ML23156A386

PR-073 - 58FR58804 - Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants

ML23156A386
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/04/1993
From:	Chilk S NRC/SECY
To:
References
PR-073, 58FR58804
Download: ML23156A386 (1)

Text

ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 11/04/1993 TITLE: PR-073 - 58FR58804 - PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES ATNUCLEAR POWER PLANTS CASE

REFERENCE:

PR-073 58FR58804 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

STATUS OF ROLEMAKING PROPOSED ROLE: PR-073 OPEN ITEM (Y/N) N RULB NAME: PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE: 58FR58804 PROPOSED ROLE PUBLICATION DATE: 11/04/93 NUMBER OF COMMENTS: 35 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 01/03/94 EXTENSION DATE: I I FINAL ROLE FED. REG. CITE: 59FR38889 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 07/26/94 NOTES ON FILE LOCATED ON Pl.

~AT~, ,

,F Rvt;E TO FIND THB STAFF CONTACT OR VIEW THE RULEMAKING HISTORY PRESS PAGE DOWN KEY HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PR-073 ROLE TITLE: PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS i:' OPOSED RULE PROPOSED ROLE DATE PROPOSED ROLE SECY PAPER: 93-270 SRM DATE: 10/26/93 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 10/29/93 FINAL RULE FINAL RULE DATE FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: 94-121 SRM DATE: I I SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 07/26/94 STAFF CONTACTS ON THE ROLE CONTACTl: PRISCILLA A. DWYER MAIL STOP: 4-E-4 PHONE: 504-2478 CONTACT2: MAIL STOP: PHONE:

DOCKET NO. PR-073 (58FR58804)

In the Matter of PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 10/29/93 10/29/93 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - PROPOSED RULE 12/09/93 12/06/93 COMMENT OF MARVIN I. LEWIS ( 1) 12/14/93 12/03/93 COMMENT OF ROBERT M. BOYD ( 2) 12/17/93 12/12/93 COMMENT OF LOCKWOOD GREEN ENGINEERS, INC.

(SAL DEPASQUALE) ( 3) 12/27/93 12/17/93 COMMENT OF DETROIT EDISON (ROBERT A. NEWKIRK) ( 4) 12/27/93 12/21/93 COMMENT OF GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION (J.C. FORNICOLA) ( 5) 12/27/93 12/23/93 LTR FM DANIEL STENGER/JAN MACGREGOR, COUNSEL TO NUC UTILITY BACKFITTING AND REFORM GROUP, WINSTON

& STRAWN TO S. CHILK, SECY, NRC RE EXTENS OF TIME 12/28/93 12/20/93 COMMENT OF OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT (W. G. GATES) ( 6) 12/30/93 12/29/93 COMMENT OF AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP.

(E. E. FITZPATRICK) ( 7) 01/03/94 12/27/93 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER l LIGHT CO (J. H. GOLDBERG) ( 8) 01/03/94 12/28/93 COMMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC l GAS COMPANY (JOHN L. SKOLDS) ( 9) 01/03/94 12/29/93 COMMENT OF CONSUMERS POWER (DAVID W. ROGERS) ( 10) 01/03/94 12/29/93 COMMENT OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (LOUIS 0. DELGEORGE) ( 11) 01/03/94 12/29/93 COMMENT OF ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

(JERROLD G. DEWEASE) ( 12) 01/03/94 12/29/93 COMMENT OF CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (R. E. ROGAN) ( 13)

DOCKET NO. PR-073 (58FR58804)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 01/03/94 12/30/93 COMMENT OF WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY (BOB LINK) ( 14) 01/03/94 12/30/93 COMMENT OF NORTHERN STATES POWER CO (D. D. ANTONY) ( 15) 01/03/94 12/31/93 COMMENT OF COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP (DANIEL HIRSCH) ( 16) 01/03/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY (WALTER C. MARSH) ( 17) 01/03/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT l RESOURCES COUNCIL (THOMAS E. TIPTON) ( 18) 01/04/94 12/28/93 COMMENT OF CONSUMERS POWER (MICHAEL D. BOURASSA) ( 19) 01/04/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE (LEVENTHAL/HORNER) ( 20) 01/04/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF BOSTON EDISON CO (E.T. BOULETTE) ( 21) 01/04/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF NORTHEAST UTILITIES SYSTEM (J. F. OPEKA) ( 22) 01/05/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY INC (SUSAN L. HIATT) ( 23)

- 01/05/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF WINSTON l STRAWN (NICHOLAS S. REYNOLDS) ( 24) 01/05/94 01/04/94 COMMENT OF GEORGIA POWER CO (J. T. BECKHAM) ( 25) 01/06/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF PECO ENERGY COMPANY (G. A. HUNGER, JR.) ( 26) 01/10/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF UNION ELECTRIC (ALAN C. PASSWATER) ( 27) 01/10/94 01/04/94 COMMENT OF WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION (C. A. SCHROCK) ( 28) 01/10/94 12/30/93 COMMENT OF YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY (DONALD W. EDWARDS) ( 30) 01/12/94 01/06/94 COMMENT OF VIRGINIA POWER (M. L. BOWLING) ( 29) 01/13/94 01/10/94 COMMENT OF BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (ROBERT E. DENTON, V. P.) ( 31) 01/27/94 01/03/94 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY (DAVE MOREY, V. P.) ( 32) 02/04/94 01/31/94 COMMENT OF WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION (N. J. LIPARULO) ( 33)

DOCKET NO. PR-073 (58FR58804)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 02/07/94 01/24/94 COMMENT OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY (THOMAS W. ORTCIGER, DIRECTOR) ( 34) 02/22/94 02/15/94 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION (P. M. BEARD, JR., SR. V. P.) ( 35) 07/27/94 07/26/94 FINAL RULE FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE, PUBLISHED ON 8/1/94 AT 59 FR 38889 .

- 07/03/95 07/04/95 LTR FM MARVIN LEWIS ENCLOSING COMMENT SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH 58FR58804 (COMMENT NO . 1); AND CITING OKLAHOMA CITY FEDERAL BUILDING EVENT

Marvin I. Lewis 3133 Fairfield Street Philadelphia, PA 19136 (215)6'76 1291 DOCKET ED USNRC Secretary USNRC DOCKET NUMBER Washington, D. C. 20555 PROPOSED RULE PR )~ *g; JUL -3 P4 :09

( 5"6 f"re. :5"2,~ o"\-;

Dear Secretary; Please find enclc,sed a cc,mment which I sent in c,n 12-6-'W'F4G-£ OF SECRETARY the 10CFR'73 Prc,tectic,n against malevc,lent use c,f vehicles a -E)OCKE Tlt' G & SER VICE nuclear power plant sites. I was most critical of your find ings BRANC H then and remain so.

The recent event at Oklahoma City Federal Building suggests that this rulemaking should be reopened due to recent events.

Recent events strongly suggest that the 10 CFR 73 rulemaking was very deficient in its treatment of vehicle bombs.

If you wish you may consider this letter as a 2.206 request fc,r rulemaking.

Sincerely, Marvin I. Lewis 7801 Roosevelt Boulevard Suite 62 Phila., PA 19152 (215)624-1574 Secretary USNRC l,,J- . ngtc,n, D. C. 20555 Dear Secretary; Please accept this letter as my comments on 10CFR 73 Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants: Proposed Rule.

In the "Findings. NRC has cc,ncluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry."

Whoever come up with this finding is either crazy, dumb or doesn't read the newspapers. The World Trade center was recently bombed with a truck bomb. 276 marines were killed in Lebanon with a truck bomb. A truck managed to get in the gate of a nuclear power plant and drive all over the utilities property.

This "finding" is clearly inadequate, deficient and just plain wrong. Any Proposed rule based on this finding is laughable. I recommend that all copies of this proposed rule be destroyed, and the NRC never admit to this idiocy.

I wish that could say Respectfully submitted, 12-6-93

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOt-.

DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date _ 'l

-L+-.L.\-'..,_,__ _ _ __

Copies Received_....___ _ _ __ _

A Copies Reproduce<! ---'=' - - - - - - -

Special Distribution _==::!~ ~~ ----..!..d:~

OOCKETE US C [7590-01-P]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• 94 JUL 27 P 4 :16 10 CFR Part 73 OFFlr- r= sr. ..~-*;'-:"

O(;r;: . .

RIN 3150-AESl Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants

- AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Action: Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC} is amending its physical protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors. The amendments modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas and to include a land vehicle bomb.

The amendments also require reactor licensees to install vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, to protect against the malevolent use of a land vehicle. The Commission believes this action is prudent based on an evaluation of an intrusion incident at the Three Mile Island {TMI) nucledr power station and a bombing of the World Trade Center. The objective of this final rule is to enhance reactor safety by protecting against the use of a vehicle to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. Further, the amendments will enhance reactor safety by protecting vital equipment from 1

damage by detonation of a large explosive charge at the point of vehicle denial.

EFFECTIVE DATE: (Insert 30 days from publication in the Federal Register.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Phillip F. McKee, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-2933.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On November 4, 1993 (58 FR 58804). the Commission published a proposed rule in the Federal Register for public comment that presented amendments to the physical protection requirements for operating commercial nuclear power reactors. The amendments proposed to modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for 4t transporting personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives. A total of 35 letters of public comment were received from respondents representing more than 160 individual comments .. Comments received in association with a public meeting conducted by the NRC on May 10, 1993, on this same topic have also been analyzed as part of this final rulemaking. An additional 11 comments were received as a result of the meeting, representing an additional 38 individual comments. Written comments received from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and public comments made at a February 10, 1994, meeting of the ACRS are also addressed under the following analysis. Copies 2

of the public comments received on this proposed rule are available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

Public Comment Analysis General.

Public comment on the rule was received from 25 licensees that operate commercial nuclear power reactors; two industry groups, the Nuclear Management and Resources Councjl (NUMARC) and the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG); two public citizens and one citizen's group, Ohio Citizen's for Responsible Energy; two advocacy groups, the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) and the Committee to Bridge the Gap; one State nuclear safety agency; and two vendors.

Additional comments were received as a result of an NRC-sponsored public meeting of May 10, 1993. Comments were received from eight private citizens (the letter from one enclosed a petition signed by 40 individuals); two utilities; and one public interest group, Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy. The proposed rule indicated that comments regarding malevolent use of vehicles submitted in association with the meeting would be treated under this final rule and that duplicate comments need not be submitted. Many of these respondents recommended strengthening the design basis threat to cover the maximum credible threat and increasing the number of security force members at power reactor sites as the best method to counter a terrorist vehicle bomb attack. The aforementioned petition, submitted to the Chairman of the NRC, 3

indicated, among other things, that Congress should strengthen safeguards at nuclear facilities and should legislate the use of Federal guards at NRC-licensed sites. Comments received from 2 utilities that operate commercial nuclear power reactors either indicated support for the then-developing NUMARC comments or were similar to comments received on the proposed rule.

A variety of general comments were received on the proposed rule and supporting documentation. Several strongly supported the ruTemaking as proposed and expressed the view that rulemaking on this topic was the proper, proactive approach. A number of co111J1ents strongly supported a belief that 9 vehicle intrusion and vehicle bomb threats exist. These comments refer to the Three Mile Island intrusion event and the World Trade Center bombing event as evidehce of these threats. The NCI commented that the rule was long overdue.

Some of those that supported the rule offered more detailed comments proposing further expa~sion of the design basis threat and placing more rigid controls on licensee actions to implement the rule.

NUMARC provided detailed comments on behalf of the industry. Fourteen utilities confirmed their support or agreement with NUMARC's comments. NUMARC commented that industry believes that it is important to deter unauthorized land vehicle penetration challenges to a licensee's protected area and that industry recognizes that facilities must be able to shut down safely in the unlikely event of the detonation of an explosive device outside the protected area. NUMARC consid~rs these actions to be prudent for the protection of its employees, investment, and public confidence. NUMARC commented that because the NRC {as expressed in the proposed rule) and NUMARC agree in principle, the issue should be addressed in an integrated manner using a reasonable and realistic approach without imposing unnecessary conservatism. The details of 4

NUMARC's comments identifjed areas where they considered the proposed rule took too conservative an approach. NUMARC also expressed general concerns about the backfit justification for the rule and the schedule for implementation.

NUBARG, whose members include 15 nuclear utilities, provided comments that generally challenge the backfitting and regulatory analyses based on their concerns that the analyses did not provide a sufficient quantified basis for finding the requisite "substantial increase" in safety under the NRC's backfitting rule. Two of the comment letters provided by utilities confirmed their support or agreement with NUBARG's comments.

Several comments expressed the view that the proposed rule could not be substantiated based on the current threat. As support for this position, comments referred to conclusions reached by the NRC in denial of a 1991 petition for rulemaking to require licensees to protect against truck bombs.

Other comments indicated that two isolated events (the Three Mile Island intrusion event and World Trade Center bombing) did not justify rulemaking, particularly in light of the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), by their account, does not support the position that the threat of malevolent use of vehicles has increased and the NRC position is that no actual vehicle bomb threat against power reactors exists.

Several coTI111ents opposed the proposed rule because they considered that it did not provide a substantial increase in protection of public health and safety or common defense ___ j security at a justifiable cost. Other comments indicated that the rule was extreme and unnecessarily burdensome with little if any safety benefit and that contingency plans for vehicle bombs currently in place adequately addressed the threat of malevolent use of vehicles.

5

The NRC staff presented the proposed rulemaking package to the Security Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) on November 3, 1993, and the full committee on November 4, 1993. The full committee was briefed on December 10, 1993, in a closed session, by the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. Following these briefings, ACRS's December 10, 1993 letter to the Chairman raised concerns about the rulemaking, particularly the justification for the rule, the lack of a quantitative risk assessment to support it, and the expedited nature of the rulemaking. A minority of four members of the ACRS expressed a view that the proposed rule represents a prudent and effective step toward enhancing public health and safety. On February 10, 1994, the ACRS heard presentations on the rulemaking from the NUMARC, the NCI, one public citizen, and the NRC staff members. On April 7, 1994; the staff briefed the ACRS in a closed session regarding additional, quantitative evaluations that supported this rulemaking.

Issues raised by the ACRS in their December 10, 1993, letter are encompassed by issues raised by the public and are addressed in the following responses.

Like the ACRS, NUMARC, NUBARG, and numerous utilities expressed concern that the safety benefit was not adequately justified or quantified. They challenged the validity of the regulatory and backfit analyses because of lack of-quantification of the threat. They contended that the analyses contain no quantified risk data or safety goal evaluation to support the conclusion that the proposed regulations result in a substantial increase in public health and safety. Another comment, while acknowledging the potential 'crifficulty in quantification of the threat, stated that the analyses were no more than "conclusionary" and fall short of demonstrating the requisite substantial increase in radiological safety.

6

The Commission notes that the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as a tool for estimating risk is sound when based on results from demonstrable, repeatable events and test data - for example, establishing the probability of failure and the mean time to failure for aircraft wing root structures due to metal fatigue or for valve failures due to water hammer or corrosion, etc. The NRC has examined the use of PRA to predict sabotage as an initiating event and concluded that to do so would not be credible or valid because terrorist attacks, by their very nature, may not be quantified. Past attempts to apply PRA techniques to acts of sabotage have resulted in similar findings. For example, in 1978, NUREG/CR-0400, the "Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission" stated, "it was recognized that the probability of sabotage of a nuclear power plant cannot be estimated with any confidence." For this same reason, according to this report, consideration of risk of sabotage was deliberately omitted in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).

In the "Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants" published on March 14, 1983 (48 FR 10772), the Commission stated:

The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear materials is not presently.included in the safety goal. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of the risk of these matters. It is the Commission's intention that everything that is needed shall be done to keep such risks at their present, very low, level; and it is our expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful.

With these exceptions it is our intent that the risk from all various 7

initiating mechanisms be taken into account to the best of the capability of the current evaluation techniques.

In the 1983 Indian Point licensing hearings, the NRC staff testified that PRA is unable to predict the probability of sabotage as an initiating event. Also, in a June 11, 1991, petition to institute an individual plant examination program for threats beyond the design basis, the NCI stated a position similar to the NRC's by recognizing that PRA-type methods cannot be used to analyze for core damage frequency since one cannot quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack.

The Commission continues to believe that arbitrary selection of numbers to nquantify" threat probability without demonstrable, actual, supporting event data would yield misleading re~ults at best. Knowledgeable terrorism analysts recognize the danger and are unwilling to quantify the risk. Over the past several years, a number of National Intelligence Estimates have been produced addressing the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. The analyses and conclusions are not presented in terms of quantified probability but recognize the unpredictable nature of terrorist activity in terms of likelihood. The NRC continues to believe that, although in many cases considerations of probabilities can provide insights into the relative risk of an event, in some cases it is not possible, with current knowledge and methods, to usefully quantify the probability of a specific vulnerability threat.

The NRC notes that, although not quantified, i~s. regulatory analysis recognizes the importance of the perception of the likelihood of an attempt to create radiological sabotage in assessing whether to redefine adequate protection. The NRC's assessment that there is no indication of an actual 8

vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry was an important consideration in concluding that neither the Three Mile Island intrusion nor the World Trade Center bombing demonstrated a need to redefine adequate protection.

The NRC does not agree that quantifying the probability of an actual attack is necessary to a judgment of a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety (a less stringent test of the justification for a rule change). Inherent in the NRC's current regulations is a policy decision that the threat, although not quantified, is likely in a range that warrants protection against a violent external assault as a matter of prudence.

The potential threat posed by malevolent use of vehicles as part of a violent external assault and the need to protect against it have been the subject of detailed consideration and reconsideration by the Commission for more than fifteen years. The original requirements for physical security at power reactor sites proposed in the mid-1970s included a requirement for barriers to prevent ready access to vital areas by ground vehicles. The Commission decided not to include the requirement at that time.

The Commission reexamined the vehicle issue in great detail in the 1980s.

In 1986, the Commission concluded that, even though perimeter chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion, the requirement for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired weapons would limit actions of intruders. In reconsidering the risk from use of a vehicle to gain proximity to vital areas, the NRC's regulatory analysis does not suggest that the likelihood of a violent external assault has increased. Rather, the staff focussed its regulatory analysis on whether a vehicle could provide an advantage to an adversary with the characteristics of the design basis threat.

9

The NRC assessed lessons learned from the TMI intrusion and concluded that a vehicle could provide advantages to an adversary not previously considered.

In SECY-86-101, "Design Basis Threat - Options for Consideration," March 31, 1986, the NRC concluded that, even though perimeter chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion, the requirement for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired weapons would limit actions of intruders.

Accordingly, in 1986, the NRC concluded that the 1nstallatibn of vehicle barriers might not constitute a substantial overall increase in the protection of public health and safety. More recently, the NRC has analyzed the capability of existi~g licensee security measures to protect against a violent external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation. These new analyses support the NRC's conclusions in the regulatory analysis for the proposed rulemaking. The NRC believes that the vehicle intrusion issue alone warrants the installation of vehicle barriers at nuclear power plants.

In the 1980s, the NRC also consulted with other Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, regarding the use of vehicle bombs in the Middle East and their possible impact on the domestic threat situation. In

- June 1988, the NRC decided that it would not be necessary to change the design basis threat for radiological sabotage (10 CFR 73.l(a)(l)) nor to require long-range planning by power reactor licensees for permanent protection against land vehicle bombs. However, as a matter of prudence, it directed*

development of NRC and licensee contingency plans for dealing with a possible land vehicle bomb threat to power reactors, should one arise.

On June 11, 1991 (56 FR 26782), the Corrvnission denied a petition for rulemaking to revise the design basis threat to include explosive-laden vehicles (PRN-73-9). In denying that petition, the NRC noted that the 10

decision was based, in part, on the fact that only one truck bomb attack (1970) had occurred in the United States; there had been no other vehicle bomb attacks in the Western Hemisphere; there had been none outside areas of civil unrest; and there had been none directed against a nuclear activity. The vehicle bomb attack on the World Trade Center represented a significant change to the domestic threat environment that changed many of the points used in denying the petition and eroded the basis for concluding that vehicle bombs could be excluded from any consideration of the domestic threat environment.

For the first time 1n the United States, a conspiracy with ties to Middle East extremists clearly demonstrated the capability and motivation to organize, plan, and successfully conduct a major vehicle bomb attack. Regardless of the motivations or connections of the conspirators, it is significant that the bombing was organized within the United States and implemented with materials obtained on the open market in the United States. Accordingly, the Commission believes that the threat characterized in the final rule is appropriate.

As a result of the World Trade Center bombing, the NRC believes that the construction of a vehicle bomb is more likely to develop without advance indications. The NRC does not believe that it can quantify the likelihood of vehicle bomb attack. However, it has performed a conditional probabilistic risk analysis for an existing power reactor site, assuming an attempt to damage a nuclear power plant with a design basis vehicle bomb placed at locations within the pro~ected area that would create the greatest risk to public health and safety. The analysis indicated that the contribution to core damage frequency could be high.

Barriers installed to protect against vehicle intrusion into protected areas would also protect, to varying degrees, against vehicle bombs. The NRC 11

believes that adjusting the location of barriers where necess.ary to ensure a capability of protecting vital equipment against a design basis vehicle bomb would provide an additional, substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. Further, the NRC believes that the incremental costs to licensees to analyze the degree of protection against a vehicle bomb and to make adjustments in vehicle control measures in limited cases are justified, particularly considering the provisions in the rule allowing licensees to propose alternative measures if, a site-specific analysis indicates that the costs of fully meeting the rule's design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. The NRC's additional deterministic evaluations and limited probabilistic assessments have supported the NRC's earlier findings that protecting against vehicle intrusion and a vehicle bomb would substantially increase the overall protection of public health and safety. The NRC has updated the regulatory analysis to include these evaluations.

Additional issues raised and the NRC response to these *issues are provided in the sections list:d below \hat follow:

I. Threat Considerations A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive C. "Margin of Prudence" D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13 F. "Threat" or "Alert" Program 12

II. Regulatory and Backfit Analyses A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems B. Peer Review of Analyses C. Clarification III. Rule Implementation A. Schedule B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals C. Vehicle Barriers D. Passive Vehicle Barriers E. Active Vehicle Barriers F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives IV. NRC Inspection V. Miscellaneous A. Research Reactors B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement e I. Threat Considerations A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the proposed rule unnecessarily linked vehicle ;.. ~rusion with a vehicle bomb. NUMARC commented that the proposed rule contemplates that the intruding vehicle would be fully loaded with personnel, equipment, and a large explosive device. NUMARC also convnented that any considerations of a vehicle bomb should be for a stationary 13

vehicle. NUMARC stated that coupling the vehicle intrusion event and vehicle bomb event added unn~cessary conservatism. For example, to protect against a moving vehicle, bomb barriers would, in some cases, need to be more substantial to stop penetration of vehicle. NUMARC proposed that the revised design basis threat should include either a land vehicle intrusion or a detonation of explosives outside the protected area, but not a combination of the two. Along this same line, one comment expressed the opinion that the proposed language implies the need to protect against a vehicle used for transport, not for breaching a barrier or for use as a truck bomb.

4t Another comment expressed a concern that a major defect in the rule is the lack of the assumption that the adversary could blast away a fence if a licensee were to choose to use, for example, cabling in the fence as the means to stop a vehicle. The respondent proposed that any barrier should be a heavy mass which would be resistant to destruction.

Response. The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment that the proposed rule could be read to imply that licensees would be required to provide protection against an intrusion by adversaries using a vehicle for transportation coincident with a vehicle bomb. This was not the intent and the rule wording has been revised to clarify this point. Commission deliberations on the rule have considered use of the vehicle as transportation for an adversary and a vehicle bomb as separate threats to be protected against. Any coupling of adversary tactics associated with the rule was intended to allow for more efficient and cost effective protection against either a vehicle intrusion to gain rapid access to vital areas, as a single act, or against a vehicle bomb.

14

Meeting the requirements of the final rule will result in substantial protection from a vehicle bomb whether it is moving or stationary. The NRC's regulatory analysis indicated that, because of the short distances between vital areas and portions of some protected area boundaries, protection against a vehicle at those boundaries would be inconsistent with NUMARC's stated goal of being able to safely shut down a plant following the detonation of an explosive device outside the protected area.

Regarding the comment that the rule should include the assumption that adversaries may use devices to destroy less substantial barriers and then gain access, the Commission does not agree thatrthis assumption shoula be included in the rule. The NRC assessment of the threat environment does not support this assumption. Further, use of such a technique by an adversary would tend to diminish one of the major advantages of use of a vehicle - the element of surprise.

B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive Comment. NUMARC provided a detailed proposal for characteristics of a design basis vehicle that could be used to attempt penetration of a nuclear power plant protected area and a design basis bomb that could be used in an attempt to damage plant equipment. Other comments indicated that vehicle speed should take into consideration terrain and seasonal conditions and that the proposed vehicle explosive aevice size was excessive and not justified by historical experience, particularly that in the United States.

Response. The Commission notes that it has relied on analogous historical data when enumerating the attributes of a design basis threat because there 15

has never been a terrorist attack on an NRC-licensed power reactor facility or a credible threat of an attack. This was the methodology used in formulating the original design basis threat statements in the late 1970s, and it was used in defining the proposed design basis vehicle threat. The design basis vehicle was defined after examining several hundred actual vehicle bombing attacks occurring worldwide during approximately the past decade. Historical data indicates that vehicle bombs, similar to the design basis vehicle, have been used in the past and their use can reasonably be expected to continue to occur in the future. The Convnission has made some changes in the detailed characteristics of the design basis vehicle. The revised characteristics will require licensees to provide substantial protection against a moving vehicle bomb. In addition, the NRC's implementation guidance discusses how the design of barrier systems can account for site-specific limits on the speed that a vehicle could attain because of factors such as terrain.

Comment. One comment expressed confusion over reference to the design basis vehicle as a "4-wheel drive vehicle in that this could imply that non 11 4-wheel drive vehicles would not have to be protected against. The comment reconvnended that the final rule language be changed to require protection against all land vehicles.

Response, The Collllllission disagrees that the term "4-wheel drive vehicle" needs c1arification. It reasons that protection against intrusion by a 4-wheel drive vehicle encompasses protection against a land vehicle with less than 4-wheel drive.

Comment. Other comments noted that the regulatory language should be changed to remove reference to equipment and explosives capable of being hand-carried, as opposed to that which the vehicle could carry.

16

Response. As stated previously, this issue is being clarified by a revision of the design basis threat statement to separate the threat of intrusion versus vehicle bomb. In an intrusion event, the yehicle is obviously capable of transporting the equipment and explosives proposed to be hand-carried by an adversary. While the vehicle could carry more equipment than can be carried by the persons being transported, it is unlike*ly that this additional equipment would be of use to the adversaries. Tne vehicle is essentially a means of transport for the adversaries, and it is unlikely that once adversaries have left the vehicle they would be able to return to obtain additional equipment or explosives.

Comment. One utility provided specific questions regarding several assumptions associated with the vehicle bomb. These included whether:

The vehicle is under control by adversaries up to the point of detonation; The vehicle bomb automatically detonates when the adversary loses control of the vehicle or after a pre-defined time period; The vehicle is used in combination with a secondary external event, e.g.,

loss of offsite power; and, 4t Point of detonation, i.e., crash point or at a later point as vehicle rolls towards a facility.

Response. With respect to a vehicle bomb, for analysis purposes the device would be considered to detonate at the point where the vehicle impacted the vehicle barrier system. Whether adversaries still have control of the vehicle or whether the detonation of the device is delayed should have little impact on the analysis of tne effect of the explosive blast. Because the barrier system is intended to protect against vehicles gaining proximity to vital 17

areas, the barrier system should not allow a vehicle to fully penetrate it and continue to roll towards a facility.

With respect to a secondary external event, power reactor licensees must protect against all capabilities and attributes described by the design basis threat for radiologi~al sabotage. This would not include protection against other natural events, such as damage from a hurricane, coincid~nt with a sabotage threat. However, with respect to loss of off-site power, licensees should consider its loss, if vital equipment is assumed damaged, in their analysis of the effects of a vehicle bomb. This consideration is compatible with the basic premise that equipment not designated and protected as vital is vulnerable to damage and is not available.

C. "Margin of Prudence" Cornment. NUMARC and several utilities commented on NRC's use of the term "margin of prudence" as the basis for support of the proposed rulemaking.

NUMARC commented that it is inappropriate to use such an undefined concept as a basis for rulemaking. These comments indicated that NRC expansion into matters of prudence is unwarranted and would result in expansion of the NRC's sphere of regulatory influence beyond plant safety.

Response. Use of the term "margin of prudence" must be put in perspective as used by the NRC in this rulemaking. The NRC requires an established level of security at nuclear power reactor sites as a provision against possible security contingencies that might arise. The NRC has concluded that a satisfactory level of security is one that is designed and implemented to protect against a hypothetical threat (design basis threat) that contains 18

certain adversary attributes. These attributes have been selected based on Corrmission analyses of actual terrorist attributes and on judgment. The term "margin of prudence" was used in recent Corrmission deliberations to suggest that the World Trade Center bombing and the Three Mile Island intrusion had caused a change in the domestic threat environment or in the NRC's understanding of the sabotage threat that was not satisfactorily addressed by the existing design basis threat. Further, the tenn was used to suggest that a modification of the design basis threat was necessary to reestablish a level of security commensurate with the nature of security contingencies that might

- arise. Its use was illustrative only of the relationship between an actual threat and the hypothetical design basis threat and the change in that relationship caused by the World Trade Center and Three Mile Island events.

The NRC intended no wider or expanded use of the term.

D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the revi.sion to the design basis threat to address malevolent use of vehicles should be addressed in an integrated manner so that rulemaking on this topic would not be impacted after completion of an ongoing, more comprehensive review of the design basis threat. Other comments expressed concerns about deficiencies in the design basis threat that need to be addressed. Deficiencies identified by these comments included: protection against more than one insider, protection against a larger number of external attackers, capability of attackers to operate as more than one team, and use of aquatic vehicles. One comment was 19

made that ongoing co~siderations for reductions in the insider requirements should be part of the overall reconsideration of the design basis threat.

Response. The Commission notes that use of a vehicle by adversaries was addressed under Phase I of a re-evaluation of the design basis threat which the NRC began in the Spring of 1993. This phase of the re-evaluation has been completed. Other attributes associated with the design basis threat, such as those characterized in comments on the proposed rule, have been reviewed and considered as part of Phase II of the re-evaluation. NRC staff recommendations on this part of the re-evaluation were provided to the Commission in a classified paper on March 15, 1994.

E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13 Comment. NUMARC, NUBARG, and several utilities stated that the proposed change in the design basis threat to include malevolent use of a vehicle amounts to escalation of the threat to efforts by an enemy of the United States. The comments contended that the proposed changes to the design basis threat are, therefore, in conflict with 10 CFR 50.13, which specifies that licensees are not required to provide for design features to protect against attacks and destructive acts by an enemy of the United States. One comment reco1TBTiended that NRC should re-evaluate the design basis threat assumption to now include foreign enemies of the United States.

Response. In lp CFR 50.13, which was promulgated on September 26, 1967 (32 FR 13445), the regulations provide that applicants for construction permits, operating license), or amendments thereto, need not provide for design features or other measures to protect against the attacks or destructive acts, 20

including sabotage, by an enemy of the United States. The issue raised in a contested application for a power reactor construction permit, which led to the promulgation of 10 CFR 50.13, was whether the reactor should be constructed to withstand a missile attack from Cuba. There is a significant difference in the practicality of defending against a missile attack and constructing a vehicle barrier at a safe standoff distance from vital areas.

The statement of considerations for 10 CFR 50.13 makes it clear that the scope of that regulation is to relieve applicants of the need to provide protective measures that are the assigned responsibility of the nation'3 defense establishment. The Atomic Energy Commission recognized that it was not practical for the licensees of civilian nuclear power reactors to provide design features that could protect against the full range of the modern arsenal of weapons. The statement concluded with the observation that assessing whether another nation would use force against a nuclear power plant was speculative in the extreme and, in any case, would involve the use of sensitiYe information regarding both the capabilities of the United States' defense establishment and diplomatic relations.

The new rule, with its addition to the design basis threat and added performance requirements, is in response to a clearly demonstrated domestic capability for acts of extreme violence directed at civilian structures. The participation or sponsorship of a foreign state in the use of an explosives-laden vehicle is not necessary. The vehicle, explosives, and know-how are all readily available in a pu,~lY domestic context. It is simply not the case that a vehicle bomb attack on a nuclear power plant would almost certainly represent an attack by an enemy of the United States, within the meaning of that phrase in 10 CFR 50.13.

21

Further, characterizing the threat as "para-military" adds little to the understanding of the intent of 10 CFR 50.13. "Para-military" suggests an armed, trained group acting outside of a legally constituted military organization. In that sense, the design basis threat prior to this amendment already described a "para-military" group. "Para-military" groups of entirely domestic origin exist. Accordingly, the amended regulation and supporting analyses need not address 10 CFR 50.13, either on the grounds that a vehicle bomb attack is an attack by an enemy of the United States or the action of a "paramilitary" group. That regulation is irrelevant to the present

- rulemaking.

The implication of the comments regarding 10 CFR 50.13 is that the simple addition of a vehicle bomb to the design basis threat should shift the function of providing physical security for nuclear power plants from the licensee to the Federal Government. The respondents present no real evidence or persuasive arguments for such a radical change in the regulatory environment.

F. "Threat" or "Alert" Program Comment. One comment suggested that the NRC develop and implement a "threat or alert" program similar to the Department of Defense's Defense Condition "DEFCON" program. It was recommended that, under such a program, the NRC would immediately notify the industry when information is received from the intelligence community of an impending security alert and provide a recommended level of action. Licensees, in turn, would be required to develop security response plans based on NRG-established threat levels.

22

Response, The Commission believes that its current Information Assessment Team approach for notifying licensees of significant events has been effective in disseminating and coordinating such information. The Information Assessment Team (IAT) assesses in a timely manner reported threats to NRC-licensed facilities, materials, and activities to determine credibility and make recommendations to NRC management. The IAT is composed of experienced Headquarter's and Regional staff who are on-call 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a*day and bring a variety of expertise to the assessment process, such as reactor systems, site specific information, and liaison with other Federal agencies, including close coordination with the Department of Energy on threat advisories to the utility industry and NRC licensees. The IAT was established in 1976, and since that time has supported N~C decision makers responding to a range of threats, from bomb threats against reactors to times of international tension during Operation Desert Shield and Storm. For example, coordinated threat advisories related to the latter were issued by the IAT on August 24, 1990, January 9, 1991, and April 2, 1991. However, the NRC does not believe that the IAT is an adequate alternative to vehicles barriers at nuclear power plants.

II. Regulatory and Backfit Analysis A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems Comment. One comnent indica~ed that the proposed rule did not adequately take into consideration the existing engineered safeguards systems installed at nuclear power plants. The comment was made that unauthorized access and 23

possible damage to any one vital area does not necessarily prevent the safe shut down of the nuclear reactor.

Response. The Commission agrees that consideration should be given to engineered safeguards systems and believes that flexibility has been built into the rule to allow for consideration of such existing systems. The redundancy and diversity of existing engineered safeguards systems was considered in the NRC analysis of the capability of existing *licensee security measures to protect against a violent external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation. Specific plant equipment layout can be a factor 4I in protective considerations against a vehicle bomb. Equipment that is redundant or provides backup to equipment assumed to be damaged by a vehicle bomb may be considered in the analysis for determining whether protective measures established to protect against vehicle intrusion fully meet the design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb.

B. Peer Review of Analysis

- Comment. One comment recommended that any research results, risk analyses, cost calculations and other work by the NRC should be subject to peer review.

Response. The NRC believes that its work is subject to various types of review and, in a sense, is subject to peer review. Portions of the risk analyses were conducted by groups with appropriate expertise, including threat assessment, physical security systc.~ performance evaluation, critical target set analysis, safety system inspections, probabilistic risk analysis, vehicle barrier design, and vehicle bomb analysis. In addition, the types of efforts mentioned by the comment are often the subject of multiple office review 24

within the NRC. Several technical review groups, both within and external to the NRC, provide further consideration of NRC staff work. Finally, with respect to rulemaking, analyses are the subject of public comment.

C. Clarification Comment, One comment noted that the wording associated.with the backfit anaiysis in the proposed Federal Register notice did not precisely coincide with that found under 10 CFR 50.109 (a)(3).

Response, The Commission notes that the wording in the notice is wording that is used for most NRC rules that are subject to backfitting. The Commission considers that this wording is consistent with the requirement cited.

III. Rule Implementation A. Schedule Comment. A large number of comments were received on the schedules associated with the proposed rule. Some indicated that the proposed schedule to submit a summary description of the barrier system and results of vehicle bomb comparison within 90 days was not long enough. One comment was received supporting the proposed schedule. Those commenting that the schedule was too tight expressed concern that 90 days did not provide sufficient time to perform a thorough design analysis, particularly if alternative measures were to be proposed. NUMARC, and several other respondents, recommended that 25

licensees be provided 180 days after issuance of the rule to provide a summary description of the barrier system.

A number Of comments were also received stating that the proposed schedule to confirm implementation within 360 days after issuance of the rule was not long enough. Those commenting that the schedule for completion of installation was too tight expressed concern that the schedule did not adequately account for material procurement and availability, outage schedules, and weather circumstances. NUMARC and several other respondents recommended that licensee~ be provided 18 months after issuance of the rule to complete installation of measures to meet the rule. A few comments were received that recommended that implementation schedules be established on a case-by-case basis.

Response. The Commission agrees that an extension to the schedule is reasonable based on the fact that this is a new program for power reactor sites, that there may be some difficulty in procurement of active vehicle barrier systems, and that possible deleterious effects on scheduling may

~~sult from the weather or planned outages. Accordingly, the time period for submission of the summary required by 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) is extended from 90 to 180 days from the effective date of the rule. The implementation period required under 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(9){ii) is extended from 360 days to 18 months from the rule's effective date.

B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals Comment. Three comments recommended that the NRC should review and approve all licensee submittals, including the summary description of the proposed 26

measures to protect against vehicle intrusion, the results of the vehicle bomb comparison, and, for applicable licensees, alternative measures to protect against an explosive device.

Response. The NRC believes that approval of all su!Mlaries submitted under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i} would unnecessarily delay expeditious implementation of this rule. All licensees are required to amend their physical security plans to connnit to the implementation and use of the vehicle barrier system described by the regulations. These co1M1itments are fully inspectable and enforceable by the NRC. The NRC would review and approve the limited number of requests expected to use alternative measures that might not fully meet the design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. The final rule has been changed to clarify that proposals for alternative measures be submitted in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90.

C. Vehicle Barriers Comment. NUMARC and several other respondents expre*ssed concern that barrier systems would be required to be "nuclear grade" and that this would unnecessarily escalate costs. Another comment expressed the opinion that, instead of licensees certifying to the NRC that vehicle barriers meet requirements, they be able to choose barriers from some pre-approved list.

NUMARC commented that design and certification needed to utilize existing technology and barrier device te~t results, or costs would unnecessarily escalate. NUMARC also requested that the discussion in the Regulatory Guide be expanded to describe flexibility available to licensees in designing and installing barriers.

27

Response. The NRC is unaware of any requirement for "nuclear grade equipment" and notes that the expression does not appear in the proposed rule or supporting guidance. The NRC agrees with the industry comment that commercially available materials suffice for the construction of the vehicle barrier if the barrier is capable of countering the design basis vehicle threat. As suggested by many respondents, the NRC recommends that affected licensees take advantage of available information on vehicle barrier testing, much of which has been conducted by Federal laboratories and agencies.

With respect to the use of "pre-approved barriers," the Commission believes that most vendors of commercial vehicle barrier systems know what the "stopping powers" of their barriers are. Licensees should use this as a resource in determining what barrier can counter the attributes of the Commission's design basis vehicle most cost effectively. In addition, the NRC has provided information on performance levels of several types of barriers to affected licensees. The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment concerning expansion of the discussion on the flexibility of designing and installing barriers in the regulatory guide supporting the rule. The regulatory guide now reflects this.

Comment. NUMARC expressed the view that compensatory measures, not explicitly addressed in the proposed rule or regulatory guide, for maintenance or repair of barriers should be determined by the licensee. Another comment stated that compensatory measures required if a barrier is temporarily inoperable, as with mpintenance, need to be addressed at an early stage.

Response. The NRC anticipates that vehicle barriers, particularly passive barriers, will infrequently become non-functional once installed. For those infrequent cases, any compensatory measures should take into consideration the 28

type and cause of the problem and the time the barrier will be non-functional.

For example, for short term problems with active or passive barriers.,

compensatory measures would not be expected to be extensive. In cases where barriers are non-functional for longer periods, compensatory measures may include placement of heavy vehicular equipment, concrete highway median barriers arranged in a serpentine fashion, installation of strands of airplane arresting wires, or the positioning of an officer armed with a high power contingency weapon may be appropriate. The regulatory guide issued in support of this rulemaking has been revised to include guidance regarding compensatory measures.

D. Passive Vehicle Barriers Comment. One comment was directed at the guidance that specified measures should be established to periodically verify the integrity of passive barriers outside the protected area. It was commented that passive barriers by their nature (ditches, berms, concrete filled embedded poles, etc.) do not require inspection, or if so, the period for inspecting should be on the order of several years. If licensees were to install a unique passive barrier that should need periodic.inspection, it should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

Response, The ~ommission agrees that the components of many passive barrier systems do not need to be inspected on a weekly or monthly basis due to the nature of their construction. Observations by routine security patrols should be sufficient to detect any degradation in the barrier. Some types of barriers may be more susceptible to deterioration, damage, or tampering and 29

therefore should be subject to more frequent observation by security patrols or, in some cases, periodic inspection. Given the large variation in components of passive barriers, the Commission considers it appropriate to provide licensees with flexibility on how to assure the continued integrity of barrier components. If the barrier system is damaged, the Commission expects that such damage would be identified in a reasonable period and actions would be taken promptly to repair the damage.

E. Active Vehicle Barriers Comment. Two comments were received requesting that the wording in the proposed regulatory guidance clarify that only one active barrier is needed to deny access. Also, one utility commented that the provision in the regulatory guide that specified vehicles and their operators be authorized for entry before being permitted access inside the vehicle barrier system would preclude their current practice of searching the vehicle after entry inside the active barrier.

Response. The NRC agrees with these comments and the guidance in the regulatory guide supporting the rule has been changed.

Comment. Another comment recommended that specific kinetic energy be identified for use in design of active barriers with documented performance satisfying specific energy requirements because this approach would help avoid costly independent testing to demonstrate performance.

Response,_ Guidance previously forwarded to licensees, designated as I

Safeguards Information, defines the kinetic energy associated with the design basis vehicle. As previously stated, the NRC has provided information to

affected licensees on performance levels of several types of barriers to help avoid costly independent testing.

F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives Comment. One comment objected to the rule's provisions that would allow some licensees to prJvide only "substantial protection" and not equivalent protection to fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. One comment indicated that the NRC should not be considering costs in determining the acceptability of alternative measures because costs should not be considered relative to enforcing adequate protection. NUMARC commented that it was reasonable for licensees*to have the option to propose alternative measures for Commission review when the design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb cannot be met without a significant resource burden.

8esponse. The NRC's regulatory analysis concluded that neither the Three Mile Island or World Trade Center events demonstrated a need to redefine adequate protection. The NRC's basis for the backfit being implemented by this rulemaking was a determination that it would result in a substantial increase in protection of the public health and safety. Paragraph 50.109(a}(3} of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, authorizes such a backfit only if the costs of implementation are justified in view of the increased protection. The NRC concluded that the estimated costs for all licensees to provide barriers to protect against vehicle intrusion were justified. However, at some sites, the location of barriers to protect against vehicle intrusion could provide substantial protection against a 31

vehicle bomb without fully meeting the NRC's design goals and criteria for protection against an explosive device. For these licensees, the incremental costs for placing barriers further from vital areas or for providing additional protective measures to fully meet the design goal and criteria may not be justified by the incremental protection beyond the substantial level.

Comment. NUMARC objected to the provision that licensees proposing alternative measures must compare their costs with the costs of measures needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb and must provide an assessment supporting a finding that the additional costs are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. NUMARC asserted that the NRC was requiring licensees to perform analyses beyond what the NRC staff has done in support of the proposed rule.

NUBARG similarly asserted that the NRC was requiring licensees to prove that alternative measures substantially increase safety, which is unfair.

NUBARG asserts that this requires licensees to perform a backfit analysis on why they should not jnstall a proposed modification (one that would fully meet the design goals and criteria) and that this runs counter to the backfit principle of the NRC providing the analysis.

Several respondents stated that they understood that the rule and regulatory guidance specified that those licensees proposing alternative measures would need to submit to the NRC a quantitative analysis to justify that the cost of plant specific measures are not justified by the added protection afforded. The comments indicated that, ~ased on this understanding, such a task would be difficult, if not impossible.

32

A publtc interest group expressed the opinion that contingency planning as part of alternative measures is unacceptable when compared to a permanent vehicle control systam.

Response. The optional licensee analysis provided for in the revised regulations is intended to be similar in approach to that performed by the NRC in the development of the regulatory analysis for the rulemaking. The Commission recognizes the difficulties with respect to quantification of the protection provided {see general discussion) and would expect licensees to provide a more deterministic analysis in comparing the relative protection provided by alternative measures taken by the licensee that don't fully meet the Commission design goal and criteria fo~ protection against a vehicle bomb.

The Commission did not intend to require its licensees to do more of an analysis or a different type of analysis than that performed by the NRC. The quantitative aspects of the analysis required by the regulation only apply to cost considerations, particularly the comparison of costs needed to fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb *with the cost of alternative measures.

The comment that contingency planning would be an unacceptable alternative to permanent vehicle barriers does not recognize the provision in the rule that specifies that all licensees are required to establish a vehicle barrier system to protect against use of a land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. Licensees may not substitute contingency plans for vehit:- barriers. Rather, contingency plans were identified as one pQssible option for licensees (those few where it may be practical for them to propose alternative measures to protect against 33

explosives} to supplement protection provided by the licensee's vehicle barrier system for protection against a vehicle bomb.

IV. NRC Inspection Comment. One comment indicated that the NRC should establish procedures to assure licensee compliance with the rule.

Response. The NRC plans to inspect licensee implementation of the rule as part of the ongoing reactor inspection program. Most likely the inspection will be accomplished using a temporary inspection procedure, which is planned to be orepared after publication of the rule but before the required implementation date.

As previously stated, all affected licensees are required to amend their physical security plans in response to this rule. All commitments in physical security plans are fully inspectable and enforceable by the NRC.

V. Miscellaneous A. Research Reactors Comment. One comment recommended that, in light of the upcoming 1996 Olympics, all reactor fuel, heavy water, and kilocuries of Co and Cs be removed immediately from the Georgia Tech campus.

Response. While research reactors do not fall within the scope of this rulemaking, the Commission notes that its threat assessment activities are performed on a continuing basis, in close liaison with the intelligence 34

community. Should the level of domestic threat change at any time, appropriate action will be taken by the NRC. Specifically, the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI has established liaison with all Federa1 agencies in Georgia, including the NRC, relative to the Olympics. The FBI is the lead law enforcement agency in charge of the Olympics and, to date, has not indicated that there is any threat to NRC-licensed facilities or materials relative to the Olympics.

B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Comment. NUMARC commented that independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSis) should be clearly exempted from the rule.

Response. The NRC did not intend for ISFSis to be subject to this regulation because of the lower consequences associated with storage of irradiated fuel removed from a power reactor core, particularly since spent fuel stored at ISFSis must be aged for at least one year. The NRC is currently preparing a proposed rule to clarify physical protection requirements for ISFSis. The lessons learned from the TMI intrusion will be considered in that rulemaking. In addition, the NRC is attempting to quantify the consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in the vicinity of an ISFSI. The results of this study will assist in making a detennination as to whether vehicle bomb protection is needed at ISFSis. In the interim, the staff believes that the inherent nature o~ the fuel, along with the degree of protection provided by the approved storage means for spent fuel, provides adequate protection against a vehicle bomb.

35

C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement Comment. One comment identified that the NRC-estimated financial burden to licensees did not include capital costs for modifications.

Response. The NRC notes that the financial burden cited by the comment was derived from the Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement, required under the Paperwork Reduction Act. This statement deals solely with the licensee recordkeeping and reporting burden resulting from the new rule, i.e., the paperwork burden. Actual construction costs are considered in the regulatory analysis that supports the rule.

Summary of Changes Made to Rule The following changes have been made as a result of public comment analysis:

1. The design basis threat statement for radiological sabotage has been clarified to separate the threat of a land vehicle used for intrusion with that of a land vehicle used as a vehicle bomb.

2. ISFSis have been specifically exempted from the rule.

3. Clarification of what is 1111::ant by "the Commission's design goals and criteria has been added to the regulatory text.

11 36

4. The appropriate means for submitting alternative measures has been clarified under 10 CFR 73.55(c}(9)(i) by adding the phrase in11 accordance with 10 CFR 50.90."

5. Summary and implementation schedules have been revised - from 90 to 180 days for summary subm1ttals, and from 360 to 540 days (18 months) for completion of implementation. Both time periods are from the effective date of the rule which is 1 month from the date of publication in the Federal Register.

Availability of Supporting Guidance Two guidance documents are being developed by the NRC in support of this rule and are expected to be distributed to affected licensees before the effective date of the rule. These documents are: (1) Regulatory Guide 5.68, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" and (2) NUREG/CR 6190, Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear 11

- Power Plants."

Regulatory Guide 5.68 will be available for inspection and copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Copies of issued guides may be purchased from the Government Printing Office at the current GPO price. Information on current GPO prices may be obtained by contacting the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.

Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-2171. Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service 37

on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5825 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Copies of NUREG/CR-6190 may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. Copies also will be available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy also will be available for inspection and copying for a fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

Electronic Submittals Required paperwork may be submitted, in addition to an original paper copy, in electronic format on a DOS-formatted (IBM compatible) 5.25 or 3.5 inch computer diskette. Text files should be provided in WordPerfect format or unformatted ASCII code. The format and version should be identified on the diskette's external label.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The rule involves installation of vehicle barriers at operating power reactor sites and an evaluation of these barriers by the licensee to determine whether they provide acceptable protection against a 38

land vehicle bomb under design goals and criteria established by the Convn1ssion.

Implementation of these amendments will not involve release of or exposure to radioactivity from the site. Construction activities associated with passive vehicle barriers will involve some earth movement, either for excavation or development of berms, and possible destruction of trees and shrubbery. Since most active vehicle barriers are hydraulically operated, there may on occasion be leakage of this fluid to the environment. The activities required to implement these amendments involve no significant environmental impact.

The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact are available from: Carrie Brown, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission, Washington, DC, telephone (301} 504-2382.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule amends_ information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et sec.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget approval number 3150-0002.

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the J9

data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden esti.mate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuc1ear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150-0002), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission. Interested persons may examine a copy of the regulatory analysis at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level}, Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Robert J. Dube, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2912.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605{b), the Commission certifies that this final rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The rule affects only licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor. The utilities that operate these nuclear power reactors do not fall within the scope of the definition "small entities" as given in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the 40

Small Business Size Standards promulgated in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration (13 CFR Part 121).

Backfit Analysis As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a backfit analysis for the final rule. The Commission has determined, based on this analysis, that backfitting to comply with the requirements of this final rule provides a substantial increase in protection to public health and safety or 4lt the common defense and security at a cost which is justified by the substantial increase. The backfit analysis on which this determination is based reads as follows.

I. Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed action is designated to achieve.

To publish a rule in response to direction from the Commission in a staff requirements memorandum dated June 29, 1993. The Commissioners' decision to proceed with expedited rulemaking was the result of two events. On February 7, 1993, there was. a forced vehicle entry into the protected area (PA) at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit I. On February 25, 1993, a van bomb, containing between 500 and 1,500 pounds of TNT equivalent, was detonaten ~t the World Trade Center in New York City.

In its subsequent review of the threat environment, the NRC staff concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat I

against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. Nonetheless, in light 41

of the vehicle intrusion at TMI and the World Trade Center vehicle bombing, the NRC staff concluded that a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the future.

The objective of the rulemaking is to enhance reactor safety by maintaining a prudent margin between what is the current threat estimate (low) and the design basis threat for radiological sabotage specified in 10 CFR 73.l(a) (higher).

II. General description Jf the activity that would be required by the

- licensee or applicant in order to complete the proposed action.

The rule requires each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power plant to estab1ish vehicle control measures to protect against the use of a design basis land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. This provides two benefits.

First, it enhances a licensee's ability to interdict an adversary attempting to use a vehicle as an aid to reach critical safety equipment. Second, it provides protection against a land vehicle bomb.

The rule requires licensees to evaluate the effectiveness of their vehicle control measures with respect to the protection they provide against a land vehicle bomb. Licensees are required to confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures to protect against vehicle intrusion, alone or in combination with additional measures, fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. Licensees that can show that the additional costs for measures required to fully meet the Commission's design goals and 42

criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection that would be provided have the option to propose alternative measures to the Commission. These licensees will not be relieved of the requirement to protect the facility against vehicle intrusion.

Licensees that propose alternative measures are required to describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle bomb and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the criteria. The NRC will approve the alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if the licensee demonstrates by an analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection provided.

III. Potential change in the risk to the p~blic from the accidental offsite release of radioactive material.

The potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental offsite release of radioactive material is discussed in detail in pages 4 through 7 ani 10 through 14 of the regulatory analysis that supports the rulemaking. Failure to protect against attempted radiological sabotage could result in reactor core damage and large radiological releases. Based on its assessment, the NRC concludes that amending its regulations to protect against malevolent use of a vehicle against a 43

nuclear power plant provides a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety.

In summary, the TMI event demonstrated some aspects regarding use of a vehicle by a potential adversary that could present some challenges not previously considered by staff and licensees. The NRC considers that providing vehicle intrusion protection provides substantial enhancement against such a threat. Enhancements to protect against the vehicle intrusion threat also provide, to varying degrees dependent on site characteristics, enhancement for protection against vehicle bombs.

The World Trade Center event demonstrated a capability within the United States to construct a truck bomb undetected. This recently demonstrated capability indicates that although a vehicle bomb attack at a nuclear power plant is not reasonably to be expected, it is somewhat more likely to develop without advance indications than the NRC previously believed. Therefore, the NRC considers that providing permanently installed vehicle bomb protection provides substantial enhancement against such a threat.

IV. Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employees and other ons1te w1rkers.

By enhancing protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle, the rule decreases the potential ~or radiological exposure of facility employees and other onsite workers. Although the threat of a determined, violent attack at a nuclear power plant is considered to be 44

low, the rule also decreases the risk that onsite workers could be injured by weapons fire or an explosion.

V. Installation and continuing costs associated with the action, including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction delay .

.Estimates of installation costs are discussed in detail on pages 7 through 10 and 14 of the regulatory analysis. Ranges in cost estimates for three vehicle types illustrate the strong influence of vehicle characteristics. In addition, site-specific characteristics influence costs, including the need at some sites to extend the vehicle exclusion area beyond portions of the current PA boundary or providing a more substantial passive barrier.

The NRC staff estimates that about 80 to 90 percent of the sites will provide safe standoff distances against a vehicle bomb by providing a vehicle barrier in proximity to the present PA boundary. For these sites, cost estimates range from $290K for protecting the smallest protected area against a passenger vehicle to $2,955K for protecting the largest protected area against a large truck. {The characteristics of the design basis vehicle used to establish protection goals are described in a Safeguards Information document provided separately to affected licensees.) For the remaining 10 to 20 percent of the sites, cost estimates range from $440K to $3,655K.

An important consideration in assessing costs for the 10 to 20 percent of the sites that may have to protect beyond the existing protected areas is that the only definitive requirement for all 45

licensees is that they provide measures to protect against the use of a land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain proximity to vital areas and that they assess any incremental measures, if necessary, to meet the design goal for a land vehicle bomb. The NRC will accept alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if the licensee demonstrates by an analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection provided.

Continuing costs to maintain barriers should be small.

Implementation of the rule will not require facility downtime or construction delay.

VI. The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational complexity, including the relationship to proposed and existing regulatory req1irements and NRC staff positions.

There should be no adverse safety impact from the rule. Construction of barriers will be near or beyond existing protected area perimeters and should not delay authorized access to the protected area.

VII. The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the action and the availability of such resources.

There should be no new resource burden on the NRC. There will be no NRC staff licensing review of licensees' vehicle control measures before 46

implementation. Licensees will be required to retain their analyses on site for NRC staff review during routine inspections. Inspection of the approximately 67 total sites for explosive protection will be about 1 FTE. Reviewing licensee proposals for alternative measures and 10 CFR 50.109 type analyses will require approximately 1 FTE and 40K of technical assistance from the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

VIII. The potential impact of differences in facility type, design, O*r age on the relevancy and practicality of the proposed action.

The action is relevant for all nuclear power reactors. The action should also be practical at most sites. If a barrier stopped a vehicle at the PA perimeter with little or no further penetration, about 90 percent of the sites*would provide significant protection against the design basis vehicle bomb.

In those cases where licensees determine additional security measures may be needed to protect safe shutdown capability, the rule permits licensees to either implement the additional security measures or develop alternative protection strategies. The licensee may propose alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if they demonstrate by an analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection provided. The NRC *staff will review licensee's alternative proposals and make an acceptability 47

determination. The Commission will be notified of such NRC staff action.

NRC staff's analysis also indicates that there is a high likelihood that all sites will be capable of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown if a design basis bomb were detonated at any land accessible location of a nuclear power plant outside of the owner controlled area.

IX. Whether the proposed action is interim or final, and if interim, the justification for imposing the proposed action on an interim basis.

The action is to promulgate a final rule. The rulemaking does not involve interi~ actions.

list of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to Part 73.

PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

48

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.147, 94 Stat.

780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat.

2232, 2241, (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L.99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

2. In §73.1, the introductory text of paragraph (a) and the text of (a)(l)(ii) are revised and new paragraphs (a)(l)(i)(E) and (a)(l)(iii) are added to read as follow:

§73.l Purpose and scope.

(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system which will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material. licensees subject to the provisions o; ~72.182, §72.212, §73.20, §73.50, and §73.60 are exempt from §73.l(a)(l)(i)(E) and §73.l{a)(l)(iii).

49

(1) ***

{i) ***

(E} A four-wheel drive land vehicle used for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas, and (ii) An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position), and (iii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb.

3. In §73.21, a new paragraph (b){l)(xiii) is added to read as follows:

§73.21 Requirements for the protection of safeguards information.

(b) ***

(1) ***

{xiii) Information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8} and (9).

50

4. In §73.55, new paragraphs {c)(7), (8), {9), and {10) are added to read as follow:

§73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

(c) ***

(7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas.

(8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c){7) to the Commission's design goals {i.e., to protect equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety by exposure to radiation) and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb. Each licensee shall either:

{i) Confirm to the Commissio~ that the vehicle control measures meet the design goals and criteria specified; or 51

(ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7), describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb, and it is determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.

(9) Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall:

(1) By (insert 180 days from the effective date of the rule) submit to the Commission a summary description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8). For licensees who choose to propose alternative measures as provided for in 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8), the proposal must be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 and include the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives.

(ii) By {insert 18 months from final rule effective date) fully implement the required vehicle control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as approved by the Commis~~~n.

(iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55{c)(8) and (9).

52

(iv) Retain, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.70, all comparisons and analyses prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) and {8).

(10) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.2l{b) or 10 CFR 50.22 of this chapter, whose application was submitted prior to {insert effective date of rule), shall incorporate the required vehicle control program into the site Physical Security Plan and implement it by the date of receipt of the operating license .

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this ~b~day of July 1994.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ary of the Commission.

53

DOCKET NUMBER PR Pr10P0SED RULE..:...:.:::.-----

( S~F /< 5' ffOL/)

'94 FCO 22 P1 :49 Florida Power CORPORATION February 15, 1994 NL94-0002 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Services Branch Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants (58 Fed. Reg. 58804)

Dear Sir:

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) has reviewed the proposed rule expanding the design basis threat (OBT) to include vehicle -laden bombs and opposes this action.

The proposed rule appears to be based more on perception than on a quantitative evaluation of the Three Mile Island and World Trade Center events. We believe that the two events should be considered as basically irrelevant in determining the appropriate DBT for nuclear power plants from the perspective of the NRC.

As noted in the proposed rulemaking, the TMI event did not pose any threat to public health and safety. The most compelling conclusion one can draw from these events is that publicity-seekers of questionable judgmental capacity may view nuclear power plants as "targets," but terrorists with the capacity to assemble and deploy truck bombs do not.

We are particularly concerned by the prescriptive* nature of the proposal.

Responsible owners or managers of any commercial enterprise should reassess the risk from malevolent actions against the cost for deterrence when circumstances appear to have changed. In this case, we have done so and for Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) we have judged it to be unnecessary to employ the types of features the proposed rulemaking suggests since the existing CR-3 configuration-provides a great deal of deterrence. Had the proposal been to discontinue the exclusion of truck bombs from consideration as part of the DBT, and had the Commission suggested a means to compare the risks from this external event with others, we would be less concerned.

CRYSTAL RIVER ENERGY COMPLEX: 15760 W Power Line St

• Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 * (904) 795-6486 A Florida Progress Company MAY El' 4 1994 Acknowledged by card .........:,111eettt1Uttttttt111

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL94-0002 Page 2 of 4 From a broader perspective, the Commission must, in our view, consider the policy implications of this rulemaking. When the agency proposes hardware fixes in response to an external occurrence that poses no threat to public health and safety or national security, the current initiatives associated with cost-beneficial licensing are undermined.

We are also concerned by other aspects of the proposal. Following are those we consider to be most important.

Quantification of Risks and Benefits The information accompanying the notice (page 5 of the regulatory analysis) states:

"Traditionally, the staff has not attempted a quantitative evaluation of the benefits associated with safeguards requirements."

and 11

• • • no technical basis was available for quantifying the contribution of sabotage to the overall risk from nuclear power plant operations."

"For the purpose of this analysis , a quantitative evaluation would require, among other things , quantification of the likelihood that someone would use a vehicle bomb in an attempt to damage a nuclear power plant , the probability that the bomb would be set off from a stationary location or that forced entry into the PA would be attempted, the probability that a bomb of a particular size would be used, and the probability that the bomb would be in a particular location. Staff is unable to quantify anv of these factors." (emphasis added)

The picture painted by reading the regulatory analysis is that the Staff is satisfied with the justification that some parts of the vital area may be so close that an externally detonated bomb might damage something sufficiently that some threat to public health and safety could occur. With this uncertainty, the Commission should direct the staff to find a way to at least estimate most of these values. Without such an assessment 1i censees may expend excessive resources on security as compared to other external threats. The technology for doing complex systems interaction and vulnerabilities analyses has continued to improve. It is certainly possible to assess the relative risk from the damage or loss of equipment in one physical area. For example, any legitimate fire-PSA must do so. An even less rigorous approach of simply reviewing minimum target sets developed from the RER/OSRE efforts, or safe-shutdown equipment lists developed as part of A-46 resolution would yield useful information.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL94-0002 Page 3 of 4 It is difficult to understand why the NRC management would expect such assessments of external events by licensees, as requested in Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4 (IPEEE), and not expect the same of its own staff. We understand that such an assessment might rely heavily on estimates when it comes to core damage frequency values, but the real risk could certainly be better estimated. We believe that such an assessment could significantly change the understanding of the relative importance of all security measures, not simply the threat potentially posed by bomb-laden vehicles.

Value/Impact Assessment Without an estimate of risk or benefits, it is difficult to do any traditional sort of cost/benefit assessment. The Commission's rules and practices require a cost/benefit assessment, but a true cost/benefit assessment was not provided with the proposed rule. The Decisi on Rati onale explained the reasoning, but the question of whether the benefits and risk reductions warranted the costs are left unaddressed. Having a reason for the choice suggested is not the same as having a cost/benefit assessment.

The effort at estimating costs is also insufficient. The cost is assumed to be totally in construction. No cost is included for increased maintenance. This is never true. Any capital addition adds operating and maintenance (O&M) costs, unless one of its benefits is to lower some existing O&M burden, which we do not believe to be the case in this instance. Further, to assume the total cost of the installation of any structure, system or component at a nuclear power plant is only twice the cost of the structure, system or component itself is non-conservative. Any time one has to install sub-surface structures one must also deal with the interferences presented by previously installed cable, etc.

This may make the cost of the system a small fraction of overall costs.

Another item neglected was the interference imposed during construction. Changes in normal traffic flow during installation will also be costly.

Obligation for Licensees Proposing Alternate Actions The proposed rule puts the burden on the licensee to provide an analysis of the risk reduction of proposed alternatives. The same difficulties in quantifying risk noted above are apparently assumed to be readily resolved by the licensee who does not choose to solve the "problem" in the manner suggested by the NRC.

The standards that the Staff does not meet in the proposed rulemaking are thus imposed on the licensee. Further, while the Staff has not performed a quantified cost-benefit analysis on its proposals, it will have to review and approve those suggested by licensees. In our view, the Staff must conform to the backfitting rule and either substantiate that the proposed rule is cost -beneficial or withdraw it.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL94-0002 Page 4 of 4 Conclusion As noted in our Cost Beneficial Licensing Actions (CBLA) submittal last year, FPC would be willing to participate with the NRC in an appropriate effort to assess the relative benefit of security safeguards as they relate to risk. This measure could then be compared to other contributors to better understand the relative importance and overall risk. We have contacted appropriate consulting firms that have worked with the NRC in doing target analysis and with the industry in doing probabilistic safety assessments. They assure us that such an effort would be productive and insightful. We had planned to do this as part of our CBLA effort.

If such an effort would be well received by the staff, it would be a more appropriate focus, in our judgement, than the proposed rule.

Finally, without a substantially improved assessment of relative risks and benefits, this proposed rulemaking is legally and technically deficient. The best time to address requirements marginal to safety is at their inception and we urge the Commission to reconsider the current proposal.

Sincerely,

4-~,,

P. M. Beard, Jr.

Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations PMB/KRW:ff

60CKET NUMBERPR - , 4,.__

PROPOSED RULE~_- 1 ::J_- - -

(§3--F f<. S"~ao't)

• 94 FEB -7 P3 :45 STATE OF ILLIN0IS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY I f. r ! ! * ' - .. ~

1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE ~l,1LKL ,_',r;i _; , ,f

~ ,.,

1' SPRINGFIELD, IL 62704 (217) 785-9900 THOMAS W. 0RTCIGER JIM EOOAR January 24 , 1994 DIRECTOR GOVERNOR Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

Subject:

Proposed Rule on Protection Against Malevolent Use of Veh icles at Nuclear Power Plants The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IONS) hereby submits its comments on the proposed rule. IDNS is the lead agency in Illinois for preparing emergency plans for and, in cooperation with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA), coordinating emergency responses to accidents at nuclear power plants.

IONS believes NRC's Part 73 rule amendment, by addressing only land vehicles, is too narrow. The important lesson from the intrusion at the TMI plant is that of relatively easily achieved threat by terrorists to the protected areas at a nuclear power plant, reg ardless of access mode. Land, water, rail, air, and even topographical feat ures , depending on their proximity to the plant , all provide access that can threaten protected areas.

The margin between the current estimate of threat and the higher design basis threat, should be based on a realistic analysis of all potential avenues for terrorist threat to protected areas.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on these proposed rule changes.

If you require additional information, please contact Roy Wight of my staff at 217/785-9851.

TWO: 1kd

[93-27]

@ recyclable

\).S- NUCU:. _: , !;,:.. *1 ,~ , l'.)FlY COMMISSION OOC?<E". "'* :: & 61::flVICE SECTION OFFiCc OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Do:ument s:atistics

DOGl\c T NUMBER PR 7 -

Westinghouse PAOPOSED RULE

($6-Pfl 59-~~

Energy Systems f", t

• t

iNhC

~I

• NTD-NRC-94-4054 Box 355 Electric Corporation *94 FEB - 4 J\1 L e@@iurgh Pennsylvania 15230-0355

! '* t

[ 11,Lh[ I , l !January 31 , 1994 tf ~ l

~fr . Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION : Docketing and Services Branch

SUBJECT:

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" 58 Fed. Reg. 58804, Nov . 4, 1993, Request for Comments These comments are submitted by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse ") in response to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") request for public comments on proposed rule for "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" 58 Fed. Reg. 58804, Nov . 4, 1993. Westinghouse supports and endorses the NUMARC comments that were provided relative to this notice of proposed rulemaking.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rulemaking and would welcome the opportunity to discuss these comments further with appropriate NRC personnel.

Very truly yours,

~anager Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Activities 1116C-KJV-1:013194

)J.S. Nuc,_:. \~- , ,,_,_.,:x,: rnnv COMM1ss1ON OOCKETii-lG ;'. SE;:{VICE SECTION OFFIC~ or Hi E SECRETARY Or Ti,:.: cm.'iMISSION

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone (205) 868-5131 Dave Morey *94 JAN 27 P3 :J6Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vice President Farley Project the southern electnc system 1/2January 3, 1994 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Proposed Design Basis Vehicular Threat Regulations

{58 Federal Register 58804 of November 4, 1993)

Dear Sir:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company has reviewed the proposed amendment on "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants,"

published in the Federal Register on November 4, 1993. In accordance with the request for comments, Southern Nuclear is in total agreement with the NUMARC conments which are to be provided to the NRC.

Should you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely, n ~

Dave Morey DNM/dsc cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company R. D. Hill, Nuclear Plant General Manager U.S . Nucl ear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC B. L. Siegel, Licensing Project Manager, NRR U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Region II S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator T. M. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector Acknowledged by card ..M!t:=.t~

ll.--* N:_;,.:: *_ . -_- :c 'r COMMISSION c::.- ,*. .  :-* 1: * *: -:: cCTION

, . - , -~ i.~RY C - . _; _,,~ *. , ,0..,iON

1650 CALVERT CLIFFS PARKWAY* LUSBY, MARYLAND 20657-4702

'94 JAN 13 P3 :11

, ,r , ! * , ,, '.: ~- 1,t t. t -{

ROBERT E. DENTON tdl-Ki 1 1tl': ', ',,, 'I.:

! I ,\r, I VICE PRESIDENT January 10, 1994 NUCLEAR E NERGY

( 4 10 ) 260- 44 5 5 Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Services Branch

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 CFR Part 73: Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants (59FR58804)

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject rulemaking. Having reviewed the rulemaking package in detail, we agree with and endorse the comments provided by Nuclear Management and Resources Council. The rulemaking package appears deficient in its analysis to quantitatively support the conclusion that the proposed action would provide a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. We would be pleased to work with you to provide assurance that Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant is secure against reasonable threats.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

~~

RED/JMO/jmo/bjd cc: D. A Brune, Esquire J.E. Silberg, Esquire R. A Capra, NRC D. G. McDonald, Jr., NRC T. T. Martin, NRC P. R. Wilson, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR J. H. Walter, PSC MAY: 4 1994 Acknowledged by card .................. N .........- ..

\ -  :;.,.;A ...... ,

.., i A *t *~-;

.. r .

Ip.,

!I

Telephone (508) 779-6711 YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY TWX 710-380-7619

~*-----*

no*

"-..YANKEE 580 Main Street, Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398

,I.fr '* @)

December 30, 1993 FYC 93-029 SPS93-127 1

~9~~FT N *: -~E~ -J7i Secretary of the Com.mission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (sJ-F K5rf O:) -

Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

Subject:

Request for Comments Concerning Proposed Amendments to 10CFR73 that Would Modify the Design Basis Threat for Radiological Sabotage to Include Use of a Land Vehicle (58FR58804 to 58807)

Dear Sir:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject Federal Register Notice. Yankee is the owner of the nuclear power plant in Rowe, Massachusetts and our Nuclear Services Division also provides engineering and licensing services to other nuclear power plants in the United States. These comments are also filed on behalf of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation.

We do not believe that there is sufficient justification for any change in the existing regulatory design basis threat. The staff has acknowledged that an adequate level of public safety in regard to physical security exists now. The proposed change is acknowledged as beyond adequate protection to incremental improvement. Page 3 of NUREG/BR-0184, the NRC's Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook, states:

"In justifying a proposed back.fit under the back.fit rule, the burden is on the staff to make a positive showing that a generic safety problem actually exists and that the proposed back.fit will both address the problem effectively and provide a substantial safety improvement in a cost-beneficial manner."

The subjective rationale offered the "analysis" provided for this issue does not appear to meet this test. Should the Commission's S.R.M. be offered as a basis, it should be recognized that the Commission is bound by this same principle unless they overtly set it aside for this specific rule change or change the rule on which the principle is based.

C76\382 MAY f 4 1994, Acknowledged by card umNtHNHIHUlltHI::;;.

. ;f.5.NUCLEAR RE:GULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERViCE SECTION OFFICE Or THE SECRETARY OF THE COi,1MISSION Postmarl: D"': __Lj_3_:./_ . c;_</_ _ _

Cop;es ",1,;,.*. *_ _ _

'd I co~: - **. **1 J.,-1 Ao i '"'"

1/2'4 i (.. I '--' _. ,.:, ,j ---'-- ----

Special DistriLutior. ~ T i'.J.JJ LtJ LL "'",.,_ ffl A. "- btJi fs-m.. I v-' 'R..i.r- J

Secretary of the Commission December 30, 1993 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Page 2 It is virtually impossible to provide an objective review and criticism of the subjective assessment provided other than to note that the subject position is, in fact, subjective. Thus, we can provide little substantive criticism of the analysis. However, the development of the threat is clearly flawed. The Staff has taken an isolated event at one plant and turned it into a generic problem. Furthermore, the scope of the perceived generic problem is irrationally expanded by linking the single power plant event to another completely unrelated event; even though that event has been characterized as not indicative of a power plant threat by an expert agency; the FBI. After acknowledging that there is "no indication of an actual vehicle threat", the Staff postulates, with no identifiable basis, that "such a threat could develop without warning in the future", and, thus, a backfit is justified because it provides a perceived "substantial increase in protection to public health and safety". Even the defense of an alternative proposal by a licensee is precluded because it must be compared quantitatively against a requirement which itself, is justified by an unquantified analysis.

The offering of a patently illogical justification could be construed as a signal that development of regulatory and backfit analyses is viewed as a proforma exercise. The same general "logic" employed in the analysis of this issue could be used to justify practically any desired regulatory initiative. At that point, the shared objective of both the regulator and the industry; regulatory stability will become unattainable.

Perhaps this change is viewed by NRC as a very minor adjustment. The time involved for compliance suggests that perception. It is, however, neither minor, nor easily accommodated, and the proposed time for compliance is unrealistic.

This issue appears to involve business prudence, not radiological sabotage or nuclear safety considerations. Prudency judgments should be left to each plant owner rather than be embodied in a design basis threat.

Sincerely, Donald W. Edwards Director, Industry Affairs DWE/dhm C76\382

5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virginia 23060

• 94 JAN 12 P2 :19 fr I ' r ' . t t,I* { VIRGINIA POWER

-1; >,; 1 vrf January 6, 1994 Secretary Serial No.93-731 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL&P/RBP R3 Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn : Docketing and Service Branch

- Gentlemen:

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR 73 - TO PROTECT AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Virginia Power has reviewed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed rulemaking published in the Federal Register dated November 4, 1993. The rulemaking would require each nuclear plant licensee to install a vehicle barrier system to prevent land vehicle intrusion into the protected area and to provide assurance that a land vehicle bomb would not result in damage to vital plant equipment sufficient to preclude safe shutdown of the nuclear plant.

We endorse the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) comments sent separately to the NRC on this issue and specifically highlight their comment concerning the schedule for implementation of the proposed rule . We strongly recommend reconsideration of the proposed expedited schedule to allow adequate time for completion of required analyses and identification , evaluation , and implementation of modification alternatives should they be required.

We also urge the NRC to consider the NUMARC comments concerning installation of a vehicle barrier system (VBS) at nuclear power plants. The NUMARC proposed VBS position allows the licensee to choose a proven barrier system that would absorb sufficient kinetic energy of an intruding land vehicle while maintaining reasonable assurance that the protection goal would be met.

Very truly yours,

/&;J~

M. L. Bowling, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Programs MAY

• 4 1994 Acknowledged by card ........................""....."

S. NUC_EAf1 f: J .UL TO RY COMMISSION DOS'-L T ___ i'\l,Cr. SECTION OF- * , : sr- _.Rn ARY Or F,E 1.,C, i,,'v.J..:SiON

cc: Mr. Ron Simard Director, Industry Relations and Administration Division Nuclear Management and Resources Council 1776 Eye Street, N. W.

Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006-3706

PR 7 *

~

PUBLIC ~

ET NUMBER (S"t ULE F~SH"tJ'-/)

WPSC (414) 433-1598 ~ SERVICE NRC-94-003 TELEC.OPIER (414 J 433-5544 EASYLINK 62891993

~

'. _I Ni<C WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION 600 North Adams

• P.O. Box 19002

• Green Bay, W I 54307-9002

• 94 JA I 10 P12 :;_ 7 January 4, 1994 Secretary of the Commission Attention Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Comments on Prru><>sed Vehicle Intrusion Rule

Reference:

1) 58FR58804 dated November 4, 1993 Publication on Vehicle Intrusion at Nuclear Power Plants Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) is the operator of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant and is hereby providing comments to the NRC's proposed rule for "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," (Reference 1).

Based on our evaluation of the proposed rule, the associated regulatory analysis, and the backfit analysis, we have concluded that the rule is not justified for the following reasons:

1) The NRC has stated in the regulatory analysis that "NRC has concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry.

However based on recent events, NRC believes that a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the future."

The recent events referenced by the NRC include two unrelated events (TMI intruder and World Trade Center Bombing). Nuclear power plants have been and continue to be considered hardened targets and therefore are not by nature the target of choice for a terrorist. Promulgating rulemaking because conditions may change in the future is a dangerous precedent to set. If the NRC and FBI had evidence that nuclear power plants MAY l 4 1994 Acknowledged by card ..................................

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKED G & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statis*ics Postm ,. "' 'P.

Cop:.,s .

• Add'I V* Jg~ /Jl)C,

~ ~ ~,r"_ _ __

Secretary of the Commission January 4, 1994 Page 2 are now considered a greater terrorist target than they were in the past it would certainly warrant re-evaluating the Design Basis Threat. But by the NRC's own admission, there is no indication that this increased threat exists now or that it will in the future.

2) The basis for the Backfit Analysis and promulgation of the rule is that the regulations "would provide a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety." Improvements and reductions in risk can always be made; however, the cost versus the benefit received must be part of the equation. As cited by the NRC, the current threat estimate is low and the Design Basis Threat required by regulation is higher. It has not been proven that an inadequate margin between current threat and Design Basis Threat exists. If the current risk is indeed sufficiently low, what basis exists for incurring costs to provide a larger margin of safety? The current margin of safety has not been shown to be inadequate.

3) The size of the proposed explosive that must be considered as part of the design basis is considered safeguards information. It is not understood how the NRC determined the quoted size of explosive that needs to be considered. To our knowledge the explosive size proposed by the NRC far exceeds any device previously detonated during terrorist activities in the United States. The bombing at the World Trade Center, which by definition was a "soft" target, was estimated to be caused by a quantity of explosives that is significantly below that proposed in the NRC rulemaking. The explosive size should be based on some reasonably expected size and have some clearly explained basis.

4) By combining the weight of the vehicle and of the explosive, the barrier must be substantially increased in stopping strength. It would also indicate that the Design Basis Vehicle Threat would be a suicide mission. With the exception of the Marine barracks in Beirut, there have been no known suicide strikes against U.S. targets. The vehicle and explosives should be distinctively separate if this rule continues.

5) If NRC feels the need to continue with promulgation of the rule a re-evaluation of the implementation schedule is in order. It is unreasonable to expect licensees to evaluate all of the supporting technical documentation in the 90 days currently provided in the proposed rule. To date, NRC is continuing the development of materials for licensee use in assessing the impact of this rule. It is more reasonable to expect licensees to familiarize themselves with the previous generated material, apply the material to site specific conditions, and assess whether the design requirements are met by current site characteristics within 180 days of receiving all the information currently being generated by NRC to support the rule. The currently proposed date (90 days after issuance of final rulemaking) is not reasonable given the technical nature of the requirements and the need to do site specific analysis. The NRC has estimated the industry financial burden to run between $47,500 and $87,120 for the efforts necessary to perform the requested evaluations and submit the necessary summary letter to the NRC. These estimates do

Secretary of the Commission January 4, 1994 Page 3 not include the capital cost of the modifications that may be necessary to the plant and protected area barriers. The estimated capital costs are not insignificant. By unnecessarily limiting the time allowed before the submittal is due licensees may need to devote multiple engineering personnel to the task. By allowing a more reasonable 180 day submittal licensees should be able to perform the analysis at a lesser cost than if the analysis is required within 90 days.

In closing, we appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule. We believe the rule is not justified because sufficient basis for the rule and the associated costs of implementation have not been provided.

C. A. Schrock Manager-Nuclear Engineering DJM/gdl cc - US NRC Region III US NRC Senior Resident Inspector US NRC Document Control Desk lie\nrc\58. wp

1901 Chouteau Avenue Post Office Box 149 St. Lows. Missouri 63166 DOCKET NUMBER 7 .J 314-621-3222 p£1OPOSED RULE_ -

(!?~FR 5 t'ir0'-1)

• 94 JAN 10 P1 2 :25 UMON January 3, 1994 ELECTRIC

• i '~

ruu l

~)]

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk ULNRC-2928 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

SOLICITATION OF PUBLIC COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGE TO 10 CFR 73; PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

References:

1) Federal Register Volume 58 Number 212 dated November 4, 1993 (58 FR 58804)

2) NUMARC letter to Samuel J. Chilk, dated January 3, 1994 from Thomas E. Tipton Union Electric Company fully endorses the comments submitted by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) on the proposed rule. We feel that the already conservative design basis threat would be further exaggerated simply because the proposal seeks to needlessly couple two unrelated events (World Trade Center bombing and Three Mile Island intrusion).

Regardless of the form of the final rule, one issue left unaddressed is the compensatory measures required in the case that the vehicle barrier system is temporarily inoperable, as with maintenance activities. We believe this issue should be resolved at an early stage.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this issue. Please contact us if there are any questions regarding this letter.

Very truly yours,

~~

Alan C. Passwater Manager, Licensing & Fuels RMD/kea Acknowledged by card ... ~~:,.:~w!:,:~,, ..

'**.s.NUCLEAR Rf ~ : A.TORY COMMISSIO~

OOCK-: *.. ,*, "RViCE SECTION Ofl- ,-.~ ' . *: SECRETARY o;:* 1h :,-- 1.. JMVilSSION D*"'t ~+ l"'~:t:~!!cs 1 I s-/qLJ /~ - - -

~ 3.- :--:--- -

- ~Uvy~v:-_ __ __

~ °4 fl/) &

cc: T. A. Baxter, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N. Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037 M. H. Fletcher CFA, Inc.

18225-A Flower Hill Way Gaithersburg, MD 20879-5334 L. Robert Greger Chief, Reactor Project Branch 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Bruce Bartlett Call a way Resident Of f ice U.S. Regulatory Commission RR#l Steedman, Missouri 65077 L. R. Wharton (2)

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 White Flint, North, Mail Stop 13E21 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Manager, Electric Department Missouri Public Service Commission P.O. Box 360 Jefferson City, MO 65102

dOCKl=T NUMBER PR ---7""2.

Nuclear Group Headquarters Vi .; 0-:::D RULE ..;:_;:~----

(~o FR sr<r-oL1J_

IJ

_, ~  : * :

• t PECO ENERGY PECO Energy Company 965 Chesterbrook Blvd.

Wayne, PA 19087-5691

• 94 JAN - 6 i-'11 , :16 Ir-,.!

~  :,,: January 3, 1994 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Services Branch Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

PECO Energy Company Comments Concerning NRC Proposed Rule 10 CFR 73, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehitles at Nuclear Power Plants" (58FR58804}

Dear Mr. Chilk:

This letter is being submitted in response to the NRC' s request for comments regarding the Proposed Rule 10 CFR 73, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," published in the Federal Register (i.e., 58FR58804, dated November 4, 1993 ). PECO Energy Company (formerly Philadel ph ia Electric Company) appreciates the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule that would amend the NRC's regulations concerning the physical protecti on of nuclear power plants by modifying the design threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives.

PECO Energy Company offers the following comments on the proposed rule for consideration by the NRC. These comments pertai n to the rule's implementation schedule and issues that we consider to need clarification.

Implementation Schedule The implementation schedule stipulated in the proposed rule may be difficult to meet due to a number of factors (e.g ~, plant outage schedule constraints, availability of outside resources, and site configuration/location). This schedule could prove burdensome for some licensees and make full implementation of the rule within the required time period extremely difficult. Therefore, we recommend that the NRC consider a longer implementation period.

Clarification Issues

1) We request that the NRC clarify whether the proposed rule assumes the vehicle is under control by the adversaries up to the point of detonation.

~tJ,S. NUCLF.' l ,'

: LATO RY COMMISSION oo:*-':;*

• Ci:f1'/ICE SECTION Offl::.: ( r fl '::: SECRETARY OF Ti!:.: CO'.,lMlSSION c~v A*'di C Sp<<~ _ /Z;f >().sl /lOf) I J:2'vc.l'--/£ 7 ~ -------

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 3, 1994 Page 2

2) We request that the NRC clarify whether the proposed rule assumes the vehicle bomb automatically detonates when the adversaries lose control of the vehicle, or after a pre-defined time period.

3) The proposed rule uses "and/or" when referring to explosives. We request that the NRC clarify whether the proposed rule requires an analysis for both a Design Basis Vehicle Bomb threat combined with a Design Basis Adversarial threat.

4) We request that the NRC clarify whether the proposed rule assumes the vehicle bomb is used on the facility in combination with a secondary external plant event such as a loss of offsite power.

5) The proposed rule stipulates that vital equipment must be protected from the effects of a design basis vehicle bomb. The proposed rule also states that licensees could take credit for alternate equipment not damaged by the assumed explosion. However, NRC's design goals imply that there shall be no intrusion of vehicle bomb beyond the existing protected area boundary. Therefore, we are requesting that the NRC clarify whether a licensee can eliminate consideration of the need to protect certain vital equipment if alternate equipment is available after the detonation.

6) Certain terrain features are natural bar.riers that aid in the interdiction of armed terrorists via vehicle. A vehicle attempting to navigate through certain terrain would crash and could roll toward the facility. The effectiveness of a vehicle bomb would be dependent on its point of detonation. Therefore, under these circumstances, we request that the NRC clarify the point of detonation (i.e., first crash point or at a later time as it progresses toward the facility).

In addition, we fully support the Nuclear Management and Resources Council's (NUMARC's) position and comments concerning this proposed rule.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours, A~~~r,}-

Director Licensing Section

Georgia Power Company 40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 877-7279 J. T. Beckham, Jr.

Vice President - Nuclear Hatch Project r

January 4 , 1994 Docket Nos. 50-321 50-424 HL -4475 50-366 50-425 LCV-0246 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch Proposed Design Basis Vehicular Threat Regulations (58 Federal Register 58804 of November 4, 1993)

Dear Sir :

Georgi a Power Company has reviewed the proposed amendment on "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," published in the Federal Register on November 4, 1993 . In accordance with the request for comments, Georg i a Power Company is in total agreement with the NUMARC comments which are to be provided to the NRC.

Should you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted ,

~;i *~

T./ Betlha~ fr.-

DSC/dsc MAY 4 1994, Acknowledged by card .........................~.::;;

___ c {d__h_l I

,  :! ~ qi?~~

--'Tfr!o ;;;~~,,4,.,,; -~

- ~- -~*- .

. f" .

- --- - I jt7/hf I

Georgia Power , \

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page Two cc: Georgia Power Company C. K. McCoy, Vice President, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant J. B. Beasley, General Manager, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant H. L. Sumner, Jr., General Manager, Plant Hatch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC K. N. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager - Vogtle U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss ion, Region II S. D. Ebneter, Regional Admin istrator L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector - Vogtle HL-4475 LCV-0246 G.02 .17

FREDERICK H. WINSlON (1853-1886) 1400 L STREET, N.W. CHICAGO OFFICE SILAS H. STRAWN (1891-1946) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3502 35 WEST WACKER DRIVE

• 94 JAtl - 5 /',' -~ :JG CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601 (312) 558-5600 (202) 371-5700 NEW YORK OFFICE FACSIMILE (202) 371-5950 175 WATER STREET NEW YORK, NY 10038-4981 202-371-5798 (212) 269-2500 January 3, 1994 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington , D. C. 20555 Re: Proposed Rule on "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehi cl es a t Nuclear Power Plants" (58 Fed. Reg. 58.804 (19 93) )

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On November 4, 1 993, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published for comment a proposed rule titled "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants." 58 Fed. Reg.

58,804 (1993). The proposed rule would modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle to t ransport personnel or explosives . On behalf of the Nuclear Ut il ity Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG),Y we respectfully submit the following comments on the proposed rule.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our views on this important rulemaking. We support the positions taken by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC). Our comments focus on the backf i tting aspects of the rul e, specif i cal l y, the backf it ting and regulatory analyses that have been provided to support the initiative.

The intrusion incident at Three Mile Island and the bombing of the World Trade Center may j us tify a review of nuclear power plant security measures. The results of such a review as discussed in the documentation associated with this proposed rulemaking, however, suggest that those two isolated and unrelated Y NUBARG consists of the nuclear utilities listed in the Attachment hereto, each of which owns or operates a power reactor licensed by the NRC. NUBARG actively part i cipated in t he development of the NRC's backf i tting rule and has closely monitored its implementation.

, MAY 14 1994-----..

Acknowledged by card ...................."*-*"'"*

Malevolent Vehicle Use January 3, 1994 Page 2 events do not convincingly demonstrate that the actions contained in the proposed rule are truly necessary from a public health and safety standpoint. More specifically, the backfitting and regulatory analyses accompanying the proposed rule do not appear to provide a sufficient quantified basis for finding the requisite "substantial increase" in safety under the NRC's backfitting rule, 10 C.F.R. § 50.109.

Discussion The proposed rule would require a licensee to submit within 90 days {1) proposed vehicle intrusion control me a sures;

{2) results of an evaluation comparing the measures to protect against vehicle intrusion with the de s ign goals and criteria for prot e cting against a land vehicle bomb (including a review of safe standoff distances); and {3) the measures it will take to fully meet the Commis s ion's criteria for protecting against a vehicle bomb, if its proposed vehicle intrusion control measures do not by themselves meet the specified design goals and criteria. A licensee may propose alternative measures to those required by requirement {3). However, in such a case, the licensee would be required to provide a detailed analysis and justification showing that the proposed alternative bomb-protection measures provide "substantial protection" and that "the cost of measures needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided." 58 Fed. Reg. at 58,805.

Backfittinq Analysis The NRC states in the backfitting section of the proposed rule that requirement {1) to develop vehicle intrusion control measures is a cost-jus tified backfit; that is, it provides a substantial increase in protection of the public health and safety at a cost which is justified by the safety increase. However, the backf it ting analysis {which addresses only the installation of vehicle intrusion control measures) does not rigorously analyze the expected radiological safety benefits to be achieved by these measures. For example, the analys is is lacking in quantified risk data and does not provide a safety goal evaluation which could be used as a basis for quantifying the requisite substantial increase in public health and safety. Although the backfitting analysis does contain pertinent cost information, neither an explicit benefit-to- cos t analysi s {for example, as a ratio) as discussed in the current revision of the Regulatory Analysis Guidelines, NUREG/BR-0058, and associated value-impact handbook, NUREG/CR-3568, nor a net-value formulation as discussed in the proposed Revision 2 to the Regulatory Analysis Guidelines has been provided.

Malevolent Vehicle Use January 3, 1994 Page 3 Instead, the NRC relies on a qualitative evaluation to conclude that a substantial increase in safety will result. The "Backfit Analysis" Section of the proposed rule (58 Fed. Reg. at 58,806) notes that "the conclusions reached are based on the best available data." In this connection, the regulatory analysis (at page 10) further indicates that the design basis threat is "not intended to represent a real threat." We appreciate that it may be difficult to quantify the safety benefit for a hypothetical threat where actual data do not exist, and we do not in principle disagree with the use of a qualitative analysis in the safeguards area.

Nevertheless, the present analysis, in our view, is no more than conclusory and falls short of demonstrating the requisite substantial increase in radiological safety .Y This may well reflect the fact that, as indicated in NUMARC's comments, installation of v e hi c le barrie r sys tems is n o t justified out of a concern for attempted radiological sabotage.

Bomb Threat Improvements The second requirement of the proposed rule would have licensees evaluate their vehicle intrusion control measures against specified bomb threat design goals. The NRC informally estimates that for about 80% of the plants, no additional measures beyond the proposed vehicle intrusion control measures will be required to protect against the bomb threat. (It is possible, of course, since the NRC's 80% estimate appears to be a "ballpark" number, that a greater percentage of plants actually will be affected.) For the estimated 20% of plants that do not meet the bomb threat criteria, additional measures could be required to fully meet design goals.

Alternatively, the licensee may propose other measures if the licensee demonstrates a substantial increase in safety from such measures and that the costs to fully meet the design goals and criteria would not be justified by the resulting incremental increase in protection that would be provided. 58 Fed. Reg. at 58,805.

Y Although all the factors required for a backfitting analysis per Section 50.109(c) are listed in the backfitting analysis, the substance supporting those factors is conclusory in the quantification of a substantial increase in safety. The backfitting analysis refers back to the regulatory analysis for supporting details. However, adequate supporting detail does not appear to exist in the referenced sections of the regulatory analysis either.

Malevolent Vehicle Use January 3, 1994 Page 4 We are concerned that this approach is inconsistent with Section 50.109. The NRC will expect affected licensees to analyze their facilities and make whatever improvements are needed to fully meet the design goals. However, the backfitting and regulatory analyses do not attempt to demonstrate the substantial increase in safety required by the backfitting rule for either the requirement to evaluate the facility or any plant modifications that will be needed. The NRC states in the regulatory analysis in Section 4.2 that "[t]raditionally, the Staff has not attempted a quantitative evaluation of the benefits associated with safeguards requi r ements."

The NRC appears to base this on the conclusions of a 1983 Staff review which showed that "no technical basis was available for quantifying the contribution of sabotage to the overa ll risk from nuclear power plant operations." The regulatory analysis states later in Section 4 . 2 that such an evaluation would require the quantification of various factors including the likelihood of bomb use to damage a nuclear plant, the probability of forced entry into the protected area, and the probability of the use of a particular size of bomb at a particular location. The paragraph concludes that the "Staff is unable to quantify any of these factors."

In short, the NRC appears to be saying with regard to the bomb threat that it is unable to quantify the relevant factors, and that in any event it does not have to do so because the factors are safeguards-related. We are concerned that this approach could set a precedent for an exception from Section 50.109 - - i.e., for new safeguards requirements - - that currently does not exist. The NRC also does not appear to have addressed whether new data that may have been developed over the past 10 years might have brought its previous conclusion from the 1983 review into question. For example, it may be possible to quantify, based on historical data, the probability of bomb use against a power reactor, the probability of forced entry, and the likelihood of damage to safety systems.

With respect to plant changes, the NRC states in the proposed rule that if a licensee, following its evaluation of the site, does not want to take measures to meet fully the bomb threat design goals, it may propose alternative measures if it demonstrates that those measures will substantially increase safety and that the costs to meet the design goals are not justified by any incremental increase in protection. This requirement seems inappropriate for two reasons. First, with regard to risk, it will be difficult for the licensee to show what the Staff already admits

Malevolent Vehicle Use January 3, 1994 Page 5 it is unable to show. Second, the Staff appears to be asking the licensee to perform what is effectively a backfitting analysis to justify why the licensee should not install a proposed modification. Such a provision runs counter to the principle of the backfitting rule that the NRC must provide a documented analysis to justify a proposed change. The better approach, in our view, would be, first, for the licensee to propose any voluntary measures based on the site evaluation; and then, if the Staff wishes to propose additional measures for the site, the Staff would prepare a plant-specific backfitting analysis to justify its proposals.

Exclusion of 10 C.F.R. § 50.13 Finally, we note that the regulatory/backfit analysis does not attempt to reconcile the proposed new rule with the provisions of 10 C.F.R. § 50.13. Section 50.13 provides that licensees do not need to include "design features or other measures for the specific purpose of protection against the effects of . .

attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign government or other person . . . . " This provision appears to reflect the Commission position that "the defense and internal security capabilities of this country constitute, of necessity, the basic 'safeguards' as respects possible hostile acts by an enemy of the United States."~ Since a vehicular bomb attack on a nuclear power reactor would almost certainly represent an attack by an enemy of the United States, such as a foreign-based terrorist organization, an explanation of how the proposed new design basis threat is consistent with this specific exclusion should be provided.

~ Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F.2d 778, 782 (D.C.

Cir. 1968).

Malevolent Vehicle Use January 3, 1994 Page 6 NUBARG appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. We hope that our comments will assist the NRC in assessing the technical basis for this rulemaking and in assuring that the proposed new measures accord with the requirements of the backfitting rule as appropriate.

ely ,

0 s.

niel F. St Jan A.

Counsel to the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group Attachment

\VINSTON & S TRAWN NUBARG Members Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Carolina Power & Light Company Centerior Energy Corporation (representing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company and Toledo Edison Company)

Commonwealth Edison Company Entergy Operations, Inc (representing Arkansas Power & Light, System Energy Resources, Inc., and Louisiana Power & Light)

Florida Power & Light Company Florida Power Corporation New York Power Authority Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Northeast Utilities Pennsylvania Power & Light Company Philadelphia Electric Company Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation Texas Utilities Washington Public Power Supply System

C January 3, 1994 COMMENTS OF OHIO CIT I ZENS FOR RES PONS IBLE ENERGY, INC. ( "OCRE ..

ON PROPOSED RULE, "PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VERIB-h AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS," 58 FED. REG. 58804 (NOVEMBER 4, 1993)

OCRE generally supports this proposed rule. The need for this rule is compelling in light of the intrusion incident at Three Mile Island and the World Trade Center bombing.

However, OCRE would recommend that the scope of the rule not be limited to land vehicles, but also include aquatic vehicles, since virtually all nuclear power plants are located on navigable bodies of water. OCRE has outlined the need for protection against malevolent use of boats in our previous comments submit-ted after the May 10, 1993 meeting and on PRM-73-9. OCRE be-lieves that substantial protection against malevolent uses of boats could be achieved at low cost, by using barriers such as buoys linked with ropes placed at the safe standoff distance, and by visual or electronic surveillance to watch for suspicious activity or intrusion of the barrier. As defenses against land vehicles are strengthened through this rule, then defenses against attack by water will, in comparison, be softer, and thus the aquatic route will present a more attractive option for at-tackers.

OCRE is concerned that proposed 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8)(ii) provides an escape hatch by which licensees can evade the intent of the rule. OCRE would question whether the consideration of costs to licensees of full compliance is contrary to the court's ruling in Union Qf.. Concerned Scientists Y..... N.E.C., 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir.

1987), which held that the NRC may not consider costs to licen-sees in either setting or enforcing "adequate protection" stand-ards.

It is stated in the Federal Register notice that ' contingency planning may be approved as one element of these proposed alter-native measures. OCRE finds this unacceptable. If the NRC truly believes, as is stated elsewhere in the notice,, that "a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the future," then contingency planning, which is the present requirement under Generic Letter 89-07, is com-pletely inadequate.

1 MAY 4 1994 Acknowledged by card .......................'"........

• uc~. . . . ~* . . ,~~TORY COMMISSION DCCV. _ ~ : *: t. SERVICE SECTION OFf'1 *- J~ fflE. SECRETARY OF 1Ht C0 ..1MISSION n >1-ra.J '¥/O il,

~

Should the NRC decide to allow alternative measures, pursuant to proposed 10 CFR 73.55(c) (8) (ii), then OCRE supports the condition that licensee proposals to use alternative measures be handled as 10 CFR 50.90 amendments. Requiring a license amendment would preserve public hearing rights on this important matter, and would also tend to discourage less than full compliance. Howev-er, this requirement does not appear in the text of the proposed rule. OCRE believes that to be enforceable, it should be part of proposed 10 CFR 73.55(c) (B)(ii).

Respectfully submitted, Susan L. Hiatt Director, OCRE 8275 Munson Road Mentor, OH 44060-2406 (216) 255-3158 2

r0cKET ~UM_ ER P \ Jr U..,..:D RULE R7 - -r NORTHEAST UTILITIES (t;fF F (< S"fr~O'--/J General Offices* Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

((I!]

THE CONNECTICUT l.lGHT ANO POWER COMPANY WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY P.O. BOX 270 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY (203) 665-5000 January 3, 1994 Docket Nos. 50-213 Re: 58 FR 58804 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Proposed Revision to 10 CFR 73 58 FR 58804, November 4, 1993, Opportun itv f or Public Comment On November 4, 1993, 111 the NRC published in the Federal Register a notice seeking comment from interested parties regarding the NRC's proposal to amend its physical protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors by modifying the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company {CYAPCO) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company {NNECO) welcome the opportunity to provide input on this issue.

- The nuclear power industry has evaluated and developed comments on the proposed rule. In particular, the Nuclear Management and Resources Council {NUMARC) is submitting comments on this proposed rule. CYAPCO and NNECO endorse NUMARC's submittal as representative of our position on the proposed rule. Most notably, CYAPCO and NNECO agree with NUMARC's comments regarding the level of conservatism that exists in the NRC's proposed design basis threat, and their recommendation regarding reconsideration of the expedited schedule.

(1) Federal Register, Volume 58, No. 212, Pages 58804 through 58807, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "10 CFR Part 73, Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 4, 1993.

0S3422 REV. 4-88 MAY ~ 4 1994' Acknowledged by card ........Mlllltttttteeceneeeeuv

~&. r1UCL f 11 9 tl:.GULATORY COMMISSION en*--: C, 1*~r, ' ~ERVICE SECTION OfhC.: :j~ ,,,[ SECRETARY OF THE COMMISvlON

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk B14717/Page 2 January 3, 1994 CYAPCO and NNECO appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant J. W. Andersen, NRC Acting Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1 G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2 V. L. Rooney, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Station W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3

BOSTON EDISON Pilgrim Nuclear Powe r Station Rocky Hill Roa d

, ;:_, r,. : , :.. i

,,., **1--!

, ..,r, , ...

t/ ('J l

r Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

• 94 .IAN }ff P12 :24 January "3, 1994 BECo Ltr.94-001 E. T. Boulette, PhD Senior Vice President - Nuclear Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35

Subject:

Proposed Rule "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants (58FR58804)

Boston Edison is opposed to the issuance of this proposed Rule regarding protection against land vehicle intrusion at nuclear power plants. Implementation of this rule would not increase the safe operation of nuclear power pl ants. The events assumed do not warrant the significant expenditure of resources to implement (see our cost estimates below). Rather, the proposed rule will reduce the likeli hood of an already low probability event.

Absent withdrawal of this proposed rulemaking, we support the comments submitted by NUMARC and have some additional comments.

We agree with NUMARC that it is not necessary to make the Design Basis Threat (DBT) any more unrealistic. The events at Three Mile Island and the World Trade Center need to be uncoupled as a hypothetical threat before building further conservatisms into the current DBT. Uncoupling these events allows for a more realistic basis for a vehicle barrier system. There would either be the potential for a land vehicular intrusion attempt or the potential for an attempted bombing by means of remote detonation of explosives in a parked vehicle outside the protected area, not a combination of the two. Similarly, the proposed rule increases the design basis explosive well above domestic experience to date. The size of the design basis explosive should be no larger than the maximum explosive equivalent previously detonated within this country.

Protecting the health and safety of the public and our employees is the primary concern in the operation of Pilgrim. The emphasis of any new rule should be to protect those areas and/or systems necessary for

• safe shut down in the event of a security breach. The proposed rule goes beyond ensuring safe shutdown by prescribing additional protection for all vital areas. For example, the statements in sections 73.55(c)(7) and 73.55(c)(8)(ii) "to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas 11 and "The Commission wi 11 approve the proposed alternative measures if they provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb" may be unnecessary.

There may be a vital area that could be lost due to an explosion and yet the plant MAY i4 19~

Acknowledged by card .. ,.."_"..'"'""......N ..

1UCLEf.R FUULATORY COMMISSION OCKETI 1G ~ SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION

Boston Edison Company

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 could st ill be safel y sh ut down. This approach is cons is te nt with th e NRC's philosophy used during the Operations Safeguards Response Evaluations (OSRE) currently being conducted at plants.

Implementation Schedule Beyond NUMARC's comments, we believe it is imperative that any rulemaking process be delayed until the NRC's blast effect analyses have been completed and are available for industry review, with an appropriate comment and discussion period. The safe standoff distance is key in determining the implementation expense of this rule making. While the Regulatory Analysis states that most existing protected area boundaries are probably at acceptable standoff di stances, until the blast effect analyses are known this i s an unsupported statement.

Furthermore, we propose that utilities who have an approved integrated schedule (such as the Pilgrim "Long Term Program" required by our Condition of License #3.H) have the option to schedule the implementation of this rule through t hat process instead of required dates in the code. The current wording of the proposed rule would require a formal exemption to change the date. We suggest the proposed 73 . 55(c)(9)(i) and (ii) be combined into one section and a new (ii) be added to read: "Those utilities with an NRC approved "Integrated Schedule" (57FR43888) shall prioritize implementation of the requirements of this part as a "Level I" item and include it in their next required NRC submittal of the schedule".

Backfit Analysis We cannot realistically comment on the Backfit Analysis as it relates to Pilgrim Station until we can determine the safe standoff distance for all of our vital areas. However, we agree with NUMARC that the NRC has not provided quantifiable justification for the statement that this rulemaking will provide a substantial increase in public health and safety.

We have performed rough calculations and have determined that the cost of implementation for Pilgrim Station could be a least $1.7 million. We expect that when formal calculations are performed using realistic blast effect analyses, that the costs may increase.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. Should you have any questions regarding our comments, please call our Security Manager, Mr. John Neal at 508 -830-8788.

E.T. Boulette, PhD ML/bal/9401 cc: Mr. R. B. Eaton Div. of Reactor Projects 1/11 Office of NRR - USNRC One White Flint North - Mail Stop 14Dl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Sr. NRC Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Station

DOCKET NUMBER R PROPOSED RULE~ ~......--*

( 5"F-F R sa-e-o'-1) rc:cr-r: i E J l '::; ~ii*C NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE *94 JM - 4 P3 :44 1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202*822*8444 FAX 202*452*0892 January 3, 1994 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

We are writing to express the views of the Nuclear Control Institute ("NCI")

concerning proposed revision of the rules of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the "NRC" or the "Commission") governing protection against malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants (10 CFR, Part 73), as published in the Federal Register on November 4, 1993 (58 Fed. Reg. 58804), and corrected on November 12, 1993 (58 Fed. Reg. 59965).

NCI is a non-profit corporation organized and existing under the laws of the District of Columbia. It monitors developments in nuclear commerce that increase the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. In 1985, NCI co-sponsored a multidisciplinary, internationally attended conference on nuclear terrorism and thereafter created an International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, comprised of 26 experts from nine countries. These initiatives resulted in two books: Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat (Leventhal and Alexander, eds., Pergamon, 1986) and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Leventhal and Alexander, eds., Lexington, 1987). Among other matters, the 150 participants in the conference and the 26 Task Force members identified deficiencies and urged improvements in protection against radiological sabotage at nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities.

Since completion of its Task Force's work, NCI has collaborated with the Los Angeles-based Committee to Bridge the Gap (which is submitting separate comments) in pressing the NRC to upgrade its design basis threat for radiological sabotage and the implementing regulations. NCl's efforts have included letters to the NRC and National Security Council (1987), testimony before a House subcommittee (1988), and a Petition for Rulemaking (1991) and a Request for Action (1991) to the NRC. All these efforts proved unsuccessful. In 1993, prompted by the intrusion at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station and the bombing of the World Trade Center, NCI and the Committee to Bridge the Gap renewed their efforts to have the NRC upgrade security measures at domestic nuclear power plants. NCI testified before a Senate subcommittee (March 19), briefed the Commission (April 22), and served on a panel at the NRC-sponsored public meeting (May

10) on the design basis threat for radiological sabotage.

Given this long history, NCI is gratified that the NRC is proposing long-overdue measures to provide security against malevolent use of land vehicles at nuclear power Strategies for stopping tbe spread and reversing tbe growth of nuclear arms.

Paul L Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Victor Gilinsky, Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer, Roger 3/4~iH* ~. ;rheodore B. Taylor BOARD OF DIRECTORS Acknowledgedb y card ................................

MAJ - 4 1994

$. N'JC~.:' ~ *. .-.. .".,; u:; *t COM:*/iiSSION DO~."; ' *..: *: :, >1'.' '.:'I: SECTION o;.=, .,:: 'w'i "-~ :~!;P t:.TARY 0 1* r,.i.: (,!J:.i ~t6S1:JN st:"!1:r-e!'~ . . _/-L~ _ c!..t,,I i ve,,rJ C~*~'JJS'* { /~ - - -- - -

plants. The Commission is to be commended for talcing this action. However, for the rule to be effective ~ preventing vehicle intrusions and protecting against the detonation of vehicle bombs that could cause major radiological releases at nuclear power plants, the Commission should eliminate some apparent oversights and ambiguities in the proposed rule.

In addition, the Commission will have to address other aspects of adversary attributes, including the insider threat, nUD1ber of attackers, and weaponry and equipment used, if it wants to provide full protection against the threat of sabotage at nuclear power plants. Most of these *are specified in the Phase II plan submitted by the Executive Director for Operations in his October 28 Memorandum for the Commission.

Licensee Discretion In NCI' s view the principal problem of the proposed rule is that it could be misread to allow licensees a greater degree of discretion than is warranted.

This is not true of all provisions of the proposed rule. For example, 73.55(c)(7) unconditionally stipulates: "Vehicle control measures, including barrier systems, must be established to protect against the use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas." In contrast to this unambiguous objective, Section (c)(8) allows "[e]ach licensee [to] compare the vehicle control measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) to the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb." On the basis of this evaluation, the licensee may "[c]onfum to the Commission that the vehicle control measures meet the design goals and criteria specified." If the licensee cannot make this confirmation, it can proceed in one of two ways, according to the explanatory section entitled "Regulatory Approach":

It may implement additional measures that would fully meet the design goals and criteria such as moving vehicle barriers further away from vital areas or equipment, installing blast shields, or modifying plant systems and equipment Alternatively, the licensee may propose to the Commission additio'na.I measures other than the ones needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria, provided this approach provides substantial protection against a vehicle bomb and that it can be demonstrated that the costs of measures to fully meet the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. (Emphasis supplied.)

As NCI _understands the procedure, the proposed rule requires at least four potential determinations to be made regarding the adequacy of licensee actions to provide protection against vehicle bombs:

1. Do the licensee's implemented vehicle denial measures, as required under 2

73.55(c)(7), by themselves provide a level of protection against land vehicle bombs that "fully meet[s] the design goals and criteria" of the Commission?

2. If not, do the licensee's "additional measures" provide a level of protection against land vehicle bombs that "fully meet[s] the design goals and criteria" of the Commission?

3. If not, will the licensee be permitted to provide a lesser level of protection? In other words, does the licensee satisfy the stipulated criterion, that "the costs of measures to fully meet the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided"?

. 4. If so, do the licensee's "additional measures" nonetheless provide "substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb"?

- It should be noted that implicit in determination No. 3 and No. 4 are definitions of two terms the Commission has not defined in the proposed rule: "substantial protection" and "unjustified costs."

In NCI's view, it is essential that the rule be made explicit in stating that the final determination in each of these four decisions, and any others involving an evaluation of the adequacy of protective measures at licensed facilities, rests with the Commission, not with the licensees. In the proposed rule, including the explanatory material in the Federal Register announcement, the language is ambiguous on this point. For example, in the "Description of Proposed Amendments," the announcement says, Licensees whose vehicle denial measures do not fully satisfy the design goals for protection against a vehicle bomb would have the option to establish additional measures to meet the design goals or propose other additional measures that give substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb. (Emphasis supplied.)

This sentence easily could be misread to suggest that the ultimate decision on the nature and adequacy of the protective measures rests with the licensee. Similarly, under "Regulatory Approach," the announcement says, The licensee would be required to determine if measures established to protect against vehicle proximity to vital areas of the facility also protect against the threat of a land vehicle bomb as defined by the design goals and criteria set by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, under "Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability," one reads, The proposed rule involves installation of vehicle barriers at 3

operating power reactor sites and an evaluation of these barriers by the licensee to determine whether they provide adequate protection against a land vehicle bomb under design goals and criteria established by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied.)

The "Implementation" section does state, "Proposals by licensees to use alternative measures would be handled as 10 CFR 50.90 amendments," apparently establishing the authority for final approval by the Commission in those cases. Yet the question of the Commission's authority to make final determinations remains ambiguous, at best, for those determinations that do not deal specifically with alternative measures, as in examples 1 and 2 above.

In short, the wording of the rule and its explanatory material should be clarified so as to make plain the Commission's authority to make each of the crucial determinations cited above, and to evaluate independently the analyses provided by the licensee. The rule explanatory material should be revised to correct these shortcomings, as described above, and the rule itself should be modified as follows:

At the end of 73.55(c)(7), insert the following: "These measures shall be reviewed by, and subject to the approval of, the Commission."

In 73.55(c)(8)(i), strike "Confirm to the Commission" and insert "Submit to the Commission a confirmation, subject to the approval of the Commission,".

In 73.55(c)(8)(ii), second sentence, strike "an analysis" and insert "the Commission's analysis".

At the end of 73.55(c)(9)(i), strike the semicolon and insert a period. After the period, insert "The submittal shall be reviewed by, and subject to the approval of, the Commission;"

"Substantial Protection" NCI strongly objects to provision 73.55(c)(8)(ii), which allows some licensees to comply only with the lesser standard of "substantial protection" against land vehicle bombs, rather than "fully meet[ing] the design goals and criteria" While NCI recognizes that the Commission is attempting to provide a degree of flexibility to licensees because of differences in the characteristics of protected areas among the affected sites, this flexibility should not compromise the level of protection at each licensed facility. Therefore, NCI proposes that the term "substantial protection" be replaced with "equivalent protection" or "a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the Commission's design goals and criteria" 4

Backfit Analysis The "Backfit Analysis" of the Federal Register announcement states that backfitting to comply with the requirements of this proposed rule will provide a substantial increase in protection to public health and safety or ~e common defense and security at a cost which is justified by the substantial increase." This language appears to be intended to track the slightly different language in the relevant section of the backfit rule (10 CFR 50.109(a)(i)(3)): "... that there is a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation... are justified in view of this increased protection." Unless the Commission intends to make a distinction from the backfit rule, the language of the proposed rule should be identical. If a distinction is intended, the Commission should state its reasons for the distinction and submit them for public comment Hand-Carried Weapons, Equipment and Explosives A further problem with the proposed rule is that by finally upgrading the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to provide for malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants, it creates inconsistencies with other elements of the design basis threat that are carried over into the proposed rule. In particular, the proposed rule continues to assume that intruders will bring only hand-held automatic weapons and hand-carried equipment and/or explosives (73.l(a)(l)(i)(C) and (D)). The assumption of hand-carried equipment and/or explosives also is included in the new paragraph (a)(l)(i)(E) specifying the design-basis vehicle.

NCI has previously stated its view that the assumption that intruders will have only hand-held weapons and hand-carried explosives is one of the deficiencies of the design basis threat for radiological sabotage. However, this provision at least had the virtue of being consistent with the flawed assumption that intruders would not use a vehicle. Now that the NRC is acknowledging the possibility that a vehicle will be used, it stands to reason that the intruder will be able to use the vehicle to carry heavier, more powerful weapons, equipment and explosives. Indeed, by proposing in its regulatory approach that licensees "establish measures to protect vital equipment within power reactor vital areas from ... damage from the detonation of a vehicle bomb in the vicinity of the vital area" (emphasis supplied), the Commission is acknowledging the use of a greater quantity of explosives than can be carried by hand. By the same reasoning, it also can be assumed that the vehicle can be used to carry heavier weapons and equipment than can be carried by hand.

NCI proposes, therefore, that in 73.1, the new paragraph (a)(l)(i)(E) be amended to read as follows: "A four-wheel drive land vehicle used as a vehicle bomb or for the transport of personnel, weapons, equipment, and/or explosives, and". In addition, we propose that as part of Phase II of the Commission's review of the design basis threat for radiological sabotage, in which adversary attributes for weaponry, equipment, and group size are to be addressed, that paragraphs (a)(l)(i)(C) and (D) be modified to provide 5

specifically for weapons, equipment and explosives that could be transported by vehicle and, therefore, would be heavier and more powerful than those that are hand-held and hand-carried.

However, NCI wishes to emphasize that even if one accepts the present assumption that the adversary will use only hand-held weapons, there is still a major defect in the proposed rule and in the guidance issued by the Commission for its implementation (NUREG-CR-4250). Neither the proposed rule nor the guidance assumes that the adversary can blast away the protective fence. Yet, shoulder-fired weapons such as a bazooka or a more modern laser-guided ("LAW1') grenade launcher could easily blast a large opening in a fence reinforced with aircraft cable and enable an explosives-laden land vehicle to pass through and gain sufficient proximity to vital areas of a plant to cause severe damage and radiological releases. Thus, the type of barrier to be required by the proposed rule to repel a design-basis land vehicle will be insufficient to withstand a design-basis, hand-held e weapon.

It might be argued that there never has been a land vehicle bomb attack in conjunction with the use of a bazooka or similar type of weapon to blast through a barrier prior to detonation and that, therefore, such a contingency need not be addressed in the design-basis threat for radiological sabotage. NCI contends, however, that in most cases, such as the truck-bomb attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon and the World Trade Center in New York, there were no obstacles that needed to be blasted away for the truck to get close enough to cause severe damage. Also, the large radiological releases that could be caused by detonation of a truck bomb in close proximity to the vital areas of a nuclear power plant make it imperative that such an obvious vulnerability of the protected-area fence be foreclosed.

The Commission, therefore, should revise the proposed rule and the guidance for its implementation to require licensees to take compensatory measures in the form of heavy-mass protective systems, such as the installation of steep, S-curve ditches or steep, wide berms ~ 5 feet high by 10 feet wide) around the protected-area fence. Such heavy-mass barriers would prevent a four-wheel drive land vehicle from penetrating the fence after a section of it is blasted away; without such barriers, the protected-area fence easily could be compromised with shoulder-fired weapons.

Timing NCI supports the 90-day time frame for licensees' submittal of the summary description of their proposed vehicle control measures under the proposed 73.55(c)(9)(i).

However, the Commission should express a firm commitment to conduct a prompt review of this submittal.

Under 73.55(c)(9)(ii), a licensee would have 360 days from the effective date of the final rule to bring its facility into compliance with the rule. NCI believes that 360 days is a reasonable time period in which to achieve compliance. However, the rule should stipulate 6

that there will be no extension of that deadline, absent a finding of due diligence and circumstances beyond the licensee's control.

Finally, the Commission should establish procedures for monitoring licensees' compliance with the rule to ensure that the stipulated measures are, in fact, implemented within 360 days of the rule's effective date. The process of upgrading security to protect against truck bombs at nuclear power plants has been beset by numerous impediments and delays. Given the wake-up calls at Three Mile Island and the World Trade Center, the NRC and the public can ill afford any further delays.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions about the views expressed herein or if you require any further information concerning our position.

• • Sincerely, Daniel Homer President Deputy pirector 7

1.., r t ; !... ~

'J::,N,'(

consumers Power Patrick M Donnelly

• 94 JAN -4 P3 :43 Plant Manager PDWERINli MICHlliAN'S PROliRESS Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant. 10269 US-31 North. CharlevoiK, Ml 49720 December 28, 1993 Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

- Attention: Docketing and Services Branch The following comments represent the view of Consumers Power Company's Nuclear Operations Department.

10CFR73.55(c)(9)(i)

"Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall:

By (insert 90 days from effective date of rule) submit to the Commission a summary description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10CFR73.55(c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as required by 10CFR73.55(c)(8). For licensees who choose to propose alternative measures as provided for in 10CFR73.55(c)(8), the submittals must include the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives;"

The Amendment states that licensees are required to submit a summary description of the vehicle control measures within 90 days from the effect i ve date of the rule.

Due to the complexity of calculations, design and planning it appears this is not a realistic time frame to perform analysis and develop a comprehensive, cost-effective plan . We suggest this be increased to 120 days.

10CFR73.55(c)(9)(ii)

"By (insert 360 days from final rule effective date), fully implement the required vehicle control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as approved by the Commission;"

The 360 day time frame for full implementation of this amendment also appears unrealistic. The three phases to implementation include (1) plan development; (2) review and approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and (3) design ,

procurement and construction. The plan devel opment (as currently proposed) i s slated for 90 days, however the time frame for the review and approval process remains an unknown at this time. The review of over 60 different site plans could take much of the remaining 280 days which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had slated for licensee construct i on/implementation. Further, due A CMS' ENERGY COMPANY Acknowledged by card .... ~~..~....................

4 1994 J

-U.S. ~UCLEA.R REC GLATORY COMMISSION DOC fCF: :~G & S::RV!CE SECTION Orf:(..:= Cf- THE SECRETARY Or rnE cm,1MISSION Document Stati'.>tics Postmark Dat9 /-:L I J-q /1 J Coples RGCDivc l - -- - -- - -

J'------

d'I Cop13 i::".qrndLiCSd ....

Special Distribution ftr/J >. '(!.012.

. r2-vy ~ (J 7 *  ;

Secretary 2 December 28, 1993 to the limited number of vendors manufacturing some of the equipment necessary to implement this rule there may be long procurement periods.

Another factor which would affect construction of the vehicle protection system is the adverse weather conditions at some northern sites. Frozen ground, ice and snow could prevent or slow construction activities. We suggest this paragraph be revised to state that licensees have 360 days to implement this rule after plan approval by the Commission.

Big Rock Point Pl ant Only, Pg 58805 Discussion Decommissioning Reactors This paragraph states that licensees who plan to decommission in the near future may be able to receive a full or partial exemption from the rule. Due to our end of license being approximately five or six years after the implementation date of the rule, we request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission provide an interpretation of "decommission in the near future."

Sincerely, Michael D Bourassa Senior Licensing Engineer sra cc: PMDonnelly, Consumers Power Company JSRang, Consumers Power Company JLKuemin, Consumers Power Company

- SAKiss, Consumers Power Company

,_r *u.~s R1 (ffFR 5

. . . _=. .

~~io

! ~-~---

NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES COUNCIL ~E)C 1776 Eye Street, NW

• Suite 300

• Washington. DC 20006-3706 (202)872-1280 ' ' '"' - ~ - 1 Thomas E. Tipton Vice President & Director Operations. Management and January 3, 1994 Support Services Division Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Services Branch

SUBJECT:

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" 58 Fed. Reg. 58804 - November 4, 1993 Request for Comments

Dear Mr. Chilk:

These comments are submitted by Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) 1 on behalf of the industry in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proposed rule for Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, (58 Fed. Reg. 58804 - November 4, 1993). In addition to the general comments below, detailed comments on the proposed rule and regulatory analysis, the backfit analysis and the proposed Regulatory Guide are provided in Enclosures 1 through 3, respectively.

The NRC is addressing the review of the design basis threat (DBT) in two phases.

The first phase, on malevolent use of vehicles, has resulted in this proposed regulation that would require each licensee to install a vehicle barrier system (VBS) to prevent land vehicle intrusion into the protected area. The second phase, which explores revisions to the makeup, equipment and capabilities of a postulated paramilitary force that a licensee 1

NUMARC is the organi7.ation of the nuclear power industry that is responsible for coordinating the combined efforts of all utilities licensed by the NRC to construct or operate nuclear power plants, and of other nuclear industry organi7.ations, in all matters involving generic regulatory policy issues and on the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues affecting the nuclear power industry. Every utility responsible for constructing or operating a commercial nuclear power plant in the United States is a member ofNUMARC. In addition, NUMARCs members include major architect/engineering firms and all of the major nuclear steam supply system vendors.

MAY _ 4 1994.

Acknowledged by card ..................".....,.,.,MN

. '*')

~c:., i ':f' : ,. .-, *~:: .;' *: X: (;i~ v COMMISSION L ..:* .:, .. . .: W'" t: SECTION u:. ,:*- v*  ;*1/2.: -:f: '.:ft:fARY 0.- : r  :: cc:.~r.:,SSiON

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 3, 1994 Page 2 must protect against, will not be completed and available for comment until later this year. The industry is concerned that addressing the DBT in phases rather than in an integrated manner may cause licensees to make changes as a result of this proposed rule that will later have to be modified or may be unnecessary after all aspects of the DBT have been considered.

The industry is concerned that the NRC has proposed a rule on malevolent use of vehicles that is not supported by it's regulatocy analysis or backfit analysis. For example, the backfit analysis contains no quantified risk data or safety goal evaluation to support the conclusion that the proposed regulations result in the substantial increase in public health and safety required by 10 CFR 50.109. The proposed requirements would also impose excessive conservatism on the existing conservative security requirements.

The NRC has linked the vehicular penetration of the protected area (PA) fence at Three Mile Island (TMI) with the terrorist bombing at the World Trade Center (WTC).

The proposed rule contemplates that the intruding vehicle will be fully loaded with personneL equipment, and a large explosive device. Other than the fact that both occurred in February 1993, there is no connection between the TMI and WTC events.

The NRC's vehicle bomb assessment results show that vehicle bombs are usually stationary when the explosive device has been detonated. Further, historical data support the assumptions that the explosive will be placed in a stationary vehicle outside the protected area and that suicide missions are rare. The NRC has already built substantial

• conservatism into the current design basis threat (DBT); coupling these events results in adding unnecessary conservatism. For example, the revised DBT should include either a land vehicle intrusion or a detonation of explosives outside the protected area, but not a combination of the two.

The proposed rule contemplates an explosive TNT equivalent more powerful than any previously detonated for malevolent purposes in the United States. To specify the power of a postulated explosive device significantly larger, as described in the NRC's safeguards addendum, adds unnecessary conservatism to the DBT.

The industry is also concerned that the VBS design would be required to be "nuclear grade." Unless the design utilizes existing technology and barrier device test results, the cost will unnecessarily escalate. The NRC should evaluate the effectiveness of the VBS as but one part of the broader defense-in-depth approach to protect public health and safety.

Notwithstanding these important concerns, the industry believes that it is important to deter unauthorized land vehicle penetration challenges to nuclear power plant protected

Mr. SamuelJ. Chilk January 3, 1994 Page 3 areas. The industry also recognizes that it must be able to safely shutdown the plant in the unlikely event of the detonation of an explosive device parked outside the protected area. -These beliefs are based_on business prudence_(e.g., pwtection of employees ~d the investment in generating equipment inside the protected area) rather than concern for radiological sabotage or nuclear safety considerations since adequate protection of public health and safety are provided within existing NRC rules.

Key Principles

• Both industry and NRC agree, albeit for different reasons, that unauthorized vehicles should not be allowed inside the protected area and the licensee must be able to safely shutdown the plant following the detonation of an explosive device outside the protected area In order to accomplish the NRC's and industry's objectives in a reasonable and realistic manner, we recommend that the following principles be used to guide the establishment of protection requirements for land vehicles and land vehicle bombs in the proposed rule:

(1) The design basis vehicle that could be used to attempt penetration of a nuclear power plant site protected area; (a) Has a mass typical of a four-wheel drive land vehicle;

• (b) Attains speed(s) that depends upon the speed(s) achievable by a four-wheel drive vehicle traveling over the plant site-specific road(s) and/or terrain immediately outside the portion of the protected area fence chosen for the intrusion attempt; (c) Carries only personnel and hand-carried equipment; and (d) Has a total mass and maximum impact speed that are limited to the vehicle mass and speed specified in the NRCs November 19, 1993, safeguards document *

(2) The objective of a vehicle barrier system (VBS) or set of vehicle obstacles is to stop the forward motion of the vehicle in the vicinity of the site protected area fence rather than at the fence line; (3) A design basis bomb that could be used in an attempt to damage plant equipment will;

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 3, 1994 Page4 (a) Be placed in a stationary vehicle outside the protected area; and (b) Have explosive capability no greater than bombs previously detonated for malevolent purposes within the United States.

(4) Plant operators should be able to safely shutdown the plant following the detonation of an explosive device as described above outside the protected area; and (5) Commercial-grade design, procurement and installation is appropriate for the resolution of this issue; a "nuclear grade" review and inspection process is not necessary.

To make these principles operational, we suggest that the discussion in the regulatory guide be expanded to describe the flexibility available to licensees in designing and insta11ing harriers to protect against this threat. For example, the energy-absorbing capability of the various barrier devices and the speed-reducing capability of natural and man-made obstacles would be based on presently available test data (from Federal agencies, national laboratories and/or barrier manufacturers).

Schedule The NRC-proposed schedule of 90 days to submit plans to the NRC and 270 additional days to fully implement the rule is unrealistic given the many factors that licensees must take into account to be in full compliance with the final rule. These make it impractical for many licensees to fully meet the rule on the schedule proposed As a result, we recommend that licensees be given at least 180 days (vice 90 days) after issuance of the rule and various guidance documents to perform the required analysis, prepare and submit their plans. Additionally, a minimum of eighteen mo~

after issuing the proposed design to the NRC, should be allowed to fina1iz.e the desi~

procure and install the VBS. There are two key reasons for changing the schedule. First, the necessary guidance will not be issued until sometime in 1994. Second, many factors (e.g., site configuration, outage schedules, material availability, adverse weather conditions, etc.) could make it impractical for licensees to procure and install the designed VBS in the remaining NRC-proposed 270-day period, especially since there are only a few manufacturers of active vehicle barriers.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 3, 1994 Page 5 Summary Plant ~ t y is but one part o( a bro~ defense-:-in-depth approach to ¢ety employed in ihe des1gn-and operation of the plants. The present-security systems are designed to provide deterrence, detection, delay, assessment and armed response. These features, together with the design, operation, training, emergency p1anning and related activities, provide adequate protection of public health and safety from uncontrolled radiological releases.

The industry believes that it is important to deter unauthorized land vehicle penetration challenges to a licensee's protected area. The industry also recognizes that it must be able to safely shutdown the plant in the unlikely event of the detonation of an explosive device outside the PA These actions are prudent for the protection of its employees, investment and public confidence. Since NRC and industry agree in principle, it is important that, in addressing the issue, it be done in an integrated manner using a reasonable and realistic approach without imposing unnecessary conservatism.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule modification and would welcome the opportunity to discuss our comments further with appropriate NRC personnel.

• ly,

• m{~z omas E. Tipton TET:plg Enclosures

Enclosure 1 NUMARC Comments Proposed Rule and Regulatory Analysis PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEIDCLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Proposed Requirements The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 73 .1 of its regulations concerning physical protection of nuclear power plants to specifically include in the design basis threat (DBn: A four-wheel drive land vehicle usedfor the transport ofpersonnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives...

It also proposes to amend§ 73.55(c) to add: Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use ofa land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures established in accordance with JO CFR 73.55(c)(7) to the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb.

The NRC schedule would require each licensee to: ... submit to the Commission a summary description ofthe proposed vehicle control measures ... and the results ofthe vehicle bomb comparison ... within 90 days from the effective date of the rule. Then 270 days after that (within 360 days from the effective date of the rule), each licensee would be required to: .. .folly implement the required vehicle control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as approved by the Commission. ...

Impetus for the Rule The impetus for this rulemaldng is the linking of two unrelated events that occurred in February 1993. The first event was the Three Mile Island (TM.I) vehicular intrusion; the second event occurred in New York City at the World Trade Center (WTC). Other than the fact that both events occurred in February 1993, there was no actual connection between these events. However, the NRC's proposed rule has coupled them together forging a combined protection requirement. The relevance of the events will be discussed further below.

Regulatory History The malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants is not a new concern. The design basis threat was developed by the NRC in the mid-1970s. The potential for malevolent use of vehicles/bombs at nuclear sites was reviewed after the Beirut bombing in 1983*. NRC Information Notice 84-07, Design-Basis Threat and Review of Vehicular Access Controls, advised licensees ... to examine their contingency plans and the tactical measures to be employed by members of the security organization to impede penetration ofprotected areas by unauthorized vehicles. In 1989, further review resulted in Generic Letter 89-07, Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle "

Bombs, which required licensees to have short-range surface vehicle bomb threat

• contingencies. The NRC rejected the need for permanent measures, such as those now being proposed, in favor of those contingency plans. They continue to be available for implementation at each site.

NRC Denial of Petition in 1991 The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) and the Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG) have, since 1985, periodically petitioned the Commission to expand the design basis threat The NRC denied a January 11, 1991, petition by NCI/CBG (noticed in 56 Fed.

Reg. 3228 - January 29, 1991) with the following statements in-56 Fed. Reg. 26784 -

June 11, 1991:

The NRC staffbelieves that a decision on the petition can be based on response to a single pivotal issue: Has the threat of radiological sabotage ofdomestic nuclear reactors changed to an extent that Justifies a need to upgrade the cu"ent design basis threat?

The nature ofterrorism was the subject ofdetailed analysis before the NRC published its design basis threat(§ 73.1), and it continues to .remain the focus ofstaffreview. NRC efforts in creating the design basts threat and the actions taken by the NRC since the publication of§ 73.1 to assure its continuing validity remain a key component in the NRC safeguards program.

Thousands ofacts ofterrorist violence worldwide, ranging from simple attacks on property to the sophisticated, deadly bombing ofcivil airlines, are examined and analyzed by the NRC. The NRC uses a wide variety of information. ranging from that reported directly from the scene of the incident to that included in a finished analysis provided by the intelligence community. Throughout this ongoing daily analysis, the stafffocuses its effort on reviewing realistic, not hypothetical, adversary characteristics, including weaponry, group size, tactics, explosives, and targets. The NRC then compares what has occurred or is credible to the attributes enumerated in the design.basis threat.

With respect to truck and boat bombs of the size estimated in NRC studies as being capable of causing significant damage to domestic power reactors, the NRC staffnotes the following:

• There has been one such truck bomb in the U.S. (Math Lab.,

Wiscomin, 1970).

There have been no others in the Western Hemisphere .

There have been no others outside of an area of civil unrest.

• There have been none directed agaimt a nuclear activity worldwide.

• There have been no boat bombs directed at any activity, nuclear or otherwise, worldwide.

• Contingency planning to protect agaimt truck bombs has been completedfor all domestic power reactol'S.

Based on the foregoing facts, on discussiom with appropriate elements of the Executive Branch, and on NRC's independent assessment ofthe domestic threat environment, the NRC concludes that the likelihood of nuclear terrorism involving the use oflarge truck bombs agaimt nuclear power reactors in the United States is extremely low, that a change in the design basis threat for radiological sabotage is unwarranted, and that contingency planning is sufficient.

Although changes are occurring worldwide, the NRC has not detected, to date, any significant change to the threat environment, including weaponry, /

group size, state-spomorshtp, or targeting. that warrants a modification of the design basis threat statements for NRC licemed nuclear power reactors.

The NRC has accepted the notion that reactor sabotage, with radiological releases, is technically feasible for many years. Measures are employed at power reactors to protect agaimt credible radiological sabotage scenarios.

In the unlikely event of radiological sabotage, damage control and accident mitigation measures would likely limit the amount of radioactivity released Among the issues considered by the NRC during its deliberations on the vehicle bomb were the provisions of the Commission's backfit rule. The rule states in JO CFR 50.109(a)(3) that the Commission can require backfltting when it determines that there is a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to be derived from the backjit, and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation for that facility are justified in view of this increased protection. Contrary to the beliefof the petitioner and supported by some commenters, the NRC concluded that the vehicle denial system referred to in this excerpt would not provide a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. Cost was not a deciding factor.

The Commission concludes that there has been no change in the domestic threat since the design basis threat was adopted that would justify a change in the design basis threat Accordingly, the petitioners' request to modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage as set forth in 10 CFR

73. J is hereby denied We believe that the points made by the NRC in that 1991 denial are still valid after the TMI and WTC events and should be reviewed during this rulernaking process. The attention given to these two unrelated events has clearly overshadowed the NRC's previous long-term perspective.

Of further interest is that this petition was submitted just before the period of the Gulf War (Desert Storm), February 1991, when the highest potential terrorist threat was expected. The NRC did not conclude that the DBT or other security posture at nuclear power plants needed to be increased during that period.

NUMARC 1992 Letter to the NRC Chairman As we stated in our letter of December 21, 1992, to Chairman Selin, the industry is not suggesting that terrorism should no longer be considered a threat in the United States.

Our comments noted that the FBI has been recording and analyzing terrorist incidents for over ten years. It published a report on terrorist incidents occurring in the period 1980 to 1986 in December of 1986. Discussing the 190 terrorist incidents that occurred in the United States and Puerto Rico during these years, the report notes that New York alone accounted for 52 of these (39 percent). The FBI report states that, This is not unexpected since New York, particularly New York City, has a high concentration ofGovernment buildings, diplomatic establishments, national monuments and world-renowned commercial and cultural institutions. During that period seven known terrorist groups were active in New York. More recently, in the FBrs report for 1990, seven terrorist incidents were recorded - five in Puerto Rico and two in California.

In a discussion of a behavioral science approach to understanding terrorists in the 1990 report, the FBI states, Terrorists carefully assess which targets are most vulnerable, and may conduct surveillance to further develop their intelligence on a target. They select operations that pose a minimum of risk with a maximum chance ofsuccess. The FBI indicates that such events, if they occur, are most likely to be directed at attractive, relatively unprotected targets (e.g., the WTC). If an explosive device is used, it would most likely be placed in a parked vehicle. We also noted from FBI information that terrorists are likely to lack the training, weapons and education presumed in the DBT.

Historically, terrorist groups have chosen targets that represented or sympathized with the government or cause the group opposed. People opposed to nuclear power have chosen to demonstrate at the plant, seek media time and other activities to express their point of view to mass audiences. None of these groups match the description of the DBT.

Even though more terrorism is experienced in other countries, it appears that the security requirements for commercial nuclear power plants overseas are not as prescriptive as those in the United States. The basic philosophy in other countries with respect to protection against an outside threat is to make the site more secure than other political targets of opportunity.

Three Mile Island Event The gate crashing by a trespasser at TMI was evaluated in detail by an NRC Incident Investigation Team (ITT). Their findings are described in NUREG-1485, "Unauthorized Forced Entry into the Protected Area at Three Mile Island Unit 1 on February 7, 1993." The germane conclusions were:

• The event resulted in no actual adverse reactor safety consequences and was ofminimal safety significance.

• The security force responded appropriately to the specific challenge presented by the intruder.

• The NRC requirements for establishing and maintaining a physical protection system and as used during the security program licensing process do not consider use of a vehicle to breach a PA barrier. In this event, the use ofa vehicle reduced the amount of time the security force had to assess and respond to the event.

World Trade Center Event On February 26,1993, an explosive laden rental van, which had been parked under the WTC in New York City, was detonated. This was a rare event that was graphically newsworthy.

In our aforementioned letter of December 21, 1992, we quoted a previous FBI statement acknowledging that a terrorist event would not be unexpected in New York.

The WTC bombing followed the predicted pattern, although more brazen than earlier events. In a December 1992 counter-terrorism briefing with NUMARC, the FBI advised that their method of predicting any potential terrorist activity is to review the history of terrorist groups. A WTC type of event would have been a reasonable prediction. We also learned that the FBrs terrorist profile in this country does not include suicide as an expected tactic, as confirmed in the WTC event In April 1993, NRC reported that they had studied 508 vehicle bomb events as part of a continuing vehicle bomb assessment begun in 1988. Fewer than 5 of those events occurred in the United States. For the 508 events, the vehicle was usually parked, and the explosives detonated by a timing device or by remote control. Suicide attacks were rare.

It is thus reasonable to expect that, as at the WTC, a vehicle bombing attempt in the U.S.

would involve a parked vehicle. To assmne otherwise would add additional conservatism to an already very conservative assumption that a commercial nuclear plant would be a terrorist target Senate Subcommittee Hearing Statements In a hearing before the Senate Environment Committee's Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation, on March 19, 1993, NRC Chairman Selin stated, The objective of our physical protection requirements at commercial nuclear power reactors is to protect the general public from sabotage-induced releases of radioactive material off the site - in other words, to protect the general health and safety from radioactive releases.... {T]he licensees, not as NRC licensees, but as operators ofpower plants, may have other responsibilities to their own shareholders in light of their own law enforcement responsibilities.... Thus, unless there is a potential for radiological sabotage, protection of the plant and its personnel is the province of each nuclear utility.

Further, in commenting on previous Commission reviews concerning the need for any additional requirements for vehicle control measures, Chairman Selin stated, The Commission concluded that such protection was not needed at the time. The Commission put a lot of dependence on the sturdiness of reactor buildings, on redundant safety zystems, 01'1 damage-mitigatingfeatures ofpower reactors, reactors that are designed to take a hurricane, a tornado, natural effects, ove,pressures. They're quite sturdy buildings compared to normal construction. In other words, I would just say that the Commission followed its traditional defense-in-depth philosophy. Considerable weight is also given to the fact that an attack on a nuclear facility is a drastic step, that the potential consequences and likely political backlash could be directed against the causes of the saboteur. The Commission consulted with the intelligence community and heard fhat the community believed that there was no credible threat ofterrorism against nuclear power plants.

This last statement was confirmed at the hearing by Mr. Brandon, FBI Intelligence Division Deputy Assistant Director, who stated, With regard to nuclear facilities in the United States specifically, we rate the threat of acts of terrorism as low. We have no current indications of targeting or planning of acts of terrorism by any group or individuals.

Relevance of TMI and WTC Events As the staff notes, neither the Three Mile Island intrusion nor the World Trade Center explosion si!9.W an increase in the threat against hardened facilities such as nuclear power plants. Prior to the occurrence of these events, the NRC considered it unnecessary to require licensees to have permanent vehicle barrier systems. However, the staff now believes that barriers are needed to repel any attempt to penetrate the protected area with a land vehicle transporting personnel, hand-carried equipment and/or explosives and to keep any bomb attempt outside a safe standoff distance from vital equipment Contingency plans, required by Generic Letter 89-07, were considered sufficient for this purpose.

The TMI event demonstrated that a trespasser can use a land vehicle to penetrate a gate made from chain-link fencing - an event that a licensee is not required to prevent The WTC event was a rare, but graphic, newsworthy item that demonstrated terrorist capability in the United States. After several years of continuous threat evaluation and the recent reduction in Middle East tensions, the coupling of these two events has caused the NRC to propose a change in the DBT to include a four-wheel drive land vehicle that could be used to gain access to the protected area with explosives on board - a suicide mission. The basis for this action, the coupling of two unrelated events, is unwarranted.

Even though the NRC acknowledges that there has been no increase in the threat against nuclear power plan~ this rulemaking action is now deemed necessary to enhance public safety. The apparent staff reasoning is that regulatory change is necessary to restore consecutive losses in a so called "margin of prudence," the protection necessary to thwart the hypothetical DBT of§ 73. I as opposed to that required to protect against the current threat estimate. -

Our concern about this postulated decrease in the "margin of prudence" is further discussed in the Regulatory Analysis below. It is inappropriate to use such an undefined concept as a basis for this rulemakine. Enhancements made as a matter of prudence are the province of each individual licensee.

Regulatory Analysis The arguments presented by the NRC in various staff papers (SECY-93-102 and SECY-93-166) and the docwnents supporting this proposed rule (SECY-93-270) do not make a convincing case for a significant enhancement of public health and safety resulting from the installation of a vehicle barrier system (VBS) at each nuclear power plant. There is no quantitative basis provided by the staff in support of any conclusion other than an enhancement of industrial safety by precluding intrusion of 1mauthorized vehicles.

The background section of the Regulatory Analysis for this proposed rule discusses the development of Generic Letter 89-07, which requires licensees to have short-range contingency plans for installation of temporary measures for response to a surface vehicle bomb threat. Then, after linking the TMI and WTC events together, the objectives of this rulemaking are discussed. Although concluding ... that there ts no indication ofan actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry... , the propQsed rulemaking is required ... to enhance reactor safety by maintaining a prudent margin between what ts the current threat estimate (low) and the design basis threat for radiological sabotage specified in 10 CFR 73.1 (a) (higher).

During staff presentations on November 3-4, 1993, members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards challenged the use of the "margin of prudence" argwnent as a substitute for the customary considerations of a backfit analysis. Some ACRS members expressed concern that the staff avoided the use of probability in their analysis. We emphasize that NRC responsibilities, as defined in the Atomic Energy Act, are to ensure the protection of public health and safety. NRC expansion into matters of prudence is unwarranted and would result in expansion of the NRC's sphere of regulatory influence beyond plant safety. If there would be no public health and safety consequence of an activity, the licensee alone should make the necessary decisions.

In paragraph 4.2, Benefits, the staff writes, For the purpose of this analysis, a quantitative evaluation would require, among other things, quantification of the likelihood that someone would use a vehicle bomb in an attempt to damage a nuclear power plant, the probability that the bomb would be set offfrom a stationary location or that forced entry into the PA would be attempted, the probability that a bomb of a particular size would be used, and the probability that the bomb would be in a particular location. Staff is unable to quantify any of these factors. With the difficulty in performing a quantitative evaluation, one should rely on past history. When NUMARC was briefed by the FBI, the point was made by the FBI representative that the Bureau does not rely on a "crystal ball" to predict future potential threats. Rather, historical patterns and profiles are used History does not support coupling the two unrelated events (i.e., TMI and WTC).

We note that the NRC has previously discounted the tactic of adding all possibilities associated with a postulated event without sufficient consideration of the associated probabilities. An example of this was noted in the NRC response (56 Fed Reg. at 26787, columns 1 and 2) to the aforementioned NCI/CBG petition. In the section where the petitioner used worst case observations to conclude there would be "unacceptable damage" to nuclear power plant safety equipment, the NRC responded:

The massive structures, redundant safety systems and damage mitigation features of currently licensed reactors each provide a certain, although unquantified measure of protection against an uncontrollable release of radioactive material resulting from a truck bomb, irrespective ofstandoffdistance... and The NRC considers the foregoing set ofassumptions to be unlikely in the extreme and not an appropriate basis for safeguards rulemaking. The NRC rejected the petitioners' combination of twelve conservative assumptions (e.g., that a terrorist group favors nuclear reactor sabotage over other targets that exist in the U.S., etc.) to determine the need for additional regulation.

Although discounting the petitioners' argument that "if it can happen, it will happen," the staff appears to be using the same line of reasoning - malevolent attempts will be directed at commercial nuclear facilities simply because two unrelated events occmred in time proximity.

Also in paragraph 4.2, the staff states that licensee operators made decisions during the TMI intrusion event that could have negatively affected the public health and safety. This statement is contrary to the aforementioned ITT conclusion (NUREG-1485),

that, The event resulted in no actual adverse reactor safety consequences and was of minimal safety significance [emphasis addedi In paragraph 5.0, Decision Rationale, the staff concludes that in each case, TMI and WTC, the event' has not established a need to redefine adequate protection. But, rule amendments are still necessary to provide a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety, to prevent attempts of radiological sabotage. Ag~ no justification is provided to support the position that a "substantial" increase will be realized.

Option 5 (paragraph 6.0), is the one recommended in SECY-93-166, and approved for proposed rulernaJcing by the Commission. One industry concern would be alleviated -

if the staff assessment that the determination on costs ofimplementation ofOption 5 is based on the premise that the only definitive requirement for all licensees is that they provide measures to protect against the use ofa land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain proximity to vital areas and that they assess any incremental measures, if necessary to meet the design goal for a land vehicle bomb... , means that the goal of prevention of vehicle intrusion and the design goal for a potential land vehicle bomb are considered to be separate entities.

Since the staff simply asserts, but does not demonstrate, that a substantial increase in public health and safety would accrue from the installation of a VBS, no regulatory basis, analytical or otherwise, has been provided. Adequate protection against radiological sabotage already exists.

Industry Concerns The nuclear power industry has significant concerns relative to this rulemaking, Because the proposed rule amendments and implementation requirements are the unsubstantiated result of linking the TMI and WTC events into one threat, the requirements will add more conservatism on top of existing conservative requirements.

Postulating a combination of hypothetical threats when no such credible threat exists, as an argument favoring increasing a so-called "margin of prudence," is unfmmded. The NRC has built substantial conservatism into the existing DBT. It is not necessary to make the DBT any more unrealistic.

The proposed rule contemplates that the intruding vehicle will be fully loaded with personnel, equipment, .Dru! a large bomb. Since no connection was established between the TMI and WTC events, such Hnkage should be removed. Uncoupling the proposed protection requirements would allow for a more reasonable basis for a vehicle barrier system. There would either be the potential for a land vehicular intrusion attempt Q! the potential for an attempted bombing by means of remote detonation of explosives in a parked vehicle outside the protected area barrier system, not a combination of the two.

Some design attributes (e.g., loaded vehicle weight and bomb explosive power) contained in the NRC's safeguards addendum which was sent to each licensee on November 19, 1993, should be reconsidered. The staff agrees that, there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. Given the lack of an actual threat and the historical perspective concerning the magnitude and method of terrorist bombings, we are unable to find justification for the selection of some of the prescribed threat attributes. We understand that the WTC bomb was the largest terrorist-planted explosive charge ever detonated in this country. By requiring additional protection against an admittedly unlikely event and increasing the size of the explosive above domestic experience to date, the NRC is being ultra-conservative. The size of the design basis explosive (DBX) should be no larger than the maximum explosive equivalent previously detonated within this country. Additionally, any additions to the DBT phraseology regarding land vehicle bombs should specify that the carrier is to be considered stationary outside the protected area prior to any hypothesized explosive detonation.

Many licensees have the expectation that the NRC will want to inspect VBS installations to "nuclear grade" standards. Our pre1iminary review shows that licensees can meet the intent of the rule without an expensive "nuclear grade" barrier system.

Installations costing between $500K to $IM per site are considered more than adequate to protect our employees and our generating equipment while continuing to adequately protect the health and safety of the public. As noted in the Regulatory Analysis, § 4.3, the staff's cost estimates include doubling the vendor costs [t]o account for licensee overhead costs (engineering, interface connections, procurement and training) ... for installation of active barriers and tripling for passive barriers. The review does not include costs associated with design verification/certification to "nuclear standards" that could increase the resulting cost by an additional factor of two to three.

The industry is also apprehensive about the second phase of the NRC's DBT reevaluation. The first phase covers the malevolent use of vehicles; the second (yet to be completed) explores revisions to the makeup, equipment and capabilities of a postulated paramilitary force that a licensee must protect against The industry is concerned that potential modifications to the paramilitary aspects of the DBT may ignore the facility protection responsibility of the Federal government in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.13.

Licensees need to be assured that their VBS or other protection features will not need additional modifications as a result of the phase two reevaluation.

Key Principles Nuclear power plants are considered "hardened" facilities. Plant security is but one part of a broad defense-in-depth approach to safety employed in the design and operation of the plants. The present security systems are designed to provide deterrence, detection, delay, assessment and armed response. These features, together with the design, operation, training, emergency planning and related activities, provide adequate protection of public health and safety from \lllcontrolled radiological releases. As reflected in statements made at the Senate Subcommittee Hearing, and stated in the regulatory and backfit analyses, the NRC agrees.

The industry recognizes the importance of preventing unauthorized site penetration by land vehicles. A licensee must also retain the capability to safely- shutdown the plant in the unlikely event that an explosive device in a stationary land vehicle outside the protected area barrier is detonated. We also assert that these are separate and 4istlnct challenges. The denial of unauthorized vehicle access is done for the purpose of protecting om employees, our investment in plant equipment and to maintain the confidence and support of the public in providing safe generation of electricity.

Both industiy and NRC agree that the issue needs to be addressed albeit for different reasons. In order to accomplish the NRC's objectives, as well as those of the industiy, we recommend that the proposed rule be based on a set of principles. We suggest that the following principles be used to guide the establishment of protection requirements for land vehicles and land vehicle bombs:

(1) The design basis vehicle that could be used to attempt penetration of a nuclear power plant site protected area; (a) Has a mass typical of a four-wheel drive land vehicle; (b) Attains speed(s) that depends upon the speed(s) achievable by a four-wheel drive vehicle traveling over the plant site-specific road(s)

e. and/or terrain immediately outside the portion of the protected area fence chosen for the intrusion attempt; (c) Carries only personnel and hand-carried equipment; and (d) Has a total mass and maximum impact speed that are limited to the vehicle mass and speed specified in the NRC's November 19, 1993, safeguards document (2) The objective of a vehicle barrier system (VBS) or set of vehicle obstacles is to stop the forward motion of the vehicle in the vicinity of the site protected area fence; (3) A design basis bomb that could be used in an attempt to damage plant equipment will; (a) Be placed in a stationary vehicle outside the protected area; and (b) Have explosive capability no greater than bombs previously detonated for malevolent pmposes within the United States.

(4) Plant operators should _be able to safely shutdown the plant following the detonation of this explosive device outside the protected area; and (5) Commercial-grade design, procmement and installation is appropriate for the resolution of this issue; a "nuclear grade" review and inspection process is not necessary.

To make these principles operatio11a4 we suggest that the discussion in the regulatory guide be expanded to describe the flexibility available to licensees in designing and installing barriers to protect against this threat. For example, the energy-absorbing capability of the various barrier devices and the speed-reducing capability of natural and man-made obstacles would be based on presently available test data (from Federal agencies, national laboratories and/or barrier manufacturers).

There are also operational features under the cognivmce of each licensee that should not be prescribed in the rulemaking. Any VBS inspection requirement would be covered by existing regulations by extending the provisions of subparagraph

§73.55(cX4): Aft exterior areas within the protected area shall be periodically checked to detect the presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials. Compensatory measures for maintenance or repair of barriers would be the preserve of licensee personnel And, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations should specifically be excluded from such barrier requirements.

Consolidation of DDT Rule Change Proposals This ntlernaking is concerned with only one of two phases of the NRC's DBT reevaluation. The NRC staff's Design Basis Threat Reevaluation - Proposed Action Plan (Memorandum for the Commissioners from the Executive director of Operations, March 11, 1993), provided for a two-phased review of the DBT. The first phase, on malevolent use of vehicles, has resulted in this proposed rulemaking. The second, which explores the makeup, equipment and capabilities of a postulated paramilitary force that a licensee must protect again~ will apparently not be available for comment until later in 1994. Separate rulemaking could result in more expensive, layered, and potentially inconsistent action at the licensee sites.

Also, the inqustry is concerned that additional paramilitary activities could be included in an amended DBT. In previous correspondence (Section 2.3.18, ofNUMARC letter to the NRC dated July 29, 1993, submitted in response to the Regulatory Review Group review), we suggested a reevaluation of the paramilitary aspect of the cmrent DBT. In our opinion, the threat attributes in 10 CFR 73.1 for the design basis force that could attempt radiological sabotage fall into the definition of a paramilitary (formed on a military pattern) force. We note that 10 CFR 50.13 states that a licensee ... is not required to provide for design features or other measures for the specific purpose of protection agaimt the effects of... attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed agaimt the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign government or other person, .... At a news conference on July 7, 1993, Chairman Selin is quoted as saying, Once you get into paramilitary attacks, et cetera, you're really beyond what it makes seme for licemees to do. It appears that the event at the World Trade Center was caused by an enemy of the United States.

We strongly recommend:

( 1) The NRC delay determining the implementation date on a final rule concerning the DBT until both phases of the DBT reevaluation have been completed and evaluated; and (2) The NRC establish a clear demarcation of the capability accorded to the § 73 .1 design basis threat and that which would shift the responsibility for protection of these critical facilities to the Federal government in accordance with§ 50.13.

Schedule The NRC-proposed schedule is too tight for the magnitude of the action required.

Since the NRC's final guidance document (Reg. Guide or NUREG) is not expected to be published until the rule becomes final, a ninety-day period will not be sufficient to properly develop and submit the required summary description of the proposed vehicle control measures and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison.

As a minimwn, licensees should be allowed 180 days after all guidance documents and the final rule have been issued in order to perform the required analysis and prepare the submittal. Some sites are expected to need to perform studies of design alternatives because of site specific issues associated with the safe standoff requirement Additionally, a minimum of eighteen months from issuance of the design description to the NRC should be allowed for VBS procurement and installation. Many factors (e.g., site configuration, outage schedules, material availability, adverse weather conditions, etc.) may make it impractical for some licensees to complete the VBS in less time. Also, there are only a few commercial manufacturers of active vehicle barriers.

Further, we recommend that the NRC complete phase two of the DBT reevaluation and resolve all comments on both phases prior to establishing a final implementation schedule. Licensees need to be assured that their protected area perimeter will not need additional modifications resulting from the Phase Two reevaluation. The final schedule must allow sufficient time for cost-efficient completion.

Enclosure 2 NUMARC Comments Backfit Analysis PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEIDCLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The backfitting analysis developed by the staff attempts to justify only the installation of proposed vehicle intrusion control measures. The analysis falls short of the threshold established in the backfitting rule in that it contains uo quantified risk data or safety goal evaluation which could be used as a basis for quantifying the substantial increase in public health and safety required by 10 CFR § 50.109. Regarding appropriate measures to fully meet the vehicle bomb cri~ the staff has not sought to develop a backfitting analysis, because it is unable to quantify the risk. Instead, it has shifted the burden of developing a backfitting-type analysis to the licensee, which must justify why the measures required to fully meet the bomb criteria do not result in increased protection. There is no explanation of how the licensee would be able to quantify the risk factors that the staff admits it is unable to quantify. In other words, the licensee must show objectively that it substantially satisfies requirements that were derived subjectively. This provision runs counter to the fundamental principle of the backfitting rule that it is the NRC, not the licensee, which must provide a documented analysis to justify a proposed change.

The NRC referenced SECY-93-166 in its determination that neither the Three Mile Island (Th1I) intrusion incident nor the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing established a need to redefine adequate protection as used in the context of 10 CFR 50.109. With regard to the WTC bombing in particular, the staff concluded that "the use of a vehicle bomb to create radiological sabotage at a nuclear power plant is not currently a reasonable expectation" (SECY-93-166, encl. 6, page 12).

Since adequate protection was not an issue, the staffjustified the backfit imposed by the proposed rule by concluding that amending the Commission's regulations to protect against malevolent use of a vehicle bomb against a nuclear power plant would provide a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety. Citing the TMI event as the basis for this conclusion, the staff stated that the TMI operations staff "made decisions that could have negatively affected the public health and safety" (SECY-93-166, encl. 6, page 12). This was the only referral to public health and safety in the backfit analysis.

While the Incident Investigating Team (IIT) 1 concluded that licensee performance needed improvement in some areas, there was no allegation that public health and safety was ever in question. Conclusion 6.1 ofNUREG-1485 was: The event resulted in no actual adverse reactor safety consequences and was ofminimal safety significance. The lessons of the TMI incident are informative, but there is no evidence that they necessarily have generic implications for all nuclear power plants. The NRC provided no quantitative analysis to support its position that the requirements of the this rule provide a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety. On the contrary, the staff's contention for the need for the rule is highly subjective. NUMARC feels that the observations of one event at one plant are being applied improperly to justify the imposition of the proposed ~e upon the entire industry.

NUREG-1485, "Uoauthomed Forced Entry into the Protected Area at Three Mile Island Unit I on February 7, 1993.*

Enclosure 3 NUMARC Comments

- Proposed Regulatory Guide DG-5006 PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS In the Regulatory Position portion (Part C) of the proposed Regulatory Guide, paragraph 1.1, Passive Barriers, the staff writes that, Measures should be established to periodically verify the integrity of those portions of the barrier that are located outside the protected area. Since the shape, configmation, materials and other characteristics of the Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) will vary from site-to-site, we recommend that the choice of these measures be left to each licensee.

In paragraph 1.2, Active Barriers, in the same part, the staff writes that Operational design features ofthe active barrier or barrier system should be capable of allowing access for authorized vehicles while preventing access ofunauthorized vehicles.

Adequate assurance of achieving this objective can be obtained in an arrangement using just one active barrier. We suggest that the text be revised to remove any ambiguity on this point

• We agree with the logic steps described in paragraph 2.1, Blast Effect Analysis, for determining whether the criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb are satisfied. Until the industry has the opportunity to review the addendum which specifies approaches acceptable for determining safe standoff distances, it will be unable to comment on the cost involved in the blast effects analyses.

The regulatory position described in paragraph C.2.2, Alternate Measures to Protect Against Explosive, is excessive. It is reasonable that the licensee propose alternative measures for Commission review when the design goals and criteria cannot fully be met It is not reasonable to ask licensees to perform analyses beyond what the NRC staff has done in support of this proposed rule. In paragraph C.2.2, the NRC staff notes that licensee proposals for alternative measure should include:

1) Findings regarding the extent to which a licensee is able to provide protection against explosives;

2) A description, analysis, and cost estimate of additional measures needed to :fully meet the design goals and criteria;

3) A description, analysis, and cost estimate for the alternative measures, including an assessment of the protection provided; and

4) A comparison of the costs ofthe measures described in (2) and (3) and assessment supporting a finding that additional costs offully meeting the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided The assessment should describe the extent that alternative measures provide equivalent protection against a vehicle bomb and unique plant characteristics relevant to potential consequences ofa vehicle bomb.

Since the comparison and assessment requested in item (4) was not provided by the Commission in support of this proposed rule, this same subjective assessment should not be required of licensees. Licensees who determine the need to propose alternative measures should only be required to provide the information resulting from accomplishment of items 1, 2, and 3 above. Discussions between the NRC staff and the licensee should be held to resolve any issues .

Southern California Edison Company

~ ;;

I-\* * ;

__:{ ~

23 PARKE R STREET

• 94 JAN l{f' P2 :49 IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92718 WALTEA C. MARSH tTELEPHONE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY AFFAIRS

' I,, I (714) 454-~03 January 3, 1994 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

Subject:

Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants

Reference:

1. 58 Federal Register 58804, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," November 4, 1993

2. Letter, T. E. Tipton (NUMARC), "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-Amendments to 10 CFR 73 to Protect Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants 58 Fed. Reg. 58804 -

November 4, 1993 Request for Comments,"

January 3, 1994 In the referenced Federal Register, the NRC published for public comments the proposed rulemaking on Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants. Provided below are Southern California Edison's (Edison's) comments on the proposed rulemaking.

Basically, Edison concurs with NUMARC's comments that were provided in Reference 2. Although Edison does not disagree with the need by nuclear utilities to take additional security precautions in the wake of the World Trade Center (WTC) event, Edison believes the NRC should modify the proposed rule as indicated below:

1. Edison believes the requirement for licensees to provide the NRC a written report within 90 days is too stringent.

Edison recommends that licensees should be given 180 days after the effective date of the final rule to perform the required analysis and to prepare and issue the submittal.

Acknowledged by card ... !~~-.. . ~. . ~~E!........

. CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET! 'G & SERVICE SECTION

\ OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION t Is /1'-I

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 3, 1994

2. The requirement for licensees to implement its vehicle control measures (including its vehicle barrier system) within 360 days of the rule becoming effective may be impractical. There are many factors (e.g., outage schedules, material availability, few commercial manufacturers of vehicle barriers) that may inhibit the licensees' abi l ity to complete the vehicle barrier system within this time.

Edison believes the NRC should modify this requirement to allow for case-by-case extensions of the effective date by the Commission where the licensee can present good and sufficient reason for the extension.

3. The size of the design basis explosive being proposed for the design basis threat is unreasonably large and burdensome. Edison believes the NRC's proposed threat vehicle explosive size i s significantly larger than the explosive used at the WTC.

Edison recommends that the NRC reduce the size of the design basis explosive charge to not more than 75% of the NRC's proposed charge.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me.

Sincerely,

COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE T H~ GAP

. DO KET NUMBER f . ........ D RULE PR 1637 BUTLER AVENUE, SUITE 203 r d,l",i. i L~

(5t"-:F/2 §&-/rO'i LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025 U:)NhC

( 310) 478-0829

• 94 JAN -3 PS :55

(!j) 31 December 1993

.. rr,c - rt udLh; !!'l r*

'. I\, J

• Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comntjssion Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch Re: Comments on Proposed 8:evisions to Design Basis Threat Regulations, 58 FR 58804 To Whom It May Concern:

Enclosed please find comments by the Committee to Bridge the Gap regarding the Commission's proposed revisions to its Design Basis Threat (DBT) regulations. We also join in the comments submitted separately by the Nuclear Control Institute.

We also wish to make the following additional comments: *

1. The language regarding a "four-wheel drive" vehicle should be removed. It makes it appear that larger vehicles than, say, a jeep or pickup truck, need not be protected against. And it would appear to say that a pickup truck with four-wheel drive must be protected against, but an identical sized vehicle without four-wheel drive need not be protected against. One should perhaps indicate that one must protect against four-wheel drive vehicles, but also against other types of vehicles as well. In short, the language should require protection against all land vehicles, used for any

• e

• purpose in an attack upon a nuclear facility.

2. The proposed language impiies one need only protect against a vehicle used for transport, not for breaching barriers or for use as a truck bomb. This needs to be changed. It is, after all, the truck bomb threat that this rule is supposed to address. *

3. The proposed language could be read to suggest that one need only protect against a vehicle containing equipment capable of being hand-carried, as opposed to that which the vehicle could carry. -Furthermore, the language is unclear, as it could be read to consider only hcµ1d-carried explosives, in addition to hand-carried equipment. The phrase "hand-carried" should be removed.

4. 73.44(c)(8) appears to delegate to the licensee the regulation function properly exercised by the Commission. It should be changed to make clear it is the Commission that must approve the vehicle control measures, it is the Commission that must confirm that the measures meet the design goals and criteria, and it is the Commission that must regularly inspect so as to enforce this requirement. .

• Lastly, we wish to remind the Commission that it committed to .a phased plan for consideration of revisions to the DBT regulations. The initial phase was consideration of the vehicular attack question. Subsequent phases are to address altering the other outdated aspects of the DBT: the requirement that one need only protect against a total of three attackers, acting as only one team, using only weapons that can be hand-carried and are only up to hand-held automatic Acknowledged by card MAY "'4.. ___

..."...:. 19941 ...._

@ 100% Post-Consumer Waste Recycled Paper

u.s : ~CLEA[-. --~ ,JLA°fORY COMMISSION

. JC KET 1'\iG ~ SERVICE SECTION OFFl~E Cr THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics P-:,stmark _Date ___,J ...../_3_/_

q_LJ____

• Copies Re~ived . _.

. Add'! Copies Reproduced _.___,,.._ __

. _S e1;ial Diw,1 ibution [l;t ()1 f!"(}ll,

-- -----~- - - - -

weapons in sophistication or power. We note that the accused conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing number far more than three; operated as more than one team; and used far more explosives than could be hand-carried. While we commend the Commission for finally addressing the truck bomb issue (a decade after we first brought it before the Commission for action), it is now time to commence curing the remaining defects in the Commissions nuclear

~ecurity regulations.

S1 ::;urs) -L Daniel Hirsch President

- enclosure e.

Comments on Pro.P(Rd Rule, 10 CFR Part 73: Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nudear Power Plants, Submitted by Committee to Bridge the Gap We wish to commend the Commission for deciding to revise the design basis threat to include the danger of vehicular bombs. At the same time we remain troubled by two matters:

1) Assurance that licensees will implement adequate protective measures to address the vehicular bomb threat.

2) Absence of Commission commitment to resolve other deficiencies in the design basis threat.

Adequacy of implementing protective measures: While proposed 10 CFR 73.55 (c) 0) and (c) (8) require that licensees implement vehicle barrier systems and compare mechanisms to NRC design goals and criteria, the Commission allows the licensee to determine whether its protective measures conform. The adequacy of such measures should not be resolved by the licensee alone. The Commission should bear responsibility to certify--via site visits--that licensees' measures meet NRC criteria. Without such certification, the Commission cannot reassure the public that licensees have addressed the vehicular bomb threat.

Other deficiencies in the design basis threat: The Commission made a comminnent to reconsider the design basis threat broadly, beyond the truck bomb issue alone. (See Memorandum to the Commission from Executive Director James M. Taylor March 11, 1993.) A number of matters remain to be addressed. NRC security regulations in 10 CFR 50.13 and 73.1 still mandate that nuclear power plants need nQt protect against sabotage by

• more than one insider

• more than three external attackers

• attackers capable of operating as more than one team, i.e. capable of employing "effective team maneuvering tactics" 1

• enemies of the United States The modest level of threat against which plants are required to be protected was rationalized when originally promulgated in 1974-1976 on the following bases:

- Intelligence that there were no known groups "having the combination of motivation, skill, and resources to attack a fuel facility or nuclear power reactor."2

--Studies asserting that redundant safety measures made severe core damage of such low probability as to be "non credible."

-The belief that prospective teITOrists had demonstrated an unwillingness to undertake actions that would result in large numbers of casualties and the assertion that moral and political constraints prevent terrorist 141 FR 34310 July S, 1977 at 34311.

2NRC's Statement of Consideration accompanying final rule 42 FR 10836, February 24, 19n.

actions that would result in significant property damage and injury and death.

- The presumption that foreign terrorists would not undertake serious acts in the United States.

Each of these assumptions have been called into question since promulgation of the design basis threat. The Three Mile Island accident demonstrated that the assumptions of severe fuel damage being noncredible were in error even for accidental destruction. (The consequences of successful sabotage of critical plant components could, of course, be far worse than TilrCe Mile Island which terminated prior to full core melt and containment failure.) Further, the capabilities, motivations, and resources of terrorist groups--some now state sponsored--appear to have grown significantly since the NRC arrived at its threat basis. And most importantly. any assumption of moral and political constraints preventing terrorists from taking large number of lives in the United States appears to have been overturned in the wake of the World Trade Center bombing and plans by the terrorists to target other critical facilities including nuclear power plants.

In light of these considerations and the failure of the NRC to remove from public document rooms sensitive security information on the vulnerability of nuclear plants and means to bypass defenses, the Commission has a heavy burden to assure the public that the design basis threat adequately reflects the danger and that protective measures are up to the challenge. Specifically, the Commission must review whether assumptions about the insider threat, the numbers and capabilities of attackers and the possibility that they may include foreign enemies of the United States suffice. The Commission's willingness to protect against malevolent use of vehicles against nuclear power plants already acknowledges that the threat environment is deadlier than the design basis threat assumed originally. The time for a comprehensive review of the standard that goes beyond the vehicular bomb threat is now upon us. We call upon the Commission to act promptly and responsibly.

Northem States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401-1927

• s, JAN -3 P3 :35 Telephone (612) 330-5500 December 30, 1993 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: DOCKETING AND SERVICE BRANCH RE: Proposed Rule - Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants 58FR58804 to 58807 (November 4, 1993) Request fQI Comments Northern States Power Company appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the proposed rule for Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants. We fully understand and accept our obligation to protect the health and safety of the general public and the following comments are supportive of that obligation .

Northern States Power Company generally endorses the comments submitted by NUMARC in response to the proposed rule. Specifically the items below from the NUMARC comments are of concern to Northern States Power Company.

1) The Three Mile Island and World Trade Center events should not be linked together. The FBI has not connected these two separate events and testified to this "non-linkage" during a March 19, 1993 U.S. Senate Hearing. Further, neither the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or Department of Defense (DOD) have linked these two incidents.

2) The size of explosive proposed by the NRC is significantly larger than any explosive ever detonated in the United States. The Design Basis Explosive should be comparable to the largest explosive previously used in the United States.

3) There have been no previous instances of vehicle bombs being driven in the United States. A suicidal vehicle bombing or any kind of moving vehicle bomb has never occurred in the United States. Instead, the norm for vehicle bombings worldwide, is to park the explosive laden vehicle and remotely detonate the explosives.

MAY 4 1994 Acknowledged by card NHtNtttttMttttr:ne:enmlN

S. NUC~EtFi RcGULATO, Y COMMISSION DOCKET!:,G & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COfAMISSION Document S!atistics stmarf.'D e /2_/Jo(ft]

Copiss Rwcei* J_ _I_ _ __ __

Add'I Coc:es RE~*: :::*:;ed J Special rn~tribution U.:t; p~S-, _p_/J_&

7 tZwy.e v

S. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page 2

4) The Backfit Analysis performed by the NRG does not objectively provide sufficient justification to support the determination that the requirements of the proposed rule provide a significant increase in the protection of the public health and safety. In fact, in the analysis of the TMI event, the NRG concluded in NUREG-1485, conclusion 6.1 , that: "The event resulted in no actual adverse reactor safety consequences and was of minimal safety significance11

• Existing security measures and the "defense in depth" approach of nuclear plant safety systems are sufficient, as concluded in NUREG-1485 and as previously determined during the Gulf War, to ensure the public health and safety.

5) The NUMARC comments recommend that the DST be augmented with a specified kinetic energy that would allow for the use of active barriers with documented performance satisfying the specified energy requirements. With a specified energy in place, the need to perform costly independent testing to demonstrate performance would be eliminated.

6) We need additional time to perform an analysis. The current 90 days proposed by the NRG is not sufficient for those licensees proposing alternative methods of protection to perform the required supporting analysis. NUMARC has proposed 180 days for the study of alternative methods, Northern States Power Company fully supports the 180 day time frame.

7) The requirement for licensees to objectively demonstrate the satisfactory performance of alternative measures is unfair. The NRG is asking licensees to objectively demonstrate satisfactory compliance with subjectively determined criteria. It is not reasonable for the NRG to require licensees to perform analysis beyond what the NRG has done in support of the proposed rule.

In addition to the above discussion of the NUMARC industry comments, Northern States Power Company would like to provide the following comments on the proposed rule which appears in the November 4, 1993 Federal Register (58FR 58804 to 58807).

1) High explosives, technologically sophisticated and capable of causing significant damage to nuclear power plants, are not readily available in the United States.

2) According to FBI testimony, terrorists will hit only "soft targets". The FBI considers nuclear power plants to be "hardened targets". The FBI has not determined any linkage between the World Trade Center and Three Mile Island events. The proposed rule should take into consideration the fact that a nuclear

S. Chilk December 30 , 1993 Page 3 plant is a hardened target, (e.g . armed guards available for response).

According to the FBI , DOE, and DOD, the threat proposed by the NRC does not appear realistic. Any revision to the Design Basis Threat should be based on a realistic threat.

3) DOE and DOD have not modified their design basis threat based on these two events. DOE addresses the LVI from a significantly less prescriptive approach.

It is recommended that the NRC further coordinate a more realistic approach.

4) If the LVI is to be included in the DBT, further evaluation of the entire DBT is needed. The NRC has not made a reduction commitment of the insider threat due to the implementation of the FFD and Access Authorization Rules by all Nuclear licensees. This reduction should be part of the revised DBT.

5) More time is needed for implementation than is currently provided for in the proposed rule. Those licensees that will be required to provide analysis to justify alternative measures will also need a larger window in which to prepare for and construct Vehicle Barrier Systems. Plant safety (e.g . assuring ingress and egress of emergency vehicles) is a primary concern.

6) Any Land Vehicle Threat added to the Design Basis Threat should be based on terroristic history in the continental United States. Currently, terroristic history does not support the threat presently being proposed . The FBI has publicly stated that, "state sponsored" terrorism is steadily declining worldwide and is non-existent in the United States.

7) The NRC should implement a program of "Threat or Alert" similar to DOD's "DEFCON" (Defense Condition) program. Under this program, when information is received from the intelligence community, of an impending security alert, the NRC would immediately notify the industry and provide a recommended level of action. The industry, in turn, would be required to develop security response plans based on these threat levels. These licensee plans would in turn require close coordination with local and state law enforcement authorities.

8) If the NRC considers a foreign country-sponsored paramilitary attack on a nuclear power plant credible, such as terroristic acts, the federal government should be prepared to protect nuclear power plants in accordance with 10 CFR 50.13.

S. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page4 Please contact us if you have any questions concerning our comments related to the proposed Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants rule.

Sincerely, 4-,~ ~

a / . . - D.D. Antony

.,,-V v Vice President Nuclear Generation c: NUMARC

U' t.;KI: r NUMBER PR ~

t 0 OSED RULE~ ~ '- .,,,,.._ _

(;-~pp. S8i W1scons1n ElectrJC POWER COMPANY 231 W. M ichigan. P.O. Box 2046, Milwaukee. WI 53201-2046 *94 I I

, _. -3 p~ :s5 (41_4) 221 -2345 VPNPD-93-226 NRC-93-141 December 30, 1993 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING - AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 73 PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, 58 FED. REG. 58804 - NOVEMBER 4 1 1993 Wisconsin Electric Power Company is submitting the following comments in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proposed rule for "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," (58 Fed. Reg. 58804 - November 4, 1993).

This proposed rule would require nuclear power plant licensees to install vehicle barrier systems to prevent land vehicle intrusion into the protected area and to provide reasonable assurance that a land vehicle bomb would not cause severe enough damage to plant equipment to prevent the safe shutdown of the nuclear reactor.

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSED RULE The NRC is proposing to amend the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage defined in 10 CFR 73.1 to include: "A four-wheel drive land vehicle used for the transport of personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives ... " The proposed physical requirements to protect nuclear power reactors against this DBT are to be added to 10 CFR 73.55(c): "Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas."

The characteristics of the proposed design basis vehicle and explosive device were provided to Wisconsin Electric in a package of safeguards information dated November 19, 1993.

'MAY 4 1994 __

A subsidia,y of Wisconsin Ene,gy Co,poration Acknowledged by card_

OOOOIHOHff-llHIHI-.........

S. t~UC. ~ ..~ - -, ; ,.ORY CT;i.'.vl'SSION DOCK.::i /.i & ---HVICt SECTiON OFFiCc OF Th.: SECiicTARY OF l HE co:,ir HSSIO,~ .e Document ~ic:.ts'ics Postmar1: Qa,e P-l30 /q3

• Cop1esR-., ,. _ _ _ , _ _ _ __

Add'I Ccp*e5 F. v~ *~.:! =-

!3_ __ _ _

pecial Dist bu ,v:1 [?I 0~ Pt2 f4_

llwy<<:-'

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page 2 IMPETUS FOR THB PROPOSED RULE The impetus for this proposed rule is the linking of two unrelated events that occurred in February 1993. The first event is the vehicular intrusion incident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant (TMI) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The other event is the bombing of the parking structure at the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City. This tragic event occurred within days of, but independently from, the intrusion event at TMI. The timing of these two events is coincidental and there are no connections between the two events. However, the NRC's proposed rule has coupled these two events together resulting in a combined protection requirement.

OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED RULE The malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants is not a new concern. The potential for malevolent use of vehicles/bombs at nuclear sites was reviewed after the Beirut bombing in 1983.

NRC Information Notice 84-07 advised licensees to examine their contingency plans and the tactical measures to be employed by members of the security organization to impede penetration of protected areas by unauthorized vehicles. In 1989, further review resulted in Generic Letter 89-07, which required licensees to have short-range surface vehicle bomb threat contingencies. The NRC rejected the need for permanent measures, such as those now being proposed, in favor of those contingency plans. These contingency plans continue to be available for implementation at each site. In 1991, the NRC denied a petition to expand the design basis threat.

The NRC concluded that the likelihood of nuclear terrorism involving the use of a large truck bomb against power reactors in the United states is extremely low.

Today, there remains a general agreement that the actual threat of a commercial nuclear plant being a terrorist target is low.

The NRC staff stated this in their June 24, 1993, briefing of the Commissioners. This conclusion is also reflected in the November 4, 1993, Federal Register notice of the proposed rule.

There is also general agreement that nuclear power facilities are considered "hardened" targets. Plant security is but one part of a broader defense-in-depth approach to safety employed in the design and operation of nuclear plants. Plant security systems are designed to provide deterrence, detection, delay, assessment, and armed response. These features, together with the design, operation, training, and emergency planning and related activities, provide adequate protection of public health and safety from uncontrolled radiological releases. As reflected in statements made at a March 19, 1993, Senate Subcommittee hearing, and as

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page 3 stated in the regulatory and backfit analyses which support the proposed rule, the NRC agrees with the conclusion that adequate protection against radiological sabotage already exists.

Wisconsin Electric is committed to operating Point Beach Nuclear Plant in such a manner as to protect the health and safety of the public. The NRC has built substantial conservatism into the current design basis threat. We believe that this conservatism and the defense-in-depth philosophy continues to ensure adequate protection against radiological sabotage.

Wisconsin Electric believes that any revisions to the design basis threat should be premised upon substantiated and quantifiable evidence of an increased threat of radiological sabotage.

Requirements associated with a revised design basis threat should provide a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. If these criteria cannot be met, we believe that a revision to the design basis threat imposes further unjustified and unrealistic conservatism and results in economically imprudent regulation.

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC CONCERNS Wisconsin Electric has significant concerns relative to this rulemaking. These concerns are in the following areas:

1) current assessed threat to nuclear power plants,

2) inappropriate coupling of WTC and TMI,

3) backfit analysis,

4) objectives of the proposed rule,

5) unrealistic design attributes,

6) role of redundant engineered safeguards systems, and

7) rulemaking schedule.

Our concerns are summarized in the following paragraphs.

current Assessed Threat to Nuclear Power Plants The need for the rule as proposed cannot be substantiated based upon the current assessed threat against nuclear power plants in the United States. No known terrorist or other type of group has plotted or attempted to penetrate the protected area of a nuclear power plant with the intent of radiological sabotage anywhere in the world. To our knowledge, security measures, such as required by the proposed rule, have not been implemented by other nuclear power producing countries.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page 4 The Nuclear Control Institute and the Committee to Bridge the Gap have periodically petitioned the Commission since 1985 to expand the design basis threat. The NRC denied the 1991 petition based upon the lack of quantifiable evidence of any increased threat of radiological sabotage. At that time, the NRC concluded that the likelihood of terrorism involving the use of large truck bombs

.1 against nuclear power reactors in the United States was extremely low, that a change in the design basis threat for radiological sabotage was unwarranted and that contingency planning, as required by Generic Letter 89-07, was sufficient to protect the public health and safety. Furthermore, the NRC concluded that vehicle denial systems would not provide a substantial increase in the overall protection to the public health and safety.

We believe the points made by the NRC in the denial of the 1991 petition remain valid after the unrelated events at TMI and the WTC. We believe the attention given to these two events has resulted in the NRC inappropriately invalidating previous conclusions on the actual terrorist threat to nuclear power reactors.

We are not aware of any evidence presented since 1991 by intelligence community agencies that indicates there may be an increase in this type of threat to nuclear power plants in the foreseeable future. Mr. Harry B. Brandon III, Deputy Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Division, in testimony before Senator Lieberman, stated " ... we do not have reason to believe the (World Trade Center bombing)

,_ is the forerunner of a wave of terrorism inside the United States .

... Between 1982 and 1992 terrorism incidents within the United States, with few exceptions, have shown a steady decline. Our constant, continuous analysis of all indicators worldwide does not show the beginning of such an initiative or wave of terrorism *.*

We have no current indications of targeting or planning of acts of terrorism by any groups or individuals."

In a 1990 report on terrorist incidents, the FBI stated "Terrorists carefully assess which targets are most vulnerable, and may conduct surveillance to further develop their intelligence on a target.

They select operations that pose a minimum of risk with a maximum chance of success." The FBI further concluded that such terrorist activities would be most likely directed against attractive, relatively unprotected targets. Domestic nuclear power plants are security hardened facilities which provide excellent deterrence to potential terrorist attack. Furthermore, not withstanding the isolated event at the World Trade Center, the United States remains one of the safest countries in the world in avoiding terrorist incidents.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page 5 Wisconsin Electric believes the continuous evaluation of the threat of domestic terrorism by the FBI continues to provide adequate warning to licensees if these conditions were to change such that prudent actions could be taken. Present security programs, both those associated with the present 10 CFR 73 design basis threat as well as those initiated by the nuclear power industry, are sufficient to ensure the protection of the health and safety of our employees and the public against any reasonable threat. Further increases in plant safety, as a result of promulgation of this rule, cannot be substantiated based upon the current threat of radiological terrorism.

Inappropriate coupling of WTC and THI No evidence has been presented by the NRC which would indicate that the bombing of the WTC and the intrusion event at TMI are related, or which would suggest that a bombing, such as that experienced at the WTC, will be repeated elsewhere in the country. The parties responsible for this tragic event have been identified and incarcerated.

The unauthorized intrusion by a vehicle at TMI appears to be a simple act of trespass by an unstable individual. There is no indication that the perpetrator had any intent on performing an act of radiological sabotage or terrorism.

The linking of these two dissimilar and unrelated incidents has not been substantiated and therefore cannot alone justify the imposition of additional security requirements. Reevaluation of the design basis threat should be performed with these two incidents "uncoupled" to prevent the formulation of unreasonable regulatory requirements.

Baokfit Analysis The backfit analysis performed by the NRC presents no quantifiable evidence that an increased threat of radiological sabotage exists.

As explained in Section I, paragraph 2 of the backfit analysis document, "In its subsequent review of the threat environment, (NRC) staff concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry."

This lack of evidence has prevented the NRC from performing the "systematic and documented analysis" on the actual threat environment as required by 10 CFR 50.109(a) (2). Furthermore, the " *** substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security *** "

requirement in 10 CFR 50.109(a) (3) cannot be demonstrated without this evidence.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page 6 As mentioned earlier, the NRC's rationale for denying the 1991 petition by the Nuclear Control Institute and the Committee to Bridge the Gap was based upon the lack of quantifiable evidence on any increased threat of radiological sabotage. Wisconsin Electric believes this lack of evidence has once again prevented the backfit requirements of 10 CFR 50.109 from being fulfilled.

A "substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety" has been asserted but not demonstrated by the backfit analysis by the NRC. NRC staff's own conclusion

" *** that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry .*. " indicates that a substantial increase in the health and safety of the public cannot be realized through the promulgation of this rule.

Objectives of Proposed Rule The background section of the Regulatory Analysis for this proposed rule discusses the objectives of ~e rulemaking process. Although concluding " ... that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry .** ," the proposed rulemaking is required 11 * *

• to enhance reactor safety by maintaining a prudent margin between what is the current threat estimate (low) and the design basis threat for radiological sabotage specified in 10 CFR 73.l(a) (higher)."

Even though the NRC acknowledges that there has been no increase in the threat of radiological sabotage to the domestic nuclear power industry, this rulemaking action has been deemed necessary to enhance public safety. The NRC's reason for pursuing regulatory action at this time is to restore the so-called "margin of prudence," the protection necessary to thwart the hypothetical DBT of 10 CFR 73.1 as opposed to that required to protect against the current threat estimate. Some of this "margin of prudence" has been perceived by the NRC as lost after the TMI and WTC incidents.

Wisconsin Electric believes enhancements made as a matter of prudence are the province of each individual licensee. During staff presentations on November 3-4, 1993, members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards also challenged the "margin of prudence" argument. NRC responsibilities, as defined in the Atomic Energy Act, are protection of public health and safety. NRC expansion into matters of prudence is unwarranted and would result in expansion of the NRC's sphere of regulatory influence beyond plant safety.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December JO, 1993 Page 7 Unrealistic Design Attributes If the NRC proceeds with promulgation of this rule, we believe that proposed design attributes should be reconsidered. Design attributes such as vehicle weight, speed, and explosive size which are provided in the safeguards addendum should be reconsidered.

Wiscons~n Electric concurs with the selection of the design basis vehicle (DBV); however, the specification for the DBT vehicle speed has been made with no supporting evidence. Also, consideration of the effect of site specific terrain or seasonal conditions on attainable vehicle speed has not been considered. A more realistic design basis threat would be that of impact of the design basis vehicle at the maximum speed attainable at various points along the perimeter o~ each licensee's protected area, not to exceed the stated design basis vehicle speed. This method of DBT development would further meet the intent of the proposed rule and prevent the hardening of facilities beyond that which is required.

The design basis explosive specified by the NRC in the safeguards information is also unrealistic. The low explosive type device detonated at the WTC was comprised entirely of ingredients which are readily obtainable in the United states. We acknowledge that the WTC bombing incident demonstrates that this type of device could be assembled without detection in the future if the assessed threat environment would radically change; *however, this incident alone does not justify the type and size of explosive device outlined in the safeguards material. The type and size of explosive device outlined in the safeguards information remains extremely rare internationally and unprecedented in the United States.

Access to the quantity of high explosive material outlined in the safeguards information is seen as highly unlikely if not impossible in the United states. Other than government agencies, these materials are only available to licensed parties in quantities many times smaller than the design basis explosive. An attempt to obtain such a large quantity of this material would very likely draw the attention of the federal agencies responsible for

_ monitoring this activity. Also, import of such a large quantity of this material would likely not go unnoticed. We therefore believe that this type of device could not be assembled, delivered, and detonated in the United states in the foreseeable future. We therefore assert that the proposed design basis explosive should be no larger than the largest device previously detonated in the United States.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page a Wisconsin Electric encourages the NRC to reevaluate the proposed design basis threat taking into consideration historical, domestic terrorism evidence and the expertise of the federal agencies responsible for monitoring this activity.

Role of Redundant Engineered Safeguards systems The proposed amendment to 10 CFR 73.55 (8), "Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas," does not adequately take into consideration the existing engineered safeguards systems installed at domestic nuclear power plants. The unauthorized access and possible damage to any one vital area does not necessarily prevent the safe shut down of the nuclear reactor.

Redundant safeguards systems were designed in such a way that the failure of any one train of safety related equipment would not prevent the safe shutdown of the nuclear reactor. The suggestion that all access to vital equipment must be prevented does not give sufficient consideration to this key design feature of nuclear power plants. Security measures to protect against any design basis threat should be allowed to take credit for these redundant engineered safeguards systems.

We recommend that the NRC give consideration to redundant safeguards systems, as is done with other rulemaking issues, while reevaluating the proposed amendments to the design basis threat.

Rulemaking Schedule This rulemaking is concerned with only one of two phases of the NRC's DBT reevaluation. The first phase has resulted in this proposed rulemaking. The second phase explores the makeup, equipment, and capabilities of a postulated paramilitary force that a licensee must protect against. Completion of this second phase is not expected until later in 1994. Wisconsin Electric believes there should be no rule promulgation while the NRC continues its second phase of the design basis threat reevaluation. Separate rulemaking could result in more expensive, layered, and potentially inconsistent action. Wisconsin Electric recommends that the NRC delay determining the implementation date on a final rule concerning the DBT until both phases of the DBT reevaluation have been completed and evaluated. Licensees should be assured that their protected area perimeter will not need additional modifications resulting from the phase two reevaluation.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 30,. 1993 Page 9 If the NRC proceeds with phase one rulemaking, the implementation schedule proposed is too stringent. As proposed, implementation of increased security measures would be required within 360 days of the rule effective date. We believe this time frame would deny the licensees sufficient opportunity to complete proper evaluations to identify prudent compliance measures. We believe the NRC staff's own conclusion that there is no imminent threat of radiological sabotage to the nuclear power industry supports an extended schedule for this proposed rulemaking process.

Wisconsin Electric suggests that the NRC extend the time period for the licensees to submit 11 * *

• a summary description of the proposed vehicle intrusion control measures and the results of its evaluation comparing the measures to protect against vehicle intrusion with the design goals and criteria for protecting against a land vehicle bomb" from 90 days to 180 days from the rule effective date. We also suggest that a minimum of 18 months should be allowed for vehicular barrier system procurement and installation following issuance of the design description to the NRC.

SOMMARY Wisconsin Electric believes that arguments presented by the NRC in staff papers (SECY-93-102 and SECY-93-166) and the documents supporting this proposed rule (SECY-93-270) lacks sufficient quantifiable data and facts to support the proposed amendments to the design basis threat.

Since the NRC staff simply asserts, but does not demonstrate, that a substantial increase in public health and safety would accrue from the installation of a vehicle barrier system, no regulatory basis, analytical or otherwise, has been provided. Adequate protection against radiological sabotage already exists; therefore, we believe the amendments currently proposed to 10 CFR ~art 73 cannot be supported or justified.

The threat of domestic terrorism has not changed significantly since the most recent review of the design basis threat in 1991.

We believe the NRC's linking of the unrelated events at TMI and the WTC has resulted in the NRC inappropriately invalidating their previous conclusions on the threat of radiological sabotage. These two events should be "uncoupled" when assessing a credible design basis threat.

The backfit requirements of 10 CFR 50.109 have been asserted, but not demonstrated by the Commission. The NRC's objective of

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk December 30, 1993 Page 10 reestablishing a "margin of prudence" through the promulgation of this rule results in the expansion of NRC regulatory influence beyond plant safety.

If the NRC proceeds with the promulgation of this rule, Wisconsin Electric encourages the NRC to reevaluate the proposed design attributes. The effect of site terrain and seasonal conditions on attainable vehicle speed should be considered. The design basis explosive should be based upon historical precedence rather than on speculation. Credit for the role of the redundant safeguards systems of nuclear power plants should be allowed during development of additional security measures to prevent unnecessary hardening of facilities.

Finally, Wisconsin Electric proposes that the rulemaking schedule be expanded. This will allow sufficient time for the licensees to complete proper evaluation of the regulation and facilitate cost-effective implementation schedules.

Wisconsin Electric appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments on this proposed rule, and would welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues further with appropriate NRC staff.

Sincerely,

• ~1f!LI Vice President Nuclear Power

~b it~

GAP/jg cc: NUMARC

r*: i r=

CP&I 'u}FP.~iffD;;. , . .

.... \ ~ .

Caronna Power & Light Company

.'1.J JAN -J P3 :39 December 29, 1993 FILE: X-X-0702 X-X-1075 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary United states Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Docketing & Services Branch Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 58 FEDERAL REGISTER 58804 (NOVEMBER 4 1 1993)

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) appreciates the opportunity to provide comment in response to the NRC request for public comments ( 58 FR 58804) concerning malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants. Carolina Power &

Light Company has also reviewed the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG) comments regarding the same subject. Carolina Power & Light Company endorses the NUMARC and NUBARG comments, as submitted.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Dale Bates at (919) 546-6154.

Yours very truly, R. E. Rogan Manager Generic Licensing Section DBB/jbw MAY a 4 1994 Acknow1eogea. by card ........................... ".....

411 Fayetteville Street

• P. 0 . Box 1551

• Raleigh . N . C. 27602 (2138GRI)

. ~;'.JC\ 1: .., * ;.* .- (!_. ,_. ~Gf~Y CO:*!.MISSION r,~-* i ~ :: : * . *.  :., ~~1v. (;t: SEGT ION t; ; .. : ' *. T "i.. :.~*.:r,r:c:TAHY

(_ , -*  : ' I *~ .,..:\ ) l ff1~!~~ ;c..r~

J

[, i,.;

• t:T NUMBER ~n PROPOSED RULE M'H ~

-===- ENTERGY (5~FR. ~ B"~OLf} Entergy Operations, Inc.

PO Box 31995

~;O C!';t_i l Jackson, MS 39286-1995 U'.:i NPC Tel 601 984 9760 Jerrold G. Dewease Vice President Operations Support December 29, 1993 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Entergy Operations, Inc. Comments of Proposed Rule Change to 10CFR73, "Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants"

Reference:

Federal Register Vol. 58, No. 212, November 4, 1993 CNRO-93/0038

Dear Sir:

The referenced Federal Register listing invited comments on the proposed 10CFR73 rule change.

Entergy Operations, Inc., the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, and Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station has reviewed the proposed rule change and offers the following comments for your consideration.

The proposed changes would require licensees to take steps to prevent land vehicle intrusion into the protected area (PA) and preclude a land vehicle bomb detonation from preventing safe shut down of the reactor. The premise for this rulemaking is that the unauthorized intrusion at Three Mile Island (TMI) and the bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) make such steps prudent.

Entergy Operations concurs that unauthorized intrusion into the PA under circumstances !:.uch as those at TMI is highly undesirable and is committed to taking steps to preclude a similar occurrence at our facilitie.:;. o~tr concerns with land vehicle intrusion are based on prudent business and industrial security considerations rather than any concern for the potential to commit successful radiological sabotage. Nuclear sit~s are extremely hardened targets due to their inherent design features, defense in depth, redundancy, regulated security programs, etc.

This makes them extremely low probability targets for terrorist acts.

MAY f 4 1994 Acknowledged by card ..............__" ..'"*"-

JS. NLJC~E.;~ -~. ; : . "TORY COMMISSION DOC'(i:-" ,:*, * - ,_ :- 'lCE SECTION OF F'~;:~ .>

• i: * =cRETARY Qi= H.c (,u:, . 3SION Jstmc:r~D2t: _[!: /1-1_/'tS 1 Copies i:Jc :- i _ _ _/

Addl'C"'~ ) r, _,_ :*' 3 _ _ -,--__

Spcci~.1 o;~t,.l.1 :~;,1 }t;J;YJf. P.12..u.

12'-,.-__

f2,uy~r ,

Entergy Operations Comments on NRC Proposed Rule for Malevolent Use of Vehicles Page 2 of 3 CNRO-93/0038 December 22, 1993 Also, we agree it is prudent to be able to safely shutdown the plant in the event of an explosion.

In fact, blast analyses are routinely performed when there is a concern for volatile mixtures (such as hydrogen) being brought to a site.

However, we question the idea that these two isolated events warrant rulemaking. Terrorist detonated a bomb, but not at a hardened target such as a nuclear facility. This event was consistent with a 1990 FBI report about the nature of terrorists and targets they attack. Also, an individual used an automobile to gain unauthorized access to a licensee's PA but the individual was not a terrorist and did not use any explosive devices. It is not clear why, based on these two events alone, such extreme measures as those proposed are necessary to make an already hardened target even more hardened.

In the proposed rule, the NRC states its conclusion that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. Based on this conclusion, and in consideration of the NRC's decision to link two these two events, our concern is that the proposed attributes are extremely severe and significantly exceed any actual event in the United States. There does not appear to be an adequate basis for the proposed measures. In fact, the proposed rule results in the licensee's inability to use much of the existing technical guidance directly due to the masses involved verses typical masses analyzed in the draft regulatory guide.

Entergy Operations is also concerned that the proposed regulatory guidance states measures should be established to periodically verify the integrity of barriers outside the PA. Passive barriers by their nature (ditches, burms, concrete, etc.) should not need any periodic inspections or the period should be on the order of several years. If a licensee were to propose some unique vehicle barrier system (VBS) for which a passive barriers did warrant inspection, no additional measures should be necessary beyond those currently employed per 10CFR73.55(c)(4) for barriers in close proximity to the existing PA barrier.

Finally, the proposed timing for licensee responses is not realistic. Licensees should be allowed at least 180 days from the issuance of the NRC's final regulatory guidance rather than 90 days from the final rule. Imposing mch a short response time is not necessary based on the NRC's conclusion that no threat currently exists. Further, this could force licensees into taking unnecessary steps and performing unwarranted modifications due to the lack of time to perform in-depth analysis.

Entergy Operations Comments on NRC Proposed Rule for Malevolent Use of Vehicles Page 3 of3 CNRO-93/0038 December 22, 1993 In addition to our specific comments noted above, Entergy Operations, Inc. provided input to and concurs with the comments submitted by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) in regard to this request for comments.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our comment on the proposed rule and welcome any attempts for the industry and NRC to work together for issuance of a rule that will meet the stated goals without being unduly burdensome.

Our detailed comments on the proposed rule, the backfit analysis, and draft regulatory guide are included as Attachment 1 to this letter.

Sincerely,

,z.,,:l(~

Jerrold G. Dewease JGD/jkw attachment cc: Mr. R. P. Barkhurst Mr. R. F. Burski Mr. C.R. Hutchinson Mr. W. K. Hughey Mr. L. W. Laughlin Mr. M. J. Meisner Mr. D. C. Mims Mr. J. W. Yelverton Corporate File [ ]

DCC(ANO)

Records Center (W-3)

Central File (CKiNS)

Attachment 1 to CNRO-93/0038 Page 1 of 4 December 22, 1993 Entergy Operations Comments on NRC Proposed Rule for Malevolent Use of Vehicles GENERAL Entergy Operations questions the need for rulemaking in this area based solely on two isolated events. Most experts agree that nuclear sites are extremely low probability targets for terrorist acts due to their inherent hardened security characteristics. We believe there is little if anything to be gained by taking an already extremely hardened target and mandating additional hardening measures. Entergy Operations does not take issue with the basic premise of installing vehicle barrier systems (VBS) for prudent industrial security reasons. However, we believe the probability for land vehicles or massive explosives to cause successful radiological sabotage is remote enough to be considered negligible. Our basis is the same as that cited by the NRC for backfit considerations related to adequate protection.

Should the NRC determine to move forward with this rulemaking, our primary concern is that the proposed rulemaking is extreme and unnecessarily burdensome with little, if any safety benefit.

We also believe that if rulemaking proceeds, establishing an adequate, reasonable criteria for such systems is essential so that costs are commensurate with expected safety benefit.

• The current proposed attributes (vehicle weight, speed, explosive quantity, etc.) do not appear to be consistent with the recent events that were precursors to this rulemaking. Also, this proposed rule does not appear to be consistent with government findings to date in this area, including findings of the NRC. In 1991 , NRC staff notes related to denial of a petition on this topic showed:

• No bombings directed against a nuclear activity worldwide.

• One truck bomb in the U.S. since 1970 (now two including the World Trade Center).

• No others in the Western Hemisphere.

• No others in areas outside of civil unrest.

The recent TMI & WTC events are consistent with the above, the bombing was not at a nuclear facility, and the vehicle intrusion was not a terrorist act. Similarly, both these events bear out the findings of a 1990 FBI report which stated: "Terrorist carefully assess which targets are most vulnerable . . . They select operations that pose a minimum of risk with a maximum chance of success."

It is not clear why an isolated bombing of a highly assessable soft target in a city that FBI data indicates approximately 40% of all terrorist activities against the United States occur nor the to CNRO-93/0038 Page 2 of 4 December 22, 1993 isolated intrusion at TMI warrants such extreme action on part of the NRC generically for the entire nuclear industry.

PROPOSED ATTRIBUTES While the vehicle weight & speed are not in and of themselves excessive, coupling vehicle weight and speed with explosive weight is excessive and unreasonable. While we understand the basic premise for coupling the two events, that is, vehicles were involved in both events, there does not appear to be a valid basis for considering bombs other than in parked cars. Any VBS would be a significant deterrent to attempting to ram a barrier at high speeds with massive explosives in a vehicle. As discussed above, this coupling is not consistent with the recent events in question, experience to date, nor expert studies in this area such as those by the FBI.

An attempt to use an explosive during a high speed penetration of a VBS would constitute a "suicide mission." Such an attempt would maximize risk and minimize the potential for success which is completely contrary to FBI studies on terrorist behavior. The recent intrusion at TMI tends to reaffirm historical events at nuclear power plants where perpetrators represent special interest groups opposed to nuclear power or those with some motive other than terrorism. None of these groups are representative of the current Design Basis Threat (DBT).

Coupling becomes significant for several reasons. Due to the proposed mass of the explosive charge, coupling significantly increases overall kinetic energy for barrier design. Further, coupling makes much if not most of the currently available technical data inadequate due to the proposed masses verses masses typically considered. Finally, coupling will affect a significant portion of licensees when determining safe stand off distances with little or no demonstrated increase in safety benefit. Therefore we strongly recommend that any consideration of explosives be limited to quantities in a parked vehicle, in a scenario similar to that which actually occurred at the WTC.,

The amount of explosives in question is also extreme with no apparent basis. We strongly recommend that the amount explosives considered be limited to those previously detonated in the United States.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE The NRC's previous denial of a petition to require VBS concluded that "the [VBSJ would not provide a substantial increase in the overall protection ofpublic health and safety. Cost was not a deciding/actor. " The NRC's backfit analysis for the proposed rule concludes that it would provide a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety. Citing the TMI event, the NRC states "some aspects .. . could present some challenges not previously

Attachment 1 to CNRO-93/0038 Page 3 of 4 December 22, 1993 considered " While we agree with the basic conclusion, we reject the notion that this means a VBS would provide a significant safety benefit to public health and safety. Our reasoning is the same as cited by NRC in rejecting VBS for backfit consideration under adequate protection in SECY 93-166. Specifically, a perpetrator would still have: 1) to leave the vehicle; 2) reach one or more vital areas which are typically reinforced concrete walls and locked, alarmed doors; 3) create a reactor transient or loss of coolant accident; 4) disable sufficient safety systems to prevent reactor safe shutdown; 5) cause a breach of containment; and 6) accomplish all of this without intervention by the licensee's armed responding security officers.

We agree with conclusion 6.1 -Safety Significance of the Event ofNUREG-1485, "Unauthorized Forced Entry into the Protected Area at three Mile Island Unit 1 on February 7, 1993" which states: "The event resulted in no actual adverse reactor safety consequences and was of minimal safety significance. " (emphasis added).

The backfit analysis for vehicle bombs states: "although a vehicle bomb attack at a nuclear power plant is not reasonably to be expected, it is somewhat more likely to develop without advance indications than staffpreviously believed " Here again, we agree that this is not a reasonable expectation. The hypothesis that there may be little advanced warning does not support the subjective conclusion that the proposed measures will result in a substantial increase in protection of the public health and safety. Linking these two events to consider anything beyond a parked car bomb is unreasonable and unnecessary based on discussions above.

- BACKFIT ANALYSIS Entergy Operations has reviewed and concurs with the comments submitted by NUBARG on this topic. Essential comments we wish to reinforce for backfit analysis of the rule are the same as those discussed for Section 2.2 of the Draft Regulatory Guide below.

DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE DG-5006 Section 1.1 Passive Barriers:

This section states that measurc*s should be established to periodically verify the integrity of passive barriers outside th~ protected area. Passive barriers by their nature (ditches, burms, concrete filled embedded poles, etc.) do not require inspection or the period would be on the order of several years. If a licensee installs a unique passive barrier that should need periodic inspection, it should be addressed specifically under the NRC's review of that licensee's proposed VBS. It would be expected that even for those cases, inspections currently required by 10CFR73.55(c)(4) of areas within the protected area would be more than adequate to assure the integrity of such passive barriers in close proximity and thus no further steps necessary.

to CNRO-93/0038 Page 4 of 4 December 22, 1993 Section 1.2 Active Barriers:

This section states that operational design features of active barriers should be capable of allowing access to authorized vehicles while preventing access to unauthorized vehicles. The purpose of this sentence is not clear. It may be more appropriate in defining an active barrier. In order to prevent any confusion during subsequent inspections, the regulatory guide should be explicit that dual active barriers such as a "sally port" are not required. Any attempt by an unauthorized vehicle to gain access while licensee was in-processing an authorized vehicle would be effectively addressed by presence of the authorized vehicle, the in-processing personnel involved, and good security practices.

Section 2.2 Alternative Measures To Protect A~ainst Explosives:

This section requires licensees to submit a quantitative analysis to justify that the cost of plant specific measures are not justified by the added protection afforded. This will be difficult, if not impossible. In fact, the NRC does not include any quantitative basis to support a substantial increase in public health and safety. In effect, for these cases, the NRC appears to require licensees to perform a backfit analysis to justify not installing NRC proposed measures. This is significant as NRC estimates, which may be low, are that up to 20% of the current licensees may not have adequate stand off distances afforded by VBS systems alone.

SCHEDULE CONSIDERATIONS It is our understanding that guidance on design and placement of barriers will not be available until sometime in early 1994. Further NRC estimates are up to 20% of the industry may require measures beyond a VBS system alone. Most if not all of these licensees will need to perform in-depth analysis to determine what the most prudent, cost effective measures are for such circumstances including consideration of the essential elements of 10CFRS0.109. This task will be even more difficult in light of the NRC's somewhat subjective assessment that these measures result in a substantive increase in public health and safety. Further, since the precursors to this proposed rule occurred almost a year ago, we do not expect much to be gained by putting licensees in a position that could lead to unnecessarily conservative approaches driven by schedule rather than by prudent business decisions with sound technical justification. Therefore, we strongly recommend licensees be allowed at least 180 days from the issuance of the final guidance on barrier design and placement.

DOC r *T NUMBER e Commonwealth Edison 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, Illinois 60515 December 29, 1993 13 P'lOPOSED RULE...:;..;;.;;....,,..---

(£ ~f R S"rr~ }

(if)

• cJJ JAN -3 P3 :33 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk

,_,F L~ tr Secretary l1UCK[ i I f U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I  ; ll Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

Commonwealth Edison's (CECo.) Co. Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking -- Amendments to 10CFR Part 73 "To Protect Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" REF: 58 Fed. Reg. 58804 - November 4, 1993

Dear Mr. Chilk:

These comments are submitted on behalf of Commonwealth Edison's six Nuclear Power Stations in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed rule for "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" .

Commonwealth Edison supports NUMARC's position as defined in its letter and enclosures to you dated January 3, 1994.

In addition to comments on the rule, the NUMARC letter addresses phase two of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) evaluation which will be considered by the NRC in the near future. We are also concerned that any increase in the composition, equipment requirements, and capabilities of the current DBT has the potential to escalate security expec~tions and requirements beyond the reasonable capability of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.

Therefore, we concur with NUMARC' s recommendation that the NRC complete phase two of the DBT reevaluation and resolve all comments on both phases prior to establishing a final schedule for a rule.

Commonwealth Edison invites your attention to several significant issues to be considered with respect to the proposed amendment to 10CFR Part 73.

The NRC has concluded there is a relationship between the TMI vehicle penetration and the World Trade Center vehicle bomb events. In fact, these are two significantly different and separate incidents. The separation of these incidents is important in order to distinguish between security measures to deter a vehicle carrying personnel and weapons from penetrating the Protected Area (PA) and security measures for a stationary vehicle containing explosives.

MAY f 4 1994 Acknowledged by card ................._ .. ___

I * . * 'tF _ ** ... ::.u:...ATORY COMMISSION DV . 1 1\. t, SEi1 VICE SECTION Of **1

~:.: CF THE SECRETARY OF THE COi,lt,11S ION Document S'.a *sties stmark o~ '} Jl Izql 1.J Cop,i:s ~c * - ' _ _ _/ _ _ _ __

Acd"I Cor* _) RE:,., : ... u:::;d _.J'---- - -

S:) .

• I f' i~ tur n 121 f2-5 P{)fl

-12.w 1/ e,.r '

On March 19, 1993, during a Senate Hearing, the FBI stated there is no connection between the TMI and World Trade Center events, there is no credible threat to commercial nuclear power plants, and nuclear power plants are not appealing to terrorists as targets because they are hardened facilities.

The Land Vehicle Intrusion (LVI) should be limited to a vehicle carrying personnel and weapons. A Vehicle Barrier System's (VBS) objective should be to deter a vehicle from penetrating the Protected Area based on the fact that barrier impact would disable the vehicle.

The vehicle explosive should be limited to consideration of a stationary position outside the PA and be recognized as separate and distinct from the land vehicle used to penetrate the PA. There are no known vehicle bomb incidents in this country other than those in the stationary position.

If a VBS enhancement must be designed and installed, it should be based upon reasonable engineering judgement and practices, and utilize commercial grade material. Any other approach would result in an inappropriate use of industry resources and is not justified based on the safety threat posed.

As a result of our preliminary evaluations, additional time (180 days) is needed to perform a proper analysis for a VBS and prepare it for submittal. Due to the extensive passive barrier work required and a very limited number of manufacturers of active barriers, the implementation time should be extended to March, 1996.

Commonwealth Edison is committed to providing appropriate security for our nuclear power plants and we appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments.

Sincerely,

~!!+

Vice President Nuclear Operations Support

consumers Power *94 JAN - 3 P 1P.[g David W. Rogers t Safety and Licensing Director POWERINli MICHlliAN"S PROliRESS Palisades Nuclear Plant: 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway, Covert~~\}~~ ., '

December 29, 1993 9 Secretary, U.S. Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Docketing and Services Branch COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 10CFR73 TO PROTECT AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Palisades Nuclear Plant provides the following comments concerning the proposed amendment to 10CFR73, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," as published in the November 4, 1993 Federal Register (pages 58804-58807). The proposed amendment to 10CFR73.55(c)(9)(i) reads as follows:

Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall:

By (insert 90 days from effective date of the rule) submit to the Commission a summary description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10CFR13.55(c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as required by 10CFR13.55(c)(l). For licensees who choose to propose alternative measures as provided for in 10CFR13.55(c)(B), the submittal must include the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives; The proposed rule states that licensees are required to submit a summary description of the vehicle control measures within 90 days from the effective date of the rule. Due to the complexity of calculations, design, and planning, this is not a realistic time frame to perform the analyses and develop a comprehensive, cost-effective plan. We suggest this be increased to 180 days.

Proposed rule, 10CFR73.55(c)(9)(ii) also states:

By (insert 360 days from the final rule effective date), fully implement the required vehicle control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as approved by the Commission;"

MAY

• 4 1994

• A CAf5 ENERGY COMPANY Acknowledged by card..............

S. NUCLEAR R.::GULArORY COMMISSION DOC l(ETI. 'G & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMrvllSSION Document Statistics

• Postmark Date JJ-/30 /q]

Cop;es Rccr: . *- - ~- - - - -

1.dd'I Copie:; fier' *:,.,.,.,d ...,,3' - - - - -

Special Distribution ~~ PORy Z21Mye,r-

2 The 360 day time frame for full implementation of this rule is also unrealistic. The three phases to implementation include (1) Plan Development; (2) Review and approval by the NRC; and (3) Design, Procurement, and Construction. The plan development (as currently proposed) is slated for 90 days, however, the time frame for the review and approval process remain an unknown at this time. The review of over 60 different site plans could take much of the remaining 270 days which NRC had slated for licensee construction and implementation. Further, due to the limited number of vendors manufacturing some of the equipment necessary to implement this rule there may be long procurement periods. Another factor which would affect construction of the vehicle protection system is the adverse weather conditions at some northern sites. Frozen ground, ice, and snow could prevent or slow construction activities. We suggest that this paragraph be revised to state that the licensee have 360 days to implement this rule after plan approval by the Commission.

~

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company John L. Skolds P.O. Box 88 Vice President Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Nuclear Operations SCE&G (803) 345-4040 December 28 , 1993 AIICIIIUICompany Refer to : RC 03 14

• 94 JAN - 3 p 1 :S 2 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Collll'lission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch Gentlemen:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION COMMENTS ON THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10CFR73 TO PROTECT AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (PR 930049)

This letter forwards the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commissi on's (NRC) proposed amendments to 10CFR73, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants." SCE&G has reviewed the proposed amendments and has the following comments:

1. "The proposed amendments would modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried equipment and/or explosives.

The Commission believes this action is prudent based on an evaluation of an intrusion incident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station and the bombing at the World Trade Center."

SCE&G considers these events to be significant. However, they do not warrant the changes proposed by the NRC. Compliance with present security requirements at nuclear facilities provides adequate assurance that the protection of the health and safety of the public is maintained for credible events which are postulated to occur. The cost to implement these changes and the unnecessary burden associated with that implementation i s not justified and will not significantly improve security or safety at nuclear power facilities.

2. "Each licensee would be required to submit to the NRC within 90 days from the effecti ve date of the rule a summary description of the proposed vehicle intrusion control measures and the results of its evaluation comparing the measures to protect against vehicle intrusion with the design goals and criteria for protecting against a land vehicle bomb."

SCE&G considers that the 90 day evaluation period and response is not adequate to effectively evaluate and design a vehicle intrusion control measure. SCE&G considers that 180 days would provide sufficient time to complete the required evaluation and prepare the response for the NRC.

MAY 14 1994' Acknowledged by card ..................................

s. NIJL~::;.r.~ r;~~u*;.*roR YCOMMISSION DC(;~*-- '.'.Ci~ ~f f/lCE SECTION OF~*. F c F Thi: SECRETARY Or rnE COi.1MiSSION Document 8!atistics Postmar'i< Dat<J L2-./ 'Lr1q 1

Secretary PR 930049 Page 2 of 2

3. "Licensees would be required to implement their measures within 360 days of the rule effective date. 11 SCE&G considers that the 360 day implementation schedule does not provide adequate time for implementation. With refueling and maintenance outage resource requirements, a 360 day implementation period cannot be supported by the resources necessary to implement the measures. SCE&G considers that an eighteen month implementation schedule would be more reasonable.

As a member of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), SCE&G supports any comments on this proposed rule made by NUMARC. SCE&G appreciates the opportunity to review and to provide comments on this proposed rule.

Should you require any additional information, please contact Ms. Susan B.

Reese at (803)-345-4591.

Very truly yours, SBR/JLS/nkk

/41/kit~

c: General Managers H. L. 0 1 Quinn K. W. Nettles CFS RTS (PR 930049)

File (811.02)

NUCLEAR EXCELLENCE - A SUJ"4ER TRADITION!

Florida Power & Light Company, P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

[!"\*~i<ET NUMBER l PR ' . ,. . .

~ ~;1 t 7

p,~0,)0::,EO RULE..!...!!~~ ~ - OEC t 11993  :)

L-93-322

( ,~FRSB-?-o'i) *~ JAN - 3 P3 :33

-r L Mr. Samuel J. Chilk '

Secretary U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

Subject:

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants,"

58 FR 58804. November 4. 1993 These comments are submitted by Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) in response to the subject Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

FPL emphasizes the need for a much more rigorous risk quantifica tion in advance of any change in the regulations a nd urges that the design basis threat not be modified without further study. The public record does not support the degree of urgency placed on this issue by the NRC Staff nor does it justify the imposition of greater security responsibilities on licensees. For example, the NRC report of the TMI security event that occurred on February 7, 1993, concluded that the event was of minimal safety significance. Also, the World Trade Center event of February 26, 1993, was directed at a soft target (office building), not a hard target (for example, a nuclear power plant). Furthermore, there is no indication of an actual threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. The proposed rule would improperly impose costly requirements in private industry absent any actual increase in the design basis threat (DBT). Our specific comments follow:

a. The proposed rule is inconsistent with NRC policy regarding the responsibility of government to defend against hostile enemy acts.

The proposed amendments to 10 CFR 73.l and 73.55 would modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand carried equipment, and/or explosives. They would require each 1 icensee: ( 1) to establish vehicle control measures to protect against the use of the design basis land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas, and (2) to evaluate the effectiveness of these measures in protecting against a an FPL Group company MAY 4 1994 Acknowledged by card ............................._

S. NUCL::Ar: Rft'.JULATORY COMMISSION DOC*' F.:TING & SERVICE SECTION OFF ICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COW.1ISSION Document Statistics Postmark Dute ).../ 1-..r Copies Rrcei* *~~1_ _ _ 1_ _ __ __

Md'I Copie3 F:e~rcJuczd .......___ _ _ __

ipecial Distribution PJ:.P ~ /J~

~ .e ,,--

L-93-322 Page 2 1

vehicle bomb. This amounts to a paramilibary threat, which an industrial facility should not be expected to defend against, and opens the possibility of continual expansion of the DBT and associated costs without objective proof that there is any need for it. The federal government and its agencies do not serve the public interest, in either a safety or an economic sense, if it responds to hypothetical concerns by deferring its responsibilities to private industry. The real question is not so much what the hypothetical DBT should be, but at what point does the licensee cease to have primary responsibility because the threat has become large enough (and real enough) to be a government concern.

The Commission's well-founded and long-established policy, embodied in 10 CFR 50.13, is that responsibility for defense against hostile enemy acts belongs to the government and not to private industry. Section 50.13 explicitly states that a licensee " is not required to p r ovide for design features or other measures for the specific purpose of p rotection a gainst the effects of attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of th~

United States. whether a foreign government or other person."

Land vehicles of the type specified in the proposed rule rise to the level of an effort by an "enemy of the United States. "

The use of "four-wheel drive land vehicles by adversaries for the transport 3

of personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives" is likely to involve more than a hostile act against a private corporate entity or facility. Rather, it will almost certainly be associated with action against national interests. Meeting such a threat is properly the responsibility of the government, not a licensee.

As discussed in the Statement of Consideration accompanying adoption of Section 50 .13, " reactor design features to protect against the full range of the modern arsenal of weapons are simply not practicable and the defense and internal securi ty capabilities of this country constitute, of necessf ty, the basic 'safeguards' as respects possible hostile acts." Similarly, a terrorist attack at a nuclear facility or " other structure that play[s] [a] vital role within our 1

Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,804 (1993) (hereinafter "proposed rule").

2 10 CFR 50.13 (emphasis added).

3 Proposed rule at 50,804.

4 Statement of Consideration, 32 Fed. Reg. 13,445 {1967).

L-93-322 Page 3 complex industrial economy 115 would constitute an attack against national interests. Because it would be 11 [ in essence]6 directed against this [nation as a whole] 11 , the responsibility of guarding against it belongs to the government, not to the licensee. Thus, where the level of threat against a facility is unusually high, nuclear power plant protection should become the duty of the government, not a private entity.

Shortly before 10 CFR 50.13 was promulgated in the late 1960s, the Commission ruled that a licensee need not make a showing of effective protection against the 7 possibilities of attack and sabotage by national enemies. This ruling was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Siegal v. AEC, which restated the basic cons iderations behind Section 50 .13, which r e ma i n val i d today:

(1) impracticability, particularly in the case of p r ivate industry, of a nticipa t ing a ccurate ly the nature of enemy attack and of designing defenses against it, (2) the settled tradition of looking to the military to deal with this problem and the consequent sharing of its burdens by all citizens, and (3) the unavailability, through security classification and otherwise, of relevant information and the undesirability of ventilating 8

what is available in public proceedings.

The Court further stated that 11 [w]hile an applicant for a license should bear the burden of proving the security of his proposed facility as against his own treachery, negligence, or incapacity, [he should not be expected] to demonstrate how his plan would be invulnerable to whatever destructivt forces a foreign enemy might be able to direct against it."

5 6

7 Florida Power and Light co ** (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), 4 AEC 9, 13, (1967), aff'd, Siegal v. AEC, 400 F 2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

8 Siegal v. AEC, 400 F 2nd at 782 (D.C. Cr. 1968).

9 Siegal v. AEC, 400 F 2nd 778, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

L-93-322 Page 4

b. Insider Threat outside Scope of Proposed Role The proposed rule does not specifically state that any increased vehicular and explosive threat is an outsider threat and that designs or allowed alternative defenses do not require consideration of a combined insider threat. It should be clarified that combined consideration of an outsider threat together with an insider threat is not required.

c. The NRC Staff position is too subjective.

The Staff's backfit analysis contains no objective information to support the conclusion that amending the regulations would provide a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety. The DBT should not be changed until there is a more quantitative basis for doing so. The NRC staff and industry should jointly determine whether protected-area barriers need to be strengthened and, if so, devise cost-effective, practical alternatives. A variety of regulatory options is available to implement the alternatives and rulemaking may not be necessary.

d. Plant-specific backfit analyses should be performed.

The Staff's proposed rule would impose costly, prescriptive requirements absent any actual increase in the DBT.

Therefore, each licensee should be given time to perform a plant-specific backfit analysis outside the context of a rulemaking. The analysis would include a probabilistic safety assessment to estimate the DBT risk and cost estimates associated with reducing that risk. A better picture of the need for rulemaking would then emerge, and action could be taken with far less uncertainty than is now the case.

Industry should have the chance to participate in the research and analyses.

e. Peer reviews should be performed.

The research results, risk analyses, cost calculations, and other work products developed by the NRC Staff, licensees or other parties should be subject to peer review. Also, the Staff has introduced the concept of "margin of prudence",

which appears to be an additional layer of conservatism on top of the existing margins designed into the overall security system. The industry should have the opportunity to understand the need for this added measure of conservatism.

f. Existing measures are adequate.

Contingency planning is in place in accordance with existing regulations. Plant procedures exist for a wide range of off-

L-93-322 Page 5 normal, accident management, and damage control situations, and plant personnel are trained to use them. There is much design margin in plant structures, systems, and components (defense in depth, redundency, diversity, single failure criterion)

• Access authorization programs have been improved.

Extensive site security systems are in place to detect and respond to challenges.

To summarize, the proposed rule is inconsistent with the Commission's well-founded policy that defense against hostile enemy acts, whether by "a foreign government or other person," is the responsibility of the government. Thus, because it requires a licensee to protect against the type of threat that amounts to an attack against the nation as a whole, the proposed rule should not be adopted.

Sincerely, ffG 1~

President Nuclear Division JHG:abk cc: Chairman Ivan Selin Commissioner Kenneth c. Rogers Commissioner Forrest J. Renick Commissioner Gail de Planque Senator Bob Graham

.. American Electric Power Service Corporation 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus. OH 43215 .2 "-- (j) 614 2231000 r/:;t<l (§"rFRS~'/) ==

AMERICAN ELECTRIC

• 93 DEC 30 A1 1 :04 POWER

,fFI I tJt, i' c AEP:NRC:0508AD The Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch December 29, 1993

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Volume 58, No . 211 of the Federal Register includes notification tha t the NRC is proposing to amend the physica l protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors. We are providing comments regarding this proposed rulemaking, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants".

We concur with the NUMARC Industry Comments on the proposed rule .

In addition we have the following comment on the regulatory guide.

For the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, we took the initiative to install substantial active vehicle barriers at all vehicle access points, including a railroad access gate, in 1984. Two of the barriers are located within vehicle "sally ports" at normally used vehicle access points and are currently opened only after it has been determined that vehicles intending to enter the protected area have a legitimate need for entry. Upon making that determination, the vehicle is permitted access to the "sally port" where a physical search for contraband is conducted prior to final entry into the Protected Area.

Regulatory Guide DG-5006 requires that "Barriers remain in the denial position to prevent entry and are moved to allow entry only after authorization for the vehicle has been confirmed."

The guide further requires that all vehicle access control measures including a search for explosives be conducted prior to moving the barrier. If that requirement remains in effect it would require that our current vehicle barriers be removed and others installed at considerable cost.

MAY

• 4 1994" Acknowledged by card "*-...*****mmmrn=*

I.,

',). .' 1.11SSt6N TiON y

• : iJ!-_: - "'N Pc-s* ~

• c.~

_I 2.__/J:_ 1 I

/ PJ:;

I.cc --1~ - - - - -

Sp., - . tJ.r J?J , p()k_ ,

}2LJ -e_tr r  ;

Secretary of the Commission AEP:NRC:0508AD It is our position that once it has been determined that a vehicle has a legitimate need for entry, the barrier may be removed and the vehicle permitted access to the "sally port",

thereby acting as a barrier to any land vehicle attempting penetration to the protected area. While in the "sally port" other access control measures including search of the vehicle would be completed prior to permitting final access to the protected area.

Sincerely, eeJdj,iiL(

E. E. Fitzpatrick Vic e Presid e nt dr cc: A. A. Blind G. Charnoff J. B. Martin - Region III Dr. T. E. Murley NFEM Section Chief NRC Resident Inspector - Bridgman J. R. Padgett

• Lt

• Omaha Public Power District *93 OEC 28 P1 :55 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 402/636-2000 ' I '

iiut..,I'[ l 1 December 20, 1993 LIC-93-0300 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

References:

1. Docket No. 50-285

2. Proposed Rule - Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, dated November 4, 1993

SUBJECT:

Comments from Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) on Proposed Rule In Reference 2, the NRC solicited comments for proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 which would modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand -

carried equipment, and/or explosives.

As a utility licensed to operate a nuclear power plant, OPPD's fosition is that the proposed rule is unnecessary, and that its requirements wi 1 not provide a substantial increase in protection to public health and safety or the common defense and security at a justifiable cost.

OPPD recognizes that the proposed rule will probably be finalized. If so, certain provisions of the rule should be modified. The period allowed for each licensee to submit a summary description of the proposed vehicle intrusion control methods, the results of the vehicle bomb comparison, and any proposed alternative measures should be extended from 90 days to 180 days from the effective date of the rule. The proposed 90-day period will not allow licensees time to sufficiently evaluate the final rule with the related extensive NUREG report from the Army Corps of Engineers, and to propose cost-effective methods.

In addition, instead of all licensees being required to implement their measures within 360 days of the rule effective date, implementation dates should be negotiated with the NRC on an individual licensee basis commensurate with the scope of the proposed methods and availability of necessary components.

MAY Z4 1994 45-5124 Employment with Equal Opportunity Acknowledged by card .................._.N..._

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk LIC-93-0300 Page 2 Please contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

~~.~

W. G. Gates Vice President WGG/tcm c: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby &MacRae J. L. Milhoan, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector S. D. Bloom, NRC Project Manager NRC Document Control Desk

73 l { ~ ::-:-- ~ ~ f}

WINSTON & S T RAWN Ft<_ 5 tf'f-Ot

. ) ~11* L FREDERICK H. WINSlON (1853-1886) 1400 L STREET, N.W. CHICAGO OFFICE SILAS H. STRAWN (1891-1946) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-350293 Off 27 p 1 :16 35 WEST WACKER DRIVE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601 (312) 558-5600 (202) 371-5700 NEW YORK OFFICE FACSIMILE (202) 371-5950 *;l,1' 175 WATER STREET NEW YORK, NY 10038-4981 (212) 269-2500 202-371-5798 December 23, 1993 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Request for Extension of Time

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On November 4, 1993, the proposed rule titled "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" was published for public comment with a comment deadline of January 3, 1994. 58 Fed. Reg. 58,804 (1993 ) .

We understand that this proposed rulemaking is receiving accelerated processing and appreciate the efforts of the Staff and Commission in providing sixty days for the development of comments on this high-visibility issue. The establ i shment of a comment deadline occurring immediately after the holiday season, however, has created difficulties for some NUBARG members who are considering comments on the important plant - specific impacts this proposed rule may have. The Federal Register notice includes the standard provision that late comments will be considered if practical, but that full consideration cannot be assured. NUBARG recognizes that a significant deadline extension may not be feasible under the circumstances. However, in view of the effect of the holiday period, the potentially signi ficant implications of this proposed rulemaking, and the amount of documentation requiring review, NUBARG requests that the NRC grant a brief two week extension of time for submission of comments. Your prompt assistance on this matter would be greatly appreciated.

~~ '

Dani{ ~

Jan A. MacG:!J;~;'

Counsel to the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group

S. NUCLE ' . 7Y COMMISSION DOCK E SECTION OFF .:TARY ostnic:* o

• J:2:--J?-J~/-'--

11_ _

Cop*es i \.

Addi Cc ; :~* ., 3 Specia1 o s'1 JI *, l'Z-:r;,IJ

(j)

GPU Nuclear Corporation Nuclear *93 DEC 27 P2 :39 One Upper Pond Road Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 201-316-7000 TELEX 136-482 Writer's Direct Dial Number.

December 21, 1993 C300-93-2408 CJll-93-2178 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555 Dear Mr. Chilk;

Subject:

Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 To Protect Against Malvolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants (58 FR 58804 - dated, November 4, 1993)

General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation (GPU Nuclear) has reviewed the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking contained in the Federal Register and is pleased to provide the Commissioners with the comments below:

1. GPU Nuclear agrees with the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) position that deterrence of unauthorized, possibly malevolent, use of a land vehicle from penetrating into a licensee's Protected Area and shutting down the plant safely in the unlikely event of an explosion outside the protected area is not a nuclear safety issue, but a prudent action to be taken by licensees as a sound business action.

2. The NRC staff assessment concluded that the World Trade Center (WTC) and TMI events have not demonstrated a need to redefine adequate protection.

Therefore, GPU Nuclear believes actions initiated as a result of these events should be industry initiatives and not regulated through implementation of the proposed rule.

3. Of the vehicle bomb attacks world-wide since the Beirut attack (10 years ago), none have included suicide; therefore, industry initiatives of the proposed rule should only consider stationary vehicles *1aden with explosives.

MAY i! 4 1994 Acknowledged by card ..................................

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of General Public Utilities Corporation

S. NUC '1 Y COMMISSION DO X E SECTION

'\ 0 T Fl TARY OF Ti-'E C 310N O lfTla: D t _ / 1... / -J..

==-  ?-__,_/-'-

°1._

'J _ __

Cop*e,. r /____ _

Add'! C"r- ., ;-- J ,,,,,___ __ _

Spee:11 ... . t2::f- YJ~ f)Oll..

L2 y a&JC J24c ..;£

/

r

December 21, 1993 C3OO-93-24O8 C311-93-2178 Page 2

4. GPU Nuclear believes saboteurs would rely on speed and mobility to gain access to a hardened facility, such as a nuclear power plant; therefore, the vehicle/bomb size and weight should be limited to what was used at the WTC.

If you have any questions concerning the above, please contact me at (201) 316-7334.

. C. Fornicola icensing &Regulatory Affairs Director JCF/GMG/crb cc: J. J. Barton - Vice President &Director, Oyster Creek T. G. Broughton - Vice President &Director, TMl -1 P. C. Clark - President &CEO R. L. Long - Vice President &Director, Services &TMl-2 Divisions C. A. Mascari - Vice President Nuclear Assurance Division 32092096. LET

Detroit Fermi2 6400 North Dixie Highway Edison Newport, Michigan 48166 (313) 586-4000 Nuclear Operations

• 93 O[C 27 P 2 :38 December 17, 1993 HRC-93-0149 The Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 At tention: Docketing and Service Branch

Reference:

Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 HRC License No. NPF-43

Subject:

Detroit Edison Comments on the Proposed Rule, 10 CFR Part 73, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants",

58 FR 58804, dated November 4, 1993 The purpose of this letter is to provide comments on the subject rulemaking and to notify the HRC that Detroit Edison endorses and concurs with the comments made by NUMARC on behalf of the nuclear industry. This is in response to the request for public comments on the rulemaking published in the Federal Register, Volume 58, Number 212 pages 58804-55807, dated November 4, 1993.

First, we would like to emphasize that the Backfit Analysis lacks any quantitative analysis that the proposed actions would provide a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety. The Commission seems to reach this conclusion by linking two, unrelated incidents (the World Trade Center bombing and the intrusion at Three Mile Island). We concur that these two incidents should be uncoupled in developing the rule.

Second, we would emphasize the comment regarding little benefit being derived from each licensee verifying that installed barriers will prevent an intrusion. Any requirement to certify the installation as "nuclear grade" would be expensive and unjustifiable. Instead of performing a stringent design certification, a licensee should be able to chose a proven (by US Army Corps of Engineers, Sandia, etc.)

barrier system that would absorb sufficient kinetic energy of an intruding land vehicle with reasonable assurance that the protection goal would be met.

Additionally, the commission needs to acknowledge that anyone attempting to gain entry to the protected area would be severely MAY"4 ~

Acknowledged by card""'""""""'"""""""

r '"'.Y COMM 1SSION

'"E SECTION C, .E ,ARY

• ~ION

[, ~

o !rr~ / 1_/1--0 /qJ I ----

3 -----

flLJ/25 0 fl

"'-/- .er-

_ __..'-"t,i/ - -- - - - -

The Secretary of the Commission December 17, 1993 NRC-93-0149 Page 2 injured otherwise incapacitated as aggressors and the vehicle too damaged to continue on much past the barrier. Would be intruders would be severely injured and unable to further any attack on a facility. Scenarios for evaluating security contingency responses should not make an assumption that intruders could successfully defeat a barrier.

Finally, we would like to emphasize the comment regarding the schedule. The final reg guide will not be available until the rule is final. That information, along with any supplemental material to assist in barrier design and blast analysis , must be available in order to develop vehicle control measures. The licensees should be given at least the 180 days recommended by NUMARC after all materials are made available to submit their proposed vehicle control measures.

The rule does not state whether the proposed control measures must be approved. If approval of proposed measures is required, licensees should be given 365 days from the date the plan is approved to fully implement the control measures.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Girija S. Shukla at

{313) 586-4270.

Sincerely, Robert A. Newkirk Acting Director, Nuclear Licensing cc: T. G. Colburn W. J. Kropp J.B. Martin M. P. Phillips USNRC Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

LOCKWOOD GRBBNB (j)

Planners/Engineers/Architects/ Managers Lockwood Greene Fngineers, !Pc.

• 93 O[C 17 A1C :43 440 Ninth Avenue New York, New York 10001 Main (212) 465-8220 Fax (212) 6 ~ 174

[ l

• December 12, 1993 l, l I

• Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

~ ..v4-"""'t

Reference:

Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants.

Dear Sir:

This correspondence is to support your agency's approach to the above referenced security issue. By and large, security has been the target of criticism for failing to address issues proactively. Many have suggested that security resembles law enforcement in this respect; it is prepared to react to an event, but ill prepared to prevent it.

In defense of security it may be argued that management has not facilitated a proactive posture by constantly issuing directives based on ad-hoc events. To be sure, a proactive effort requires a global approach, so priorities are clearly defined and resources applied accordingly.

It is important to note that even when security is approached correctly, there still is a need for reexamination in response to the unpredictability of human behavior. This, however, should be accomplished within t}_le context of a global analysis so protection against one threat does create another exposure in the process.

Your approach to conduct an assessment of each facility and develop an appropriate response based on local circumstances is essential in maintaining a well rounded effort. My organization would be pleased to testify before the NRC, should additional hearings be required, to elaborate on the value of these assessments.

Sincerely yours, LOCKWOOD GREENE

)!;t/£,J Sal DePasqu le, CPP MAY 4 1994 Acknowledged by card ..................................

ATLANTA

• BRIDGEWATER

• CINCINNATI

• DALLAS

• NASHVILLE

• NEW YORK

• OAK RIDGE

• SAN JUAN

• SAVANNAH

• SEATTLE

• SPARTANBURG

fos'.r:-,:>,'.. D*' _J.)_IIL../ :J Cop:es ~. / ______

-Addi G1. * .

• 93 DEC 14 Al 1 :c4 December 3, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Secretary Wash i ngton, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Services Branch

Dear Sir:

The attached NRC proposed amendment to physical security requirements for Nuclear Power Plants is proper in my view. Also, more security is needed around university research reactors and high level facilities.

Specifically, I would strongly recommend that all reactor fuel, heavy water and Kilo Curies of 60 co and 137 cs be removed immediately from the Georgia Tech campus in Downtown Atlanta, Georgia. This would eliminate for the duration one of the many security concerns during the 1996 USA Olympic Games, much of which centers around the Georgia Tech campus. Past experience in other countries has shown that the olympics is a highly vulnerable place for sabotage. As you know, the public is paranoid about "Radiation". Terrorists could exploit this fear and embarrass the USA or seriously injure innocent people. Furthermore, I am pro-

• nuclear and I don't want the USA Olympic Games to be used as a too l by anyone to hurt the vital nuclear industry.

Please accept these personal comments in the spirit of free expression of opinion from a concerned citizen.

Sincerely,

~~+-

Robert M. Boyd Attachment c: Senator John Glenn Senator Paul Coveradell Robert M. Boyd Senator Sam Nunn 3993 Inca Court Stone Mountain, GA 30083 Mr. Billy Payne Acknowledged by card --~~-:::.~...!~~1...".....

S. NUC!.EA- ,- - :*. . <:,-, '. '.:,OMM iSSION oor* *:;.. * ....;-* ' i:- =s:.:cT101

,Pos!rc;' ~

o::-:*.*.,.: r~r .--, . --:.~~ ,~~ET'\F;f u~- r.-\.: ,:c; . ,!Jt.;:rjd

/:)...

1**

/r/_1J _ _ _

, ;\.;, - -*- - - -- -~- - - --

Ace r_: . ' ,* * ~J____ _

<;*e * , _l!l1 >:25. Prvf2 7

..J2J,-t,n*j L r )

No.93-167 November 4, 1993 against--the use of a four-wheel-drive land vehicle for the transport of personnel, hand-carried equipment NRC PROPOSES AMENDMENTS TO PHYSICAL or explosives. The amendments would SECURITY REQUIREMENTS provide a process to allow for FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS alternative measures to protect against sabotage.

The Nuclear Regulatory Licensees would be required to Commission is proposing to amend its establish vehicle control measures physical prote ction regulations for to protect the facility from use of operating nuclear power plants. The a land vehicle to gain unauthorized amendments would modify the design proximity to vital area barriers.

basis threat for radiological They would also be required to sabotage to include the use of land assess whether the measures taken to vehicles by adversaries for protect against vehicle intrusion transporting personnel, hand-carried provide protection against a vehicle equipment and explosives. bomb consistent with design goals and criteria specified by the Nuclear power plant licensees Commission. Licensees who could not are required to implement a system demonstrate that they fully meet the that protects against acts of Commission's design goal for radiological sabotage, and protection against a vehicle bomb specifically against the design would have the option of proposing basis threat for radiological alternative measures for protection sabotage as set out in the against this threat.

Commi s sion's regulations.

Programs of licensees who are Based on current information in the process of decommissioning or derived by continually monitoring are contemplating decommissioning in and evaluating the worldwide threat the near future would be evaluated environment and briefings by various on a case-by-case basis by the NRC government intelligence agencies, to determine if full or partial the NRC has concluded that there is exemption from the new rule is no indication of an actual vehicle appropriate.

threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. The rule calls for licensees However, based on the recent bombing authorized to operate a nuclear of the World Trade Center and the power plant (1) to submit (within 90 unauthorized intrusion at the Three days of the effective date of the Mile Island nuclear power plant, the final rule) a summary description of NRC believes that a vehicle the proposed vehicle control intrusion or bomb threat to a measures and the results of their nuclear power plant could develop cost-benefit analysis and (2) to without warning in the future. fully implement the required vehicle control measures or the site-To maintain a prudent margin specific alternative measures as between the current threat estimate approved by the Commission within (low) and the design basis threat 360 days of the effective date of (postulated as higher for the final rule.

conservatism), the NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include protection against malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants.

Interested persons are invited The proposed amendments, which to submit written comments on the are to Part 73 of the Commission's proposal to the Secretary, U.S.

regulations, would include--within Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the design basis threat that Washington, DC 20555, Attention:

licensees are required to protect Docketing and Services Branch. The comments should be submitted by 2 January 3, 1994 (60 days following publication of a Federal Register notice).

KET NU ER PO ED Le..!..!.::-....;......~** (!J

(_ § y F fl s f--y-0 L/

• 93 O[C -9 A10 :25 Marvin I. Lewis 1 P:~. r -~ ., 11~1

OIJCK t. Tt~H, \ f \IICI 7801 Roosevelt Boulevard  ! r1 t.,Nt *1 Suite 62 Phila., PA 19152 (215)624-1574 Secretary USNRC Washington, D. C. 20555 Dear Secretary; Please accept this letter as my comments on 10CFR 73 otection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power lants: Proposed Rule.

In the "Findings. NRC has concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry."

Whoever come up with this finding is either crazy, dumb or doesn't read the newspapers. The World Trade center was recently bombed with a truck bomb. 276 marines were killed in Lebanon with a truck bomb. A truck managed to get in the gate of a nuclear power plant and drive all over the utilities property.

This "finding" is clearly inadequate, deficient and just plain wrong. Any Proposed rule based on this finding is laughable. I recommend that all copies of this proposed rule be dest r oyed, and the NRC never admit to this idiocy.

I wish that could say I

MAY 4 1994 Acknowledged by card ..................................

,,>;v~ ~C'v

'.JI p;;

_.1?;

• 93 OCT 29 P3 :53 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,_i r !U E t tf,r -.1 10 CFR Part 73 Ode Ki , * , 1 vI r H !,N L RIN 3150-AEBl Protecti on Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its physical protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors. The proposed amendment would modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to i nclude use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives. The Commission believes this action i s prudent based on an evaluation of an intrusion i ncident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station and the bombing at the World Trade Center. The objective of the proposed rule is to enhance reactor safety by precluding the malevolent use of a vehicle to gain unauthorized proximity to a vital area barrier. Further, the proposed rule would enhance reactor safety by protecting vital equ i pment from damage by detonation of an explosive charge at the point of vehicle denial.

DATE:

I /3 /13/

Comment period exp i res (i nse r t 60 days after publication in the Federal Register). Comments received after this date will be considered if it is

practical to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES; Mail written comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch.

Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays.

A proposed environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which the determination is based, proposed regulatory analysis, proposed backfit analysis, and proposed regulatory guide are available for inspection, at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact are available from Carrie Brown, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2382. Single copies of e the regulatory and backfit analyses are available from Robert J. Dube, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) -504-2912.

Single copies of the regulatory guide are available from Ann Beranek, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 492-3519.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-2478.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

- Background I.n the development of its physical protection programs, NRC uses the concept of a design basis threat to assure adequate protection. The design basis threat is a hypothetical threat that is not intended to represent a real threat. The design basis threat serNes three purposes:

(1) It provides a standard with which to measure changes in the real threat environment, (2) It is used to develop regulatory requirements, and (3) It provides a standard *for evaluation of implemented safeguards programs.

The intent of the design basis threat for power :eactors is to provide a physical protection system that protects against radiological sabotage.

To assure adequacy of the design basis threat, ~~RC continually monitors and evaluates the threat environment worldwide. The Commission is also briefed periodically by agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to keep abreast of domestic and foreign intelligence concerning threat. The bombing at the World Trade Center demonstrated that a large explosive device could be assembled, delivered to a public area, and detonated in the United States without advance intelligence.

The unauthorized intrusion at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station demonstrated that a vehicle could be used to gain quick access to the protected area at a nuclear power plant. In light of these incidents, NRC neld a public meeting on May 10, 1993, to obtain additional information from the public, affected licensees, and other interested parties concerning the need for any changes to the design basis threat for radiological sabotage.

Discussion Findings. NRC has concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry._ However, based on recent events, NRC believes that a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the future. To

• maintain a prudent margin between the current threat estimate (low) and the design basis threat (higher) NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR Part 13 to modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include protection against the malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants.

Description of Proposed Amendments. NRC proposes to amend 10 CFR 73.1 to explicitly include use of a four-wheel drive land vehicle by adversaries for the transport of personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives.

Proposed criteria specifying vehicle and explosive characteristics are exempted from public disclosure as Safeguards Information and have been previously provided to personnel of affected licensees authorized access to Safeguards Information pursuant to 10 CFR 73.21 on a need-to-know basis. Four provisions would be added to amend 10 CFR 73.55. The first provision, 10 CFR 73.55(c}(7), would include new regulatory requirements to establish measures to prbtect a reactor from use of a land vehicle to gain proximity to vital areas. The vital areas contain equipment, systems, devices, or material the failure or destruction or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. The second provision, 10 CFR 73.55(c)(B), would propose a process for licensees to assess whether the protective measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (7) protect against a vehicle bomb consistent with design goals and criteria specified by the Co11111ission. Licensees whose vehicle denial measures do not fully satisfy the design goals for protection against a vehicle bomb*

would have the option to establish a9ditional measures to meet the design goals or propose other additional measures that give substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb. The thtrd provision, 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9},

describes proposed implementation schedules and information that*would be required to be submitted to the Commission. In order to protect certain documents, required by amendments to 10 CFR 73.55, as Safeguards InformatiQn, 10 CFR 73.21 would also be amended. The fourth provision, 10 CFR 73.SS(c)(l0), treats applicants for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor.

Regulatory Approach. The NRC proposes that licensees establish measures to protect vital equipment within power reactor vital areas from:

1) access by persons transported by a land vehicle and

2) damage from the detonation of a vehicle bomb in the vicinity of the vital area.

The NRC would emphasize the protection of vital equipment by requiring licensees to establish measures to protect against the use of a land vehicle to gain proximity to vital areas of a facility. The NRC would require each licensee to establish a barrier system to prevent land vehicle proximity to vital areas of the plant. The NRC would allow for use of natural features such as cliffs and natural waterways or artificial features such as buildings and canals to be included as part of the barrier system. In establishing a system of physical barriers to protect against access of a land vehicle to vital areas, the licensee would also protect the facility against a vehicle transporting a bomb which could detonate at or near the point of the vehicle barrier.

The licensee would be required to determine if measures established to protect against vehicle proximity to vital areas of the facility also protect against the threat of a land vehicle bomb as defined by the design goals and criteria set by the Commission. Essentially, the licensee would need to protect vital or alternative equipment needed to shut down the reactor and maintain the reactor in a shutdown condition. In evaluating the protection of vital equipment, the licensee could consider protection provided by structures near the equipment, assigning credit for alternative equipment not damaged by the assumed explosion, and damage control measures.

Most sites would likely meet the Commission's design goals for protection against a vehicle bomb by establishing protective measures against vehicle intrusion in the vicinity of existing protected area boundaries. The licensee would have two options if its evaluation shows that these protective measures do not fully meet the design goals and criteria for protecting against a land vehicle bomb. It may implement additional measures that would fully meet the design goals and criteria such as moving vehicle barriers further away from vital areas or equipment, installing blast shields, or modifying plant systems and equipment. Alternatively, the licensee may propose to the Commission additional measures other than ones needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria, provided this approach provides substantial protection against a vehicle bomb and that it can be demonstrated that the costs of measures to fully meet the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.

Guidance. The staff prepared a regulatory guide containing preliminary information for licensees in initial assessments of protective measures against vehicle intrusions and approaches to assess whether the Commission 1 s design goals and criteria are met by measures taken to protect against vehicle intrusion. The regulatory guide is titled DG-5006, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants. 11 Additional guidance is available in NUREG/CR-5246, 11 A Methodology to Assist in Contingency Planning for Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Land Vehicle Bombs. 11 NRC has also arranged for the United States Army Corps of Engineers to write a NUREG-series report that would be available to the licensees through the Commission in time for publication of the final rule. This NUREG report would include simple methods for the licensee to select barriers and perform an analysis of existing structures and equipment to demonstrate their ability to withstand the effects of an explosive blast.

{...,:Jr--rt.01:~,J 70 6f1 P-7S p.(__r 5 f- F fl f Cf 61 6 s -1' CII I ,2...[ qJ Public Comment. The Commission is issuing this proposed rule with a 30-day public comment period. The Commission notes that some of the issues associated with a design basis threat modification have been previously discussed in a public meeting. Interested parties who previously submitted comments at the

• time of the public meeting need not resubmit their comments. Previously submitted comments will be addressed during the review of the comments submitted on this proposed rule.

The Commission wishes to receive comments on the need to revise the design basis threat and on the proposed implementation schedule for the rule, particularly on the availability of active vehicle denial systems for purchase.

Implementation. The proposed rule would likely be implemented through 10 CFR 50.54(p) (no decrease in effectiveness of security plan), or 10 CFR 50.54(p) coupled with 10 CFR 50.59 (no change to the technical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety issue) changes. Each licensee would be required to submit to the NRC within 90 days from the effective date of the rule a summary description of the proposed vehicle intrusion control measures and the results of its evaluation comparing the measures to protect against vehicle intrusion with the design goals and criteria for protecting against a land vehicle bomb. A licensee proposing measures, as alternatives to those needed to fully meet the Commission's criteria for protecting against a vehicle bomb, would be required to submit details of their analyses, including justification that substantial protection was provided and that the cost of measures needed to fully. meet the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. Proposals by licensees to use alternative measures would be handled as 10 CFR 50.90 amendments. Licensees would be required to implement their measures within 360 days of the rule effective date .

• Once implemented, the control measures required to meet these regulations supersede contingency requirements initiated in response to Generic Letter 89-07, 11 Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs,~ dated April 28, 1989. However, licensees whose vehicle control measures do not fully meet the NRC's design goals and measures may choose to maintain vehicle bomb contingency planning as one element of proposed

-alternative measures.

Safeguards Information. The Commission cautions licensees not to submit any data that is protected as Safeguards Information as part of their comments on the proposed rule.

Enforcement. Violation of these proposed rules, if codified, may subject a person to the criminal penalties in section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Decommissioning Reactors. The rule would apply to licensees who are either in the process of decommissioning or plan to decommission in the near future and do not have a possession-only license. Those licensees would need to be evaluated individually to determine if full or partial exemption from the new rule is appropriate.

Electronic Submittals. Comments may be submitted, in addition to the original paper copy, by copy of the letter in electronic format on IBM

• personal computer MS-DOS compatible 3.5- or 5.25-inch double-side, double density (OS/DD) or high density (HD) diskettes. Data files should be submitted in WordPerfect 5.0 or 5.1, unformatted ASCII code, or if formatted text is required, IBM Revisable-Form-Text Document Context Architecture (RFT/DCA) format.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission s regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR 1

Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environmental impact statement is not required. The proposed rule involves installation of vehicle barriers at operating power reactor sites and an evaluation of these barriers by the licensee to determine whether they provide adequate protection against a land vehicle bomb under design goals and criteria established by the Commission. Implementation of these amendments would not involve release of or exposure to radioactivity from the site. The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact are available from Carrie Brown, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-2382.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

• This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of the information collection requirements.

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 497 hours0.00575 days <br />0.138 hours <br />8.217593e-4 weeks <br />1.891085e-4 months <br /> per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150-0002), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this proposed regulation. The analysis examines the cost and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the draft analysis may be obtained from Robert J. Dube, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2912.

1he Commission requests public co111T1ent on the draft regulatory analysis.

Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification Based on the information available at this stage of the rulemaking proceeding and in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.

605{b), the Commission certifies that, if promulgated, this rule will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.

The proposed rule affects only licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor. The utilities that operate these nuclear power reactors do not fall within the scope of the definition of small entitiesu as given in the 0

Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards promulgated in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration (13 CFR Part 121).

Backfit Analysis As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a backfit analysis for the proposed rule. The Commission has determined, based on this analysis, that backfitting to comply with the requirements of this proposed rule will provide a substantial increase in protection to public health and safety or the common defense and security at a cost which is justified by the substantial increase. The backfit analysis on which this determination is based is available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the backfit analysis are available from Robert J. Dube, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-2912. It should be noted that the conclusions reached are based on best available data. The proposed rule contains a provision for affected licensees to conduct site-specific analyses if they so choose.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to Part 73.

PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat.

1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

• Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat.

2232, 2241, (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.21 is issued under sec. 606 Pub. L.99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

2. In §73.1, the introductory text of paragraph (a) is revised and a new paragraph (a)(l)(i)(E) is added to read as follows:

§73.1 Purpose and scope.,

(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system which will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites and in transit and in plants in which special nuclear material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft o-f special nuclear material

• Licensees subject to the provisions of §73.20, §73.50, or §73.60 are exempt from

§73.l(a) (1) (i) (E).

(1) ***

( i) ***

(E) A four-wheel drive lanq vehicle used for the transport of personnel,

• hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives, and

3. In §73.21, a new paragraph (b)(l){xiii) is added to read as follows:

§73.21 Requirements for the protection of safeguards information.

{b) ***

(1) ***

(xiii) Information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(B) (9), and (10).

4. In §73.55, new paragraphs (c)(7), (8), (9), and (10) are added to read as follow:

§73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

(c) ***

(7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas .

• (8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) to the Commission 1 s design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb. Each licensee shall either:

(i) Confirm to the Con111ission that the vehicle control measures meet the design goals and criteria specified; or (ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c}(7}, describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and it is determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.

(9) Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall:

(i) By (insert 90 days from effective date of rule) submit to the Cormiission a sulllllary description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison

• as required by 10 CFR 73.SS(c) (8). For licensees who choose to propose alternative measures as provided for in 10 CFR 73.55(c){8), the submittal must include the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives; (ii) By (insert 360 days from final rule effective date)', fully implement the -required vehicle control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as approved by the Conunission;

- (iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by the Cammi ss*i on pursuant to 10 CFR 73. 55 (c){8) and (9); and (iv) Retain, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.70, all comparisons and analyses prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(c){7) and (8).

(10) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.2l(b) or 10 CFR 50.22 of this chapter, whose application was submitted prior to (insert effective date of rule), shall incorporate the required vehicle control program into the site Physical Security Plan and implement it by the date of receipt of the operating license.

--, -q Dated at Rockville, Maryland this -

1:

r /

~ - day of 1993.

egulatory Commission.