plates after the top CGOC drop followed by the puncture drop event.

The tertiary containers may be employed in conjunction with Liner Tanks and LTCs to increase the shielding of the transported package contents. Governing end drops and side drop of the tertiary container inside of the LTCs are also performed. The results for the tertiary container connections are presented in Table 2.7.4.

The analysis presented in [2.6.3] also confirms that the single-piece modeling of dunnage inside the liner tank in a direct loading configuration, provides a bounding results relative to the discrete dunnage configuration.

Lastly, the key results for the sensitivity simulation are summarized in Table 2.7.3. It is shown that the lower bound material strength properties considered for the impact absorber material in the sensitivity simulation have negligible effect on the results. The results presented in summary table 2.7.3 indicates that safety results presented in Table 2.7.1 remain bounding. More importantly, the overall conclusion reached from the base simulations remains unchanged.

The materials used for the cask exterior impact absorber components must meet the strength limits summarized in Table 8.1.5 of this SAR. If the strength properties for these impact absorbing (or energy absorbing) components exceed the limits specified in the Table 8.1.5, the package must be to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-83 qualified by re-analysis using the same licensing basis FE model and methodology presented in this Chapter.

2.7.2 Puncture This is the Load Case D in Table 2.1.1. The effects of the puncture drop will, quite ostensibly, be most severe when the steel bar is perpendicular to the impact surface. Therefore, the puncture analysis assumes that the bar is perpendicular to the impact surface and is aligned with the center of gravity of the package as applicable.

Four limiting transport package orientations are considered for the 1-meter (40-inches) puncture drop events viz., the top end puncture onto the closure center, the top end puncture onto the closure lid edge aligned with the seals, the puncture bar aligned with the seals onto the cask short side and the puncture bar aligned with the seals onto the cask long side. Specific details of the 40-inches puncture are discussed below:

i.

Top End Puncture Drop at the Lid Center: The top end drop package puncture model is identical to the 9-m (30-ft.) top end drop model except for the impact target which is replaced by a 6 diameter vertical steel bar fixed at its baseThis particular drop event is considered critical since it could challenge the closure lid and potentially open up the sealed joint contributing to loss of the gasket sealing function. The puncture bar essentially impacts the center of the closure lid which maximizes bending in the closure lid. Another top end puncture drop event is considered with the puncture bar impacting the center of the closure lid which maximizes bending in the closure lid.

ii.

Top End Puncture Drop Over Sealing Region: This particular drop event is considered critical since it could challenge the closure lid and potentially open up the sealed joint contributing to loss of the gasket sealing function. The top end drop puncture model is identical to the 9-m (30-ft.) top end drop model except for the impact target which is replaced by a 6 diameter vertical steel bar fixed at its base. The puncture bar essentially impacts on the closure lid long edge aligned with the seals to maximize the potential damage to the seal seating surfaces.

iii.

Short Side Puncture Drop Near Sealing Region :Region: The short side puncture drop model is identical to the corresponding 9-m side drop model with exception that the impact target is replaced by a 6 diameter vertical steel bar fixed at its base. To render conservative results, the puncture bar is assumed to impact the HI-STAR 330 package onto the outer side dose blocker plate aligned with the seal seating region to maximize the potential damage to the seal seating surfaces iv.

Long Side Puncture Drop Near Sealing Region :Region: The long side puncture drop model is identical to the corresponding 9-m side drop model with exception that the impact target is replaced by a 6 diameter vertical steel bar fixed at its base. The impact target is to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-84 placed near the center of the long side in plane of the sealing region to maximize the potential damage to the seal seating surfaces.

v.

Long Side Puncture Drop on the Impact Absorber Bracket :Bracket: The long side puncture drop model is identical to the corresponding 9-m bottom end drop model with exception that the impact target is replaced by a 6 diameter vertical steel bar fixed at its base. The puncture bar is positioned to impact the cask side impact absorber bracket assembly, including the aluminum absorbers.

vi.

Puncture Drop onto the Corner Impact Absorber :Absorber: The corner impact drop model is identical to the corresponding 9-m bottom end drop model with exception that the impact target is replaced by a 6 diameter vertical steel bar fixed at its base. In this drop scenario, the puncture bar is positioned directly below the corner impact absorber.

vii.

Puncture Drop onto the Edge of the Strongback Protective Cover :Cover: The edge of strongback protective cover puncture drop model is identical to the corresponding 9-m bottom end drop model with except that the impact target is replaced by a 6 diameter vertical steel bar fixed at its base. This simulation evaluates a scenario where the edge of the strongback protective cover is impacted by the puncture bar to assesassess the localized bending of the protective cover and possible breach of the internal thermal insulation layer.

iv.viii. Puncture Drop onto the Trunnion :Trunnion: The puncture drop onto the trunnion model is identical to the corresponding 9-m bottom end drop model with exception that the impact target is replaced by a 6 diameter vertical steel bar fixed at its base. In this scenario, the puncture bar is aligned to directly strike the trunnion Additionally, the CGOC (primary impact with top end corner) puncture drop and bottom end puncture drop simulation warrants a special mention since they are sequenced after the respective orientation 30 ft. (9-m) free drop event to accumulate the damage to the package from both accidental events viz. 9-m drop onto a rigid flat target and 1-m drop onto a puncture bar. For the subsequent 1-m puncture drop after the 9-m HAC drop, the critical components are carried forward from the cask CGOC and bottom end drops. This setup ensures that residual stresses, deformations, and local plasticity realized by the cask from the bottom-end drop are accurately preserved and carried forward to the puncture event.

For the subsequent 1-m puncture drop after the 9-m HAC drop, the critical components are carried forward from the CGOC and bottom end drops. This setup ensures that residual stresses, deformations, and local plasticity realized by the cask from the bottom-end drop are accurately preserved and carried forward to the puncture event.

Figure 2.7.5 shows that there is superficial damage to the DBS after the 30 ft. (9-m) CGOC drop events. Hence, a A sequential puncture drop event after the CGOC drop event is unwarranted also performedas separate puncture analyses are already to maximize the potential damage to the seal seating surfaces. Figure 2.7.13 shows that there is superficial damage to the DBS after the 30 ft.

(9-m) CGOC drop followed by 1-m puncture drop event. Targeted puncture drops onto the package top and side drops aligned with the sealing region is further justified due to the closer proximity to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-85 of the sealing region from the cask exterior from the cask top and sides in comparison to cask corner.

A mild steel bar used for the puncture simulations is placed in the proper orientation to maximize the damage to the cask. Its bottom nodes are applied a fixed constraint. The package is then assumed to have a known initial velocity at contact with the bar. The governing results from this evaluation are summarized in Table 2.7.2. Figures 2.7.7 through 2.7.10 show the key results in the containment boundary components.

The results from the puncture analyses yield the following conclusions:

i.

No thru-wall penetration of the containment boundary is indicated. The total depth of local indentation is a fraction of the available material thickness in the path of the penetrant.

ii.

The primary stresses in the closure lid, the containment shell, and the baseplate remain below their respective limits.

iii.

The opening between the closure lid to top flange in the seal region, resulting from the governing HAC, is shown to be less than the seal useful springback. It is therefore demonstrated that the land area (i.e. closure lid/top flange joint interface region) remains sealed subsequent to the critical HAC drop events.

iv.

The DBS continues to maintain its shielding effectiveness (i.e., no thru-wall cracks).

v.

The thermal performance of the package remains unaffected by the puncture drops.

vi.

The strongback assembly remains attached to the cask, ensuring the continued effectiveness of the thermal insulation layer critical for fire accident protection.

vi.vii.

The trunnion puncture simulation confirms that the weld between the trunnion and the dose blocker plate can withstand the imposed load without rupturerupture, and the trunnion will not get detached from the cask.

The above results confirm the structural adequacy of the package under the puncture event.

2.7.3 Thermal In this subsection, the structural consequences of the 30-minute fire event, which occurs after hypothetical drop and puncture events, are evaluated using the metal temperature data from Chapter 3 where a detailed analysis of the fire and post-fire condition is presented.

During NCT, thermal stresses have no effect on the behavior of the closure lid sealed joint. This is due to the low design basis heat load of the cask (see Table 7.1.2) and the fact that the maximum metal temperatures of the containment top flange and the closure lid are nearly equal under NCT (see Table 3.1.1). to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-86 The more significant risk to the closure lid sealed joint and the effectiveness of the containment boundary is associated with the fire event during HAC. The worst-case scenario is a top-down drop with the cask coming to rest on the closure lid followed by a 30-minute enveloping fire per 10CFR71 requirements. Since the closure lid is directly exposed to the flame, it heats up more than the closure lid bolts and causes differential thermal growth between these two components. The risk is that, with the cask oriented upside down, the differential thermal growth would allow the lid to displace downward and unload the sealed joint between the closure lid and the compression land on the top flange.

To evaluate this risk, the maximum differential thermal growth between the closure lid and the closure lid bolts has been calculated for the fire event and compared with the minimum useful springback of the seals specified in Table 2.2.6. Since the calculated differential thermal growth is much less than the useful springback, the seals will remain functionalfunctional, and the containment boundary will not be compromised. The differential thermal growth calculation is documented in [2.6.4].

The 30-minute fire event also results in an increased cask cavity pressure, as reported in Table 3.1.3. The induced stress in the containment boundary due to the maximum cask cavity pressure is less than the material yield strength corresponding to the peak metal temperature, as shown in

[2.6.4]. This means that the fire accident event does not result in any permanent deformation of the containment boundary components. More importantly, it allows the evaluation of the drop and puncture events to be decoupled from the fire accident event since the latter does not produce any inelastic strains.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2-92 TABLE 2.7.4: Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2.REF-1 Chapter 2 References The following generic industry and Holtec produced references may have been consulted in the preparation of this document. Where specifically cited, the identifier is listed in the SAR text or table.

[2.1.1]

Regulatory Guide 7.6, "Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels", Revision 1, March, 1978, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

[2.1.2]

ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection NF, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 Edition.

[2.1.3]

ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection WB, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 Edition.

[2.1.4]

ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Parts A and D, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 Edition.

[2.1.5]

ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection NB, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 Edition.

[2.1.6]

Regulatory Guide 7.8, "Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material", Revision 1, March, 1989, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

[2.1.7]

Deleted.

[2.1.8]

ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Nonmandatory Appendices EE and FF, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 Edition.

[2.1.9]

NUREG-1617 2216 Standard Review Plan for Transportation Packages for Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation, USNRC, (200019).

[2.1.10]

ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Appendices, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 Edition.

[2.1.11]

NUREG/CR-1815, Recommendations for Protecting Against Failure by Brittle Fracture in Ferritic Steel Shipping Containers Up to Four Inches Thick.

[2.2.1]

DOE-HDBK - 1017/2-93, DOE Fundamentals Handbook, Material Science, Vol.

2 of 2.

[2.3.1]

Reg Guide 1.31, Control of Ferrite Content in Weld Metal, October 2013, Rev 4. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 2.REF-2

[2.6.1]

LS-DYNA, Version mpp971d R10.1.0.LS-DYNA, Version 971, LSTC Software, 2006.

[2.6.2]

ANSYS, Version 2020R2, Ansys Inc., Copyright 2020 SAS IP, Inc.

[2.6.3]

Holtec Calculation HI-2240059, Revision 01, HI-STAR 330 Package Drop Analysis.

[2.6.4]

Holtec Calculation HI-2210998, Revision 01, Structural Calculation Package for HI-STAR 330 Transport Package.

[2.6.5]

Regulatory Guide 7.9, Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material

[2.6.6]

HI-2167517, Revision 2, HI-STAR ATB 1T Transport Package Quarter Scale Drop Simulations Using LS-DYNA Program.

[2.6.7]

SAND2017-0404 Holtec HI-STAR 330 ATB 1T Impact Test Program Report, Sandia National Laboratories, January 2017.

[2.6.8]

HI-2210251, Revision 01, Benchmarking of Material Stress-Strain Curves in LS-DYNA.

[2.7.1]

Draft Guidance Document, Use of Explicit Finite element Analysis for the Evaluation of Nuclear Transport and Storage Packages in Energy-Limited Impact Events, 2015.Deleted.

[2.7.2]

Atlas of Stress-Strain Curves, Howard E. Boyer, American Society for Metals, 1987.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 3-2 3.1 Description of Thermal Design 3.1.1 Design Features Design details of the HI-STAR 330 Package are presented in Chapter 1 with structural and mechanical features further described in Chapter 2. The HI-STAR 330 Package geometry is detailed in Section 1.3. The HI-STAR 330 Package consists of a Liner Tank inside a thick cask equipped with a removable closure lid. An insulation board is used in the top impact absorber strongback frame to ensure the sealing gasket performance is not compromised during accident conditions due to high temperatures. The Liner Tank contains a Liner Tank Cassette (LTC), and the stainless-steel segments cut from reactor internal components placed in the LTC. The Liner Tank cavity and the cask cavity (i.e. the open space between the Liner Tank external surface and the cask internal surface) are at atmospheric pressure, at time of its sealing. Prior to sealing the Liner Tank, the residual water inside the Liner Tank is removed by the method of vacuum drying.

The rejection of heat from the cask occurs from its external surfaces by natural convection and radiation.

3.1.2 Contents Decay Heat The design basis heat load for the HI-STAR 330 Package is provided in Table 1.2.1. A heat load of 1.75kW, which is the maximum permissible heat load (Table 7.1.2) and bounds the design basis heat loads in Table 1.2.1, is adopted in all thermal evaluations in this chapter.

3.1.3 Summary Table of Temperatures The HI-STAR 330 Package temperatures are analyzed for the normal transport condition and under the design basis fire event in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Tables 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 provide summary data on computed package temperatures under the normal transport condition and the design basis fire event.

3.1.4 Summary Table of Maximum Pressures The HI-STAR 330 Package containment boundary pressure under normal transport condition is required to remain below the design pressure set down in Table 1.2.1. Internal pressures computed under the normal and design basis fire conditions are summarized in Table 3.1.3.

3.1.5 Cask Surface Temperature Evaluation In accordance with the regulatory requirement specified in 10CFR71 (§71.43(g)), the cask accessible surface temperature is evaluated in still air at 38oC (100oF) and in shade. The calculated cask surface temperature tabulated in Table 3.1.4 is below the allowable surface temperature limit of 85oC (185oF).

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 3.REF-1 Chapter 3 References

[3.0.1]

Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material, USNRC 10CFR Part 71

[3.2.1]

Baumeister, T., Avallone, E.A. and Baumeister III, T., Marks Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, 8th Edition, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1978.

[3.2.2]

Rohsenow, W.M. and Hartnett, J.P., Handbook of Heat Transfer, McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1973.

[3.2.3]

Kern, D.Q., Process Heat Transfer, McGraw Hill Kogakusha, (1950).

[3.2.4]

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Part D, 20123 Edition.

[3.2.5]

Nuclear Systems Materials Handbook, Vol. 1, Design Data, ORNL TID 26666.

[3.2.6]

Scoping Design Analyses for Optimized Shipping Casks Containing 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-

, 7-, or 10-Year-Old PWR Spent Fuel, ORNL/CSD/TM-149 TTC-0316, (1983).

[3.2.7]

Jakob, M. and Hawkins, G.A., Elements of Heat Transfer, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1957.

[3.2.8]

Henninger, J. H. Solar Absorptance and Thermal Emittance of Some Common Spacecraft Thermal-Control Coatings, NASA Reference Publication 1121, April 1984.

[3.3.1]

FLUENT Computational Fluid Dynamics Software (Fluent, Inc., Centerra Resource Park, 10 Cavendish Court, Lebanon, NH 03766).

[3.4.1]

Thermal Measurements in a Series of Large Pool Fires, Sandia Report SAND85

- 0196 TTC - 0659 UC 71, Page 41, August 1971.

[3.4.2]

Thermal Evaluation of HI-STAR 330 Cask, HI-2240063, Revision 0.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-3 8.1.2.1 Containment Material To provide protection against brittle fracture under cold conditions, fracture toughness test criteria for cask containment boundary ferritic components and associated welds are specified in Table 8.1.4. The welded cask containment boundary will be examined and tested by a combination of methods (including leakage rate test, MT, and/or PT, as specified in the licensing drawing and this Chapter) to ensure that it is free of cracks, pinholes, uncontrolled voids or other defects that could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the packaging.

8.1.2.2 Dose Blocker Material To provide assurance against through-thickness cracks that could substantially affect the shielding effectiveness of the cask, the brittle fracture testing requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NF [8.1.1] are invoked for all dose blocker materials and associated welds.

Fracture toughness testing and acceptance criteria shall follow the guidance of NF-2300 (materials) and NF-2400 (welds). Brittle fracture testing of the Liner Tanks and LTCs is not required, as substantial reconfiguration of the component plates is not feasible due to their tight clearances within the loaded cask.

8.1.2.3 Impact Absorber Material The structural strength and stiffness of the crushable aluminum Impact Absorber plates, which serve to absorb a significant portion of the energy from Package impact event, are crucial to maintaining the safety function of the package. Specifically, these components serve to protect the Cask containment boundary from excessive stresses and to maintain the Closure Lid sealing function during NCT and HAC drop events. Table 8.1.5 specifies the required range of strength properties for the aluminum Impact Absorber plates. The material shall be procured in accordance with an ASTM or ASME Section II specification, as indicated in Table 8.1.2. Further details regarding the numerical simulations used to establish the required ranges of critical properties are discussed in Chapter 2.

8.1.2.4 Trunnion Material Four Lifting Trunnions embedded in the long sides of the Cask are provided for vertical lifting and handling of the Cask during loading and unloading operations. The trunnions are required to be designed in accordance with NUREG-0612 [1.2.3], and tested and inspected in accordance with ANSI N14.6 [1.2.2] at 300% of the maximum design-basis lifting load (Table 7.1.1) in the configuration matching the lifting equipment. The test load shall be applied for a minimum of 10 minutes. Load tests may be performed in excess of the test loads specified above provided an engineering evaluation is performed to ensure trunnions and other cask components will not be damaged by the load test. After the load test, a PT or MT examination shall be performed on all accessible parts of the trunnions in accordance with ASME Code Section V, with acceptance criteria per ASME Code Section III, Subsection NB, Article NB-5300. The accessible parts of the trunnions (areas visible outside the cask), and the local cask areas shall then be visually examined to ensure that no deformation, distortion, or cracking has occurred. Any evidence of to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-5

2. ITS welds for the cask DBS and, Impact Absorber attachment structure, and Liner Tanks shall be examined in accordance with ASME Code Section V, with acceptance criteria per ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, Article NF-5300. These welds shall be repaired in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Article NF-4450 and examined after repair in the same manner as the original weld.

3. Not important-to-safety (NITS) welds (e.g. seal welds) on the cask. shall be examined and repaired in accordance with written and approved procedures.

8.1.4 Pressure Testing Pressure testing of the HI-STAR 330 package is not required. The Maximum Normal Operating Pressure (MNOP) for the HI-STAR 330 package does not exceed the 5 psig threshold in 10 CFR 71.85(b).

8.1.5 Leakage Tests Leakage rate tests on the cask containment system shall be performed per procedures written and approved in accordance with Chapter 7 of this SAR and the requirements of ANSI N14.5 [8.1.4],

specified in this chapter. Table 8.1.1 specifies the leakage test method, allowable leakage rate and test sensitivity for fabrication and pre-shipment leakage rate tests. A pre-shipment leakage rate test of cask containment seals (gaskets) is performed for each loading prior to transport. This pre-shipment leakage rate test is valid for 1 year as long as the seal (gaskets) are not disturbed by removing the Cask closure lid, or as justified by the requirements in SAR Paragraph 8.2.4(v). In case of an unsatisfactory leakage rate, necessary repairs shall be performed and the Cask shall be retested using the same method as the original test until the test acceptance criterion is satisfied.

Leakage rate testing procedures shall be approved by an American Society for Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) Level III Specialist. The ASNT Level III Specialist approving leak testing procedures shall be qualified and certified in the nondestructive method of leak testing for which procedures are written. The written and approved test procedure shall clearly define the test equipment arrangement. Leakage rate testing shall be performed in accordance with a written quality assurance program by personnel who are qualified and certified in accordance with the requirements of SNT-TC-1A. Fabrication leakage rate test results shall become part of the final quality documentation package. The pre-shipment leakage rate test shall be documented in accordance with the users quality assurance program.

8.1.6 Shielding Tests A shielding effectiveness test shall be performed prior to the first shipment of each HI-STAR 330 package. Testing shall be performed using written and approved procedures. Calibrated radiation detection equipment shall be used to take measurements at the surface of the HI-STAR package. Measurements shall be taken at locations specified by the Users radiation protection program for comparison against calculated values for the specific loaded contents to assess the continued effectiveness of the shielding. If the measured dose rates are higher than the calculated to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-9 TABLE 8.1.2 ASME CODE BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE AND OTHER STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO HI-STAR 330 Component ID Material Procurement Component Design Acceptance Criteria Stress and Deformation Analysis Criteria Welding (Fabrication and Qualification)

Inspection Testing Cask Containment System (except closure seals)

ASME Code Section III Subsection NB-2000 ASME Code Section III Subsection NB-3000 ASME Code Section III Subsection NB-3000 ASME Code Section III Subsection NB-4000 and Chapter 8 of this SAR ASME Code Section III Subsection NB-5000 and Chapter 8 of this SAR ASME Code Section III Subsection NB-6000 and Chapter 8 of this SAR Lifting Trunnions ASME Code Section II NUREG-0612 NUREG-0612 Not Applicable Chapter 8 of this SAR Chapter 8 of this SAR Cask Dose Blocker Structure (DBS)

ASTM or ASME Code Section II

[Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390]

Not Applicable ASME Code Section IX and Chapter 8 of this SAR ASME Code Section V Chapter 8 of this SAR Liner Tanks ASTM or ASME Code Section II

[Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390]

Not Applicable ASME Code Section IX and Chapter 8 of this SAR ASME Code Section V Not Applicable Liner Tank Cassettes ASTM or ASME Code Section II

[Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390]

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-10 Tertiary Container Retainer Box ASTM or ASME Code Section II

[Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390]

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Crushable Impact Absorber Plates (Aluminum)

ASTM or ASME Section II

[Proprietary Information Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390]

Not Applicable Not Applicable Chapter 8 of this SAR Not Applicable Note 1: See drawing package referenced in the CoC for material requirements.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-13 TABLE 8.1.4: FRACTURE TOUGHNESS TEST CRITERIA: CONTAINMENT SYSTEM1 Item Material Material Thickness or Diameter (inches)

Maximum TNDT2

(°F)

Maximum Drop Weight Test Temperature

(°F)

Maximum Charpy V-Notch Test Temperature

(°F)

Testing and Acceptance Criteria Containment Base Plate and Side Walls SA-203 Grade E 2

LST - 73 TNDT TNDT + 60 ASME Section III, Subsection NB, Article NB-2330 Containment Flange 3 3/4 LST - 100 TNDT + 60 Closure Lid4Lid 7 3/4 LST - 115 TNDT + 60 Closure Lid Bolts SA-564 Type 630 H1100 2 1/4 N/A Not Required LST ASME Section III, Subsection NB, Article NB-2333 Weld Metal for NB Welds ER80S-Ni1 or Equivalent Strength MaterialAs required 2

LST - 73 Not Required3 TNDT + 60 ASME Section III, Subsection NB, Article NB-2330 and Article NB-2430 Notes

1. The cask may be qualified to a Lowest Service Temperature (LST) of -20oF or -40oF.

2. For materials up to 4 thick, TNDT is determined in accordance with the guidance of Reg. Guide 7.11 [8.1.3] for a Category I container and NUREG/CR 1815. For materials greater than 4 thick and up to 12 thick, TNDT is determined in accordance with the guidance of Reg. Guide 7.12 [8.1.5]. In lieu of qualification per Reg. Guide 7.12, qualification per NUREG/CR-3826 may be applied to establish a higher TNDT but with 100% volumetric examination to confirm the absence of flaws which exceed the critical values as defined in NUREG/CR-3826 Table 3. 100% volumetric re-examination is required for cask components qualified per NUREG-CR-3826 following cask operations which result in impactive or impulsive loadings in excess of those defined in the normal conditions of transport.

3. TNDT has been specified in accordance with recognized guidelines consistent with the Code alternative to NB-2330 in Table 8.1.3 of this SAR; therefore, drop weight testing is not required. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-14 3.4.

SA-350 LF3 may be used as an alternative material for the cask closure lid.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-15 TABLE 8.1.5 (SHEET 1 OF 43)

CRITICAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR NON-CONTAINMENT TRANSPORT PACKAGE COMPONENTS Component Material Function Applicable Critical Characteristics Requirement1 Pre-Evaluated Material(s)1 Dose Blocker (Bottom, Side &

End Plates)

Carbon Steel Provides gamma radiation shielding, protection of the internal containment structure, and affects cask heat transfer Yield strength (ksi) 34.8 min.

SA-516 Grade 70 or A516 Grade 70 Ultimate strength (ksi) 70.0 min.

Thermal conductivity2 (BTU/ft*hr*°F) 60.1 Specific heat2 (BTU/lbm*°F) 0.11 Cask Body and Lid Sealing Surfaces (Weld Overlay)

Austenitic Stainless Steel or Non-Ferrous Metal Increased material strength to prevent inelastic strain in cask sealing region during drop events, and corrosion protection at sealing region.

Yield strength (ksi) 100 min.

AWS ER360 Ultimate strength (ksi)

Minimum 125%

of yield strength Lifting Trunnions and, Tie-Down Bars, and Closure Lid Lifting Lug Austenitic Stainless Steel or Non-Ferrous Metal3 Means for lifting, handling, or tie-down of the cask components Yield strength (ksi) 38.8 min.

SA-479 S21800 Ultimate strength (ksi) 90.0 min.

Impact Absorbers (Corner and Side),

Top Flange Corner Inserts, and Closure Lid Spacers Aluminum4 Sacrificial material to protect containment and dose blocker Yield strength (ksi) 1418.0 min.

24.0 max.

ASTM B209 60615083 Ultimate strength (ksi) 3242.0 min.

50.0 max.

Area reduction (%)5 42 35 min. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-16 TABLE 8.1.5 (SHEET 2 OF 43)

CRITICAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR NON-CONTAINMENT WASTE PACKAGE COMPONENTS Component Material Function Applicable Critical Characteristics Requirement1 Pre-Evaluated Material(s)1 Closure Lid Shims and Top Flange Corner Inserts Aluminum Close gap between the closure lid and cask at impact absorber locations Yield strength (ksi) 14.0 min.

ASTM B209 6061 Top Impact Absorber Insulation Board Insulation Thermal protection to limit cask seal temperature during a fire Thermal conductivity6 (BTU*in/hr*ft2*°F)

See Appendix 1.A Kaowool Millboard 1401 Strongback Assembly and Side & Corner, Impact Absorber Attachment Bracket SetsAssemblies (Top and Bottom), Shim Strips and Internal Protective Cover Carbon Steel Structural attachment of impact absorbers under normal transport conditions Yield strength (ksi) 21.4 34 min.

SA-240 Type 304L SA-240-304, SA-516 Grade 70, or A516 Grade 70 Ultimate strength (ksi) 66.1 70 min.

Strongback And Impact Absorber Attachment Bolts Stainless Steel Structural attachment of impact absorbers under normal transport conditions Yield strength (ksi) 25 min.

SA-193 Grade 8 Ultimate strength (ksi) 71 min.

Liner Tank (Top, Bottom and Side Plates) &

Liner Tank Cassette (Top and Bottom Plates)

Steel Shielding during transport and structural support of materials during loading operations Yield strength (ksi) 34.8 min.

SA-516 Grade 70 or A516 Grade 70 Ultimate strength (ksi) 70.049 min.

to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-17 TABLE 8.1.5 (SHEET 3 OF 4)

CRITICAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR NON-CONTAINMENT TRANSPORT PACKAGE COMPONENTS Component Material Function Applicable Critical Characteristics Requirement1 Pre-Evaluated Material(s)1 Liner Tank Bolts Steel Structural attachment of the liner tank top cover under normal transport conditions Yield strength (ksi) 97.1 min.

SA-564 Grade 630 H1150 Ultimate strength (ksi) 135 min.

Liner Tank Cassette Corner Tubes Steel Maintain shielding configuration of LTC top and bottom plates Yield strength (ksi) 72.5 min.

A513 Grade 1026 SRA7 SRA or A519 Grade 1026 SRA7 SRA Ultimate strength (ksi) 97 min.

Tertiary Container Retainer Box Plates Steel Maintain configuration of tertiary container shield box Ultimate strength (ksi) 70.0 min.

SA-516 Grade 70 or A516 Grade 70 Tertiary Container Retainer Box Bolts Steel Maintain configuration of tertiary container shield box Ultimate strength (ksi)9 100 min.

ASTM F593-CW1 Tertiary Container Shield Box Steel Provide shielding of high specific activity material Nominal Density (lb/in3) 0.28 All carbon steels, low alloy steels, and 300-series stainless steels8 to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-18 TABLE 8.1.5 (SHEET 43 OF 43)

CRITICAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR NON-CONTAINMENT TRANSPORT PACKAGE COMPONENTS Notes

1. Pre-evaluated materials are those used as the basis for all critical characteristics used in the SARs licensing basis evaluations. Unless otherwise specified, the critical characteristic requirement is based on ASME Section II minimum material propertiesshall be evaluated at 200°F or greater to bound the maximum normal operating temperature of the cask. The evaluation of alternative materials may be based on ASME Section II specifications or material test data at 200°F or greater.

2. Listed thermal conductivity and specific heat capacity are values at 100°F used in the licensing-basis thermal analysis model, based on properties of SA-516 Grade 70 carbon steel. Because of the low internal heat load of the cask contents, the limiting heat transfer requirement is protection of the containment seal temperature during the fire accident. Therefore, for conservatism in bounding the thermal analysis model, alternative materials should have an equal or lesser nominal thermal conductivity and an equal or greater nominal specific heat value compared to SA-516 Grade 70 carbon steel over the entire analysis temperature range. As the thermal properties of carbon steel materials are well correlated with their material composition, confirmation of thermal properties by direct measurement is not required.

3. Material shall be austenitic stainless steel or non-ferrous material, in accordance with ASME Section III, Subsection NF-2311 for materials exempt from impact testing. Yield strength shall be less than 80% of ultimate strength, in accordance with ANSI N14.6.

4. Aluminum crush material properties are evaluated at ambient room temperature. Due to their large surface area at the periphery of the transport package, the temperature of the external impact absorbers is not affected by internal heat generation within the cask. Slight variation in the crush characteristics of the aluminum cask flange corner inserts and closure lid spacers due to elevated temperature does not significantly affect the safety function of the cask, as they are not the primary mechanism for cask deceleration after impact.

5. The minimum percentage area reduction is conservatively estimated based on the physical testing of aluminum material documented in [8.1.6]. Alternative aluminum materials shall be similarly tested to confirm the minimum percentage area reduction requirement is met. A larger percentage area reduction implies higher material ductility and energy absorption capacity, which will dissipate more energy during the impact event. Therefore, the upper bound (or maximum) percentage area reduction for these materials is not limiting for the safety determination.

6. Thermal conductivities values used in the licensing-basis thermal analysis model for the fire accident are based on nominal properties of commercially available Kaowool 1401 Millboard as specified in the manufacturers datasheet (Appendix 1.A of this SAR). Alternative insulation material may be substituted, but must be qualified by re-analysis using the same licensing basis thermal models and methodology to ensure the containment seal temperature does not exceed allowable limits. Material acceptance shall be based upon the nominal thermal conductivity reported by the supplier, based on testing per ASTM C201 or other ASTM testing method.

7. The pre-evaluated material types for the cassette corner tubes are suitable for achieving the minimum required yield and ultimate material strengths. The purchase specification for these components shall include requirements for verification of these strength values through testing, in addition to meeting all other requirements of the ASTM specifications.

8. Refer to Table PRD of Section II, Part D of ASME B&PVC [8.1.1].

9. Tensile strength at RT test conditions. Material strength is conservatively adjusted as basis for structural analysis at maximum predicted operating temperatures. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-20 Leakage rate testing procedures shall be approved by an American Society for Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) Level III Specialist. The ASNT Level III Specialist approving leak testing procedures shall be qualified and certified in the nondestructive method of leak testing for which procedures are written. The written and approved test procedure shall clearly define the test equipment arrangement. Leakage rate testing shall be performed in accordance with a written quality assurance program by personnel who are qualified and certified in accordance with the requirements of SNT-TC-1A [8.1.2]. The pre-shipment, periodic, and maintenance leakage rate test results shall be documented and maintained as required by the users quality assurance program.

8.2.3 Component and Material Tests (i)

Shielding Materials Radiation shielding in the HI-STAR 330 cask is provided entirely by the combined thickness of the steel plates that comprise the containment boundary, DBS, secondary container (Liner Tank, LTC), and tertiary containers (if used). As there is no physical mechanism for deterioration of the steels shielding effectiveness over time other than gross damage, rearrangement, or loss of the material, visual inspection of the cask prior to each waste loading (as described in Section 8.2.3(ii)) is sufficient to ensure that the casks shielding effectiveness is maintained. No periodic testing of the casks shielding integrity is required.

(ii)

Packaging Surfaces Accessible surfaces of the Cask (internal and external) and Liner Tanks (external) shall be visually inspected prior to each waste loading to ensure that the packaging effectiveness is not significantly reduced. Inspections shall identify any surface coating and component damage, including conditions such as surface denting, surface penetrations, weld cracking, and chipped or missing coating. Where necessary, coatings shall be reapplied. Damage shall be evaluated for impact on packaging safety and shall be repaired or replaced accordingly. Wear and tear from normal use will not impact cask safety. Repairs or replacement in accordance with written and approved procedures, as set down in the O&M manual, shall be required if unacceptable conditions are identified. Following repair or replacement of material that appreciably affects the casks shielding integrity, a shielding test in accordance with Section 8.1.6 of this Chapter shall be re-performed.

Prior to installation or replacement of a closure seal, it shall be verified that the cask sealing surface is cleaned and surfaces affected by scratches, pitting or roughness shall be polished smooth or repaired as necessary in accordance with written and approved procedures.

(iii)

Packaging Fasteners Cask Closure Lid Bolts shall be examined in accordance with ASME Section III, Subsection NBF-2582 and NB-2585. Fasteners without sufficient usable thread length meeting the to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-21 requirements of NBF-2582 shall be replaced. Damaged internal threads may be repaired per standard industry practice (e.g. threaded inserts). Any repair shall be evaluated to ensure ASME Code stress limits applicable to bolted joints are met. Any required material or manufacturing process testing would also be performed in accordance with the original applicable code. Cask Closure Lid Bolts shall be replaced as guided by fatigue analysis per the provisions of ASME Code Section III. The maintenance program in Table 8.2.1 provides a bolt change out schedule to ensure that the cumulative damage factor accumulated by a bolt shall be less than 1.0 with sufficient margin. One bolting cycle is the complete sequence of torquing and removal of bolts.

The internal threads of the Containment Top Flange have a maximum service life limit based on bolting cycles as determined by fatigue analysis per the provisions of Section III of the ASME Code. The bolting cycles specified in Table 8.2.1 shall not be exceeded. One bolting cycle is the complete sequence of torquing and removal of bolts.

Cask Impact Absorber Bolts and Liner Tank Bolts shall require visual verification for indications of damaged or loose fasteners. Visual verification shall confirm wear on the threaded surfaces of loose fasteners prior to reinstallation or replacement. Liner Tank bolts shall be examined to ensure the requirements in the licensing drawing are met. Fasteners not meeting the requirements shall be replaced.

Bolting of the cask Impact Absorbers and Liner Tank Top Covers are foreseen to be one-time events. Unless replacement is necessary, impact absorbers will remain attached to the cask (bottom impact absorbers) or the strongback assembly (top impact absorbers) during loading, unloading and transport operations. Similarly, frequent installation and removal of Liner Tank Top Covers, following loading and closure of the Liner Tank, is not anticipated. Fatigue analysis for these bolts and internal threads is therefore not required.

(iv)

Cask Lifting Trunnions Cask Lifting Trunnions shall be inspected prior to each cask lifting. The accessible parts of the trunnions (areas outside the cask), and the local cask areas shall be visually examined to ensure no deformation, distortion, or cracking has occurred. Any evidence of deformation (other than minor localized surface deformation due to contact pressure between the lifting device and the trunnion), distortion or cracking of the trunnion or adjacent cask areas shall require repair or replacement of the trunnion and/or repair of the cask.

Following any replacements and/or repair, load testing shall be re-performed and the components re-examined in accordance with the original procedure and acceptance criteria.

(v)

Closure Seals The HI-STAR 330 Packaging is equipped with elastomeric seals on the Cask flange to ensure leakage meets the criteria in Table 8.1.1. The closure seals are shipped from the factory pre-inspected and carefully packaged. Seals are considered to be reusable until pre-shipment leakage testing indicates that they can no longer meet the leakage criteria or they fail a visual inspection. to Holtec Letter 3155004

HI-STAR 330 SAR Rev. 10 Report HI-2210970 8-23 Table 8.2.1: Maintenance Program Schedule Task SAR Reference Section Schedule Cask surface visual verification Paragraph 8.2.3(ii)

Prior to each Non-Fuel Waste (NFW) loading.

Liner Tank accessible exterior surfaces visual verification Paragraph 8.2.3(ii)

Prior to emplacement into the cask.

Packaging fasteners visual verification Paragraph 8.2.3(iii)

Prior to each loading and emplacement of Liner Tank into cask.

Cask lifting trunnion visual inspection Paragraph 8.2.3(iv)

Prior to each NFW loading.

Pre-shipment leakage test of containment system seal Subsection 8.2.2 Following each NFW loading.

Periodic leakage rate test of containment system seals Subsection 8.2.2 Prior to off-site package transport if period from last test exceeds 1 year.

Maintenance leakage rate test of containment system seals Subsection 8.2.2 Prior to returning package to service following maintenance, repair or replacement of containment boundary components.

Seal replacement for closure lid Paragraph 8.2.3(v)

Following removal of the Cask Closure Lid if the seal is not considered reusable (damaged, not free of debris, exhibits excessive compression set) or if seal fails to meet the leakage criteria for pre-shipment, periodic or maintenance during testing. Seals which have been in use for over one year shall be replaced.

Closure lid bolt replacement Paragraph 8.2.3(iii)

Replace every 20050 bolting cycles.

Containment top flange service life Paragraph 8.2.3(iii) 10,000 bolting cycles. to Holtec Letter 3155004