ML24269A002
| ML24269A002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/2024 |
| From: | Blind A - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 57121, 50-255-LA-3, ASLBP 24-986-01-LA-BD01 | |
| Download: ML24269A002 (0) | |
Text
September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 of 1
14
Subject:
Supplemental, Part Two, Filing to Strengthen Standing of Petitioners in NRC Docket No. 50-255-LA-3
Dear Members of the Licensing Board,
This Supplement Two is filed to further strengthen Petitioners' argument that Petitioners, in this hearing request, have standing. For this supplement, part two, petitioners are informed by arguments and matters of law raised in "Applicants Answer Opposing Beyond Nuclear et al.s Petition for Leave to Intervene and Request for a Hearing" (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Docket Nos. 50-255-LT-3 and 72-007-LT-3, September 23, 2024), and apply those principles to further reinforce Petitioners' standing in the present case. The purpose of this supplement is to build upon existing law, as well as NRC regulations, to demonstrate the concrete and particularized harm faced by Petitioners in the event of the Palisades Nuclear Plant restart, and the real, quantifiable, increased risk of harm if no action is taken on Petitioners' petition.
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14 To clarify, the two cases referenced are separate, with no overlap in petitioners or bases for standing between them. This supplement is intended to provide further legal and factual justification for Petitioners' standing in the current case, related to the Palisades Nuclear Plant restart, License Amendment Reviews, and the regulatory processes used to reduce risks through defense in depth principles.
Points of Law from the Applicants Answer Opposing Beyond Nuclear et al.
Case Informing This Supplement Informed by the legal findings from "Applicants Answer Opposing Beyond Nuclear et al.s Petition for Leave to Intervene and Request for a Hearing",
this supplement incorporates the following key points of law to support Petitioners' standing in this case:
Proximity Presumption: The legal presumption that residents within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a nuclear power plant have standing based on their close proximity to the reactor and the heightened risk they face in the event of an accident. This presumption has been consistently upheld in NRC case law and applies to Petitioners in the present case.
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14 Concrete and Particularized Injury: Petitioners need to demonstrate a "concrete and particularized injury" to establish standing. In the referenced case, the Commission determined that the risk of radiological exposure, property damage, and economic loss qualifies as such an injury when the harm is linked to the plant's operations. Petitioners in this case face similar risks tied directly to Palisades potential restart and petitioners request to the licensing board for action.
Credible Risk of Harm: The law recognizes that the potential harm from nuclear incidents is credible, even in the absence of a prior accident, particularly when protective actions like evacuation plans and Potassium Iodide (KI)distribution are part of NRC-approved emergency measures.
This principle is relevant in this case, as Petitioners face tangible risks tied to the plants operation.
Regulatory Recognition of Harm: In the referenced case, it was recognized that regulatory frameworks such as 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and the Price-Anderson Act provide legal grounds for standing, as they
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14 acknowledge the potential for harm to residents within an EPZ and offer mechanisms for compensation and protective measures.
Defense-In-Depth and Safety Margins: A robust defense-in-depth approach is critical to preventing nuclear accidents, and failure to maintain or enhance safety margins can increase the risk of accidents. Petitioners Contention Two, asserts, that without an NRC approved FSAR accident analysis and NRC inspections, the likelihood of a design-basis accident, such as a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), is increased.
I. Proximity and Direct Risk of Harm The central argument for Petitioners' standing rests on the proximity of their homes to the Palisades Nuclear Plant, which places them within the federally defined Ten-Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). As outlined in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, the EPZ is recognized by NRC regulations as an area where residents face increased risks in the event of a radiological emergency.
Radiological Exposure: As previously argued in Supplement One, Additional Standing Basis, residents within the EPZ, including Petitioners,
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14 face real and substantial risks of radiological exposure in the event of an emergency. The NRC-approved emergency plans specifically account for potential airborne radioactive particles that pose significant health risks, such as thyroid cancer and other long-term illnesses. The distribution and use of Potassium Iodide (KI) as a protective measure further underscores the risk of exposure to radioactive iodine for individuals residing in the EPZ.
Evacuation and Economic Impact: Petitioners face not only the immediate threat of evacuation in the event of a a design basis accident and entry into the emergency plan, but also the potential for long-term displacement. Past nuclear incidents, including Fukushima and Three Mile Island, demonstrate the real and significant impacts on property values, economic stability, and permanent displacement. These risks are not speculative but grounded in historical precedent and federal recognition of the hazards inherent to living near a nuclear facility.
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14 II. Regulatory and Legal Framework Supporting Standing Petitioners' standing is further supported by the statutory and regulatory framework that governs nuclear emergency preparedness and public safety.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E: This regulation requires licensees to establish emergency plans that specifically address the evacuation and sheltering of residents within the EPZ. This underscores the recognition by federal agencies of the real and imminent risk posed to homeowners like the Petitioners in this case.
The Price-Anderson Act: This federal law provides compensation mechanisms for individuals affected by nuclear incidents, including personal injury and property damage. The statutory framework recognizes the potential harm that could result from the plant's operations, reinforcing the legitimacy of Petitioners' concerns.
Emergency Planning and Use of KI: As acknowledged in NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1, emergency planning specifically provides for the distribution of KI to EPZ residents. This is not merely a precautionary measure but a critical part of the defense-in-depth strategy required to
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14 protect the public in the event of radioactive iodine exposure. The provision of KI is part of the emergency response planning process, and Petitioners' potential need for this protection ties directly to their standing.
III. Petitioners' Requested Action and the Link to Petitioners Real Harm Petitioners' petition, centers around asserting Holtecs current use of regulations and process are flawed, and left unchecked by requested actions, will impact the defense-in-depth and safety margins within the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident safety analysis (Contention Two). Petitioners have specifically requested, through petitioner-requested Licensing Board findings, that the NRC apply more robust inspection processes based on updated General Design Criteria (GDC)and Standard Review Plan (SRP) (Contention Four). Without these updates to the accident analysis and inspection framework, the risk of a design-basis accident occurring at the Palisades Nuclear Plant is heightened. The lack of the requested safety enhancements measurably increases the probability of an accident, which in turn elevates the risk of radiological exposure to Petitioners, who reside within the EPZ.
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14 IV. Incorporating Site-Specific PRA into the Argument for Harm A. Palisades Was Licensed Before the Introduction of GDC and SRP The Palisades Nuclear Plant was licensed prior to the establishment of the General Design Criteria (GDC) and the Standard Review Plan (SRP) (Contention Two). As such, its original design and safety analysis were based on earlier, less stringent standards. This leaves a significant gap in ensuring that Palisades FSAR considers current safety and risk assessment criteria. Petitioners argue that without the proper consideration of current GDC and SRP standards, the FSAR and accident safety analysis will not adequately account for potential safety vulnerabilities and reduced defense in depth due to less margin to safety limits.
B. Flaws in Holtecs Use of § 50.59 Holtecs reliance on § 50.59 to make changes to the FSAR without prior NRC approval is flawed (Contention Two). Section 50.59 allows certain changes without prior approval, provided they do not result in an unreviewed safety issue or a significant increase in risk. However, without incorporating modern PRA
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14 techniques, Holtecs approach fails to properly evaluate the increased risk of various design-basis accidents.
Without action on Petitioners' petition, Holtec will produce an incomplete FSAR that fails to reference or adhere to today's GDC and SRP standards, reducing defense-in-depth and leaving critical safety vulnerabilities unaddressed.
V. Defense-in-Depth and Increased Risk via PRA Significance Determination A. Higher Risk of Accidents Without Updated FSAR The lack of updates to the FSAR means that accidents like Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), which is one of the most likely design-basis accidents at Palisades, will have an elevated risk profile. Without a modern FSAR informed by a site-specific PRA, the risk of these accidents will be underestimated, resulting in reduced safety margins.
B. Increased Risk to Petitioners Can Be Quantified The Significance Determination Process (SDP) uses NRC-approved PRA methods to quantify the risk posed by various accident scenarios. If Petitioners'
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of 10 14 requested actions are not taken, the PRA models will show a higher probability of core damage or radiological release, meaning the quantified risk to Petitioners is real and measurable, not speculative.
This increased risk to EPZ residents, including Petitioners, can be quantified using the NRCs PRA tools, providing clear evidence that the risk of harm is direct and significant.
VI. Concrete and Particularized Harm The argument that the harm Petitioners face is speculative is directly refuted by the NRCs own regulatory framework and emergency planning procedures. As homeowners within the EPZ, Petitioners are subject to federal and state-mandated evacuation plans, emergency response protocols, and public safety measures.
These measures directly address the concrete risks faced by Petitioners in the event of a nuclear emergency.
As previously outlined:
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of 11 14 KI Tablet Use: The NRC-approved emergency plans call for the distribution of KI tablets to EPZ residents in the event of a nuclear incident. This protective action further demonstrates that the risks of radiological exposure are real and recognized by both federal and state emergency management authorities. The use of KI is not speculative; it is a required action in case of exposure to radioactive iodine, linking it directly to the operational status of the reactor.
Evacuation and Long-Term Displacement: The potential for harm is further substantiated by the real-world impacts of historical nuclear accidents, including long-term evacuation and property devaluation.
Petitioners' proximity to Palisades places them at increased risk for these outcomes in the event of any radiological release following the restart of the plant.
VII. My Credentials as a Plant Emergency Plan Director To further substantiate the Petitioners claim of standing, I, Alan Blind, served as a qualified Plant Emergency Plan Director for the previous owner of Palisades,
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of 12 14 Entergy. Additionally, I was also a qualified Plant Emergency Plan Director at DC Cook and Indian Point nuclear plants. In these roles, I was responsible for overseeing and final approval of the implementation of NRC-approved emergency plans, including coordination with federal and state authorities, public safety measures, and the distribution of KI.
I have firsthand knowledge of how and when KI was to be used, as well as how emergency protocols were designed to protect residents within the EPZ. As part of my responsibilities, I participated in multiple NRC-required mock emergency drills, including those involving the use of KI, to ensure preparedness in case of a radiological release. I was the emergency plan director for an actual emergency, a Steam Generator Tube rupture at the Indian Point, Unit Two, Nuclear Plant. These experiences provide me with unique insights into the real risks that EPZ residents, including Petitioners, face from an operational nuclear plant.
VIII. Conclusion Homeowners within the ten-mile EPZ face unique and legally recognized risks due to their proximity to the Palisades Nuclear Plant. These risks include radiation
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of 13 14 exposure, economic losses, and mandatory evacuation during a nuclear emergency.
Given these substantial and unique risks, the petitioners have a legitimate interest in the safety and operational status of the Palisades Nuclear Plant, justifying their standing under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d).
For these reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Supplement Two be considered alongside the original Supplement One to further strengthen the argument for their standing in this proceeding.
Sincerely, Alan Blind Representative for the Joint Petitioners
September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3
of 14 14 DECLARATION OF ALAN BLIND: Supplemental Filing to Strengthen Standing of Petitioners in NRC Docket No. 50-255-LA-3