ML23199A146
| ML23199A146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/2023 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-III/DORS/OB |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Energy Point Beach |
| Jim Nance | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22007A029 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML23199A146 (1) | |
Text
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Point Beach Scenario #: 1 Scenario Source:
Op. Test #: Feb 2023 Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100% Power, MOC, Boron @ 1000 ppm Turnover:
Unload and secure G01 EDG from loaded surveillance.
Critical Tasks:
- 1. Close PORV before adequate SCM is lost
- 2. Actuate Manual Rx Trip prior to Step 4 of CSP.S-1 Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A (N) BOP Unload G01 EDG following surveillance 2
(C) BOP (C/TS) SRO High Vibrations on W-1B1, Containment Accident Recirc Fan 3
(C) ATC (C/TS) SRO 1RC-431C (PZR PORV) Sticks open (CT) 4 (C) BOP (C) SRO CW Degradation (Fish intrusion) 5 (R) ATC Perform Rapid Power Reduction 6
(C/MC) ATC (C/TS) SRO Reactor Coolant Leak / Charging to maximum to control PZR Level 7
(M) CREW LOCA / SI / Auto Rx Trip Fails 8
(C/MC) ATC (C) SRO Manual Rx Trip successful in inserting Control Rods (CT)
Termination Criteria:
Critical Tasks have been evaluated Crew transition to EOP-1 At the discretion of the Lead Evaluator
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
CT1: Close PZR PORV before adequate SCM is lost Initiating Cue: Both of the following:
o Annunciators for PZR level deviation o Indication that (RED light) that the PORV is open o Indications of high temperature in discharge line o Lowering PZR pressure and level Performance Feedback: All of the following:
o Valve indication (GREEN light) that the block valve is closed o Lowering temperature indications in discharge line o Raising PZR pressure and level Success Path: 1RC-431C PZR PORV is isolated by closing 1RC-515 (PORV Block Valve)
Measurable Performance Standard: Manually close PZR block valve prior to Reactor Coolant Subcooling Margin of 30°F.
Safety Significance: If no operator action is taken, a loss of Subcooling Margin would occur. A loss of Subcooling Margin would result in loss of adequate core cooling as the primary system reaches saturation conditions.
CT2: Manually Trip the Reactor prior to Step 4 of CSP-S.1 Initiating Cue: Both of the following:
o Rod bottom lights NOT LIT o Reactor Power greater than 5%
Performance Feedback: All of the following:
o All rod bottom lights LIT o Reactor Power lowering into NIS Source Range Success Path: By actuating Alternate Rod Insertion, this will insert all withdrawn control rods into the core shutting down the nuclear chain reaction as part of EOP-1 Step 1 RNO AND CSP-S.1 Step 1 (Immediate Operator Actions).
Measurable Performance Standard: Insert negative reactivity into the core prior to entering step 4 of CSP-S.1.
Safety Significance: If no operator action is taken, the reactor will continue to generate power and continue to challenge the Core Cooling Safety Function. Step 4 of CSP-S.1 will shift mitigation strategies to boration to restore the subcriticality safety function.
Scenario Executive Summary Initial Conditions / Turnover:
Point Beach Unit 1 will be at 100% during the middle of the operating cycle with RCS Boron concentration at 1000 ppm. No Xenon transient is in progress. No equipment is out of service.
Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Condition E was entered approximately two (2) hours ago to conduct monthly surveillance of G-01, Emergency Diesel Generator. All required actions for this LCO Condition have been completed. TS-81, Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly Surveillance has been completed up to Step 5.50. All required data was recorded, and the analysis will be completed by the off-going shift.
Direction(s) for the Shift:
Shutdown the G-01, Emergency Diesel Generator in accordance with TS-81, Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly Surveillance beginning at Step 5.50. Auxiliary Operators have been briefed and standing by to complete the evolution.
Event #1 - G-01, EDG Surveillance Crew will continue with TS 81 at Step 5.50 and complete the unloading, shutdown, and return to standby condition G-01, Emergency Diesel Generator. Attachment E is not required to be performed. This event is completed once the EDG is aligned in the standby condition and Step 5.66 is complete and with the concurrence of the lead evaluator.
Event #2 - High Vibration on W-1B1, Containment Accident Recirculation Fan A high vibration condition will develop on the W-1B1, Containment Recirculation Fan. Crew will respond to ARB C01 B 4-3 and secure the fan and start the W-1A1 fan. SRO will determine Tech Spec LCO 3.6.6 (Containment Cooling Systems) Condition C. This event is complete when the A Containment Accident Fan is started, and Tech Specs have been determined and with the concurrence of the Lead Evaluator.
Event #3 - 1RC-431C (PZR PORV) Sticks Open A malfunction will cause 1RC-431C to stick open (Rate of Leakage provides ~2 min before trip criteria). Crew will respond to ARB 1C04 1C 1-4 (PZR Safety / Relief line High Temp) which will direct the crew to close 1RC-515 (PORV Block valve). This action is also contained in AOP-1A (Rx Coolant Leak). SRO will determine Tech Spec LCO 3.4.1 (PZR Pressure < COLR)
Condition A and LCO 3.4.11 (PZR PORV) Condition B. This event is complete when the plant is stabilized, and Tech Specs have been determined and with the concurrence of the lead evaluator.
Event #4 - Circulating Water Degradation (Fish Intrusion)
A fish intrusion will be in progress which causes a high differential level on the traveling screen.
ARB C01 A 4-5 directs Aux Operator to report conditions at the CWPH. Operator will report pump bay level lowering slowly and excessive debris breaking shear pins, which will require the
crew to reduce Circ Water flow to one pump using AOP-13A (CW System Malfunction). This event is complete when AOP-17A is entered.
Event #5 - Rapid Power Reduction Based on the reduction to one (1) Circ Water pump running, the crew will enter AOP-17A (Rapid Power Reduction) to reduce power to within Figure 1 of AOP-13A. This event is completed when target reactor power is being approached and with the concurrence of the lead evaluator.
Event #6 - Reactor Coolant Leak A small reactor coolant leak (approximately 30 gpm) will develop that will result in PZR level lowering (less than max charging capability) and lowering PZR pressure. Crew will enter AOP-1A (Reactor Coolant Leak) and manually take control of charging flow and adjust to stabilize and recover PZR level. This event is completed when PZR level and pressure are in control of the crew and with the concurrence of the lead evaluator. SRO will analyze Technical Specifications and determine TS LCO 3.4.13 (RCS Leakage) Condition A.
Event #7 (Major) - Small Break LOCA / SI / Automatic Reactor Trip Fails The small coolant leak will propagate quickly into a small break LOCA (exceeding charging pump capacity) such that an automatic reactor trip and safety injection signals are generated, and the crew will enter EOP-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection). The automatic Reactor trip will not be successful. Crew will address the failed reactor trip (outlined below) and progress through EOP-0 and transition to EOP-1 (Reactor or Secondary Coolant Leak).
Event #8 - Manual Reactor Trip Successful in Inserting Control Rods Crew will manually trip the reactor. Train A Switch will not be successful; however, the Train B switch will be successful in inserting all withdrawn control rods into the reactor.
Scenario Termination The scenario is terminated when the Critical Tasks have been evaluated, the crew has transitioned to EOP-1 (through RHR Termination) and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Page 1 of 4 Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Point Beach Scenario #:
2 Scenario Source:
Op. Test #:
Feb 2023 Applicants/
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
2% Power in MODE 2. RCS boron concentration is 1000 ppm. No equipment out of service.
Turnover:
Continue the Reactor Startup to Power Operation Critical Tasks**:
- 2. Isolate the steam leak Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description**
1 (N) BOP (N) SRO Switch running feed/condensate train 2
(R) ATC Raise power to 4%
3 (C) BOP (C/TS) SRO Low Gas pressure on ECCS accumulator 4
(C/MC) ATC (C) SRO 1CV-135 Letdown Line Backpressure controller oscillations in AUTO; works in manual 5
(C/MC) BOP (C/TS) SRO Component Cooling Pump trip with failure to start standby pump. AOP-9B 6
(C) ATC (C) SRO Seismic Event causing multiple CRs to drop / Rx Trip 7
(M) CREW After the Reactor Trip, a Steam Line Break occurs downstream of MSIV, 1MS-2017 (CT) 8 (C) CREW MSIVs fail to auto close on SLI signal (manual operation not successful, direction of local action required) (CT)
Termination Criteria:
Critical Tasks have been evaluated Transition from EOP-2 to EOP-1 At the discretion of the Lead Evaluator
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
- Details on subsequent pages
Page 2 of 4 Critical Task Details:
CT1: Control AFW flow to minimize RCS cooldown Initiating Cue: All of the following:
o Uncontrolled depressurization of both SGs o Cooldown rate in RCS cold legs exceeds 100°F per hour Performance Feedback:
o Control board indications show that AFW flow was lowered o Indication (and establishment) of minimum flow to both S/Gs Success Path: Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to both SGs at a rate of approximately 50 gpm per S/G.
Performance Standard: Manipulation of controls as required throttling AFW flow sufficiently to prevent a severe ORANGE challenge to the integrity CSF but not less than the 50 gpm per SG.
Safety Significance: Failure to control AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable severe challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions.
CT2: Isolate the steam leak Initiating Cue: All of the following:
o Uncontrolled depressurization of both SGs o Cooldown rate in RCS cold legs exceeds 100°F per hour Performance Feedback:
o S/G pressures stabilize (consistent with RCS cooldown) o MSIVs indicate closed o Lowering rate of RCS cooldown.
Success Path: Crew directs LOCAL closing of the MSIVs IAW EOP 2, Attachment A, Local Shutting of MSIV or IAW ECA-2.1, Attachment B, Local Shutting of MSIV.
Measurable Performance Standard: The crew must DIRECT LOCAL closing of both MSIVs prior to completing step 1 of ECA-2.1.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component."
Failure to isolate a steam leak can result in challenges to the following CSFs:
o Integrity o Subcriticality
Page 3 of 4 Scenario Executive Summary Initial Conditions / Turnover:
Point Beach Unit 1 will be at 2% conducting a reactor startup following completion of a maintenance outage with RCS Boron concentration at 1000 ppm. CL 2F (MODE 2 to MODE 1 Checklist) is complete. IT 08A (Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test) is not required.
Currently at OP-1C Step 5.3.2.
Direction(s) for the Shift:
Switch running feed and condensate pumps at Chemistrys request per OP-13A, Secondary Systems Startup.
Continue the reactor plant startup using OP-1C at step 5.3.1 to establish 4% power. CL 2F (MODE 2 to MODE 1 Checklist) is complete. IT 08A (Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test) is not required.
Event #1 - Reactor Startup Crew will continue with OP-1C at Step 5.3.1. This event is completed once the reactor is approximately 4% and ready to complete step 5.3.2 or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Event #1 - Switch Running feed and condensate pupms Crew will switch from 1P-28A, SGFP and 1P25A Condensate pump to 1P-28B SGFP and 1P-24B, Condensate pump running.
Event #3 - Low N2 Pressure on 1T-34B Accumulator A low nitrogen gas pressure condition will develop on accumulator 1T-34B. Crew should pause the startup and respond to ARP C01 B 4-8 and determine gas pressure is approximately 700 psig. Crew will take action using OI-100B (Adjusting SI accumulator level, pressure, and PORV backup nitrogen pressure Unit 1), to pressurize the accumulator. SRO will evaluate and enter Tech Spec LCO 3.5.1 Condition B (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore to OPERABLE). This event is completed when the accumulator is re-pressurized, and the TS determination has occurred and / or at the direction of the lead evaluator.
Event #4 - 1CV-135 Letdown Line Backpressure controller oscillations, works in manual Receives the 1C04 1C 106 annunciator and determines letdown pressure and flow are oscillating. The ATC identifies the 1CV-135 controller is cycling and recommends placing letdown pressure control to manual, references ARB 1C04 1C 1-6 Letdown Pressure High, and stabilizes letdown pressure and flow. The SRO directs entry into AOP-1D, Unit 1 CVCS malfunctions, references Step 36 for a failure of 1CV-135, and directs the ATC to places the controller in manual.
Event #5 - Component Cooling Pump trip with Auto-Start failure of Standby Pump 1P-11A, (running CCW pump) will trip and its standby CCW pump will not auto start. Crew will respond to various ARPs and enter AOP-9B, Component Cooling System Malfunctions. Crew will start 1P-11B CCW pump manually and verify CCW cooled component temperatures return to normal ranges. SRO will evaluate and enter Tech Spec LCO 3.7.7 Condition A. This event is complete when the plant is stable, Tech Specs have been evaluated and at the direction of the Lead Evaluator.
Page 4 of 4 Event #6 - Seismic Event / Multiple CRs drop / Reactor Trip A seismic event occurs and causes three control rods to drop into the core. Crew will reference AOP-6A and note that more than one rod bottom light is illuminated and trip the reactor. EOP-0 will be entered. This event goes into the next without delay.
Event #7 (Major) - Steam Line Break on the B Steam Line Downstream of the MSIV Approximately 15 seconds after the reactor trip (PRIOR TO completion of EOP-0 Step 4), a steam line break will occur on the turbine side of 1MS-2017, Main Steam Isolation Valve. The steam line break will actuate an automatic safety injection signal and an automatic MSIV isolation actuation.
Uncontrolled depressurization of both steam generators will occur causing the crew to transition from EOP-0, Step 11 to EOP-2. With both steam generators depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner, the crew will transition from EOP-2, Step 2 to contingency procedure ECA-2.1. Once in the ECA-2.1 the crew will attempt to locally isolate the steam leak and will establish 50 gpm of AFW flow to each steam generator to minimize RCS cooldown. Once the steam leak is locally isolated and prior to ECA-2.1, Step 9 the crew will transition back to EOP-2 and then at Step 7 go to EOP-1.
Event #8 - MSIVs Fail to Close on Auto Steam Line Isolation and Manual Control Switch Manipulation The steam line break will actuate an automatic MSIV isolation actuation. The MSIVs will not close on the AUTO signal or when the crew attempts to manually close them from the main control room control switches. The crew must direct LOCAL closing of the MSIVs IAW EOP-2, Attachment A, Local Shutting of MSIV or IAW ECA-2.1, Attachment B, Local Shutting of MSIV.
Scenario Termination This scenario can be terminated when the critical tasks have been evaluated, the crew transitions from EOP-2 to EOP-1, and at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A (N) BOP Service water pump swap (for February lineup) 2 (I) ATC (I/TS) SRO PRNI Channel 1 Fails high 3
(I) ATC (I/TS) SRO PZR Level Channel 2 (controlling) fails low 4
(C/MC) BOP (C) SRO Trip of running EHC Pump/Standby fails to start.
5 (R) ATC B SG Tube Leak (~50 gpd) IAW AOP 3, Rapid Downpower to <50% Power IAW AOP 17A.
6 (M) CREW B SGTR - (EOP-0 -> EOP-3) 7 (C/MC) BOP (C) SRO Condensate Steam Dump Failure (CSD) requiring use of ADV to Cooldown.
Termination Criteria:
Critical Tasks have been evaluated RCS depressurized IAW E-3 (SI Termination-Step 22)
At the discretion of the Lead Evaluator
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control Facility:
Point Beach Scenario #: 4 Scenario Source:
Op. Test #: Feb 2023 Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100% Power Turnover:
The plant is at 100% power, A Containment Spray pump is tagged OOS for maintenance. Crew is expected to swap service water pumps.
Critical Tasks:
- 1. Isolate B SG (Steam from & Feed Flow to)
- 2. Control Initial RCS Cooldown
CT2: Control Initial RCS Cooldown Initiating Cue: (Paste from DCC Scen 3) SGTR indications requiring EOP-3 action:
o Uncontrollable rise in B SG level o Hi Steam line rad levels Performance Feedback: All of the following:
o Continuing rise in SG Level o Indications of reactor water inleakage to SG until depressurization Success Path: Performing steps 6-14 of EOP-3 Measurable Performance Standard: Perform Steps 6 - 14 of EOP-3 to identify target SG pressure (Step 6) and depressurize to less than the target pressure in order to effectively mitigate the transient.
Safety Significance: Failure to perform the steps in E-3 could result in reduced SGWL inventory necessary for core cooling, increased RCS to ruptures SG breakflow, which increases radioactive release to the public. Additionally, failure to control the depressurization could reduce RCS temperature and challenge the reactor vessel integrity.
CT1: Isolate B SG (Steam from & Feed Flow to)
Initiating Cues: (Paste from DDC Scen 3) o B SGTR results in uncontrolled rising level post reactor trip o SG Level continues to rise following AFW flow control o Hi SGWL alarms Performance Feedback: All of the following:
o Valve indication (GREEN light) that the valves closed during isolation Success Path: Isolation of a ruptured SG in E-3, Steps 3 and 4.
Measurable Performance Standard: Perform steps to isolate steam and feed flow by performing steps 3 and 4 of EOP-3 before B SG overfills.
Safety Significance: Isolating a ruptured SG minimizes release of radioactivity from the SG.
CT3: Depressurize RCS to meet SI Termination Criteria Initiating Cues: (Paste from DDC Scen 3) o B SGTR results in uncontrolled rising level post reactor trip o SG Level continues to rise following AFW flow control o Hi SGWL alarms Performance Feedback: All of the following:
o Valve indication (GREEN light) that the valves closed during isolation Success Path: Depressurize RCS using PZR Spray to meet EOP-3 SI Termination Criteria Measurable Performance Standard: Perform steps to isolate steam and feed flow by performing steps 3 and 4 of EOP-3 before B SG overfills.
Safety Significance: Isolating a ruptured SG minimizes release of radioactivity from the SG.
Scenario Executive Summary Initial Conditions / Turnover:
Point Beach Unit 1 will be at 100% during the middle of the operating cycle. A Containment Spray pump is tagged OOS for maintenance.
Direction(s) for the Shift:
Configure SW pumps for February, March, April operation IAW 0-SOP-SW-107, Service Water Pump Operation. An auxiliary operator is on station and ready to perform the evolution.
Event #1 - Service Water Pump Configuration Change Crew will swap SW configurations from A and E running (with C as the 3rd pump) to B and D running (with F as the 3rd pump) using 0-SOP-SW-107. This event will be completed when the SW configuration has been completed.
Event #2 - PRNI Channel 1 Fails high Due to a card malfunction, NE-44 (Power Range Channel YELLOW) will fail high. The crew will investigate and recognize the failed channel and remove it from service using 0-SOP-IC-001 YELLOW, Attachment A (pg 32). Manual rod control will be taken while the channel is removed from service. SRO will evaluate and enter Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1 Condition A, D, R, and S (Functions 2a, 2b, 5, 17b(1), 17c, 17d, and 17e). This event will be completed when the plant is stable, Tech Specs have been evaluated and/or at the direction of the Lead Examiner.
Event #3 - PZR Level Channel 2 (controlling) Fails Low A malfunction causes 1LC-427B to fail low. Crew will respond to various alarms; however, ARP 1C04 1C 1-3, Pressurizer Level Low or High gives guidance to take manual control of charging pumps and refer to AOP-24, Instrument Malfunction. Channel will be removed from service using 0-SOP-IC-001 WHITE. Once the channel is removed from service, auto control will be restored. SRO will evaluate and enter Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1 Condition A and K (Function 8).
This event will be completed when the plant is stable, Tech Specs have been evaluated and/or at the direction of the Lead Examiner.
Event #4 - Trip of running EHC Pump/Standby fails to start.
(start standby pump using ARP 1C03 1F 1-11)
A trip of 1P-75 EHC pump will occur (standby fails to auto start). Crew will take action using ARP 1C03 1F 1-11, EH Supply System Unit 1. Crew will take manual action to start 1P-76 and restore EHC pressures to normal operating band. This event will be completed when the plant is stable and/or at the direction of the Lead Examiner.
Event #5 - B SG Tube Leak (~50 gpd) IAW AOP 3, Rapid Downpower to <50% Power IAW AOP 17A.
A 50 gpd SGTL in Steam Generator B will be inserted. Crew will respond to various alarms and take action using AOP-3, Steam Generator Tube Leak. Crew will evaluate leak rate and determine that power needs to be reduced to < 50% in one hour using AOP-17A. This event will be completed when the plant is reducing power and/or at the direction of the Lead Examiner.
Event #6 - (Major) - B SGTR - (EOP EOP-3)
The tube leak will propagate into a tube rupture. Automatic reactor trip and safety injection will occur. Crew will enter EOP-0, diagnose a tube rupture, and go to EOP-3. Crew will depressurize to stop the break flow.
Event #7 - Condensate Steam Dump Failure (CSD) requiring use of ADV to Cooldown.
When the crew attempts to cooldown using the steam dumps, a failure will occur such that the steam dump valves cannot be used. The crew will use atmospheric steam dumps to cooldown.
Scenario Termination The scenario is terminated when the Critical Tasks have been evaluated, the crew has performed an RCS depressurization IAW E-3 (SI Termination-Step 22) and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A (N) BOP (N/TS)
SRO Shift Control Room Recirc Fans 2
(C) BOP (C) SRO High feed pump vibrations on 1P-28A SG Feed pump 3
(R) ATC (R) BOP Rapid power reduction to less than 60% power 4
(I) BOP (I/TS) SRO Failure Low of LT-462 (Blue) (Steam Generator Level Loop A) 5 (M) CREW LBLOCA, reactor trip/SI - (EOP EOP-1) 6 (C/MC) ATC (C) SRO SI auto actuation failure. Requires manual actuation of SI (CT) 7 (C/MC) BOP (C) SRO Containment accident cooling unit 1W-1D1 fails to auto start (E0 Attachment A, Step A5 failure) 8 (M) CREW Transfer to Containment Sump Recirc IAW EOP-1.3 (CT)
Termination Criteria:
Critical Tasks have been evaluated RHR suction transferred to the ECCS sump At the discretion of the Lead Evaluator
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control Facility:
Point Beach Scenario #: 5 Scenario Source:
Op. Test #: Feb 2023 Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
65% Power, MOC, Boron @ 1000 ppm.
Turnover:
The crew is directed to shift Main Control Room recirc fans.
Critical Tasks:
- 1. Manually initiate SI
CT1: Manually initiate SI when required by E-0 Initiating Cue: The following indications:
o Indications of a large break LOCA inside containment o Reactor pressure lowering rapidly o Pressurizer Level lowering rapidly o Annunciator alarms o Rising containment pressures o No safety injection pumps running with valid initiation signals Performance Feedback: All of the following:
o Primary conditions will continue to degrade with ongoing plant conditions without safety injection o Manual initiation of SI will result in system actuation Success Path: At least one required train of safety injection actuated Measurable Performance Standard: Manually initiate Safety Injection prior to completion of EOP-0 Step 4.
Safety Significance: If no operator action is taken, the reactor would be under LOCA conditions without cooling water injection, resulting in core damage.
CT2: Transfer the suction of the RHR pumps to the Containment Sump prior to meeting the loss of suction criteria Initiating Cue: The following indications:
o Lowering RWST level to less than 34%
o Containment Sump Level >38 o Indication of high injection flow rates during LOCA Performance Feedback: All of the following:
o Valve indication as transfer is made in EOP-1.3 o Continuing lowering RWST level until transition is made o Continuing rising containment sump levels Success Path: at least 1 train of RHR pumps swapped to the containment sump IAW EOP-1.3 Measurable Performance Standard: Manually align RHR for cold leg recirculation prior to meeting the loss of pump suction criteria provided in EOP-1.3.
Safety Significance: If no operator action is taken, the running RHR pumps would lose their suction source resulting in loss of injection and cooling capabilities to the reactor core during LOCA conditions.
Scenario Executive Summary Initial Conditions / Turnover:
Point Beach Unit 1 will be at 65% during the middle of the operating cycle to set initial conditions for testing. No equipment OOS and no Tech Spec LCOs in effect.
Direction(s) for the Shift:
The crew is directed to shift running Control Room Recirculation Fans using 0-SOP-VNCR-002, Control and Computer Room Ventilation System Normal Operation.
Event #1 - Shift Control Room Recirc Fans Crew will shift from W-13B1 to W-13B2 using 0-SOP-VNCR-002, Control and Computer Room Ventilation System Normal Operation. By procedure, the SRO will declare CREFs INOPERABLE and enter TRM LCO 3.7.9 Condition C. Once the shift is complete, CREFs will be declared OPERABLE and exit the TRM LCO Condition. This event will be completed when the recirc fans are shifted, TRM exited and/or at the direction of the Lead Examiner.
Event #2 - High feed pump vibrations on 1P-28A S/G Feed Pump (requires securing feed pump)
Crew will respond to abnormal noise / field report of 1P-28A S/G Feed Pump vibrating (imminent failure). Crew will enter AOP-2B, Feedwater System Malfunctions for an abnormal S/G Feed Pump. Crew will secure the feed pump and commence a rapid power reduction to less than 60% using AOP-17A. This carries directly to the next event.
Event #3 - Rapid power reduction to less than 60% power The crew will enter AOP-17A to reduce power to less than 60%. Crew will reduce turbine load and borate as needed to reduce power and stabilize the plant with one S/G Feed Pump in operation. This event will be completed when the plant is less than 60%, stabilization efforts are in progress and/or at the direction of the Lead Examiner Event #4 - Failure Low of LT-462 (Blue) (Steam Generator Level Loop A)
A card failure will occur and cause LT-462 (S/G Level Loop A BLUE) to fail low. Crew will respond to various annunciators. ARB 1C03 1E2 4-3 (S/G A Low-Low Level Alert) refers to AOP-24 (instrument / channel failure), where the crew will remove the affected instrument from service using 0-SOP-IC-001 BLUE. SRO will analyze Technical Specifications and determine TS LCO 3.3.1 (RPS) Conditions A and D (function 13), LCO 3.3.2 (ESFAS) Conditions A and D (Functions 5b and 6b). This event is complete when the plant is stabilized, and Tech Specs have been determined and with the concurrence of the lead evaluator.
Event #5 - (Major) - LBLOCA A large break LOCA will be inserted causing an automatic Reactor trip and safety injection signals. Crew will enter EOP-0 and transition to EOP-1.
Event #6 - SI Fails to Auto Initiate Crew will note during EOP-0 immediate operator actions that the automatic SI signal did not work. Crew will manually initiate safety injection and continue in EOP-0.
Event #7 - Containment accident cooling unit 1W-1D1 Fails to Auto Start on ESF Signal Crew will perform EOP-0, Attachment A and note that on Step A5, Containment accident recirculation fan 1W-1D1 failed to start. BOP will take action to manually start the fan.
Event #8 - Transfer to Containment Sump Recirc IAW EOP-1.3 Crew will transition to EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and determine that containment sump recirculation is required (based on FOP criteria in EOP-1) and go to EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection. Crew will align ECCS in piggyback mode to maintain the core covered.
Scenario Termination The scenario is terminated when the Critical Tasks have been evaluated, the crew has transferred RHR suction to the ECCS sump, and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.