ML24269A002
| ML24269A002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/2024 |
| From: | Blind A - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 57121, 50-255-LA-3, ASLBP 24-986-01-LA-BD01 | |
| Download: ML24269A002 (0) | |
Text
September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 1 of 14
Subject:
Supplemental, Part Two, Filing to Strengthen Standing of Petitioners
in NRC Docket No. 50-255-LA-3
Dear Members of the Licensing Board,
This Supplement Two is "led to further strengthen Petitioners' argument that
Petitioners, in this hearing request, have standing. For this supplement, part two,
petitioners are informed by arguments and matters of law raised in "Applicants
Answer Opposing Beyond Nuclear et al.s Petition for Leave to Intervene and
Request for a Hearing" (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Docket
Nos. 50-255-LT-3 and 72-007-LT-3, September 23, 2024), and apply those
principles to further reinforce Petitioners' standing in the present case. The purpose
of this supplement is to build upon existing law, as well as NRC regulations, to
demonstrate the concrete and particularized harm faced by Petitioners in the event
of the Palisades Nuclear Plant restart, and the real, quanti"able, increased risk of
harm if no action is taken on Petitioners' petition.
September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 2 of 14
To clarify, the two cases referenced are separate, with no overlap in petitioners or
bases for standing between them. This supplement is intended to provide further
legal and factual justi"cation for Petitioners' standing in the current case, related to
the Palisades Nuclear Plant restart, License Amendment Reviews, and the
regulatory processes used to reduce risks through defense in depth principles.
Points of Law from the Applicants Answer Opposing Beyond Nuclear et al.
Case Informing This Supplement
Informed by the legal "ndings from "Applicants Answer Opposing Beyond
Nuclear et al.s Petition for Leave to Intervene and Request for a Hearing",
this supplement incorporates the following key points of law to support Petitioners'
standing in this case:
- Proximity Presumption: The legal presumption that residents within the
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a nuclear power plant have standing
based on their close proximity to the reactor and the heightened risk they
face in the event of an accident. This presumption has been consistently
upheld in NRC case law and applies to Petitioners in the present case.
September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 3 of 14
- Concrete and Particularized Injury: Petitioners need to demonstrate a
"concrete and particularized injury" to establish standing. In the referenced
case, the Commission determined that the risk of radiological exposure,
property damage, and economic loss quali"es as such an injury when the
harm is linked to the plant's operations. Petitioners in this case face similar
risks tied directly to Palisades potential restart and petitioners request to the
licensing board for action.
- Credible Risk of Harm: The law recognizes that the potential harm from
nuclear incidents is credible, even in the absence of a prior accident,
particularly when protective actions like evacuation plans and Potassium
Iodide (KI)distribution are part of NRC-approved emergency measures.
This principle is relevant in this case, as Petitioners face tangible risks tied to
the plants operation.
- Regulatory Recognition of Harm: In the referenced case, it was recognized
that regulatory frameworks such as 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and the
Price-Anderson Act provide legal grounds for standing, as they September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 4 of 14
acknowledge the potential for harm to residents within an EPZ and offer
mechanisms for compensation and protective measures.
- Defense-In-Depth and Safety Margins: A robust defense-in-depth
approach is critical to preventing nuclear accidents, and failure to maintain
or enhance safety margins can increase the risk of accidents. Petitioner s
Contention Two, asserts, that without an NRC approved FSAR accident
analysis and NRC inspections, the likelihood of a design-basis accident,
such as a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), is increased.
I. Proximity and Direct Risk of Harm
The central argument for Petitioners' standing rests on the proximity of their homes
to the Palisades Nuclear Plant, which places them within the federally de"ned Te n -
Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). As outlined in NUREG-0654/FEMA-
REP-1, Revision 1, the EPZ is recognized by NRC regulations as an area where
residents face increased risks in the event of a radiological emergency.
- Radiological Exposure : As previously argued in Supplement One,
Additional Standing Basis, residents within the EPZ, including Petitioners, September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 5 of 14
face real and substantial risks of radiological exposure in the event of an
emergency. The NRC-approved emergency plans speci"cally account for
potential airborne radioactive particles that pose signi"cant health risks, such
as thyroid cancer and other long-term illnesses. The distribution and use of
Potassium Iodide (KI) as a protective measure further underscores the risk
of exposure to radioactive iodine for individuals residing in the EPZ.
- Evacuation and Economic Impact: Petitioners face not only the immediate
threat of evacuation in the event of a a design basis accident and entry into
the emergency plan, but also the potential for long-term displacement. Past
nuclear incidents, including Fukushima and Three Mile Island,
demonstrate the real and signi"cant impacts on property values, economic
stability, and permanent displacement. These risks are not speculative but
grounded in historical precedent and federal recognition of the hazards
inherent to living near a nuclear facility.
September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 6 of 14
II. Regulatory and Legal Framework Supporting Standing
Petitioners' standing is further supported by the statutory and regulatory framework
that governs nuclear emergency preparedness and public safety.
- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E: This regulation requires licensees to
establish emergency plans that speci"cally address the evacuation and
sheltering of residents within the EPZ. This underscores the recognition by
federal agencies of the real and imminent risk posed to homeowners like the
Petitioners in this case.
- The Price-Anderson Act: This federal law provides compensation
mechanisms for individuals affected by nuclear incidents, including personal
injury and property damage. The statutory framework recognizes the
potential harm that could result from the plant's operations, reinforcing the
legitimacy of Petitioners' concerns.
- Emergency Planning and Use of KI: As acknowledged in NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1, emergency planning speci"cally provides for the
distribution of KI to EPZ residents. This is not merely a precautionary
measure but a critical part of the defense-in-depth strategy required to September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 7 of 14
protect the public in the event of radioactive iodine exposure. The provision
of KI is part of the emergency response planning process, and Petitioners'
potential need for this protection ties directly to their standing.
III. Petitioners' Requested Action and the Link to Petitioner s Real Harm
Petitioners' petition, centers around asserting Holtecs current use of regulations
and process are "awed, and left unchecked by requested actions, will impact the
defense-in-depth and safety margins within the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR) accident safety analysis (Contention Two). Petitioners have speci"cally
requested, through petitioner-requested Licensing Board "ndings, that the NRC
apply more robust inspection processes based on updated General Design
Criteria (GDC)and Standard Review Plan (SRP) (Contention Four). Without
these updates to the accident analysis and inspection framework, the risk of a
design-basis accident occurring at the Palisades Nuclear Plant is heightened. The
lack of the requested safety enhancements measurably increases the probability of
an accident, which in turn elevates the risk of radiological exposure to Petitioners,
who reside within the EPZ.
September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 8 of 14
IV. Incorporating Site-Speci"c PRA into the Argument for Harm
A. Palisades Was Licensed Before the Introduction of GDC and SRP
The Palisades Nuclear Plant was licensed prior to the establishment of the General
Design Criteria (GDC) and the Standard Review Plan (SRP) (Contention
Two). As such, its original design and safety analysis were based on earlier, less
stringent standards. This leaves a signi"cant gap in ensuring that Palisades FSAR
considers current safety and risk assessment criteria. Petitioners argue that without
the proper consideration of current GDC and SRP standards, the FSAR and
accident safety analysis will not adequately account for potential safety
vulnerabilities and reduced defense in depth due to less margin to safety limits.
B. Flaws in Holtecs Use of § 50.59
Holtecs reliance on § 50.59 to make changes to the FSAR without prior NRC
approval is "awed (Contention Two). Section 50.59 allows certain changes
without prior approval, provided they do not result in an unreviewed safety issue or
a signi"cant increase in risk. However, without incorporating modern PRA September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 9 of 14
techniques, Holtecs approach fails to properly evaluate the increased risk of
various design-basis accidents.
Without action on Petitioners' petition, Holtec will produce an incomplete FSAR
that fails to reference or adhere to today's GDC and SRP standards, reducing
defense-in-depth and leaving critical safety vulnerabilities unaddressed.
V. Defense-in-Depth and Increased Risk via PRA Signi"cance Determination
A. Higher Risk of Accidents Without Updated FSAR
The lack of updates to the FSAR means that accidents like Steam Generator Tube
Rupture (SGTR), which is one of the most likely design-basis accidents at
Palisades, will have an elevated risk pro"le. Without a modern FSAR informed by
a site-speci"c PRA, the risk of these accidents will be underestimated, resulting
in reduced safety margins.
B. Increased Risk to Petitioners Can Be Quanti"ed
The Signi"cance Determination Process (SDP) uses NRC-approved PRA
methods to quantify the risk posed by various accident scenarios. If Petitioners' September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 10 of 14
requested actions are not taken, the PRA models will show a higher probability of
core damage or radiological release, meaning the quanti"ed risk to Petitioners is
real and measurable, not speculative.
This increased risk to EPZ residents, including Petitioners, can be quanti"ed using
the NRCs PRA tools, providing clear evidence that the risk of harm is direct and
signi"cant.
VI. Concrete and Particularized Harm
The argument that the harm Petitioners face is speculative is directly refuted by the
NRCs own regulatory framework and emergency planning procedures. As
homeowners within the EPZ, Petitioners are subject to federal and state-mandated
evacuation plans, emergency response protocols, and public safety measures.
These measures directly address the concrete risks faced by Petitioners in the event
of a nuclear emergency.
As previously outlined:
September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 11 of 14
- KI Tablet Use: The NRC-approved emergency plans call for the distribution
of KI tablets to EPZ residents in the event of a nuclear incident. This
protective action further demonstrates that the risks of radiological exposure
are real and recognized by both federal and state emergency management
authorities. The use of KI is not speculative; it is a required action in case of
exposure to radioactive iodine, linking it directly to the operational status of
the reactor.
- Evacuation and Long-Term Displacement: The potential for harm is
further substantiated by the real-world impacts of historical nuclear
accidents, including long-term evacuation and property devaluation.
Petitioners' proximity to Palisades places them at increased risk for these
outcomes in the event of any radiological release following the restart of the
plant.
VII. My Credentials as a Plant Emergency Plan Director
To further substantiate the Petitioners claim of standing, I, Alan Blind, served as a
quali"ed Plant Emergency Plan Director for the previous owner of Palisades, September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 12 of 14
Entergy. Additionally, I was also a quali"ed Plant Emergency Plan Director at
DC Cook and Indian Point nuclear plants. In these roles, I was responsible for
overseeing and "nal approval of the implementation of NRC-approved emergency
plans, including coordination with federal and state authorities, public safety
measures, and the distribution of KI.
I have "rsthand knowledge of how and when KI was to be used, as well as how
emergency protocols were designed to protect residents within the EPZ. As part of
my responsibilities, I participated in multiple NRC-required mock emergency
drills, including those involving the use of KI, to ensure preparedness in case of a
radiological release. I was the emergency plan director for an actual emergency, a
Steam Generator Tube rupture at the Indian Point, Unit Two, Nuclear Plant. These
experiences provide me with unique insights into the real risks that EPZ residents,
including Petitioners, face from an operational nuclear plant.
VIII. Conclusion
Homeowners within the ten-mile EPZ face unique and legally recognized risks due
to their proximity to the Palisades Nuclear Plant. These risks include radiation September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 13 of 14
exposure, economic losses, and mandatory evacuation during a nuclear emergency.
Given these substantial and unique risks, the petitioners have a legitimate interest
in the safety and operational status of the Palisades Nuclear Plant, justifying their
standing under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d).
For these reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Supplement Two be
considered alongside the original Supplement One to further strengthen the
argument for their standing in this proceeding.
Sincerely,
Alan Blind
Representative for the Joint Petitioners September 25, 2024 Docket No. 50-255-LA-3 14 of 14
DECLARATION OF ALAN BLIND: Supplemental Filing to Strengthen Standing of Petitioners in NRC Docket No. 50-255-LA-3