ML24193A282
| ML24193A282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109382 |
| Issue date: | 07/11/2024 |
| From: | Donis S Orano TN Americas, TN Americas LLC |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Document Control Desk |
| Shared Package | |
| ML24193A281 | List: |
| References | |
| E-63293 | |
| Download: ML24193A282 (1) | |
Text
Orano TN 7160 Riverwood Drive Suite 200 Columbia, MD 21046 USA Tel: 410-910-6900 Fax: 434-260-8480 Enclosures transmitted herein contain SUNSI. When separated from enclosures, this transmittal document is decontrolled.
July 11, 2024 E-63293 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852
Subject:
TN Americas LLC Application for Revision 1 to Certificate of Compliance No. 9382 for the TN Eagle Transportation Package (Docket No. 71-9382)
Reference:
[1] NRC Certificate of Compliance No. 9382, Revision 0, dated October 23, 2023, Docket No. 71-9382 (Accession No. ML23275A041)
In accordance with 10 CFR 71.31(b), TN Americas LLC (TN) submits this application to revise the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 9382 for the TN Eagle Transportation Package. This application proposes to modify the design for cask configurations and to update the criticality analysis for already loaded 32PT Dry Shielded Canisters (DSCs).
A description of the changes to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) as well as justifications for those changes is provided in Enclosure 1.
Safety Analysis Report changed pages are included as Enclosure 2, with a header on each changed page annotated as Rev. 1, 07/24, and changes are indicated by italicized text and revision bars.
Revised drawings show alpha-numeric revision numbers. The redacted public version of these SAR changed pages and drawings is provided as Enclosure 3.
The proposed changes to CoC 9382 Revision 0 [1] are annotated and provided as. provides a listing of the calculation computer files contained on the hard drive provided as Enclosure 6. These files are associated with Changes 1, 3, 4 and 7 as described in Enclosure 1. The file structure of the computer files is not compatible with the NRC EIE application process; therefore, Enclosure 6 is being submitted separately.
In support of the discussion associated with the VYAL-HT resin, TN is providing, as, document NTE-21-003314-000-3.0, Qualification of a New Neutron Shielding Material of Resin: VYAL HT-1, which is proprietary in its entirety.
E-63293 Document Control Desk Page 2 of 2 Certain portions of this submittal include proprietary information. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, TN is providing an affidavit (Enclosure 7) requesting that this proprietary information be withheld from public disclosure.
Should the NRC staff require additional information to support review of this application, please contact Mr. Doug Yates at 434-832-3101, or by email at douglas.yates@orano.group.
Sincerely, Don Shaw Licensing Manager cc:
Pierre Saverot (NRC), Senior Project Manager, Division of Fuel Management Douglas Yates, TN Americas, Licensing Engineer Kamran Tavassoli, TN Americas, Project Manager
Enclosures:
- 1. Summary of Changes to the SAR
- 2. TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report, Revision 1A Changed Pages (Proprietary Version)
- 3. TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report, Revision 1A Changed Pages (Public Version)
- 4. Proposed Certificate of Compliance No. 9382, Revision 0 Markup
- 5. Listing of Computer Files Contained in Enclosure 6
- 6. Computer Files (Proprietary)
- 7. TN Americas LLC Affidavit Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
- 8. NTE-21-003314-000-3.0, Qualification of a New Neutron Shielding Material of Resin: VYAL HT-1 (Proprietary)
SHAW Donis Digitally signed by SHAW Donis Date: 2024.07.11 08:10:50
-04'00' to E-63293 Page 1 of 7 Summary of Changes to TN Eagle SAR Revision 1 Summary of Changes:
Item 1:
Description of Changes:
Changes have been made to SAR Drawing TNEAGLE01-1100 Revision 0 to reconcile the currently-licensed cask design with the first of a kind (FOAK) fabricated unit, including (but not limited to) providing tapped holes for the DSC sleeve at the top of the TN Eagle cask SC configuration cask cavity, requiring some stainless steel-clad areas at the seals, updating the design of the top handling ring, providing some missing dimensions, removing obsolete dimensions (or make them reference dimensions), and relaxing some tolerances where possible.
Justification of Changes:
SAR Drawing TNEAGLE01-1100 Revision 0 has been updated to reflect FOAK changes to the as-built configuration. These changes have a negligible impact on overall package weight and center of gravity.
Impact:
SAR Chapter 1:
Section 1.5.1, Drawing TNEAGLE01-1100 Item 2:
Description of Changes:
SAR changes have been made to correct editorial errors on pages 1.6-1, 2-4, 2-5, and 7-1.
Justification of Changes:
Section 1.6.8 was mistakenly referenced instead of Section 9.4.1.
Impact:
SAR Chapter 1:
Section 1.6 SAR Chapter 2:
Section 2.1.2.1.3 Section 2.1.2.1.4 SAR Chapter 7:
Section 7.2.2 to E-63293 Page 2 of 7 Item 3:
Description of Changes:
A SAR change has been made relating to the criticality analysis for 32PT DSC 16-poison-plate and 24-poison-plate Type A configurations loaded with CE 14x14 fuel class. The analysis addresses the 10 dry shielded canisters (DSCs) (32PT DSC 16-poison-plate and 24-poison-plate Type A) loaded in 2006 and 2009.
Justification of Changes:
An additional criticality analysis is required for the 32PT DSC 16-poison-plate and 24-poison-plate Type A and the 10 DSCs loaded in 2006 and 2009. They are not currently covered by TN Eagle Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 9382.
Impact:
SAR Appendix 1.6.4:
Tables 1.6.4-6 through 1.6.4-9 SAR Appendix 6.8.5:
Section 6.8.5 Section 6.8.5.2 Section 6.8.5.3 Section 6.8.5.5 Section 6.8.5.5.1 Section 6.8.5.6 Section 6.8.5.6.1 Section 6.8.5.6.2.4 Section 6.8.5.6.2.5 Section 6.8.5.6.2.9 Section 6.8.5.6.2.10 Section 6.8.5.7.1 Table 6.8.5-4 Tables 6.8.5-10 through 6.8.5-27 (new)
Figures 6.8.5-8 through 6.8.5-17 (new) to E-63293 Page 3 of 7 Item 4:
Description of Changes:
Change 1:
The SAR has been updated to add a new neutron shielding ring type C1 (which is made of carbon steel only; cast iron is not a material option for this new ring type), filled with a new type of neutron shielding resin (VYAL-HT) to the TN Eagle cask SC configuration. This new VYAL-HT resin material can withstand higher temperatures than the existing VYAL-B resin but has a lower density and different thermal properties.
Change 2:
The SAR has also been updated to update the bounding paint emissivity and absorptivity values from 0.8 to 0.75 minimum and from 0.7 to 0.75 maximum, respectively, for the TN Eagle cask SC configuration.
Justification of Changes:
Change 1:
Since the new VYAL-HT resin material being introduced can withstand higher temperatures experienced during installation of the shielding rings on the cask and transportation of spent fuel compared to VYAL-B, but has a lower density than VYAL-B, it is less efficient at shielding gammas. To accommodate the lower density of the VYAL-HT resin material, a new higher shielding ring design (type C1) with higher density carbon steel and updated dimensions is introduced to allow for sufficient shielding to meet regulatory requirements. These changes have a negligible impact on overall package weight and center of gravity.
Change 2:
The paint emissivity and absorptivity values have been changed to allow more flexibility for the paint choice. These changes have a negligible impact on overall package weight and center of gravity.
Impact:
SAR Chapter 1:
Section 1.2.1 Table 1-1 Figures 1-1, 1-7, 1-8, and 1-9 Section 1.5.1 SAR drawing TNEAGLE01-1100 SAR Chapter 2:
Section 2.1.1.1 Table 2-2 to E-63293 Page 4 of 7 SAR Appendix 2.11.10:
Section 2.11.10.1 Section 2.11.10.2 Section 2.11.10.4 SAR Chapter 3:
Section 3.2.1 Section 3.2.3 Section 3.5 SAR Appendix 3.6.5:
Section 3.6.5.1 Section 3.6.5.3 Table 3.6.5-2 Table 3.6.5-9 Table 3.6.5-10 SAR Appendix 3.6.5A (new)
SAR Appendix 5.6.1:
Section 5.6.1.1 Section 5.6.1.3 Section 5.6.1.4 Section 5.6.1.6 Table 5.6.1-1 Table 5.6.1-15 Table 5.6.1-19a (new)
Table 5.6.1-28 and Table 5.6.1-29 (new)
Figure 5.6.1-1 SAR Chapter 7:
Section 7.6.1 Section 7.17 Table 7-7 SAR Chapter 9:
Section 9.1.7 to E-63293 Page 5 of 7 Item 5:
Description of Changes:
Some defects resulting in slight loss of material were observed on the Vyal-HT resin blocks such as, for example, cracked or chipped corners, cracks, and voids. Practical acceptance criteria to cover these defects were, therefore, specifically developed for the Vyal-HT and added to SAR Chapter 9.
Justification of Changes:
The need for assessment of all the above conditions originated during fabrication and the changes are needed in order to accept the as-fabricated first production packaging.
Impact:
SAR Chapter 9:
Section 9.1.7 to E-63293 Page 6 of 7 Item 6:
Description of Changes:
SAR Chapter 6 and Appendices have been updated to remove references made to ISG 8, Revision 3.
Justification of Changes:
The Interim Staff Guidance (ISG 8, Revision 3) has been removed from the list of Interim Staff Guidance for Spent fuel Storage and Transportation since it has been incorporated into the Standard Review Plan for Transportation, NUREG-2216.
Impact:
SAR Chapter 6:
Section 6.2.2 Section 6.7 SAR Appendix 6.8.2:
Section 6.8.2 Section 6.8.2.4 Section 6.8.2.7 Section 6.8.2.8 Section 6.8.2.10 SAR Appendix 6.8.5:
Section 6.8.5 Section 6.8.5.6 Section 6.8.5.10 to E-63293 Page 7 of 7 Item 7:
Description of Changes:
SAR Chapter 2 and Appendices 2.11.1 and 2.11.2 have been updated to evaluate the change of configuration at the bottom of the cask (spacers/washers introduced between forged cask body bottom and bottom closure/shielding plate).
Justification of Changes:
The impact of this change is analyzed in Calculation TNEAGLE01-0204 and documented in the SAR as described above. These changes have a negligible impact on overall package weight and center of gravity.
Impact:
SAR Chapter 2:
Table 2-3 SAR Appendix 2.11.1:
Section 2.11.1.2 SAR Appendix 2.11.2 Section 2.11.2.2.1.1 Tables 2.11.2-4 and 2.11.2-5 (NEW)
Figures 2.11.2-11 through 2.11.2-16 (NEW) to E-63293 TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report, Revision 1A Changed Pages Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390 to E-63293 TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report, Revision 1A Changed Pages (Public Version)
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1-5 The leak-tightness of the containment boundary defined by the forged cask body
[100], the primary lid [201] and its lid orifice cover plate [220], the ram access cover plate (RACP) [910], the lid inner seal [G1], orifice cover plate seal [G6],
and RACP inner seal [G12] in normal conditions of transport (NCT) and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC).
The shielding is provided by the steel of the forged cask body, top handling ring
[131], the shielding rings [130], bottom ring [180] and bottom closure plate [190],
and the neutron shield resin blocks [150; 151] placed in the lodgments of the shielding rings.
Bottom spacer and top spacer are used (if needed) to limit the axial gap for shorter DSCs.
A sleeve is used to limit the radial gap of DSCs in TN Eagle SC Casks.
The TN Eagle packaging is designed to transport a maximum heat load of 38.4 kW.
The content (including fuel and control components (CCs)) that will be transported in the TN Eagle packaging is presented in Section 1.2.3.
The TN Eagle Cask consists of (proceeding from inner radius to outer):
A forged cask body that provides the structural integrity of the cask, part of the gamma shielding, and the radioactive material containment function, A lid that provides radioactive material containment and gamma shielding, Shielding rings that surround the forged cask body to provide additional neutron radiation shielding with the resin blocks and gamma shielding with the steel components, Impact limiters placed on each end for use in transport, The bottom closure plate, which provides shielding.
The TN Eagle Cask is composed of the following sub-components:
A forged cask body [100] equipped with a stack of shielding rings [130] shrink fitted onto its outer surface, A closure system composed of a primary lid [201], screws [V1] and an RACP
[910]. The RACP bolts [V14] onto the forged cask body [100].
The primary lid is equipped with:
Inner and outer elastomeric seals [G1; G2]
A vent hole, closed by a port plug [223] and port plug seal [G5]
An orifice cover plate [220] fixed with screws [V5] and equipped with a seal [G6].
The ram access cover plate is equipped with:
Inner and outer elastomeric seals [G12; G13].
A top and a bottom impact limiter of similar design ensuring protection of the package containment system. Both are composed of a steel casing enclosing aluminum honeycomb blocks, Vyal-B (or Vyal-HT for the SC cask with neutron shield rings type C1) neutron shielding resin, and an adapter.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1-6 Table 1-1 describes the TN Eagle items related to safety requirements with their dimensions. A full list of the components, their materials and their classification is provided in Chapter 7.
Forged Cask Body The body is composed of a forged cask [100] defining the cavity of the TN Eagle, on which is shrink-fitted a stack of shielding rings [130]. The stack is blocked at the bottom of the forged cask by a bottom ring [180] and a bottom closure plate [190] that ensures non-sliding of the assembly.
The forged cask results from a monobloc fabrication:
Monobloc: one single forged part [100] made of forged carbon steel.
The dimensions of the forged cask are detailed in Table 1-1. The top edge of the forged cask [100] has a bigger outside diameter than the rest of the part, creating a thicker flange that is machined to accommodate the primary lid. There are 64 M42 threaded holes drilled to allow fixation of the primary lid [201].
The bottom of the forged cask has an opening provided for hydraulic ram access penetration of the cask for DSC loading and unloading operations. An RACP [910] is furnished to seal the opening outside of loading and unloading operations.
The bearing surfaces of the seals of the primary lid [201] and the RACP [910] are protected by a corrosion protection coating. A zinc aluminum coating is applied to the carbon steel surface of the cavity. The rails are used to facilitate loading and unloading by providing a low friction contact surface. The cavity coating is protected from scratching during loading and unloading activities by the rails mounted inside the forged cask body.
Shielding Rings There are 25 shielding rings [130] made of either carbon steel or cast iron. The cylindrical rings are machined to define an inner lodgment and are of four types:
Type A for TN Eagle LC only with a minimum Vyal-B resin thickness of [
] and can be fabricated using [
]
Type B for TN Eagle SC only with a minimum Vyal-B resin thickness of [
] and can be fabricated using [
]
Type C for TN Eagle SC only with a minimum Vyal-B resin thickness of [
] and can be fabricated using only [
]
Type C1 for TN Eagle SC only with a minimum Vyal-HT resin thickness of [
] and can be fabricated using only [
]
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1-7 The dimensions of the rings are detailed in Table 1-1. The ring lodgments are filled with Vyal-B or Vyal-HT neutron shield resin blocks [150; 151]. Drillings are machined through the ring ligaments to ensure air communication between the lodgments of all the stacked rings. All the rings lodgments are connected through holes machined in ring ligaments up to the relieve valves [702] located in the handling ring. The rings lodgments are protected from humidity or water ingress thanks to silicon sealing between the rings. The exposed outer surfaces of the rings are protected from corrosion by painting or coating.
The top handling ring [131] differs from the intermediate rings. It has a recess machined to mate with the shear key on the transport frame instead of a neutron shield resin lodgment machined onto it.
A closing plate [140] follows the last shielding ring to close the bottom lodgment and hold the neutron shield resin blocks in place. It is held in place by the bottom ring
[180], followed by the bottom closure plate [190].
Closure System The closure system is composed of the primary lid [201] equipped with the lid orifice cover plate [220], the ram access cover plate [910], and all the screws associated, mounted onto the forged cask. They create a leak-tightness boundary and a containment boundary.
Primary Lid The primary lid [201] is a circular disk made of martensitic stainless steel. A centering area is machined on its lower part to allow insertion in the forged cask cavity. The primary lid is equipped with threaded holes to allow handling during loading and unloading operations.
The primary lid is fixed to the forged cask with 64 M42 bolts [V1] equipped with captive washers [R1] and tightened in lodgments machined into the outer flange of the lid. A lid centering pin [111] is mounted on the forged cask body to help mounting the primary lid.
The primary lid is equipped with two elastomeric seals [G1; G2]. The seals are inserted in two grooves carved on the inner surface of the lid. A test port is drilled between the two seals, closed with a test plug [705] equipped with an O-ring seal
[G7].
Another port is drilled through the lid and filled with an insert lid port plug [223]
equipped with a metallic seal [G5]. The lid port plug is maintained in position by a tightening nut [222]. The port is then closed by the lid port cover plate [220] made of martensitic stainless steel and fixed to the primary lid with ten screws M14 [V5]. The port cover is equipped with a double metallic seal [G6], and a test port is drilled between the two seals, closed by a test plug [705] equipped with an O-ring seal [G7].
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1-9 The primary lid [201] and its inner fluorocarbon seal [G1],
The lid orifice cover plate [220] and its metallic seal [G6],
The RACP [910] and its inner-fluorocarbon seal [G12].
The tightening torques of the screws of the leak-tight boundary is given in the drawing in Section 1.5.
The ability of the leak-tight boundary to withstand the regulatory accident conditions is demonstrated in Chapter 2.
The TN Eagle is designed and fabricated to be leak tight. The cask containment boundary fabrication acceptance criterion is 1.0 x 10-7 ref cm3/s with a sensitivity of at least 5 x 10-8 ref cm3/s, which is also verified periodically. The leak-tight design criteria ensure that the cask must be water-tight for the purpose of the criticality evaluation as described in Chapter 6.
The TN Eagle Cask will be handled solely in a horizontal position after the impact limiters are removed and lifted via slings, around the top flange of the forged body and the bottom ring of the cask. It will be transported on a transport frame.
The cask is secured to the transport frame vertically and horizontally with tie down straps, and axially with the shear key located at the bottom on the cask.
Shielding Composition The gamma shielding is provided by the forged cask body and the steel parts of the rings. The neutron shielding is provided by the neutron shield resin.
Personnel barriers will be used during transport to prevent access to the cask outer surface, and prevent personnel access when the cask surface temperature is above 85 °C (185 °F). The 2-meter dose rate evaluation is performed from the personnel barrier.
The radial shielding, from the inside to the outside of the packaging, is composed of:
The forged cask body [100]
The inner part of the shielding ring [130]
The neutron shield resin blocks [150;151]
The outer part of the shielding ring [130]
The axial shielding at top end, from the inside to the outside of the packaging, is composed of:
The primary lid [201]
The top impact limiter The axial shielding at bottom end, from the inside to the outside of the packaging, is composed of:
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1-19 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4 Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1.5.1-1 TN Eagle Cask Drawings DWG-TNEAGLE01-1100 Rev 1A TN Eagle LC and TN Eagle SC Transport Package (7 Sheets)
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing TNEAGLE01-1100, Rev. 1A Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1.6-1 APPENDICES 1.6.1 EOS-37PTH DSC 1.6.2 EOS-89BTH DSC 1.6.3.
24PT4 DSC 1.6.4 32PT DSC 1.6.5 32PTH1 DSC 1.6.6 FO, FC, FF DSCs 1.6.7 24PT1 DSC All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 2
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1.6.4-8 Table 1.6.4-6 Maximum Planar Average Initial Enrichment/Minimum Burnup Combinations -
Intact Fuel NUHOMS-32PT Part 1 of 3 WE 17x17, WE 15x15, B&W 15x15, and CE 15x15 Assembly Classes Enrichment (Wt. % U-235) 16 PP NO PRA 24 PP NO PRA (1) 24 PP 04 PRA 24 PP 08 PRA 24 PP 16 PRA 1.35 fresh 1.45 fresh 1.55 fresh 1.65 fresh 1.95 fresh Burnup (GWD/MTU) 40 Years Decay Burnup (GWD/MTU) 30 Years Decay Burnup (GWD/MTU) 15 Years Decay 2.00 21 19 19 14 6
2.25 26 23 20 19 11 2.50 31 28 23 20 16 2.75 32 31 28 23 19 3.00 37 34 31 27 21 3.25 39 38 33 31 23 3.50 41 39 37 32 26 3.75 45 42 39 36 30 4.00 45 41 39 31 4.20 43 39 34 4.40 41 37 4.60 44 39 4.80 40 5.00 41 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1.6.4-9 Table 1.6.4-6 Maximum Planar Average Initial Enrichment/Minimum Burnup Combinations -
Intact Fuel NUHOMS-32PT Part 2 of 3 WE 14x14 Assembly Class Enrichment (Wt. % U-235) 16 PP NO PRA 24 PP NO PRA 24 PP 04 PRA 24 PP 08 PRA 24 PP 16 PRA (see note) 1.55 fresh 1.70 fresh 1.80 fresh 1.85 fresh Burnup (GWd/MTU),
40 Years Decay Burnup (GWd/MTU),
15 Years Decay 2.00 19 15 10 6
2.25 20 19 16 11 2.50 23 20 19 16 2.75 27 24 20 19 3.00 31 28 24 21 3.25 32 31 29 23 3.50 36 33 31 26 3.75 39 37 34 30 4.00 40 39 38 31 4.20 43 40 39 34 4.40 42 40 37 4.60 45 43 39 4.80 45 40 5.00 41 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1.6.4-10 Table 1.6.4-6 Maximum Planar Average Initial Enrichment/Minimum Burnup Combinations -
Intact Fuel NUHOMS-32PT Part 3 of 3 CE 14x14 Assembly Class 16 PP NO PRA 24 PP NO PRA Intact Fresh Fuel 1.35 1.45 Cooling Time 30 Years Burnup (GWd/MTU)
Fuel Initial Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 5 1.52 1.65 10 1.69 1.83 15 1.85 2.00 20 2.36 2.53 25 2.72 2.90 30 3.25 3.44 35 3.67 3.87 40 4.39 4.60 45 4.76 4.98 50 5.00 5.00 Notes:
As-loaded 32PT DSCs in Table 6.8.5-16 through Table 6.8.5-20 and Figure 6.8.5-8 through Figure 6.8.5-17 are qualified for transportation in the TN Eagle SC.
Use burnup and enrichment to look up minimum cooling time in years. Licensee is responsible for ensuring that uncertainties in fuel enrichment and burnup are conservatively applied in determination of actual values for these parameters (uncertainty in enrichment to be added and uncertainty in burnup to be subtracted).
Interpolation can be performed to determine the burnup for enrichment values (between 2.00 wt. % U-235 and 5.00 wt. % U-235) that are not explicitly shown herein. Alternatively, the burnup value corresponding to the next higher enrichment may be utilized.
Extrapolation shall not be performed to determine burnup requirements.
The burnup of the fresh assemblies is 0. For a given configuration, the enrichment corresponding to fresh in this table is the maximum enrichment above which a burnup value is needed for fuel assemblies to qualify for transportation.
Fuel assemblies with accumulated control rod insertion duration less than or equal to one-half of their total irradiation time are authorized content, provided an additional burnup of 3 GWd/MTU is added to the minimum burnup requirements described above. Fuel assemblies with accumulated control rod insertion duration greater than one-half of their total irradiation time are not authorized.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1.6.4-11 Table 1.6.4-7 Maximum Planar Average Initial Enrichment/Minimum Burnup Combinations CE14x14 -
Intact Fuel NUHOMS-32PT - 24PP, Type A1/A2, No PRA Intact Fresh Fuel 1.8 wt. % U-235 Cooling Time 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years Burnup (GWd/MTU)
Fuel Initial Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 5 1.75 1.80 1.80 1.80 10 1.90 1.95 2.00 2.00 15 2.05 2.10 2.15 2.20 20 2.40 2.60 2.65 2.75 25 2.80 2.95 3.05 3.10 30 3.25 3.45 3.60 3.65 35 3.65 3.85 4.00 4.10 40 4.25 4.55 4.75 4.85 45 4.60 4.90 5.00 5.00 50 5.00 5.00 55 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1.6.4-12 Table 1.6.4-8 Maximum Planar Average Initial Enrichment/Minimum Burnup Combinations CE14x14 -
Damaged Fuel NUHOMS-32PT - 24PP, Type A1/A2, No PRA 4 Damaged Fuels Fresh Fuel 1.75 wt. % U-235 Cooling Time 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years Burnup (GWd/MTU)
Damaged Fuel Initial Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 5 1.55 1.60 1.55 1.60 10 1.65 1.70 1.70 1.70 15 1.75 1.85 1.85 1.90 20 2.10 2.20 2.30 2.40 25 2.30 2.40 2.60 2.70 30 2.80 3.05 3.15 3.20 35 3.15 3.35 3.50 3.55 40 3.80 3.85 4.00 4.25 45 4.05 4.25 5.00 5.00 50 4.50 5.00 55 5.00 Note: The enrichments tabulated in this table apply only to damaged fuel assemblies while the intact fuels enrichments remain at the values provided per Table 1.6.4-7. For example, for burnup of 50 GWd/MTU, 5 years cooling time, the maximum initial enrichment for the 4 damaged fuels is 4.50 wt% while it is 5.00 wt% for the 28 intact fuels per Table 1.6.4-7.
28 Damaged Fuels Fresh Fuel 1.70 wt. % U-235 Cooling Time 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years Burnup (GWd/MTU)
Damaged Fuel Initial Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 5 1.60 1.60 1.65 1.65 10 1.70 1.75 1.80 1.80 20 2.15 2.25 2.35 2.40 25 2.45 2.55 2.65 2.70 30 2.85 3.05 3.15 3.20 35 3.15 3.35 3.50 3.60 40 3.75 3.95 4.10 4.20 45 4.05 4.30 4.50 4.70 50 4.35 4.75 5.00 5.00 55 4.70 5.00 Note: The enrichments tabulated in this table apply only to damaged fuel assemblies while the intact fuels enrichments remain at the values provided per Table 1.6.4-7. For example, for burnup of 50 GWd/MTU, 5 years cooling time, the maximum initial enrichment for the 28 damaged fuels is 4.35 wt% while it is 5.00 wt% for the 4 intact fuels per Table 1.6.4-7.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 1.6.4-13 Table 1.6.4-9 Maximum Planar Average Initial Enrichment/Minimum Burnup Combinations CE14x14 -
Failed Fuel NUHOMS-32PT - 24PP, Type A1/A2, No PRA Fresh Fuel 1.65 wt. % U-235 Cooling Time 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years Burnup (GWd/MTU)
Failed Fuel Initial Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 5 1.55 1.60 1.45 1.65 10 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 15 1.80 1.85 1.85 1.90 20 2.15 2.10 2.25 2.35 25 2.30 2.35 2.65 2.65 30 2.80 3.05 3.10 3.05 35 3.10 3.25 3.45 3.35 40 3.65 3.80 4.10 4.30 45 4.05 4.15 5.00 5.00 50 4.85 5.00 55 5.00 Note: The enrichments tabulated in this table apply only to failed fuel assemblies while the intact fuels enrichments remain at the values provided per Table 1.6.4-7. For example, for burnup of 50 GWd/MTU, 5 years cooling time, the maximum initial enrichment for the 8 failed fuels is 4.85 wt% while it is 5.00 wt% for the 24 intact fuels per Table 1.6.4-7.
Table 1.6.4-10 PWR Assembly Decay Heat for Heat Load Configurations The Decay Heat (DH) in watts is expressed as:
F1 = -44.8 + 41.6*X1 - 37.1*X2 + 0.611*X12 - 6.80*X1*X2 + 24.0*X22 DH = F1*Exp({[1-(1.8/X3)]* -0.575}*[(X3-4.5)0.169]*[(X2/X1) -0.147]) + 20
- where, F1 Intermediate Function X1 Assembly Burnup in GWd/MTU X2 Initial Enrichment in wt. % U-235 X3 Cooling Time in Years (minimum 10 years)
Note:
Even though a minimum cooling time of 10 years is used, the minimum cooling time requirement for criticality from Table 1.6.4-6 is 15 years.
A uranium loading of 490 kg is employed in the calculation of the decay heat equation. Alternatively, decay heat can be calculated without employing the decay heat equation by using an approved methodology with actual spent fuel parameters instead of bounding spent fuel parameters.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2-1 Structural Evaluation Description of Structural Design This chapter, including its appendices, contains the structural evaluation of the TN Eagle packaging. This evaluation consists of numerical analyses which demonstrate that the TN Eagle packaging satisfies applicable 10 CFR Part 71 requirements for a Type B(U) fissile material packaging.
Descriptive Information Including Weights and Centers of Gravity The structural integrity of the TN Eagle packaging under normal conditions of transport (NCT) and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) specified in 10 CFR Part 71 is shown to meet the design criteria described in 2.1.2.1. The TN Eagle consists of three major structural components: the cask body, one of several transportable dry shielded canisters (DSCs), and the ILs (top and bottom). Each DSC consists of a shell assembly and a basket assembly. These components are described in detail in Chapter 1.
Numerical analyses have been performed for the NCT and HAC, as well as for the lifting and tie-down loads. In general, numerical analyses have been performed for the regulatory events. These analyses of the TN Eagle packaging are summarized in the main body of this section and are described in detail in the appendices to this chapter (see complete list in Section 2.11).
2.1.1.1 Cask The design of the cask described in Chapter 1, shows the overall transport configuration of the TN Eagle packaging. Key details of the various components of cask used in the structural analysis are provide also provided in Chapter 1 on the engineering drawings for package approval. A detailed parts list is shown on each drawing that includes all the parts with materials and codes to be considered in the analyses.
The cask is a cylindrical assembly that is open at the top end and includes a ram access at the bottom for loading and unloading operations. The forged cask body, which acts as the main component of the containment boundary, is made of [
] The open top and bottom ends of the cask are sealed closed with the primary lid and the ram access cover plate, which are made of [
] A series of shielding rings shrink fitted on the cylindrical forged body. These rings consist of a structural section made of [
] and are filled with Vyal B or Vyal HT resin for shielding purposes. The resin is not credited for structural loads.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2-4 2.1.2.1 Basic Design Criteria 2.1.2.1.1 Cask Containment Vessel The containment vessel is described in Chapter 4 and is designed to the maximum practical extent as an ASME Class I component in accordance with the rules of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection NB [8]. The Subsection NB rules for materials, design, fabrication, and examination are applied to all containment boundary components to the maximum practical extent. In addition, the design meets the requirements of Regulatory Guides 7.6 [2] and 7.8 [3]. The containment boundary bolts meet the design requirements of [5]. The design criteria established in this paragraph and used in the appendices of this chapter ensure that the containment boundary remains leak tight under both NCT and HAC. The design criteria of the cask containment vessel are summarized in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4.
2.1.2.1.2 Cask Non-Containment Structure Certain components such as the shielding rings, bottom closure plate and its bolts, top handling ring, bottom ring, and closing plate are not part of the containment vessel but do have structural functions. These components, referred to as non-containment structures, are required to withstand the containment environmental loads, and in some cases share the loads with the containment vessel. The non-containment structures are designed, fabricated, and inspected in accordance with the ASME Code Subsection NF [10], to the maximum practical extent. The top handling ring is fabricated and inspected as per ASME Code Subsection NB [8], to the maximum practical extent.
2.1.2.1.3 DSC Shell Assembly The TN Eagle Cask is designed to carry the following DSCs:
EOS-37PTH and EOS-89BTH licensed for storage in [17].
32PTH1, 32PT, and 24PT4 licensed for transportation in [15] and their respective storage licenses.
FO/FC/FF and 24PT1 licensed for transportation in [16] and their respective storage licenses.
The components of each DSC including the shell, the top outer/inner cover plates, the inner bottom cover plate, the siphon vent block, and the siphon/vent port cover plate are designed, fabricated, and inspected in accordance with the applicable year versions of ASME Code Subsection NB and code alternatives specified in Section 9.4.1 of Chapter 9 to the maximum practical extent. Design criteria and methodologies specified in [15], [16], and [17] are followed in this license for new structural evaluations. The design criteria for the DSC shell assemblies are summarized in Table 2-3.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 2
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2-5 2.1.2.1.4 DSC Baskets The baskets for all of the DSCs are designed, fabricated, and inspected in accordance with the ASME Code Subsection NG to the maximum practical extent with the applicable code year and code alternatives specified in Section 9.4.1 of Chapter 9.
The fuel compartment response to compressive loads is evaluated to ensure that buckling will not occur under HAC. Basket assembly allowable buckling loads are evaluated based on non-linear, large displacement, quasi-static analysis models using ANSYS or LS-DYNA by following the methodologies specified in [15], [16], and
[17].
The design criteria for the DSC baskets are summarized in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6.
2.1.2.1.5 Impact Limiters The TN Eagle is provided with an IL at each end of the cask body. The IL stainless steel shells and gussets and adapter are designed to position and confine the AH blocks. The stainless steel shells are designed to support and protect the AH blocks under normal environmental conditions. The adapter is designed to provide the means of attachment to the cask body. The IL and its bolts are designed to withstand the applied loads and to prevent separation of the limiters from the cask during an impact. The design criteria of the IL and its bolts are specified in Appendix 2.11.3.
2.1.2.1.6 Tie-Down Devices The top handling ring and shielding rings are classified as tie-down devices as per 10 CFR 71.45 (b). As per 10 CFR 71.45 (b), any system of tie-down devices that is a structural part of the package must be capable of withstanding, without generating stress in any material of the package in excess of its yield strength given a static force applied to its center of gravity with the following components:
10 g longitudinal acceleration in the direction of travel 2 g vertical acceleration 5 g lateral acceleration perpendicular to the direction of travel All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 2
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2-19 Table 2-2 TN Eagle SC Configuration Calculated Weights and Centers of Gravity Component Weight (kg)
CG (mm)(1)
Cask Body (No Lid, Ram Access Cover Plate, or ILs)
Cask Lid(2)
Ram Access Cover Plate(2)
Top IL(2)
Bottom IL(2)
Contents (Maximum Loaded DSC, Sleeve, and Spacer, if Required)
FC FO FF 24PT1 24PT4 32PT - S100 32PT - S125 32PT - L100 32PT - L125 32PTH1 - Short (3) 32PTH1 - Medium 32PTH1 - Long Fully Loaded TN Eagle (with Maximum Content Weight)(3) (4)
(1) Axial CG taken with respect to the origin located at the interior surface of the bottom of the forged body with a positive value indicating a direction toward the top of the cask.
(2) Includes the attachment bolts for the component.
(3) [
]
(4) The SC configuration with Vyal B resin is reported because its weight bounds the weight of the SC configuration with Vyal HT resin in Type C1 neutron shielding rings.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2-20 Table 2-3 Containment Vessel and DSC Shell Stress Limits (3)
Classification Stress Intensity Limit NCT (Level A)(1)
Pm Sm Pl 1.5 Sm (Pm or Pl)+Pb 1.5 Sm (Pm or Pl)+Pb+Q 3.0 Sm (Pm or Pl)+Pb+Q+F Sa Shear Stress 0.6 Sm Bearing Stress Sy HAC (Level D)(2)
Pm Lesser of 2.4 Sm or 0.7 Su Pl Lesser of 3.6 Sm or Su (Pm or Pl)+Pb Lesser of 3.6 Sm or Su Shear Stress 0.42 Su Notes:
- 1.
Classification and stress limits are defined in [2] and [8]. [
]
- 2.
Classification of stress limits are defined in [2] and Appendix XXVIII of [11]. [
]
- 3. [
]
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 7
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2.11.1-1 TN Eagle Cask NCT Evaluation 2.11.1.1 Introduction The objective of this appendix is to demonstrate the structural adequacy of the TN Eagle transportation cask against Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) loads as per 10 CFR 71.71 requirements.
2.11.1.2 Cask and FE Model Description Material properties of the modeled parts can be found in Chapter 7.
2.11.1.3 Design Criteria The acceptability of the packaging design is assessed by stress criteria based on ASME code,Section III, Subsection NB requirements [4]. These criteria are tabulated in Table 2.11.1-1 and applied to obtain the stress allowables for each part, which are shown in Table 2.11.1-2.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 7
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2.11.2-1 TN Eagle Cask HAC Evaluation 2.11.2.1 Introduction This appendix documents the structural evaluation of the TN Eagle for the loading conditions specified in 10 CFR 71.73 and the load combinations outlined in Table 1 of
[5]. The stress criteria used are as per [4], Article NB-3000 of [6] and Mandatory Appendix XXVII of [7].
This appendix uses the finite element (FE) model from Appendix 2.11.1 for all load cases [
]
This appendix evaluates the containment boundary of the TN Eagle, except for the primary lid and ram access cover plate (RACP) bolts, which are evaluated in Appendix 2.11.4.
2.11.2.2 Analyses 2.11.2.2.1 30 ft Free Drops The 30 ft free drop load combination evaluates the TN Eagle containment boundary for the set of 30 ft drops presented in Appendix 2.11.3. [
]
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 7
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2.11.2-2 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 7 Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2.11.2-3 2.11.2.2.2 Fire Accident The fire accident load combination evaluates the TN Eagle containment boundary at post-fire steady-state conditions at 30 minutes after the fire. An internal pressure of
[
] is applied on the inner surface of the containment boundary.
This pressure bounds the internal pressure of [
] presented in Section 3.4.4.1 of Chapter 3. [
] The weights of the cask (including the non-modelled parts), internals (i.e., canister, basket, and fuel assemblies (FAs)), and impact limiters (ILs) are included in the load combination.
2.11.2.2.3 Immersion The Immersion load combination evaluates the TN Eagle containment boundary for immersion under a head of water of at least 15 m. An external pressure of [
] This pressure bounds the external pressure of 150 kPa required by 10 CFR 71.73 (c) (6). The weights of the cask (including the non-modelled parts), internals (i.e., canister, basket, and FAs), and ILs are included in the load combination. [
]
2.11.2.2.4 Summary of HAC Evaluations The stress results from the HAC load combinations, shown in Table 2.11.2-3, meet the stress criteria for a hypothetical accident condition (HAC) set by [4], Article NB-3000 of [6] and Mandatory Appendix XXVII of [7]. These results show that the HAC load combination specified in Table 1 of [5] do not adversely affect the structural integrity of the containment boundary.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 7
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2.11.2-4 2.11.2.3 References
- 1.
LS-DYNA Version R7.0, Keyword Users Manual, Volume I.
- 2.
LS-DYNA Version R7.0, Keyword Users Manual, Volume II, Material Models.
- 3.
ANSYS Computer Code and Users Manual, Release 17.1.
- 4.
NRC, Regulatory Guide 7.6, Rev. 1, Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels, 1978.
- 5.
NRC, Regulatory Guide 7.8, Rev. 1, Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material, 1989.
- 6.
ASME, B&PVC,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB, 2017.
- 7.
ASME, B&PVC,Section III, Appendices 2017.
- 8.
ANSYS Computer Code and Users Manual, Release 2022 R2.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 7
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2.11.2-6 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 7 Proprietary Information on Pages 2.11.2-6 and 2.11.2-12 through 2.11.2-15 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2.11.10-3 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4 Proprietary Information on Pages 2.11.10-3, 2.11.10-4, 2.11.10-6, and 2.11.10-7 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 2.11.10-15 2.11.10.2.6 24PT1 Basket 2.11.10.3 Conclusions This appendix shows the DSC canisters and baskets of the non-EOS contents (i.e.,
32PT, 32PTH1, 24PT4, FO, FC, FF, and 24PT1) are structurally adequate for the NCT and HAC free drops while in the TN Eagle transportation cask.
The analyses performed in [1] for the 32PT, 32PTH1, and 24PT4 are bounding. The analyses performed in [2] for the FO, FC, FF, and 24PT1 are bounding.
2.11.10.4 References
- 1.
Orano TN, NUHOMS-MP197 Transportation Packaging Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20. Docket No. 07109302
- 2.
Orano TN, NUHOMS-MP187 Multi-Purpose Cask Transportation Package Safety Analysis Report, Revision 17. Docket No. 07109255
- 3.
ANSYS Computer Code and User's Manual, Release 17.1.
- 4.
ASME, B&PVC,Section III, Subsection NG and Appendices, 1998 Edition with 2000 Addenda.
- 5.
Orano TN, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized NUHOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System for Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Revision 18, Docket No. 07201004.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3-19 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4 Proprietary Information on Pages 3-19 and 3-20 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3-32 Maximum fuel cladding temperature limits of 752 °F (400 °C) for NCT and 1,058 °°F (570 °C) for HAC are considered for the FAs with an inert cover gas as concluded in ISG-11 [5]. The maximum fuel cladding temperature limit of 752 °F (400 °C) is considered for HBU FAs under NCT. However, HBU reconfigured fuels, whose physical integrity may not be guaranteed under HAC, are conservatively assumed as rubble. Therefore, the above maximum fuel cladding temperature limit of 1,058 °F (570 °C) for HAC is not applicable to the HBU reconfigured fuels.
Containment of radioactive material and gases is a major design requirement.
Seal temperatures must be maintained within specified limits to satisfy the leak-tight containment requirement. A maximum temperature limit of 400 °F (204 °C) is considered for the Fluorocarbon seals (Viton O-rings) in the containment vessel ([11] and [12]) for NCT and HAC. A maximum seal temperature of 572 °F (300 °C) is considered for all metallic seals for thermal evaluation for NCT and HAC.
To maintain the stability of the neutron shield resin, a maximum allowable temperature of 320 °F (160 °C) is considered for the neutron shield Vyal-B resin
[13] and 356°F (180°C) for the Vyal-HT resin [22] (see Appendix 3.6.5A) for NCT.
The neutron shield resin are assumed to disintegrate completely after the HAC fire, therefore, are not taken credit in heat transfer. The above neutron shield resin temperature limits are not applicable to HAC.
In accordance with 10 CFR 71.43(g) [6] the maximum temperature of the accessible packaging surfaces in the shade is limited to 185 °F (85 °C).
The recommended temperature design limit for the aluminum honeycomb in the impact limiter is 248 °F (120 °C) under NCT, per manufacturer's recommendations [20].
The maximum DSC cavity internal design pressures are summarized below:
DSC Design Pressure (psig)
NCT (3% rods ruptured)
HAC (100% rods ruptured)
EOS-37PTH and EOS-89BTH DSCs [1]
20 130 24PT4 [3]
20 100 32PT [2]
15 125 32PTH1 Type 1 and Type 2 [2]
15 140 FO/FC/FF [4]
10 50 24PT1 [3]
10 60 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3-62
- 19. USNRC, Dry Storage and Transportation of High Burnup Spent Nuclear Fuel Final Report, NUREG-2224, November 2020.
- 20. TR-1004453, Benchmarking of the Constitutive Model of Biaxial Aluminum Honeycomb.
- 21. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Material Specifications, Part D, 2017.
- 22. Qualification of a new neutron shielding material of resin: Vyal-HT-1, Orano NPS report NTE-21-003314-000 Version 3.0.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5-2 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4 Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5-8 3.6.5.3 References
- 1.
Orano TN, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized NUHOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System for Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Revision 18, Docket No. 07201004.
- 2.
Orano TN, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System for Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Revision 9, Docket No. 07201029.
- 3.
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Rancho Seco Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 6, Docket No.
07200011.
- 4.
Orano TN, NUHOMS-MP197 Transportation Package Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Docket No. 07109302.
- 5.
Orano TN, Safety Analysis Report for the NUHOMS-MP187 Multi-Purpose Cask, Revision 17. Docket No. 07109255.
- 6.
ANSYS ICEM CFD, Version 17.1, ANSYS, Inc.
- 7.
ANSYS FLUENT, Version 17.1 and Version 2022R2, ANSYS, Inc.
- 8.
Orano TN, NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 3, Docket No. 07201042.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5-10 Table 3.6.5-2 Design Load Cases of 32PTH1 DSC in TN Eagle SC with Impact Limiters under NCT Load Case #
Ambient Temperature (F) 1 or 1a(2) 100 2
100 3
100 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5-16 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4 Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-i Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
Appendix 3.6.5A Thermal Reconciliation for TN Eagle SC with Type C1 Neutron Shield Rings TABLE OF CONTENTS Thermal Reconciliation for TN Eagle SC with Type C1 Neutron Shield Rings..................................................................................................................... 3.6.5A-1 3.6.5A.1 Description of Thermal Evaluation with Type C1 Neutron Shield Ring..................................................................................................... 3.6.5A-1 3.6.5A.2 Thermal Evaluation Results................................................................. 3.6.5A-1 LIST OF TABLES Table 3.6.5A-1 Maximum Temperatures of Key Components in TN Eagle SC Loaded with 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC under NC................................ 3.6.5A-6 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.6.5A-1 Temperature Profiles for TN Eagle SC Loaded with 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC under NCT (Load Case 1a)...................................... 3.6.5A-7 Figure 3.6.5A-2 Heat Capacity of Vyal-B and Vyal-HT............................................ 3.6.5A-9 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-1 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
Thermal Reconciliation for TN Eagle SC with Type C1 Neutron Shield Rings This section describes the thermal evaluation of the TN Eagle Standard Cask (SC) equipped with Type C1 neutron shield rings, which use Vyal-HT new resin with higher temperature limit at 356 °F (180 °C) compared to 320 °F (160 °C) for VYAL-B as presented in Section 3.2.3.
3.6.5A.1 Description of Thermal Evaluation with Type C1 Neutron Shield Ring There are slight changes of new shield ring design (Type C1) with Vyal-HT resin from Type C shield ring design with the Vyal-B as noted on Schedule 1 of drawing TNEAGLE01-1100, Revision 1 including 0.36" total increased thickness for inner and outer shielding rings with 0.08" reduced resin thickness, but they are considered having insignificant impact on thermal performance of the TN Eagle SC compared to Type C shield ring design.
The same thermal model as described in Section 3.6.5.1.2 is used for thermal evaluation of the TN Eagle SC with Type C1 except the two following changes:
- 1.
Using thermal properties of resin (Vyal-HT) provided in Section 3.2.1 Item 11b.
- 2.
To account for the coating uncertainty, the minimum emissivity of 0.75 and maximum absorptivity of 0.75 are conservatively assumed for the paintings on the outside surfaces of the TN Eagle SC package.
The thermal analysis methodology used for Type C1 shield ring design is identical to that used for Type C shield ring design described in Sections 3.6.5.1 and 3.6.5.2 for NCT and HAC, respectively.
As justified in Section 3.6.5.1.1, the maximum component temperatures of 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC in the TN Eagle SC based on bounding design load case (LC#1) from Table 3.6.5-2 represent the bounding temperatures for all non-EOS DSCs loaded in TN Eagle SC under NCT. Therefore, the same load case (LC#1a) listed in Table 3.6.5-2 for the 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC with maximum heat load of 26 kW during NCT in the TN Eagle SC with Type C1 shield ring design is selected to evaluate thermal impact of Type C1 shield ring design on the thermal performance of TN Eagle SC during the transport operations.
3.6.5A.2 Thermal Evaluation Results 3.6.5A.2.1 Convergence of Thermal Model The computational convergence of the thermal model for LC #1a shows that the differences between the highest and lowest maximum temperatures of the fuel cladding over the last 500 iterations are all within 0.06 °F. The total heat transfer flux imbalances are within 0.06% and the radiation heat transfer flux imbalances are within 0.004%. Based on this discussion, the thermal calculation is computationally converged.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-2 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
3.6.5A.2.2 Temperature Calculations The maximum and average temperatures of DSC shell, homogenized basket and key components of TN Eagle SC loaded with the 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC for LC#1a (Type C1 shield ring) are summarized in Table 3.6.5A-1 and Table 3.6.5-9, respectively.
Table 3.6.5A-1 also compares the maximum temperatures of DSC shell, homogenized basket and key components of TN Eagle SC loaded with the 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC for LC#1a with the TN Eagle SC design basis temperatures based on Type C shield ring design (LC#1 in Table 3.6.5-6).
Figure 3.6.5A-1 shows the temperature distributions of the key components in the TN Eagle SC loaded with the 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC for LC #1a.
The same methodology as employed in Section 3.6.5.2 can be used to determine if the transient HAC temperatures of the TN Eagle SC with the 32PTH1 DSC are bounded by those of the TN Eagle LC with the EOS-37PTH DSC by comparing the initial temperatures at the beginning of the fire HAC and the heat up rates for the two systems:
- 1.
Based on the comparisons shown in Table 3.6.5A-1, the initial temperatures of the TN Eagle SC structural components under HAC are lower than the corresponding ones for the TN Eagle LC with EOS-37PTH DSC with 38.4 kW under HAC.
- 2.
As discussed in Section 3.6.5.2.1, heat up rate for any system is expressed as total decay heat load (Q) / heat capacity (C). Since the TN Eagle SC for Vyal-B resin with the 32PTH1 DSC has low decay heat load and high thermal capacity, its heat up rate is much lower than that of the TN Eagle LC with the EOS-37PTH DSC. As shown in Figure 3.6.5A-2, heat capacity of the new resin (Vyal-HT) is higher than Vyal-B resin, the heat up rate of the TN Eagle SC with Type C shielding ring design (Vyal-B resin) remains bounding for the TN Eagle SC with Type C1 new shielding ring design (Vyal-HT resin).
Therefore, the HAC results for the maximum cask components of the TN Eagle LC with EOS-37PTH DSC with 38.4 kW in Table 3-16 remain bounding for the TN Eagle SC with non-EOS DSCs and no further thermal analyses are required for these DSC types. The maximum temperatures for DSC contents for all non-EOS DSCs to be transported in the TN Eagle SC for HAC are listed in Table 3.6.5-12.
3.6.5A.2.2.1 Cask Component Temperatures As shown in Table 3.6.5A-1, the maximum resin temperature for LC#1a is 287 °F, which is increased by 13 °F compared to design basis LC#1 with Type C shield ring design. However, it remains below the allowable temperature limit of 356 °F (180 °C) specified in Section 3.2.3 for Vyal-HT resin with sufficient margin of 69 °F.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-3 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
As shown in Table 3.6.5A-1, the fluorocarbon seals in the primary lid and ram access cover plate are not explicitly specified in the models but their temperatures at appropriate seal locations are monitored. The maximum temperature of the primary lid seal, port and test plug seal and ram access cover plate seal are 205 °F, 205 °F and 190 °F, respectively from LC #1a, which are all well below the long-term design limit of 400 °F.
As shown in Table 3.6.5A-1, the maximum temperature increases of other cask components for TN Eagle SC with Type C1 shield ring design are within 13 °F compared to design basis LC#1 with Type C shield ring design. A similar comparison of LC # 1a with the maximum temperatures from LC # 1 (TN EAGLE LC with EOS-37PTH) shows that all temperatures remain bounded except for the primary lid which is higher by 1°F.
The design basis temperatures of the primary lid are 96 °C (205 °F) for NCT (Table 3.6.5A-1) and 217 °C (423 °F) for HAC (Table 3-16). However, the design basis stress allowable limits for the primary lid structural evaluation are based on the conservative temperatures of 175 °C (347 °F) for NCT (Table 2.11.1-2) and 250 °C (482 °F) for HAC (Section 2.11.2.2.2), which provide sufficient margins (> 55 °F) to bound a minor temperature increase of 1 °F for the primary lid and there is no impact on design basis structural evaluation of the TN Eagle cask for NCT and HAC presented in Appendix 2.11.1 and Appendix 2.11.2, respectively.
Due to high heat load of 38.4 kW for the TN Eagle LC, it is expected that the design basis cask component temperatures for the TN Eagle LC with the EOS-37PTH DSC with 38.4 kW heat load bounds those for the TN Eagle SC with non-EOS DSCs under NCT and HAC. Therefore, thermal design criteria for the TN Eagle cask components specified in Section 3.2.3 are met.
3.6.5A.2.2.2 Maximum Accessible Surface Temperature The maximum accessible surface temperatures under shade for TN Eagle LC, 149°F and 161°F for impact limiter shell and personnel barrier, respectively, as calculated in Section 3.3.4 bound the maximum accessible surface temperatures under shade for TN Eagle SC with Type C1 new shield ring design, which remain below the maximum temperature limit of 185 °F (85 °C) for the accessible packaging surfaces defined in Section 3.2.3.
3.6.5A.2.2.3 DSC Component Temperature As shown in Table 3.6.5A-1, the maximum temperature increases of the DSC shell and basket components for LC#1a with Type C1 shield ring design are limited to 9 °F compared to design basis LC#1 with Type C shield ring design.
Accounting for the impact of Type C1 shield ring design and the coating uncertainty for the TN Eagle SC, 9 °F temperature increase is considered for maximum DSC component temperatures listed in Tables 3.6.5-6, 3.6.5-8 and 3.6.5-12 for Type C shield ring design under NCT and HAC.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-4 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
A review of Table 3.6.5-7 shows that even with this 9 °F increase the maximum DSC shell during NCT remains bounded by previous evaluations for 24PT4, 32PTH1 Type 1, FO/FC/FF and 24PT1 DSCs and will exceed the previously evaluated temperature limits for 32PT and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSCs.
Fuel Cladding As discussed above, maximum DSC shell temperatures for non-EOS DSCs, except 32PT DSC and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSC, remain below the bounding values listed in Table 3.6.5-7. Therefore, there is no impact to the maximum fuel cladding temperatures for those DSCs for NCT and HAC.
For the 32PT DSC and the 32PTH1 Type 2 DSC, a 9 °F increase in the maximum DSC shell temperature will result in smaller increase in the fuel cladding temperature.
However, considering a 9 °F increase in the maximum fuel cladding temperatures listed in Table 3.6.5-8, the maximum fuel cladding temperatures will still remain below
<729 °F for 32PT DSC and <737 °F for 32PTH1 Type 2 DSC. Similarly for HAC there will be no impact since as shown in Table 3.6.5-12, the maximum fuel cladding temperature will remain below <872 °F for 32PT DSC and <867 °F for 32PTH1 Type 2 DSC.
Therefore, maximum fuel cladding temperatures for Type C1 shield ring design for NCT and HAC remain below maximum fuel cladding temperature limits of 752 °F (400 °C) for NCT and 1,058 °F (570 °C) for HAC specified in Section 3.2.3.
DSC Shell and Basket Component Considering the above 9 °F temperature increase for Type C1 shield ring design, the maximum DSC shell temperatures for non-EOS DSCs except 32PT DSC and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSC remain below the bounding values listed in Table 3.6.5-7.
Therefore, except 32PT and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSCs, the maximum DSC component temperatures for Type C shield ring design listed in Tables 3.6.5-7 and 3.6.5-12 for NCT and HAC, respectively, remain valid for Type C1 shield design.
For Type C1 shield ring design with 32PT and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSCs, the additional structural impact of the above 9 °F temperature increase for transportation in the TN Eagle SC is provided in Appendix 2.11.10. Considering the available stress ratio margin and conservatism assumed for design basis structural evaluation for non-EOS DSCs, the structural evaluation for non-EOS DSCs in TN Eagle SC with Type C shield ring design in Appendix 2.11.10 remains valid for Type C1 shield ring design.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-5 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
3.6.5A.2.3 Maximum Internal Pressures 3.6.5A.2.3.1 Maximum Normal Operating Pressure (MNOP)
The methodology to calculate the MNOP in the TN Eagle SC cask cavity is the same as described in Section 3.6.5.1.4. The bounding MNOP of the TN Eagle SC loaded with non-EOS DSCs is calculated as 11.7 psig in Table 3.6.5-10 for Type C shield ring with Vyal-B resin. When Vyal-B resin is replaced by Vyal-HT resin, the bounding average helium temperature in the cask cavity for NCT is increased by 9 °F from 294 °F to 303 °F as shown in Table 3.6.5-10.
The bounding MNOP the TN Eagle SC for Type C1 shield ring with Vyal-HT resin listed in Table 3.6.5-10 is calculated below.
PNCT, Vyal-HT
= PNCT, Vyal-B x (Tavg, He, Vyal-HT +459.67) / (Tavg, He, Vyal-B) -14.7
= (11.7+14.7) x (303+459.67) / (294+459.67) -14.7
= 12.0 psig This value is less than the MNOP of 12.1 psig for the TN Eagle LC listed in Table 3-12.
Therefore, the EOS-37PTH DSC in TN Eagle LC with 38.4 kW heat load is bounding for the maximum TN Eagle LC and SC cask cavity pressure for all DSCs. Similarly, the TN Eagle LC cask cavity HAC pressure listed in Table 3-12 remains bounding for the TN Eagle SC cask cavity HAC pressure.
3.6.5A.2.3.2 Maximum Internal Pressures in non-EOS DSCs As discussed in Section 3.6.5A.2.2.3, except 32PT and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSCs, the DSC component temperatures for Type C shield ring design remain valid for Type C1 new shield design. The maximum internal pressures for non-EOS DSCs except 32PT and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSCs listed in Table 3.6.5-11 for Type C shield ring design remain valid for Type C1 shield design.
As shown in Table 3.6.5-11, there are enough pressure margins (> 4 psig for NCT and >14 psig for HAC) for the maximum internal pressures of both 32PT and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSCs. It is expected that the minor temperature increase of 9 °F for average cavity temperature has negligible impact on maximum internal pressures for both 32PT and 32PTH1 Type 2 DSCs.
Therefore, the maximum internal pressures for all non-EOS DSCs listed in Table 3.6.5-11 remain valid for Type C1 shield design, which remain lower than the design basis NCT and HAC pressures considered for the structural evaluation of non-EOS DSCs in Appendix 2.11.10.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-6 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
Table 3.6.5A-1 Maximum Temperatures of Key Components in TN Eagle SC Loaded with 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC under NC Maximum Temperature (ºF)
EOS-37PTH DSC in TN Eagle LC 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC in TN Eagle SC Components LC #1 (Table 3-8)
LC #1 (Table 3.6.5-6)
Design Limit Shielding Ring Design Type A (Vyal-B)
Type C (Vyal-B)
Type C1 (Vyal-HT)
Heat Load (kW) 38.4 26 26 Basket 629(3) 637 8
DSC Shell 478 444 453 9
Cask Body (Shell and Bottom) 367 300 311 11 Shielding Rings 340 279 290 11 Primary Lid 204 198 205 7
Bottom Closure Plate 214 180 188 8
DSC Slide Rail 370 315 326 11 Bottom Ring 218 182 189 7
Ram Access Cover Plate 216 182 190 8
Neutron Shield Resin (Vyal-B) 329 274 287 13 320 (160°C)
Neutron Shield Resin (Vyal-HT) 356 (180°C)
Port and Test Plug Seal @ Primary Lid Seal (1) 204 198 205 7
400 Ram Access Cover Plate Seal (2) 216 182 190 8
Inner Aluminium Honeycomb 144 137 134
-3 248 (120°C)
Outer Aluminium Honeycomb 158 146 153 7
Shell Inner Plate 141 135 141 6
Shell Outer Plate 141 135 141 6
Adapter Ring 215 196 204 8
Adapter Flange Plate 169 154 161 7
Gussets 193 177 183 6
IL Resin 212 193 200 7
356 (180°C)
Notes:
(1) The seal O-rings are not explicitly considered in the models. The maximum temperature of primary lid is conservatively reported as the maximum seal temperature.
(2) The seal O-rings are not explicitly considered in the models. The maximum temperature of ram access cover plate is conservatively reported as the maximum seal temperature.
(3) As shown in Figure 3.6.5-2(a).
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-7 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
Figure 3.6.5A-1 Temperature Profiles for TN Eagle SC Loaded with 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC under NCT (Load Case 1a)
Part 1 of 2 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-8 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
Figure 3.6.5A-1 Temperature Profiles for TN Eagle SC Loaded with 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC under NCT Part 2 of 2 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 3.6.5A-9 Appendix 3.6.5A is newly added in Revision 1.
Figure 3.6.5A-2 Heat Capacity of Vyal-B and Vyal-HT All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-1 Shielding Evaluation for TN Eagle SC The TN Eagle cask includes two configurations: TN Eagle Large Canister (LC) and TN Eagle Standard Canister (SC). The TN Eagle LC is designed to host the EOS-37PTH DSC and the EOS-89BTH DSC, and the TN Eagle SC is designed to host other DSCs of TN products, including the FC/FO/FF DSC, the 24PT1 DSC, the 24PT4 DSC, the 32PT DSC, and the 32PTH1 DSC.
The dose rates around the TN Eagle cask are in compliance with the applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 for exclusive-use transportation in an open transport vehicle [1].
This section describes the shielding evaluation of the TN Eagle SC transportation package, which includes the TN Eagle SC and the authorized contents. The shielding evaluation of the TN Eagle LC transportation package is described in Chapter 5.
5.6.1.1 Description of the Shielding Design The TN Eagle cask, including both the TN Eagle LC and the TN Eagle SC, consists of (proceeding from inner radius to outer):
a forged cask body that provides the structural integrity of the cask, the gamma shielding, and the radioactive material containment function, a lid which provides radioactive material containment, shielding rings that surround the forged cask body to provide additional gamma and neutron radiation shielding, and impact limiters with adapters placed on each end for use in transport.
The TN Eagle cask is designed to allow horizontal transport of the DSCs loaded with spent fuel assemblies (FAs) in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71 [1].
The authorized contents acceptable for transport are described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3. Drawings of the TN Eagle cask and the allowed DSCs are available in Chapter 1, Section 1.5. The main differences between the TN Eagle LC and the TN Eagle SC are the forged cask body shell thickness and the neutron shielding rings, which are discussed with more details in Section 5.6.1.3.1 and Section 5.6.1.4.4.3. The TN Eagle SC has three design options for the neutron shielding rings: shielding ring type B and shielding ring type C, which both use Vyal-B resin, and shielding ring type C1, which uses Vyal-HT resin. The impact limiters are the same for the TN Eagle SC and the TN Eagle LC (with the exception that the impact limiters for the SC with NSR type C1 have a slightly larger outer diameter).
The TN Eagle LC is designed to host the EOS-37PTH DSC and the EOS-89BTH DSC. The EOS-37PTH DSC is designed to accommodate up to 37 intact, up to 8 damaged, and up to 4 failed PWR FAs with uranium dioxide (UO2) fuels, zirconium alloy claddings, and with or without control components (CCs). The EOS-89BTH DSC is designed to accommodate up to 89 intact BWR FAs with UO2 fuels, zirconium alloy claddings, and with or without fuel channels.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-3 5.6.1.1.1 Package Design Features Similar to the TN Eagle LC, shielding for the TN Eagle SC transportation package at the cask side is provided mainly by the forged cask body and the shielding rings surrounding the forged cask body. Shielding for gamma radiation is provided by the forged cask body shell and the shielding ring steel. For the neutron shielding, borated Vyal-B or Vyal-HT resin blocks are provided in the shielding rings surrounding the forged cask body radially.
Gamma shielding at the cask ends is provided by the steel top and bottom assemblies of the TN Eagle cask and axial ends of the DSCs. Vyal-B or Vyal-HT resin plates are also provided [
] at both ends to provide additional neutron shielding at the cask ends.
Additional shielding around the cask is provided by the [
] the impact limiters and the adapters.
Minimum dimensions are generally applied in the model configurations. A full discussion and description of the models used in the shielding evaluation is contained in Section 5.6.1.3.2. Minimum boron and hydrogen content are applied in the shielding models, and material properties used in the shielding evaluation of the TN Eagle SC transportation package are described in detail in Section 5.6.1.3.3.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-14 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4 Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-18 5.6.1.3.2.2 HAC Other model configurations for HAC analysis of the TN Eagle SC are the same as the model configurations of the TN Eagle LC. Details have been described in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.2 and are not repeated here.
5.6.1.3.3 Material Properties Material properties used in the MCNP models of the TN Eagle SC are the same as the ones used for the TN Eagle LC, which have been described in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2 and are not repeated here.
5.6.1.4 Shielding Evaluation 5.6.1.4.1 Methods MCNP5 v1.40 is used in the shielding analysis [4]. MCNP5 is a Monte Carlo transport program that allows full three-dimensional modeling of the TN Eagle System. Therefore, no geometrical approximations are necessary when developing the shielding models.
With the source terms generated in Section 5.6.1.2 and model configurations developed in Section 5.6.1.3, shielding evaluation is performed for the TN Eagle SC and external dose rates are provided in Section 5.6.1.4.4 for both NCT and HAC analysis.
5.6.1.4.2 Input and Output Data MCNP models are built for the model parameters described in Section 5.6.1.3 and source terms described in Section 5.6.1.2 for shielding evaluations. Different scenarios are analyzed to cover different cask conditions, and fuel conditions under both NCT and HAC, to demonstrate the compliance of the TN Eagle SC transportation package with the regulation dose rate limits. Details of analyzed scenarios are described below in Section 5.6.1.4.4.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-21 5.6.1.4.4.3 Shielding Ring Type C1 Shielding ring type C1 dimensions are shown in Figure 5.6.1-1. Shielding ring type C1 may only be made of carbon steel and Vyal-HT neutron shield resin.
The inner steel thickness of the types B and C neutron shielding rings is 4 mm smaller than the type C1 neutron shielding ring. The outer steel thickness of the types B and C1 neutron shielding rings is 5 mm larger than the type C shielding ring. The resin block thickness of the type B neutron shielding ring is 3 mm less than the type C and C1 neutron shielding rings. The total thickness from inner radius to outer radius of type B and C neutron shielding rings are the same, and both are 7 mm smaller than the type C1 shielding ring. Please refer to Figure 5.6.1-1.
Important to shielding dimensions of metal and resin components at the cask side are summarized for different TN Eagle transportation systems with PWR fuel in Table 5.6.1-15. The total thickness of metal at the cask side from the PWR FAs in the peripheral zone to the cask outer surface of the TN Eagle SC equipped with type C1 neutron shield rings is from 1.6 mm up to 6.4 mm larger than the TN Eagle LC depending on the DSC. The resin thickness of the TN Eagle SC equipped with type C1 neutron shield rings is 48 mm larger than the TN Eagle LC. Therefore, it is expected that the TN Eagle SC equipped with type C1 neutron shield rings will provide better shielding performance than the TN Eagle LC, and very similar shielding performance to the TN Eagle SC equipped with type B neutron shield rings for the cask side. However, because of the use of a different neutron shielding resin (Vyal-HT vs Vyal-B) and some other considerations, this expectation is explicitly verified by analysis.
Shielding ring type C1 uses borated neutron shielding material Vyal-HT [10]. The same neutron shielding material is employed in the impact limiter adapters. The composition and density of the Vyal-HT resin is reported in Table 5.6.1-28. The minimum weight fraction of hydrogen and boron is applied in the shielding models, as well as the minimum density of the resin (conservatively taken as 1.33 g/cc). The shielding effect of superficial chips in the resin block corners or edges, which may occur during fabrication, is analyzed by performing an additional sensitivity analysis that uniformly reduces the resin density by an additional 0.5 wt. % to 1.32 g/cc.
A sensitivity analysis is performed for the shielding ring type C1 with the Vyal-HT resin to verify regulatory dose rate compliance, and also to confirm the applicability of the existing FQTs determined for the TN Eagle SC equipped with type B neutron shielding rings using Vyal-B resin.
The analysis of the TN Eagle SC equipped with type C1 neutron shield rings is based on the TN Eagle SC equipped with type B neutron shield ring design basis model described in Section 5.6.1.3.1, except that the Type B materials and shield ring geometry are modified to reflect the Type C1 material and geometry details.
Additional considerations are also included in the model as discussed below.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-22 Detailed TN Eagle SC equipped with type C1 neutron shield rings MCNP models are developed considering a 2.2 mm void between the steel structure and the neutron shield resin (axial direction) and a minimum resin thickness of 188 mm instead of 195 mm nominal thickness (radial direction). Additionally, a second configuration is considered to address a reduction in the Vyal-HT resin material density due to chipping that may occur during fabrication. In this configuration, the Vyal-HT resin density is reduced by 0.5 wt. % to represent up to 0.5% resin loss during fabrication.
All source, DSC, impact limiter, and cask details are identical to the TN Eagle SC with neutron shield ring B design basis model described in Section 5.6.1.3.1 except for the neutron shield rings.
Two NCT evaluations are performed as described above: the first is the TN Eagle SC with neutron shield ring C1 design in NCT; the second analysis is a rerun of the TN Eagle SC equipped with type C1 neutron shield rings NCT models with an additional 0.5 wt. % reduction in Vyal-HT resin density to quantify the impact on total dose rates.
As illustrated in Figure 5-15, HAC shielding evaluation for the TN Eagle system involves the loss of two adjacent neutron shielding ring resin block sections and their corresponding outer steel rings at the highest dose rate cask axial location, and a reduction in the density of the remaining neutron shield ring resin in all other intact neutron shield rings. This configuration leaves only the inner steel ring thickness of the neutron shield rings to provide shielding functionality outside of the radius of the cask shell. The shielding ring inner steel thickness of the type C1 neutron shield ring is 4 mm thicker than the type B or C neutron shield rings. In the HAC scenario described, with two adjacent neutron shielding resin rings and their corresponding outer steel rings removed, the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type C1 neutron shield rings will produce lower maximum side dose rates when compared to the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type B neutron shield rings. Therefore, it is not necessary to calculate HAC dose rates for the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type C1 neutron shield rings as they will be bound by those produced by the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type B neutron shield rings.
The maximum radiation dose rates for NCT from the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type C1 neutron shield rings are reported in Table 5.6.1-29 and are compared to the maximum dose rates from the TN Eagle LC reported in Table 5-80, and the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type B neutron shield rings reported in Table 5.6.1-23. These results demonstrate that the maximum radiation dose rates for the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type C1 neutron shield rings are comparable to the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type B neutron shield rings and are conservatively bounded by the maximum dose rates from the TN Eagle LC. Therefore, the FQTs for the TN Eagle SC with type B neutron shield rings developed from the FQTs of the EOS-37PTH DSC in the TN Eagle LC remain valid for the TN Eagle SC equipped with the type C1 neutron shield rings.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-25 5.6.1.6 References
- 1.
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials.
- 2.
NUREG 2224, Dry Storage and Transportation of High Burnup Spent Nuclear Fuel Final Repor, November 2020.
- 3.
SCALE 6: Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for Workstations and Personal Computers, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Radiation Shielding Information Center Code Package CCC-750, February 2009.
- 4.
MCNP/MCNPX - Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System Including MCNP5 1.40 and MCNPX 2.5.0 and Data Libraries, CCC-730, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, RSICC Computer Code Collection, January 2006.
- 5.
NUREG/CR-6835, Effects of Fuel Failure on Criticality Safety and Radiation Dose for Spent Fuel Casks, September 2003.
- 6.
ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1977, American National Standard Neutron and Gamma-Ray Flux-to-Dose-Rate Factors, American National Standards Institute, Inc., New York, New York.
- 7.
ORNL/TM-2013/416, Rev. 1, ADVANTG - An Automated Variance Reduction Parameter Generator, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
- 8.
TN Document, DI-83016-006, Neutron Sources, Rev. 0.
- 9.
TN Americas LLC, NUHOMS-MP197 TRANSPORTATION PACKAGING SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, Revision 20.
- 10. Qualification of a new Neutron Shielding Material of Resin: VYAL HT-1, Orano NPS report NTE-21-003314-000 Version 3.0.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-26 Table 5.6.1-1 Maximum Dose Rates of TN Eagle Cask Location Limit (mrem/hr)
(Exclusive Use Open Transport)
Maximum Total Dose Rate (mrem/hr)
TN Eagle LC TN Eagle SC External surface of the package (NCT) 200 126 105 Vertical planes projected from outer edges, including the top and underside (NCT) 200 126 105 2 meters from the vertical planes projected from outer edges (NCT) 10 9.4 7.7 1 meter from the surface of the package (HAC) 1000 714 395 Table 5.6.1-2 Authorized PWR Fuel in TN Eagle Cask All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 5.6.1-39 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, tem 4 Proprietary Information on Pages 5.6.1-39, 5.6.1-43, and 5.6.1-50 through 5.6.1-52 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6-5 The calculations determine keff with the CSAS5 control module of SCALE 6.0 [3] for various configurations and initial enrichments, including all uncertainties to assure criticality safety under all credible conditions.
The results of the evaluation demonstrate that the maximum keff including statistical uncertainty is less than the upper subcriticality limit (USL) determined from a statistical analysis of benchmark criticality experiments. The statistical analysis procedure includes a confidence band with an administrative safety margin of 0.05.
Burnup Credit Methodology The criticality analysis for the transfer of EOS-37PTH [2] has been previously performed in a generic transfer cask utilizing fixed neutron absorbers in the basket, soluble boron in the pool water, and favorable basket geometry. This methodology is modified to add credit for the negative reactivity due to the burnup of fuel (burnup credit) while not using soluble boron credit. This analysis along with a description of the contents, calculation models, and criticality analysis results for the EOS-37PTH DSC is presented in Appendix 6.8.2.
Taking credit for fuel assembly burnup or burnup credit requires a different analytical approach for criticality analysis than is used in traditional analysis with a fresh fuel assumption. For fresh fuel, the only key fuel parameters to be taken into account in the analyses are the initial enrichment and the most reactive fuel configuration. The analysis of burned fuel must include consideration of the most reactive assembly as a function of burnup, end effects (underburned fuel at the ends), reactor operating history, fuel composition, initial enrichment, and cooling time. Therefore, additional calculations and codes are required for burned fuel to determine the isotopic composition of the burned fuel as a function of fuel design, initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time using an assumed bounding reactor operating history. These are termed as depletion calculations.
The PWR burnup credit methodology outlined in Section 6.4.7 of [5] is used as the basis for the EOS-37PTH burnup credit evaluation.
The burnup credit analysis includes:
Limits for the licensing basis applicable to PWR UO2 fuel assembly enriched up to 5 wt % U-235, irradiated up to an assembly-average burnup value of 60 GWd/MTU, cooled up to 40 years. The evaluation is based on limited actinide and fission product compositions shown in Table 6.8.2-18 consistently to Table 6.2 of [5].
Licensing-basis model assumptions including appropriate axial burnup profiles, presence of burnable absorbers or control rods during irradiation, and appropriate bounding depletion parameters encompassing actual irradiation histories.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6-11 The bias and bias uncertainty associated with minor actinides and fission products credit conservatively 1.5% of minor actinides and fission product worth, as SCALE 6.1.3/ENDF/B-VII cross-section library is used, and design similar to GBC-32 and credited minor actinides and fission products < 0.1 in keff are shown as required in Table 6-6 of [5], Section 6.8.2.4.2.2.
The bias and bias uncertainty associated isotopic depletion shown in Table 6-3 of [5]
is credited, as SCALE 6.1.3/ENDF/B-VII cross-section library is used, and design similar to GBC-32 are shown as required in Table 6-5 of [5], Section 6.8.2.4.2.2.
The bias and bias uncertainty associated with minor actinides and fission products and the bias and bias uncertainty associated isotopic depletion are to be added to the kkeno + keno.
The USL including 5% administrative margin and major actinides bias and bias uncertainty is 0.9423.
References
- 1.
10 CFR 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials.
- 2.
TN Americas LLC, NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Docket Number 72-1042, Revision 3.
- 3.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, RSIC Computer Code Collection, SCALE: A Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analysis for Licensing Evaluations for Workstations and Personal Computers, NUREG/CR-0200, Revision 6, ORNL/NUREG/CSD-2/V2/R6.
- 4.
ORNL, Scale: a Comprehensive Modeling and Simulation Suite for Nuclear Safety Analysis and Design, ORNL/TM-2005/39 Version 6.1, June, 2011.
- 5.
US NRC, Standard Review Plan for Transportation Packages for Spent Fuel and Radioactive Material, NUREG-2216.
- 6.
Deleted
- 7.
US NRC, An Approach for Validating Actinide and Fission Product Burnup Credit Criticality Safety Analyses - Criticality (keff) Predictions, NUREG/CR7109.
- 8.
US NRC, Evaluation of the French Haut Taux de Combustion Safety Analyses -
Criticality (HTC) Critical Experiment Data, NUREG/CR-6979.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.2-1 NUHOMS EOS-37PTH DSC Criticality Evaluation NOTE: References in this Appendix are shown as [1], [2], etc. and refer to the reference list in Section 6.8.2.5.
This Appendix 6.8.2 to Chapter 6 demonstrates that the TN Eagle Cask, when loaded with the NUHOMS EOS-37PTH Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) payload, meets the criticality requirements specified in the Sections 71.55 and 71.59 of 10 CFR Part 71
[1]. This is done by ensuring that the effective multiplication factor (keff) of the most reactive configuration of the system stays below the Upper Subcritical Limit (USL).
The USL includes a confidence band with an administrative safety margin of 0.05.
The design has a Criticality Safety Index (CSI), given in 10 CFR 71.59(b) as CSI =
50/N of 0 because N is infinity (). The number N is based on all of the following conditions being satisfied, assuming packages are stacked together in any arrangement and with close full reflection on all sides of the stack by water:
- 1.
Five times N undamaged packages with nothing between the packages are subcritical;
- 2.
Two times N damaged packages, if each package is subjected to the tests specified in 10 CFR Part 71.73 (HAC) is subcritical with optimum interspersed hydrogenous moderation; and
- 3.
The value of N cannot be less than 0.5.
Burnup credit is employed in the criticality analysis to demonstrate compliance with the sub-criticality requirements of 10 CFR 71.55 (b). The criticality analysis of the NUHOMS EOS-37PTH DSC follows the burnup credit approach for pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels described in NUREG-2216 [7].
[
] These calculations are documented in Section 6.8.2.9.
6.8.2.1 Discussion and Results The NUHOMS EOS-37PTH DSC is designed to accommodate up to 37 PWR fuel assemblies (FAs). It consists of a shell assembly, and an internal basket assembly for housing the FAs. The basket is made up of interlocking slotted plates that form an egg-crate type structure. This structure is made up of steel plates, aluminum plates for heat transfer and a neutron poison plate for criticality control.
The basket uses Al-B4C metal matrix composite (MMC) as its neutron poison material. This material is ideal for long-term use in radiation and thermal environments of a dry cask storage system. The minimum required boron-10 loading for Type A DSC is 0.028 g/cm2 (90% credit is taken in the criticality analysis or 0.0252 g/cm2) for MMC and for Type B DSC is 0.035 g/cm2 (90% credit is taken in the criticality analysis or 0.0315 g/cm2) for MMC.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.2-14 6.8.2.4.2.4 Determination of Maximum Initial Enrichment for each Fuel The most reactive EOS-37PTH DSC configuration and most reactive FA type for each fuel assembly class is determined in [2]. In this evaluation, the maximum initial enrichment as a function of discharge burnup is evaluated for the B&W 15x15 Mark B-10, WE 14x14 STD and WE 17x17 RFA FAs loaded in the EOS-37PTH DSC in TN Eagle Cask. The STARBUCS control module of SCALE 6.1.3 [3] is used to perform the burnup credit criticality analysis for the EOS-37PTH DSC loaded with intact FAs.
The fresh fuel criticality analysis and the burnup credit analysis for failed fuel are performed using CSAS5 control module of SCALE 6.1.3 [3]. The STARBUCS control module is used to obtain the depleted fuel composition of failed fuel to be used in KENO V.a models for failed fuel burnup credit criticality analysis.
References [6-7] state that an important outcome from the burnup credit criticality safety analysis is the loading curves with the minimum burnup requirements for a given initial enrichment and cooling time. The loading curves are determined by ensuring that the maximum expected keff is less than the USL.
Nuclides of Importance Based on the results presented in [8], the nuclides listed in Table 6.8.2-7 are the actinides and fission products important to burnup credit criticality analysis. Note that these are the credited isotopes of the fuel composition in the criticality analysis.
During depletion, Section 6A.3 of [7] states that the code must ensure that all the transmutation and decay chains during burnup must be tracked. This is due to the fact that the burnup-dependent cross sections generated for the next cycle burnup depend on the neutron spectrum, which is impacted by the actinide and fission product content at current cycle. The burnup credit may be taken by using actinide-only depletion or actinide and fission product depletion. Since there are sufficient data to validate the use of both actinides and fission products, the TN Eagle criticality evaluation is evaluated by taking credit for isotopes listed in Table 6.8.2-7.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.2-15 Burnup and Enrichment Limits Section 6.4.7.1 of [7] states that the available radio-chemical assay data support assembly-average burnups of up to 60 GWd/MTU and enrichments of up to 5 wt. %
U-235. The local burnups for the assembly may be higher but the assembly-average burnup shall not exceed 60 GWd/MTU. This limit is only used in the analysis, and does not prevent transporting fuel with assembly-average burnup in excess of 60 GWd/MTU.
Horizontal Burnup Profiles The effect on FAs discharged from the periphery of the reactor core where differences in neutron flux in this region relative to the rest of the core may result in significant variations in horizontal burnup after a cycle of operation. The discussion in Section 6A.4 of [7] indicates that for large systems such as the EOS-37PTH DSC, horizontal loading bias has little impact on burnup credit evaluations and therefore zero horizontal bias is assigned for the burnup credit analysis.
Axial Burnup Profiles Section 6.4.7.2 of [7] points to [12], where axial burnup profiles are presented based on an evaluation of 4% of FAs discharged through 1994 (~45,000 FAs) and uses as SCALE 6.1.3 built-in burnup dependent axial profiles. These data are used in [9] to state that:
The survey of FAs in [12] provides a representative sampling of discharged assemblies. This conclusion is reached in [9] based on:
Fuel vendor/reactor design, Type of operation (i.e., first cycles, out-in fuel management, and low-leakage fuel management),
Burnup and enrichment ranges, Use of burnable absorbers (including different absorber types), and Exposure to control rods (CRs) (including axial power shaping rods (APSRs)).
Although limited data exist for burnup values greater than 40 GWd/MTU and initial enrichments greater than 4 wt. % U-235, the profiles resulting in the highest reactivity at intermediate burnup values will yield the highest reactivity at higher burnups.
In addition to the SCALE 6.1.3 built-in burnup-dependent axial profiles, the evaluations herein employ an additional axial profile for burnups greater than 38 GWd/MTU using 38 to 42 GWd/MTU range from [3]. Note that the SCALE 6.1.3 built-in axial profiles are also from the same reference and this evaluation adds one more profile to use more representative axial profiles for higher burnup fuel. The 18-section burnup-dependent axial correction factors are shown in Table 6.8.2-6.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.2-24 6.8.2.7 Code Validation - Isotopic depletion According to Section 6.4.7.3 of [7], the purpose of the validation of the depletion analysis code is to:
Determine if the code is capable of modelling the depletion environment of FAs by performing depletion of FAs from which measurement has been obtained through radiochemical assay, Quantify bias and bias uncertainty of the isotopic depletion calculation code against the depletion parameters, FA design characteristics, initial enrichment, and cooling time.
Section 6.4.7.3 of [7] states that, if it can be shown that the system considered is similar to the GBC-32, a virtual generic 32-PWR compartment cask that is used in the NUREGs to generate bias and bias uncertainties, after which the NUREG-generated bias and bias uncertainties can be used. This similarity approach is used in this evaluation.
Section 6.4.7.3 of [7] presents a list of burnup-dependent bias and bias uncertainties of the isotopic depletion calculation that may be used, provided the following conditions are met:
The applicant uses the same depletion code and cross-section library as was used in NUREG/CR-7108 [16] (SCALE/TRITON and the ENDF/B-V or -VII cross-section library),
The applicant can justify that its design is similar to the hypothetical GBC-32 system design used as the basis for the NUREG/CR-7108 [16] isotopic depletion validation, and credit is limited to the specific nuclides listed in Table 6.8.2-7.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.2-26 The TSUNAMI-3D module of SCALE 6.1.3, [3], has been used for performing the similarity analysis. TSUNAMI-3D calculations are performed for the application and experiment models. Isotopic number densities obtained from the STARBUCS outputs are used for the TSUNAMI-3D models as well. Direct perturbation calculations are used to confirm the adequacy of the sensitivity data files. Direct perturbation calculations involve varying the composition information around the nominal value and using the resulting keff value variations to calculate the total sensitivity. The direct perturbation results are compared with the TSUNAMI sensitivity results to confirm the adequacy of the sensitivity data. Finally, TSUNAMI-3D generates sensitivity data files
(.sdf), which contains the energy-dependent sensitivity coefficients for each value of burnup.
The.sdf files generated by TSUNAMI-3D for the two systems in the previous step are used by TSUNAMI-IP to determine a ck value at each burnup. The TSUNAMI-IP module of SCALE 6.1.3, [3], was used to calculate detailed keff uncertainty information for the application model. The correlation factor, Ck quantifies correlations in uncertainties by propagating the tabulated cross-section-uncertainty information to the calculated keff value of a given system via the energy-dependent sensitivity coefficients.
This evaluation demonstrates similarity by comparing the global parameters, as well as by determining the sensitivity and uncertainty. The ck parameters generated from the sensitivity and uncertainty calculation, which indicate high degree of similarity, are provided in Table 6.8.2-36.
The results satisfy the requirements of Section 6.4.7.3 of [7]; thereby allowing the user to adopt the results from Table 6-3 of [7] in preparing system-specific loading requirements with burnup credit.
6.8.2.8 Misload Analysis This section presents a misload analysis of the TN Eagle cask system loaded with NUHOMS EOS-37PTH DSC containing 37 B&W 15x15 FAs. Section 6.4.7.5 of [7]
provides the basic criteria to study the single and multiple misload events. The single misload is studied by misloading one assembly which is severely underburned and highly reactive. The multiple misload is studied by misloading all assemblies with moderately burned FAs.
Equal reactivity curves are developed to perform the single and multiple misload analysis. These curves developed for single and multiple misload events are superimposed on the U.S. commercial PWR fleet, spent fuel inventory graph. The resulting graphs are used to quantify the number of FAs falling above and below the equal reactivity curve. The equal reactivity curves are generated for both Type A (with 28 mg B-10/cm2) and Type B (with 35 mg B-10/cm2) basket types.
B&W 15x15 assembly is the most reactive assembly as compared to WE 14x14 and WE 17x17 assemblies as can be seen from the loading curves generated in Section 6.8.2.4.3. Hence, the misload burnup loading curve is generated for B&W 15x15 assemblies with the assumption of five years cooling time. Burnup credit methodology described in Section 6.8.2.4.3 is used to develop the misload burnup loading curve.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.2-27 STARBUCS and CSAS5 modules available with SCALE 6.1.3 [3] code are used to perform the analysis. Since CSAS5 cannot be used for burnup credit analysis, STARBUCS is used to get the composition of the burned fuel. Since this is misload analysis, the keff obtained is compared to the USL value calculated in Section 6.8.2.4.2.1 with 0.02 as administrative margin.
Section 6.4.7.5 of [7] has a set of recommendations for performing misload analysis:
- 1.
The misload evaluation should be based on a reliable and relatively recent estimate of the discharged PWR fuel population.
- 2.
It should evaluate both single severely underburned misload and multiple moderately burned misload events.
- 3.
The single severely underburned assembly should be chosen such that any assembly average burnup and initial enrichment along an equal reactivity curve bound 95% of the discharged fuel population considered unacceptable for loading in a particular storage or transportation system with 95% confidence.
- 4.
For the evaluation of the application system with multiple moderately underburned assemblies, misloaded SNF should be assumed to make up at least 50% of the system payload, and should be chosen such that the assembly average burnups and initial enrichments along the equal reactivity curve bound 90% of the total discharged fuel population.
- 5.
Experience with identified code errors and an understanding of uncertainties in cross section data and their impacts on reactivity indicates that an administrative margin of at least 0.02 is necessary for analyses to show subcriticality with misload.
6.8.2.8.1 Equal Reactivity Curves All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.2-31 6.8.2.10 References
- 1.
10 CFR 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials.
- 2.
TN Americas LLC, NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Docket Number 72-1042, Revision 3.
- 3.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, RSIC Computer Code Collection, SCALE: A Comprehensive Modeling and Simulation Suite for Nuclear Safety Analysis and Design, ORNL/TM-2005/39, Version 6.1, June 2011.
- 4.
International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (IHECSBE), NEA-1486/15, NEA Nuclear Science Committee, September 2016.
- 5.
US NRC, NUREG/CR-6698, Guide for Validation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculational Methodology, January 2001.
- 6.
Deleted
- 7.
US NRC, NUREG-2216, Standard Review Plan for Transportation Packages for Spent Fuel and Radioactive Material, August 2020
- 8.
US NRC, NUREG/CR-7203, A quantitative Impact Assessment of Hypothetical Spent Fuel Reconfiguration in Spent Fuel Storage Casks and Transportation Packages, September 2015.
- 9.
US NRC, NUREG/CR-6801, Recommendations for Addressing Axial Burnup in PWR Burnup Credit Analysis, March 2003.
- 10. US NRC, NUREG/CR-7109, An Approach for Validating Actinide and Fission Product Burnup Credit Criticality Safety Analysis - Criticality (keff) Predictions, J.
M. Scaglione, D.E. Mueller, J.C. Wagner, and W.J. Marshall, April 2012.
- 11. US NRC, NUREG/CR-6665, Review and Prioritization of Technical Issues Related to Burnup Credit for LWR Fuel, February 2000.
- 12. YAEC 1937, Axial Burnup Profile Database for Pressurized Water Reactors, R.J. Cacciaputi, Van S. Volkinburg, May 1997.
- 13. Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Material Outside Reactors, ANSI/ANS-8.1-1998; R2007, an American National Standard, published by the American Nuclear Society, LaGrange Park, IL, 1998
- 14. US NRC, Interim Staff Guidance-10, Revision 0, Justification for Minimum Margin of Subcriticality for Safety, ISG-10, Revision 0, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards.
- 15. US NRC, NUREG/CR-6979, Evaluation of the French Haut Taux de Combustion (HTC) Critical Experiment Data, September 2008.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-1 32PT DSC Criticality Evaluation NOTE: References in this Appendix are shown as [1], [2], etc., and refer to the reference list in Section 6.8.5.8.
This Appendix 6.8.5 to Chapter 6 demonstrates that the TN Eagle Cask when loaded with the NUHOMS 32PT Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) payload meets the criticality requirements specified in the Sections 71.55 and 71.59 of 10 CFR Part 71 [1]. This is done by ensuring that the effective multiplication factor (keff) of the most reactive configuration of the system stays below the upper subcritical limit (USL). The USL includes a confidence band with an administrative safety margin of 0.05. The design has a criticality safety index (CSI), given in 10 CFR 71.59(b) as CSI = 50/N of 0 because N is infinity (). The number N is based on all of the following conditions being satisfied, assuming packages are stacked together in any arrangement and with close full reflection on all sides of the stack by water:
- 1.
Five times N undamaged packages with nothing between the packages are subcritical;
- 2.
Two times N damaged packages, if each package is subjected to the tests specified in 10 CFR 71.73 hypothetical accident condition (HAC) is subcritical with optimum interspersed hydrogenous moderation; and
- 3.
The value of N cannot be less than 0.5.
Burnup credit is employed in the criticality analysis to demonstrate compliance with the sub-criticality requirements of 10 CFR 71.55 (b). The criticality analysis of the NUHOMS 32PT DSC loaded with CE14x14 fuel class in the 16 poison plates (low poison content - Type A), in the 24 poison plates (low poison content - Type A/B/C/D), and in the 24 poison plates (high poison content - Type A1/A2) configurations follows the burnup credit approach for pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels described in NUREG-2216 [5]. The criticality analysis of the NUHOMS 32PT DSC loaded with the allowable PWR intact fuels except the Combustion Engineering (CE) 14x14 in 24PP configuration was performed, based on burnup credit, in Appendix A.6.5.6 of the NUHOMS-MP197HB Transportation Cask Safety Analysis Report (SAR), [3].
6.8.5.1 Fissile Material Contents The allowable contents for the 32PT DSC are listed in Chapter 1, Appendix 1.6.4, Table 1.6.4-3.
The 32PT DSC is designed to transport 32 intact fuel assemblies (FAs) and/or damaged and/or failed PWR FAs with or without control components (CCs). Note that only the Combustion Engineering (CE) 14x14 fuel class is allowed for transportation with intact and/or damaged and/or failed FAs.
Item 3 Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-2 6.8.5.2 General Consideration The basket uses an aluminum/B4C metal matrix composite (MMC) as its neutron poison material. The minimum required B-10 loadings are 0.007 g/cm2 (90% credit is taken in the criticality analysis or 0.0063 g/cm2) for the low poison content - Type A/B/C/D, and 0.015 g/cm2 (90% credit is taken on the criticality analysis or 0.0135 g/cm2) for the high poison content - Type A1/A2. In addition to the fixed neutron poison in the basket, poison rod assemblies (PRAs) are required for the center zero, four, eight or sixteen assemblies depending on fuel assembly design and initial enrichment. The minimum required B4C content of the PRAs is 40% theoretical density (TD) (75% credit is taken in the criticality analysis or 30% TD). The minimum required B4C content of the PRAs is only 30% (in the KENO input).
Two different basket types are applicable to the 32PT DSC depending on the number and orientation of the L-shaped poison/aluminum inserts:
16-plate configuration (16PP Type A) containing fixed low poison content in 16 compartments; PRAs are not authorized in this configuration 24-plate configuration 24PP Type A/B/C/D: containing fixed low poison content in 24 compartments; 0 (Type A), 4 (Type B), 8 (Type C), or 16 (Type D) PRAs are authorized in this configuration.
24PP Type A1/A2: containing fixed high poison content in 24 compartments; PRAs are not authorized in this configuration.
The arrangements of poison/aluminum plates in the fuel compartments of the basket for these two configurations are shown in Figure 6.8.5-4 and Figure 6.8.5-5. The mandatory location of the PRAs for the 4, 8 or 16 PRA configurations is shown in Figure 6.8.5-1 through Figure 6.8.5-3.
6.8.5.3 Discussion and Results Table 6.8.5-1 lists the FAs considered as authorized contents of the 32PT DSC.
The criticality analysis for the 32PT DSCs for the allowable PWR intact fuel contents listed in Chapter 1, Appendix 1.6.4, Table 1.6.4-3, was performed based on burnup credit in Appendix A.6.5.6 of [3].
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-3 The 32PT DSC in the NUHOMS-MP197HB transportation cask is shown to be subcritical for an infinite array undamaged casks and for an infinite array of damaged casks after being subjected to hypothetical accident conditions. N is equal to. The cask is shown to be subcritical for five times N or an infinite number of undamaged packages with close full reflection between packages and no inleakage of water as required by 10 CFR 71.59(a)(1). In addition, as required by 10 CFR 71.59(a)(2), two times N or an infinite array of packages is shown to be subcritical with the fissile material in its most reactive configuration, optimum water moderation and close full water reflection consistent with its damaged condition. CSI is 0.
The minimum required burnup as a function of initial enrichment, cooling time and basket/poison type for the two bounding fuel assembly classes, Westinghouse (WE) 17x17, and WE 14x14 are shown in Table 1.6.4-6. The results of the WE 17X17 class bound those of the WE 15x15, the Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) 15x15, the CE 14x14 (except for the configurations described below), and CE 15x15 classes.
Additional analysis for the CE 14x14 is performed considering the burnup credit approach for PWR fuels described in NUREG-2216 [5], and applied to the TN Eagle cask in Appendix 6.8.2 for the EOS 37PTH DSC. The additional analysis includes:
Intact, damaged, and failed fuels in the 32PT DSC with the 24-poison-plate configuration (24PP Type A1/A2). A maximum of 8 failed or up to 28 damaged CE 14x14 FAs are authorized to be stored along with intact fuel assemblies. The minimum required burnup as a function of initial enrichment, cooling time for the CE 14x14 in the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration are shown in Table 1.6.4-7 through Table 1.6.4-9.
Intact fuels in the 32PT DSC with the 16-poison-plate configuration (16PP-Type A) and 24-poison-plate configuration (24PP Type A). No PRAs in both configurations. The minimum required burnup as a function of initial enrichment, cooling time for the CE 14x14 in the 16PP Type A and 24PP Type A baskets configurations are shown in Table 1.6.4-6 Part 3/3.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-4 The control components (CCs) are also authorized for storage in the 32PT DSCs.
The authorized CCs are burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs), control rod assemblies (CRAs), thimble plug assemblies (TPAs), axial power shaping rod assemblies (APSRAs), control element assemblies (CEAs), vibration suppressor inserts (VSIs), orifice rod assemblies (ORAs), neutron source assemblies (NSAs),
and Neutron Sources.
The results of the evaluation demonstrate that the maximum keff, including statistical uncertainty, is less than the USL determined from a statistical analysis of benchmark criticality experiments. The statistical analysis procedure includes a confidence band with an administrative safety margin of 0.05.
6.8.5.4 Package Fuel Loading The 32PT DSC is capable of storing and transporting a maximum of 32 intact PWR FAs. In addition, a maximum of 8 failed and up to 28 damaged and remaining intact (for a total of 32) PWR FAs can also be transported within the 32PT DSC for CE 14x14 fuel class.
Reconstituted FAs, where the fuel pins are replaced by lower enriched fuel pins or non-fuel pins that displace an equal to or greater than the amount of water in the active fuel region of the FA, are considered intact FAs in the criticality evaluation.
For all the FA classes, CCs are also included as authorized contents. The only change to the package fuel loading to evaluate the addition of these CCs is replacing the water in the guide tubes/water holes with 11B4C. Since these CCs displace moderator in the assembly guide and or instrument tubes, an evaluation is not needed to determine the potential impact of storage of CCs that extend into the active fuel region on the system reactivity. The presence of these CCs such as CRAs, CEAs and BPRAs will result in a reduction in the reactivity of the fuel assemblies. CCs that do not extend into the active fuel region of the assembly do not have any effect on the reactivity of the system as evaluated because only the active fuel region is modeled in this evaluation with periodic boundary conditions making the model infinite in the axial direction. Additionally, the presences of non-multiplying sources like the NSAs have no impact on criticality calculations.
Therefore, any CC that is inserted into the FA in such a way that it does or does not extend into the active fuel region is considered as authorized for transportation without adjustment to the burnup or initial enrichment as required for CCs. No credit is taken for the presence of any residual absorber remaining in the CC nor is any credit taken for the displacement of fresh water from within the guide tube of theFAs containing CCs.
6.8.5.5 Model Specification The following section is related to the criticality analysis for the CE 14x14 loaded in the 32PT DSC with the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration (intact, damaged, and failed fuels) and with the 16PP Type A and 24PP Type A configurations (intact fuels).
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-5 The evaluations are performed using SCALE 6.1.3 [2] and ENDF/B-VII nuclear data.
The SCALE 6.1.3 capabilities used include automated sequences to produce problem-dependent multi-group cross-section data and analysis sequences for Monte Carlo neutron transport (CSAS5) and burnup-credit criticality safety (STARBUCS).
The 238-group cross-section library based on the ENDF/B-VII nuclear data, 44-group cross section library based on the ENDF/B-V nuclear data and the resonance cross-section methodology employing CENTRM are used.
The STARBUCS sequence is used to determine U-235 wt. % enrichment values for various burnup and cooling times. STARBUCS enables modelling of the phenomena important to burnup credit and allows analysts to investigate the impact on criticality safety of various assumptions related to the burnup credit calculation methodology.
The STARBUCS sequence provides a burnup credit loading curve search capability in addition to its initial capability of performing criticality safety analyses employing burnup credit. This capability may be used to determine the combination of assembly initial enrichment and discharge burnup values that result in a user-specified keff values. STARBUCS uses the ORIGEN-ARP method to rapidly generate fuel compositions as a function of fuel mixture initial enrichment, burnup and cooling time.
ORIGEN-ARP libraries for the STARBUCS calculations are obtained by performing TRITON depletion calculations for the PWR assembly types used in the safety analysis models and for a range of fuel initial enrichment and assembly average burnup values.
The following subsections describe the physical models and materials of the 32PT DSC within the TN Eagle Cask used for the input to the STARBUCS or CSAS5 module of SCALE 6.1.3 [2] to perform the criticality evaluations.
6.8.5.5.1 Description of the Calculational Models The basic calculational KENO models employed in Appendix A.6.5.6 of [3], for the 32PT DSC with the 16PP and 24PP configurations are used for the analysis. The fixed poison modeled in the calculation is based on a poison plate thickness of 0.050 inches consistent with that specified for borated aluminum. The important parameter is the minimum B-10 areal density; therefore, the modeled thickness of the poison plate does not affect the results of the calculation.
The key basket dimensions utilized in the calculation are shown in Table 6.8.5-2.
The basket structure is connected to the DSC shell by perimeter transition rail assemblies. The transition rail material is solid aluminum that provides a structural function as well as provides a heat conduction path from the basket to the DSC shell.
The rails are modeled as solid aluminum between the outside of the basket and the inner diameter (ID) of the DSC shell.
For criticality analysis, only the cask body and the inner shielding ring layer of the TN Eagle cask are modelled.
A list of all the geometry units used in this KENO model is shown in Table 6.8.5-3.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-6 Intact Fuel Assemblies Model The most reactive configuration determined in Appendix A.6.5.6 of [3], is utilized to determine the keff of the 32PT for the CE 14x14 fuel class in the 16PP and 24PP configurations.
Damaged Fuel Assemblies Model (24PP-type A1/A2 only)
[
]
Failed Fuel Assemblies Model (24PP-type A1/A2 only) 6.8.5.5.2 Package Regional Densities The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) SCALE 6.1.3 code package [2] contains a standard material data library for common elements, compounds, and mixtures. All the materials used for the cask and canister analyses are available in this data library.
The DSC model does not include the top shell or closure lid, the bottom shell or the resin shielding rings. The gap between the casks contains unborated water. For the transfer cask, the neutron skin and shield are assumed to have vanished under accident loading conditions.
A list of the relevant materials used for the criticality evaluation is provided in Table 6.8.5-4. The poison plate material specifications are modeled considering a 90% B-10 credit for the B-10 loading.
6.8.5.6 Criticality Calculations The following section is related to the criticality analysis for the CE 14x14 with intact, damaged and failed fuels in the 32PT DSC with the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration and the CE 14x14 with intact fuels in the 32PT DSC with the 16PP and 24PP Type A configurations.
This section describes the models used for the criticality analysis. The analyses are performed with the STARBUCS and the CSAS5 modules of the SCALE 6.1.3 computer package [2]. The USL is calculated for the TN Eagle system based on the critical experiments benchmarked with fresh fuel and burnup credit assumptions in Section 6.8.2.4.2.1.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-7 6.8.5.6.1 Calculational Model Criticality Calculations with Fresh Fuel The fresh fuel criticality analysis is performed using the CSAS5 module of SCALE 6.1.3. The maximum allowable fresh fuel enrichment is determined for the CE 14x14 fuel class intact, damaged and failed fuels in the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration and for the CE 14x14 intact fuels in the 16PP and 24PP Type A configurations. The USL determined using fresh fuel assumptions in Section 6.8.2.4.2.1 is applicable.
Criticality Calculations with Burnup Credit This section describes the analysis methodology utilized for the criticality analysis by taking credit for depletion of fissile material in FAs loaded in the EOS-32PT DSC. The loading curves in terms of initial fuel enrichment as a function of average burnup and cooling times for the CE 14x14 fuel class intact, damaged and failed fuels in the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration and for the CE 14x14 intact fuels in the 16PP and 24PP Type A configurations are determined based on the most reactive assembly in the most reactive DSC configuration. The criticality model includes the full active fuel length of the FA for the purpose of burnup credit. The criticality safety analysis for the TN Eagle cask loaded with the 32PT DSC is performed with pure water flooding the entire cavity.
A total of 28 isotopes are included in the material description of the burned fuel assembly, which includes 12 actinides and 16 fission products, listed Table 6.8.5-5.
Loading curves show the acceptable combinations of average burnup and initial fuel enrichment for cooling periods after FA discharge. The acceptable combinations of average burnups and initial fuel enrichments for intact and failed fuel are developed using the STARBUCS module with ORIGEN-ARP libraries generated using TRITON simulations. The ORIGEN-ARP library for CE 14x14 fuel class is developed in Section 6.8.5.6.2.8, which is used in the STARBUCS models. The loading curves are developed for cooling periods of 5, 10, 15 and 20 years for the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration and 30 years for the 16PP and 24PP Type A configurations. The maximum initial fuel enrichment is determined for burnups 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 GWd/MTU. For each assembly type, the averaged burnup value, and the initial enrichment value satisfying the USL and all applicable biases and bias uncertainties associated with burnup credit are determined. The USL and all applicable biases and bias uncertainties are discussed in Section 6.8.5.6.2.1 and Section 6.8.5.6.2.2.
The damaged fuel loading curve is developed for the 32PT DSC loaded with 28 damaged FAs along with 4 intact FAs in the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration.
The failed fuel loading curve is developed for the 32PT DSC loaded with 8 FAs in failed fuel configuration along with 24 intact FAs in the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration.
The material compositions of discharged intact, damaged and failed for specific enrichment/burnup/cooling time are obtained from STARBUCS simulations.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-12 6.8.5.6.2.4 Determination of Maximum Initial Enrichment The most reactive 32PT DSC 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration from Appendix A.6.5.6 of [3], and the most reactive configuration for the CE 14x14 intact, damaged and failed fuels are employed to develop the loading curves considering water moderation to the most reactive credible extent, maximum initial enrichment as a function of burnup and cooling time, for intact, damaged and failed fuels loading. Water boundary conditions are applicable on all sides. The radial layout of the 32PT DSC in the TN Eagle is presented in Figure 6.8.5-6.
The STARBUCS control module of SCALE 6.1.3 [2] is used to perform the burnup credit criticality analysis for the 32PT DSC loaded with CE 14x14 in 24PP the Type A1/A2 configuration. The loading curves are determined by ensuring that the maximum expected keff and applicable biases and biases uncertainties are less than the USL.
The most reactive 32PT DSC 16PP and 24PP Type A configurations from Appendix A.6.5.6 of [3], and the most reactive configuration for the CE 14x14 intact fuel are employed to develop the loading curves considering water moderation to the most reactive credible extent.
The STARBUCS control module of SCALE 6.1.3 [2] is used to perform the burnup credit criticality analysis for the 32PT DSC loaded with CE 14x14 in the 16PP and 24PP Type A configurations. The loading curves are determined by ensuring that the maximum expected keff and applicable biases and bias uncertainties are less than the USL.
Nuclides of Importance Based on the results presented in [6], the nuclides listed in Table 6.8.5-5 are the actinides and fission products important to burnup credit criticality analysis. Note that these are the credited isotopes of the fuel composition in the criticality analysis.
During depletion, Section 6A.3 of [5] states that the code must ensure that all the transmutation and decay chains during burnup must be tracked. This is due to the fact that the burnup-dependent cross-sections generated for the next cycle burnup depend on the neutron spectrum, which is impacted by the actinide and fission product content at current cycle. The burnup credit may be taken by using actinide-only depletion or actinide and fission product depletion. Since there are sufficient data to validate the use of both actinides and fission products, the TN Eagle criticality evaluation is evaluated by taking credit for isotopes listed in Table 6.8.5-5.
Burnup and Enrichment Limits Section 6.4.7.1 of [5] states that the available radio-chemical assay data support assembly-average burnups of up to 60 GWd/MTU and enrichments of up to 5 wt. %
U-235. The local burnups for the assembly may be higher but the assembly-average burnup shall not exceed 60 GWd/MTU.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3 Item 3 Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-13 Horizontal Burnup Profiles The effect on FAs discharged from the periphery of the reactor core where differences in neutron flux in this region relative to the rest of the core may result in significant variations in horizontal burnup after a cycle of operation. The discussion in Section 6A.4 of [5] indicates that for large systems such as the 32PT DSC, horizontal loading bias has little impact on burnup credit evaluations and therefore zero horizontal bias is assigned for the burnup credit analysis.
Axial Burnup Profiles Section 6.4.7.2 of [5] points to [9], where axial burnup profiles are presented based on an evaluation of 4% of fuel assemblies discharged through 1994 (~45,000 FAs) and used as SCALE 6.1.3 built-in burnup dependent axial profiles. These data are used in [7] to state that:
The survey of fuel assemblies in [9] provides a representative sampling of discharged assemblies. This conclusion is reached in [7] based on:
Fuel vendor/reactor design, Type of operation (i.e., first cycles, out-in fuel management, and low-leakage fuel management),
Burnup and enrichment ranges, Use of burnable absorbers (including different absorber types), and Exposure to control rods (CRs) (including axial power shaping rods (APSRs)).
Although limited data exist for burnup values greater than 40 GWd/MTU and initial enrichments greater than 4 wt. % U-235, the profiles resulting in the highest reactivity at intermediate burnup values will yield the highest reactivity at higher burnups.
In addition to the SCALE 6.1.3 built-in burnup-dependent axial profiles, the evaluations herein employ an additional axial profile for burnups greater than 38 GWd/MTU using 38 to 42 GWd/MTU range from [2]. Note that the SCALE 6.1.3 built-in axial profiles are also from the same reference and this evaluation adds one more profile to use more representative axial profiles for higher burnup fuel. The 18-section burnup-dependent axial correction factors are shown in Table 6.8.5-6.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-14 Loading Curves Loading curves present the acceptable combinations of assembly average burnup, and initial enrichment for loading FAs. The STARBUCS control module is used with ORIGEN-ARP to develop loading curves for various BECTs for 32PT DSC loaded with intact FAs. The CSAS5 module is used to develop loading curves for various BECTs for 32PT DSC loaded with failed fuel assemblies. The STARBUCS control module is used to obtain the depleted fuel composition of failed fuel to be used in KENO V.a models for failed fuel burnup credit criticality analysis. The run time is determined by the uncertainty cutoff of 0.0005. The burnup is used as an input to determine the maximum allowable initial enrichment that satisfies the USL. The cooling times considered are 5, 10, 15 and 20 years for the 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration and 30 years for the 16PP and 24PP Type A configurations. In addition, maximum allowable initial enrichment for fresh fuel that satisfies the USL is also evaluated.
Criticality analysis for as-loaded 32PT DSCs The following subsection provides the burnup credit criticality analysis for 10 as-loaded 16PP and 24PP Type A 32PT DSCs that included CE 14x14 intact FAs with burnup below the minimum required assembly average burnup as a function of initial enrichment determined in the loading curves above. The cooling time of the as-loaded 16PP and 24PP Type A 32PT DSCs is assumed to be 30 years. There are 9 (nine) 16PP Type A 32PT DSCs and 1 (one) 24PP Type A 32PT DSC loaded with CE 14x14 intact FAs. The details of DSCs along with the fuel assemblies enrichments and average burnups are shown in Table 6.8.5-16 through Table 6.8.5-20 and in Figure 6.8.5-8 through Figure 6.8.5-17.
Although, the DSCs were loaded in 2006 and 2009 and stored in dry horizontal storage modules, a comprehensive criticality analysis is performed for each of the DSCs comprising routine condition with water ingress, and misloading analysis.
The burnup credit criticality analysis in routine condition and misloading employs the ORIGEN-ARP libraries for CE 14x14 fuel assemblies with CR insertions described in Section 6.8.5.6.2.8.
6.8.5.6.2.5 Criticality Results The burnup criticality analysis is performed to develop loading curves for the CE 14x14 intact and failed FAs loaded in 32PT DSC 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration placed inside TN Eagle. The initial U-235 enrichment is calculated for burnups ranging from 5 GWd/MTU to 60 GWd/MTU. The loading curves are developed for 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of cooling time.
The loading curves for the 32PT DSC 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration loaded with CE 14x14 fuel class intact FAs are summarized and provided in Table 1.6.4-7.
The loading curves for the 32PT DSC 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration loaded with CE 14x14 fuel class damaged FAs are summarized and provided in Table 1.6.4-8.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-15 The results for the loading curves calculations are shown in Table 6.8.5-10 through Table 6.8.5-13.
The loading curves for the 32PT DSC 24PP Type A1/A2 configuration loaded with CE 14x14 fuel class failed FAs are summarized and provided in Table 1.6.4-9.
The burnup criticality analysis is performed to develop loading curves for the CE 14x14 intact FAs loaded in the 16PP and 24PP Type A 32PT DSC configurations placed inside TN Eagle. The initial U-235 enrichment is calculated for burnups ranging from 5 GWd/MTU to 60 GWd/MTU. The loading curves are developed for 30 years of cooling time.
The loading curves for the 16PP and 24PP Type A 32PT DSC configurations loaded with CE 14x14 fuel class intact FAs are summarized and provided in Table 1.6.4-6 Part 3/3.
The burnup criticality analysis is performed for the 10 as-loaded 16PP and 24PP Type A 32PT DSC configurations shown in Table 6.8.5-16 through Table 6.8.5-20 and in Figure 6.8.5-8 through Figure 6.8.5-17 assuming fresh water ingress.
Table 6.8.5-21 reports the keff of each DSC. All the DSCs are shown to be subcritical.
The criterion for subcriticality is that:
keff + (+ ) + < USL where USL is the upper subcriticality limit established by an analysis of benchmark criticality experiments, is the code bias due to minor actinides and fission products, 0.1 x 0.015 =
0.0015, And (+ ) is the burnup-dependent bias and bias uncertainty for isotopics validation shown in Table 6-3 of [5].
KKENO + 2KENO + (+ ) + 0.0015 < 0.94236 6.8.5.6.2.6 Critical Benchmark Experiments and applicable biases The criticality benchmark for fresh fuel and burnup credit are provided in Section 6.8.2.5.1 through Section 6.8.2.5.5.
6.8.5.6.2.7 Minor Actinides and Fission Products Worth The code bias and bias uncertainty due to minor actinides and fission products may be computed as 1.5% of the worth provided the credited minor actinides and fission products worth not greater than 0.1 in keff.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-17 6.8.5.6.2.9 Code Validation - Isotopic depletion According to Section 6.4.7.3 of [5], the purpose of the validation of the depletion analysis code is to:
Determine if the code is capable of modelling the depletion environment of FAs by performing depletion of FAs from which measurement has been obtained through radiochemical assay, Quantify bias and bias uncertainty of the isotopic depletion calculation code against the depletion parameters, fuel assembly design characteristics, initial enrichment, and cooling time.
Section 6.4.7.3 of [5] states that, if it can be shown that the system considered is similar to the GBC-32, a virtual generic 32-PWR compartment cask that is used in the NUREGs to generate bias and bias uncertainties, after which the NUREG-generated bias and bias uncertainties can be used. This similarity approach is used in this evaluation.
Section 6.4.7.3 of [5] presents a list of burnup-dependent bias and bias uncertainties of the isotopic depletion calculation that may be used, provided the following conditions are met:
The applicant uses the same depletion code and cross-section library as was used in NUREG/CR-7108 [8] (SCALE/TRITON and the ENDF/B-V or -VII cross-section library),
The applicant can justify that its design is similar to the hypothetical GBC-32 system design used as the basis for the NUREG/CR-7108 [8] isotopic depletion validation, and credit is limited to the specific nuclides listed in Table 6.8.5-5.
A similarity analysis is performed in Section 6.8.2.7 for the TN Eagle cask loaded with the EOS-37PTH DSC. The evaluation demonstrates similarity by comparing the global parameters, as well as by determining the sensitivity and uncertainty. The ck parameters generated from the sensitivity and uncertainty calculation, which indicate high degree of similarity between the EOS-37PTH and the GBC-32, are provided in Table 6.8.2-48.
One notable structural difference between the EOS-37PTH DSC and the 32PT DSC are the poison plate specifications. For 32PT DSC, the poison plate is made of borated aluminum while EOS-37PTH utilizes an MMC. The B-10 areal density in the poison plates used in the models for 32PT DCS 24PP configuration is 13.5 mg B-10/cm2 while it is 25.2 mg B-10/cm2 for the EOS-37PTH Type A. These differences are expected to have minimum effects on the ck parameters; the 32PT DCS 24PP configuration is expected to high degree of similarity with the GBC-32; therefore, it is acceptable to use the isotopic bias and bias uncertainties from Table 6A.3 of [5] when the preparing system-specific loading requirements with burnup credit.
6.8.5.6.2.10 Misload Analysis The misload analysis for the 32PT DSC is performed in Appendix A.6.5.13 of [3].
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-18 Additional misload analysis is performed for the 10 as-loaded 16PP and 24PP Type A 32PT DSC configurations described in Section 6.8.5.6.2.4.
The misload analysis is performed for DSC-02 (as-loaded 16PP Type A DSC with the highest keff, Table 6.8.5-21), and DSC-10 (as-loaded 24PP Type A DSC).
As recommended in Section 6.4.7.5 of [5], the misload analysis evaluates the impact of a single severely underburned assembly and multiple moderately underburned assemblies up to 50% of the system payload.
This analysis uses the ORIGEN-ARP library developed in Section 6.8.5.6.2.8. These libraries are developed using bounding depletion parameters and CR insertion present up to the first 15 GWd/MTU of the depletion cycle. The criticality models are from Section 6.8.5.6.2.5. Additionally, appropriate biases and bias uncertainties are accounted for the isotopes of interest and SCALE 6.1.3 [2] computer code is used while demonstrating subcriticality; hence, a 2% administrative margin is employed for the purpose of the misload evaluation due to the inherent conservatisms in the analysis.
The misload analysis starts by ranking the reactivity of each fuel assembly loaded in DSC-02 and DSC-10, i.e., the DSC is assumed to be loaded uniformly with 32 FAs of identical enrichment/burnup characteristics. Table 6.8.5-24 and Table 6.8.5-25 show the keff value of each assembly in DSC-02 and DSC-10.
The single severely underburned assembly misload analysis for DSC-02 is performed by replacing the least reactive FA at the center, A042 (1.39 wt. % enrichment and burnup of 7.84 GWd/MTU) Figure 6.8.5-9, by a FA with enrichment of 5.00 wt. %
U-235 and burnup of 10 GWd/MTU. The characteristics of the severely underburned assembly is determined by misloading a fuel assembly enriched at 5 wt% in the 32PT DSC 16PP Type A loading curve shown in Table 6.8.5-14. The keff of DSC-02 for the single severely underburned assembly misload as described is 0.9201 which is below the USL with 2% administrative margin.
The single severely underburned assembly misload analysis for DSC-10 is performed by replacing least reactive FA at the center, G008 (3.02 wt. % enrichment and burnup of 38.48 GWd/MTU) Figure 6.8.5-10, by a FA with enrichment of 5.00 wt. %
U-235 and burnup of 18.5 GWd/MTU. The characteristics of the severely underburned assembly is determined by misloading a fuel assembly enriched at 5 wt% in the 32PT DSC 24PP Type A loading curve shown in Table 6.8.5-15. The keff of DSC-10 for the single severely underburned assembly misload as described is 0.9161 which is below the USL with 2% administrative margin.
For the multiple misload analysis, 50% of the least reactive fuel assemblies in the DSC is replaced with the most reactive FA from hypothetical full misloaded 32PT DSC 16PP and 24PP Type A. Table 6.8.5-26 and Table 6.8.5-27 show respectively the results of hypothetical full misloaded 32PT DSC 16PP and 24PP Type A. The highest reactivity for a fully misloaded 32PT DSC 16PP Type A is obtained for the enrichment/burnup combination of 1.69 wt. % U-235 and 5 GWd/MTU, Table 6.8.5-26. The highest reactivity for a full misloaded 32PT DSC 24PP Type A is obtained for the enrichment/burnup combination of 3.87 wt. % U-235 and 30.5 GWd/MTU, Table 6.8.5-27.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-19 The multiple misload analysis for DSC-02 is performed assuming 50% of the least reactive fuel assemblies in the DSC is replaced by fuel assemblies at 1.69 wt. %
U-235 and 5 GWd/MTU. Basically, fuel assemblies ID of E112, E104, JA21, G026, A016, A042, G028, F012, A001, A039, F003, JA22, F101, E109, HA16 and D039, see FAs keff values in Table 6.8.5-24, are replaced by fuel assemblies of 1.69 wt. %
U-235 and 5 GWd/MTU. The keff of the TN EAGLE SC system for DSC-02 considering the multiple misload scenario described above is 0.9332.
The multiple misload analysis for DSC-10 is performed assuming 50% of the least reactive fuel assemblies in the DSC is replaced by fuel assemblies at 3.87 wt. %
U-235 and 5 GWd/MTU. Basically, fuel assemblies ID of F110, HA20, HA23, A023, G003, G008, G022, G042, B224, E008, E011, E010, E022, HA27, F102 and F112, see FAs keff values in Table 6.8.5-25, are replaced by fuel assemblies of 3.87 wt. %
U-235 and 30.5 GWd/MTU. The keff of the TN EAGLE SC system for DSC-10 considering the multiple misload scenario described above is 0.9135.
6.8.5.7 Evaluations under NCT and HAC This section describes the evaluations under HAC and NCT performed for the TN Eagle transport package with the 32PT DSC.
6.8.5.7.1 Package Arrays under Hypothetical Accident Conditions All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-20 6.8.5.7.2 Package Arrays under Normal Conditions of Transport 6.8.5.7.3 Single package 6.8.5.8 Reference
- 1.
10 CFR 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials.
- 2.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, RSIC Computer Code Collection, SCALE: A Comprehensive Modeling and Simulation Suite for Nuclear Safety Analysis and Design, ORNL/TM-2005/39, Version 6.1, June 2011.
- 3.
TN Americas LLC, NUHOMS-MP197 Transportation Packaging Safety Analysis Report, Docket Number 71-9302, NUH09-0101 Revision 20.
- 4.
Deleted
- 5.
US NRC, NUREG-2216, Standard Review Plan for Transportation Packages for Spent Fuel and Radioactive Material, August 2020.
- 6.
US NRC, NUREG/CR-7203, A quantitative Impact Assessment of Hypothetical Spent Fuel Reconfiguration in Spent Fuel Storage Casks and Transportation Packages, September 2015.
- 7.
US NRC, NUREG/CR-6801, Recommendations for Addressing Axial Burnup in PWR Burnup Credit Analysis, March 2003.
- 8.
US NRC, NUREG/CR-7108, An Approach for Validating Actinide and Fission Product Burnup Credit Criticality Safety Analyses-Isotopic Composition Predictions, April 2012.
- 9.
YAEC 1937, Axial Burnup Profile Database for Pressurized Water Reactors, R.J. Cacciaputi, Van S. Volkinburg, May 1997.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 6
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-24 Table 6.8.5-4 Material Property Data Material ID Density g/cm3 Element Weight %
Atom Density (atoms/b-cm)
Zircaloy-4 2
6.56 Zr 98.23 4.2541E-02 Sn 1.45 4.8254E-04 Fe 0.21 1.4856E-04 Cr 0.10 7.5978E-05 Hf 0.01 2.2133E-06 Water (Pellet Clad Gap) 3 0.998 H
11.1 6.6769E-02 O
88.9 3.3385E-02 Stainless Steel (SS304) 5 7.94 C
0.080 3.1877E-04 Si 1.000 1.7025E-03 P
0.045 6.9468E-05 Cr 19.000 1.7473E-02 Mn 2.000 1.7407E-03 Fe 68.375 5.8545E-02 Ni 9.500 7.7402E-03 11B4C in CC 8
2.555 B11 78.56 1.0988E-01 C
21.44 2.7470E-02 Aluminum 6
2.702 Al 100.0 6.0307E-02 Aluminum - Boron Poison Plate (13.5 mg B-10/cm2) - Type A1/A2 7
2.693 B-10 2.63 4.26230E-03 B11 0.29 4.3073E-04 Al 97.08 5.8349E-02 Aluminum - Boron Poison Plate (6.30 mg B-10/cm2) - Type A 7
2.693 B-10 1.224 1.9825E-03 B11 0.136 2.0034E-04 Al 98.640 5.9288E-2 Water 9
0.998 H
11.1 6.6769E-02 O
88.9 3.3385E-02 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-31 Table 6.8.5-10 Acceptable Initial Enrichment / Burnup Combinations for CE 14x14 Fuel Class Intact FAs
- 24PP Type A1/A2 No PRA Cooling Time Burnup Enrichment kkeno keno kkeno+2 keno keff + (+) +
0 years (Fresh Fuel) 0 1.80 0.9343 0.0005 0.9353 5 years 5
1.78 0.9240 0.0004 0.9249 0.9414 10*
1.91 0.9240 0.0004 0.9249 0.9412 15 2.06 0.9241 0.0004 0.9248 0.9420 20 2.44 0.9243 0.0004 0.9252 0.9421 25 2.83 0.9243 0.0005 0.9252 0.9421 30 3.29 0.9231 0.0005 0.9240 0.9416 35 3.69 0.9234 0.0004 0.9243 0.9421 40*
4.29 0.9228 0.0005 0.9238 0.9416 45 4.64 0.9194 0.0004 0.9202 0.9422 50 5.00 0.9148 0.0005 0.9157 0.9391 55 5.00 0.8957 0.0005 0.8967 0.9282 10 years 5
1.80 0.9240 0.0005 0.9250 0.9415 10 1.97 0.9250 0.0005 0.9259 0.9422 15 2.12 0.9239 0.0005 0.9249 0.9421 20 2.61 0.9244 0.0005 0.9253 0.9422 25 2.98 0.9243 0.0005 0.9252 0.9421 30 3.48 0.9232 0.0005 0.9241 0.9417 35 3.89 0.9230 0.0005 0.9240 0.9418 40 4.58 0.9228 0.0005 0.9237 0.9415 45 4.92 0.9184 0.0005 0.9194 0.9414 50 5.00 0.9004 0.0005 0.9014 0.9248 55 5.00 0.8785 0.0005 0.8794 0.9109 15 years 5
1.82 0.9248 0.0004 0.9257 0.9422 10 2.01 0.9247 0.0005 0.9257 0.9420 15 2.17 0.9241 0.0005 0.9251 0.9423 20 2.69 0.9242 0.0004 0.9251 0.9420 25 3.07 0.9236 0.0004 0.9245 0.9414 30 3.60 0.9233 0.0005 0.9242 0.9418 35 4.03 0.9231 0.0005 0.9240 0.9418 40 4.76 0.9232 0.0004 0.9241 0.9419 45 5.00 0.9122 0.0004 0.9131 0.9351 50 5.00 0.8906 0.0005 0.8915 0.9149 55 5.00 0.8676 0.0005 0.8686 0.9001 20 years 5
1.82 0.9245 0.0004 0.9254 0.9419 10 2.03 0.9247 0.0005 0.9257 0.9420 15 2.20 0.9240 0.0004 0.9249 0.9421 20 2.75 0.9243 0.0005 0.9253 0.9422 25 3.14 0.9232 0.0004 0.9241 0.9410 30 3.69 0.9229 0.0005 0.9238 0.9414 35 4.13 0.9232 0.0005 0.9242 0.9420 40 4.87 0.9233 0.0005 0.9242 0.9420 45 5.00 0.9058 0.0004 0.9067 0.9287 50 5.00 0.8823 0.0004 0.8832 0.9066 55 5.00 0.8586 0.0005 0.8596 0.8911 Note: Reported enrichments are rounded down to 2 decimal digits.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-32 Table 6.8.5-11 Acceptable Initial Enrichment / Burnup Combinations for 4 CE 14x14 Fuel Class Damaged FAs - 24PP Type A1/A2 No PRA Cooling Time Burnup Enrichment kkeno keno kkeno+2 keno keff + (+) +
0 years (Fresh Fuel) 0 1.75 0.9375 0.0005 0.9385 5 years 5
1.55 0.9221 0.0005 0.9230 0.9395 10 1.65 0.9214 0.0004 0.9222 0.9385 15 1.75 0.9223 0.0005 0.9233 0.9405 20 2.10 0.9210 0.0005 0.9219 0.9388 25 2.30 0.9227 0.0004 0.9235 0.9404 30 2.80 0.9212 0.0005 0.9221 0.9397 35 3.15 0.9219 0.0005 0.9228 0.9406 40 3.80 0.9202 0.0005 0.9211 0.9389 45 4.05 0.9165 0.0005 0.9175 0.9395 50 4.50 0.9149 0.0004 0.9157 0.9391 55 5.00 0.8996 0.0005 0.9005 0.9320 10 years 5
1.60 0.9233 0.0005 0.9242 0.9407 10 1.70 0.9224 0.0005 0.9233 0.9396 15 1.85 0.9219 0.0005 0.9229 0.9401 20 2.20 0.9227 0.0005 0.9237 0.9406 25 2.40 0.9205 0.0005 0.9215 0.9384 30 3.05 0.9222 0.0005 0.9231 0.9407 35 3.35 0.9214 0.0005 0.9223 0.9401 40 3.85 0.9212 0.0004 0.9220 0.9398 45 4.25 0.9176 0.0005 0.9185 0.9405 50 5.00 0.9051 0.0004 0.9059 0.9293 55 5.00 0.8830 0.0004 0.8838 0.9153 15 years 5
1.55 0.9220 0.0004 0.9229 0.9394 10 1.70 0.9233 0.0005 0.9242 0.9405 15 1.85 0.9212 0.0005 0.9221 0.9393 20 2.30 0.9221 0.0004 0.9230 0.9399 25 2.60 0.9221 0.0005 0.9230 0.9399 30 3.15 0.9216 0.0005 0.9225 0.9401 35 3.50 0.9212 0.0005 0.9221 0.9399 40 4.00 0.9216 0.0005 0.9225 0.9403 45 5.00 0.9178 0.0005 0.9187 0.9407 50 5.00 0.8944 0.0005 0.8954 0.9188 55 5.00 0.8717 0.0005 0.8727 0.9042 20 years 5
1.60 0.9227 0.0004 0.9236 0.9401 10 1.70 0.9232 0.0005 0.9241 0.9404 15 1.90 0.9225 0.0005 0.9235 0.9407 20 2.40 0.9220 0.0005 0.9229 0.9398 25 2.70 0.9223 0.0005 0.9232 0.9401 30 3.20 0.9216 0.0005 0.9226 0.9402 35 3.55 0.9205 0.0005 0.9215 0.9393 40 4.25 0.9214 0.0004 0.9222 0.9400 45 5.00 0.9101 0.0005 0.9110 0.9330 50 5.00 0.8858 0.0005 0.8867 0.9101 55 5.00 0.8623 0.0004 0.8632 0.8947 Note: The burnup/enrichment combinations shown in this table apply only to damaged fuel assemblies while the burnup/enrichment combinations for balance intact fuels are at the values provided in Table 6.8.5-10.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-33 Table 6.8.5-12 Acceptable Initial Enrichment / Burnup Combinations for 28 CE 14x14 Fuel Class Damaged FAs - 24PP Type A1/A2 No PRA Cooling Time Burnup Enrichment kkeno keno kkeno+2 keno keff + (+) +
0 years (Fresh Fuel) 0 1.70 0.9343 0.0005 0.9353 5 years 5
1.60 0.9222 0.0005 0.9232 0.9397 10 1.70 0.9232 0.0004 0.9240 0.9403 20 2.15 0.9215 0.0005 0.9225 0.9394 25 2.45 0.9233 0.0004 0.9241 0.9410 30 2.85 0.9231 0.0005 0.9241 0.9417 35 3.15 0.9230 0.0004 0.9238 0.9416 40 3.75 0.9231 0.0005 0.9241 0.9419 45 4.05 0.9189 0.0004 0.9197 0.9417 50 4.35 0.9161 0.0004 0.9169 0.9403 55 4.70 0.9095 0.0004 0.9103 0.9418 10 years 5
1.60 0.9203 0.0004 0.9211 0.9376 10 1.75 0.9240 0.0005 0.9250 0.9413 20 2.25 0.9207 0.0005 0.9216 0.9385 25 2.55 0.9219 0.0005 0.9229 0.9398 30 3.05 0.9233 0.0004 0.9242 0.9418 35 3.35 0.9209 0.0004 0.9217 0.9395 40 3.95 0.9227 0.0005 0.9236 0.9414 45 4.30 0.9185 0.0005 0.9195 0.9415 50 4.75 0.9169 0.0005 0.9178 0.9412 55 5.00 0.9061 0.0005 0.9071 0.9386 15 years 5
1.65 0.9235 0.0005 0.9245 0.9410 10 1.80 0.9240 0.0004 0.9248 0.9411 20 2.35 0.9235 0.0005 0.9244 0.9413 25 2.65 0.9219 0.0005 0.9228 0.9397 30 3.15 0.9226 0.0005 0.9235 0.9411 35 3.50 0.9224 0.0005 0.9233 0.9411 40 4.10 0.9212 0.0005 0.9222 0.9400 45 4.50 0.9179 0.0004 0.9188 0.9408 50 5.00 0.9152 0.0005 0.9162 0.9396 55 5.00 0.8932 0.0005 0.8941 0.9256 20 years 5
1.65 0.9233 0.0005 0.9242 0.9407 10 1.80 0.9223 0.0004 0.9231 0.9394 20 2.40 0.9221 0.0005 0.9230 0.9399 25 2.70 0.9210 0.0005 0.9220 0.9389 30 3.20 0.9201 0.0005 0.9211 0.9387 35 3.60 0.9226 0.0005 0.9236 0.9414 40 4.20 0.9206 0.0005 0.9216 0.9394 45 4.70 0.9183 0.0004 0.9192 0.9412 50 5.00 0.9087 0.0005 0.9097 0.9331 55 5.00 0.8849 0.0005 0.8858 0.9173 Note: The burnup/enrichment combinations shown in this table apply only to damaged fuel assemblies while the burnup/enrichment combinations for balance intact fuels are at the values provided in Table 6.8.5-10.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-34 Table 6.8.5-13 Acceptable Initial Enrichment / Burnup Combinations for 8 CE 14x14 Fuel Class Failed FAs - 24PP Type A1/A2 No PRA Cooling Time Burnup Enrichment k-keno k-keno+2 k-keno+2+kx+ki 0 years (Fresh Fuel) 0 1.65 0.9313 0.0006 0.9325 5 years 5
1.55 0.9228 0.0005 0.9238 0.9403 10 1.70 0.9227 0.0005 0.9237 0.9400 15 1.80 0.9237 0.0005 0.9247 0.9419 20 2.15 0.9229 0.0005 0.9239 0.9408 25 2.30 0.9235 0.0005 0.9245 0.9414 30 2.80 0.9211 0.0004 0.9219 0.9395 35 3.10 0.9208 0.0005 0.9218 0.9396 40 3.65 0.9200 0.0005 0.9210 0.9388 45 4.05 0.9187 0.0005 0.9197 0.9417 50 4.85 0.9170 0.0004 0.9178 0.9412 55 5.00 0.8968 0.0005 0.8978 0.9293 10 years 5
1.60 0.9215 0.0005 0.9225 0.9390 10 1.70 0.9225 0.0005 0.9235 0.9398 15 1.85 0.9217 0.0004 0.9225 0.9397 20 2.10 0.9224 0.0005 0.9234 0.9403 25 2.35 0.9233 0.0005 0.9243 0.9412 30 3.05 0.9224 0.0005 0.9234 0.9410 35 3.25 0.9218 0.0005 0.9228 0.9406 40 3.80 0.9231 0.0004 0.9239 0.9417 45 4.15 0.9169 0.0004 0.9177 0.9397 50 5.00 0.9030 0.0004 0.9038 0.9272 15 years 5
1.45 0.9220 0.0005 0.9230 0.9395 10 1.70 0.9221 0.0005 0.9231 0.9394 15 1.85 0.9224 0.0005 0.9234 0.9406 20 2.25 0.9221 0.0004 0.9229 0.9398 25 2.65 0.9228 0.0005 0.9238 0.9407 30 3.10 0.9225 0.0005 0.9235 0.9411 35 3.45 0.9219 0.0005 0.9229 0.9407 40 4.10 0.9217 0.0005 0.9227 0.9405 45 5.00 0.9139 0.0005 0.9149 0.9369 20 years 5
1.65 0.9227 0.0005 0.9237 0.9402 10 1.70 0.9233 0.0005 0.9243 0.9406 15 1.90 0.9226 0.0005 0.9236 0.9408 20 2.35 0.9212 0.0005 0.9222 0.9391 25 2.65 0.9227 0.0005 0.9237 0.9406 30 3.05 0.9206 0.0005 0.9216 0.9392 35 3.35 0.9210 0.0005 0.9220 0.9398 40 4.30 0.9223 0.0005 0.9233 0.9411 45 5.00 0.9070 0.0005 0.9080 0.9300 Note: The burnup/enrichment combinations shown in this table apply only to failed fuel assemblies while the burnup/enrichment combinations for balance intact fuels are at the values provided in Table 6.8.5-10.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-35 Table 6.8.5-14 Acceptable Initial Enrichment / Burnup Combinations for CE 14x14 Fuel Class Intact FAs
- 16PP Type A No PRA Cooling Time Burnup (GWd/MTU)
Enrichment (wt. %
U-235) kKENO KENO keff keff + (i+ki) + kx 30 years 5
1.52 0.9240 0.0001 0.9242 0.9407 10 1.69 0.9241 0.0001 0.9243 0.9406 15 1.85 0.9231 0.0001 0.9233 0.9405 20 2.36 0.9236 0.0001 0.9238 0.9407 25 2.72 0.9235 0.0001 0.9237 0.9406 30 3.25 0.9228 0.0001 0.9230 0.9406 35 3.67 0.9226 0.0001 0.9228 0.9406 40 4.39 0.9226 0.0001 0.9228 0.9406 45 4.76 0.9184 0.0001 0.9186 0.9406 50 5.00 0.9066 0.0001 0.9068 0.9302 Table 6.8.5-15 Acceptable Initial Enrichment / Burnup Combinations for CE 14x14 Fuel Class Intact FAs
- 24PP Type A No PRA Cooling Time Burnup (GWd/MTU)
Enrichment (wt. %
U-235) kKENO KENO keff keff + (i+ki) + kx 30 years 5
1.65 0.9239 0.0001 0.9241 0.9406 10 1.83 0.9241 0.0001 0.9243 0.9406 15 2.00 0.9233 0.0001 0.9235 0.9407 20 2.53 0.9235 0.0001 0.9237 0.9406 25 2.90 0.9234 0.0001 0.9236 0.9405 30 3.44 0.9228 0.0001 0.9230 0.9406 35 3.87 0.9227 0.0001 0.9229 0.9407 40 4.60 0.9226 0.0001 0.9228 0.9406 45 4.98 0.9184 0.0001 0.9186 0.9406 50 5.00 0.8942 0.0001 0.8944 0.9178 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-36 Table 6.8.5-16 DSC-01 and DSC-02 Fuel Data - CE 14x14 Intact FAs - No PRA DSC 16PP Type A DSC 16PP Type A FA Number FA ID Enrichment (wt. %
Burnup (GWd/MTU)
FA ID Enrichment (wt. %
Burnup (GWd/MTU) 1 HA34 3.48 33.26 HA29 3.48 33.16 2
D036 2.97 33.35 E112 2.72 30.62 3
D042 2.97 33.35 E104 2.72 30.62 4
IA28 3.51 36.54 HA31 3.48 33.10 5
IA29 3.51 36.37 HA32 3.48 33.42 6
HA26 3.48 37.58 IA25 3.51 36.45 7
A031 1.38 9.03 B113 2.37 22.03 8
B104 2.37 20.08 B110 2.38 22.09 9
HA18 3.48 38.03 JA21 3.51 37.70 10 IA30 3.51 36.54 HA33 3.48 33.28 11 D044 2.97 33.35 G026 3.02 31.07 12 B103 2.37 22.09 B220 2.41 22.66 13 A022 1.39 7.84 A016 1.40 7.84 14 A024 1.39 8.44 A042 1.39 7.84 15 B217 2.38 22.81 D041 2.97 30.22 16 D034 2.97 33.75 G028 3.02 31.07 17 D037 2.97 33.75 F012 3.02 32.40 18 B002 2.38 27.04 D009 2.96 30.22 19 A034 1.39 8.44 A001 1.40 7.91 20 A026 1.39 9.03 A039 1.40 7.91 21 G019 3.02 31.97 E009 3.03 30.32 22 G004 3.02 33.25 F003 3.01 32.40 23 IA32 3.51 36.41 IA12 3.51 34.95 24 G036 3.02 36.13 JA22 3.51 37.67 25 G024 3.02 31.97 F101 2.74 30.62 26 D035 2.97 33.35 E109 2.72 30.62 27 JA35 3.51 38.79 HA16 3.48 37.58 28 HA37 3.48 36.63 IA13 3.51 35.64 29 HA17 3.48 37.66 IA15 3.51 35.14 30 G021 3.02 33.25 D039 2.97 33.35 31 G027 3.02 33.25 HA21 3.48 33.08 32 HA25 3.48 37.16 IA16 3.51 35.06 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-37 Table 6.8.5-17 DSC-03 and DSC-04 Fuel Data - CE 14x14 Intact FAs - No PRA DSC 16PP Type A DSC 16PP Type A FA Number FA ID Enrichment (wt. %
Burnup (GWd/MTU)
FA ID Enrichment (wt. % U235)
Burnup (GWd/MTU) 1 G037 3.01 39.82 E113 2.72 27.93 2
E001 3.03 32.83 E105 2.72 27.93 3
G038 3.01 39.78 E108 2.72 27.93 4
E005 3.03 32.83 E110 2.72 27.93 5
JA09 3.51 38.92 A028 1.38 15.31 6
E006 3.03 32.83 A029 1.38 15.31 7
P107 3.60 37.85 JA29 3.51 39.83 8
P106 3.60 37.81 HA15 3.48 39.50 9
E007 3.03 32.83 A021 1.39 15.67 10 JA10 3.51 39.05 A025 1.39 15.67 11 A011 1.39 7.91 F002 3.01 32.40 12 G013 3.03 42.18 JA08 3.51 39.95 13 G020 3.02 40.78 KA22 3.49 39.49 14 G023 3.02 41.71 KA13 3.49 39.45 15 G030 3.02 41.75 JA11 3.51 38.97 16 A008 1.40 8.25 F004 3.01 32.40 17 A019 1.39 15.31 B210 2.38 22.19 18 G006 3.02 42.20 HA36 3.48 39.30 19 G010 3.02 42.28 HA38 3.48 39.23 20 G017 3.02 42.30 HA40 3.48 39.28 21 G018 3.02 41.75 HA10 3.48 36.95 22 A032 1.39 15.31 B211 2.38 22.19 23 B123 2.37 22.03 C007 3.19 27.40 24 B109 2.38 22.09 C009 3.19 27.64 25 JA33 3.51 39.10 KA29 3.51 39.27 26 JA32 3.51 39.28 KA17 3.50 38.41 27 B101 2.37 22.09 C015 3.18 27.64 28 B114 2.37 22.09 C014 3.18 27.64 29 B008 2.38 27.04 D001 2.96 28.39 30 B001 2.37 27.04 D004 2.95 28.39 31 B003 2.39 27.04 D007 2.96 28.39 32 B004 2.40 27.04 D008 2.96 28.39 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-38 Table 6.8.5-18 DSC-05 and DSC-06 Fuel Data - CE 14x14 Intact FAs - No PRA DSC 16PP Type A DSC 16PP Type A FA Number FA ID Enrichment (wt.%
Burnup (GWd/MTU)
FA ID Enrichment (wt.% U235)
Burnup (GWd/MTU) 1 D016 2.95 28.39 B206 2.37 29.01 2
D017 2.96 28.39 B102 2.37 28.56 3
D018 2.95 28.39 B117 2.38 28.56 4
E111 2.72 27.68 E119 2.72 27.93 5
A036 1.40 8.44 E120 2.72 27.93 6
A033 1.39 15.67 F011 3.02 39.67 7
P114 3.60 37.35 B209 2.38 22.19 8
KA08 3.49 42.01 B212 2.38 22.81 9
A030 1.38 15.67 F001 3.02 39.67 10 A007 1.40 8.49 E013 3.04 39.67 11 B222 2.41 22.66 B119 2.37 28.56 12 IA40 3.51 38.34 B218 2.38 22.81 13 HA11 3.48 39.81 A003 1.38 8.64 14 G025 3.02 38.79 A035 1.39 15.67 15 HA35 3.48 39.14 B219 2.38 22.81 16 B223 2.40 22.66 B120 2.37 28.56 17 E012 3.03 26.44 B105 2.37 28.56 18 E014 3.04 36.88 B204 2.37 22.81 19 E015 3.04 36.88 A044 1.39 15.67 20 E017 3.04 36.88 A045 1.39 15.67 21 HA39 3.48 33.59 B006 2.39 27.04 22 E016 3.04 26.44 B208 2.38 29.01 23 F008 3.03 29.08 E018 3.03 39.67 24 F009 3.02 29.08 F005 3.02 39.67 25 JA13 3.51 39.56 B005 2.40 27.04 26 JA14 3.51 39.50 B108 2.38 28.56 27 IA04 3.51 27.03 G044 3.03 38.62 28 IA08 3.51 26.75 E021 3.03 39.67 29 D025 2.96 27.61 F006 3.03 39.67 30 D031 2.96 33.75 B202 2.37 29.01 31 D026 2.96 27.61 B203 2.37 29.01 32 D032 2.97 33.75 F010 3.02 39.67 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-39 Table 6.8.5-19 DSC-07 and DSC-08 Fuel Data - CE 14x14 Intact FAs - No PRA DSC 16PP Type A DSC 16PP Type A FA Number FA ID Enrichment (wt.%
Burnup (GWd/MTU)
FA ID Enrichment (wt.% U235)
Burnup (GWd/MTU) 1 KA20 3.49 33.37 IA36 3.51 38.10 2
KA24 3.49 33.46 C116 3.16 29.25 3
C010 3.18 35.49 C103 3.19 29.45 4
IA11 3.51 35.03 IA37 3.51 38.62 5
A014 1.39 9.03 IA38 3.51 38.47 6
D002 2.96 27.39 JA06 3.51 39.35 7
G033 3.01 38.69 B118 2.38 20.08 8
IA03 3.51 38.36 B116 2.38 22.03 9
D011 2.96 27.39 JA07 3.51 39.52 10 A020 1.39 9.03 JA17 3.51 39.00 11 B214 2.38 22.81 C105 3.19 29.45 12 P101 3.60 37.40 C006 3.19 27.40 13 IA35 3.51 38.55 A004 1.38 15.31 14 IA39 3.51 38.45 A012 1.39 15.31 15 P102 3.60 37.74 D019 2.96 27.39 16 B215 2.38 22.81 C101 3.18 29.45 17 D010 2.96 27.61 C112 3.16 29.45 18 JA31 3.51 38.98 D020 2.96 27.39 19 HA01 3.48 33.35 A013 1.39 15.67 20 HA28 3.48 32.91 A038 1.40 17.05 21 G001 3.03 38.04 C110 3.17 29.25 22 E103 2.72 27.68 IA05 3.51 27.61 23 F103 2.74 29.64 JA20 3.51 38.56 24 F104 2.74 29.64 JA04 3.51 40.35 25 JA27 3.51 36.27 C111 3.17 29.25 26 JA28 3.51 36.25 C115 3.16 29.25 27 F105 2.74 29.64 JA03 3.51 39.20 28 F106 2.74 29.64 JA15 3.51 39.99 29 D033 2.97 33.35 JA16 3.51 39.62 30 D027 2.96 33.75 IA06 3.51 27.57 31 D029 2.97 33.75 IA07 3.51 27.11 32 D030 2.97 33.75 JA05 3.51 39.45 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-40 Table 6.8.5-20 DSC-09 and DSC-10 Fuel Data - CE 14x14 Intact FAs - No PRA DSC 16PP Type A DSC 24PP Type A FA Number FA ID Enrichment (wt.%
Burnup (GWd/MTU)
FA ID Enrichment (wt.% U235)
Burnup (GWd/MTU) 1 D012 2.96 27.39 F107 2.74 29.64 2
D024 2.96 27.39 F109 2.74 29.64 3
D014 2.96 27.61 F108 2.74 29.64 4
D015 2.96 27.61 F110 2.74 29.64 5
B115 2.38 22.09 E117 2.72 27.68 6
A009 1.40 8.49 E101 2.72 27.68 7
P108 3.60 37.75 HA20 3.48 40.22 8
G031 3.01 38.60 HA23 3.48 40.51 9
A005 1.39 8.49 E102 2.72 27.68 10 B122 2.37 22.09 E118 2.72 27.68 11 E114 2.72 27.68 A023 1.39 8.77 12 G009 3.03 38.66 G003 3.03 38.73 13 G035 3.02 38.49 G008 3.02 38.48 14 G034 3.01 38.54 G022 3.03 38.26 15 IA34 3.51 38.22 G042 3.03 36.73 16 E116 2.72 27.68 B107 2.38 20.08 17 A037 1.40 17.05 B224 2.39 22.81 18 HA08 3.48 39.68 E008 3.03 32.83 19 JA25 3.51 36.50 E011 3.03 32.83 20 HA09 3.48 39.68 E010 3.03 32.83 21 JA26 3.51 36.83 E022 3.03 32.83 22 B121 2.40 20.08 C002 3.19 25.44 23 HA03 3.48 33.14 HA02 3.48 32.99 24 HA07 3.48 33.34 IA19 3.51 32.40 25 G043 3.03 35.91 HA27 3.48 37.12 26 G002 3.03 38.09 HA13 3.48 36.27 27 HA12 3.48 33.43 IA20 3.51 32.21 28 HA06 3.48 32.98 IA17 3.51 32.59 29 C114 3.16 29.25 F102 2.74 30.62 30 C003 3.19 25.44 IA26 3.51 36.27 31 C012 3.18 25.44 F112 2.74 30.62 32 B213 2.38 29.01 IA27 3.51 36.18 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-41 Table 6.8.5-21 As-Loaded DSCs Analysis - CE 14x14 Intact FAs DSC Basket Type kKENO KENO keff keff + (i+ki)+ kx (1)
DSC-01 16PP Type A 0.9021 0.0005 0.9031 0.9209 DSC-02 0.9209 0.0004 0.9217 0.9395 DSC-03 0.8924 0.0005 0.8934 0.9154 DSC-04 0.8862 0.0004 0.8870 0.9048 DSC-05 0.8910 0.0005 0.8920 0.9140 DSC-06 0.8807 0.0004 0.8815 0.8993 DSC-07 0.9063 0.0005 0.9073 0.9251 DSC-08 0.9100 0.0005 0.9110 0.9330 DSC-09 0.8950 0.0005 0.8960 0.9138 DSC-10 24PP Type A 0.8875 0.0005 0.8885 0.9105 (1) (i+ki) burnup-dependent bias and bias uncertainty from Table 6-3 of [5] based on the maximum assembly burnup within the DSC. kx minor actinide and fission product bias, 0.0015 from Table 6-6 of
[5].
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-42 Table 6.8.5-22 HAC Evaluation - 32PT 16PP Type A DSC-TC Gap Moderator Density kKENO keff Fuel at the bottom axial location of the DSC Void 0.7415 0.0001 0.7417 10%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 20%
0.7397 0.0001 0.7399 30%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 40%
0.7397 0.0001 0.7399 50%
0.7397 0.0001 0.7399 60%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 70%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 80%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 90%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 100%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 Fuel at the middle axial location of the DSC Void 0.7297 0.0001 0.7299 10%
0.7268 0.0001 0.7270 20%
0.7268 0.0001 0.7270 30%
0.7268 0.0001 0.7270 40%
0.7268 0.0001 0.7270 50%
0.7269 0.0001 0.7271 60%
0.7268 0.0001 0.7270 70%
0.7268 0.0001 0.7270 80%
0.7269 0.0001 0.7271 90%
0.7268 0.0001 0.7270 100%
0.7268 0.0001 0.7270 Fuel at the top axial location of the DSC Void 0.7415 0.0001 0.7417 10%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 20%
0.7397 0.0001 0.7399 30%
0.7397 0.0001 0.7399 40%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 50%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 60%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 70%
0.7397 0.0001 0.7399 80%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 90%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 100%
0.7396 0.0001 0.7398 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-43 Table 6.8.5-23 HAC Evaluation - 32PT 24PP Type A DSC-TC Gap Moderator Density kKENO keff Fuel at the bottom axial location of the DSC Void 0.7410 0.0001 0.7412 10%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 20%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 30%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 40%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 50%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 60%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 70%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 80%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 90%
0.7389 0.0001 0.7391 100%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 Fuel at the middle axial location of the DSC Void 0.7294 0.0001 0.7296 10%
0.7264 0.0001 0.7266 20%
0.7264 0.0001 0.7266 30%
0.7264 0.0001 0.7266 40%
0.7264 0.0001 0.7266 50%
0.7263 0.0001 0.7265 60%
0.7263 0.0001 0.7265 70%
0.7264 0.0001 0.7266 80%
0.7264 0.0001 0.7266 90%
0.7263 0.0001 0.7265 100%
0.7263 0.0001 0.7265 Fuel at the top axial location of the DSC Void 0.7411 0.0001 0.7413 10%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 20%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 30%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 40%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 50%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 60%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 70%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 80%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 90%
0.7391 0.0001 0.7393 100%
0.7390 0.0001 0.7392 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-44 Table 6.8.5-24 keff Values for Each Fuel Assembly - DSC-02 FA ID Enrichment (wt.% U-235)
Burnup (GWd/MTU) kKENO KENO keff HA29 3.48 33.16 0.9284 0.0004 0.9293 E112 2.72 30.62 0.8878 0.0004 0.8887 E104 2.72 30.62 0.8875 0.0005 0.8885 HA31 3.48 33.10 0.9296 0.0004 0.9304 HA32 3.48 33.42 0.9278 0.0005 0.9288 IA25 3.51 36.45 0.9093 0.0004 0.9101 B113 2.37 22.03 0.9095 0.0005 0.9105 B110 2.38 22.09 0.9121 0.0004 0.9130 JA21 3.51 37.70 0.9022 0.0004 0.9030 HA33 3.48 33.28 0.9286 0.0005 0.9295 G026 3.02 31.07 0.9071 0.0005 0.9081 B220 2.41 22.66 0.9087 0.0005 0.9096 A016 1.40 7.84 0.8881 0.0005 0.8890 A042 1.39 7.84 0.8875 0.0005 0.8884 D041 2.97 30.22 0.9079 0.0005 0.9088 G028 3.02 31.07 0.9071 0.0005 0.9081 F012 3.02 32.40 0.9004 0.0005 0.9014 D009 2.96 30.22 0.9074 0.0005 0.9084 A001 1.40 7.91 0.8884 0.0005 0.8893 A039 1.40 7.91 0.8892 0.0004 0.8900 E009 3.03 30.32 0.9128 0.0004 0.9136 F003 3.01 32.40 0.8998 0.0005 0.9008 IA12 3.51 34.95 0.9197 0.0004 0.9205 JA22 3.51 37.67 0.9022 0.0004 0.9030 F101 2.74 30.62 0.8881 0.0005 0.8890 E109 2.72 30.62 0.8870 0.0004 0.8878 HA16 3.48 37.58 0.9024 0.0005 0.9033 IA13 3.51 35.64 0.9155 0.0005 0.9164 IA15 3.51 35.14 0.9182 0.0005 0.9192 D039 2.97 33.35 0.8905 0.0005 0.8914 HA21 3.48 33.08 0.9296 0.0004 0.9304 IA16 3.51 35.06 0.9193 0.0004 0.9202 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-45 Table 6.8.5-25 keff Values for Each Fuel Assembly - DSC-10 FA ID Enrichment (wt.% U-235)
Burnup (GWd/MTU) kKENO KENO keff F107 2.74 29.64 0.8925 0.0005 0.8935 F109 2.74 29.64 0.8925 0.0005 0.8935 F108 2.74 29.64 0.8925 0.0005 0.8935 F110 2.74 29.64 0.8909 0.0005 0.8918 E117 2.72 27.68 0.8992 0.0005 0.9002 E101 2.72 27.68 0.8988 0.0004 0.8997 HA20 3.48 40.22 0.8572 0.0004 0.8579 HA23 3.48 40.51 0.8568 0.0005 0.8577 E102 2.72 27.68 0.8988 0.0004 0.8997 E118 2.72 27.68 0.8992 0.0005 0.9001 A023 1.39 8.77 0.8671 0.0005 0.8680 G003 3.03 38.73 0.8345 0.0005 0.8355 G008 3.02 38.48 0.8352 0.0004 0.8361 G022 3.03 38.26 0.8368 0.0004 0.8377 G042 3.03 36.73 0.8610 0.0005 0.8619 B107 2.38 20.08 0.9050 0.0005 0.9060 B224 2.39 22.81 0.8925 0.0005 0.8934 E008 3.03 32.83 0.8849 0.0005 0.8858 E011 3.03 32.83 0.8844 0.0005 0.8854 E010 3.03 32.83 0.8844 0.0005 0.8854 E022 3.03 32.83 0.8849 0.0005 0.8858 C002 3.19 25.44 0.9439 0.0004 0.9447 HA02 3.48 32.99 0.9157 0.0005 0.9167 IA19 3.51 32.40 0.9215 0.0004 0.9224 HA27 3.48 37.12 0.8910 0.0005 0.8920 HA13 3.48 36.27 0.8950 0.0005 0.8959 IA20 3.51 32.21 0.9227 0.0004 0.9236 IA17 3.51 32.59 0.9204 0.0005 0.9214 F102 2.74 30.62 0.8751 0.0004 0.8760 IA26 3.51 36.27 0.8978 0.0005 0.8988 F112 2.74 30.62 0.8740 0.0004 0.8749 IA27 3.51 36.18 0.8991 0.0005 0.9000 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-46 Table 6.8.5-26 32PT 16PP Type A - Full Misloaded DSC Enrichment (wt.% U-235)
Burnup (GWd/MTU) ks (1) kkeno keno keff 1.52 0
0.9490 0.9314 0.0001 0.9316 1.69 5
0.9490 0.9471 0.0004 0.9479 1.85 9.5 0.9490 0.9462 0.0001 0.9464 2.36 18 0.9490 0.9342 0.0001 0.9344 2.72 21 0.9490 0.9467 0.0001 0.9469 3.25 28.5 0.9490 0.9457 0.0001 0.9459 3.67 31 0.9490 0.9448 0.0001 0.9450 4.39 38 0.9490 0.9349 0.0010 0.9368 4.76 40 0.9490 0.9459 0.0001 0.9461 5.00 42.5 0.9490 0.9457 0.0001 0.9459 (1) ks, ksubcriticality considering USL value at 2% administrative margin, minor and fission product bias, and isotopic bias and bias uncertainty at 45-50 GWd/MTU from Table 6.3 [5], (ks = 0.97236 - 0.0015 -
0.0219 = 0.9490)
Table 6.8.5-27 32PT 24PP Type A - Full Misloaded DSC Enrichment (wt.% U-235)
Burnup (GWd/MTU) kS (1) kKENO KENO keff 1.65 0
0.9490 0.9372 0.0001 0.9374 1.83 6
0.9490 0.9429 0.0005 0.9439 2.00 9.5 0.9490 0.9470 0.0001 0.9472 2.53 17.2 0.9490 0.9392 0.0001 0.9394 2.90 21 0.9490 0.9464 0.0001 0.9466 3.44 28 0.9490 0.9474 0.0001 0.9476 3.87 30.5 0.9490 0.9474 0.0001 0.9476 4.60 39 0.9490 0.9465 0.0001 0.9467 4.98 40 0.9490 0.9452 0.0001 0.9454 5.00 40.5 0.9490 0.9436 0.0001 0.9438 (1) ks, ksubcriticality considering USL value at 2% administrative margin, minor and fission product bias, and isotopic bias and bias uncertainty at 45-50 GWd/MTU from Table 6.3 [5], (ks = 0.97236 - 0.0015 -
0.0219 = 0.9490)
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-55 Figure 6.8.5-8 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-01 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-56 Figure 6.8.5-9 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-02 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-57 Figure 6.8.5-10 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-03 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-58 Figure 6.8.5-11 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-04 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-59 Figure 6.8.5-12 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-05 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-60 Figure 6.8.5-13 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-06 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-61 Figure 6.8.5-14 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-07 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-62 Figure 6.8.5-15 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-08 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-63 Figure 6.8.5-16 As-Loaded 16PP Type A 32PT DSC-09 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 6.8.5-64 Figure 6.8.5-17 As-Loaded 24PP Type A 32PT DSC-10 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 3
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 7-1 Material Evaluation Drawings The drawings for the TN Eagle and DSCs are provided in Chapter 1, Section 1.5. The materials specification, governing code, and quality category are specified in the parts list for each component.
Codes and Standards Usage and Endorsement The containment boundary of the TN Eagle is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 2017 edition [1] as described in Section 7.2.2.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Component The TN Eagle containment boundary is designed and fabricated as a Class 1 component in accordance to the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, subsection NB and the alternative provisions to the ASME Code as described in Section 9.4.1 of Chapter 9. The affected parts are identified as NB in the code criteria column of the drawing parts list.
Attachments to the containtainment boundary with a pressure retaining function, or in the support load path for the cask body are identified as NF on the drawing parts list.
The stress analysis rules of NF are used for these parts, and either ASME or ASTM materials may be used.
Code Case Use/Acceptability The TN Eagle transport cask is designed and constructed without code case usage.
Non-ASME Code Components Parts that do not meet the criteria in Section 7.2.2 for designation as ASME NB or NF are designated as non-code on the drawing parts list. These include the impact limiters, neutron shielding, and non-pressure retaining plates. Materials for these parts are as specified on the drawing parts list.
Weld Design and Inspection Welders and weld procedures are qualified per ASME Section IX. Weld inspections use the criteria of NB-5000 for containment boundary parts, and either NB-5000 or NF-5000 for all other components.
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 2
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 7-3 Radiation Shielding Neutron-Shielding Materials The neutron shielding is provided by the proprietary Vyal-B or Vyal-HT blocks inserted in the shielding rings and in the top of the impact limiters. Vyal-B and Vyal-HT properties are described in Table 7-7). [
]
Gamma-Shielding Materials The gamma shielding is provided by the forged cask body (low alloy steel described in Table 7-1), the primary lid, the RACP, the top handling ring (material described in Table 7-4), and the metalic parts of the shielding rings (materials described in Table 7-6A to Table 7-6C).
Criticality Control Not applicable to the TN Eagle. Criticality control is addressed by materials that are part of the authorized content (DSCs). The TN Eagle packaging itself has no criticality control components.
Neutron-Absorbing (Poison) Material Specification Not applicable to the TN Eagle. Neutron absorbing material is addressed by materials that are part of the authorized content (DSCs).
All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 7-10 All Indicated Changes are for Enclosure 1, Item 4 Proprietary Information on Pages 7-10 and 7-17 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 07/24 Page 9-4
- 2.
Acceptance testing of the neutron shield materials shall be performed to verify the following criteria are met:
a) Resin density is 1.75 g/cm3 or greater (VYAL-B) or 1.345 g/cm3 or greater (Vyal-HT),
b) Minimum Composition is as follows:
Element Weight%
Vyal-B Vyal-HT Hydrogen 4.59 6.65 Boron 0.82 0.81 Carbon 23.35 44.18 Aluminum 19.50 11.50 Zinc 1.40 1.63 Oxygen 50.34 35.23 c) The resin blocks are inspected visually according to following acceptance criteria:
Vyal-B:
No lack of material (void) or segregation.
Polymerization defects are not accepted.
Presence of bubbles is allowed if their diameter does not exceed 3 mm and if the sum of their area is lower than 0.35% of the surface.
No cracks are accepted.
Dimensions specified on the engineering drawings are checked with a calibrated gauge.
Vyal-HT:
Defects such as (but not limited to) voids, bubbles, broken corners, etc. are allowed, provided that the total volume of the observed defects does not exceed 0.5% of the volume of the blocks.
Thermal Tests
- 1.
A thermal test shall be performed to measure the effective thermal conductivity of the assembled cask in the radial direction.
- 2.
An analysis shall then be performed using the measured data to show that the thermal performance of the fabricated cask is equal to or exceeds the theoretical design performance.
- 3.
The thermal test is only required on the first cask (any model) fabricated to the design provided in the applicable drawings for package approval. Any change to the design that could impact the thermal performance will require a new thermal test., Item 4, Item 5 to E-63293 Proposed Certificate of Compliance No. 9382, Revision 0 Markup
2RC FORM 618 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES 1.
- a. CERTIFICATION NUMBER 9382 b.
REVISION NUMBER 0
c.
DOCKET NUMBER 71-9382 d.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER USA/9382/B(U)F-96 PAGE PAGES 1 OF 8
2.
PREAMBLE a.
This certificate is issued to certify that the package (packaging and contents) described in Item 5 below meets the applicable safety standards set forth in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material.
b.
This certificate does not relieve the consignor from compliance with any requirement of the regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation or other applicable regulatory agencies including the government of any country through or into which the package will be transported.
3.
THIS CERTIFICATE IS ISSUED ON THE BASIS OF A SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT OF THE PACKAGE DESIGN OR APPLICATION.
c.
ISSUED TO (Name and Address)
TN Americas LLC 7160 Riverwood Drive, Suite 200 Columbia, MD 21046 d.
TITLE AND IDENTIFICATION OF REPORT OR APPLICATION TN Eagle Transportation Package Safety Analysis Report, Revision No. 0, dated September 2023.
4.
CONDITIONS This certificate is conditional upon fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71, as applicable, and the conditions specified below.
5.
(a)
Packaging (1)
Model Nos: TN Eagle SC, TN Eagle LC (2)
==
Description:==
TN Eagle SC and TN Eagle LC The packaging, designed for the transport of spent fuel stored in dry shielded canisters (DSCs),
consists of a forged cask body equipped with a stack of neutron shielding rings shrink fitted onto its outer surface, a bolted steel lid, a steel bottom closure plate, and impact limiters. The bottom of the forged cask has an opening provided for the hydraulic ram access penetration of the cask for DSC loading and unloading operations. The ram access cover plate is part of the bottom closure system and is equipped with inner and outer elastomeric seals. The top and bottom impact limiters are composed of a steel casing enclosing aluminum honeycomb block, VYAL B resin, and a stainless-steel adapter serving as the interface between the cask and the blocks of aluminum honeycomb. A layer of neutron shield resin is placed in the adapter of the impact limiter for additional shielding.
To accept varying DSC lengths, spacers are used (if needed) to limit the axial movement of the payload. In addition, a hollow bottom spacer (to accommodate for the ram access) may be used depending on the DSC length. The containment boundary is defined by the forged cask body, the primary lid and its inner fluorocarbon seals, the lid port plug and its metallic seal, the ram access cover plate, and its inner-fluorocarbon seal.
or HT 1
1
2RC FORM 618 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES 1.
- a. CERTIFICATION NUMBER 9382 b.
REVISION NUMBER 0
c.
DOCKET NUMBER 71-9382 d.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER USA/9382/B(U)F-96 PAGE PAGES 2 OF 8
5.(a)(2)
Description (continued)
The TN Eagle SC (Standard Canister) and TN Eagle LC (Large Canister) have the same overall dimensions. However, because of different outside diameters for the DSCs, an inner sleeve is used for smaller diameter DSCs for the TN Eagle SC. The thickness of the forged cask body is different for the TN Eagle SC and TN Eagle LC to allow the loading of larger diameter DSCs.
The EOS-37PTH and EOS-89BTH DSCs are transported in the TN Eagle LC, while the 32PT, 32PTH1, 24PT1, 24PT4, and the Fuel-Only (FO) the Fuel/Control Components (FC), and the Failed Fuel (FF) DSCs are transported in the TN Eagle SC.
For both models, the packaging overall length is 8100 mm (318.90 in.) with the impact limiters and 5598 mm (220.39 in.) without the impact limiters, and the impact limiter outside diameter is 3550 mm (139.76 in.) while the forged cask body outside diameter is 2142 mm (84.33 in.). The TN Eagle SC has (i) a forged cask body inner diameter of 1850 mm (72.83 in.), (ii) a cavity length of 5061 mm (199.25 in.), and (iii) and empty weight of 90,000 kg (198,416 lb). The TN Eagle LC has (i) a forged cask body inner diameter of 1940 mm (76.38 in.), (ii) a cavity length of 5086 mm (200.25 in.), (iii) and an empty weight of 87,400 kg (192,684 lb).
The weight of the impact limiters for both the TN Eagle SC and the TN Eagle LC is 10,200 kg (22,487 lb). The maximum weight of the contents is 55,200 kg (121,695 lb) for the TN Eagle LC and 53,400 kg (111,727 lb) for the TN Eagle SC. The maximum gross weight is 163,000 kg (359,574 lb) for the TN Eagle LC and 164,000 kg (361,558 lb) for the TN Eagle SC.
5.(a)(3)
Drawings TN Eagle SC and TN Eagle LC The package shall be constructed and assembled in accordance with the following TN Americas LLC, Drawing numbers:
TN Eagle Package Drawings TN EAGLE01-1100 Rev 0 TN Eagle LC (Large Canister) and TN Eagle SC (Standard Canister) Transport Package (7 Sheets)
EOS Drawings EOS01-71-1000 Rev 0 NUHOMS EOS System Transportable Canister 37PTH DSC Main Assembly (7 sheets)
EOS01-71-1001 Rev 0 NUHOMS EOS System Transportable Canister 37PTH DSC Shell Assembly (2 sheets)
EOS01-71-1005 Rev 0 NUHOMS EOS System Transportable Canister 89BTH DSC Main Assembly (7 sheets)
, except for the SC version with type C1 neutron shielding rings, which has a slightly larger outer diameter
, or 3568 mm (140.47 in.) for the SC version with type C1 neutron shielding rings 8114 mm (319.45 in.)
5612 mm (220.95 in.)
1 1
2RC FORM 618 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES 1.
- a. CERTIFICATION NUMBER 9382 b.
REVISION NUMBER 0
c.
DOCKET NUMBER 71-9382 d.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER USA/9382/B(U)F-96 PAGE PAGES 3 OF 8
5.(a)(3)
Drawings, TN Eagle SC and TN Eagle LC (continued)
EOS01-71-1006 Rev 0 NUHOMS EOS System Transportable Canister 89BTH DSC Shell Assembly (2 sheets)
EOS01-71-1010 Rev 0 NUHOMS EOS System Transportable Canister 37PTH DSC Basket Assembly (15 sheets)
EOS01-71-1011 Rev 0 NUHOMS EOS System Transportable Canister 37PTH Basket Transition Rails (6 sheets)
EOS01-71-1020 Rev 0 NUHOMS EOS System Transportable Canister 89BTH DSC Basket Assembly (9 sheets)
EOS01-71-1021 Rev 0 NUHOMS EOS System Transportable Canister 89BTH Basket Transition Rails (7 sheets) 24PT1 Drawings NUH24PT1-71-1000 Rev 0 NUHOMS 24PT1-DSC Main Assembly (6 sheets) 24PT4 Drawings NUH24PT4-71-1001 Rev 1 NUHOMS 24PT4 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Basket Assembly (5 sheets)
NUH24PT4-71-1002 Rev 1 NUHOMS 24PT4 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Main Assembly (8 sheets)
NUH24PT4-71-1003 Rev 0 NUHOMS 24PT4 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Failed Fuel Can (4 sheets) 32PT Drawings NUH32PT-71-1000 Rev 1 NUHOMS 32PT Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Summary Dimensions (1 sheet)
NUH32PT-71-1001 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PT Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Main Assembly (5 sheets)
NUH32PT-71-1002 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PT Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Shell Assembly (3 sheets)
NUH32PT-71-1003 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PT Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel A Basket Assembly (16 Poison/16 Compartment Plates)
(8 sheets) 1
2RC FORM 618 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES 1.
- a. CERTIFICATION NUMBER 9382 b.
REVISION NUMBER 0
c.
DOCKET NUMBER 71-9382 d.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER USA/9382/B(U)F-96 PAGE PAGES 4 OF 8
5.(a)(3)
Drawings, TN Eagle SC and TN Eagle LC (continued)
NUH32PT-71-1004 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PT Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Aluminum Transition Rail - R90 (2 sheets)
NUH32PT-71-1005 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PT Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Aluminum Transition Rail -R45 (1 sheet)
NUH32PT-71-1006 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PT Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel A/B/C/D Basket Assembly (20 Poison/12 Compartment Plates) (6 sheets)
NUH32PT-71-1007 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PT Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel A/B/C/D Basket Assembly (24 Poison/8 Compartment Plates) (8 sheets)
FO and FC Drawings DWG-NUH24P-FOFC-71-1000 Rev 0 NUHOMS FO-DSC & FC-DSC for PWR Fuel Main Assembly (5 sheets)
FF Drawings DWG-NUH24P-FF-71-1000 Rev 0 NUHOMS FF-DSC for PWR Fuel Main Assembly (5 sheets) 32PTH1 Drawings NUH32PTH1-71-1000 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PTH1 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Main Assembly (4 sheets)
NUH32PTH1-71-1001 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PTH1 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Basket Shell Assembly (5 sheets)
NUH32PTH1-71-1002 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PTH1 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Shell Assembly (4 sheets)
NUH32PTH1-71-1003 Rev 3 NUHOMS 32PTH1 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Basket Assembly (8 sheets)
NUH32PTH1-71-1004 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PTH1 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Transition Rails (7 sheets)
NUH32PTH1-71-1010 Rev 2 NUHOMS 32PTH1 Transportable Canister for PWR Fuel Alternate Top Closure (6 sheets) 1
NRC FORM 618 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES 1.
- a. CERTIFICATION NUMBER 9302 b.
REVISION NUMBER 11 c.
DOCKET NUMBER 71-9382 d.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER USA/9382/B(U)F-96 PAGE PAGES 5 OF 8
5.(b)
Contents of Packaging (1)
Type and Form of Material (a)
Intact, damaged or failed unconsolidated Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) 15x15, Westinghouse (WE) 14x14, WE 15x15, WE 17x17, Combustion Engineering (CE) 14x14, CE 15x15 and CE 16x16 class PWR fuel assemblies (with or without control components) that are enveloped by the characteristics listed in Table 1.6.1-1 of the application are shipped in the EOS-37PTH DSC.
(b)
Intact unconsolidated 7x7, 8x8, 9x9, and 10x10 BWR fuel assemblies (with or without channels) that are enveloped by the FA design characteristics listed in Table 1.6.2-1 of the application are transported in the EOS-89BTH DSC.
(c)
Intact (including reconstituted) Westinghouse-CENP 16x16 (CE 16x16) and/or damaged or failed CE 16x16 FAs with Zircaloy or ZIRLO' cladding and UO2 or (U, Er)O2 or (U, Gd)O2 fuel pellets can be transported in the 24 PT4 DSC with the characteristics in Appendix 1.6.3 of the application. Assemblies are with or without integral fuel burnable absorber rods or integral burnable poison rods.
(d)
Intact PWR fuel assemblies with or without control components; damaged and failed fuels, loaded in an FFC, are allowed for the CE 14x14 fuel class in the 24-poison plate configuration with the characteristics described in Appendix 1.6.4 of the application.
(e)
Intact (including reconstituted) PWR fuel assemblies with or without control components; damaged fuel is allowed in the 32PTH1 DSCs with the characteristics described in Appendix1.6.5 of the application.
(f)
Intact WE 14x14 PWR fuel assemblies; UO2 (stainless steel clad) and Mixed Oxide Zircalloy Clad (MOX UO2 and PuO2) fuel assemblies with or without integral control components in the 24PT1 DSC are allowed with the characteristics described in Appendix 1.6.7 of the application. Up to four stainless steel clad damaged or failed FAs in the 24PT1-DSC. A single damaged or failed WE 14x14 MOX FA in the 24PT1-DSC with no other damaged/failed assemblies.
(2)
Maximum quantity of material per package:
(a) 37 PWR fuel assemblies in the TN Eagle LC with the EOS-37PTH DSC and a maximum heat load of 38.4 kW.
(b) 89 BWR fuel assemblies in the TN Eagle LC with the EOS-89BTH DSC and a maximum heat load of 31.15 kW.
(g) Intact, damaged or failed B&W 15x15 PWR fuel assemblies with or without control components can be transported in the FO/FC/FF DSCs with the characteristics in Safety Analysis Report Appendix 1.6.6.
1 9382
2RC FORM 618 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES 1.
- a. CERTIFICATION NUMBER 9382 b.
REVISION NUMBER 0
c.
DOCKET NUMBER 71-9382 d.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER USA/9382/B(U)F-96 PAGE PAGES 6 OF 8
5.(b)
Contents of Packaging (continued)
(c) 24 intact, damaged, or failed PWR fuel assemblies in the TN Eagle SC with the 24PT4 DSC. Alternatively, up to 12 damaged or failed fuel assemblies in FFC canisters with the balance being loaded with intact fuel. Maximum heat load of 1.26 kW per assembly and a maximum heat load of 24 kW per DSC.
(d) 32 PWR fuel assemblies in the TN Eagle SC with the 32PT DSC in any of four alternate heat zoning configurations with a maximum decay heat of 2.2 kW per assembly and a maximum heat load of 24 kW.
(e) 32 intact (including reconstituted) PWR fuel assemblies in the TN Eagle SC with the 32PTH1 DSC in any of the three alternate heat zoning configurations with a maximum decay heat of 1.5 kW per assembly and a maximum heat load of 26 kW. Up to a maximum of 16 damaged fuel assemblies placed in the center cells of the 32PTH1, with the remainder intact (f) 24PWR fuel assemblies; UO2 and Mixed Oxide Zircalloy Clad (MOX UO2 and PuO2) fuel assemblies with or without integral control components in the TN Eagle SC with the 24PT1 DSC in any of the three alternate heat zoning configurations with a maximum decay heat of 0.583 kW per assembly and a maximum heat load of 14 kW. Up to 4 stainless steel clad damaged or failed fuel assemblies. A single damaged or failed WE 14x14 MOX FA may be stored in the 24PT1 DSC with no other damaged/failed assemblies.
(3)
Damaged fuel includes assemblies with known or suspected cladding defects greater than hairline cracks or pinhole leaks or an assembly with partial and/or missing rods. Damaged fuel assemblies shall be placed in failed fuel canisters (FFC). Loose rods are considered as part of failed fuel contents. The maximum allowable heat load of a package loaded with FO/FC/FF DSC, is 13.5 kW, with a maximum assembly decay heat of 0.764 kW (Type I) or 0.563 kW (Type II) per assembly.
or between end caps (g) 24 intact PWR fuel assemblies in the TN Eagle SC with the FO or FC DSC with a maximum decay heat load per cask of 13.5 kW and either 0.764 kW per assembly (Type I) or 0.563 kW per assembly (Type II), or 13 intact, damaged or failed fuel assemblies in the TN Eagle SC with the FF DSC with a maximum decay heat load per assembly of 0.764 kW.
1
2RC FORM 618 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES 1.
- a. CERTIFICATION NUMBER 9382 b.
REVISION NUMBER 0
c.
DOCKET NUMBER 71-9382 d.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER USA/9382/B(U)F-96 PAGE PAGES 7 OF 8
5.(d)
Criticality Safety Index:
0 6.
Fuel assemblies with missing fuel rods shall not be shipped as intact fuel unless the missing fuel rods are replaced with dummy rods that displace an equal or greater amount of water.
7.
In addition to the requirements of Subpart G of 10 CFR Part 71, the TN Eagle SC and TN Eagle LC packages shall:
(a)
Be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the Operating Procedures in Chapter 8.0, and (b)
Meet the Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of Chapter 9.0.
8.
Additional operating requirements of the TN Eagle SC and TN Eagle LC package include:
(a)
Verification that the fuel assemblies to be transported in any DSC meet the characteristics, maximum average initial enrichment and burnup combinations for both intact and failed fuel assemblies as stated in Appendix 1.6 of the application and are loaded per the Fuel Qualification Tables in Appendix 8.7 of the application.
(b)
The aging management plan and evaluation for each DSC, or set of DSCs, shall be submitted to the NRC prior to shipment.
(c)
The package is transported by rail in an exclusive use conveyance only. To ensure adequate fatigue strength is maintained, the packaging is limited to 800 one-way shipments (empty or loaded).
(d)
Lifting the package, while attached to the transport frame, is not authorized. The TN Eagle package is handled solely in a horizontal position.
9.
Transport by air is not authorized.
10 The TN Eagle SC and TN Eagle LC packages authorized by this certificate are hereby approved for use under the general license provisions of 10 CFR 71.17.
11.
Expiration Date: October 31, 2028.
1
2RC FORM 618 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES 1.
- a. CERTIFICATION NUMBER 9382 b.
REVISION NUMBER 0
c.
DOCKET NUMBER 71-9382 d.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER USA/9382/B(U)F-96 PAGE PAGES 8 OF 8
REFERENCES TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report, Revision No. 0, dated September 2023.
FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Yoira K. Diaz-Sanabria, Chief Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Date: October 23, 2023 Signed by Diaz-Sanabria, Yoira on 10/23/23 1
TBD 1
to E-63293 Listing of Computer Files Contained in Enclosure 6 1 of 3 Disk ID No. (size)
Discipline System/Component File Series (topics)
Number of Files Enclosure 6
One Computer Hard Drive Total (73.6 GB)
Structural (52 GB)
Structural TNEAGLE01-0204-001 Appendices 2.11.2 Folder: \\Section 2.0 Structural Evaluation\\TNEAGLE01-0204-001 Input and output files for HAC Bottom End Drop.
(ANSYS MAPDL Evaluation) 7 Enclosure 6
One Computer Hard Drive Total (73.6 GB)
Thermal (14.1 GB)
Thermal TNEagle01-SC_LC1a (TN Eagle SC with 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC)
Section 3.6.5A (LC#1a in Table 3.6.5A-1)
Folder: \\Section 3.0 Thermal Evaluation\\
TNEagle01-SC_LC1a Input and output files for the bounding normal condition of transportation (NCT) of 32PTH1 Type 1 DSC in TN Eagle SC with 26 kW.
(ANSYS FLUENT Evaluation) 45 Enclosure 6
One Computer Hard Drive Total (73.6 GB)
Shielding (8.08 MB)
Shielding TNEAGLE01 Type C1 NSR Evaluation Folder: \\Section 5.0 Shielding Evaluation\\TNEAGLE01 Type C1 NSR Evaluation\\MCNP Gamma Case Folder for TN EAGLE with Standard Cask in NCT, SAR Chapter 5
(*.inp files: input files, *.inpo files: output files,
- .inpt files: tally files) 3 Folder: \\Section 5.0 Shielding Evaluation\\TNEAGLE01 Type C1 NSR Evaluation\\MCNP Neutron Case Folder for TN EAGLE with Standard Cask in NCT, SAR Chapter 5
(*.inp files: input files, *.inpo files: output files,
- .inpt files: tally files) 3 to E-63293 Listing of Computer Files Contained in Enclosure 6 2 of 3 Disk ID No. (size)
Discipline System/Component File Series (topics)
Number of Files Enclosure 6
One Computer Hard Drive Total (73.6 GB)
Criticality (7.47 GB)
Criticality TN Eagle SC with 32PT 16PP DSC CE14x14 Folder: \\Section 6.0 Criticality Evaluation\\SC_32PT_16PP_STARBUCS_In tact Folder for STARBUCS files for Intact fuels in the 32PT 16PP DSC with CE14x14, Table 6.8.5-14.
(*.inp files: input files, *.out files: output files) 22 TN Eagle SC with 32PT 16PP DSC CE14x14 Folder: \\Section 6.0 Criticality Evaluation\\SC_32PT_16PP_HAC_TOP Folder for files for HAC fuels in the 32PT 16PP DSC with CE14x14, Table 6.8.5-22.
(*.inp files: input files, *.out files: output files) 22 TN Eagle SC with 32PT 24PP Type A DSC CE14x14 Folder: \\Section 6.0 Criticality Evaluation\\SC_32PT_24PP_TYPE_A_STAR BUCS_Intact Folder for STARBUCS files for Intact fuels in the 32PT 24PP Type A DSC with CE14x14, Table 6.8.5-15.
(*.inp files: input files, *.out files: output files) 22 TN Eagle SC with 32PT 16PP and 24PP Type A DSC CE14x14 Folder: \\Section 6.0 Criticality Evaluation\\SC_32PT_16PP_24PP_TYPE_A
_single_misload Folder for CSAS5 files for 32PT 16PP and 24PP Type A DSC with CE14x14, single misload analysis,
(*.inp files: input files, *.out files: output files) 20 TN Eagle SC with 32PT 16PP and 24PP Type A DSC CE14x14 Folder: \\Section 6.0 Criticality Evaluation\\SC_32PT_16PP_24PP_TYPE_A
_multiple_misload Folder for CSAS5 files for 32PT 16PP and 24PP Type A DSC with CE14x14 multiple misload analysis,
(*.inp files: input files, *.out files: output files) 40 TN Eagle LC with as-loaded 32PT 16PP and24PP Type A DSCs CE14x14 Folder: \\Section 6.0 Criticality Evaluation\\SC_32PT_As-Loaded-DSCs Folder for CSAS5 files for as-loaded 32PT DSC with CE14x14 intact fuels, Table 6.8.5-
- 21.
(*.inp files: input files, *.out files: output files) 20 TN Eagle LC with as-loaded 32PT 16PP and24PP Type A DSCs CE14x14 Folder: \\Section 6.0 Criticality Evaluation\\SC_32PT_As-Loaded-DSCs\\keff_values_DSC02-DSC10 Folder for CSAS5 files for fuel assembly/keff ranking within as-loaded 32PT DSC02 and DSC10, Table 6.8.5-24 and Table 6.8.5-25
(*.inp files: input files, *.out files: output files) 128 to E-63293 Listing of Computer Files Contained in Enclosure 6 3 of 3 Disk ID No. (size)
Discipline System/Component File Series (topics)
Number of Files TN Eagle LC with as-loaded 32PT 16PP and24PP Type A DSCs CE14x14 Folder: \\Section 6.0 Criticality Evaluation\\SC_32PT_As-Loaded-DSCs_misload Folder for CSAS5 files for as-loaded 32PT DSC with CE14x14 intact fuels, misload analysis
(*.inp files: input files, *.out files: output files) 8 to E-63293 Page 1 of 1 TN AMERICAS LLC AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 State of Maryland:
County of HOWARD:
I, Prakash Narayanan, depose and say that I am the Chief Technical Officer of TN Americas LLC, duly authorized to execute this affidavit, and have reviewed or caused to have reviewed the information which is identified as proprietary and referenced in the paragraph immediately below. I am submitting this affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commissions regulations for withholding this information.
The information for which proprietary treatment is sought is listed below:
x - TN Eagle Safety Analysis Report, Revision 1A Changed Pages (Proprietary version) x - Computer Files Associated with Certain CoC 9382 Analyses (Proprietary) x - NTE-21-003314-000-3.0, Qualification of a New Neutron Shielding Material of Resin:
VYAL HT-1 (Proprietary)
This document has been appropriately designated as proprietary.
I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by TN Americas LLC in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) (4) of Section 2.390 of the Commissions regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure, included in the above referenced document, should be withheld.
- 1) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure involves certain design details associated with the SAR analyses and SAR drawings for the TN Eagle-STC System, which are owned and have been held in confidence by TN Americas LLC.
- 2) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by TN Americas LLC, and not customarily disclosed to the public. TN Americas LLC has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it.
- 3) Public disclosure of the information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of TN Americas LLC because the information consists of descriptions of the design and analysis of a radioactive material transportation system, the application of which provide a competitive economic advantage. The availability of such information to competitors would enable them to modify their product to better compete with TN Americas LLC, take marketing or other actions to improve their products position or impair the position of TN America LLCs product, and avoid developing similar data and analyses in support of their processes, methods or apparatus.
Further the deponent sayeth not.
Executed on: July 8th, 2024 Prakash Narayanan Chief Technical Officer, TN Americas LLC to E-63293 NTE-21-003314-000-3.0, Qualification of a New Neutron Shielding Material of Resin: VYAL HT-1 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390