ML23151A567

PRM-050-046 - 51FR47025 - State of Maine: Filing of Petition for Rulemaking

ML23151A567
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/30/1986
From:	Hoyle J NRC/SECY
To:
References
51FR47025, PRM-050-046
Download: ML23151A567 (1)

Text

ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 12/30/1986 TITLE: PRM-050-046 - 51FR47025 - STATE OF MAINE: FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING -

CASE

REFERENCE:

, PRM-050-046 51FR47025 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

PAGE 1 OF 2 STATUS OF RULEMAKING RECORD 1 OF 1 PROPOSED RULE: PRM-050-046 RULE NAME: STATE OF MAINE: FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE: 51FR47025 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 12/30/86 NUMBER OF COMMENTS: 64 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 03/02/87 EXTENSION DATE: 04/15/87 FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: 55FR05603 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 02/16/90 NOTES ON: PETITION CONCERNED WITH EMERGENCY PLANNING REGULATIONS. PETITION D STATUS :. ENIED BY EDO ON 2/13/90.

F RULE FILE LOCATED IN P-1.

PRESS PAGE DOWN OR ENTER TO SEE RULE HISTORY OR STAFF CONTACT PRESS ESC TO SEE ADDITIONAL RULES, (E) TO EDIT OR (S) TO STOP DISPLAY PAGE 2 OF 2 HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PRM-050-046 RULE TITLE: STATE OF MAINE: FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING

~OPQSED RULE PROPOSED RULE DATE PROPOSED RULE ECY PAPER: SRM DATE: I I SIGNED BY SECRE'TARY: 12/22/86 FINAL RULE FINAL RULE DATE FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: 89-277A SRM DATE: 01/04/90 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 02/13/90 STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULE CONTACT!: MICHAEL T. LESAR MAIL STOP: 4000MNBB PHONE: 492-7086 CONTACT2: MAIL STOP: PHONE:

PRESS PAGEUP TO SEE STATUS OF RULEMAKING PRESS ESC TO SEE* ADDITIONAL RULES, (E) TO EDIT OR (S) TO STOP DISPLAY

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-046 (51FR4~025)

In the Matter of STATE OF MAINE: FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION.OF DOCUMENT

- 10/I-7 /86 10/14/86 PETITION FOR RU~EMAKING - STATE OF MAINE (TIERNEY}

10/17/86 10/14/86 PETITION FOR RULEMAKING FROM STATE OF MAINE JAMES E. TIERNEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL 12/23/86 12/22/86 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING 12/23/86 12/22/86 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING 12/23/86 12/22/86 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - 10 CFR PART 50 STATE OF MAIN~; FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING 02/04/87 02/01/87 COMMENT OF ECOLOGY/ALERT (E. NEMETHY) ( 1) 02/04/87 02/01/87 COMMENT OF ECOLOGY/ALERT (E. NEMETHY) ( 1)

- 02/04/87 02/01/87 COMMENT OF ECOLOGY/ALERT (E. NEMETHY} ( l}

02/06/87 02/03/87 LTR NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE (MARIOTTE) REQUESTING EXTENSION OF COMMENT PERIOD 02/06/87 02/03/87 LTR NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE

. (MARIOTTE} REQUESTING EXTENSION OF COMM~NT PERIOD 02/06/87 02/03/87 LTR FROM MICHAEL MARIOTTE, NUCLEAR INFORMATION &

RESOURCE SERVICE, REQUESTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO SUBMIT COMMENTS ON PETITION FOR RULEMAKING/MAINE 02/12/87 02/12/87 NOTE OF RECIPIENTS REQUESTING THAT ALL COMMENTS PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED BE DISREGARDED EXCEPT COMMENT NO. 23 WHICH HAS BEEN RENUMBERED AS COMMENT NO. 1 02/12/87 02/12/87 NOTE OF RECIPIENTS REQUESTING THAT ALL COMMENTS PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED BE DISREGARDED EXCEPT COMMENT NO. 23 WHICH HAS BEEN RENUMBERED AS COMMENT NO. 1 02/12/87 02/11/87 COMMENT OF MICKEY W. SMITH ( 2)

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-046 ('51FR47025)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 02/12/87 02/11/87 COMMENT OF MICKEY W. SMITH ( 2) 02/12/87 02/11/87 COMMENT OF MICKEY W. SMITH ( 2) 02/13/87 02/11/87 COMMENT OF SIDNEY J. GOODMAN ( 3) 02/13/87 02/11/87 COMMENT OF SIDNEY J. GOODMAN ( 3) 02/13/87 02/11/87 COMMENT OF SIDNEY J. GOODMAN, PE ( 3) 02/17/87 02/12/87 COMMENT OF HELEN &JACK FORST ( 4) 02/17/87 02/12/87 COMMENT OF HELEN &JACK FORST ( 4) 02/17/87 02/09/87 COMMENT OF EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR A PROSPEROUS GA (TIM JOHNSON) ( 5) 02/17/87 02/09/87 COMMENT OF EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR A PROSPEROUS GA (TIM JOHNSON) ( 5) 02/17/87 02/12/87 COMMENT OF HELENE AND JACK FORST ( 4) 02/17/87 02/09/87 COMMENT OF CAMPAIGN FOR A,PROSPEROUS GEORGIA (TIM JOHNSON) ( 5) 02/20/87 02/12/87 COMMENT OF TOWN OF HAMPTON (MATTHEW T. BROCK) ( 6)

- 02/20/87 02/12/87 COMMENT OF TOWN OF HAMPTON (MATTHEW T. BROCK) ( 6) 02/20/87 02/18/87 COMMENT OF AMESBURY BOARD OF SELECTMEN (WILLIAMS. LORD) ( 7) 02/20/87 02/18/87 COMMENT OF AMESBURY BOARD OF SELECTMEN (WI-LLIAM S. LORD) ( })

02/20/87 02/12/87 COMMENT OF TOWN OF HAMPTON (MATTHEW 1. BROCK) ( 6) 02/20/87 02/20/87 COMMENT OF TOWN OF AMESBURY, MASSACHUSETTS (WILLIAM S. LORD) ( 7) 02/24/87 02/16/87 COMMENT OF SOUTH TEXAS CANCELLATION CAMPAIGN (DAN HARRIS) ( 8) 02/24/87 02/16/87 COMMENT OF SOUTH TEXAS CANCELLATION CAMPAIGN (DAN HARRIS) ( 8) 02/24/87 02/16/87 COMMENT OF SOUTH TEXAS CANCELLATION CAMPAIGN (DAN HARRISON) ( 8)

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-046 (51FR47025)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 02/25/87 02/20/87 COMMENT OF SIERRA CLUB - CUMBERLAND CHAPTER (MARY B. DAVIS) ( 9) 02/25/87 02/20/87 COMMENT OF SIERRA CLUB - CUMBERLAND CHAPTER (MARY B. DAVIS) ( 9) 02/25/87 02/20/87 COMMENT OF SIERRA CLUB, CUMBERLAND CHAPTER (MARY B. DAVIS) ( 9) 02/27/87 02/23/87 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION (E.C. SIMPSON) ( 10)

- 02/27/87 02/23/87 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION (E.C. SIMPSON) ( 10) 02/27/87 02/23/87 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION (E.C. SIMPSON) ( 10) 03/02/87 03/02/87 LTR HARMON &WEISS (CURRAN) REQUESTING EXTENSION OF COMNMENT PERIOD ON BEHALF OF UCS AND NECNP 03/02/87 03/02/87 LTR HARMON &WEISS (CURRAN) REQUESTING EXTENSION OF COMNMENT PERIOD ON BEHALF OF UCS AND NECNP 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF CONNER &WETTERHAHN, ET AL.

(TROY B. CONNER, JR.) ( 13) 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF CONNER &WETTERHAHN, ET AL.

(TROY B. CONNER, JR.) ( 13)

- 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF CONNER &WETTERHAHN, ET AL.

(TROY B. CONNER, JR.) ( 13) 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF CONNER &WETTERHAHN, ET AL ..

(TROY B. CONNER, JR.) ( 13) 03/02/87 02/26/87 COMMENT OF CLEAN AIR COUNCIL (RICHARD J. MYERS) ( 20) 03/02/87 02/26/87 COMMENT OF CLEAN AIR COUNCIL (RICHARD J. MYERS) ( 20) 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF KMC, INC. (PAUL F. COLLINS) ( 21) 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF KMC, INC. (PAUL F. COLLINS) ( 21) 03/02/87 02/27/87 COMMENT OF STATE OF MAINE (JAMES E. TIERNEY) ( 11) 03/02/87 02/25/87 COMMENT OF MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY (G.D. WHITTIER) ( 12) 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER & PUBLIC SERV. E&G (TROY B. CONNER, JR.) ( 13)

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-046 (51FR47025}

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF CONN.YANKEE POWER/NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENRG (E.J. MROCZKA, SR. VP} ( 14}

03/02/87 02/27/87 COMMENT OF MASS. ATTY. GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON (JAMES M. SHANNON} ( 15}

03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF AIF SUBCOMM. ON EMERGENCY PLANNING ETC.

(FREDERICK W. BUCKMAN} ( 16) 03/02/87 02/27/87 COMMENT OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY,INC (SUSAN L. HIATT) ( 17) 03/02/87 02/24/87 COMMENT OF GULF STATES UTILITIES (J.E. BOOKER} ( 18) 03/02/87 02/26/87 COMMENT OF SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE (JANE DOUGHTY) ( 19) 03/02/87 02/26/87 COMMENT OF CLEAN AIR COUNCIL (RICHARD J. MYERS) ( 20) 03/02/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF COORD. GROUP ON E/P: 19 UTILITIES (PAUL F. COLLINS) ( 21) 03/02/87 03/02/87 LTR FROM DIANE CURRAN, HARMON & WEISS, REQUESTING EXTENSION OF TIME UNTIL MARCH 6, 1986 FOR FILING COMMENTS 03/03/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF ARKANSAS P&L, DUKE POWER, NE UTIL. ET AL (NICHOLAS S. REYNOLDS) ( 22) 03/03/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY (D.W. EDWARDS) ( 23) 03/04/87 02/26/87 COMMENT OF BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY (JOSEPH A. TIERNAN, VP) ( 24) 03/05/87 02/25/87 COMMENT OF GEORGIA POWER COMPANY (L.T. GUCWA) ( 25) 03/05/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE (STEPHANIE MURPHY} ( 26) 03/05/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (H.W. KEISER} ( 27) 03/09/87 03/02/87 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (C.O. WOODY} ( 28}

03/09/87 03/09/87 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (FPL}

(MICHAEL A. BAUSER) ( 29}

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-046 (51FR47025}

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 03/10/87 02/26/87 COMMENT OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (DENNIS L. FARRAR} ( 30}

03/16/87 03/13/87 COMMENT OF VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER COMPANY (W.L. STEWART} ( 31}

04/03/87 03/30/87 COMMENT OF ECOLOGY CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (ANNA HARLOWE} ( 32}

04/06/87 04/03/87 COMMENT OF TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (R. L. GRIDLEY) ( 33) 04/10/87 04/04/87 COMMENT OF ECOLOGY CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (ELAINE STANSFIELD) { 34) 04/10/87 04/04/87 COMMENT OF ECOLOGY CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (ELAINE STANSFIELD} ( 34}

04/10/87 04/04/87 COMMENT OF ECOLOGY CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (ELAINE STANSFIELD} ( 34}

04/15/87 04/14/87 COMMENT OF STATE OF MAINE (JAMES E. TIERNEY} ( 35}

04/15/87 04/14/87 COMMENT OF STATE OF MAINE '(JAMES E. TlERNEY} ( 35.}

04/15/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE (NIRS} ( 36)

- 04/15/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE (NIRS} ( 36}

04/15/87 04/14/87 COMMENT OF STATE OF MAINE (JAMES E. TIERNEY} ( 35}

04/15/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE (NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERV} ( 36}

04/16/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (GEORGES. THOMAS) ( 37}

04/16/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (GEORGES. THOMAS} ( 37}

04/16/87 04/16/87 COMMENT OF UCS/NECNP ( 38}

04/16/87 04/16/87 COMMENT OF UCS/NECNP ( 38) 04/16/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE (GEORGES. THOMAS) ( 37) 04/16/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF UCS &NEW ENGLAND COALITION/NUCLEAR POLL (DIANE CURRAN &ELLYN WEISS} ( 38}

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-046 {51FR47025)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF ELIZABETH STEVENS { 39) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF ELIZABETH STEVENS { 39) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF HARRY R. BERN { 40) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF HARRY R. BERN { 40) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF BARBARA TALOS { 41)

- 04/17/87 04/17 /87 04/17/87 04/10/87 04/10/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF BARBARA TALOS {

COMMENT OF CATHY S. HOCKETT {

COMMENT OF CATHY S. HOCKETT {

41) 42) 42) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF DAVE RAPAPORT { 43) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF DAVE RAPAPORT { 43) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF KEN ALLORUM { 44) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF KEN ALLORUM { 44) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF PAUL J. HUBBARD { 45)

- 04/17/87 04/17 /87 04/17/87 04/10/87 04/10/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF PAUL J. HUBBARD (

COMMENT OF TIMOTHY D. MARTIN (

COMMENT OF TIMOTHY D. MARTIN (

45) 46) 46) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF BETH WIEMURIE ( 47) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF BETH WIEMURIE ( 47) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF NAME ILLIGIBLR ( 48) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF NAME ILLIGIBLR ( 48) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF MICHAELE. WEM ( 49) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF MICHAELE. WEM ( 49) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF LARS LERREUS ( 50) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF LARS LERREUS ( 50) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF JILL E. ZACHARY ( 51)

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-046 {51FR47025)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF JILL E. ZACHARY { 51) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF EDWARD. J. CRAIG { 52) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF EDWARD J. CRAIG { 52) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF GERALD R. LAPORITO { 53) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF GERALD R. LAPORITO { 53)

- 04/17/87 04/17/87 04/17/87 04/10/87 04/10/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF CAROLYN ELSEN {

COMMENT OF CAROLYN ELSEN {

COMMENT OF JONATHAN M. COOK {

54) 54) 55) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF JONATHAN M. COOK { 55) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF STEPHEN L. SAWYER { 56) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF STEPHEN L. SAWYER { 56) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF LARRY CORN { 57) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF LARRY CORN { 57)

• 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF FRANK V. GRIMALDI { 58) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF FRANK V. GRIMALDI { 58) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF DAVID BAGLEY { 59) 04/17 /87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF DAVID BAGLEY { 59) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF THOMAS DIJJO { 60) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF THOMAS DIJJO { 60) 04/17/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. & OTHERS

{DELISSA A. RIDGWAY) { 61) 04/17/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. & OTHERS

{ ELISSA A. RIDGWAY) { 61) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF ELIZABETH STEVENS ( 39) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF HARRY R. BENNETT ( 40) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF BARBARA TALOS ( 41)

DOCKET NO.. PRM-050-046 (51FR47025)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF CATHY S. HACKETT ( 42) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF DAVE RAPAPORT ( 43) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF KEN ALLORUM ( 44) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF PAUL J. HUBBARD ( 45) 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF TIMOTHY D. MARTIN ( 46)

- 04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF BETH WIEMURIE ( 47}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF IRVING J. (NAME ILLEGIBLE} ( 48}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF MICHAELE. WEM (?} ( 49}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF LARS LERREUS ( 50}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF JILL E. ZACHARY ( 51}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF EDWARD J. CRAIG ( 52}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF GERALD R. LAPOSITO ( 53}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF CAROLYN ELSEN ( 54}

• 04/17 /87 04/17/87 04/17 /87 04/10/87 04/10/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF JONATHAN M. COOK (

COMMENT OF STEPHEN L. SAWYER (

COMMENT OF LARRY CORN ( 57}

55}

56}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF FRANK V. GRIMALDI ( 58}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF DAVID BAGLEY ( 59}

04/17/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF THOMAS DIJJO ( 60) 04/17/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF AMERICAN ELECTRIC, BALTIMORE G&E, ET AL (JAYE. SILBERG & DELISSA A. RIDGWAY} ( 61) 04/20/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF NEW YORK PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP (JOAN HOLT} ( 62) 04/20/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF NEW YORK PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP (JOAN HOLT} ( 62}

04/20/87 04/16/87 COMMENT OF MARVIN I. LEWIS ( 63}

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-046 (51FR4Z025)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 04/20/87 04/16/87 COMMENT OF MARVIN I. LEWIS ( 63) 04/20/87 04/15/87 COMMENT OF NEW YORK PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP (JOAN HOLT) ( 62) 04/20/87 04/16/87 COMMENT OF MARVIN I. LEWIS ( 63) 04/28/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF MICHAEL DECHIAVA ( 64) 04/28/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF MICHAEL DECHIAVA ( 64) 04/28/87 04/10/87 COMMENT OF MICHAEL DECHIAVA ( 64)

02/22/90 02/13/90 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE 02/22/90 02/13/90 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE 02/22/90 02/13/89 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE; 10 CFR PARTS 50 AND 70; SUB. 2/16/90 55 FR 5603

[7590 -0lgOCKtlEfr U5NHC "90 FEB 22 P4 :23 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,)fF!C£ OF Sc.CRfTARV 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 DOCKETI NG t.. ';filVICf:

BRANCH

[Docket Nos. PRM-50-31, PRM-50-45, and PRM-50-46 ]

Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants; Denial of Petitions fgr RuJemaking AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Denial of petitions for rulemaking.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is denying three petitions for rulemaking concerning emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants. These petitions were submitted by the Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, North Carolina; the Department of Attorney General, State of Maine; and an individual, Kenneth G. Sexton, Ph.D. The Citizens Task Force petition (PRM-50-31) requested that (1) the emergency planning zone radius around nuclear power plants be extended from 10 miles to 20 miles, (2) independent radiological monitoring systems operated by local coll'lllunities be established, and (3) mandatory utility funding of the emergency preparedness efforts of local co1T1Tiunities be required. The petition submitted by Mr. Sexton (PRM-50-45) requested that the size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ be determined on a site-specific basis, using the most up-to-date methodologies and that the size of the EPZ be reevaluated at least every five years. The petition submitted by the State of Maine (PRM-50-46) requested 1) expansion of the emergency planning zone for both plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway; 2) requiring that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the governor or governors of any affected state approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction; and 3) requiring that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading or low power operations are permitted.

The CoRlllission considers that these three petitions have a comnon theme thus warranting simultaneous evaluation. Additionally, the State of Maine formally requested that " *** the Maine Petition be consolidated with the so-called Sexton Petition *** " In denying the petitions, the COllllli ssion concludes that its ~ //,[q~

1 f\lJt' 5110' y;?ft

[7590-01]-

present regulations on emergency preparedness are adequate to protect public health and safety.

ADDRESSES: Copies of a11 NRC documents are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Copies of NUREG documents may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office by calling {202) 275-2060 or by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. Copies are also available from the National Technical Infonnation Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jamgochian, Severe Accident Issues Branch, Office of Nuc1ear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 (301-492-3918)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

PRM-50-31: A petition filed before the Co1J111ission on December 21, 1981 by the Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, requested the CoD1Tiission to amend its emergency preparedness regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilit1es,N and Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.* The petition requested the Corrmission to amend the regulations to require that the present 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) radius for nuclear power plants be extended from 10 miles to 20 miles and include any towns bordering on or partially within this EPZ, that towns within the EPZ with a population in excess of 5,000 persons operate their own radiolo-gical monitoring equipment, and that utilities be required to finance the emergency preparedness efforts of the towns around the nuclear power plants.

A notice of filing the petition, Docket No. PRM-50-31, was published 1n the Federal Register on March 24, 1982 (47 FR 12639). Public comments were requested by May 24, 1982. The coimnent period was extended to March 9, 1987 (51 FR 40335; Noveut>er 6, 1986).

2

[7590-01]

A total of 74 co1T1T1ent letters were received. Twenty-three of the letters were from individuals, of whom 15 favored the petition and eight opposed it.

Thirteen letters were from environmental, nuclear, or energy oriented citizen activist groups. Of these, 12 favored the petition and one opposed it.

Twenty-nine letters were from utilities, their law firms, or other companies associated with the nuclear industry. A11 2_9 opposed the petition. Seven letters were received from state or local emergency preparedness agencies. All seven opposed the petition. A letter from a political club and a letter from a county conmission were received, both favored the petition.

PRM-50-45: A petition filed before the ColTITlission on August 6, 1986 by Mr.

Kenneth G. Sexton, requested the ColTITlission to amend its emergency preparedness regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." The petition requested the Colilllission to amend 10 CFR 50.47{c)(2) for nuclear power plants to require that *the plume exposure pathway EPZ for all nuclear power plants shall consist of an area to be detennined by the NRC on a site-specific basis, after allowing for review of the determination report by interested parties. The report shall list, describe, and reference all input data and methodologies used and all other factors considered. The NRC shall use methodologies and procedures which are generally accepted as reasonably current and appropriate by recognized professional groups in each supporting field (including the American Meteorology Society (AMS} and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Likewise, best available estimates for model input (such as source tenns), shall be used.

This distance shall be reevaluated at least every five years, using latest techniques and information, unless petitioned earlier by the NRC, another .

professional group (such as the EPA or AMS), or the general public. Generally, the models shall be at least as complex and realistic as described in NUREG-0654 for Class B models. Meteorological submodels shall consider all factors which can have an effect on the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment. The exact size and configuration of the EPZ surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capab-ilities as they are affected by such conditions as power plant specifics (type, power output, age, etc.), local meteorology (including data from both the power plant site and local national 3

[7590-01]

weather service), demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, jurisdictional boundaries, and proximity of seats of local government.y A notice of filing of the petition, Docket No. PRM-50-45, was published in the Federal Register on October 6, 1986 (51 FR 35518). Public cornnents were requested by December 5, 1986.

A total of 314 co11111ent letters were received of which 278 favored the petition and 14 opposed it. Two hundred thirty-five of the letters were from individuals. Four letters were from environmental, nuclear, or energy oriented citizen activist groups. Of these, three favored the petition and one opposed it. Ten letters were from utilities, their law firms, or other companies associated with the nuclear industry. All ten opposed the petition. Seven letters were received from local government emergency preparedness agencies, of whom four favored the petition and three opposed the petition.

PRM-50-46: A petition filed before the Corrmission on October 14, 1986 by the Attorney General, State of Maine, requested the Conmission to amend its emergency preparedness regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, *oomestic licensing of Production and Utilization Fac11itiesw. The petition requested that the Corrmission amend 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for nuclear power plants to 1) expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway; 2) require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the governor or governors of any affected*state approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction; and 3) require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading or low power operations are permitted.

Subsequently, the State of Maine, Department of the Attorney General in a letter dated February 13, 1987 requested u *** that the Maine Petition be consolidated with the so-called Sexton Petition, Docket No. PRM-50-45, 51 Federal Register 35518 (October 6, 1986) ***

• A notice of filing of the petition, Docket No. PRM-50-46, was published in the Federal Register on Deceni:ler 30, 1986 (51 FR 47025). Public comments were requested by March 2, 1987.

4

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A total of 37 comment letters were received. Seven of the 1etters were from 1nd1vidua1s, a11 favoring the petition. Five letters were from environmental, nuclear, or energy oriented citizen activist groups. Of these, four favored the petition and one opposed it. Twenty-two letters were from utilities and law firms. Of these, four favored the petition and sixteen opposed the petition. One letter was received from a state and favored the petition.

Each of the three petitioners requeste~, among other things, a fundamental change to the NRC emergency planning regulations that would or could change the size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Each petitioner provided a different rationale to support its request and many comment letters surfaced additional reasons to either support or oppose the petitioners requests.

Sixteen separate issues have been identified in the petition and colTDtlents.

Issues 1 through 11 focus on this colTITIOn theme, to change the size of the EPZ, while addressing different rationales. Issues 12 through 16 focus on emergency planning areas of tangential concern. Each issue with accompanying rationale is fu11y discussed and evaluated followed by a Comission response to that particular concern.

Issue 1. Extend the emergency planning zone radius from 10 miles to 20 miles because the most severe accidents were not adequately considered The rationale used for expressing the opinion that a 10-mile EPZ is inadequate is that following a core-melt accident which results in an atmospheric release of radiation, large doses of radiation could occur outside the 10-mile radius.

The petition fi1ed by the Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, quoted the joint NRC-FEMA report NUREG-0654. 1 1 NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Noveni:ler 1980.

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On the othe.r hand, for the wor~t possible accidents, protective actions

[evacuation of the population] would need to be taken outside the planning zones [of 10 miles]. NUREG-0654 Rev. 1 at 11.

The pet1t1oner argued that the size of the EPZ should be based on the worst-case core meltdown accident stating, It is disturbing that the 11 evacuation preparedness EPZ zone is 11mited to 10 miles despite the clear recognition that in a worst-case accident, evacuation would need to be taken outside the zone. 11 The petitioner further argued that evacuation should be taken not only to avoid 11 1111118d1ate life threatening doses" but other severe adverse health risks as well.

Several commenters supported the idea that the EPZ shoula be based on the worst-case accident: an accident involving a core-melt, a major breach of containment resulting in an atmospheric release of large amounts of radioactivity especially during adverse weather conditions. These connenters said that people beyond 10 miles were in danger from such an accident. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists said:

Although the NRC alleged in NUREG-0396 3 that it considered accidents beyond the traditional design basis, the consideration given such accidents was minimal at best.

It is clear that the 10-mile plume EPZ was not directed toward accidents in which the containment fails either concurrently with a core-melt or consequent to a core-melt. It is precisely such accidents which dominate the risk to the public from the operation of nuclear power plants.

Commenters cited large consequences from a severe accident. For example, Pollution and Environmental Problems, Inc., said:

The Reactor Safety Study 4 estimates that a core-melt could cause 48,000 fatalities; 285,000 non-fatal illnesses and 5,000 genetic injuries. These consequences--as bad as they are--assume that most people downwind of an accident within a 45 degree sector extending 25 miles from a plant could be evacuated within a few hours. The NRC requires--only a 10-mile 2 Note that the words in brackets, [evacuation of the population], were added to the quote by one of the petitioners. The words change the meaning intended in NUREG-0654, wherein protective action includes other actions besides evacuation, such as seeking shelter indoors.

3 NUREG-0396, Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, December 1978.

4 WASH-1400 (also nunt>ered NUREG-75/0014), Reactor Safety Study, of~,n called the nRasmussen Report 11 or WASH-1400, 11 October 1975.

6

l evacuation zone--so it must be assumed that NRC is willing to accept a larger number of deaths and injuries than the Reactor Safety Study assumes.

Commission Response to Issue 1:

The Conmission dealt extensively with the issue of the adequacy of the 10 mile EPZ in the context of severe accidents, in its decision in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuc"1ear Power Station, Unit 1) CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383 (1987). The discussion in that case su1I1T1arizes the Co11111ission development of the 10 mile EPZ concept and it is appropriate to quote extensively from it in response to the petitions here. The Corrmission noted that, For design-basis/loss-of-coolant accidents (OBA/LOCA), the Report

[NUREG-0396] concluded, among other things, that for most plants the 25-rem (thyroid) and 5-rem (whole-body) EPA protective action guides 5 would not be exceeded beyond 10 miles from the plant, even using conservative assumptions and analyses. Report, Appendix I at 4-6.

As for serious Class 9 accidents involving core-melt and containment failure, the Report [NUREG-0396] concluded that these protective action guides generally would not be exceeded beyond 10 miles unless the containment failed catastrophically and there was a very large release of radioactive material *** [and] that even for very large releases, emergency actions such as sheltering or evacuation within 10 miles would result in significant reductions in deaths and early injuries. Id. at 6-7. From a probability standpoint, the Report concluded that the probability of large doses from core-melt accidents drops off substantially at about 10 miles from the reactor.

Id. at 37.

Based on these considerations, the Report concluded that:

Emergency response plans should be useful for responding to any accident that would produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs.

This would include the more severe design-basis accidents and the accident spectrum analyzed in [the Reactor Safety Study]

RSS. After reviewing the potential consequences associated with these types of accidents, it was the consensus (sic) of the Task 5 uProtective action guides are units of radiation doses which, if projected to be received by an individual, would warrant protective action." 26 NRC, at 393 N. 18 (1987), citing Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-520/1-75-001 (September 1975).

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Force that emergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out to which predetermined actions would provide dose savings for any such accidents. Beyond this generic distance it was concluded that actions could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same considerations that went into the initial action determinations.

The Task Force judgment on the extent of the Emergency Planning Zone is derived from the characteristics of design basis and Class 9 accident consequences. Based on the information provided in Appendix I lof NUREG-0396] and the applicable PAGs a radius of about 10 miles was selected for the plume exposure pathway and a radius of about 50 miles was selected for the ingestion exposure pathway as shown in Table 1. Although the radius for the EPZ implies a circular area, the actual shape would depend upon the characteristics of a particular site. The circular or other defined area would be for planning whereas initial response would likely involve only a portion of the total area. Report at 16. 26 NRC at 393 (brackets not in the original).

A reading of the Report [NUREG-0396] indicates clearly that the margins of safety provided by the reco11111ended 10-mile radias were not calculated in any precise fashion, but were qualitatively found adequate as a matter of judgment. 61ven the uncertainties in estimations of Class 9 accident probabilities and consequences, there was no other feasible choice in this regard. The EPZ's shape could be somewhat different than the 10-mile circular radius implies, without compromising emergency planning goals. Indeed, the Report

[NUREG-0396] is explicit that njudgment *** will be used in determining the precise size and shape of the EPZs considering local conditions such as demography, topography, and land use characteristics, access routes, local jurisdictional boundaries and arrangements with the nuclear facility operator for notification and response assistance."

These are, of course, the considerations later cited in §50.47(b)(2) with regard to determining the 11 exact size and configuration" of the EPZ.

Nothing in the Report NUREG-0396] or in any other material in the emergency planning rulesnaking record compels a finding that EPZ adequacy is especially sensitive to where exactly the boundary falls, and any such conclusion would seem to be at odds with the overall thrust of the Report [NUREG-0396]. In particular, the task force's analysis indicates that uadequate protective measures" in the context of emergency planning is not a precisely defined concept. 26 NRC at 394 (brackets not in the original).

The concept of "adequate protective measures* as used in our emergency planning regulations is explained in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 {1986), as follows:

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[7590-01].

This root question cannot be answered without some discussion of what is meant by "adequate protective measures." Our emergency planning regulations are an important part of the regulatory framework for protecting the public health and safety. But they differ in character from most of our siting and engineering design requirements which are directed at achieving or maintaining a minimum level of public safety protection. See, e.g., 10 CFR § 100.11. Our emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate plan achieve a preset mini111Jm radiation dose saving or a minimum evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a serious accident.

Rather, they attempt to achi_eve r~asonable and feasible dose redu*ct1on under the circumstances; what may be reasonable or feasible for one plant site may not be for another. *-

As the Conmission has made clear:

It is implicit in this concept of "adequate protective measures* that a determination that a particular EPZ size will provide "adequate protective measures" does not in fact mean that emergency planning will eliminate, in every conceivable accident, the possibility of serious harm to the public.

If this were actually the criterion, it would be difficult if not impossible to set any a priori limits to the size Qf the EPZ or to the scope of required emergency planning. Emergency planning can, however, be expected to reduce any public hann in the event of a serious, but highly unlikely accident.

But the rule clearly was intended to set such limits. Even under the Appeal Board's analysis, the rule amounts to a Conmission finding that adequate protection can be provided by an EPZ of limited size, 10 miles in radius, give or take a few miles, but certainly much less than 20 *

• • • the proper interpretation of the rule would call for adjustment to the exact size of the EPZ only on the basis of such straightforward administrative considerations as avoiding EPZ boundaries that run through the middle of schools or hospitals, or that arbitrarily carve out small portions of governmental jurisdictions. The goal is merely planning simplicity and avoidance of ambiguity as to the location of the ,

boundaries. With such clarity, plans can be im~lemented with an understanding as to who is being directed to take particular protective actions. 26 NRC at 394-95.

In conclusion, the Comission still finds that the 10 mile EPZ should not be increased to 20 miles.

Issue 2. Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because the effect of rainout was not adequately considered when the size of the EPZ's was determined 9

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Another reason given in support of an expansion of the EPZ was that rainout was not adequately considered when tlie size of the EPZ's was determined. "Rainout" is the deposition of radioactivity on the ground due to rain scouring radioactive materials from the air. For example, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League said, Yet another reason to extend the EPZ to at least 20 miles is the danger of rainout of the radionuclides from the plume. The dosage estimates in NUREG-0396 assume a uniform rate .9f deposition of radioactive material from the plume *** if half tne material remaining in the plume were to be washed out by a rainstorm between a radius of 15 to 20 miles from the reactor, the doses would be as high as they were within the 5 to 10 mile interva 1.

Coumission Response:

Rainout was considered. The statement that the dosage estimates in NUREG-0396 assume a uniform rate of deposition of radioactive material is in error. A full page (p. I-25) of NUREG-0396 is devoted to a discussion of rainout effects. While NUREG-0396 does not explicitly say so, the calculated doses presented in Figures I-10 through I-15 do, in fact~ include the effects of rainout.

Rainout is included in the following manner. The entire release of radioactivity is assumed to be contained in a small highly concentrated puff.

The probability of such a puff occurring is approximately 1 time in 100,000 years. Wind is assumed to blow the puff directly over a large population center during a period of extreme atmospheric stability with minimal dilution of the puff so it never becomes much more than a mile in diameter. When the puff is directly over the population center, an extremely heavy rainfall scours most of the nongaseous radioactive material from the cloud and deposits it on the ground. If such a puff is released, the probability of the puff encountering these weather conditions is approximately 1 in 10,000. The radioactivity is assumed to remain on the surface of the ground with no entrance into sewers, no runoff, and no sinking into the ground to remove or shield the radioactivity. The calculations assume that 100 percent of the radioactivity will remain on the surface without any runoff, but 1n reality the probability of this is near zero. The people are assumed to be exposed with 10

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minimal shielding to the radiation from radiation from the deposited material; in other words, that no one is in an apartment building, no one is in an office building, no one is in a basement, and no one is in any other type of building that provides more shielding than a small one-story frame house. The assumed probability of this is one, whereas it is in reality near zero. The people remain where they are with no evacuation or other protective action for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The probability of no emergency response for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is assumed in the calculations of consequences to tre one~ but in reality the probability is near zero. It is this specific series of events that gives rise to the largest casualty figures that have been calculated for severe nuclear accidents and which are presented in NUREG-0396. Because of these assumptions, the calculated consequences are greatly overestimated.

Issue 3. Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because ad hoc actions beyond 10 miles would not be adequate Another reason given by the Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC petition and several co111nenters to expand the EPZ is that they did not believe the NRC 1 s statement in its final rule on emergency planning, 45 FR 55402; (August 19, 1980) and NUREG-0396, page 16, that the 10-mile plume EPZ was "large enough to provide a response base that would support activity outside the planning zone. 11 The Citizens Task Force petition quoted a FEMA report, 6 "like the 1 5-mile' plans at TMI they [emergency plans with a 10-mile EPZ] may reflect inadequate definitions of the threat, encourage a false sense of readiness, and delay preparations for a more suitable response to a crisis.* The Union of Concerned Scientists noted that it would require only one to four hours for the plume to reach 10 miles. Thus, there would not be adequate time to notify people beyond 10 miles to evacuate.

Corrmenters opposed to the petition said that the detailed planning for the 10-mile EPZ could be applied outside the 10-mile EPZ if necessary. They also noted that the Corrmission had already made a judgment on this question in its 6 Evacuation Planning in the TMI Accident, FEMA, January 1980.

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rulemaking on emergency preparedness (45 FR 55402 and 55406). For example, the law firm of Shaw, P1ttman, Potts, and Trowbridge argued:

Thus, it is likely given the means usually used to distribute public information mater1a1s, that the geographic area actua11y covered will be greater than the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Similarly, the systems used to notify the public to take protective actions provide coverage substantially beyond the EPZ boundary, since the radio and television stations used in the Emergency Broadcast System ("EBS") can be received at distances in excess of 10 mtles._And, with respect to actual protective measures, it is clear that sheltering can be accomplished with equal ease by people both inside and outside the EPZ. As to evacuation, even that measure can easily be built upon and use evacuation plans developed for within the 10-mile EPZ.

Conmission Response:

NUREG-0396 noted that it was the consensus of the [NRG-EPA] Task Force that emergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out to which predetermined actions would provide dose savings for any such accidents. Beyond this generic distance it was concluded that actions could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same considerations that went into the initial actions determinations. [Thus], the size of the EPZs need not be site specific,

[as] emergency planning needs seem to be best served by adopting uniform EPZs for initial planning studies for all light water reactors.

Additionally, the CoRJTiission firmly believes that emergency actions could be successfully carried out beyond the 10 mile EPZ for the following reasons:

First, the 10 mile planning basis establishes an infrastructure consisting of emergency organizations, colTlffllnication capabilities, training and equipment that are similar to other normal COl'mllnity emergency organizations, such as police and fire departments that can be used in the event of an accident at the facility. Second, the radio and TV emergency broadcasting systems that NRC requires for prompt notification of the public within the 10 mile EPZ does reach beyond 10 miles. Third, if emergency actions were necessary beyond 10 miles, the time available to take those actions would be significantly greater than the time available for the taking of protective actions for persons close to the reactor (within 2 miles}. This significant additional time (many hours to days) would permit the use of resources from other states, other utilities, the Federal government, and even the international coOlllUnity.

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Beyond these reasons, the relationship between wind speed and hazard may have been misunderstood. Higher wind speeds result in lower radiation doses because the radioactive plume becomes greatly diluted and dispersed at higher wind speeds. This was discussed in NUREG-0396.

Further, the radioactive plume is not likely to originate without warning. The nuclear power plant operators, in most cases, would be able to declare an emergency hours before a release,-based on what they understand to be happening in the plant. The NRC requires utilities to set emergency action levels for in-plant measurements for which emergencies should be declared (see 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and NUREG-0654, Appendix I.) Thus, evacuation reconmendations should be made before releases of radioactivity would occur, giving people time to evacuate before the radioactivity would arrive. The petitioners may not be aware that the need for evacuation beyond a few miles from the plant is extremely unlikely. If protective actions were needed beyond 10 miles, the action required would lllOSt likely be sheltering while the plume passes and then evacuation of relatively small areas afterwards if D1Jch deposition of radioactive materials on the ground were to occur.

Another reason not to expand the EPZ is based upon the fact that risk is highly concentrated in the areas near the nuclear power plant, rather than spread uniformly throughout the 10-mile EPZ. However, the CoRlllission notes that despite the technical information to the contrary, the entire EPZ tends to be thought of by many members of the public as a single homogeneous zone to be treated in a uniform manner. Expanding the EPZ radius from 10 miles to 20 miles might even further aggravate this situation.

Issue 4. Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because the reduction of early injuries and latent cancers fatalities were not considered when the size of the 10 mile EPZ was determined Several conmenters said a reason to expand the EPZ is that in establishing the emergency planning zone, not only early fatalities, but also early injuries and future disease such as cancer should be considered. The Union of Concerned Scientists wrote:

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It is by no means clear that prompt fatalities are the dominant health effect from serious reactor accidents. In addition to prompt fatalities, the following additional effects must be considered in establishing an appropriate plume EPZ: (a) latent fatalities, (b) early radiation injuries, {c) non-fatal cancers, {d) genetic effects, and, to a lesser extent, le) property damage and restrictions on land use caused by accidents. Risk assessment studies have shown consistently that effects other than prompt fatalities constitute a significant portion of the total effects of serious reactor accidents. For instance, Dr. Jan Beyea has pointed out that for the accigent in WASH-1400 which was postulated to cause 10 prompt fatalities,-the following additional consequences would occur: 7000 cancer deaths, 4000 genetic defects, 60,000 thyroid tumor cases, and 3000 square miles of land contaminated above acceptable levels.

Conmission Response:

• The Conmission agrees with the commenter that for most accidents, long-tenn effects--cancer and genetic defects in offspring--are the most significant effects, from the standpoint of the gross number of effects. Only the most severe accidents could result in any prompt fatalities or injuries. With the existing levels of emergency preparedness it is likely that no one who followed the reconnended protective actions would be killed or injured.

Our emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose saving or a minimum evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a serious accident. Rather, they attempt to achieve reasonable and feasible dose reduction under the circumstances; what may be reasonable or feasible for one plant site may not be for another. 24 NRC at 30.

A fair reading of the C~issions Shoreham discussion is that implicit in the 1

concept of "adequate protective measures* is the fact that emergency planning will not eliminate, in every conceivable accident, the possibility of serious hann to the public. Emergency planning can, however, be expected to reduce any public hann in the event of a serious but highly unlikely accident. The proper interpretation of the rule would call for adjustment to the exact size of the EPZ on the basis of such straightforward administrative considerations as avoiding EPZ boundaries that run through the middle of schools or hospitals, or that arbitrarily carve out small portions of governmental jurisdictions. The goal is merely planning simplicity and avoidance of ambiguity as to the location of the boundaries.

Given these circumstances, the Comnission has concluded that adequate protection can be provided by an EPZ that is about 10 miles in radius.

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Issue 5. Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because the radiation from an accident would not stop at 10 miles Several commenters who favored the recorrmended change to expand the EPZ gave as a reason that radiation "is not likely to stop at the 10-mile mark in the case of a serious accident." One said, 11 No one believes that people are any safer at 11 miles than at 10 miles out." Another said, "There 1s no 10-mile island with lead walls to the sky to prevent ~adioact1vity from blowing beyond the NRC 1 s emergency planning zone.a Co1T1Tiission Response:

Obviously, there is no line at 10 miles beyond which radiation cannot pass.

However, the hazard from an accident tends*to gradually decrease as one moves further from the accident. How far from a nuclear power plant is the potential hazard small enough that specific oetailed planning is not worthwhile? In the Co11111ission 1 s judgment, that distance is about 10 miles for the considerations stated in this discussion.

Issue 6. Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because at TMI a 20 mile evacuation was considered The Citizens Task Force petition and connenters gave the .20-mile evacuation consideration during the Three Mile Island accident as a reason to expand the EPZ to 20 miles. The Task Force quoted a FEMA report as follows:

Emergency management agencies entered the crisis with cont1ngency plans to evacuate a 5-mile circle around THI **** Two days into the accident, the same scient1fic authorities (now faced with a novel and unexpected situation) suddenly recorrmended a 10-mile, then a 20-mile contingency evacuation plan. Under emergency conditions, local and State officials were forced to scrap a relatively undemanding 5-mile evacuation and plan for a large, complex population movement on short notice. (p. vi.

reference 9.)

The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League noted that the Kemeny Comnission Report said, * *** the NRC itself was considering evacuation distances as far as 20 mjles, even though the accident was far less serious than those postulated 15

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during siting. 117 The Co11111unity Energy Action Network quoted the Rogovin Report s8 conclusion that a 10-mile,EPZ is inadequate:

1 However, we believe the NRC's proposed 10-mile planning zone, is, by itself, inadequate as an arbitrary cutoff point. Wider evacuation may c1early be necessary in some unlikely accident situations. And, as Three Mile Island demonstrated, an ordered evacuatfon out of 10 miles would undoubtedly have effects to 20 miles and more. Therefore, at the very least, significant centers of population beyond 10 miles from the plant must be considered in the planning as well.

Rogovin Report, Vol. 1, p. 33 Commenters opposed to the petition said that emergency preparedness had increased greatly since the Three Mile Island accident. For example, Barry G.

Wahlig, a nuclear engineer, wrote:

The vacillation over evacuation at TMI is in no way representative of the post-TM! world. At that time, utility and regulatory personnel had scarcely thought about how to think about evacuation. The tenor of emergency exercises over the last three years assures that responsible people have given considerable thought to how to arrive at defensible evacuation recolllllendations. To the extent reasonably possible, emergency exercise experience shows that plant personnel could make such reca11111endatians in an orderly, timely way.

Cotrmiss1on Response:

The Cornnission believes that if protective actions were warranted beyond 10 miles, those actions, whether evacuations, sheltering or relocation, would certainly be reconmended to the State officials. Nonetheless, due to the additional time that is available for the taking of protective actions out to greater distances from the reactor, the implementation of these additional protective actions would not require detailed plans.

Issue 7. Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident 7 John G. Kemeny, Chairman, Report of the President's ColTlllission on the Acci.dent at Three Mile Island, at 16 generally called the 11 Kemeny Cornnission Report," October 1979.

8 NUREG/CR-1250, Three Mile Island - A Report to the Cornnissioners and to the Public, generally called the 11 Rogovin Report, 11 January 1980.

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A few colllllenters suggested that the NRC should modify its regulations because of the evacuation that took place as a result of the Chernobyl accident.

Commission Response:

A number of facts 9 about the Chernobyl accident bear on emergency planning and preparedness around U.S. convnercia1 nuclear power plants. The implications of the Chernobyl accident and the Soviet-response will now be discussed in relation to three aspects of U.S. emergency planning, namely: (1) size of the emergency planning zone, (2) ingestion pathway measures, and (3) decontamination and relocation.

In drawing a nexus between the Soviet response to the Chernobyl accident and emergency planning implications for U.S. plants, contrasts and differences should be noted. First, there is a substantial difference in the emergency planning base. After the accident at Three Mile Island, large resources were expended to improve emergency planning and response capabilities around U.S.

plants. In contrast, although some prior planning appears to have existed in the Soviet Union, perhaps for civil defense, there is little indication that the Soviets have comparable site-specific emergency plans for the general public around their nuclear power plants. Despite this, the Soviets mounted a large and generally effective ad hoc response.

Second, the specifics of the Chernobyl release are unique to the RBMK design.

The amounts of radioactive material released from U.S. plants could be as severe but for many accident sequences would be considerably less because, among other things, U.S. plants have substantial containments. In addition, although low-probability, fast-moving accident sequences may be possible, severe accidents at U.S. plants would, in general, progress more slowly resulting in longer warning times before release.

9 NUREG-1251, Vol. I - Implication of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety R~ulation.

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[7590-011 Third, some aspects of the Chernobyl evacuation defy comparison with similar aspects at U.S. plants because of economic and societal differences. For example, the Soviets had to assemble 4000 buses and trucks for the Chernobyl evacuation, whereas, in the United States most people hav~ access to private transportation and necessary alternative transportation is preplanned around U.S. nuclear power plants.

Size of the EPZ's: The Chernobyr accttlent has focused attention on the adequacy of the size of emergency planning zones around U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The Soviets evacuated a total of about 135,000 people as well as considerable farm livestock from Pripyat, Chernobyl, and other towns and villages within 30 kilometers (18 miles) of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

This evacuation appears to have taken place in several stages, beginning for the approximately 45,000 residents of Pripyat about 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> after the initial release and extending over several days to a week. The whole-body radiation dose to the majority of individuals did not exceed 25 rem, although about 24,000 persons in the most severely contaminated areas are estimated to have been exposed to whole-body doses in the range of 35-55 rem. The population of Pripyat was initially sheltered as a protective measure and then evacuated when radiation readings increased. In addition to radiation considerations, logistics and contamination control influenced the timing of the evacuation.

Despite an apparent lack of site-specific planning, the Soviets mounted a large and generally effective ad hoc response making use of some aspects of civil defense planning. The high initial plume height contributed to relatively low initial dose rates in the innediate vicinity (by cloud seeding other areas) and the spraying of a chemical polymer on evacuation routes to minimize resuspension of deposited activity were also beneficial. The Soviets took ingestion pathway protective measures within the 30-kilometer zone and well beyond. Ingestion pathway protective measures were also taken in several Soviet bloc countries, in Scandinavia, and in Eastern and Western Europe.

Assessment: One difficulty in assessing the implications of emergency actions taken at Chernobyl for U.S. co11111ercials nuclear power plants is the vast difference in the emergency planning base between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the accident at Three Mile Island, large resources were 18

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expended in the United States to improve site-specific and generic emergency planning capabilities. Utility, State, local, and federal emergency plans were developed, reviewed, and exercised. Alert and notification systems have been designed, installed, and tested within the plume exposure pathway EPZs (10-mile radius) for almost all U.S. plants. The populations within the plume exposure pathway for U.S. plants are annually provided with informational materials that are to be used in the event of an emergency. These materials contain protective actions that will be tuken ~nd include telephone numbers for public inquiries.

In contrast, there is little indication that the Soviets have comparable site-specific emergency plans for the general public around their nuclear power plants. While some prior planning existed, perhaps for civil defense, Soviet authorities indicated that many of the protective actions taken were ad hoc measures. Although a severe accident in the United States could require some ad hoc measures to be taken, a detailed planning base exists to facilitate implementation of the necessary protective actions.

With regard to the issue of EPZ size, the Soviets evacuated the population out to 18 miles, or roughly twice the distance for which an evacuation capability is required to be demonstrated in the United States. Similarly, measures were taken to prevent ingestion of foodstuffs, milk and water at distances considerably greater than the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway in the United States. This might imply that the U.S. EPZs are too small. However, examination of the background leading to the U.S. requirements leads to a different conclusion.

The sizes of the EPZs were derived from accident considerations, including the severe accidents studied in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). The more severe and most unlikely accidents studied in WASH-1400 involve releases of radioactivity that are comparable or in some instances larger in magnitude to that which was actually released at Chernobyl. The 10-mile and 50-mile EPZs were chosen as a planning basis to demonstrate a capability and to provide emergency plans with the flexibility of dealing with a broad range of accident releases, rather than being based solely on a single highly unlikely event, such as the worst case. It was recognized that protective actions might need 19

[7590-01]

to be taken beyond these planning zone distances for the most severe releases.

NUREG-0654 clearly notes:

The choice of the size of the Emergency Planning Zones represents a judgement on the extent of aetailed planning which must be performed to assure an adequate response base. In a particular emergency, protective actions might well be restricted to a small part of the planning zones.

On the other hand, for worst possible accidents, protection actions would need to be taken outside the planning zones.

Consequently, a release magnitude- similar to the one associated with Chernobyl and the possibility that ad hoc actions beyond the planning zone boundaries might be needed for very unlikely events were considered and have been factored into the development of U.S. requirements, including the sizes of the EPZs.

In conclusion, the Chernobyl accident and the Soviet response do not reveal any apparent deficiency in U.S. plans and preparedness, including the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ size and the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ size.

These zones provide an adequate basis to plan and carry out the full range of protective actions for the populations within these zones, as well as beyond them, if the highly improbable need should arise. 10 Issue 8. Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because the most current methodologies were not used in NUREG-0396 and because of new source term research information.

The petition submitted by Mr. Sexton as well as a few colTITIE!nt letters suggested that the EPZ size should be based on the most current research information and because the methodologies used in NUREG-0396 are outdated.

CoDlllission Response:

Draft NUREG-1150 (February 1987) provides substantial new infonnation concerning our ability to predict severe accident progression and the range of outcomes. Based on this information, it appears that the risks and potential 10 Ibid.

20

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consequences associated with severe reactor accidents are no higher than those predicted 1n the Reactor Safety Study and may, in fact, be substant1ally lower.

However, there are large uncertainties associated with the ability to predict precise1y the release amounts once the core-melt accident is underway and the magnitude of the source term associated with a particular outcome. Draft NUREG-1150 (February 1987) provides insights concerning (1) the way offsite doses wou1d be expected to vary with distance for the plants analyzed and (2) the relative effectiveness of different offsite protection actions 11 at various distances.

A very important question is the nature and magnitude of the radioactive re1ease to the atmosphere. The magnitude of the potential release substantially influences the potential offs1te consequences. The source tenns and principal assumptions for the analyses in this section are given in Tables M.1 and M.2 of draft NUREG-1150 (February 1987). Release of radioactive material to the environment during most severe accidents (particularly those resulting in early conta1nment failure) is modeled as occurring in two distinct phases although, for most accidents, these phases would be expected to overlap. 12 The first release would be of short duration, usually occurring before there is significant core-concrete interaction, and would consist of the more volatile radiouclide species (i.e., a11 the noble gases together with significant fractions of the more volatile species such as Cs, I, and Te). The second major release would occur after the core materials have melted through the reactor pressure vessel and are interacting with the concrete cavity. Th1s second release could usually take place over a period of several hours or longer.

The nature of the expected offsite consequences for the plants analyzed, assuming no early offsite protective action is taken, is shown in draft 11 This analysis addresses only those emergency actions that would have to be taken in the vicinity of the plant to provide protection from the inmediate effects of the plume exposure pathways.

12 All Zion releases were modeled as single-phase releases, but this will be revised for the final version of NUREG-1150.

21

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NUREG-1150 (February 1987), Tables M.3 and M.4 13 for early and late containment failure. As can be seen, there could be a significant probability of exceeding a SO-rem14 whole body dose within a few miles of three of the plants analyzed, even for late containment failure if no protective action is taken. However, this probability diminishes rapidly with distance from the reactor for both early and late containment failure. Probabilities of exceeding 200-rem whole body dose calculated for the Surry plant were compared with those obtained using Reactor Safety Study data. -

Although the probabilities calculated for draft NUREG-1150 (February 1987) are substantially lower at.large distances (due primarily to the assumption of earlier relocation time), the probabilities within a few miles of the plant are comparable.

We have used information from the plants analyzed to calculate how offsite consequences would be expected to vary with distance from each of the plants if different protective actions were taken. The results of these calculations are sunmarized in draft NU~EG-1150, Table M.5 and M.6.

An examination of Table M.5 and M.6 in draft NURES-1150 (February 1987) provides several preli~inary insights. First, either basement sheltering or evacuation will substantially lower the probability of exceeding a whole body dose expected to produce early health effects although evacuation is clearly much more effective within the first few miles. However, the effectiveness of J

evacuation diminishes substantially if it is delayed until after contaimnent failure and release of ~adioactive material to the environment. Sheltering in

~

large buildings appears~ to be very effective outside the first few miles.

Although large buildin? sheltering is not usually available for the general population in the environs of a site, it may be a prudent and valuable option for special population~~roups (e.g., hospital patients, prisoners).

~

~

13 Unless otherwise Sl)ecified in the table, the source terms and principal assumptions for Tables M.3 through M.6 are those listed in Table M.l and M.2.

14 200-rem and SO-rem whole body doses were used to allow comparisions with earlier studies [e.g., NUREG-0396 because they serve as surrogates for the early fatality a~ injury thresholds, respectively.

22

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New technical information from the plants analyzed in draft NUREG-1150 (February 1987) shows that for these plants the probability of a core damage accident is small (in the neighborhood of 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 100,000 reactor years of operation) and that the risks and potential consequences associated with such accidents are no higher than those predicted in the Reactor Safety Study and may be substantially lower. However, there is still uncertainty associated with these estimates.

Some insights obtained from this analysis are surrmarized below:

1. Time of containment failure significantly affects the magnitude of the release and resulting consequences. The consequences of an early containment tailure at a given distance are significantly higher than those for a late containment failure.

2. While there are calculated dose differences among the plants, these appear to be secondary compared to the differences seen between early and late containmeni failure.

3. For late containment failure and no offsite protective action: (a) persons beyond about 1 to 2 miles have a low probability of receiving a dose in excess of 200 rems, and (b) persons beyond about 5 miles have a low probability of receiving a dose in excess of 50 rems.

While thus far the effectiveness of protective actions has been completely investigated only for the Surry plant and no generic conclusions for other plants can be drawn, some preliminary insights that can be gleaned from draft NUREG-1150 (February 1987) are:

1. With regard to protective actions, the principal dose savings benefits are obtained from evacuation first followed by sheltering within the first few miles of the plant.

23

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2. Within the first few miles, evacuation appears to be more effective than sheltering in achieving dose savings. At distances beyond about 5 miles, these differences are less notable.

3. For late containment failure accidents, any of the protective actions analyzed would result in essentially zero probability of a person being exposed to doses in excess of 200 rems at distances beyond 1 mile and to doses in excess of 50 rems a~ distances beyond 2 miles.

In conclusion, the Co11111ission agrees that the size of the 10 mile EPZ was determined using the methodologies available in 1980 and that today there exists more sophisticated techniques and computer models to estimate radiation releases and doses to the public. Nonetheless, the most sophisticated and up to date methodologies were used in the development of NUREG-1150 {February 1987) which, as mentioned above, does not provide evidence that the size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ should now be increased.

Issue 9: Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because any radiation can be harmful therefore the public should be able to take protective actions to assure that they receive no radiation in the event of an accident Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, petition and some conrnenters in support of this change, gave the reason that any amount of radiation can be hannful.

They stated:

It is agreed that a radiation dose low enough to produce no effect has not been identified. In other words, all levels of radiation may produce some effects on cell ***

Some experts state, however, that one could sit on the fence of a normally operating nuclear power plant for a year and absorb no more radiation than that released by a chest x-ray. This group stresses the fact that people have lived with varying levels of background radiation with no demonstrable negative results ***

Others, also well informed, argue that our scientific understanding of the long-range effects of low-level radiation continuously emitted into our environment is inadequate at this time to measure the dangers with any degree of certainty. They are concerned that the various effects we get from radiation, pollution, chemical carcinogens, and so forth may lead to a yet undocumented multiplier effect. They see the precipitous rise of cancer rates during the last couple of decades as strong support for this 24

[7590-01] _ - - -- - -

conclusion. They further argue that some radioactive elements released into the air or dumped into the water--even if not irrmediately dangerous in small accounts--can in some form enter the food chain. Through a process termed "biological amplification," these radioactive elements may be concentrated through the chain of lesser plants and animals until they reach human beings through the food they eat. By this time the radioactive materials may be heavily concentrated*. They cite the well documented rise of radiation levels in milk in the United States after weapons testing in China as evidence of this process **** And although the level of harm which may result is not agreed upon, it is certain that our bodies take up radioactive eJements and use them in the matrix of the bones and in tissue; that these elements emit radiation for periods ranging from a few days to half a century; that fetuses and children under ten are nruch more vulnerable to radiation effects; and that cell damage from whatever cause is a medical concern of great importance *

• CoRJTiission Response:

The statements above representing the petitioner 1 s interpretation of various views of the hazards of radiation need clarification. The statement that "a radiation dose low enough to produce no effect has not been identifieda demonstrates an overestimation of what scientific experiments can accomplish.

Experiments on the effects of toxic substances generally do not allow experimenters to draw a conclusion of no effect. If no effect is observed, the experimenter cannot conclude that there was no effect because there may have been an effect that was too sma 11 to be observed. There are a number of experiments on low doses of radiation that show no observable effect. From such experiments one can never conclude that there is no effect. Only* an upper limit of the size of the effect can be estimated. That has been done for radiation, and there is general agreement among scientists on the approximate upper limit.

Lik~ise, the statement that "others, also well informed, argue that our scientific understanding of the long-range effects of low-level radiation continuously emitted into our environment is inadequate at this time to measure the damages with any degree of certainty,* misrepresents prevailing scientific viewpoints. Scientists are in general agreement that the effects of doses of a few rems are too small to be measured.

The petitioner s statement that, the precipitous rise in cancer rates during 1

the last couple of decades is support for the possible existence of "a yet 25

[7590-0lJ undocumented multiplier effect 11 between environmental pollutants seems to be based on an incorrect premise. According to the American Cancer Society, the death rate from all cancers except lung cancers has dropped slightly for males and dropped sharply for females during the last couple of decades (shown, for example, in Figure 19, page 38 of NUREG/BR-0024 15 ). The lung cancer death rates have climbed sharply for males and females, but this is attributed almost entirely to cigarette smoking.

The petitioner's statements that some radioactive elements 11

• • • can in some form enter the food chain and may be concentrated through the chainn is a long-known and well-documented fact. The concentration effect was predictable from knowledge of biology and was first observed almost 40 years ago before "weapons testing in China." Since this effect was known long before the start of large-scale nuclear electric generation, the radioactivity in the environment and foods near nuclear power plants is and has always been carefully measured both before and during nuclear power plant operation. Radioactivity in foods and water due to nuclear power plants is and has always been kept at low levels.

The petitioner's statement that cell damage from whatever cause is a medical 11 concern of great important* 1s misleading. Scientifically, the importance will depend on how many cells are damaged, the nature of the damage, the type of cell damage<i, and the probability of the damage to that cell leading to any further consequences. For example, if a large group of people are exposed to a radiation dose of 1 rem each, the EPA's lower protective action guide, about 5 out of 10,000 people would be expected to get cancer as a result. And, because not all cancer is fatal, about 2 out of 10,000 would be expected to die from this radiation-induced cancer. (About 2,000 out of 10,000 people will eventually die of cancer, but those cancers are mainly unrelated to radiation exposure.) Of the 9,995 out of 10,000 who did not get cancer caused by the 1-rem radiation dose, based on current knowledge, their health would be unaffected by their radiation exposure. On the basis of the epidemiological 15 NUREG/BR-0024, Working Safely in Gamna Radiography, Septent>er 1982.

26

[7590-01] _-- _

evidence, they would live as long and be as healthy as if they had not received the radiation dose.

Issue 10: Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because of the evacuation shadow phenomenon C0111T1enters in favor of the reco1TUT1ended changes gave as a reason the belief that if an accident occurred many peep-le outside the 10-mile EPZ would evacuate even though they were not advised to do so. They said, in this "evacuation shadow,"

masses of people would be fleeing in panic, would congest roads making evacuation of those within the EPZ slower or even impossible. As a way to plan for this effect these convnenters suggested extending the EPZ zone radius from 10 to 20 miles.

Conmenters opposing the petition said this was not a problem, because evaluation of nonradiological incidents which have required mass evacuation has also demonstrated that, even without advance planning, an orderly, safe, and prompt evacuation can be undertaken.

Conmission Response:

In CLI-87-12, the Conmission noted that:

... we think it is entirely reasonable and appropriate for the Comnission to hold that arguments for uadjustingu a 10-mile EPZ to improve safety, especially arguments that entail complex analysis and lengthy litigation are an impermissible challenge to the rule ***

Accordingly, we think the better interpretation is that the rule precludes adjustments on safety grounds to the size of an EPZ that is "about 10 miles in radiusu and that Contention 22.C [whether the EPZ should be expanded by a few miles to minimize the occurrence and effects of spontaneous evacuation from outside the EPZ] should on this ground be deemed impermissible challenges to the rule. In our view, the proper interpretation of the rule would call for adjustment to the exact size of the EPZ only on the basis of such straightforward administrative considerations as avoiding EPZ boundaries that run through the middle of schools or hospitals, or that arbitrarily carve out small portions of governmental jurisdictions. The goal is merely planning simplicity and avoidance of ambiguity as to the location of the boundaries. With such clarity, plans can be implemented with an understanding as to who is being directed to take particular protective actions. 26 NRC at 395 (brackets not in the original).

27

[7590-Ql] _ . ____ .. _

As noted above, the Corranission detennined, based on information available at the time that it promulgated the emergency planning regulations, that a plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (plume EPZ) of about 10 miles in radius was the proper and appropriate area for detailed planning for protective actions in the event of a radio~ogical emergency. At that time, the Co11111ission specifically recognized that detailed planning in that zone would more readily pennit the development and implementation of ad hoc actions beyond the 10 mile plume EPZ should the need arise. - See -NUREG-0386, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"(December 1978); NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans

• and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,* (November 1980), p. 12; Shoreham, 26 NRC, at 392-93, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 &3), LBP 82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1171-73 (1983). In effect, the Co11111ission accounted for the possibility of spontaneous evacuation outside the plume EPZ when it established the size of that EPZ in the first instance. The petitions provide no justification for expansion of the plume EPZ to further account for the possiblity of spontaneous evacuations.

Issue 11: Extend the EPZ to include any towns bordering on or partially within the EPZ The Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, petition requested the NRC to amend its regulations to state that any towns bordering on or partially within the EPZ be included within the EPZ in their entirely.

Conmenters in favor of this request said that if, for example, some suburbs of a city were included in the emergency planning, but the city were not, then fragmented authority would result.

Corrmission Response:

As discussed in the Conmission response to Issue 1, NUREG-0396 provides that 11 judgement *** will be used in detenninging the precise size and shape of the EPZs considering local conditions such as *** local jurisdictional boundaries *** "

28

[7590-01]_ __ - - _ --

Thus, Coirmission practice already allows for adjustment of the EPZ to accorrmodate jurisdictional boundaries where appropriate to enhance the planning basis.

Issue 12: That a utility fund and install independent monitoring equipment to be used by local communities around nuclear power plants The Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, petition requested that the coU111Unities within the EPZ should- be provided, with utility funding to purchase, install, and operate their own radiological monitoring equipment.

The petitioner said such independent monitoring will permit detection of radioactive materials such as iodine-131 in a short enough time to be useful in making decisions on emergency actions.

As a reason for requiring independent monitoring, the petitioner claimed there is a lack in both quality and quantity of radiation monitoring equipment around nuclear power plants. Since the petitioner believes the utilities do not have adequate equipment, the petitioner believes local c011111Unit1es should provide it for themselves. The petitioner cited as evidence a Marth 30, 1979 General Accounting Office report, Areas Around Nuclear Facilities Should be Better Prepared for Radiological Emergencies. The section of the report quoted by the petitioner referred to "deficiencies in *** preparedness." The petitioner also cited a June 1980 FEMA report, State Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. FEMA wrote:

• • • the preparedness of state and local governments with respect to

• • • monitoring instruments *** is generally inadequate to meet the requirements of the new [post-TM!] evaluation criteria.

Conmenters opposing the petition said that adequate monitoring equipment is now available, that the evidence cited by the petitioners is outdated and no longer valid, and that such equipment would be too difficult for local co1T111Unities to use properly. For example, Barry 6. Whalig, nuclear engineer, wrote:

Petitioners show a lack of appreciation for the difficulty of making accurate estimates of airborne and groundplane contamination in the post-accident environment. This is especially difficult using the sort of survey meters which the petitioners seem to want supplied in the tens or hundreds to individuals in the nearby comrunities. Ex8111ples of the 29

[7590-01]

problems are: a) prevention of instrument contamination during the event; b) ensuring uniformity of instrument calibration and of measurement protocol; c) differentiation of plume and groundplane contributions without sampling; and d) precise reporting of the location where measurements are made. Experience show that even technically competent people are subject to these errors.

The Citizens Task Force petition also said that there is a need for independent monitoring because there is a credibility gap between what the utility and NRC would say during the course of an- acctdent and what the public would believe.

The petitioner quoted a May 12, 1979 statement by Dayne H. Broun, Director of Radiation Protection Section of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources, and an April 29, 1979 statement by North Carolina Governor James B.

Hunt, Jr., as evidence of lack of credibility. The petitioner wrote:

The largely spontaneous and unorganized evacuation of several hundred thousand people from the area around the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident reflects a serious problem: the lack of public confidence in the utilities* coRlllitment and ability to provide timely and accurate warnings regarding leakages of radioactivity and/or reactor problems. The.

resultant uncertainty contributed to very real psychological stre~s experience by citizens *living in communities around the reactor.

The Sorghum Alliance wrote:

Independent radiation monitoring is necessary because of the history of utilities' and the NRC's reluctance to let the public know of danger and also because of problems in utility-managed monitoring equipment.

The NRC officials played down the gravity of the accident at Three Mile Island, as they were more concerned with the public relations i111Pact of their statements than with technical accuracy.

Commenters opposing the Citizens Task Force petition saw little evidence of a problem with a credibility gap. The law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge wrote:

Aside from two newspaper accounts of statements made more than three years ago by the North Carolina Governor and the State Director for Radiation Protection, petitioner offers no support for its broad-based claim of a

'credibility gap 1

• Barry G. Wahlig, a nuclear engineer, wrote:

30

[7590-01] -- _

Whether or not they suffer a *credibility gap' as alleged by the petitioners, the existing monitoring organizations are answerable to responsible bodies. The diffuse group of independent monitors suggested by petitioners would be answerable to no one but themselves for the accuracy of their measurements, the method of their reporting, or the consequences of poor values. This lack of responsibility would make their measurements less reliable, not more so.

Commiss1on Response:

The Conmission agrees that as of March 30, 1979, there was a need to be better prepared for emergencies around nuclear power plants. This need prompted the Commission to publish in the Federal Register (45 FR 55402; August 19, 1980) an upgraded emergency preparedness regulation. The regulation required, among other things, the establishment of emergency planning zones, the development of emergency action levels, the installation of prompt public warning systems, and adequate off site monitoring capabi 1ities. Imp lementatio,n of these upgraded regulations has been completed.

Equipment capability is continually checked by NRC and FEMA. The Conmiss1on does not believe there is a lack of monitoring equipment and therefore does not see lack of equipment as a reason to amend its regulations to require that monitoring equipment be given to and operated by local communities.

The Conmission also finds no basis to assume there is a credibility gap that would cause a danger to public health and safety. There is no evidence that the majority of the public would not respond to protective actions ordered by responsible government authorities. At Three Mile Island, although people evacuated to a far greater extent than officially reconrnended and without a written plan, the evacuation was quite orderly.

The Commission also finds no basis for the claim that 11 NRC officials played down the gravity of the accident at Three Mile Island.* In fact, quite the contrary occurred. Admittedly, there were confusing and contradictory statements which alarmed the public. But, if anything, the actual danger may have been exaggerated rather than downplayed.

31

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Furthermore, the proliferation of independent radiation monitoring could result in conflicting and confusing infonnation during the course of an accident.

Confusion can be minimized if information from all sources flows to a single operations center where it can be analyzed by experts. Expert opinion could then be presented to the state and local governments charged with the responsibility to order protective actions.

Moreover, even if the reason advanced-by the petitioner and coumenters were valid, independent monitoring would not be a solution. Offsite monitoring 1s not intended and cannot be used properly by itself to make initial decisions on protective actions. Elevated radiation levels offs1te are among the very- last indicators of an serious accident and tend to occur at a time when protective action decisions should already have been made. The earliest indication of a serious accident would be seen in the nuclear power plant control ro0tn.

Numerous indicators and alarms would tell the operators that there is a problem and should enable them to assess the problem. By NRC regulation, each plant has a set of emergency action levels based on specific plant conditions which can be used to project potential offs1te doses. Projected dose information allows protective actions to be taken or at least considered prior to the arrival of the radioactive plume. For example, if a core-melt were to occur causing a large release of radioactivity, there would necessarily be some time between the start of the accident and the release of the radioactivity from the fuel to the containment because it takes ti111e for the heat being generated to evaporate the available water and heat the fuel to its melting point. During this time, projected doses can be calculated and protective actions can be decided upon, recommended to the state and local governments, and ordered before any appreciable amount of radioactivity has been released to the environment.

During the Three Mile Island accident, the radioactivity actually released came-from auxiliary plant systems. The amount of radioactivity in these systems was relatively small and no protective actions would have been indicated based on those releases because the radiation dose, actual or projected, was smalJ. The main threat perceived by the NRC staff was the potential threat from a hydrogen gas explosion in the reactor that could conceivably result in added core damage--

and in-turn present added threat to the containment integrity. While the fears 32

)

• l

[7590-0_ll . _---

over an explosion of the hydrogen gas were not technically well-founded and, of course, the situation did not materialize, it was the central basis for the evacuation recommendation that was made. The recontnendation was not based on elevated radiation readings offsite because none of the offsite readings were high enough to just1fy ordering evacuation as a protective action.

Issue 13: Current planning is inadequate The Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, petition as a reason for the recoomended rule change, stated that Emergency planning and preparedness in 11 support of nuclear power plants is presently inadequate and incapable of

• providing an acceptable level of radiological emergency preparedness." Since utilities are seen as not providing adequate emergency preparedness, communities are seen as having to provide it for themselves. The petitioner believes that this situation requires them to have their own monitoring equipment to detect radioactive materials in a short enough time to allow them to make their own decisions on emergency actions.

The Citizens Task Force petition quoted a FEMA report which said that, for some of the 12 nuclear power plant sites with the highest population density within the 10-mile EPZ, uthe current alert and notification systems are judged to be totally inadequate *** " (FEMA, Dynamic Evacuation Analyses, p. 5, February, 1981).

A number of conmenters expressed little confidence 1n current emergency plans saying they should be more site-specific, taking into account the population density, 1arge population centers just outside the 1O-mile EPZ, a lack of sufficient roads or the presence of bottlenecks on the roads, geography, and meteorology of each specific site.

Cornnenters opposing the petition said that present emergency preparedness is adequate, that the petitioner based its conclusions on outdated information, and that the upgrade in emergency preparedness by utilities since the Three Mile Island accident should be recognized and given credit. For example, KMC, Inc. wrote:

33

) )

• L *I I

[7590-01]__

Beginning in early 1981, each operating nuclear facility's emergency plan was appraised by the NRC using NUREG-0654 as the basis of the appraisal and each facility exercised their plan in conjunction with the State and local governments with both NRC and FEMA as judges as to the adequacy of the exercise. Utilities were given 120 days to correct deficiencies which could have an actverse impact on the ability of the utility to promptly and effectively respond to an emergency. Further, nuclear facilities are required to annually have an independent audit of their program and to have an exercise in conjunction with State and local jurisdictions. In addition, the NRC will perform an annual appraisal of each utility's emergency plan to assure that the_utility's emergency capability does not degrade. It is inappropriate to compare performance of emergency planning capability and implementation in 1979 with what has been required and demonstrated in 1981 and 1982 by the utilities.

• Commission Response:

The ColTlllission does not agree with the petitioner's claim that emergency preparedness is presently inadequate. Emergency preparedness has been considerably increased since the Three Mile Island accident. The FEMA report cited was written to evaluate the alerting system existing at that time against draft criteria that had just been issued for cooment and interim use. Since the FEMA report was written, final criteria have been published and systems have since been improved to meet the criteria. FEMA and NRC now periodically evaluate the emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants and have generally found the preparedness adequate. Where improvements were thought necessary, they have been ordered.

The CoO'IJlission does agree that site-specific factors, such as those mentioned by some collll'lenters, should be taken into account in emergency plans. In fact, NRC regulations [10 CFR § 50.47(c)(2)J already require emergency plans to consider site-specific factors.

Issue 14: Utility Funding of Emergency Preparedness Another change recOD111ended by the Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC petition 1s that utilities be required to finance the emergency planning*and preparedness efforts of the municipalities around nuclear power plants. The Citizens Task Force wrote:

34

[7590-01] ---

Lack of funding is the single largest impediment to the establishment of an adequate level of emergency preparedness around nuclear reactors ****

Many states clearly have been unable to achieve effective 1egal steps to insure that utilities finance adequate emergency preparedness around nuclear plants.

The role of the federal government in regard to emergency preparations should be to insure that the co1JJ11Unities in those states which have not, or will not soon, enact preparedness-financing legislation do receive adequate funding.

Co11111enters in support of the rec011111ended change to require utility funding said that utilities should pay the full cost of choosing to build a nuclear plant instead of some other type of generating plant. They said this should be considered part of the cost of doing business and that in some cases funding of emergency preparedness is a real hardship for the municipalities or counties involved. They said it is unfair to expect local governments to finance these plans since some of the areas under obligation to plan for nuclear power plant accidents do not receive any tax revenues from the plant. One corrmenter said:

• • • considering the unique and deadly dangers of radiation, it is insane to reduce the already inadequate methods of protection and regulations. The utilities and the government owe it to us to pay for our safety. They are putting our lives in jeopardy, not the other way around.

Coomenters opposing the petition generally stated that there was no need for such a funding requirement. They said that FEMA has not found state and local plans inadequate due to lack of funding and that voluntary utility assistance together with state and local programs to assess costs for radiological emergency preparedness have been successful. All seven of the state and local emergency prepare~ness agencies that cmmnented on the petition say there is no need for such a funding requirement. Co11111enters said that states should have jurisdiction over this area of utility funding and that the Federal Government*

does not have the expertise or the legal right to mandate utility rate structure changes.

Some c011111enters thought utilities should not be forced to fund all local emergency preparedness efforts because many of the emergency preparedness improvements also improve governmental abilities to cope with natural disasters and other types of man-made emergencies. The utilities should not have to bear 35

[7590-01] . ---- -

the full costs of these improvements in plans and facilities which overlap with other functions normally required of the governments.

Some co11111enters said utilities had a strong incentive to fund local preparedness efforts. The State of Iowa Office of Disaster Services said that Iowa already receives funding assistance from four nuclear facilities and added:

Obviously the uti.11ties do not, by law, have to provide this funding, but practically speaking, it is being done. The onus of FEMA critique and NRC censure with operating license ramifications serves as a pragmatic inducement for all utilities to provide the radiological emergency response planning and exercise funding. To include this in a petition for rulemaking and potential legalization may do no more than to create an intensely acrimonious relationship between state government and utilities.

Why legalize what I know to already be the case in Iowa and other surrounding states, on a cooperative basis.

Several law finns said NRC did not have authority to require such funding. The law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge wrote:

The simple answer to this request is that CoDDnission lacks the legal authority to impose such a tax *** This 1s because the provision pursuant to which the Co11111ission collects fees from Utilities, 31 U.S.C § 483 a (1976), has been authoritatively construed by the United States Supreme Court to authorize the imposition of fees only to cover services rendered by a federal agency and then only if those services confer a special benefit on the fee-paying entity and not a general benefit on the public at-large *** This clearly would exclude the tax suggested by petitioner which would cover costs not incurred by the Comission and would result in general public benefits rather than specifically identified benefits of the utilities.

Some coomenters pointed out that utilities already pay considerable taxes and deserve some services in return. They said, typically, that nuclear power plants tend to be the largest single tax paying organization in their political subdivision and, as a result, the residents of an area generally benefit from higher than average tax revenues, even though the tax burden on the individual is usually lower than average. Thus, I11.1nicipalities around nuclear power-plants already derive sufficient funds from the operation of the plant to finance their emergency planning efforts.

Conmission Response:

Funding arrangements are essentially~ matter of state and local government ______ .

36

[7590-01]- - - - --- -

interest, therefore, the Coumission finds no factual basis to conclude that the proposed funding is necessary to enable state or local governments to establish adequate emergency preparedness plans. Accordingly, we do not reach the question of our legal authority to require licensee funding in the manner requested by the petitioner.

Issue 15: That Emergency Preparedness Requirements be Established for Low Power Operations The State of Maine petition requested that the NRC require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted.

Corrmission Response:

In a final rule published in the Federal Register on September 23, 1988 (53 FR 36955, 36960) the Comiission addressed this specific matter and for the reasons stated therein revised 10 CFR 50.47 {d) to read ***

• • • no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or detenn1nations concerning the state of offsite emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and capability to implement State and local or utility offsite emergency plans are required prior to issuance of an operating license authorizing only fuel loading or low power testing and training {up to 5 percent of the rated power). Insofar as emergency planning and preparedness requirements are concerned, a license authorizing fuel*loading and/or low power testing and training may be issued after a finding is made by the NRC that the state of onsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in event of a radiological emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the applicant's onsite emergency plans against the pertinent standards in paragraph (b) of this section and Appendix E. Review of applicant's emergency plans will include the following standards with offsite aspects:

(1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee 1 s near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite response have been identified.

(2) Procedures have been established for licensee coumunications with State and local response organizations, including initial notification of the declaration of emergency and periodic provision of plant and response status reports.

37

. [7590-01]

(3) Provisions exist for prompt co11111Unications among principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who would be responding onsite.

(4) Adequate emergency fac11it1es and equipment to support the emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.

(5) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use onsite.

(6) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated and injured onsite individuals.

(7) Radiological emergency response training has been made available to those offs1te who may be called to assist in an emergency onsite *

• Issue 16: Emergency Plans Should be Completed and Approved by the Governor of the Affected State as a Pre-condition to Construction.

The State of Maine petition requested that the Co1T111ission amend 10 CFR §50.47 to require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the Governor or Governors of any affected State approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction.

Co11111ission Response:

The intent of the State of Maine's petition was granted in part in a final rule published in the Federal Register on April 18, 1989 (54 FR 15372, 15393) where the Co111Dission added new regulations to provide for issuance of early site permits, standard design certifications, and combined construction permits and operating licenses for nuclear power reactors. The aim of this rulemaking was to provide procedures for the standardization of nuclear power plants and the early resolution of safety and environmental issues in licensing proceedings.

The new rule requires in 10 CFR Part 52, §52.79(d) that applications for a combined construction permit and operating license rwst contain emergency plans which provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

(l} If the application references an early site permit, the application may incorporate by reference errergency plans, or major features of 38

[7590-0_1]_

emergency plans, approved in connect1on with the issuance of the permit.

(2) If the application does not reference an early site permit, or if no emergency plans were approved in connection with the issuance of the permit, the applicant shall make good faith efforts to obtain certifications from the local and State governmental agencies with emergency planning responsibilities (i) that the proposed emergency plans are practicable, (ii) that these agencies are COUlll1tted to participating in any further development of the plans, including any required field demonstrations, and (iii) that these agencies are committed to executing thefrresponsibilities under the plans in the event of an emergency. The application must contain any certifications that have been obta1ned. If these certifications cannot be obtained, the application must contain information, including a utility plan, sufficient to show that the proposed plans nonetheless provide

• reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

These provisions provide that ta the maximum feasible extent emergency plans will be approved by the NRC before it issues the construction permit for a new nuclear power plant.

THE PETITION{S) ARE DENIED In conclusion, the COlllllission finds that an insufficient basis exists for amending its regulations on emergency preparedness in any of the ways recommended by the petitioners. The petitions of the Citizens' Task Force of Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Mr. K. Sexton; and the Attorney General of the State of Maine are hereby denied.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 13th day of February , 1989.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

ohn C. Hoy e Assista Secretary to the Corrmission 39

DOCKET NUMBER ' ~ DOCKET NUMBER *.

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hNHC To : Secretart , 1.uclec.1 r R2':ju latory Corr.mis.:>ion l, e : PRM-5 0-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition EPZ to one mile Date : 4/1..1/8 7 OfF1cg ~-, * - '- t .:;, r 00Ct<t r 1w~ 4 SF'i=:v'ICI BRl\NC~

I wou ld like to register my strong ob j ection to your proposa l t o replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants wit h a "site-specific" approach to evacuation p l anning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mil e.

The NKC p l~ns to aeter ~ ine the size 01 LPZ ' s basea 1n part on its preaict1on 01 how much radiation woula be r eleased from e acn plant in tne event of a maJor acciuent -- but tne staff of t he comrni::;sion nas alrea d y admitt ed to having very little Ufki~irn c iny cf 11 severe accident behavior at cor e :nelt 11 cond1t1ons . ~ e can ' t atfo r a to r e ly on your best guesse ~ in a

~atter this i t portant .

The accioent at Cne rn obyl nds provided us with some real - life experience on which to oase eme r gency ~l~nnin9 it forcea peo~le to evacuate some dreas as far as Su miles from tne plant ,

ano f ooc. c1rouucee1 within 1 , ~0 J ,., i les of the reactor *,vas class1fieo low-level rduioacciv~ waste . Given that , how can you seri o usly consider allowing Ne ~,; Hampshire i an Kee to reduce its E ~~ to one mile?

The ,r,essa1:1e f r om Che rn obyl i s cl ear -- we need t o be prepa r ed to evacuate lar~e r areas t han we ever tnought nece s sary . The state of ~aine is on the r ight trac k , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he

- ~~s for expanded minimum Emergency Planning zones.

Thank you for con.:>ide r ing my o~inion on these issues .

'r7 APR 20 All :05 Ma i- vin I. Lewis 7801 Roosevelt Blvd.,#62 Phila ., PA 19152 (215) 624-1574 DOCKET NUMBER ....

Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission &>ETITION RULE PRM .J4 -,,ft, Washington, D.C. 20555 ( 5/ F£ 4//'1"25)@

Dea r Mr. Secret a ry ;

Please accept this let ter as my comments on several rulemakings. I am commenting in one letter on several rul ema kings bec ause the rul ema king s are re lated , and the separation of these tt=ul emakings imprc,perly hides their cc,mmcn,, deleteric,us effect upon the health and safety of the public. The rulemakings and petitions upon which I am commenting in this letter include

1. 52 FR 23 3442 10 CFR Part 2 Issuance or Amendment: Power Reactor License or Permit Following Initial Decision.

2. 52 FR 47 7432 10 CFR Parts 30 etc. Completeness and Accuracy of Infc,rmatic,n.

3. 52 FR 52 8460 10 CFR Part 50 Kenneth G. Sexton and the State of ME; Petitions for Rulemaking ; Extension of Comment Period.

4. 10 CFR Part 50 Commission Policy Statement on Deferred Plants.

5. 52 FR 44 6980 10 CFR Part 50 Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning.

First, I shall discuss each of the above separately.

Secondly, I shall discuss how the sum of these rule changes A and c,ther rule changes reduce the guarantee c,f heal th and safety W for the public required in the Atomic Energy Act.

1.

The change in the Part 2 regu lations embodied in 52 FR 23 3442 is another demonstration of how the NRC (also known as the agen~y) is cutting off any chance for intervenors or whistleblowers to affect the licensing p ro cess in an effective or timely manner . The agency states clearly how very poorly a substantive issue will fair in the licensing prc,cess, " *** the appropriate subject of any judicial challenge to final agency action on a stay motion would be the agency's determination to issue c,r withhold- a stay, nc,t th e merits fc,r which the stay is sc,ugh "b."

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What the NRC (agency) is saying is that no matter how flawed a dec i s i on is on scientific grounds, the only appeal of that decision shall concern whether the NRC had the legal power to make that decision. This sort of intransigence on the NRC"s part could easily lead to situations which endanger the health and safety of the public on a grand scale.

The following scenario is provided as an e x ample and is not meant to be comprehensive, inclusive or e xcl u sive. Dangerous conditions were discovered during the construction of Marble Hill, Zimmer and the cancelled WPPSS reactors. The construction continued even though whistleblowers provided information which showed that the reactor could experience a major accident. If these reactors had been completed and if an intransigent Hearing Board and Director granted an operating license anyway, e i ntervenc,rs and public could nc,t appeal c,n the merits, but only on the legalities to make the decision. This could and would happen if this rule came into effect. This r ule could and would endanger the heal t h and saf ety of the public, a nd this rule would be an invitation for the licensee to cut all corners.

2.

The changes in 52 FR 47 7432 Completeness and Acc ur ac y of Information invite ways and means to avoid a ny penalty for not meeting the r egulation . Specifically, the new 10 CFR 55.6b states, "An applicant or licensee vic,lates this paragraph only if the applicant o r licensee fails to notif y the Commission of infor mation that the applicant or licensee has identified as having a sign i ficant implication for public health and safety or cc,mmc,n defense and secL11- i t y ."

This sentence makes the applicant or licensee the ultimate judge and j ur y for his actions. If the licensee or applicant A fails tc, identify a "sig n ificant implicatic, n ," he is i n the clear W and held harmless as far as this regulation is concerned. A simple plea of tempo r ary incompetence o r failu r e to manage adequately e xempts a ny licensee o r applicant f r om any v iolation as far as r eporting i nformation accuratel y a n d comple t el y no matter how serious the lapse is.

The r ule states t hat onl y the Applica nt o r L i cen see is li a ble fo r v iolations of non-reporting of sign i f i c an t implica t ions.

Also, the licensee or applicant must have knowledge and identified the implication as significant. The loophole is that if management is not awa r e of the sig n i f ica n t implica t i o n, they are nc,t fiable. This lc,c,phc,le allc,ws the applicant and license tc*

escape responsibilit y . As long as the licensee or applicant can put up barriers so that information about significant implication canno t get to them, they are held harmless b y the r ule. This r ule i g nores the r esp onsibil it y of managemen t t o be info rmed. That 's the ir job.

Incompetence must never be a defense to avoid proper r egulation. This 10CFR55.6b makes incompetence a proper defense no matter how serious the danger to the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security. This rule would be an invitation to cut all corners since this rule promotes incompetence and deficient management as a defense.

3.

Denial of 52 FR 52 8460 would be a disaster. The nuclear power industry would have little incentive to prepare emergency plans. The public would take the denial to mean that the NRC does not have the public health and safety as a goal. These two petitions attempt to strengthen the emergency planning in case of a major accident by reassessing the Emergency Planning Zone. New

,.,f_a ta frc, m Chernc,byl strongly suggests that the methodc,lc,gies and

~ n alytical techniques used to evaluate the size of the EPZ are hi ghly questionable. An improperly small EPZ in the event of a major accident would endanger the health and safety of the public much more than an adequate EPZ.

The present inadequate EPZ does endanger the health and safet y of the public . Reevaluating the present EPZ in light of the r ecent Chernobyl data would improve the safety of the public.

The NRC has continues to attempt to reduce the size of the EPZ, which endangers the health and safety of the public. The NRC's attempts to reduce the size of the EPZ invites the licensee to cut all corners as far as emergency planning is concerned.

4.

The only policy that a deferred plant is entitled to is that any attempt at reinstituting construction must meet all the latest safety requirements . Too often deferment or cancellation provides a cover for inadequate quality or other very dangerous Ac c,ndit i c,ns. Nc,t c,ne ic,ta c,f allc,wance fc,r any past requirement

• may be forgiven. The reason that the strictest requirements must be i nv oked for these plants is that many deferred and cancelled reactors would use this route to bu r y their problems such as, A. South Texas project was rumored to ha v e bu r ied a supernumerary in cc,nc:rete.

B. WPPSS had innumerable construction diffic u lties .

C. Zimmer admitted to many construction diffic u lties p r ior to cancel latic,n.

The NRC must handle resumption of construction in deferred and cancelled plants sternly. Any but the sternest handling of these plants when they attempt to resume construction is an invitation by the NRC for the licensee or applicant to cut corners. Cutting corners on the construction of a nuclear power plant will endanger the health and safety of the public. A simple but effective policy for deferred and cancelled plants should include a statement that the NRC will view with extreme prejudice any restart of construction on a deferred or cancelled plant.

5.

Now I shall discuss the most problematic rule change, 52 FR 44 6980 Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and Local

~ Goverriments Decline tc, Cc,c,perate in Offsite Emergency Planning.

W The Emergency Plan can be likened to lifeboats for passeng e rs on a lu ~ ury liner. While ocean going vessels are generally safe, and while passenger vessels must meet very high standards, ships have 5 unk . The Unsinkable Titanic comes to mind.

The same can be said about major accident at nuclear power plan ts. Unlikely accidents have occurred. There have been few meltd oh ns: LS-1, Chernobyl, TMI#2, Fermi. Nonetheless, residents around a nuclear power plant have as much right to an adequate emergency plan as passengers have a right to a seat on a lifeboat. Commissioner Asselstine has pointed out several of the ways that the rule eliminates the public ' s right to an adequate emergercy plan. The proposed rule also invites the licensee or applicant to cut corners and to endanger the health and safety of the p1.1blic with an inadequate emergency plan. An inadequate emergency plan will endanger the health and safety of the public in the event of a meltdown and melt thru.

CONCLUSION The actions of the NRC have been and continue to be an obvi ous invitation to licensees and applicants to cut corners.

Cutt ing corners for the sake of profitability and convenience reduces or eliminates the protection the health and safety of the public requi r ed b y the atc,mic ene1-gy Act~/.. / *---n:-.1 ~

k"./U.e,r"~ .¥1L-U '11tlt 1.Lc,"'f,1 / '- ,

Marvin I. Lewis '/llaH2t 1/2 7801 Roosevelt Blvd.,#62 Phila., PA 19152

( 215) 624-1574 NEW yORk public INTEREST RESEARcll GRoup, INC.

9 Murray Street

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NYPIRG a:M-iENI'S 'ID THE <XM-fiSSICN CN PROPOOED RULE aw.GS RE'GARDJN:i THE SIZE OF RE0UIRED 'ERGEl-1CY PIANNIN:; WNES (EPZs) ARXmD NUCIEAR POJER PLANI'S The Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission has solicited public ccmnent on several petitions for rulanaking regarding the size of anergency planning zones (EPZs} around nuclear :i;x::,wer plants (.PRM-50-41, PRM-50-45, Pm-50-46}.

NYPIRG's views on the matter of EPZ size arise out of years of involvarent with anergency planning and preparedness for nuclear plant accidents dating back to the NRC's initial, post..JJMT rulanaking on anergency planning. As the Ccmnission and Staff are well aware, oo.r particular interest has reen in anergency preparedness~r rather the lack of adequate preparedness-at Indian Point, the nation's m:>st densely populated reactor site located 25 miles fran New York City. CUr specific ccmnents below take into oonsideration our experience at Indian Point as well as the lessons learned fran Three Mile Island, other U. s. reactor accidents, and, m:>st especially, the accident one year ago at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear power station. 1iYPIRG believes that additional nuclear plant accidents are inevitable in the future and that anergency planning and preparedness in the United States-trough arguably better than elsewhere-is inadequate to protect the public and the substances we ingest fran harmful le-v-ls 0f radiation which may result fran reactor accidents.

It is clear frcm even the limited experience we have to date with nuclear power plant accidents, that a ten mile evacuation t,.,0uld te insufficient to The New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG) is a not-for-profit. nonpartisan research and advocacy organization established.

directed and supported by New York State college and university students. NYPIRG's staff of lawyers. researchers. scientists and organizers works with students and other citizens, developing citizenship skills cwld shaping public policy. Consumer protection, ener;JY, fiscal responsi)ility, political reform and social justice are NYPIRG's principal areas of concern. . APR 2 19&7  ?

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NYPIRG CCM-1ENT page 2 protect the public fran hannful (and p::>tentially lethal) doses of radiation during a serious nuclear plant accident. Radiation released during many potential accident scenarios could travel and fall out at levels hannful to health and to the genetic pcx)l at great distances fran the accident site-certainly nruch further than ten miles. In many conceivable accidents it

~uld be necessary to evacuate surrourrling ~tions for many miles beyorrl the current ten-mi.le zone. 'lb be successful an evacuation nust be swift and !:mX>th, and this in turn deperxis primarily on advance preparation:

planning, training, public education, rehearsals, drills, etc.

Since we cannot with any certainty predict precisely h::,w- far radiation fran a given accident will exterrl, whether fall-out will oe unifOIJn or spotty, etc. , the setting of an anergency planning zone size nrust be to sane extent arbitrary .Fran a technical point of view. !meed, it rcakes nore sense to determine EPZ sizes on the basis of local comitions known in advance than on the myriad of unknown possibilities which ccw.d result frcm accidents with which v.e have practically oo 'experience. Arrl since maximizing public safety dictates conservatisn, we smuld all be able to agree that larger EPZs are wiser than snaller EPZs, and that in light of Chernobyl, ten mile EPZs are nruch, much ta' snall.

Specifically, NYPIRG favors:

1. A minimcm evacuation zone of 25 miles for all ccmnercial nuclear power plants.

2. Expansion of the mi.nimum 25-mile zone to include all cities with a po?,I-lation of 500,000 or nore within 50 miles, and all cities with a population of 1,000,000 or nore within 100 miles of the reactor. We take this position because arergency rr:..=-.c1sures to protect such large population centers during a severe accident canoot be expected to be effective on an ad h::>c-unplanned and unrehearsed-basis as is currently pennitted urrler NRC's arergency planning regulations.

3. Mditional expansion of the EPZ on a site specific basis for any or all of the following considerations:

NYPIRG cc::M-IBNT page 3

• • local geographical, topographical, and meteorological factors;

• • local road conditions and mass transportation capabilities;

• • population de:rographics within and beyorrl the mininrum 25-mile EPZ (e.g., whether population beyond the zone is sparser or m::>re dense than within the zone and wf:Jather self-evacuation of segments of the population beyond the zone w::,uld impede the escape of the people within the zone); or

• • the adoption of state and local emergency planning starrlards exceeding the minimum 25-mile EPZ.

4. Adjustment of all current guidance criteria in accordance with the expanded evacuation zone. For example, refugee "reception centers" (currently pennitted as close in as 12 miles frcm the nuclear plants}

must be located much further away. Special reception centers far school children, and for the elderly and the infinn, sh:,uld :be located at least SO miles fran the reactor site-with. back-up centers pre-designated at even greater distances in case radiation fall~ut remers sc:me reception centers dangerous.

s. Expansion of the Ingestion Pathway Zone fran the current 50 miles to a mininrum of 200 miles_ for the n:ost inmadiate measures to protect food and water.

6. Creation of a new nation-wide emergency zone which. recognizes that nuclear accidents in any part of the country or in other countries can have health irrpacts far away. In the wake of Chernobyl, and taking into account the proliferation of nuclear facilities across the globe, the NRC, together

• with FEMA, EPA, and other agencies, should undertake radiological anergency planning on a national scale, including procedures for temporary local evacuations, and for protection of livestock, produce, and water wherever radiation levels (fran an accident anywhere) exceed predetennined guidelines.

The size of emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants is rut one aspect of a broader set of issues regarding E'!Tergency planning and preparedness for nuclear accidents currently urrler discussion, litigation, and legislative consideration arourrl the country. The isolation of one aspect of ane.rgency planning or another-EPZ size, state and local participation, the adequacy of NRC/FEMA guidelines, the frequency or stringency of preparedness exercises, congressional codification of emergency planning and preparedness requirements, etc.-is forced upon us by the \\Orkings of rulanaking procedures, congressional ccmnittee hearings, court cases, state and local legislati3Te initiatives, and current licensing proceedings. But, in the final analysis, it

NYPIRG cx:M1EN'I' page 4 is not possible to engage in a sensible consideration of energency planning and preparedness in bits and pieces, with:>ut reference to the total picture.

We can argue with one another over the techical aspects of nuclear i;x:,wer safety, and even evacuation time estimates, wt the emergency planning and preparedness decisions which confront the NRC, state and local gove.rnrtelts, and the congress are rcore truly IX>licy decisions, mt technical ones. Arrl ultirnately--for the public, the licensees, state and national lawnakers, and the Nuclear Regulator.{ Ccmnission-it must all come down to the extent to which each is ccmnitted to public safety over all other considerations, or the willingness of each to take gambles with public safety in the interest of other considerations such as the rruclear i.Irlustry 1 s survival and profits.

If the Corcmission' s overriding policy is going to be to raaxiroize public safety, then its energency planning and preparedness decisions will follow logically frcro that IX>licy: it will expand energency planning zones, it will require state and local participation in emergency planning (.including approval of emergency plans. and deronstrated capability to execute the plansl, and it will enhance all its energency planning requiranents to reflect the lessons to be learned fran Chermbyl. The Ccrrmission knows that Chernobyl was by no means the ~rst release of radiation of which nuclear plants are capable during an accident; it could have been far ~rse. Still, that accident required the evacuation of a much larger area than ,;.,ie are currently prepared for, as ,;.,iell as the rerroval for their safety of children fran towns and villages out to 100 miles fran the accident. And six rconths after the accident ruildings in Kiev still had to be washed down regularly, and the falling dutumn leaves had to be carted away as radioactive~ste . !NYPIRG

~Jf l:Dpes the Ccmnission is mt canprised of slow learners.

April 15, 1987 Sutmitted by: Joan Holt Director, NYPIRG F J) e Indian Point Project

DOCKET NUMBER ~

ETlTION RULE PRM  !) -4t~ ~ I C51 F~ ,;f/Jt1,t~ ~~

OCXETEO S HAW, PI TTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRl!ft5GfE A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROF"ESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 2300 N STREET, N. W. 1 TELEX/CABLE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037 87 APR -7 P2 :53 VIRGINIA OF'F'ICE 1!501 FARM CREDIT DRIVE 89*2693 (SHAWLAW WSH)

MCLEAN, VIRGINIA 22102 TELEPHONE (703) 790-7900 (202) 663-8000 OFFICE Or ~[ U:t'Ti\r y DOCKET ING t'-c '.J~WJ:CL TELECO?IER BRANCH 1202) 223 -3760 & 223-3761 ZAP MAIL WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER (202) 775-0338 April 15, 1987 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Maine Attorney General's Petition for Rulemaking on Emergency Preparedness 51 Fed. Reg. 47025 (December 30, 1986)

Docket No. PRM-50-46 Gentlemen:

The Commission recently published, at 51 Fed. Reg. 47025 (December 30, 1986), notice of receipt of a petition for rule-making filed by the Attorney General of the State of Maine

("Maine AG"). See 52 Fed. Reg. 8460 (March 18, 1987) (extension of comment period). The notice invited the comments of inter-ested parties concerning the petition, which is less than one and one-half pages in length, but which proposes amendment of the Commission's emergency planning regulations at 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 to (a) expand the emergency planning zones ("EPZs") for both the plume exposure pathway and the ingestion pathway, (b) require as a precondition to issuance of a construction permit -- the completion of emergency plans and the approval of those plans by the governor of any affected state, and (c) require findings on the adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness prior to issuance of a fuel load/low power license.

On behalf of American Electric Power Company, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company, Carolina Power & Light Company, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Detroit Edison Company, Duquesne Light Company, GPU Nuclear Corporation, Louisiana Power & Light Company, Northern States Power Company, Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, and The Toledo Edison Com-pany, all of whom hold operating licenses for nuclear power reac-tors, we are pleased to provide the following comments for the Commission's consideration.

APR 2 4 1987 Acknowledged by card. * ** -** * ,--.n-.....-

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SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFE;SSIONAL CORPORATIONS Secretary of the Commission April 15, 1987 Page 2 I. Summary The Maine AG's petition for rulemaking should be denied be-cause:

1. The proposals to expand the plume and ingestion EPZs are impermissibly vague and lacking in technical basis. Instead, the Commission should accelerate its consideration of the new source term studies, which support EPZ reduction.

2. The proposal to require a governor's concurrence in emergency planning prior to commencement of construction is in-consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and would provide no assur-ance of continued cooperation over the life of the plant. More-over, any plans current at the commencement of construction might well be obsolete by the time of plant operation, and the high costs of maintaining those plans throughout construction cannot be justified.

3. The proposal to require emergency preparedness findings prior to issuance of a fuel load/low power license is not sup-ported by any information which might call into question the Com-mission's prior determination that such findings are required only for operation above 5% power.

II. Discussion A. Expansion of Plume and rngestion EPZs Noting that 10 C.F.R. S 50.47{c)(2) provides for a plume EPZ of "about 10 miles in radius" and an ingestion EPZ of "about 50 miles in radius," the Maine AG broadly urges the Commission to expand both EPZs. However, he fails to identify the radius of the expanded EPZs which he proposes. His proposal for EPZ expan-sion is thus impermissibly vague, and must be denied.

Moreover, the Maine AG's proposal lacks any technical basis or justification. Indeed, recent source term studies by the NRC Staff and the nuclear industry support EPZ reduction, not expan-sion. See generally,~, "Nuclear Power Plant Response To Se-vere Accidents," IDCOR Technical Summary Report (November 1984);

"Emergency Planning: The Effect of New Source Term Data,"

NSAC-100 (May 1986); NUREG-0956, "Reassessment of the Technical Bases for Estimating Source Terms" (July 1986). While the peti-tion for rulemaking refers generally to Chernobyl, the Maine AG

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS Secretary of the Commission April 15, 1987 Page 3 fails to acknowledge the major differences in the design and reg-ulation of U.S. light water nuclear power plants on the one hand and Chernobyl-type, water-cooled graphite reactors on the other.

Based on such design and institutional differences, the NRC Staff recently concluded that the Chernobyl accident provides "no basis for changing [the] 10-mile plume EPZ." See Slide, "Specific Area Conclusions," Commission Briefing on Chernobyl (February 6, 1987). As the Staff noted in the February 6, 1987 Commission briefing on Chernobyl, the 10-mile plume EPZ was established based in part on the determination that "detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of re-sponse efforts [beyond 10 miles] in the event that this proved necessary." Id.; "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Ra-diological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/FEM-REP-l (Rev. 1, Nov.

1980), at 12. A long history of successful evacuations conducted in response to a broad range of natural and technological disas-ters in the absence of any emergency plans indicates that plan-ning could be successfully expanded on an ad hoc basis. See,

~ , Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-31, 20 N.R.C. 446, 569 (1984) (discussion of various large ad hoc evacuations).1/

The Maine AG's proposal for expansion of the ingestion EPZ is similarly lacking in technical basis. Again, he has failed to acknowledge the important differences between nuclear plants in the U.S. and those in the U.S.S.R. Nor has he recognized that protective action in the ingestion EPZ is much less urgent than protective action in the plume EPZ. As the Appeal Board has ob-served:

[C]omparatively less extensive planning***

is required and possible for the ingestion EPZ. Unlike the much smaller plum~ EPZ wheie evacuation or sheltering from the plume may be a matter of immediacy, protective action in the 50-mile radius ingestion EPZ need not 1/ Apparently in an attempt to support its proposal, the Maine AG points to industry efforts to reduce plume EPZ size.

However, he completely fails to explain how efforts to reduce the plume EPZ provide a logical basis for the EPZ expansion which Maine advocates.

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL =RPORATIONS Secretary of the Commission April 15, 1987 Page 4 be as immediate. * * * [T]he conservative response of a broad-scale foodstuffs quaran-tine or disposal is always available. More-over, the kinds of ingestion EPZ protective action that would be suggested -- such as quarantining or disposing of certain food-stuffs in designated areas -- are highly site and accident specific: hence, they are less amenable to planning in advance of an acci-dent than the comparable responses of shel-tering or evacuation that are appropriate for the plume EPZ.

Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 N.R.C. 346, 373 (1983).

While the Appeal Board's observations were directed at the 50-mile ingestion EPZ, its reasoning -- which was not undermined by Chernobyl -- applies with even greater force to areas more than 50 miles from a nuclear plant. Specifically, protective measures are less likely to be necessary for areas more distant from a plant. Further, the greater the distance from the plant, the longer the time available to implement any ingestion pathway protective measures which may be indicated -- again, recognizing that (as the Appeal Board has noted) "the conservative response of a broad-scale foodstuffs quarantine or disposal is always available." Finally, the nature and extent of any ingestion pathway protective measures for areas farther from the plant would be even more "site and accident specific" than those for areas within 50 miles of the plant. Thus, the Maine AG's pro-posed expansion of the ingestion EPZ is as baseless as his pro-posed expansion of the plume EPZ. His petition for rulemaking must therefore be rejected as to both proposals.

B. Plan Completion and Approval By Governor As Precondition of Construction Permit The Maine AG further proposes that NRC regulations be amended "to require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the Gov-ernor or Governors of any affected State approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction." But, again, the Maine AG fails to provide any support for his proposal. Indeed, the proposal cannot be justified.

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROPl!:SSIONAL CORPORATIONS Secretary of the Commission April 15, 1987 Page 5 There simply is no basis for requiring a governor's concur-rence in emergency planning at any stage of NRC licensing. As the NRC has recently reiterated, "vesting State or local govern-ments with de facto veto authority over full-power operation is inconsistent with the fundamental thrust of the Atomic Energy Act whereby the Commission is given exclusive de jure authority to license nuclear power plants and to impose radiological safety requirements for their construction and operation." 52 Fed. Reg.

6980 (March 6, 1987). The Maine AG's proposal to require the governor's concurrence prior to commencement of construction is thus the very antithesis of the Commission's recently published proposed rule, which would clarify that state/local cooperation in planning is not necessarily a condition precedent even, to plant operation. Id.

Moreover, governmental concurrence prior to construction would provide absolutely no assurance of continued cooperation throughout the life of the plant. As a practical matter, the level of governmental cooperation in planning may vary from one administration to the next -- perhaps dramatically. Indeed, as recent events in New York, North Carolina and elsewhere have amply demonstrated, the position of a single state or local ad-ministration may change radically over time in response to polit-ical pressures. Therefore, there is no particular administrative policy advantage to the Maine AG's proposal to require the gover-nor's concurrence in planning prior to plant construction.

Nor is there any rational basis for requiring completion of planning as a precondition to commencement of plant construction.

With construction schedules of ten to twelve years the norm in the industry, any plans current at the commencement of construc-tion might well be obsolete by the time of plant operation, due to changes in response personnel, changes in EPZ demography and infrastructure (roads, etc.), and the issuance of additional reg-ulatory guidance. The high costs to utilities and state and local governments of maintaining, updating and exercising such plans over these ten to twelve years -- and the high costs to federal authorities of monitoring and regulating those plans --

simply cannot be justified for a nuclear plant which is still under construction (and thus presents no danger whatsoever to the public). Accordingly, like his proposals for EPZ expansion, the Maine AG's proposal to require plan completion and approval by the governor as a precondition of a construction permit must be rejected.

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS Secretary of the Commission April 15, 1987 Page 6 C. Findings on Offsite Preparedness Prior To Fuel Load Finally, the Maine AG requests the amendment of 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47 "to require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted." But yet again he has failed to provide any basis for his proposal.

Current NRC regulations expressly provide that "no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concerning [offsite planning and preparedness]*** are required prior to issuance of an operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power operations (up to 5% of the rated power)." 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(d). That provision was promulgated based on the Comm.is sion's considered assessment of the level of risk associated with low power operation and the level of emergency preparedness appropriate to assure the health and safety of the public at that stage:

First, the fission product inventory during low power testing is much less than during higher power operation due to the low level of reactor power and short period of reactor operation. Second, at low power there is a significant reduction in the required capaci-ty of systems designed to mitigate the conse-quences of accidents compared to the required capacities under full-power operation.

Third, the time available for taking actions to identify accident causes and mitigate accident consequences is much longer than at full power. This means the operators should have sufficient time to prevent a radioactive release from occurring. In the worst case, the additional time available (at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />), even for a postulated low likelihood sequence which could eventually result in re-lease of the fission products accumulated at low power into the containment, would allow adequate precautionary actions to be taken to protect the public near the site.

47 Fed. Reg. 30232, 30233 incl. n.l (July 13, 1982).2/ Accord 2/ When the Commission's regulations'were amended to provide that emergency preparedness findings were not required for a (Continued Next Page)

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS Secretary of the Commission April 15, 1987

• Page 7 Id. at 30234-35; 46 Fed. Reg. 1132 (December 15, 1981). See also Letter, to Governor of New York, from Acting Chairman of NRC (August 19, 1986)(discussing need for findings prior to low power licensing in light of Chernobyl). Certainly the Maine AG has not identified any information which would call these Commission de-terminations into question. Accordingly, his proposal to amend NRC regulations to require findings on offsite preparedness prior to fuel load or low power operations also must be rejected.

III. Conclusion The Maine AG's proposals to expand the plume and ingestion EPZs are impermissibly vague and lacking in technical basis.

Citing the major differences between the design and regulation of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants and the Chernobyl reactor, the NRC Staff has concluded that the Chernobyl accident casts no doubt on the adequacy of the NRC's 10-mile EPZ rule. Nor is there any basis for expanding the ingestion EPZ. Protective ac-tion in the 50-mile ingestion EPZ is much less urgent than pro-tective action in the plume EPZ, so that comparatively less ex-tensive planning need be required. Protective measures are less likely to be necessary for areas more than 50 miles from a plant.

Moreover, the greater the distance from the plant, the longer the time available to implement any ingestion pathway protective mea-sures which may be indicated. Thus, the Chernobyl accident pro-vides no grounds for expansion of either the plume EPZ or the in-gestion EPZ. Indeed, recent NRC Staff and industry source term studies support EPZ reductions. We urge accelerated Commission consideration of those studies.

The proposal to require a governor's concurrence in emergen-cy planning prior to commencement of construction is inconsistent (Continued) fuel load/low power license, the regulations were also re-vised to provide that the pre-licensing exercise need not be the subject of NRC licensing hearings. While this latter revision was (successfully) challenged in the federal courts, the Commission's ruling on the need for emergency preparedness findings for a fuel load/low power license was never challenged. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437, 1452 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(dissent), cert.

denied, 105 S.Ct. 815 (1985).

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP INCL.UOING PROFESSIONAL. =RPORATIONS Secretary of the Commission April 15, 1987 Page 8 with the Atomic Energy Act (which vests the NRC with exclusive legal authority in nuclear plant licensing matters), and would provide no assurance cooperation over the life of the plant.

Further, any plans current at the commencement of construction might well be obsolete by the time of plant operation, and the high costs of maintaining those plans throughout the construction phase cannot be justified.

Finally, the proposal to require emergency preparedness findings prior to issuance of a fuel load/low power licehse is lacking in basis. The Commission has previously determined that such findings need be required only for operation above 5% power, based on the Commission's considered assessment of the level of risk associated with low power operation and the level of emer-gency preparedness appropriate to assure public health and safety at that stage.

Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth herein, the Maine AG's petition for rulemaking must be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

~A~

Jay E. S i l b e r g , ~

Delissa A. Ridgway

'87 APR 17 P3 :39 To: Secretary , Nuclear Hegulato r y Commission OFFICE ;}f $£ er-.~. fARY Washinyton , D. C . ~~555 DOCKETING & S~~VIC[

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition to rel~H1ts EPZ to one mile Date: 4/l'-'J/'d7 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposa l to rep l ace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuc l ear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuat i on pl anning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

~The NRC plans to determine the s ize of EPZ ' s based in pa r t on its

~ r ediction of how ~uch r adi at i on wou ld be rel eas ed f rom each plant in the event of a major accident -- out the s taff of the commi ss ion has alrea ay aomittec to 11avin1:, ve r y little understanding of " severe accident behavior a t core melt conditions . ~e can ' t atfo r o to r ely on yoJr best guesses in a rr.attcr this impo r tant .

The accident at Che r nobyl has p r oviued u s witn s ome r eal - life experience on which to base eme r gency planning it forced

~ ~eople to evacuate some ar eas as far as 50 mil es fr om the plant ,

ano food produced withi n l , ~ ~ ~ miles of t he rea cto r was classified low-level radioactive wa s te . Given tha t, how can you ser1ouslt consiaer allowing Seabrook to re~uce i t s EPZ to one mile?

Tne r.i.::: ssa~e from c11ernobyl is clear -- we ne.:d to be pre1,->ar~d to

- evacuate laryer areas tnan we eve r tnought necessa r y . The state of Maine is on the r ight t r acK , and I would like to go on record in su p port of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he ca l ls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for conside r in~ my opinion on these i s su es.

Sincerely ,

D8Cf<ET NU ~-il GER

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'87 APR 17 P3 :39 To: Secretary, Nuclear kegulatory Commission OfFlcr- '"'~ ~** __

._ -., r :: ~ i.- t*. t ! A,< Y Washington, D. C. ~0555 .

• DOCKETiNG._-,. SE?~IC[

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's pet1t1on to 1&4~ its EPZ to one mile Da te: 4/10/'d7 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zo ne s around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based 1n part on its prediction of how ~uch radiation would be released from each plant in the event of a major accident -- uut the staff of the commission has already aamitteo to navin~ very little understanding of "severe accid e nt behavior at core melt conditions." ~e can't atford to rely on your best guesses in a matter this important.

The accident at Chernobyl has proviued us with some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced peopl e to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plant, and food produced within 1,2~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given thdt, how can you seriouslt consirier allowing Seabrook to re J uce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne rue ssage from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne~d to be prepared to evacuate larger areas than we ever thought necessary . The state of Maine is on the r ight tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for considerin ~ my opinion on these issues .

Sincerely ,

D08 KET f*J' *MBER l

PETITION HULE PRM C~t F£ ,11ti:ls)t(,

'87 APR 'i 7 P3 :40 To: Secretary , Nuclear Hegulatory Commission OFFICE C~ S~ .;n_ iAR Y Washinyton , D.C . ~0555 OOCKEilNG -!r. SC:i? VICf.

ke: PRM-50-4 5 , PRM- 50-46, and NH Yankee's pet it ion taAltQlduce its EPZ to one mile Date: 4/1'6/87 I would l i ke to reg i ster my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuc lea r power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuat i on planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC pl a ns to determine the s i ze o f EPZ ' s ba sed 1n pa r t on it s prediction of how ~uch r adi at i o n would be re l ea sed f rom ea ch plant i n the event of a major accident -- but the staff of the commission has alreaay aamittea to navin~ very little understanding of " severe accident behavior at core melt conditions. " ~e can't afford to rely on your best guesses in a matter this important.

The accident at Chernobyl has proviued us witn some real - life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some a reas as far as 5~ mile s from the plant ,

and food produced within 1 , 2~~ miles of the reacto r was classified low-level radioactive waste . Given that, how can you seriously consiaer allowing Seabrook to reuuce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne message from Chernobyl is clear - - we need to be prepared to evacuate larger areas than we ever tnought necessary . The state of Maine is on the right tracK , and I would li ke to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he ca ll s for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for consideriny my opinion on these issues .

Sinc e rely ,

DOCKET NUMBER ~ -~

li'ETITION RU LE PRM -,,r/!J ~

(!$I ~ ,B~T/f) 137 APR \-, P3 :40 To : Secreta r y , Nuclear Hegulatory Commission OFFICE CF S~t,;r.t *A R'f Washington , D. C . ~~555 OOCKETiNG & SERV1Cr:

ke : PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petit ion t~W8uce its EPZ to one mile Date : 4/10/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC pl ans t o det er mi ne the size of EPZ's based 1n part on its predi ction o f how ~uch r adi at i on would be releas ed f rom eac h pl an t in the event of a majo r accide n t -- but t he staff of the commi ss ion has al r eaoy aom i tteo to navin~ very little unde r s t andi n g of " severe acc i dent behavio r at co r e melt conditi ons." we can ' t affo r d to rely on you r be s t guesse s in a ma t te r t his impo r tant .

The accident at Che r nobyl has proviued us witn some rea l - life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced

µeople t o ev a cuate some areas as far as 50 mil es from the plant ,

and food p r oduced within 1 , 2~~ miles of t he reacto r wa s clas s ified low-level r adioactive waste . Given thdt , how can you serio us lj consiaer allowing Seabrook to reJuce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne message f r om cnernobyl is clear -- we ne~d to be prepared to evacuate l ar ye r areas than we eve r thought necessary . The state of Maine i s on t he r ight t r acr. , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for conside r in~ my opinion on these is s ues .

Sincerely , ~

/4~

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DOCKET NUMBER Jl4 PETITION RU LE PRM D (jjj) DOCK'":T r 1U:V18ER -"J i, J, -t/

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'87 AflR 7 P3 :40 To : Secretary, Nuclear ~egulatory Commission OFFICE ::: S~1.t1t TAN:Y hashinyton , D. C . ~0555 DOCKETING & ~ERVICf.

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition to relM:N:CHits EPZ to one mile Date: 4/l-.J/'d7 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a " site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based in part on its prediction of how ~uch radiation would be releasad from each plant in the event of a major accident -- ~ut the s taff of the commission has dlreaay aomittea to navin~ very little unde rsta nding of " severe accid e nt behavior at core melt conditions ." ~e can ' t afford to rely on yo~r best ~uesses in a ffiatter this i~portant .

The accident at Chernobyl has proviued us witn some real-life ex?erience on which to base eillergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plant, and food produced within l , i~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given thdt, how can you seriously consirier allowing Seabrook to reuuce its EPZ to one mile?

'1'11e 1!1;;: ssas,e from Cllernobyl is clear -- we ne ~d to be preparl;!d to evacuate laryer areas than we ever tnought necessary. The state of Maine is on the right tracK , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

ThanK you for considerin~ my opinion on these issues .

Sincerely ,

To : Secretary , Nuclear Hegulatory Commission Washin~ton , o.c . ~~555 OFFICE ~F S~~,.~- .i.t< 'r

, .

• OOCKE:lN::i_~_$t.i.-VICf ke : PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankees pet i t ion toe~ce it s EPZ to one mile Ddtf:! : 4/lid/87 I would like to register my strong ob j ection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation plann i ng . I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC pl an s to dete r mine the s i z e of EPZ ' s based in pa r t on it s p r edi c tion of how much radi at i o n wo u ld be relea s ed f r om ea ch pla n t in the event of a majo r accide n t -- cut thf:! staff of the commission has alr e a dy aamittea to navin~ ve r y little understanding of " severe accident behavio r at co r e melt conditions ." ~e can ' t afford to rely on your best guesses in a matter this important .

The accident at Che r nobyl has proviued us witn some real - life experience on which to base eillergency planning it forced

µeople to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plant ,

ana food produced within l , ~~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level r ad)oactive waste . Given that, how can you seriously consider allowing Seabrook to reuuce its ~PZ to one mile?

Tne m~ ssage from Chernobyl is clear - - we nead to be prepared to evacuate lar~er areas than we ever tnought necessary . The state of Maine is on the r ight tracK , and I would l ike to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he cal l s for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you fo r conside r in~ my opinion on these issues .

Sincerely ,

DOCKET NUMBER /JI -../~ ~

PETlT\ON RULE PRM ~

(~I Ftf 3:J.a7f)

'87 iaPR ..., P3 :40 To : Secretary, Nuclear Regulatory Commission washin~ton, D. C . ~0555 ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, EPZ to one mile Date: 4/lld/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific " approach t o evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based 1n part on its prediction of how much radiation would be releas~d from each plant in the event of a major accident -- out the staff of the commission has already aamitteo to navin~ very little understanding of "severe accident behavior at core melt conditions." ~e can't afford to rely on your best guesses in a matter this important.

The accident at Che rn obyl has proviued us witn some real-li fe experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 5~ miles from the plan~,

and food produced within 1,2~~ miles of t he reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given thdt, how can you se r iously consider allowing Seabrook to re~uce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne ru~s sage from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne~d to be prepared to evacuate lar~er areas than we ever tnought necessary. The stat~

of Maine is on t he r ight trac~, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for considerin~ my opinion on these issues.

Sincerely ,

DOCKET NUMBER L.. l - DOCl<ET NUf.l'.:: C:R

~ETlTtCN

..,. 'LE PRM l"\U r,<J--l/1 ~

D ~v PETITION RULE_ PRM c!J~7J!fh (jj)

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'87 tffi 0

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40 To: Secretary, Nuclear Hegulatory Commission c- ,..~ ::. ,., *.. ,:;y OFFIC- vr Washinyton, D. C. ~0555 y-Y DOCKEiiNG & SE~v ICf ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's pet1t1~~N()p red uce its EPZ to one mile Odt~: 4/l~/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Ham pshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

Th e NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based in part on its prediction of how much radiation would be released from each plant in the event of a major accident -- but the staff of the commission has al reaa y aomittea to navin~ very little understanding of "sever e accident behavior at core melt conditions ." we can't afford to rely on your best guesse s in a matter this important.

The accident at Che rn obyl has proviued us witn some real-life experience on which to base eillergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plant, and food produced within 1 , 2~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given thdt, how can you seriously consi6er allowiny Seabrook to reuuce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne me ssage from Cnernobyl is clear -- we ne ~d to be prepared to evacuate laryer areas than we ever tnou~ht necessary. The state of Maine is on the right tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for considerin~ my opinion on these issues.

Sincerely ,

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RU LE PRM  !;Jb-<fS"~

C~ I t=-,i, SliS" 18}

To : Secret a ry , Nuclea r Reg u l a to r y Commission OFFICE CF St ,r.t. ! A"'f Wa s ninyton , D. C . ~0555 OOCXETit--iG & SERVIC[

ke : PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition to rE81oe~ i ts EPZ to one mile Date : 4/10/cl7 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to dete r mi ne the s iz e of EPZ ' s based 1n pa r t on its prediction of how ~uch r adi at i on would be releas~d f r om each plant in the event of a majo r accident -- uut the staff of the commis s ion has al r eatiy aom i ttec to navin~ ve r y little unde r standing of " severe accident behavior at core melt conditions ." ~e can ' t atfo r d to rely on yo~r best yuesses in a ffiatter this important .

The accident at Che r nobyl has p r oviued us witn some r eal-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some ar eas a s fa r as 50 miles from the plan~ ,

and food produced within 1 , 2~~ miles of the reactor was classifiea low-level r adioactive waste . Given thdt , how can you ser1ousl~ consider allowing Seabrook to reuuce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne me ssaye from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne ~d to be pre~ar~d to evacuate laryer areas than we ever tnouyht necessary . The state of Maine is on the r ight t r ac~ , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he cal l s for expanded mi nimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank jOu for considerin~ my o pinion on these issues .

Sinc ~ rely ,

DOCKET NUMBER PEJITION RU LE PRM l;J1-4~(iij) l '5 / r-,t ~ ,-~7 f)

To: Secretary, Nuclear ~egulatory Commission OFFICE JF ~:.--KL AF y Washington, D. C . ~0555 OOCKFthG _,. $C: i:WIC[

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition t o r ~ its EPZ to one mile Da t~: 4/116/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific " approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based in part on its pr e diction of how much radiation would be released from each plant in the event of a major accident -- cut the sta ff of the co~~issi o n h as alr ea ay aamittec to navin~ very little understanding of "severe accident behavior at core melt conditions." we can't atford to rely on your best guesses in a ffiatter this important.

The accident at Chernobyl has p roviued us witn some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 516 miles from the plant, and food produced within 1,2~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given thdt, how can you seriousli consider allowing Seabrook to reuuce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne ru~ ssage from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne ~d to be prepared to evacuate laryer areas than we ever thought necessary. The state of Maine is on the right tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning zones.

Thank you for considerin ~ my opinion on these issues.

Sincerely, ,,,---;;::7

(}tt£fla

DOC l,ET NUfv'lBER PETITION RULE PRM

{ ~I F/4 4/Jd:l5) o-r-~::~=.:c

J5NRC T37 ii~~ ., P3 40 To: Secretary , Nuclear Regulatory Co,nmi ss ion OFFICE '.;f S: , r.t. iAM y Washington , D.C . ~0555 OOCKE::t-iG & SErVIC[

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition to rEd'1GeH 1 ts EPZ to one mile Date : 4/10/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to r e place the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size o f EPZ's based 1n part on its predictio n of how much radiation would be relea sed f rom each plant in the event of a majo r accident -- out the s t a ff of the commission h as al r e a dy aornitteo to navin~ very little understanding of " severe accident behavior at core melt conditions ." we can ' t afford to rely on your best guesses in a matter this important.

The accident at Che rnobyl has proviued us witn some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 5~ miles from the plant ,

and food produced within 1 , 2~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste . Given thdt , how can you ser1ouslt consider allowing Seabrook to reJuce its EPZ to one mile?

The mess age from Chernobyl is clear -- we need to be prepared to evacuate laryer areas than we ever tnouyht necessary . The state of Maine is on the r ight tracK , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

ThanK you for conside r in~ my opinion on these issues .

Sincerely ,

OOCKE.T l<uM£ER PETITICN RU LE. PRM

-/2:?)

~-4.!J ~ ~~~~~~NI'~~~~- '~RM ff'-1 '- @

[51 P~ ..JTJ7f) {_51 F£ 4~1 :IS'J , Jl{:-::c

., '.l '*P.C To : Sec r e tar y , Nuclear ~egulato r y Commission washing ton, o.c . ~~555 OFF/Cf OF" _;:: Jr-.t !Atir OOCKETIN-.: >:, ~E ~Y LCf" ke : PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition to lfil!du~ i ts EPZ to one mile Date : 4/10/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC pl ans t o de ter mine the size o f EP Z's based 1n pa r t on its predi ction of how muc h r ad iation wou ld be re leas ed f rom eac h pla n t in t he even t of a majo r accide n t -- out the staff of the commi ss i on ha s al re a d y aam i tteo to navin~ ve r y little unde r standing of " seve r e accident behavior at co r e melt condi t io ns." we ca n' t affo r d to rely on you r best gu~sses in a matter t his impo r tant .

The accide n t at Che r nobyl has proviued us witn some real - life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced

~eople to evacuate some a reas as f a r as 50 miles from the plant, and food p r oduced within 1 , 2~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level r adioactive waste . Given that , how can you seriously consider allowing Seabrook to re,Juce its L~Z to one mile?

Tne message from Chernobyl is clear -- we need to be prepared to evacuate la r ge r ar eas than we eve r thought necessary . The state of Maine is on t he r ight t r acK , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning zones.

Thank you fo r conside r in~ my opinion on these issues .

Sincerely , ~ )_ \.,.,- ~

To: Secretary, Nuclear ~egulatory Commission Washington, D.C. ~0555 OFF ICE c=- $~,..,r~. !APY OOCKE:iNG -~ :;::-;N IC[

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition to re~~,r.;HLtS EPZ to one mile Date: 4/10/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based in part on its prediction of how ~uch radiation would be released from each plant in the event of a major accident -- uut the staff of the commission has al reaoy aomitteo to navin~ very little understanding of "severe accident behavior at core melt conditions." w-,e can't afford to rely on your *best guesses in a matter this important.

The accident at Che rnobyl has proviued us witn some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 5~ miles from the plant, and food produced within l,20~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given th a t, how can you seriously consirier allowing Seabrook to re~uce its E~ Z* to one mile?

Tne ru~ ssa9e from Chernobyl is cleat -- we ne~d to be prepared to evacuate lar9er areas than we ever thought necessary. The state of Maine is on the ri ght tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney Gene ral Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for considerin~ my opinion on these issues.

Sincerely,

DOCKET NUMBER  :"l _AA-PETITION RULE___PRM .bV-"7v'@ ~9'

(.57 F£ J~~7()

To: Secretary, Nuclear ~egulatory Commission Washinyton, D. C . i0555 ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, EPZ to one mile Dd te: 4/li3/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based in part on its prediction of how illuch radiation would be released from each plant in the event of a major accident -- uut the staff of the commis s ion ha s al ready aamittea to navin~ very little understanding of "severe accident be hav ior at core melt conditions." we can't afford to rely on your best guesses in a ffiatter this important.

The accident at Che rnobyl has p rovi ued us with some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 50 mile s from the plant ,

and food produced within 1,2~~ miles of the rea c tor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given thdt, how can you seriously consiaer allowing Seabrook to r e~ uce its EPZ to one mile?

The me ssage from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne ~d to be prepared to evacuate larger areas than we ever thou g ht necessary . The state of Maine is on the r ight tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for considerin ~ my opinion on thes e issues .

Acknowledged by card.~-.-**** n--.-.... ,,,,. 11a

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PRM (51 p~ .Jf-'7~

t.fC _~

~

'87 APR *1 7 P3 :39 To : Sec r et ar y , Nuclea r Reg u l a tory Commission 1/4ashiny to n , D. C . ~0555 OFFICE JF ~::LKr. ;MiY DOCKETING ~~J~VICf.

ke : PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petiti on t4RJ~ce ~ts EPZ to one mile Ddte : 4/li6/ 8 7 I would like to register my strong ob j ection to your proposal to r eplace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC pl ans to determi ne t he s i ze of EPZ ' s based 1n pa r t on i t s pr ed i ct i on of how ~ uch radiat ion wou l d be re l eas ed f r om ea ch pl an t in t he event of a ma jo r accident -- out the staff of the commi ss ion has al r eady aamitteo to naviny very little und e r standing of " severe accident behav1or at co r e melt conditions ." we ca n' t affo r d to rely on you r best guesses i n a matter this impo r tant .

The accide n t at Che r nobyl has provioed us witn some r eal - life experience on which to base e~ergency planning it f or ced peopl e to ev a cuate s ome area s as far as 50 mile s from the plant ,

and f ood p r oduced wit hi n 1 , 2~~ miles of the reacto r wa s classified low-level r adioactive waste . Given thdt , how c a n you seriously consider allowing Seabrook to re~uce its ~PZ to one mile?

The message from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne~d to be prepared to evacuate large r areas tha n we ever tnought necessary . The state of Maine i s on the r ight t r acK , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, i n which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning zones.

Thank you fo r conside r iny my o pinion on these issues .

Sincer ely , ~ ~ }. ~

l~ci (,e,J/fa l Jt,

/\)JN~N I Jl,Vt 02Ub APR i!, 4 1987 Acknowledged by card ** .-.-.....;-........,,,,,-,-._,

DOCKET NUMi3ER -

PETITION RU LE PRM .,iJ -,,/~@

{51r~ .Jn7f}

'87 ru'R t7 P3 :39 To : Secretary, Nuclear ~eg u lato r y Commission OFFICE ::JF ~:.t..r-.c.lA RY Washington, D. C. ~0555 QOCKETING ,i,, SERVICf' ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's pet1tiol'8Rlac~educe its EPZ to one mile Date: 4/10/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to r eplace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Ya nkee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based 1n part on its prediction of how much radiation would be released from each plant in the event of a major accident -- but the staff of the commission has al ready aamittea to havin~ very little u nderstanding of "severe accident behavio r at core melt conditions ." we can't afford to rely on your best guesses in a matte r this important.

The accident at Che rnobyl has proviued us witn some real-lif e experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plant, ana food produced within 1,2~~ miles of the rea c tor was classified low-level rad.1oact ive waste. Given that, how can you seriously consider allowing Seabrook to re~uce its BPZ to one mile?

Tne m~ssage from Chernobyl is clear -- we need to be prepar~d to evacuate lar~er areas than we ever thought necessary. The state of Maine is on the right tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Tha n k you for considerin~ my opinion on these issues.

Sincerely ,

~ T~.t ~L'"\- µ .

N . \J.,,~~ h tv, 6.. oz,CJ >

APR 2 4 1987 Ackr: ~-~1!edt1~c' by ca rct *. _..,;;...,-;-;-;;-;, ;, *-**

'87 APR 17 P3 :4 0 To: Secreta ry, Nuclear Regulatory Commission washing ton, D. C . i0555 OFFICE JF $:;l,r,L 11\RY OOCKEJING & $ERVICf.

ke : PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition t o rea~c~cs EPZ to one mile Date : 4/10/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC pl ans to determine the size of EPZ 's based in part on its prediction of how ~uch radiation would be released from each pl an t in the event of a major accident -- uut the staff of the commission has alreaay aamittea to navin~ very little understanding of " severe accident behavior at core melt conditions ." we can ' t affora to rely on your best guesse s in a matter this important.

The accident at Che rnobyl has proviued us with some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plant, and food produced within 1 , 2~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste . Given that, how can you seriously consider allowing Seabrook to reuuce its EP~ to one mil e ?

The mess age from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne~d to be prepared to evacuate larger areas than we ever thought necessary. The state of Maine is on the right tracK , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for considerin ~ my opinion on these issues .

S~ncerely ,

'Jtf,,,. &/~

II f/,*i S/tfe ,S -f for.l/,/

7 na. i"d.1J....o

To : Secretary , Nuclear ~egulatory Commission OFFICE CF S~l.r.t ARY DOCKETING & 3ER VICf Washin~ton , o.c . ~0555 . .BRA NCH

• ke : PRM- 5 0-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's pet1t1on to reduce its EPZ to one mi le Date : 4/lid/87 I would like to register my strong ob j ection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach t o evacuation plann i ng. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC pl ans to determine the s i ze o f EPZ 's ba sed in part on it s prediction of how ~uch radi at ion wo uld be releas ed f rom each plant in the event of a major accide n t -- but t he staff of the commission h as al r eady aamitted to navin~ very little understanding of " severe accid e nt behavio r at co r e melt conditions ." we can ' t afford to rely on your best guesses in a matter this important .

The accident at Chernobyl has proviued us witn some real - life expe rience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 5~ miles from the plant ,

and food produced within 1 , 2~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level r adioactive waste . Given thdt , how can you seriousl1 consider allowin y Seabrook to re~uce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne mds saye from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne ed to be prepared to evacuate laryer areas than we ever thought necessary. The state of Maine i s on the r ight tracK , and I would l ike to g o on record in support of Attorney Genera l Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he ca ll s for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

ThanK you for conside r in ~ my opinion on these issues .

Sin t.:e rely ,

D~ ~ -?~

~K ~Clf:)0/"t

} Obi '5W $1" lc1 ~ rtviu. ,11 fr 6 I fµ 1 AFR 2 4 1987

DOCKET NUMBER ~

iETITION RULE PRM ~i-4fi

(~I p,e J S-~7 f) tc:i'V To: Secretary, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. ~0555 OFFICE Or 3~t. r*L ARY OQCKETING & SERVI.Cf.

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's pe t1 tlQPAillOH reduce its EPZ to one mi le Date: 4/10/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based in part on its prediction of how much radiation would be releas~d from each plant in the event of a major accident -- out the staff of the commission has alreaoy aamitteo to navin~ very little u nderstanding of "severe accident behavior at core melt conditions." We can't atford to rely on your best guesses in a matter this important.

The accident at Chernobyl has proviued us witn some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced people to evacuate some areas as far as 5~ miles from the plant, and food produced within 1 , 2~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given thdt, how can you seriously consider allowing Seabrook to re~uce its EPZ to one mile?

The message from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne ~d to be pr e ~ared to evacuate laryer areas than we ever thought necessary. The state of Maine is on the r ight tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for considerin~ ~y opinion on these issues .

Sincerely ,

U 1 s Jl-v~

/OJA (. f>..;r~~

£J4u711\"" tVV\ o;:;>1 ~

To: Secretary, Nuclear Hegulatory CornmiS(Jtf~ ":; ~. ,* r* 1ARY Washington, D.C . ~0555 DOCKETING*,.: "'s(R VICF:

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's pEP@t~q~n to reduce its EPZ to one mile Date: 4/10/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten - mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based 1n part on its prediction of how ~uch radiation would be released from each plant in the event of a major accident -- but the staff of the commission has already aomitted to navin~ very little understanding of "severe accident behavior at core melt conditions." ~e can't afford to rely on your best guesses in a matter this important.

The accident at Chernobyl has proviued us witn some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced

~eople to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plant, and food produced within l,~~~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level radioactive waste. Given that, how can you seriously consider allowing Seabrook to re~uce its EPZ to one mile?

The rndssage from Chernobyl is clear -- we ne ed to be prepared to evacuate laryer areas than we ever tnought necessary. The state of Maine is on the right tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he cal l s for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for considerin~ my opinion on these issues .

Sincerely,

~

/ 'J / (;) 1A./ *~--'CJ'_.,,._.,_

v~

APR 2 4 \S~7 Acknowledged by card .***** * ** * **** ** ** _

, , -~ - r.

..,1 ..,..,, , _ I --

~5~i<:

To: Secretary, Nuclear Hegulatory Commission OFFICE :- _.., ~ 1At1 '1.

Wasnin~ton, o.c . ~0555 OOCKE7iNG & ':ii..RV1Cf.

ke: PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition toSf~a*e its EPZ to one mile Date : 4/l0/'d7 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Hampshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

• The NRC plans to determine the size of EPZ's based 1n part on its prediction of how ~uch racliation would be released from each plant in the event of a major accident -- out the staff of th e commission understand ing conditions."

has alreaoy a amitteo to navin~

of "severe accident behavior at very we can't afford to rely on your best guesses in a core little melt ffiatter this important.

The accident at Che rno byl has proviued us witn some real-life experience on which to base emergency planning it forced

~eople to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plant ,

and food produced within l,20~ miles of the reactor was classified low-level rad ~oactive waste. Given that, how can you seriously consiaer allowing Seabrook to re ~uce its EPZ to one mile?

Tne me ssage from Cnernobyl is clear -- we ne~d to be prepared to evacuate laryer areas than we ever thought necessary. The state of Maine is on the right tracK, and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning zones.

Thank you for considerin~ my opinion on these issues.

Sincerely ,

APR 24 1987 Ackno:t!edgEd by ~rd *** * * * * * .-.......- ,..,.........,.

DOCKET NU"!BER ,lJ PETITION RJLS PRM ,3 - 4 ~

Cj7 r;e .JftJ7 i) 137 WR 17 PJ :39 To : Secretary , Nuclear ~egulatory Co,11mi ss i ori OFFICE OF :::. !"t fAR'r

~asninyton , D. C . ~~555 DOCKETING & 'j[ RV ICf ke : PRM-50-45, PRM-50-46, and NH Yankee's petition to redi~Cilts

• EPZ to one mile Date : 4/Hi/87 I would like to register my strong objection to your proposal to replace the current rule requiring ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants with a "site-specific" approach to evacuation planning. I am also opposed to allowing New Ha mpshire Yankee to reduce the EPZ at Seabrook to one mile.

The NRC pl ans to determine the size of EPZ 's based 1n part on its prediction of how ~uch radiation would be released f rom ea c h plant in the event of a majo r accident -- uut the staff of the commission has al rea ay aomitteo to navin~ very little unde rsta nd in g of " severe accident behavior at co r e melt conditions ." ~e can ' t atford to rely on your best gue sses in a matter this important .

The accident at Che rn obyl has p r oviued us witn some real-li fe experience on which to base eillergency planning it forced

~eople to evacuate some areas as far as 50 miles from the plan~,

ana food produced withi n l,~~~ miles of tne reactor was classifiea low-level ra dioactive waste . Given that, h ow can you ser1ouslt consiaer allowing Seabrook to re~uce its ~PZ to one mile?

'l'r1e 1111.~ssage fr om c11e rnoby l is clear -- we ne 1=d to be preµa red to evacuate lar~er areas than we ever tnought necessary . The state of Maine is on the right t r ac~ , and I would like to go on record in support of Attorney General Tierney's PRM 50-46, in which he calls for expanded minimum Emergency Planning Zones.

Thank you for consi de rin y my opinion on these issues .

Sincerely ,

iM;rf-dLJV,ut;~

s-~ W ha ~Ja--

~ VI IQ /IA f4--- () 21'4-- 'j APR .: l~071 Acknowlec!g~d by card ** ,,., ***** ," ...,....

fl)oc ,,UMB ER --..,__ ~

iETlTICN ~ULE PRM ,58,..4~~

C5I P~ J~~7 "(85 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM!

)

Kenneth G. Sexton; Filing of )

Petition for Rulemaking, ) -

51 Fed. Reg. 35,518 ) ~87 AFR 16 A7 :45 (October 6, 1986) ) Docket Nos. PRM-50-45,

) p~;:50"'!'4 6 State of Maine; Filing of )

Petition for Rulemaking, )

51 Fed. Reg. 47,025 )

(December 30, 1986) )

)

COMMENTS BY UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") or ("Commission")

has published for comment two rulemaking petitions that request the Commission to change its criteria for establishing the size of the emergency planning zones ("EPZs") surrounding nuclear power plants. The State of Maine requests that the Commission extend the current plume exposure pathway EPZ to a minimum of twenty miles, and to extend the ingestion pathway EPZ to 100 miles in radius, thus approximately doubling the size of the EPZs. Kenneth G. Sexton seeks a change in the regulations that would establish the size of the EPZ on a case-by-case basis, using state-of-the art modelling techniques, includ i ng meteorological monitoring. It should be noted that while the regulatory language preferred by Mr. Sexton would require that the determination of EPZ size be made on a case- by -case basis, he also appears to consider that the current ten-mile radius i s inadequate and nonconservative. Thus, the intent of the Sexton (sj i..,!i.

'l,tb ,*~ *~ ,..r*.y ~r.-! ...---. .

- 2 -

petition appears to be to extend emergency planning beyond ten miles through the consideration of site-specific factors.

The Union of Concerned Scientists (*ucs*) and the New Eng-land Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (*NECNP*) support these peti-tions to the extent that they would require the extension of the radii of the plume exposure pathway EPZ and ingestion pathway EPZ beyond ten and fifty miles, respectively. We believe that the Commission should establish twenty miles as the minimum size of the plume exposure EPZ, allowing expansion of the size of the zone beyond that based on plant-specific considerations.

Comments I. The Commission Should Establish a Minimum Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ Size of Twenty Miles.

A. Assumptions Underlying Ten-Mile Zone Are Flawed.

As petitioner Sexton points out in his comments, the current ten-mile EPZ is nonconservative and based on unreliable risk estimates. ucs described the deficiencies in the planning basis in its 1982 c~mments on the rulemaking petition filed by the

• Citizens' Task Force, PRM-50-31. 1 In those comments, UCS noted that the emergency planning rule is intended to protect the pub-lic from the effects of beyond design basis accidents, which dom-inate the risk to the public. The ten-mile EPZ limit was based on NRC's conclusion that only 30% of all core melt accidents will result in qoses above the Environmental Protection Agency's Pro-1 A copy of those comments*is attached and incorporated by reference. See Exhibit 1.

tective Action Guidelines beyond ten miles. NUREG-0396 at I-9.

The ten-mile limit is also alleged to be justified on the assump-tion that there is a aspectrum* of releases which can be expected from core melt accidents. Id. at I-7.

These premises are flawed for several reasons. First, they are based on untested and unreliable probabilistic risk assess-ments, without adequate conservatisms to compensate for the uncertainties inherent in the analysis. See UCS Comments at p.

29ff

• Second, in basing the ten-mile limit on the assertion that for 70% of core melt accidents, doses were not likely to exceed the PAG guidelines beyond ten miles, the Commission arbitrarily ignored the 30% of core melt accidents which would to result in doses well above the PAGs to distances far beyond the ten-mile zone. (See UCS 1982 Comments, pp. 12-29.) It is clear that

-.:those accidents dominate the risk to the public because they would result in the release of the largest amounts of radioac-

• tivity.2 Finally, there is substantial evidence which contradicts the NRC's assumption that there is a *spectrumn of releases from core melt accidents. In fact, the studies discussed at pages 13-16 of 2 As ucs points out at age 12 of its 1982 comments, the calcula-tion of risk to the public is the product of risk and conse-quences. Because their consequences are so overwhelming, and their probability is not vanishingly small, those 30% of core melt accidents ignored in the emergency planning rule dominate the risk to the public.

UCS's 1982 Comments show that severe accidents are better cate-gorized as grouped into three general categories. For the first category, *melt-through" accidents, a 10 mile EPZ is adequate.

For the two other categories, *penetration leakage* and *major containment failure,* a 10 mile EPZ is grossly insufficient, (Id.

at 19-24.) NRC itself calculated the doses associated with an "atmospheric release* (which can be equated to a major contain-ment failure). For a case involving evacuation after five hours, the projected mean 3 doses at 10 miles is 40-rem. (The EPA Pro-

• tective Action Guides limits are 1-5 rem).

be exceeded out to ~0 miles.

The 1-rem PAG would For all cases calculated - the best being evacuation after three hours - the PAGs were greatly exceeded at the 10 mile limit. (Id. at 22-24). Thus, the 10-mile EPZ is demonstrably inadequate for two of the three general types of severe accidents. Moreover, because the PAGs may in such cases be exceeded at distances of 50 miles or more (Id. at 38-43), the current planning based on a 10 mile EPZ will not only be inapplicable, it may well be counter productive in certain respects. For example, centers designated to receive evacuees from within the 10 mile zone are likely to themselves be inside the zone of danger.

In smnmary, UCS's 1982 Comments, which are incorporated herein, establish that the current 10 mile EPZ is inadequate to 3 In half the cases the actual dose would be higher and in half the cases it would be lower.

protect the public in two of the three general categories of severe nuclear plant accidents.

B. Chernobyl Accident Demonstrates Need for Larger EPZ.

The accident at the Soviet Chernobyl plant in April, 1986, demonstrated the potential scope of the spread of radioactive material from reactor accidents. The plant is of a size typical of many U.S. reactors, in the 1000 MW range with a corresponding radioactive inventory. The International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA) report of May 9, 1986, indicates that the plant was opera-

• ting at only 6-7% of full power at the time of the accident.

Only a small fraction of the radioactive inventory under 10%, was released. The Chernobyl accident was first* discovered by the world when elevated radiation levels were detected on the cloth-ing of workers at a Swedish plant 800 miles away. The Soviets were required to evacuate all persons within 19 miles of the site and pockets of people at hot spots out to 100 miles. Children in particular were evacuated out to very large distances. A year

• after the accident the towns closest to the plant are still unlivable and will be so for the forseeable future.

persons are dead.

Thirty-one Thousands will die of cancer in the future.

The genetic effects (birth defects, stillbirths) will be seen in future generations. And it is important to note that Chernobyl was not the worst case. See *Implications of the Chernobyl-4 Accident for Nuclear Emergency Planning for the State of New York,* prepared by MBB Associates for the State of New York Con-sumer Protection Board, June, 1986. A copy is attached and incorporated herein.

While there was a concerted effort by the nuclear industry to convince people that Chernobyl could not happen here, the fact is that while differences in design mean that an accident could not happen in precisely the same way, an accident releasing equivalent amounts of radioactive material or more could happen at any nuclear plant of comparable size in the United States. No U.S. containment is designed to withstand the dynamic forces associated with a full core melt and there are in addition, acci-dent scenarios where the containment is bypassed altogether or

• where the release is by leakage of one of the many containment penetrations rather than catastrophic rupture. 4 Moreover, initial reports to the contrary, the Chernobyl plant did employ a pressure-suppression containment system similar in many respects to the design of 24 General Electric Mark I plants in the U.S. NRC's most recent research contained in NUREG-1150 concludes that there is not ahigh confidence" that any U.S. containment would withstand a severe accident and that

• in the case of the Mark I's, the chance of failure is between 10%

and 90% - i.e. they are as likely as not to fail.

In the light of these facts, it is a dangerous delusion to pretend that catastrophic accidents cannot or will not happen here. In 1975, NRC's Reactor Safety Study analyzed accident con-sequences for a roughly average site. For the worst case ana-4 A 1980 study done by American Nuclear Insurers found that in the years 1967-1979, boiling water reactor containments were actually leakproof* (i.e. all valves and other penetrations closed) only 77% of the time.

lyzed (although not the worst possible case), the estimated effects were 3,300 immediate deaths, 45,000 iatent cancer fatali-ties and 5,100 genetic effects. More recent research does not support changing these estimates.

After the TMI accident in 1979, an accident which NRC had previously deemed *incredible,* the Presidential Commission appointed to investigate its causes and recommend the needed changes concluded:

While throughout this document we emphasize that fundamental changes are necessary to prevent accidents as serious as TMI, we must not assume that an accident of this or greater seriousness cannot happen again, even if the changes we recommend are mad~. Therefore, in addition to doing every-thing to prevent such accidents we must be fully prepared to minimize the potential impact of such an accident on the public health and safety, should one occur in the future.

The Report of the Presidents Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The need for change: The legacy of TMI, October 1979, p. 15 (emphasis added).

Chernobyl reinforces UCS's and NECNP's belief that the cur-rent emergency planning rules are not sufficient to minimize the

• potential human consequences of a major accident. At Chernobyl, it was necessary to evacuate the entire population out to almost twenty miles around the plant, and many areas further away were also evacuated. Had such an evacuation been attempted at a plant in the.United States, where planning is required only out to ten miles from nuclea~ plants, an evacuation could easily fall into utter chaos, with thousands and even millions of people exposed to high ievels of radiation. Moreover, the NRC requires planning for the ingestion exposure pathway only out to 50 miles. The

Chernobyl accident demonstrated tragically that this level of planning is totally inadequate to provide for appropriate pro-tective actions during a radiological accident. Radiation travelled hundreds of miles from Chernobyl within hours, tainting livestock and agriculture far from the nuclear plant. The plume also changed directions several times, sending radiation all over Europe. Moreover, many governments received no warning of the approaching plume. NRC regulations should require, at the very minimum, the establishment of 100 miles as the minimum radius for the Ingestion Pathway Protection EPZ. Moreover, the Commission should require that each emergency plan include provision for immediate notification of all state governments within 500 miles of the nuclear power plant, with further provision for notifica-tion of other governments in the plume's path as it travels from the plant.

-II. The Commission May Not Use Probabilistic Risk Asses.sment To Reduce the Size of Emergency Planning Zones.

While probabilistic risk assessment (*PRA*) may be useful

• for identifying weaknesses in reactor design, or regulatory areas that need improvement, it is not a suitable tool for relaxing Commission safety standards. Therefore UCS and NECNP would oppose any use of PRA for the reduction in size of emergency planning zones, either on a generic or plant-specific basis.

Probabilistic risk assessment (*PRA") is a newly developing and extremely controversial methodology for the evaluation of the probabilities of nuclear reactor accidents and their conse-quences. Using engineering judgment and computer pro9ramming,

- 9 -

the PRA attempts to model the events and the consequences of a nuclear power plant accident. These models are in turn based on thousands of arbitrary and unverifiable assumptions about the character and behavior of the nuclear power plant and its thou-sands of components. The vast complexity of the analyses and the sensitivity of the codes to variations in input assumptions create considerable "uncertainties* in the reliability of the analyses. Thus, the use of PRAs for regulatory decisions has come under intense criticism. from many quarters

• In its recent Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Oper-ations of Nuclear Power Plants, the Commission recognized the continuing uncertainties in the use of PRA and emphasized its limitations for making regulatory decisions:

Since the completion of the Reactor Safety Study [WASH-1400], further progress in developing probabilistic risk assessment and in accumulating relevant data have led to a recognition that it is feasible to begin to use quantitative safety objectives for limited pur-poses. However, because of the sizable uncertainties still present in the methods and the gaps in the data base -- essential elements needed to gauge whether the

• objectives have been achieved -- the quantitative objectives should be viewed as aiming points or numeri-cal benchmarks of performance. In particular, because of the present limitations in the state of the art of quantitatively estimating risks, the quantitative health effects objectives are not a substitute for existing regulations.

51 Fed. Reg. 28,045, COl. 3 (August 4, 1986) (emphasis added).

Moreover, it is clear that in developing the current EPz*

size .requirements, the NRC relied on more than risk assessment.

NUREG-0396 relied on a prudence rationale to reject a *risk

rationale* 5 planning basis in favor of a broad spectrum of acci-dent sequences. Thus, in rejecting the utilities' arguments against the IS-minute notification rule, the Commission made it plain that it would require a certain basic level of protection, regardless of the risks posed by any individual plant:

The Commission recognizes that this requirement may present a significant financial impact and that the technical basis for this requirement is not without dispute. Moreover, there may never be an accident requiring using the 15-minute notification capability. However, the essential rationale behind emergency planning is to provide additional pro-tection even during such an unexpected event *

• 45 Fed. Reg. 55,402, 55,407, col. 2 (August 19, 1980) added).

(emphasis Public perception of risk was also an important considera-tion in establishing a uniform EPZ size that is not based on accident probabilities associated with specific plant designs.

As NUREG-0396 states, nRadiological emergency planning is not

-based upon probabilities, but on public perceptions of the prob-lem, and what could be done to protect health and safety. In

• essence it is a matter of prudence rather than necessity.*

Appendix I-2. Thus, while risk assessment may be useful in identifying significant risks and regulatory areas requiring improvement, it cannot rationally be used to justify any reduc-tion in the size of emergency planning _zo-nes.

5 Defined as accident conse9uences times the probability of accident occurrences. Appendix I-1.

Conclusion In promulgating its emergency planning rules, the Commission adopted a uniform 10 mile EPZ size based on the broad range of accident sequences that is not based on the probability or risks of an accident at a particular plant. The Commission also con-sidered other factors such as prudency and public perception.

The Commission should not abandon these essentially sound tenets which underly its emergency planning rules. However, in light of current information regarding the risks posed to the public by nuclear power plants in the United States, and the ~essons of Chernobyl regarding the potentially large distances over which evacuation and other protective measures are likely to be required, it is clear that the Commission should establish larger emergency planning zones for the plume exposure pathway and the ingestion exposure pathway, in order to provide adequate pro-tection to the public health and safety.

Respectfully submitted, HARMON & WEISS 2001 *s* Street N.w. Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 328-3500 Counsel for Onion of Concerned Scientists and New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution April 15, 1987

UNJON OF 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Dupont Circle Building, Suite 1101 CONCERNED Washington, D.C. 20036 SCIENTISTS (202) 296-5600 DRAFT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION

}

In the Matter of )

)

PETITION FOR RULEMAKING PRM-50-31

)

)

CITIZEN"$ TASK FORCE )

47 F.R. 12639

)

10 CFR Parts SO and 70 l

COMMENTS OF TBE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS Introduction

~ On March 24, 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register a "notice of receipt of petition

• for rulemaking" from the Citizen's Task Force (47 F.R. 12639).

Petition for Rulemaking proposes: ta) that the present 10-mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning zone (Plume EPZ) be The extended to a radius of 20 miles and include any towns bordering on or partially within this zone; (b) that all communities within this zone with a population in excess of 5000 persons be provided funding by the respective utility to purchase, install and operate radiological monitoring equipment; and Le) that utilities be required to finance the emergency planning efforts ~f the muni-Massachusetts Office: 1384 Massachusetts Avenue

• Cambridge, MA 02238 * (617) 547-5552

cipalities in the zone. The Union o~ Concerned Scientists (UCS) herein submits its comments on the Petition for Rulemaking; although UCS's comments will largely be limited to the first portion of the proposal, we have the following comments with regard to the second and third portions of. the petition.

UCS believes that adequate radiation monitorin~ resources and proper training to utilize such resources is a necessity to support radiological emergency preparedness and response. More

• broadly, adequate radiological emergency preparedne$s and response is* a necessity for communities located near a large commercial nuclear generating station. It is certainly true in the vast majority- of cases that the very necessity for {or certainly the extent and details of) radiological emergency planning and radiological monitoring around nuclear plants exists solely b~cause of the presence of such a facility. UCS believes,

~

~

therefore, that the cost of such planning and monitoring must

• be viewed as a cost of "doing business" for the utilities involved, and that the NRC should require the utilities to fund the necessary planning and monitoring efforts.

It is by no means clear that the Cormnission lacks the authority to require such funding from its licensees (although such a requirement could conceivably be viewed as *taxation without representation"; ucs views such funding as not materially different from license application fees in that NltC must as a predicate for issuing an operating license find that an adequate state of radiological emergency preparedness exists *in the

surrounding area). If the answer to the question of whed:her ,:

the Commission lacks the authority to require utility funding of offsite radiological emergency response planning and radiological emergency monitoring were clear one way or the other, it would*

have been a simple matter for the Commission to have so indicated when it promulgated its revised emergency planning regulations on August 19, 1980. Instead, the Commission effectively dodged the issue by concluding that it was "beyond the scope of the

• present rule change" {45 F.R. 55402, 55408).

Inasmuch as the instant petition is explicitly concerned with the very issue of funding sources for radiological emergency planning and radiological monitoring, ucs can conceive of no excuse (save a political one) why the Commission should continue to shrink away from the problem. UCS believes it is clear enough that the present system of leaving such funding to chance is not working well, and where it has worked well it has been inequitable in many instances. The Indian Point emergency planning situatio~

is a case in point; rather than the utility supplying the necessary funding to the surrounding coIIm1unities to develop their own radiological emergency plans, the utilities at Indian Point hired their own consultant to develop the plans for the communities.

The result.of this process is that over a year after the plans were to have-been "implemented", -they remain in a state of disarray.

It is UCS's understanding that the counties aroun~ Indian Point are now attempting to revise the plans so that they are workable and reflect the capabilities and procedures suited to the local

governments.

The most equitable solution to the funaing dilemma for radiological emergency planning and radiological monitoring is for those who benefit from the facility's operation to pay for all of the costs of operating the facility. UCS submits that it is abundantly clear that radiological emergency response planning and radiological monitoring is a cost of operation for nuclear power plants. As the Commission should be well

• aware, in a number of cases the population at risk from nuclear plant operation is not the same population being served by electricity generated by that facility (except, perhaps, through indirect means such as power pooling agreements). It is par-ticularly inequitable under such circumstances that the taxpayers of the surrounding communities should be forced by circumstances almost wholly beyond their control to fund radiological emergency planning and radiological monitoring for no other purpose than to protect their citizens from hazards associated with the operation of nuclear power plants.

On a related matter, UCS believes that the Commission, perhaps in concert with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, should (as a consequence of its expertise in radiological emergency planning) ensure that radiological emergency planning and radio-logical monitoring programs are in place and functional for facilities now operated by the Department of Energy. UCS is referring here to the plutonium production and test and experimental reactor facilities at Savannah River, Hanford, INELr and other

locations around the country. Certainly such facilities should be required to assure that adequate emergency planning is undertaken to protect residents in surrounding areas in case of an emergency. It is by no means clear that the DOE facilities have received the same sort of attention as have those facilities licensed by the NRC regarding radiological emergency planning and radiological monitoring, especially in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident. The NRC should at a minimmn

• use its "power of persuasion" to prompt DOE directly or through the Congress to assure that adequate emergency preparedness is achieved and maintained for DOE nuclear reactor facilities; such preparedness should be comparable if not identical to the requirements applicable to commercial nuclear generating facilities and research and tests reactors of similar size to the DOE reactors.

The remainder of UCS's comments on the rulemaking proposal are directed in detail toward the proposed extension of the Plume EPZ to 20 miles. These comments are organized around the following basic questions and issues:

I. What types of accidents require offsite emergency response?

II. What types of accidents is the present Plume EPZ directed toward?

III. What level and extent-of radiological emergency planning is required to assure adequate protection of the public health and safety in the event of accidents described above in Section I?

IV. What additional factors impact on the precise areal extent of the Plume EPZ neede to ~ccount for accidents described above in Section-I?

SECTION I WHAT TYPES OF ACCIDENTS REQUIRE OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE?

It is quite clear that radiological emergency planning as presently conceived is not directed toward accidents which fall within the so-called "design basis". As described in recent NEPA environmental impact statements and in NRC Staff testimony in the TMI-1 restart proceeding, such "design basis

• accidents" (DBA's) define the need for protective and mitigative systems at nuclear power plants and are used to test the adequacy of the design of such systems and the adequacy of the siting of nuclear plants (pursuant to 10 CFR Part 100). The accidents which form the "design basis" are not uniform for all nuclear plants since the concept has been developing over the years.

Although Regulatory Guide l.70 t"Standard Formet and Content of Mafety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants", LWR Edition, Revision 3, November 1978) discusses such accidents, the actual design basis for a particular plant can only be ascertained on a system-by-system basis for each plant in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the Technical Specifications, applicable reference or topical reports, and other related design documents.

According to the Staff's testimony, the set of DBA's now used to test the "overall adequacy" of plant design was not developed until the mid-1970 1 s (NRC Staff testimony of Jack. Rosenthal and Paul S. Check, ff~ Tr. 11,158, at 3, Docket No. S0-289SP). Such a standard set of DBA 1 s was apparently arrived at after most of

nuclear reactors now in operation or which will be in operation in the next several years received their construction permits.

The "classic" test of the adequacy of plant design has been the OBA loss-of-coolant accident {DBA/LOCA) which, using conservative assumptions of equipment failures, prevailing meteorology, and magnitude of radioactive materials available for release to the environment, has been posed as a design test to determine compliance with 10 CFR Part 100. This design test leads to a significant overestimation of consequences since a much greater release of radioactivity is assumed than would actually occur and worst-case (5th percentile) meteorology is assumed. The DBA/LOCA is equivalent to a partial or complete meltdown of the reactor fuel with the containment remaining intact {Memorandum dated 2/22/79 from Frederic D. Anderson to

~e Commissioners,

SUBJECT:

"NRC Siting Policy and Practice and the PIRG Petition for Rule-Making on Population Considerations

• (SECY-78-624), p*. 7; TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites", March 23, 1962, p. 8). In such an accident, the ultimate design feature for the reactor (namely the containment) performs its function; thus, the resultant release to the environment would be minimal compared to situations where the containment fails.

Indeed, an analysis of data for 70 reactor sites involving 129 reactors conducted in the preparation of NU~G-0396 t*Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiolo-gical Emergency ~esponse Plans in Support of Light_Water Nuclear

Power Plants", NRC/EPA Task Force on Emergency Planning, December 1978) showed that for 70% of the sites examined, offsite doses resulting from the DBA/LOCA would not exceed the Protective Action Guides (PAG's) established by the Environmental Protection Agency beyond 10 miles (NUREG-0396, p. I-5). Accidents of lesser con-sequence (which would fall within the design basis) would be expected to result in lower doses than the DBA/LOCA. An accident with the consequences of the DBA/LOCA would require

• offsite protective measures in areas close to the reactor (i.e.,

within and near*to the "Low Population Zone" established pursuant to 10 CFR 100.11), but such a response area would not be extensive.

LPZ's rarely exceed two miles in radius; the population within such a radius of commercial nuclear plants is generally small

{the 90th percentile population for all nuclear plants in operation or proposed, a total of 111 sites, is projected to be only about

~800 residents for the year 2000, and the maximum for a commercial

• nuclear plant is the estimated 12,500 expected to be living within two miles of Indian Point in the year 2000; NUREG-0348, "Demo-graphic Statistics Pertaining to Nuclear Power Reactor Sites",

October 1979, p. T31).

Thus, it is clear that in large measure emergency planning is not directed at accidents which fall within the design basis for nuclear power plants. It i& abundantly clear that the accidents which dominate the risk to the public are those which exceed the design basis. A proposed rule published by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1971 defined nine classes of accidents (.this rule

has since been withdrawn). Classes 1-2 were normal operational occurrences, while Classes 3-8 represented a gradually more severe series of accidents which essentially defined the design basis. Class 9 accidents were defined as "sequences of postulated successive failures more severe than those postulated for the design basis for the protective systems and engineered safety features". A "risk assessment" of the relative risks posed by normal operational releases of radioactivity from nuclear

• power plants, accidents.which fall ~ithin the design basis (Classes 3-8), and accidents which exceed the design basis (Class 9) was prepared for the NRC by a team of researchers at Brookhaven National Laboratory (NOREG/CR-0603, "A Risk Assessment of a Pressurized-Water Reactor for Class 3-8 Accidents", October 1979). To the extent that one wishes to rely on probabilistic risk assessment, the study clearly shows

~hat the risk to the public from nuclear power plants is

• dominated by accidents beyond the design basis. Assigning risk on the basis of "weighted curies" released per reactor-year, the study presented the following results:

SOURCE OF RELEASE RISK Normal Operational Events 1.7 weighted Ci/reactor-yr Design Basis Accidents 0.1 - 0.3 Accidents Beyond Design Basis 540

{Adapted from Table 1.2-1 of NUREG/CR-0603)

Based on these results, accidents beyond the design basis can be seen to contribute over 99% (virtually all) of the risk to the public from nuclear power plants. Operating experience is probably sufficient to verify the accuracy of releases for normal operation and accidents within the design basis. Even if the assessed risk for accidents beyond the design basis is in error by two orders of magnitude, accidents beyond the design basis would still dominate the risk to the

• public (over 70% of the risk under such assumptions).

This situation results from the fact that most of the radioactive material contained in irradiated reactor fuel will remain in the fuel unless the fuel is severely damaged or melted (NUREG/CR-1131, "Examination of Offsite Radiological Emergency Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accidents Involving Core Melt",

June 1978, p. 22).

~

Therefore, only in accidents in which the

]

Juel is subject to such conditions will there be a potential for

• the occurrence of large releases of radioactivity to the environ-ment, and only for such accidents is emergency planning for offsite areas a necessity {offsite emergency protective actions may be taken as a precautionary step, of course, at any time, but will generally not be necessary unless significant fuel da:Jl;l.age has occurred or is anticipated).

SECTION II WHAT TYPES OF ACCIDENTS IS THE PRESENT PLUME EPZ DIRECTED TOWARD?

It is obvious from the discussion in Section I that for emergency planning to have any substantial meaning for public protection that it must be based on providing adequate protection to the public health and safety from accidents beyond the design basis. The present 10-mile Plume EPZ is alleged to be based

• on such accidents, but this is not the case for the risk-dominant accidents.

The technical basis for the present Plume EPZ is set forth generally ~n NUREG-0396. In that report, it was concluded that less than 30% of all core melt accidents will result in doses above the EPA PAG's beyond io miles (.NUREG-0396, p. I-9).

This statistical conclusion is the premise for the limitation Qf the Plume EPZ to 10 miles. The limitation is also alleged

• to be justified on the assumption that there is a "spectrum* of releases which can be expected from core melt accidents (NUREG-0396, p. I-7). These matters are addressed below.

The statistical conclusion that only 30% of all core melt accidents will result in doses above the PAG's beyond 10 miles is fundamentally rooted in probabilistic risk assessment studies and one's acceptance of that conclusion is necessarily tempered by the degree to which one places faith in the accuracy and completeness of such studies. This matter is dealt with more completely in Section IV; leaving this specif~c matter aside

for the moment, the conclusion itself that only 30% of all core melt accidents will result in doses in excess of the PAG's beyond 10 miles is misleading, even if correct (UCS clearly believes the conclusion to be incorrect; see Section IV).

Such a conclusion, baldly stated with no further consideration having been given to the implications of it, ignores the truly useful information inherent in it. If nothing else is clear from risk assessment work to date, it

• is quite clear that those accidents which dominate the risk to the public are the accidents which result in the largest releases of radioactivity to the environment. It is precisely those accidents which would cause the PAG's to be exceeded beyond 10 miles from a reactor site. Although NUREG-0396 did not attempt to partition the risk to the public (similar

-to what was done in NUREG/CR-0603) between the 70% of core melts

~lleged to result in doses below the PAG's within 10 miles and

• the 30% alleged to result in doses above the PAG's outside 10 miles, it is obvious that the latter group of accidents will dominate the risk to the public unless the probabilities of such accidents are vanishingly small tthis is true because the consequences of such accidents are so overwhelmingl. The 11 vanishing smallness* of such accidents cannot be demonstrated with the present state-of-the-art in probabilistic risk assessment with any significant level of confidence in the.results.

Thus, the arbitrary cutoff at 30% of all core melt accidents (with the resultant cutoff for the Plume .EPZ at 10

miles) results in the lack of advance emergency planning for distances beyond 10 miles when it is clear that such planning will be needed for the very accidents which dominate public risk from nuclear power plants. It is certainly true that the most severe effects (prompt deaths and early injuries) will in most cases occur nearest the reactor site*(except in the case of heated releases and/or when precipitation int~rcepts the plume following release). However, it is not obvious

• that such considerations obviate the need for emergency planning beyond the present Plume EPZ tsee Sections III and IV, below}.

In addition to being based on the statistical conclusion stated above, the present 10-mile Plume EPZ is rooted in the concept that there is a nspectrumn of releases which can be expected for core melt accidents. The technical basis for the assumption of a spectrum of relea$es associated with core

• melt accidents is not explained in NUREG-0396, and there is evidence of substance which suggests that this concept is misleading and perhaps plain wrong.

Three principal reports, one of which pre-dates the NUREG-0396 report, provide a basis for questioning the concept of a "spectrum. 11 of releases from core melt accidents. The Reactor Safety Study Ol.ASH-J.400,- October 1975, Appendix VI, Table VI 2-i, p. 2~s1 grouped releases from acci?ents into 14 "release categoriesn, 9 for PWR 1 s and 5 for BWR's. While it may be this breakdown that the authors of NUREG~O396 have

characterized as a "spectrum" of releases, upon further exam-ination, these categories can be further grouped.

A study performed by the California Office of Emergency Services in 1980 ("Emergency Planning zones for Serious Nuclear Power Plant Accidents", November 1980, Alex R. Cunningham, Director) grouped the accident release categories of WASH-1400 into three classes of core melt accidents. The California study (hereafter referred to as the OES Study) defined these three classes of core melt accident release categories into the following types of accidents (OES Study, pp. 5-8):

(A) "Melt-through" accidents in which the molten fuel breaches the containment building floor; such a category includes the PWR-6 and PWR-7 release categories of WASH-1400 (no BWR release category was accompanied by this type of accident).

(B) "Penetration Leakage" accidents in which the radioactivity released to the containment atmosphere by the meltdown is released to the environment through failures in seals around containment penetrations; such a category includes the PWR-4 and PWR-5 and BWR-4 release categories of WASH-1400.

(C) "Major Containment Failure" accidents in which the containment fails due to over-pressure resulting in substantial releases of material to the environment; such a category includes the PWR-1, PWR-2, PWR-3, BWR-1, BWR-2, and BWR-3 release categories from WASH-1400. The BWR-5 category from WASH-1400 was not included in the OES Study because it did not result in a core melt.

The OES Study does not concern itself with core melt accidents in which the containment is successful, which, as

discussed above, would be the equivalent of a DBA/LOCA. NUREG-0396 (pp. I-6 to I-7) characterizes the releases associated with the melt-through type of accident as being ncomparable_"

to the releases (if they were to actually occur as postulated) from a DBA/LOCA. Thus, the three classes of releases from core melt accidents postulated in the OES Study are sufficient to describe the bounds of releases to be expected from core melt accidents *

• A more recent study, completed in June 1981, dealt with the accident source term matter by itself (.although principally concerned with the release, or lack thereof, of substantial quantities of radioiodines) {NUREG-0771, "Regulatory Impact of Nuclear Reactor Accident Source Term Assumptions", issued for Comment, June 1981). This source defines five categories of accident types (NUREG-0771, p. 4):

{A) Containment and ESF Failure

(.B) Containment Failure (C) Containment Meltthrough

(.D) 11 TMI Like" (E) OBA Equivalent Examination of these categories reveals parallels with the OES Study's classification system. Containment and ESF Failure category from NUREG-0771 is the equivalen~ of the OES "Major Containment Failure" class. Containment Failure is apparently equivalent to the OES "Penetration Leakage" class.

Containment Meltthrough is identical to the same OES class.

The "TMI Like" and OBA Equivalent classes would be equivalent to or lesser accidents than those in the 0 Melt-through" class in the OES Study. Thus, the release category descriptions in WASH-1400, the OES Study, and NUREG-0771 are quite compatible and serve to illustrate that rather than there being a "spectrum" of releases from core melt accidents, in reality there are three general classes with a considerable disjuncture in magnitude of releases between the three.

The OES Study analysis presents results which suggest that the present 10-mile Plume EPZ is sufficient only for the Melt-through class of accidents (PWR-6 and PWR-7). The OES Study set the objective for defining the Plume EPZ as it applies to Melt-through accidents as the distance where there

~is only a 1% probability of exceeding a whole-body dose of 500 millirem U/2 Rem, or half the whole-body PAG}. The

• OES Study presented the following results for the California nuclear-plants (Humboldt Bay is not included because its design precludes a Melt-through accident; furthermore, it is shutdown, apparently permanently due to seismic problems and the cost of upgrading the plant to acceptable standards; OES Study, Table 4.1}:

REACTOR MELT-THROUGH EPZ RADIOS Diablo Canyon l/2 4.5 miles Rancho Seco s.o miles San Onofre l 8.5 miles San Onofre 2/3 4. O miles

The OES Study was based on a plant-specific analysis of accident sequences and design features, and a site-specific analysis of meteorological factors. It is a realistic analysis rather than a "conservative" analysis traditionally performed for DBA's (OES Study, p. 12). The results above are not determinative for all sites, but they do suggest strongly that the present Plume EPZ of 10 miles radius is adequately sized for the Melt-through class of core melt accidents (.and for

• other accidents of lesser consequence).

A graph of conditional probabilities of exceeding the upper- and lower-bound PAG's at a given distance for melt-through accidents (.prepared by Sandia Laboratories} also suggests that the 10-mile Plume EPZ is adequate for such accidents. Figure 5.1 of NUREG/CR-1131 ("Examination of Offsite Radiological Emergency Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accidents

"~nvolving Core Melt", June 1978) (reproduced on page 18) shows

• • that, conditioned on a core melt accident, the probability of exceeding the 1-Rem whole-body PAG at 10 miles for melt-through accident is roughly 0.5%; even this is true only for an individual standing outdoors during cloud passage and assuming a one-day exposure to "ground shine" from deposited radionuclides. The doses displayed account for whole-body (thyroid) exposure during cloud passage, 1-day's ground shine, and 1-year's dose due to inhalation.

The probability of exceeding the 5-Rem whole-body PAG (the so-called upper limit or "mandatory" evacuation limit) for

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DI STANCE (MILE?l Conditional probability of exceeding PAG 10 1 ....1 1 L...-1--..:._;_....;..__;,_.1._l:....i...._ 1 100 doses versus distance for melt-through accidents (PWR-6 and PWR-7); adapted from Figure 5.1, NUREG/CR-1131.

such an acc'ident is less than o-.1% at 4 miles. Probabilities are also shown for the thyroid PAG's. One's acceptance of .

these probabilities is, of course, tempered by one's acceptance of risk assessment methodology.

Regarding the "Penetration Leak" and "Major Containment Failure 11 classes of accidents, NUREG-0396 generically stopped considering the need for evacuation planning (Plume EPZ) beyond lO miles. Here we come back to the alleged 301 probability of axceeding the PAG doses beyond 10 miles for core melt accidents.

It is useful to examine the basis for this conclusion and its reasonableness. Figure I-11 of NUREG-0396 clearly shows the 30% probability of exceeding the PAG dose at 10 miles (reproduced

• on the next page as Fi~re 2). However, the same graph also illustrates the following relationships:

(A) A roughly 22-24% probability -of exceeding the 5-Rem (upper-bound) PAG at 10 miles.

(B) A roughly .10% probability of exceeding SO-Rem whole-body dose at 10 miles.

(C) A roughly 3% probability of exceeding 200-Rem whole-body dose at 10 miles.

(D) A roughly 20% probability of exceeding the 1-Rem PAG at 20 miles, and a roughly

• (E) 10% probability of exceeding this dose at SO miles.

A roughly 15-17% probability of exceeding the 5-Rem PAG at 20 miles, and a roughly 10%

probability of exceeding this dose at 50 miles.

(F) A roughly 3% probability of exceeding SO-Rem at 40 miles.

The dose to the thyroid (-excluding the ingestion pathway, but including the dose to the thyroid from exter~al dose due to the passing cloud, exposure to radionuclides on .the ground, and the qose to the thyroid from inhaled radionuclides) displays

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similar relationships:

(A) The probability of exceeding the 5-Rem (lower~

bound thyroid PAG is over 20% at 10 miles.

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(C) A 10% probability of exceeding 300-Rem thyroid at 10 miles.

(Dl The probability of exceeding the 5-Rem thyroid PAG at 50 miles is about 12-14% and the probability of exceeding the 25-Rem thyroid PAG is 6-8% at the same distance; the probability of exceeding 300-Rem to the thyroid at 50 miles is about 0.1%.

From the above, it is clear that what the Task Force on Emergency Planning did in NUREG-0396 {and what the Commission later adopted in its regulationsl was use judgment in determining the extent of the Plume EPZ. Whether that judgment is adequately

• based is certainly open to question, since (.as demonstrated above, assuming NRC believes its own probability figures) there are substantial probabilities of exceeding PAG doses and larger at distances in excess of 10 miles.

An additional perspective is useful in evaluating whether NRC's judgment was soundly based. NUREG/CR-1131 (Figure 5.9) contains an evaluation of various protective action strategies for implementation in the event of an "atmospheric" release (which the report equates with PWR-1-5 WASH-1400 release categories). That evaluation, in the form of a graph, is reproduced on page 23; it should be noted that the curves presented in this graph (Figure 4) are for the mean case.

That is to say, half of the sites analyzed would be above these curves*, and half would be below these curves in terms of results. Figure 4 permits the following observations regarding the effectiveness of various protective action strategies given an "atmospheric" release:

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Figure 4 Conditional mean projected whole-body doses versus distance for five protective action strategies, conditional on a PWR-1-5.

(~atmospheric") release; adapted from NUREG/CR-1131, Figure 5.9.

• curve A--Individual remaining outdoors~ sheltering factors for ground exposure are l.O & 0.7.

Curve B--Sheltering, SF's t0.75, 0.33)~ 6-hr ground exposure.

Curve c--Evacuation, 5-hour delay, 10 mph avg. speed.

Curve D--Sheltering, SF's l0.5, 0.8), 6-hr ground exposure.

Curve E--Evacuation, 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> delay, 10 mph avg. speed.

(A} Assuming evacuation after a 3~hour delay (the best case analyzed), the mean whole-body dose is projected to be l-Rem tthe lower-bound PAG) out to nearly 30 miles. For the same assumption, the mean whole-body dose is projected to be above 10-Rem lthe upper-bound PAG is 5-Rem) at 10 miles, and about 100-Rem at l mile.

(.B) For the case involving sheltering with most favorable dose reduction and relocation after a 6-hour exposure to "ground shine", the mean dose at 60 miles is projected to be 1-Rem lthe lower-bound PAGl. At 10 miles, the mean projected dose is in excess of 20-Rem. The upper-bound 5-Rem PAG would be exceeded out

• lCl to slightly beyond 30 miles. The dose at l mile would be about 200-Rem.

For the case involving evacuation after a 5-hour delay, the mean whole-body dose is projected to be l-Rem lthe lower-bound PAGl out to about 40 miles. The projected mean dose at 10 miles is about 40-Rem twell in excess of the 5-Rem upper-bound PAGl. The dose at 1 mile is about 200-Rem.

If the PAG's are to be used as a guideline for implementing protective actions, it is clear that lO miles for a Plume EPZ is woefully inadequate for "Major Containment Failure" accidents.

• An examination of the results for ttpenetration Leak" type of accidents, presented in Section III, below, also shows that the present 10-mile Plume EPZ is inadequate for these accidents.

SECTION III WHAT LEVEL AND EXTENT OF RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING IS REQUIRED TO ASSURE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENTS BEYOND THE DESIGN BASIS?

ucs believes that the Commission erred seriously in the assignment of a "generic" Plume EPZ distance when it

promulgated its revised emergency planning regulations in August 1980. The adoption of such a position was, to be sure, conditioned in the regulations on the premise that "[t]he exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to the local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries" (10 CFR 50.33gf

• 45 F.R. 55402, 55408-9, August 19, 1980). In practice, however, the most frequently considered "local conditions" appear to be geographical features which make a convenient boundary for the EPZ and local political boundaries which also make convenient EPZ boundaries. Moreover, the "local conditions", although not specifically limited to those mentioned in the regulation, have not been expanded in practice to include others, most importantly meteorology *

• UCS believes a far more soundly based approach, and one which takes account of plant-specific accident sequences and design features, and site-specific factors of land use, pop-ulation distribution,.weather, and local evacuation constraints is the approach adopted by the State of California in specifying emergency planning zones for their nuclear reactors. As detailed in the OES Study (State of California, Office of Emergency Services, "Emergency Planning Zones for Seriou~ Nuclear Power Plant Accidents", November 1980, Alex R. Cunningham, Director),

California OES undertook just such a study for that state~s

nuclear facilities. UCS would caution in the adoption of this approach, however, that only very limited credit be given for plant design features, since (in principle) very serious accidents leading to a "Major Containment Failure" class of accident are predicated on system failures *.

The results of the OES Study for "Melt-through" type accidents have been given previously (page 16, above). For the establishment of a Plume EPZ for "Penetration Leak" accidents, OES specified a zone outside of which the probability of exceeding 25-Rem whole-body would be less than 1% given a core melt accident. The results for the California plants were (.Humboldt Bay is excluded since it is shutdown, apparently permanently; OES Study, Table 4.1):

PLANT PENETRATION LEAK EPZ RADIUS Diablo Canyon 1/2 20 miles Rancho Seco 18 miles San Onofre l 13 miles San Onofre 2/3 18 miles To establish a Plume EPZ for "Major Containment Failure" accidents, OES specified a zone outside of which the probability of exceeding a whole-body dose of 200-Rem would be less than 1%; the results were (OES Study, Table 4.1}:

REACTOR MAJOR CONTAINMENT FAILURE EPZ Diablo Canyon 1/2 26 miles Ranch Seco 28 miles San Onofre 1 18 miles San Onofre 2/3 35 miles UCS supports the method utilized by the California OES in the establishment of EPZ's for that state's reactors and

• proposes that, as an alternative to establishing yet another (albeit, more realistic) generic Plume EPZ distance of 20 miles as proposed in the Petition for Rulemaking. This is in accord with the underlying hypothesis of the Petition, i.e.,

that the present distance in not adequate, yet takes appropriate cognizance of plant-specific and site-specific parameters in establishing the Plume EPZ for each site.

UCS agrees with the position taken by the California Office of Emergency Services that the probability of the more serious core melt accidents is too large (even assuming that NRC's generally optimistic predictions are reasonably accurate) to rely upon ad hoc measures beyond the present generic 10-mile Plume EPZ. UCS also agrees with OES that the goal of radio-logical emergency planning should not be limited simply to the prevention of prompt and e~rly fatalities (although this is a necessity in t~rms of goals). Early injuries must also be considered, as well as latent cancer cases {both fatal and non-fatal). Thus, UCS believes that in addition to the basic Plume EPZ, an extended Plume EPZ should be adopted

to account for these factors. As the OES Study stated (p. 66):

"[P]rudence dictates that the EPZ's be ex-tended so that advance planning can be per-formed to aid in resolving the potential problems associated with the more severe types of accidents, the penetration leakage and major containment failure classifications. . .

It did not seem prudent to restrict planning attention to responding o~ly to the potential for incurring immediate life threatening radiation doses for such severe accidents.

Thus the extended zones were selected so that the potential for incurring health impacting doses was reduced not only for early fatalities, but also for early injuries and delayed cancer effects as well * * *

[E]xtending the EPZ boundaries results in a prudent reduction in the probabilities of early health effects and a substantial reduction in the probability of delayed he~lth effects (associated with 0.5 to 1 Rem PAG dose limits."

In addition, in contrast to NRC's broad assertion (discussed in ~ore detail in Section IV, below) that the 10-mile Plume EPZ is "considered la~ge enough to provide a

• response base that would uspport activity outside the planning zone should this ever be needed" (45 F.R. 55402, 55406, August 19, 1980), the OES Study noted (p. 67):

"Not only does the extension [of the Plume EPZ]

improve the probability of limiting doses to the to the public, but it also substantially improves the base of procedural plans and facilities £or required emergency response efforts with respect to evacuation, sheltering and relocation prepared-ness and capacity requirements."

OES elaborated further on this point, stating (OES Study,

p. 67):

"[T]he extended EPZ boundaries fulfill a dual purpose in the State's plans. They bring the base for preplanned emergency actions up to levels which will account for major population sources that are located relatively close. to the reactor. In addition, they provide for preplanned actions which will aid substantially in reducing the potential for adverse health effects in the event of serious core-meltdown accidents of all types. These benefits were

• judged to.be prudent requirements in view of the rather large relative probability of the most severe core-meltdown accidents (about 20-30% of all core-meltdown accidents) in spite of the low overall absolute probability of all such accidents (about 1:20,000 per reactor year)."

SECTION IV WHAT ADDITIONAL FACTORS IMPACT ON THE PRECISE AREAL EXTENT OF THE PLUME EPZ NEEDED TO ACCOUNT FOR ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE?

The effects of heated releases It is not clear that the present generic 10-mile Plume EPZ was established with heated releases in mind. Such releases, in which the radioactive plume is hot and therefore rises considerably upon release from the containment, are expected to occur particularly in the case of a containment failure type of accident as described previously.

NUREG-0396 identified heated releases as being of particular concern for "strongly elevated releases" which the report identified as being "probable" with "larger accidents" (NUREG-0396, p. I-25).

In the case of such releases, rainfall at some distance downwind which intersects the plume can cause high radiation doses at considerable distances due to the efficient "scavenging" of radioiodines and particulates from the plume by precipitation.

Also compounding the problem is the fact that heated releases are more difficult to track and predict due to changes in wind speed and direction with altitude (NUREG-0396, p. I-26).

Dr. Jan Beyea has pointed to the difficulties involved

• with attempting to predict downwind doses in events involving a heated release. After comparing the predictions of doses in such events utilizing several different plume dispersion models, Dr. Beyea found a difference in predicted concentrations (and therefore doses) which varied by four to five orders of magnitude between models. On this basis, there must remain considerable uncertainty as to the impact of such releases on the public *

• This issue requires some resolution, if by no other means than by bounding calculations using the most conservative results. This is particularly true when attempting to set adequate bounds on the areal extent of Plume EPZ 1 s since it is the most serious PWR and BWR accidents (release categories PWR-1, PWR-2, and BWR-1 from WASH-1400; Appendix VI, Table VI 2-1) which are predicted to be accompanied by heated releases.

An example of the impact of heated releases on emergency planning requirements can be seen by examining one of the emergency exercise scenarios given in NUREG/CR-0388, "Acciden~ Response

for Emergency Response Exercise Scenarios", David M. Ericson, Jr.,

November 1978, S~ndia Laboratories. Accident sequence IV in that report is a PWR-2 release category accident involving a transient beginning with the plant at full power {3200 MWt) and a loss of offsite power. Using the WASH-1400 sequence description, this accident is classified as TMLB' with containment failure due to overpressure {NUREG/CR-0388, p. 8).

The accident sequence presented involves a core melt at

• 2:30 into the sequence and subsequent containment failure. By five hours into the sequence, the followinq quantities of radio-nuclides are predicted to have been released (NUREG/CR-0388, p. 24):

{A) Noble Gases, 270 million curies (B) Iodines, 320 million curies (C) Particulates, 66 million curies It should be noted that the above release occurs in a

• • time span of only an hour and twenty minutes (NUREG/CR-0388,

p. 24). The accumulated whole-body doses at various distances and times for this accident are depicted below; these doses are predicted based on a CRAC analysis with the following provisos: (a) invariant wind direction and speed varying from 12-18 mph (NUREG/CR-0388, p. 23); {b) dispersion characteristics are neutral to stable {Id.); (c) the doses indicated are levels reached at the downwind distance due to cloud pas~age, they are not "instantaneous" values at the leading edge of the cloud (NUREG/

CR-0388, p. 8); (d) the doses are an approximate av~rage value

NUREG/CR-0388, pp. 8-9; {e) the doses are average and will be within a factor of two of antitipated exposures (NUREG/CR-0388,

p. 26); and (f) the doses are estimated by assuming a uniform distribution across the cloud (actual conditions will cause the doses to peak near the plume centerline and fall off as one moves toward the edges of the cloud) (NUREG/CR-0388, p. 26). Given these parameters, the doses for this accident are as follows (NUREG/CR-0388, p. 25):

• TIMEa 3:47 CLOUD LOCATIONb 1.75 miles WHOLE-BODY DOSE RATEc 34 Rem/hr 3:56 3.75 miles 107 Rem/hr 4:08 6.50 miles 59 Rem/hr 5:06 13.75 miles 22 Rem/hr 5:43 27.50 miles 4 Rem/hr 8:00 67.50 miles 0. 65 Rem/hr a

Hours and minutes from shutdown b

Miles from reactor, location of leading edge of cloud at the time indicated C

Average values The peaking of dose at some distance from the reactor is because "this postulated release has a high sensible heat content and is therefore initially buoyant and rises" (NUREG/CR-0388,

p. 26}. It should also be immediately obvious that the doses to the whole-body beyond ten miles for this accident are sub-stantially in excess of the upper-bound PAG and indeed approach the dose level associated with early illnesses (OES Study, p. 28).

It should also be kept in mind that this release is a PWR-2 category release and does not, therefore, necessarily represent the worst case in terms of quantities of radionuclides released or heat content of the release (see, WASH-1400, Appendix VI, Table VI 2-1, p. 2-5). This scenario is sufficiently indicative of the problem posed by the arbitrary cutoff of the Plume EPZ at 10

~l~.

B. Spontaneous evacuation beyond pre-designated zones A study of the TMI-2 accident emergency response by three professors at Michigan State University strongly suggests several factors which have not been taken into account in the establishment of the present generic 10-~le Plume EPZ (Stanley D. Brunn, James H. Johnson, Jr., and Donald J. Ziegler, Final Report~ a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents, Department of Geography, Michigan State University, August 1979; and, Donald

• J. Ziegler, Stanley D. Brunn, and James H. Johnson, Jr., "Evac-uation from a Nuclear Technological Disaster", Geographical Review, Vol. 71, No. 1, January 1981, pp. 1-16). At issue here is a phenomenon described by Brunn, et. al., as the "evacuation-shadow phenomenon", i.e., "the tendency of an official evacuation advisory to cause departure from a much larger area than was originally intended" (Geog.~, p. 7).

During the TMI-2 accident, Governor Thor~urgh issued an official evacuation advisory for pregnant women and pre-school age children (NUREG/CR-1250, Vol. II, Part 3, p. 10~3, "Rogovin

Report"}. According to a study performed for the NRC (NUREG/CR-1093, October 1979) by Mountain West Research revealed that only 144,000 of the approximately 370,000 persons living within 15 miles of TMI evacuated when this advisory was posted (NUREG/CR-1250, Vol. II, Part 3, pp. 1016 & 1053). According to Brunn, et. al., the nwnber of evacuees resulting from this advisory evacuation {not mandatory) should only have been about 2,500 persons {Geog. Rev., p. 7). Thus, nearly 60 times as many

• persons evacuated compared to the number who were advised to evacuate, and some 39% of the population within 15 miles of the plan evacuated (53% within 12 miles) despite the fact that the advisory was limited to persons living within 5 miles of the plant {Id., pp. 6-7). About 14% of the number who evacuated did so before even the limited advisory was issued fNUREG/CR-1250, Vol. II, Part 3, p. 1016). It should be noted that in addition to the evacuation advisory within 5 miles for

• pregnant women and pre-school children, a sheltering advisory was issued for persons living out to 10 miles {Id., p. 1013)1 thus, those persons outside who file miles who evacuated did so in excess of the protective action recommended by state authorities. Finally, 7% of the persons who were advised to evacuate did not do so {Id., p. 1016).

Based on this data and the1r analysis of it, Brunn, et. al.,

• recommended that the evacuation-shadow phenomenon.be taken into

.account in radiological emergency planning, noting that the scale of the evacuation should include not only those ordered to evacuate

those persons who will evacuate spontaneously outside the recommended area (Social Survey, p. 47; Geog. Rev., p. 7).

The impact of the evacuation-shadow phenomenon may be expected to be manifested in a number of ways; a key manifestation involves the accuracy of evacuation time estimates which fail to take the phenomenon into account (the subject of evacuation time estimates will be addressed further below). Dr. James H.

Johnson, Jr., one of the three authors of the Michigan State study and the Geographical Review article, testified regarding this matter in the Diablo Canyon operating license proceeding.

After reviewing _the three sets of evacuation time estimates prepared for that area (by the utility, the county, and a consultant), Dr. Johnson concluded that "the evacuation times estimates derived in these studies are likely to be grossly t;mderestimated, in large part because each fails to consider and allow for any of the findings of our TMI study * * * ,

• most importantly, the evacuation shadow phenomenon" (Prefiled Testimony of James H. Johnson, Jr., January 19, 1982, Docket No. 50-275, p. 4).

Dr. Johnson concluded that it was "unlikely that the current evacuation plans for Diablo Canyon will work, primarily because they fail to incorporate our findings regarding pop-ulation evacuation behavior during the TMI accident" (Id., p. 7).

He recommended that a detailed survey be conducted for the pop-ulation within 50 miles to ascertain that population's tendency to spontaneously evacuate, and that this information be used as

part of the basis for the emergency plans and as part of the basis for decision-making during possible accidents (Id., pp *

. 5-7).

UCS recommends that this phenomenon be further investigated and that, as an interim measure pending the results from such investigations, evacuation planning take cognizance of the existence of the evacuation-shadow phenomenon and incorporate appropriate conservatisms in estimates involved in such planning,

• particularly as this phenomenon affects evacuation time estimates.

The evacuation-snadow phenomenon strongly suggests that even if

~ change is made by the Commission as a result of this rulemaking, evacuation plans should accomodate the phenomenon by planning for an evacuation distance which exceeds the intended evacuation area.

C. Directional biases of potential evacuees

• The work of Brunn, et. al., cited above also revealed, in addition to the evacuation-shadow phenomenon, the existence of several directional biases for potential evacuees which have a potentially significant bearing on the size and shape of the Plume EPZ. The TMI studies carried out by Brunn, et. al.,

demonstrated three directional biases which need to be considered in establishing Plume EPZ boundaries for evaucations:

(A) A strong directional bias in favor of upwind destinations from the reactor (this will conflict with existing planning assumptions and evacuation time estimate assumption~ which are based on evacuees utilizing pre-designated

evacuation routes).

(B) A "psychological attraction" to mountainous areas in time of danger.

(C) A reluctance to select destinations in more densely populated urban areas.

(Geog. Rev., p. 9; Johnson Testimony, p. 5)

It should be noted that these patterns were consistent among both those who evacuated and those who did not1 the latter

• group indicated such preferences when asked where they would have evacuated to if ordered to do so (Geog.~, p. 9).

If these directional biases are not taken into account in setting the Plume EPZ boundaries, evacuation plans based on "traditional" assumptions may be inadequate. It is conceivable that locations near mountains may require special attention in terms of traffic control or monitoring to ensure that the correct routes are taken by evacuees *

• D. The capability to take ac hoc actions beyond the EPZ It is clear that the present generic 10-mile Plume EPZ is not adequate for all or even most serious nuclear plant accidents. This was clearly recognized by one of the principal authors of NUREG-0396, Peter E. McGrath of Sandia Laboratories, before the publication of the final version of NUREG-0396 (a memo dated 4/27/77 from Harold E. Collins to the members of the NRC/EPA Task Force on Emergency Planning clearly identifies Peter E. McGrath as one of the members of the Task Force's "writing group"). In NUREG/CR-1131, co-authored by- McGrath,

there is a caution which states (NUREG/CR-1131, p. 31):

"These recommendations are for planning purposes only and do not imply that actions would have to be taken throughout the PAZ ["Protective Action zone", a forerunner concept of EPZ's] or that actions should either be extended to or limited to PAZ boundaries during an actual emergency irtuation.* [emphasis added]

When the Commission adopted revised emergency planning regulations in August 1980, it postulated (without explaining a technical basis) that the generic 10-mile Plume EPZ was "large enough to provide a xesponse base that would support activity outside the planning zone should this ever be needed" (45 F.R.

55402, 55406, August 19, 1980). It is certainly true that more time would be available to effectuate protective measures for areas outside a IO-mile radius from the plant, but it is bot at all clear that the difference in available time would be significant given the magnitude of the task and the lack

• of preplanning.

It is clear from the analysis done by the California Office of Emergency Services and from graphs contained in NUREG/CR-1131 that if protective actions are required beyond the present 10-mile Plume EPZ, such protective actions will be needed to a considerable distance beyond ten miles, raising the question of the applicability of planning done within 10

• miles to the need (or lack thereof) for planning beyond that area. Three figures (Figures S, 6, 7, on page 39) amply illustrate this point. Figure 5 clearly shows that for an

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jected whole-body d~versus = 5!

o;!

distance for persons located outdoors (PWR-1 through -5)1 e r< E to2 l day ground exposure (adapted 111 from Figure 5.11, NUREG/CR- ~u

.1131).

Figure 7--Conditional mean pro-jected thyroid dose versus distance for various pro- ID I I

• I t t

• tJ *

• f I I\' \I \ f I t\ t t ' t * * *I tective strategies, conditional I IO I03 IO'l) on a PWR-1 through -5 release DIS fANC:£ CMll!SI (adapted from Figure 5.12, Figure 7 NUREG/CR-1131)

accident falling into the WASH-1400 PWR-1 thr6ugh -5 classes (equivalent to California OES classes "Major Containment Failure" and "Penetration Leakage") the upper-bound whole-body and thyroid PAG's will be exceeded out to at least 50 miles in half of such accidents. Furthermore, Figure 5 shows a 30% probability

/

of exceeding the 5-Rem whole-body PAG out to about 100 miles and a 30% probability of exceeding the 25-Rem thyroid PAG out

• to about 160-180 miles).

Figure 6 displays the whole-body dose from PWR "atmospheric" accidents and the components of that dose versus distance for persons located outdoors. rt is clear from this graph that under such conditions, the whole-body dose (and this is a ~ , not the worst case) would exceed the upper-bound PAG out to roughly a*o miles.

Figure 7 displays thyroid doses for various protection strategies (RA" is for persons located outdoors1 "B" is evacuation with a 5-hour delay; "C" is evacuation with a 3-hour delay; and "D" is sheltering with a 95% effective thyroid prophylaxis, presumably potassium iodide}. Even under the protective action strategy involving sheltering and thyroid prophylaxis, the upper-bound thyroid PAG would be exceeded out to between 40-50 miles for t h e ~ case. For the most efficacious evacuation assumed, the upper-bound thyroid PAG would be exceeded out to a similar distance.

Referring back to Figure 4 on page 23, it is clear that even for the most optimistic assumption for whole-body exposure

for protective response, the whole-body upper-bound PAG would be exceeded out to about 20 ~iles in the mean case.

From these considerations and from the recommended Plume EPZ's adopted by the California OES for the "Penetration Leakage*

and "Major Containment Failure" accidents, UCS concludes that the present 10-mile Plume EPZ is essentially meaningless with respect to acting as a response base to perf~rm !S. ~ protective actions beyond the present Plume EPZ. Such actions will involve

• protective response out to such a considerably greater distance than 10 miles and involve many more persons and institutions requiring special consideration (such as nursing homes, hospitals, schools, and prisons) that the lack of preplanning is unconscionable.

Certainly it is true that consideration of available time for implementation and the somewhat reduced probability of requiring auch plans justifies

~

a planning effort which is not as involved

~

and detailed as the plans within the present 10-mile EPZ. However,

• such considerations do not justify the total lack of emergency planning beyond 10 miles.

To gain a perspective on the magnitude of the problem presently faced by emergency planners with the assumption of the ability to carry out a d ~ measures, two examples will serve to illustrate the probiem. First consider the situation at Three Mile Island which would be faced by planners-attempting to expand 10-mile

.evacuation plans into 20-mile evacuation plans (~t should be noted that at TMI there are already 20-mile evacuation plans in effect as a result of the TMI-2 accident experience). The*-following

figures place some bounds on the magnitude of the problem at TMI (RS 2-8-34, "Evacuation Planning in the TMI Accident",

January 1980, study prepared by Human Sciences Research, Inc!,

for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, p. vi; and, "Evac-uation Time Estimates for the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ at Three ~le Island Nuclear Generating Facilities", March 3, 1981, prepared for GPU S~rvice Corporation by Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade, & Douglas, Inc., pp. 25-28):

PARAMETER 10-MILE RADIUS 20-MILE RADIUS Population 193,000 600,000 Square Miles 314 1257 Risk Counties 3 6 Host Counties N/A

• 30 Hospitals 2 14 Nursing Homes 12 62 Prisons 1 6

• Plans never developed for 10-mile zone; five-mile plans developed prior to the TMI-2 accident had all evacuees travelling to destinations within the risk counties~ a rough estimate would be 10-15 host counties.

A second perspective can be gained from the California OES experience. The following figures show the difference in population involved in taking plans from the present 10-mile EPZ out to EPZ's sufficient to plan for "Major Cohtainment Failure" accidents ("Summary of Emergency Response Planning Criteria for Regional and Local Authorities Near Nuclear Electric

Generating Stations", June 1981, MHB Technical Associates, Table

4. 2-2, p. 4-13) :

FACILITY 10-MILE EPZ POP. OES "EXTENDED" POP.

Diablo Canyon 13,400 186,700 Rancho Seco 10,500 990,600 San Onofre 36,600 259,600 Similar totals can be obtained by examining both actual 1970 and projected 2000 populations within 10, 20, and 30 miles of nuclear plants contained in NUREG-0348, "Demographic Statistics Pertaining to Nuclear Power* Reactor Sites", October 1979. For the five operating plants with the largest 10-mile radius population, the resultant figures (which compare approximately with the results above) are (NUREG-0348, pp. T24 & T26, 1970 figures):

~

FACILITY 10-MILE POP. 20-MILE POP

• 30-MILE POP.

• Indian Point Zion Three Mile Is.

218,398 190,314 136,400 888,163 525,047 621,300 3,984,844 1,262,593 995,200 Millstone 105,619 287,568 496,143 Beaver Valley 105,000 520,000 1,700,000 It should be quite clear from the above that expansion of emergency planning from 10 miles (the present Plume EPZ) out to a distance of 20 miles or 30 miles would be a major undertaking since not only would population at risk increase dramatically, but so would the number of facilities requiring special attention.

Despite these substantial difficulties, NRC r~quirements impose

~ emergency planning responsibilities outside 10 miles (with the exception of mini~al plans to control ingestion exposures out to 50 miles). A study prepared for FEMA as a result of the TMI-2 accident, on the other hand, suggests that there is a certain irreducible minimum of information and planning which must be available to support the sort of "crisis-expectant" (if NRC's present attitude toward planning beyond the 10-mile Plume EPZ can be called that) planning inherent in NRC's approach to ad hoc planning beyond 10 miles. The requisite information and planning for such a mode of operations is (RS 2-8-34, "Evacuation Planning in the TMI Accident", January 1980, prepared for FEMA by Human Sciences Research, Inc., p. ix):

{A) Plans for expanding small emergency management agencies and professional staffs in time of emergency.

(B) Notification procedures for key officials who would join in the crisis planning effort.

(C) Planned, redundant communications links with "sub-county, disaster-relevant" organizations, as well as organizations and institutions which would pose special problems in an evacuation.

(D) Prepared procedures and materials for reaching and ~arning the public via the media.

(E) Listings of institutions and populations requiring special assistance or provisions in an evacuation.

(F} Similar listings of medical facilities, nursing homes, and other institutions offering special care accomodations for potential evacue~s.

(G} Listings of available spaces for mass care and reception of evacuees.

(H} Listings of transportation resources for those without private automobiles.

(I) Checklists and instructions for those personnel who would be charged with specific crisis-planning or operational responsibilities during th~

emergency.

(J) Adequate, expandable crisis-planning and operations centers -- preferably based on a well-equipped Emergency Operations Centers *

• UCS notes that some of these functions may already exist in some areas as a result of planning undertaken for other types of emerge~cies (especially "Crisis Relocation Planning" for nuclear attack), but it is by no means clear that such information and minimal pre-planning are routinely available on short notice

~o support a massive emergency planning effort which has never qeen anticipated as a result of NRC's focusing of effort on

~

protective actions within 10 miles. It should be kept in mind

• that plans developed in the spur of the moment.in a crisis atmosphere cannot be permitted to conflict with existing plans in terms of procedures, notifications, and evacuation routes.

Furthermore, it must be understood that in most cases, those persons who would be charged with drawing up and implementing

_plans for areas outside the present Plume EPZ would already be heavily taxed in trying to respond to the emergency in the first place. Thus, it is highly guestionnable whether workable plans could be formulated on an~ hoc basis on the scale which will be involved and in the times which will be available. Advance

radiological emergency planning for areas beyond 10 miles from nuclear plants must, therefore, be considered not only prudent but an absolute necessity to ensure adequate protection of the public health and sa.£ety.

E. Efficacy of sheltering for "Atmospheric" accidents In NUREG/CR-1131 ("Examination of Offsite Radiological Emergency Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accidents Involving Core Melt", Sandia Laboratories, June 1978), Aldrich, McGrath and Rasmussen question the adequacy of protection offered by sheltering for "atmospheric" accidents (equivalent to the OES "Major Containment Failure" and "Penetration Leakage" accident classes). Aldrich, et. al., conclude that "Sheltering

~y itself, unless the quantity of radionuclides inhaled can be

~ubstantially reduced, will also not provide much protection. 11

f

.(NUREG/CR-1131, p. 92, citation omitted)

• The means for reducing the quantity of radionuclides inhaled even during sheltering involves a complicated method of ventilation at a given time period following plume passage (SAND77-1555, "Public Protection Strategies in the Event of a Nuclear Reactor Accident: Multicompartment Ventilation Model for Shelters",

Sandia Laboratories, D.C. Aldrich and D.M. Ericson, Jr., 1977).

The feasibility of this method is highly questionnable, an~ it

'is clear that it could not be successfully implemented without advance training in the methodology and perhaps practice of it prior to the need to implement such a scheme.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sponsored a witness from that State's Department of Environmental Resources to testify on this matter in the TMI-1 Restart hearings before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. Margaret Reilly, head of Pennsylvania's environmental radiation surveillance p~ogram in DER, testified on April 9, 1981, that for inhalation uose-exposure reduction sheltering is only effective for a.bout two hours (Testimony of Margaret Reilly, Transcript page 18,526,

• April 9, 1981, Docket No. S0-289SP). Sheltering does, of course, result in a substantial reduction in whole-body dose due to "cloud" exposure, especially when sheltering occurs in homes with a substantial construction or in basements. For accidents with long release times, however, sheltering can be expected to have only minimal benefits for reduction of

.l' 3i1halation doses. This raises a question as to when sheltering b::;ecomes the "favored" protective action compared with evacuation, and also raises a question about how effective sheltering can be expected to be in situations where evacuation is infeasible (for instance, in northern locations with a heavy snowfall or severely iced roadways). These questions require resolution in order to set an effective Plume EPZ distance and areal extent, and also to enable planners to establish realistic criteria to be used in determining which protective action to

-implement in a given emergency situation (10 CFR S0.47{b) (10).

F. The effect of NRC emergency planning attitudes As the Commission will no doubt recall, the conclusion of its TMI Special Inquiry Group with respect to emergency planning was (NUREG/CR-1250, Vol. II, Part 3, pp. 1046-1047):

"The principal finding is that the root cause of most of the inadequacies in governmental emergency response, and a contributory cause of all of the inadequacies, was the NRC's failure to promote an awareness that nuclear powerplant accidents with substantial offsite consequences are possible and must be planned for * .

• We believe that the NRC's use of the word credible in describing the classes of accidents used in the design basis (and its implication thereby that other accidents are 'incredible')

contributed significantly to the general attitude that serious emergency planning was not important."

UCS sees no significant alteration in this attitude, numerous platitudes and rules changes notwithstanding. Despite the Commission's announced change in regulatory approach to view emergency planning as "equivalent to, rather than as secondary to, siting and design in public protection" (44 F.R. 75167, 75169, December 19, 1979) has obviously been supplanted. There are several examples which illustrate this retreat to pre-TMI-2 attitudes, but the two most obvious are the manner in which the Commission has handled the "implementation" of emergency plans and the matter of installation of prompt public notification systems.

Emergency plans for all operating nuclear reactors were to have been implemented on April 1, 1981. It took the NRC Staff a year to finish the evaluation of the emergency pl~s. Even where there were significant deficiencies noted, the much vaunted

"four-month clock" was started in only a few cases. Even in these cases, the clock was run, it seems, not so much to permit the deficiencies to be corrected as to permit the public relations problems associated with the notification of deficiencies to defuse and postpone difficult enforcement decisions. The Commission is, of course, well aware of the instance of Indian Point in which the four-month clock ran out, the Region Office director expressed the view that the deficiencies had not been sufficiently corrected,

• and was then directed by his superior to issue a letter telling the utility that the NRC considered the matter resolved (see the following correspondence: (a) letter dated 4/24/81 from Boyce Grier to John O'Toole; (b) letter dated 8/19/81 from FEMA's Robert Jaske to Brian Grimes; (c) note dated 8/20/81 from Brian Grimes to Boyce Grier; (d) memorandum dated 8/21/81 from Boyce Grier to Brian Grimes; (e) let.ter dated 8/24/81 from Boyce Grier to John O'Toole; and (f) letter dated 9/29/81 from FEMA's Vincent

• Forde to William Hennessey).

The second matter, that of enforcement of the deadline for installation of prompt public notification systems, is a matter regarding which UCS has already appeared before the Commission.

Rather than enforcing its original deadline, the COmmission announced it was granting a six-month extension (which really turned out to be a seven-month extension). When the new deadline ran out and utilities

• .still had not complied, the Commission granted {informally)

. another month's extension before even beginning to impose civil penalties.

The civil penalties, rather than being $40,000/day a~ originally propose by the Staff were instead $1,000/day escalating over several

-so-months to a maximum of $5,000/day. This scarcely can be construed as sending a firm regulatory message to the NRC's licensees and to state and local emergency planning officials. T~is sequence of events, OCS notes, also conflicts gravely with the Commission's announced policy on enforcement: "For licensees who do not comply with NRC requirements, promot and vigorous action will be taken:

a licensee must not benefit by violating NRC requirements." (NUREG-0885, Issue 1, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Policy and Planning

• Guidance -- 1982") It is very difficult to square the Commission's enforcement policy as stated above with its actions on the matter of prompt warning system installation, particularly in view of its earlier assurance that it would now consider emergency planning to be of "equivalent" important to siting and plant design in protecting the public. Obviously, something is amiss here, and t)le plain truth is that the Co~ssion no longer appears to i

consider emergency planning terribly important. This message

• has certainly been heard thr~ughout the country by utilities and emergency managers alike.

Nonetheless, UCS has seen in at least some cases a strong and independent determination by state and local emergency planners to create and maintain a high degree of preparedness for radiological emergencies. Such efforts cannot go on indefinitely in the face of the continuing degradation of the Commission's attitude toward emergency planning. The California OES Study stated the issue squarely in its report (OES Study, p. 10):

"[I]n planning for very hazardous, though very infrequent events, one must be prepared for an event which might happen anytime and maintain readiness for the event in spite of long periods of safe, uneventful performance. Maintaining readiness conditions for activating emergency preparedness plans over such long, uneventful periods may prove to be a major long-term problem, especially if such plans are extensive and elaborate. The validity of this observation is exemplified by the current status of U.S. pre-paredness for the apparent hazards of nuclear warfare. Elaborate fallout shelters and associated civil defense plans for their utilization were prepared about 15 to 20 years

• ago to provide protection for the public. The shelters and the plans have fallen into disuse as the years have passed without direct evidence of nuclear warfare."

It is difficult to comprehend how the NRC can expect radiological emergency planners and state and local govern-ment agencies to maintain an adequate degree of preparedness over the long-term in the face of an attitude coming down from the highest levels of the NRC which says that emergency planning is no big deal. UCS views the NRC's attitude toward emergency planning to be a major impediment to the creation of adequate and workable radiological emergency plans. This is a problem which cries out for a solution in the short term, because it will take some period of time for a "new" attitude toward such planning to "trickle down" to the local and state level (UCS does not believe any but the mos~ enlightened utilities will be persuaded to change its views on emergency planning).

G. Probability of accidents Throughout these comments, UCS has relied on probability statistics supplied both by the NRC (and its consultants) and by the State of California OES Study (and its consultants) with the understanding that we were doing so not because we trusted the accuracy of these results, but because if the NRC truly believed them it should lead the agency to a different result

• in its approach to emergency planning for the Plume EPZ. UCS now briefly addresses why the prior comments are at best "optimistic" -- which is to say, the situation is probably worse than the various probability statistics and graphs would make it appear.

Despite disclaimers to the contrary (i.e., that the authors of NUREG-0396 only gained an "additional perspective"

~,p. emergency planning by examining probabilistic assessments),

it is quite clear that the present 10-rnile Plume EPZ is strongly rooted in assumptions which have their basis in the probabilistic techniques developed in WASH-1400 and in various permutations of those results performed since WASH-1400 was released in October 1975. As the Commission well knows, the absolute probability results in WASH-1400 have been substantially and thoroughly discredited in many cases. Revie)l'ls of WASH-1400 undertaken by

. the American Physical society (Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 47, Supplement No. 1, Summer 1975), a task force organized by UCS

{The Risks of Nuclear Power Reactors: A Review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study, Union of Concerned Scientists, August 1977), and

by the Risk Assessment Review Group appointed by the NRC {NUREG/CR-0400, Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1978), have all revealed substantial uncertainties in the probabilities derived in WASH-1400.

It is not at all clear that the state-of-the-art in such probabilistic risk assessment has been sufficiently advanced since October 1975 to merit any additional faith in the accuracy of probability statistics derived from similar methodology. A pre-sentation by NRC's Robert Bernero on July 23, 1981, at the Harper's Ferry NRC Safety Goals Workshop reflects the problems inherent in the methodology quite succinctly:

{1} There is a lack of "completeness 11 in the set of accident initiators considered. [Risk assessments frequently steer clear of such complex initiators as earthquakes and systems interactions. Further-more, most of the more serious event which have occurred have defied prediction with probabilistic methodology; the TMI-2 accident, the Browns Ferry fire and partial scram failure, and the Crystal

• River-3 accident in 1980 were all essentially unpredicted. Perhaps the most pertinent comment ever made on this issue is one from the NRC's own Risk Assessment Review Group Report: "When a great many rare events each have a small pro-bability of occurrence, the change that a.t least )

one of them will occur can be rather high.A NUREG/CR-0400, p. 25)

(2) The treatment of partial system failures has been inadequate. [ACRS member David Okrent has taken note on several occasions of the fact that the scram system has been the single most studied system using probabilistic methodology, yet the Browns Ferry partial scram failure incident was not predicted as being a likely even~ by pro-babilistic assessment]

(3) The treatment of time sequencing of eve~~s and failures in probabilistic risk assessment has been inadequate. [Plant behavior may shift from

"accident" behavior to "transient" behavior and back again as plant system is, changed by operators or automatic system response to plant parameters]

(4) There have been problems with the very definition of the word "failure" [the manner in which "failures" are defined will have an important effect on the outcome of the risk assessment]

(5) Most risk assessments have considered only initiating conditions involving 100% steady-state power operation. [This limits consider-ation of conditions whidl vary with time in "core life" or which occur only when the plant is operating at less than full power (i.e., "operating bypasses"); also the limitation to 100% steady-state power operation as an initiating condition may not be conservative since a study of radioactive releases in operating commercial nuclear power plants carried out at Brook-haven National Laboratory showed that only 49% of the releases occurred when the reactor was at steady-state operation (there was no information given as to whether operation was at 100% power level in these cases)

(NUREG/CR-0603, p. 48)]

{6) There have been problems with consideration of systems interaction in risk studies.

[This issue is involved with two Unresolved Safety Issues, Tasks A-17 and A-47]

(7) Treatment of human errors has been inconsistent.

[Such errors occur not only in operation, but also design, fabrication, construction, main-tenance, and surveillance activities as well)

(8) There are statistical problems involved with mathematical modelling and manipulation of of fault trees.

(9) There are problems with the modelling of containment failure pressure and failure mode.

(10) Modelling of core meltdown phenomena and the timing of core melt phenomena has been difficult.

(11) There have been modelling problems with consequence models, including treatment of particulate deposition and evacuation and sheltering as protective responses during emergencies.

Despite the large uncertainty acknowledged to exist in the WASH-1400 core melt probability of 1 in 20,000 per reactor-year, this number was frequently and explicitly used without indication of the bounds of error (confidence levels) associated with this probability. For example, NUREG-0396 pegs the pro-bability of exceeding PAG doses at 10 miles at 1.5 x 10- 5

• This result was obtained by multiplying the WASH-1400 estimate of 1 chance in 20,000 (5 x 10- 5 ) for core melt by a 30% chance (from an unspecified source) of exceeding the PAG doses at 10 miles given a core melt. Thus the assertion that the chance

~f exceeding the PAG doses at 10 miles for all core melt accidents

~sonly 30% is exceedingly tenuous at best.

For similar reasons, all of the other graphs and statistical

• comparisons and relationships drawn in WASH-1400, NUREG-0396, and NUREG/CR-1131 are suspect as well. The source of uncertainty in the estimates upon which the emergency planning zones is based has never been elucidated by the NRC (indeed, an internal NRC memo written during the development of NUREG-0396 and the EPZ concept, dated 3/2/78 from R. Wayne Houston to Harold E. Collins, stated: "The alleged raionale for the proposed planning basis,

'particularly the uniform PAZs [EPZ's], is clouded' in obscurity.

This applies no only to why they should be the same for every plant, but how the particular distances were arrived at.").

Other criticisms also applied to the establishment of the 10-mile Plume EPZ and the SO-mile Ingestion EPZ. Although not taking issue with the conclusions, Roger Mattson in a hand-written note to Edson Case on 3/13/78 alluded to NUREG-0396 as "somewhat arbitrary science". Delbert Bunch and R. Wayne Houston, in a September 1, 1978 memo to Brian Grimes and Harold Collins, characterized the establishment of uniform EPZ's as "overly simplistic and naive in conception" .

• UCS believes that the uncertainties inherent in probabil-istic risk assessment methodologies only lend more weight to the fundamental position that the present 10-rnile Plume EPZ is not adequate for severe accidents and does not represent a prudent choice among competing factors of cost, effectiveness, and the temporal and spatial aspects of the problem.

H.. The iodine fission product release issue

• If Roger Mattson is correctly quoted in the May 1982 issue of Discover, the NRC has a serious dissenter in its midst on the fission product release issue. An article in that issue attributes to Mattson remarks which indicate that "perhaps*no one would be killed outright even in the worst nuclear accidents" as a result of alleged reductions in the release of iodine in serious nuclear accidents, and that for the same reasons, delayed cancer deaths would be reduced by 90% compared with WAS~-1400 estimates (Kevin McKean, "The Mounting crisis in Nuclear Energy", Discover, May 1982, p. 26).

The controversy ~ver possible reductions in the iodine source term originated in investigations of the TMI-2 accident by a team of consul tan ts and staff members of the President '.s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. In a letter dated August 14, 1980," Dr. William R. Stratton of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and Ors. A.P. Malinauskas and o.o.*eampbell of Oak Ridge National Laboratory wrote to NRC Chairman John Ahearne about this issue. This letter contained an explicit

• limitation in the very first paragraph that nearly everyone in the industry and apparently several NRC Staff members seem to have forgotten. The letter stated:

"Iodine volatility is grossly overestimated by these models for accidents in which substantial amounts of water are present, and the escape of iodine to the environment will be extremely small (as it was at Three Mile Island) as long as rea-sonable containment integrity is also maintained."

[emphasis added]

• Several observations can be made in this regard.

has been demonstrated above, accidents in which containment As integrity is maintained would not in any event, regardless of the amount or chemical form of iodine released from the reactor fuel, pose a significant hazard to the public. Risk to the public from the operation of nuclear power plants is clearly and nearly completely dominated by core melt accidents in which

• .containment integrity is breached resulting in an. atmospheric release of radionuclides to the environment.

Second, it is clear that not all accidents are characterized

by release pathways dominated by the presence of water. In fact, it has not been demonstrated that this is the case even in a majority or a significant percentage of such accidents (involving core melt).

One of the authors of the 8/14/80 letter to former Chairman Ahearne, A.P. Malinauskas, acknowledged these limitations during a meeting in October 1980 with the NRC Staff {nin response to staff questions, Malinauskas emphasized that the stated conclusions were not applicable to those accidents in which the fission products

• are released into an atmosphere containing air. Stratton [another co-author of the letter] stated that their remarks were intended to address those accidents where containment integrity is maintained."

See, memo to distribution from Walter F. Pasedeg, dated 10/30/80,

SUBJECT:

"Minuates of Meeting with Ors. Stratton, Malinauskas, and Campbell"). In addition, when he reported the matter back to the Commission in SECY-80-504 on 11/13/80, Harold Denton stated:

"For the plume exposure pathway, health effects from

• severe core melt accidents are controlled by other isotopes and may not be affected significantly [by the assumptions in the 8/14/80 letter]."

The NRC Staff proceeded from these early efforts to undertake two companion NUREG reports on the matter, NUREG-0771 ("Regulatory Impact of Nuclear Reactor Accident Source Term Assumptions") and NUREG-0772 ("Technical Bases for Estimating Fission Product Behavior During LWR Accidents"). These two reports alone contain sufficient information to conclude that for the Piume EPZ, the postulated reduction in iodine releases for accidents which a water-dominated release pathway in which containment integrity is

maintained has little or no impact on the size or areal extent of the Plume EPZ.

NUREG-0772 concluded that for those accidents in which the postulated iodine source term reductions are applicable, absence of significant iodine releases would reduce the dose contributing to early fatalities and injuries by one-half, but only result in a 5% reduction in the dose contributing to latent cancers (the question is thus raised as to the source of Roger

• Mattson*s 90% reduction in latent cancers referred to earlier).

NUREG-0772 also stated (NUREG-0772, p. 1.5):

"An important conclusion of this work*was that because of the contribution of a number of radio-nuclides, reductions in severe accident consequence predictions can only be realized by the systematic reduction in the predicted atmospheric releases of all of the significant radionuclide species."

The companion study, NUREG-0771, reached the following conclusions:

(1) For some accidents, postulating the release of iodine from damaged fuel as CsI results in higher doses than if it is released as r 2 (p. 13).

(2) For the mose severe accidents, approximating PWR-1 release category in WASH-1400 (i.e.,

TMLB' with containment failure due to over-pressure) the assumption of CsI has no impact on any conventional measure of consequences from the accident (includes early fatalities and illnesses, cancer fatalities, dose to the bone marrow and thyroid, and property damage)

(p. 19) * *

(3) The rationales for emergency action levels and the need for prompt public notification systems are unaffected by the source term issue (contrary to Mr. Stello's 2/2/82 memo to Mr. Dircks) (p. 37).

{4} In conclusion, the Emergency Plannning rule should not be directly impacted by those source term issues discussed herein. The rationale to support the rule was based on a spectrum of accidents and on considerations of the uncertainties of the source terms. As such, the emergency planning basis has a solid foundation with respect to these matters."

(p. 37)

(5) "[E]nvironmental impact statements and probabilistic risk assessments would not be impacted by the source term issues except in terms of a better understanding of the uncertainties in such analyses." (p. 41)

It is therefore quite clear that there should be no substantial impact on the consideration of the size and areal extent of the Plume EPZ to be derived from the iodine source term issue. This is esepcially true since, as established above, the choice of

• an appropriate Plume EPZ requires consideration of accidents which are unaffected by the chemical form of iodine .

• CONCLUSION In summary, UCS finds and recommends as follows:

(1) To the extent that communities are forced to pay the costs of emergency planning and radiological monitoring and yet derive no direct benefits from the operation of the plant, the present system is inequitable. Therefore, UCS recommends that the NRC adopt changes to its regulations to require utilities to fund the development and implementation (including required

training and equipment) of radiological emergency planning. For instances where, for various reasons, communities and/or states wish to make plans beyond NRC requirements, those costs should be borne by the states and communities.

(2) The present 10-mile Plume EPZ is sufficient for most core melt accidents resqlting in a "melt-through" type of release and in all cases where the containment remains intact *

• However, the present Plume EPZ of 10 miles radius is insufficient to adequately protect the public health and safety in the event of core melt accidents which result in "penetration.leakage" and "major containment failure" types of releases. Therefore, UCS recommends that the Commission adopt the approach outlined in the study performed by the California Office of Emergency Services,

~d establish a Basic Plume EPZ and an Extended Plume EPZ to properly account for such accidents. The Extended Plume EPZ should

• • be sized so as to result in substantial reductions of early injuries and latent cancer cases (such is not the case with the present 10-mile Plume EPZ which is aimed at reducing prompt fatalities, using an ad hoc "triage" approach for other con-sequences; See NUREG-0771, p. 36). UCS concludes that this is the approach to be favored over the establishment of a generic distance (even if 20 miles},, although the fundamental notion behind the proposal to increase the distance to 20 miles is correct (i.e., that the present generic distance is insufficient to protect the public health and safety).

(3) UCS finds that there are a significant number of related issues which must be considered in order to establish sufficient Plume EPZ's. ucs therefore recommends that the following matters be considered:

A. The effects of heated releases B. Spontaneous evacuation beyond predesignated areas (evacuation-shadow phemenon)

C. Directional biases of potential evacuees D* The capability to take ad hoc actions beyond the Plume EPZ as this capaE'ITity is affected by the additional area and numbers of persons and special facilities affected E. The efficacy of sheltering for protection against inhalation exposure for "atmospheric accidents" F. The effect of present emergency planning attitudes of the NRC on the long-term preparedness of state and local planners G. The substantial uncertainties associated with the present state-of-the-art in estimating probabilities using probabilistic risk assessment methodologies

• (4)

H. The lack of impact on emergency planning as a whole from the iodine source term issue As modified above, UCS concludes that the petition for rulemaking should be granted and the Commission's rules and regulations modified accordingly.

DATED: RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL-4 ACCIDENT FOR NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK Prepared For The STATE OF NEW YORK CONSUMER PROTECTION BOARD

• June 1986 MHB TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K San Jose, California 95125 (408) 266-2716

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL-4 ACCIDENT FOR NOCLLAR EMERGENCY PLAlmING FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK Preparea For The STATE OF NEW YORK CONSUMER PROTECTION BOARD

• MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K San Jose, California 95125 (408) 266-2716 I. OVERVIEW On April 26, 19 86, the most severe nuc*lear power plant accident to date occurred at the Chernobyl-4 nuclear power station, located in the Soviet Union along the Dneiper River approximately 60 miles from the city of Kiev. The reported death

• toll deaths from due several months.

the to accident radiation is currently exposure likely twenty-three, to occur Approximately 92,000 people have been evacuated in with the more next from the area within an 18-mile radius of the reactor site.

Radioactivity from the damage core has spread through the Soviet Union, Eastern and Western Europe, and beyond.

The societal impacts of the accident can be expected to be significant. The long-term health effects (e.g., latent cancers, genetic effects, thyroid nodules, etc.) are likely to be substantial, but the magnitude of the impact cannot be accurately determined at this time. Contaminated foodstuffs have been taken off the market in Eastern and Western Europ~. The economic cost of the accident cannot be accurately quantified at this time, but appears likely to be in the range of billions of dollars.. In general, for a very large release of radioactivity (such as occurred at Chernobyl), it can be expected that long-term relocation of the population will be nece.ssary for hundreds of square miles, and decontamination will be necessary to varying degrees for perhaps thousands*of square miles *

• This paper is intended to review Chernobyl accident for the citizens of New York.

the lessons of the The lessons of Chernobyl are particularly relevant because New York is "home to a number of nuclear power plan ts: Indian Point Uni ts 2 and 3, Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2 (Unit 2 is under construction),

Fitzpatrick, Ginna, and Shoreham (now in low-power testing). In addition, New York could be affected by accidents at a number of nuclear plants in other states.

This paper is based on what must be recognized to be limited and preliminary technical information, and sometimes contradictory reports, on the nature and course of the Chernobyl accident. As more becomes known about the accident, additional lessons beyond those discussed here may well be identified.

The paper is organized in eight sections. This "Overview" des er ibes the purpose of the paper. Next, the nature of the Chernobyl accident is described. The third section of the paper briefly describes the salient design features of the Chernobyl-4 nuclear power plant. Section IV sets forth the various scenarios that have been proposed as possible causes of the Chernobyl accident. The next section of the paper presents the consequences of the accident. Section VI discusses emergency planning and reactor siting issues raised by the Chernobyl accident, while Section VII discusses U.S. nuclear accident liability policies. Finally, the iessons of the Chernobyl accident are summarized. Briefly, these lessons are:

Lesson One: General design similarities in terms ,of containment and safety systems exist between Chernobyl-4 and many U.S. nuclea= power plants, particularly boiling water reactors. These similarities should be considered in reassessing the vulnerablili ty of U.s.

nuclear power plants to serious accidents. The need for such a reassessment is particularly great for pressure suppression containments. This conclusion places a premium on the prompt and thorough-going

• examination of the Fitzpatrick, Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2, and Shoreham nuclear plants.

Lesson Two: Catastrophic reactor accidents resulting in very large releases of radioactivity are possible in U.S. reactors. Such accidents might be caused by inherent design deficiencies, lack of construction quality, human error, external events, sabotage, or multiple causes. New York State emergency planning efforts should explicitly consider such serious accidents.

Lesson Three: The long-term impacts of radiation releases on agriculture, health, water, and the economy are likely to be more disruptive to society than the short-term impacts. Unfortunately, current emergency plans place insufficient emphasis on long-term radiation.safety measures. Both the early and long-

• term consequences of a serious reactor accident can be partially emergency mitigated plan which with an provides effective for a reaional variety of protective measures, including an extension of the current ten- and fifty-mile emergency planning zones.

New York state should also consider the need for emergency response for accidents at nuclear power plants in other states and at plants in Canada, since such accidents could require emergency response in counties which do not now have radiological emergency plans to deal with the accident.

Lesson Four: Emergency plans should be in place at all times for an operable reactor, regardless of whether the plant is undergoing testing, temporarily out of service, or operating at full power. l/

l/ Although Chernobyl-4 was at low power at the beginning of the accident, the plant achieved initial criticality on December 14, 1983 (Walter Mitchell, III, Desiqn Features of Lesson Five: State governments and regional Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) offices should have an automatic data link connecting them with nuclear power plant control room instruments to ensure prompt assessment of the severity of any potential nuclear power plant accident. Such a data link would help reduce the potential for miscommunication of essential plant status and radiation release information in time of crisis.

Lesson Six: The State of New York should ensure that adequate regional and/or federal capabilities are in place for tracking radioactive plumes, and for coordinating actions needed to interdict potentially contaminated food and water supplies, and decontaminate potentially large affected land areas *

• Lesson Seven: Remote siting should be required for new nuclear power plants. Urban siting severely limits or renders impossible the prompt evacuation of the near-site population, which increases the potential for large early casualty tolls in the event of a serious the Soviet RBMK-1000/Chernobyl-4 Reactor, report prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, May 4, 1983), and had operated for some time at higher power levels. Thus, the plant had developed a large amount of fission products and, as a result, a considerable decay heat inventory at the time of the accident on April 26, 1986.

accident. Further, urban siting increases the potential for societal disruption resulting from a serious nuclear accident since a larger number of people would have to be relocated, and a greater level of economic activity would be disrupted. Existing urban-sited plants, such as Indian Point, merit special review of containment adequacy .. Improvements can be made to strengthen the ability of existing containments to withstand accidents and minimize releases. Plans

• should be developed for the orderly phase out of plants which cannot be adequately improved in this regard.

the interim, strengthened inspection_ and enforcement In measures should be taken to attempt to reduce the likelihood of an accident and to ensure that emergency response plans and procedures are fully implemented while these plants operate *

• Lesson the Eight: The State of New York should Congress to raise or entirely remove federal limits on financial liability of nuclear power owners/operators and designers/suppliers who may be at press plant fault in a nuclear accident.

II. The Chernobvl-4 Accident The Chernobyl Unit 4 nuclear power plant accident began at 1:23 a.m. on April 26, 1986, with a chemical explosion at the plant. 2/ The cause of this explosion is currently unknown. ll An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, which was based on interviews with Soviet officials, indicates that the reactor was being shut down for pla~ned maintenance at the time of the accident, with its core generating about 6-7 percent of

• full power.

The

,+/-/

explosion (or its aftermath) evidently reduction or loss of coolant flow to the reactor core.

resul tea in Despite a

the low power level the inventory of fission products produced sufficient decay heat that the coolant loss, coupled with insufficient, unavailable, or unti~ely emergency cooling, led ~o severe core damage and ignition of the graphite moderator. 1/

Themis Speis and Brian Sheron (NRC), "Status Briefing on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: Presentation to the Commission,"

May 13, 1986.

ll There are a number of possible causes for such an explosion, but the precise cause is unknown. It is also currently unknown whether there was a single explosions, or multiple explosions, and, if the latter, their relative timing. It has been suggested, for example, that the accident was started by an explosion and subsequent fire in the turbine/auxiliary complex, resulting in the production of hydrogen which then escaped to the reactor building above the refueling deck and caused the explosion which destroyed the upper part of the reactor building. This hypothesis, however, cannot be confirmed or negated on the basis of the information currently available.

New York Times, May 10, 1986, text of statement on the Chernobyl accident released on May 9 by the IAEA New York Times, "Consensus of Experts: The Accident Isn't Over," May 10, 1986.

The Chernobyl-4 containment boundary failed in an as-yet unspecified manner, leading to the release of fission and other radioactive products to the environment.

European nations have reported elevated levels of many cifferent radioisotopes in air, water, and soil samples.  !/ As of this writing, it is not clear to what extent fuel melted, 21 al though the quantities and types of radionuclides reported in Europe suggest very significant core damage and fuel melting. ~/

The first releases of radioactivity began the morning of

• 26, 1986. Soviet officials e~auations in the afternoon of April 27, stated that they began approximately 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> fi U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Request for Collection of Licensee Radioactivity Measurements Attributed to the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident," IE Information Notice No.

86-32, May 2, 1986. Reported isotopes collected in Europe include Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and -137, Tellurium-132, Rutheniurn-103, Molybdenum-99, Neptunium-239, and Niobium-95.

Some of these fission products had previously been predicted to remain largely in the damaged reactor core, even after fuel melting and containment failure.

21 The NRC has concluded that decay heat plus the heat from the graphite fire produced temperatures sufficient to melt the fuel. In addition, the NRC has concluded that "some or all of molten core material is probably on the reactor cavity floor" -- i.e., some of the core material may have melted out of the core region entirely. See, Themis Speis and Brian Sheron (NRC) , "Status Brief .frig on the Chernobyl Nuc'lear Accident: Presentation to the Commission," May 13, 1986.

8/ Preliminary dose estimates prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory assumed the release of half of the core inventory of Iodine-131 and Cesium-137, with most of this release occuring in the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, "ARAC Preliminary Dose Estimates for Chernobyl Reactor Accident, 11 May 7, 1986, p. 2). Such a magnitude of release, combined with detection of many different radioactive species in Europe, are consistent with WASH-1400 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, October 1975) radiation release estimates for core melt accidents.

-a-

later. On Apri 1 28, Swedish technicians at the Forsmark nuclear power plant discovered unusually high radiation levels on workers' clothing, and, finding nothing wrong with their own plant, demanded an explanation from the Soviet Union. 10/ For hours, none was forthcoming. Finally, late in the evening of April 27, the Soviets admitted that an accident had taken place at the Chernobyl plant, some 800 miles southeast of the Forsmark site. g; Los Angeles Times, "soviets Cite Local Officials 1 MisJudgment, 11 May 7, 1986 .*

l:..Q/ Time, "Deadly Meltdown," May 12, 1986.

QI Newsweek, "The Chernobyl Syndrome," May 12, 1986.

III. Reactor Desian Issues Chernobyl Unit 4 is a graphite-modeiated, boiling-water-cooled, vertical pressure-tube nuclear power plant with an electrical output of 1,000 megawatts. The reactor is designated as an RBMK-1000 design. As of early 1986, there were fourteen RBMK-1000 plants in operation in the Soviet Union

(:~eluding Chernobyl-4). The RBMK-1000 design, based on early Soviet plutonium production re~ctors, was completed in 1969, and the first unit went critical in 1973 (Leningrad Unit 1)

• The low-enriched, uranium oxide fuel (approximately 192 metric tons) is contained in a large number (more than 1,000) of zirconium-niobium alloy pressure tubes embedded in a matrix of graphite blocks. Each pressure tube contains eighteen fuel rods and a central support member. The fuel rods are clad in a zirconium-niobium alloy. There are two stacked fuel assemblies

in each fuel channel. On-line refueling is accomplished via a

'j Information in this section has been extracted and summarized from the following references: N. A. Dollezhal, I. Y. Emelyanov, et al., "Some Features of Nuclear Power Plants With RBMK-lO0OReactors and Experience in Their Operation," IAEA-CN-42/385, September 1982; E. v. Kulikov, "State-of-the-Art and Development Prospects for Nuclear Power Stations Containing RBMK Reactors," translated from Atomnaya Energiya, Vol. 56, No. 6, June 1984; Walter Mitchell, III, Design Features of the Soviet RBMK-1000/Chernobyl-4 Reactor, report prepared for the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, May 4, 1986; B. A. Semenov, "Nuclear power in the Soviet Union," IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 2; Themis Speis and Brian Sheron (NRC), "status Briefing on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Presented to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards," May 8, 1986, and "Status Briefing on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: Presentation to the Commission," May 13, 1986; and N. A. Dollezhal, "Graphite-water steam-generating reactor in the USSR,"

Nuclear Energy, Vol. 20, No. 5, October 1981.

special refueling machine located on the refueling deck above the reactor.

The reactor core region is a cylinder about forty feet in diameter and twenty-six feet high, and is contained in a reactor vault. The reactor vault is a steel-lined, prestressed concrete region below the refueling deck. The atmosphere in the reactor vault is inerted. The vault is designed for a pressure of 27 psi

( 0 .18 MP a)

• In contrast to numerous early press reports, the safety

• systems available at the Chernobyl-4 plant

~ccidents a:::-e broadly corr.parable to those used in U.S.

power plants. Safety systems provid-ed in to respond to nuclear the Chernobyl-4 design include passive coolant injection tanks (referred to in U.S. plan ts as accumulators or core flood tanks) , as we 11 as high- and low-pressure injections systems, which can be supplied

_with emergency power from three diesel generators (these diesels serve a two-unit station) * .!_!/

• The containment which consist Chernobyl-4 and of the design confinement.

reactor incorporates There vault are and two the elements "drywell 11 primary of both regions enclosure which encompasses the primary coolant piping and main coolant pumps ( the pump enclosure area is designed to a pressure of 56

_!l/ Compare, for example, descriptions in Themis Speis and Brian Sheron, S!E.!. cit., and Walter Mitchell, III, .£E...:_ cit., with Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) listings of safety equipment for U.S. boiling water reactors, including Shoreham, Fitzpatrick, and Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2.

See, also, New York Times, "Chernobyl Design Found to Include New Safety Plans," May 19, 1986.

14/ Themis Speis and Brian Sheron, S!E.!. cit.

psi). Below these drywell areas is a two-layer suppression pool.

l:.2,/ The Suppression pool is intended ta condense steam and thereby reduce pressure in the drywell region. In addition, the suppression pool water is circulated through a heat exchanger, and then pumped through spray nozzles back to the suppression pool. 16 The drywell areas are connected to the suppression pool via a system of valves and "downcomer~ pipes. The remainder of the reactor building is a confinement structure. See Figure 1.

• In principle, this arrangement is not_ dramatically different from U.S. boiling water reactors, particularly th9se of the so-called "Mark II" design (such as Shoreham or Nine Mile Point Unit

2) . The degree to which the comparison is accurate depends on design details of the Chernobyl-4' plant, which are not yet publicly available. 17/

Drawings contained in NRC documents appear to indicate the presence of a spray ("sprinkler") system iz:i the air space

• above the two suppression pools. puch a system would assist in the suppression of steam and help hold containment pressure down. The source of the spray water and the system which supplies the spray water are not indicated in the NRC documents.

"Status See, Themis Speis and Brian Sheron (NRC),

Briefing on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident:

Presentation to the Commission," May 13, 1986.

16/ L. I. Turetskii, et al., "A System for Localising Failures of Generating Unffi with the RBMK-1000 Reactor, 11 Thermal Engineering, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1984, pp. 117-118.

1:J./ The information most important to such comparisons includes the volumes enclosed by the drywell areas and the suppression pool, the amount of water in the suppression pool, the size of the downcomers, the design pressure of the drywe 11 and suppr1=ssion pool areas, and a host of other details. Such information should become available over the next few months' as the Soviet investigation into the Chernobyl accident proceeds.

The containment concept employed at Chernobyl-4 is referred to as a "pressure suppression" containment. Chernobyl-4 utilizes two water-filled pools (called suppression pools) to condense steam released into the containment during an accident. Pressure suppression containments are used in most boili~g water reactors in the U.S. In addition, some pressurized water reactors employ a pressure suppression concept referred to as an ., ice condenser" containment, which employs large volumes of ice to

• condense steam, rather than boiling water reactors in the U.S.

In comparison with large the dry pools of water containments used used in in most most pressurized water reactors (such as Indian Point and Ginna), the pressure suppression containments are relatively small in volume.

Concerns have been raised for many years about the ability of pressure suppression containments to withstand the forces exerted by a core melt accident. Even the most recent studies suggest that such containments are predicted to fail very early in a

• range of severe accident scenarios.

It is obvious from drawings and photographs of the Chernobyl plant that the plant does not have the "containment dome" Chernobyl, that is characteristic of some boiling water and most pressurized water reactors in the U.S. It should be pointed out, however, that BWR Mark I and Mark II plants also do not have a "containment dome." One should not, therefore, necessarily associate the concept of containment with the presence or absence of a "dome. 11 .

This is particularly true for Mark I boiling water containments and ice condenser pressurized water reactor containments, but is also true of Mark II containments as well. See, for example, NUREG-1079, Estimates of Early Containment Loads from Core Melt Accidents, draft report for comment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm1ss1on, December 1985; and Steven C. Shelly and Gordon Thompson, Union of Concerned Scientists, The Source Term Debate, January 1986.

preliminary reports suggest that the analogous containment system failed very early in the accident, although the precise mode of containment failure at Chernobyl is not currently clear. ~/

• It has been suggested that the Chernobyl-4 containment could have failed from a number of causes, including an excess-reactivity explosion in the reactor core (see, Victor Gilinsky, "How Can We Learn More?", The Wash1ngton Post National Weeklx Edition, June 2, 1986, "an uncont~olled chain reaction') a hydrogen explosion in the reactor vault (although the inerted atmosphere in* the reactor vault should have prevented this), leakage past seals damaged by high temperature, *radiation exposure, and/or high pressure, and by puncturing by the overhead crane when the crane lost structural supports in an explosion above the refueling deck. Any or none of these possible causes could have been involved. A final determination of the cause of containment failure awaits the release of additional information during the course of the Soviet investigation into tpe Chernobyl accident.

IV. Seouence of Events (Acciaent Scenario)

The exact cause of the Chernobyl-4 accident is not known at this time. Several hypotheses have been advanced, however, which deserve mention. Former NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie, 21/ Harold Denton (Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at the NRC), and Canadian and Swedish nuclear officials have speculatea. that Chernobyl may have experienced a "station blackout" -- loss of all normal and emergency AC power. ~/

• burned One possible cause of station blackout is a fire, and it has been suggested through that Chernobyl may have experienced a fire electric power cables to* safety systems.

that Regardless of plant design, electric power and cables are vital to reactor shutdown, provision of emergency coolant, and instrumentation to monitor an accident or determine its potential severity. The sufficiency of fire protection requirements for U.S. reactors has long been debated. Fires represent a so-called "common mode" or "domino" failure that can simultaneously disable what would normally be considered to be redundant safety systems.

Other possible causes for the accident have been suggested.

One potential cause that has been advanced is a "reactivity QI New York Times, 11 Experts See Soviet Nuclear Accident As Being Long-Feared 'Worst Case'," May 9, 1986.

Inside N.R.C., "Opinions Vary on Impact of Chernobyl Accident on U.S. Plants," Vol. 8, No. 10, May 12, 1986.

New York Times, "Experts See Soviet Nuclear Accident As Being Long-Feared 'Worst Case'," May 9, 1986. See, also, Inside N.R.C., "Opinions Vary on Impact of Chernobyl Accident on U.S. Plants," Vol. 8, No. 10, May 12, 1986.

transient" a sudden surge in reactor power. 24/ Other possible causes for the accident that have been discussed are a

£uel handling accident, a loss of coolant accident, 25/ or a flow blockage to part of the core. 26/

Soviet nuclear officials have repeatedly stated that "human error" was involved in the accident, and that there is no evidence of any basic design deficiency in the reactor. 27 /

Wnile this is a somewhat predictable response, given the number o: similar plants in operation and under construe tion in the

• Scviet Union, it may also be true. Human errors can increase the likelihood of accidents in any reactor (human error was at least p~rtially to blame for the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island and the 1957 accident at the Windscale reactQr in England), or a:-r..plify the consequences of an accident. For example, on several occasions, containments in U.S. commercial nuclear plants have been inadvertently left open for extended periods of time, offering a direct release pathway to the environment in the event

• 24/ Victor Gil in sky, 11 How Can We Learn More?", The Washington Post National Wee~ly Edition, June 2, 1986; article mentions 11 an uncontrolled chain reaction."

One of the designers of the Chernobyl plant (Ivan Emelyanov) suggested in an interview that one of the hundreds of cooling pipes burst, which may have triggered the accident.

He also suggested that a power surge from 6% to 50% of full power occurred in less than ten seconds after the coolant pipe failure. See, San Jose Mercury News, "Chernobyl Designer Blames Disaster on Human Error, l'f May 20, 1986.

Thernis Speis and Brian Sheron (NRC), "Status Briefing on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Presented to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards," May 8, 1986.

Los Angeles Times, "Human Error Blamed for Soviet Disaster,"

May 20, 19 86; San Jose Mercur{ News, "Chernob_yl Designer Blames Disaster on Human Error,' May 20, 1986.

of an accident. Such a containment "bypass" failure would defeat even the strongest of U.S. containm*ents, and result, in the event of a core melt accident, in a large release of radioactivity to the environment

• Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Re liability Analysis of Containment I sol a tion sys terns, NUREG/CR-4 2 2 0, - prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1985.

V. Accident Conseauences Whatever the cause of the Chernobyl-4 accident, there is little question that a severe accident involving major fuel melting and early loss of containment is possible at U.S.

reactors. The scientific community has mainly differed over the likelihood of such an accident and the size the resulting radioactivity release. The Chernobyl accident appears to negate claims of both Soviet and American nuclear industry

• ~epresentatives that the likelihood of a release was as low as one chance in a million per reactor year.

The Chernobyl *accident demonstrates large both that radioactive such an accident is possible, and that its results can be devastating.

The magnitude of radioactivity released as a result of a reactor accident, and the consequences of such an accident, have been the s~bject of numerous safety studies since the start of commercial nuclear power: the WASH-740 report in 1957, the abortive Brookhaven National Laboratory update of WASH-740 in 1965, the WASH-1400 report ("Rasmussen Report") in 1975, and more recent studies by Sandia National Laboratories for the NRC. Generally, these studies indicate that, for U.S. reactors, fue 1 me 1 ting coupled with early containment failure could leave hundreds of square miles uninhabitable, necessitate decontamination or abandonment of thousands of square miles of land, and result in tens of billions of dollars in property losses and cleanup costs.

There is no questioning the need for the most stringent nuclear safety laws, as well as the need for rigid enforcement of those laws. But however well-designed, built, and operated, the chance of a serious nuclear accident at existing plants cannot be reduced to zero. All current nuclear plants can experience catastrophic failures. The consequences of such an event can involve huge land areas and the health and lifelihood of many thousands of private citizens.

Twenty-three deaths have been attributed to the Chernobyl accicent, 29/ although the number could rise substantially in the next few months. In addition, up to three hundred radiation-related injuries have been reported, with eighty of those patients reported to be II in extreme danger. " 1.Q/ A wide

• aria tion in the number of early deaths are possible for a radiolgical release of the magnitude which occurred at Chernobyl-

~. The magnitude of the ef fee ts would depend on the timing of the release, the elevation of the release point, the population distribution around the reactor site, the protective measures

~aken off site and their timing relative to the. time of the release, and the weather at the time of and subsequent to the

• release, among other factors. Thus, the size of the death toll in the Chernobyl-4 accident to date cannot be taken to represent an upper limit on the possible casualties. Under less favorable weather conditions, early fatalities and injuries could have been much greater. l!_/

New York .Times, "Chernobyl Disaster's Toll Rises to 23," May 30, 1986.

Ibid.

Reactor accident scenario studies to date indicate that larget numbers of early deaths and injuries (nu~bers greater than a few hundred) would result from weather involving rain downwind from the accident site a,nd/or a slowdown in wind Early radiation-caused deaths and injuries occur only at the very highest levels of exposure. Early fatalities would not be expected to occur at doses less than 150-200 Rems, and early injuries would not be expected to occur at doses less than 25-50 Re:ns. Such dose levels would generally be obtained only very near the plant or in areas heavily contaminated due to weather following the release (e.g., in the event of rain, which would tend to "washout" the radioactivity from the plume).

In contrast, results of accident studies indicate clearly

• that the long-term health effects and environmental impacts dominate the societal impact of a serious reactor accioent. l£/

F0r example, the number of cancer deaths resulting from an accident with a large release of radioactivity to the e,vironmental is predicted to reach into the thousands to several tens of thousands. ~/ Such cancers arise from the exposure of velocity, both of which would allow a large amount of radioactivity to deposit out of the plume onto the ground, thus exposing even sheltered persons to very high radiation doses. Such weather scenarios and resulting impacts are not

• limited to areas within ten miles of nuclear power plants, but could occur at distances of approximately fifteen to fifty miles. In comparison, the current planning basis distance under NRC regulations is a ten-mile diameter zone around the reactor site. See, Sandia National Laboratories, Technical Guidance for-,iting Criteria Development, NUREG/CR-2239, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1982, p. 2-62.

32/ See, for example, Richard B. Hubbard and Gregory C. Minor, eds., The Risks of Nuclear Power Re.actors: A Review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), Union of Concerned Scientists (Cambridge, Massachusetts), August 1977.

Similar numbers of non-fatal cancers would also be expected to occur; accident consequence models such as the NRC' s "CRAC-2" code calculate only cancer fatalities, ignoring the fact that not all cancer vie tims die as a result of the disease.

a large population to doses smaller than those which would pose an immediate health risk.

In addition to health effects, contamination arising from a serious accicent poses significant societal problems. Land interdiction and agricultural restrictions in the event of a large release of radioactivity could be necessary to distances ranging from twenty to more than fifty miles downwind, thereby involving areas in the hundreds to thousands of square miles.

1_!/ In the case of Chernobyl, potentially contaminated foods were removed from market and destroyed as far away as Italy. The European Economic Com~unity nations barred Eastern European and Soviet foodstuffs produced within 625 miles of Chernobyl. 22_/

Livestock within twelve miles of the plant were slaughtered. 2..§_/

It is unclear at this time how long food supplies may be impaired due to the Chernobyl accident. There are no clear international agreements that distinguish between safe and unsafe contamination levels in food or water, nor are there procedures

• in place for the level of sampling needed to reliably make such determinations.

D. C. Aldrich, Moreover, it must be recognized et al., Technical Guidance for Siting that some Criteria Develooment-,- Sandia National Laboratories, NUREG/CR-2239, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1982, p. 2-62 and CRAC-2 computer model printouts, available at the NRC Public Document Room, Washington, D.C.

New York Times, "Europeans Squabbling Over Food: Is Their Produce Free of Radiation?," May 10, 19 8 6; "Europeans Bar Food From the Soviet Bloc Until the End of May," May 13, 1986.

36 Themis Speis and Brian Sheron (NRC), "Status Briefing on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Presented to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards," May 8, 1986.

radioactive materials are biologically concentrated by both plants and animals, potentially over perio9s of decades in the case of long-lived radioactive materials .

VI. Emergency Planning Issues The principal reason for a nuclear ~mergency plan is to reauce the hea.l th consequences of any radioactive release. A secondary objective of emergency plans is to mitigate the environmental damage which might be caused by a reactor accident.

For the most part, U.S. nuclear emergency plans have been based on the assumptions that accidents would require evacuation or other* protective actions out to a maximum of ten miles and

• that nearly all fmpacts would be contained within fifty miles.

1]_/ The Chernobyl accident shows that the potential dimension of a serious nuclear accident can be substantially greater.

For example, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory calculations suggest that iodine doses to the thyroid which would have required protective action under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency standards 2!/ may have occurred over an area of

• 37/ Officially, these are the planning distances for emergency response -- "The choice of the size of the Emergency Planning Zones represents a judgment on the extent of detailed planning which must be performed to assure an adequate Preparation response. 11 and See, Evaluation NUREG-0654, of Criteria Radiological for Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Rev. 1, November 1980. The NRC, in adopting its emergency planning rules in 1980, effectively t;,ook the position that the ten- and fifty-mile planning zones provided an adequate basis for response at greater distances.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency specifies "Protective Action Guides" or PAGs of five to twenty-five Rem to the thyroid from inhalation of radioactive iodine.

U.s. Environmental Protection Agency, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-520/1-75-001, September 1975, Revised June 1980.

thousands of square miles. In addition, potassium iodide tablets were distributed throughout Eastern and Western Europe, and vegetables and dairy products were withheld from market because of actual or suspected contamination. It is highly unlikely that any European nation had an emergency plan to address such widespread radiologic hazards, or that the Sovie ts had any plan to notify adjoining nations. It seems unlikely that emergency plans in the U.S., being limited to a 50-mile radius a=ound the reactor site for ingestion exposure planning, would be

• capable of dealing effectively with an accident of Chernobyl's r:-:::gnitude.

The long term health impact of the Chernobyl disaster cannot be predicted accurately at this time. Whatever the toll, some i~pacts could have been reduced with prompt notification of affected governments. Chernobyl clearly demonstrates the need for prompt and effective notification about nuclear accidents to provide ample time for state and local authorities to act to

• mitigate the consequences of the accident.

the need It also demonstrates to e>..pand the radius of concern compared with current NRC planning standards.

In addition, the Chernobyl accident raises a number of e~ergency planning issues which need to be addressed by the State 21_/ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, "ARAC Preliminary Dose Estimates for Chernobyl Reactor Accident," May 7, 1986.

A generic study by Sandia National Laboratories indicates that for an arbitrary large release, the EPA PAG doses for the thyroid pathway could be exceeded to distances of hundreds of miles. See, NUREG/CR-2239, Technical Guidance for Siting Criterla Development, Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1982, p. 2-61.

of New York. First, nuclear power plant emergency plans should explicitly address the possibility of large accidents with impacts requiring protective measures beyond the current ten- and fifty-mile mile planning zones. In adopting the emergency 11 planning rule specifying the ten-mile plume exposure pa th way" emergency planning zone, the NRC concluded that the planning within ten or fifty miles of a nuclear power plant site would provide an adequate base to expand response efforts beyond this area. While this may be true for some sites, it is probably not true for sites with higher than average population density, increasing population density (and numbers of special facilities such as schools, nursing homes, prisons, etc.)) just outside the ten-mile planning zone, or for sites with access/egress routes which are constrained by geographic features. Moreover, should emergency response be needed outside ten miles, it would likely be needed at distances considerably beyond ten or fifty miles, in which case the existing plans may have little relevance.

Thus, what seems to be needed is emergency planning on a regional basis. Both the early and long-term effects of a serious reactor accident could be mitigated {perhaps considerably so) by an effective regional emergency plan which provides for a range of protective measures, including the extension of the current planning zones. This conclusion implies, in the case of New York, the need to consider possible accidents at nuclear power plants in other states or at plants in Canada. This is particularly important because such accidents could necessitate emergency response in counties which may not now have radiological emergency plans to deal with the accident and its impacts.

As a practical matter, if a serious accident were to occur, people would inevitably evacuate beyond any radius selected by state or local officials or by the NRC, particularly after the experiences with Three Mi le Island and Chernobyl. Emergency plans should be designed to identify and, if possible, resolve such problems, but they cannot do so if they focus on too small an area .

• build A second obvious lesson of Chernobyl is that we should not essentially new nuclear impossible power to plants evacuate in urban quickly.

areas that Urban are siting severely limits 0r renders impossible the prompt evacuation of the near-site population (as distinct from relocation; the former implies movement before plume passage, whereas the latter implies movement after plume passage). This increases the potential for large early casualty tolls in the event of a large release of radioactivity.

Urban siting also increases the societal impact of a serious accident. This is due to the greater social disruption oc::::asioned by the need to relocate the population from a large ur~an area should it become necessary. Estimated property losses fr~m reactor accidents at urban-sited plants are also cc~siderably larger than for remote-sited plants.

Existing urban-sited plants, such as Indian Point, merit a SF*==ial attention to containment adequacy. Improvements can be made to strengthen the ability of existing reactor containments to wi thstana accidents and minimize releases. Such potential improvements include, for example, "filtered, vented containment 11 concepts which would trade off a release of noble gases such as krypton and xenon (which do not cause long-term contamination problems) against the more certain ability to contain the more hazardous radioactive particulates such as cesium, iodine, strontium etc.

For existing urban-sited plants which cannot be adequately improved in this respect, plans should be mace for an orderly

• phase out of operations.

enforcement measures In the interim, strengthened inspection should be u:..dertaken to attempt to the likelihood of an accident and to ensure that emergency plans reduce and procedures are always in place should an accident nonetheless occur.

Third, nuclear emergency plans tend to overemphasize

_evacuation planning ~ se at the expense of other forms of emergency response. The wide dispersion of radioactive material

• from the tracking Chernobyl accident illustrates the need for effective of identification radioactive of plumes contaminated in areas the to atmosphere, assure that prompt the population in such areas can be promptly relocated, provision of uncontaminated food and water, interdiction of agricultural supplies, decontamination of affected land and water, and standards for reentry into contaminated areas. Again, this suggests the need for regional planning (and, in the case of Canadian plants, international cooperation between the State of New York and Canadian authorities).

Another element of emergency planning concerns the possible reluctance of reactor operators to notify numerous government authorities early in an accident when it is not clear that control of a reactor has been irretrievably lost. ln addition, there have been problems with reliable communication of plant status and radiation monitoring information during previous accidents. The Soviets now claim that the operators at Chernobyl failed to appreciate the potential impact of this accident, and therefore kept even Moscow in 'the dark. There was also a

• lack of accurate public information during the Three Mile Island accident. The operators of ~h~ee ~ile Island repeatedly told the press (and the state government) that their plant was completely under control in the early stages of the accident, when, in fact, top officials of the NRC were extremely worried and the plant was not under control. QI Faced with these problems, some state agencies have acquired*

the capacity to monitor on-site and off-site radiation levels from remote f aci li ties. While any such monitoring instruments can malfunction, off-site instrumentation under public supervision gives responsible state officials prompt notification of a problem {under most circumstances), and provides a more reliable basis for making informed decisions on ordering protective measures up to and including evacuation. This

!QI New York Times, "Delay Reported on Evacuation at Nuclear Site," May 7, 1986.

Special Inquiry Group (Mitchell Rogovin, Director) , Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Pub-lic, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-125-, Vols. I and II, 1980.

monitoring equipment includes a plant stack monitor and sixteen radially positioned gamma radiation monitors two miles from the reactor site.

Over the last four years, the State of Illinois has put in place a highly sophisticated nuclear emergency program.

Illinois' Department of Nuclear Safety in Springfield has a direct computer link to each reactor control room in the state.

The Department has developed computer software that facilitates interpretation of the monitored parameters to identify an

• evolving accident.

syst.e:-:1 independently the This provides t!}at perr:.its possibility of the Department with an state a

officials large release, to early assess dispatch radiation monitoring teams and e~ergency response personnel, and notify local officials of a possible evacuation. The Department also has a direct telephone link to each reactor control room.

42/

?

42 The NRC' s Region I Office recently wrote to all nuclear power plant owners in the Region about its possible plans to set up an "Emergency Response Data System" (EROS). To fulfill its role, NRC has determined that it needs reliable information concerning core and coolant conditions (to assess the extent or likelihood of core damage), containment conditions ( to assess the likelihood of containment failure), radioactivity release rates (to assess the immediacy and degree of public danger), and meteorological data (to assess the distribution of potential or actual impacts of a radiation release on the public) . The t~RC letter* states that experience with "voice-only communications" links has demonstrated that excessive amounts of time are needed for data transmission, that error rates are high, initiation of data links has been slow, and that voice-only data links creates an excessive drain on a limited number of technical experts available to assess the situation. See, for example, an April 25, 1986, letter from Richard W. ~arostecki (NRC) to Long Island Lighting Company,

Subject:

"Emergency Communication System, Point-of-Contact. 11 Applied locally or regionally, this type of system could resolve many of the prompt not if ica t,ion problems and ir:accurate/untimely data transmission problems facing any state with an operating reactor. It would permit off-site authorities know almost as quickly as reactor operators when a reactor has a problem. Such connections to the regional NRC office and appropriate state offices would permit qualified authorities to monitor the course of an accident, assess its potential severity, and plan precautionary measures

• VII. Nuclear Accident Liability Limitations The Chernobyl accident also focuses attention on the nuclear accident liability issue. Currently, federal law limits the lia-bility of reactor operators in the event of a catastrophic acci-dent. This legislation called the Price-Anderson Act -- is now being considered for renewal by Congress. The current limits under the Price-Anderson Act are less than $1 billion. There is little question that this limits could be quickly reached if a

• Chernobyl-like accident* occurred in the United States.

point, the responsibility for treating or At corr.pens a ting accident victims for health or property damage would fall o~ the state or that federal government, and reactor owners/operators and plant designers/constructors would be held harmless from further liability.

The widespread damage caused by the Chernobyl accident

• clearly indicates the need for a substantial increase in the level of nuclear accident insurance required of U.S. utilities.

A proposed revision of Price-Anderson would require automatic payments, in the event of an accident, from all U.S. utilities with opera ting nuclear plants. In addition to these insurance provisions, we see no reason that the public or a state government should be deprived of further recourse from gui 1 ty pa~ties through litigation. That should be accomplished by raising significantly or removing entirely the current cap on nuclear liability.

VIII. Conclusion Chernobyl demonstrates very clearly thai nuclear power plant accidents are possible and that their consequences can be catas-trophic. Although the American nuclear industry initially claimed that a Chernobyl-type accident could not happen here, recent reports indicate that Chernobyl-4 had safety systems that were analogous, at least in principle, to the safety features on some American commercial reactors, including Shoreham.

Even if the specific sequence of events at Chernobyl are eventually demonstrated to be very unlikely in U.S. reactors, t~ere are a host of other types of accidents which can occur and r-::s:..il t in potentially large radiological releases to the environment. Thus, any design differences that exist between Chernobyl Unit 4 and domestic reactors provide little basis for complacency.

As tragic as Chernobyl was, it would be even more tragic if we failed to learn the obvious lessons of this accident. We must redouble our efforts to reduce the likelihood of nuclear accidents, and strengthen our emergency response procedures. To these ends, we must learn from the basic lessons of Chernobyl including:

Lesson One: General design similarities in terms of containment and safety systems exist between Chernobyl-4 and many U.S. nuclear power plants, particularly boiling water reactors. These similarities ,should be considered in reassessing the vulnerablili ty of U.S.

nuclear power plants to serious accidents. The need for such a reassessment is particularly great for pressure suppression containments. This conclusion places a premium on the prompt and thorough-going examination of the Fitzpatrick, Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2, and Shoreham nuclear plants.

Lesson Two: Catastrophic reactor accidents resulting in very large re leases of radioactivity

• are possible in U.S. reactors.

caused by construction inherent quality, design human Such accidents might be deficiencies, error, external lack of events, sabotage, or multiple causes. New York State emergency planning efforts should explicitly consider such serious accidents.

Lesson Three: The long-term impacts of radiation releases on agriculture, health, water, and the economy are likely to be more disruptive to society than the short-term impacts. Unfortunately, current emergency plans place insufficient emphasis on long-term radiation safety measures. Both the early and long-term consequences of a serious reactor accident can be partially mitigated with an effective regional emergency plan which provides for a variety of protective measures, including an extension of the current ten- and fifty-mile emergency planning- zones.

New York state should also consider the need for emergency response for accidents at nuclear power plants in other states and at plants in Canada, since such accidents could require emergency response in counties which do not now have radiological emergency plans to deal with the accident.

Lesson Four: Emergency plans should be in place at all times for an operable reactor, regardless of whether

• the plant is undergoing testing, service, or operating at full power.

temporarily 43/

out of Lesson Five: State governments and regional Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) offices should have an automatic data link connecting them with nuclear power plant control room instruments to ensure prompt assessment of the severity of any potential nuclear power plant accident. Such a data link would help reduce the potential for miscommunication of essential plant status and radiation release information in time of crisis.

QI Although Chernobyl-4 was at low power at the beginning of the accident, the plant achieved initial er i tical i ty on December 14, 1983 (Walter Mitchell, III, Desian Features of the Soviet RBMK-100 O/Chernobyl-4 Reactor, report prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, May 4, 1983), and had operated for some time at higher power levels. Thus, the plant had developed a large amount of fission products and, as a result, a considerable decay heat inventory _at the time of the accident on April 26, 1986.

Lesson Six: The State of New York should ensure that adequate regional and/or federal capabilities are in place for tracking radioactive plumes, and for coordinating actions needed to interdict potentially contaminated food and water supplies, and decontaminate potentially large affected land areas.

Lesson Seven: Remote siting should b~ required for new nuclear power plants. Urban siting severely limits or renders impossible the pr-ompt evacuation of t~e near-site population, which increases the potential -for large early casualty tolls in the event of a serious accident. Further, urban siting increases the potential for society disruption resulting from a serious nuclear accident since a larger number of people would have to be relocated, and a greater level of economic activity would be disrupted. Existing urban-sited plants, such as Indian Point, merit special review of containment adequacy. Improvements can be made to strengthen the ability of existing containments to withstand accidents and mi nirnize re leases. Plans should be developed for the orderly phase out of such plants which cannot be adequately improved in this regard. In the interim, strengthened inspection and enforcement measures should be taken to attempt to reduce the likelihood of an accident and to ensure that emergency response plans and procedures are fully implemented while these plants operate.

Lesson Eiqht: The State of New York should press Congress to raise or entirely remove federal limits on the financial liability of nuclear power plant owners/operators and designers/suppliers who may be at fault in a nuclear accident.

FIGURE 1 l'l Arll ARRAIIGLHUH REHAIHIHG PIHi I IOU~

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OVERFLOW TUBE SPRINKL:'.RS SOURCE: T . Speis and B . Sheron , "St at us Brief i n-g on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Presented to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 0 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 8, 1986 (adapted from).

FIGURE 1 l' LArll ARRAflGL H(N I REHAIIHIIG POHi 11111)

Of PRIM.a.RY SYSllll

• l'.J t, 111 j I 1, t' I I I I __ __ I ~ R[ACTOR VAlll l HAJOR PIPIIIG kUOl1 1,IWlll/11 IL LI (11) SUPPRESSIO!I POOL(S) 72 m (235 FT)

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OVERFLOW TUBE SPRlllKLE~S SOURCE: T. Speis and B . Sheron, "Status Briefin g on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Presented to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Saf .e guards,"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi on , lay 8, 1986 (adapted from).

DOCKET NUMBER P.ETITJON RULE PRM ~6 -,4(, £ii)

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ev Georges. Thomas Vice President-Nuclear Production NYN-87052 April 10, 1987 Public Service of New Hampshire New Hampshire Yankee Division 00(;K£TED USNHC Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

'87 APR 16 Pl2 :20 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

Reference:

(a) Docket No. PRM-50-46

Subject:

State of Maine Petition for Rulemaking (51FR47025);

Comments

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In a letter dated October 14, 1986, Mr. James E. Tierney, Attorney General for the State of Maine acting on behalf of the State, requested the initiation of rulemaking to change NRC reg-ulation 10CFR50.47 regarding emergency preparedness .

Pursuant to the Commission's "Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking", dated December 22, 1986, New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) herewith submits comments (enclosed) concerning the State of Maine's Petition . In brief the enclosure concludes that:

o the State of Maine's Petition provides no analytical basis justifying the extension of the planning zones o State approval of offsite emergency plans as a precondition to authorizing construction may be inconsistent with Con-gressional intent regarding offsite emergency planning o low power operation does not entail the kind of health and safety risks justifying the requirements for offsite emergency plans .

As a result of the above, NHY believes that the State of Maine's Petition for Rulemaking should be rejected.

Very truly yours, Enclosure APR 2 4 1987 Acknowll"dg 0 d by card * ,*,-.**-,Tr..... ~

P.O. Box 300. Seabrook, NH 03874. Telephone (603) 474-9574

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ENCLOSURE TO NYN-87052 Comments on State of Maine's Petition for Rulemaking on Emergency Planning: PRM-50-46 The State of Maine has requested the Commission to amend 10CFR50.47 so as to expand the size of the emergency planning zones (EPZ) for nuclear power facilities, to require that emergency plans be completed and approved by the Governors of affected States before any construction of a nuclear facility is authorized, and to require that offsite emerg-ency preparedness findings be made before fuel loading and/or low power operation is authorized. The asserted ground for this request is the Chernobyl accident where there was an evacuation out to 19 miles from the site (beyond the 10-mile plume EPZ required for U.S. nuclear plants by NRC regulations) and where "fallout" assertedly contaminated crops, milk and animals "all over Europe" (an area larger than the 50 mile ingestion EPZ required for U.S. nuclear plants by NRC regulations).

AB a general comment, neither the cited consequences of the Chernobyl accident, nor the referenced actions found necessary in response to that accident currently justify the regulatory changes the State of Maine seeks in its Petition for Rulemaking. Design differences be-tween U.S. commercial nuclear power facilities and the Chernobyl facility make a Chernobyl-type accident and Chernobyl-type releases virtually impossible for U.S. facilities. In any event, the ramifica-tions of the Chernobyl accident for U.S. nuclear facility emergency planning are still under study.

In its Petition for Rulemaking, the State of Maine provides a proposal by which the Commission would amend 10CFRS0.47. The following discusses the three specific amendments proposed.

1. Proposal Expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway.

Response

The existing NRC regulations involving EPZ sizes were estab-lished based on substantial analyses and evaluations using information available at that time. Included in this evalua-tion was consideration of what was necessary to provide adequate protection for the health and safety of the public around facilities of the type and design existing in the United States.

We believe that there should be such a rational basis for the establishment of EPZ size whether site specific or generic.

In fact, there is a substantial technical database developed /

since TMI that would support, on a generic basis, a reduced EPZ or at least a more graded type of response plan. Since there is nothing in the State of Maine's petition (e.g. grounds for the petition) providing a basis' to justify and support the undefined expansion of the EPZ, the proposed amendment should be rejected.

ENCLOSURE TO NYN-87O52 Comments on State of Maine's Petition for Rulemaking on Emergency Planning: PRM-5O-46 A second difficulty of this proposed amendment is that it perpetuates and extends a shift in Commission policy which occurred directly in response to the TMI accident. Prior to that time, the rule had been that an Applicant for a license to construct and operate a power plant need only show the ability to supply dynamic protection (i.e., sheltering and/or evacuation) of persons located within the low population zone as defined under 10CFRlOO. New England Power Co. (NEP Units 1 and 2), ALAB-39O, 5 NRC 733 (1977). This rule meant that a utility could substitute for a demonstration of the ability to evacuate and/or shelter persons over a widespread area, a plant design which would serve to minimize the low population zone as defined under 10CFRlOO. Such a rule encouraged utilities to invest funds in hardware to protect the public and, in addition, premised the protection of the public upon hardware rather than the need to move or shelter people in time of emergency, with all the associated problems that entails. In light of the foregoing, the old rule represented sound regulatory policy. The post-TM!

rule changed this policy and created a situation where there is reduced incentive, economic or otherwise, for supplemental equip-ment and systems to reduce the risk to the public off-site. The rule proposed by the State of Maine will simply extend this unwise policy.

We also believe that this expansion will compromise the effective-ness of protective action on behalf of individuals who should receive most attention; i.e., those inhabiting areas immediately surrounding plant sites. Effective emergency plans require details in many areas. Each of these plan provisions must be structured to achieve the most effective implementation. This effectiveness hinges primarily upon the area and population characteristics involved. Expanding these two factors changes the overall nature of an optimal approach, and the benefit to any one population segment may be reduced thereby. Planning and response resources should be applied close to the site. More expansion means, effect-ively, less protection.

2. Proposal Require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and the Governor or Governors of any affected State approve the emergency plans as a pre-condition to construction.

Response

The proposal to require offsite emergency plan development and state approval as a precondition to construction is unworkable.

The construction permit stage of licensing is so far in advance of facility completion and final licensing that emergency plans developed then would be meaningless. The many fundamental changes in the characteristics of the planning area, planning and response ENCLOSURE TO NYN-87052 Comments on State of Maine's Petition for Rulemaking on Emergency Planning: PRM-50-46 organizations, and possibly new emergency planning regulatory requirements makes it less advantageous to have emergency plans developed and approved at the construction permit stage. Even if drafted, plan approval would be impossible because of the uncertainties and unanswered questions that would exist.

Similarly, Maine's request that State approval of offsite emergency plans be a precondition to authorization of con-struction is wholly unjustified. Final State-approved off-site plans are simply unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose at the construction permit stage. Beyond that, any requirement for State approval may be inconsistent with the most currently expressed Congressional intent on what is required for offsite emergency planning. Congress has made it clear in past NRC Authorization Acts that utility formu-lated offsite plans may appropriately compensate for deficient State and local government planning. See P.L.96-295, Section 109 (1980); P.L.97-415, Section 5 (1983). This at least implies a Congressional intent not to permit State and local governments to determine nuclear li cens_ing matters by their actions or inactions on nuclear emergency planning. Requiring State approval of offsite plans as a condition of NRC licensing would be contrary to that intent. Indeed, NRC currently may not have the authority to impose a requirement that runs counter to such Congressional intent. The State of Maine's request in this regard should be denied.

There is an additional reason why adoption of such a rule would constitute unwise policy. As stated in 1 above, it represents a reaffirmation and extension of a policy which was inserted into the regulations after the TMI accident which, however laudable its purpose, has turned out to be unworkable and to have given states an unintended de facto power to delay the licensing of nuclear power plants, even those in neighboring states. At the time the present regulations were adopted, the Commission stated its belief "that State and local officials as partners in this undertaking will endeavor to provide fully for public protection". 45 FR at 55404, August 19, 1980.

Unfortunately, this belief has turned out to have been in error, at least with respect to certain states. Nuclear power plants in two states are being held hostage to the refusal of state and local officials to cooperate with the NRC, FEMA, and the utilities in emergency planning. In addition, officials in at least one other State have threatened to refuse future cooperation thus threatening the closure of operating plants in that State. We believe that the proposed addition to 10CFRS0.47 recently published for comment (52FR6980, March 6, 1987) is a step in the right direction on this policy issue.

The suggestion of the State of Maine is not.

ENCLOSURE TO NYN-87052 Comments on State of Maine's Petition for Rulemaking on Emergency Planning: PRM-50-46

3. Proposal Require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are per-mitted.

Response

Again, the State of Maine has provided no justification for its request.

Under current regulations [10CFR50.47(d)] the NRC may issue a low power license without regard to the adequacy of offsite emergency plans. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), CLI-85-1, 21 NRC 275, 278-79 (1985); CLI-83-17, 17 NRC 1032, 1034 (1983). This is not because NRC ignores emergency preparedness for low power operation. It is because the NRC has long recognized that nuclear power plant operation at low power levels (5% of rated power or less) entails low risk to public health and safety. For example, in modifying its emergency planning regulations to reduce the requirements for low power licensing, the Commission stated that

[it] has *** fully considered the risks of operating a nuclear power reactor at low power. The risks of operating a power reactor at low power are significantly lower than the risks of operating at full power because: first, the fission product inventory during low power testing is much less than during higher power operation due to the low level of reactor power and short period of operation; second, at low power there is a significant reduction in the required capacity of systems designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents compared to the required capacities under full-power operation; and third, the time available for taking actions to identify accident causes and mitigate accident consequences is much longer than at full power. This means the operators should have sufficient time to prevent a radioactive release from occurring. In the worst case, the additional time available (at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />), even for a postulated low likelihood sequence which eventually results in release of the fission products accumulated at low power into the containment, would allow adequate precautionary actions to be taken to protect the public near the site. Emergency Planning and Preparedness

- Final Rule, 47 FR 30232, July 13, 1982.

ENCLOSURE TO NYN-87052 Comments on State of Maine's Petition for Rulemaking on Emergency Planning: PRM-50-46 In effect, the Commission determined that not all emergency planning requirements were necessary for fuel loading and low power operation because the risks are low. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), CLI-83-17, 17 NRC 1032, 1034 (1983). Similarly the Commission has found that the environmental impacts of low power operation are insignificant and are "subsumed in the far greater impacts of full power operation". Shoreham, CLI-85-12, 21 NRC 1587, 1590 (1985).

In general, the NRC has consistently denied motions for stays of low power licensing because the movants "failed to describe any aspect of low power operation which would create an undue risk to public health and safety or to plant personnel".

Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-5, 19 NRC 953, 964 (1984). See also Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 748 and n. 20 (1985) (claims about severe accidents from low power operation were purely conjectural); Shoreham, ALAB-810, 21 NRC 1616, 1620 (1985)

(no demonstrated actual threat to public health and safety from low power operation); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-794, 20 NRC 1630, 1633-35 (1984)

(no demonstrated irreparable injury from low power operation).

Low power operation simply does not entail the kind of health and safety risks that would justify any requirement for fully approved offsite emergency plans as requested by the State of Maine. Therefore, we see no reason for requiring offsite emergency preparedness findings to be made prior to fuel loading or low power testing.

1fl Am 15 P4 :19 Nuclear 1n,orm~tion and Resource~,~~f 1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 160, Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-0002 roHft~?~~\

y r-;.;:i"l[f BRAN ,:j"*' '*

Comments of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service on t~e Sexton and Maine Attorney General's petitions for rulemaking (PRM 50-45 and 50-46) requesting changes in the emergency planning regulations.

On October 6, 1986, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register a *Notice of receipt of petition for rulemaking* from Kenneth G. Sexton (51 FR 35518). Mr. Sexton proposes that 10 CFR 50.47 be amended so that the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) for all nuclear power plants consist of a site-specific area determined by the NRC. It states that the NRC will use *methodologies and procedures which are generally accepted as reasonably current and appropriate by recognized professional groups* such as the American Meteorology Society and the Environmental Protection Agency. The petitioner is concerned that current EPZs are not based upon the most up-to-date techniques, casting doubt on the assumptions used for the current 10-mile emergency planning zones. The Nuclear Information and Resource Service herein submits its comments opposing the petition as it is currently worded. Implicit in the petition is that the EPZ would be of a much different, and probably larger, nature if such concepts as meteorology, geography and topography were taken into account. However, the petitioner does not stipulate a minimum-sized zone, and it is for this reason that NIRS-opposes the petition. It is NIRS' belief that emergency planning zones should consist of a twenty-mile minimum zone with the flexibility to expand due to site-specific factors such as those mentioned in MR. Sexton's petition.

On March 24, 1982 (47 FR 12639) the NRC published a petition for rulemaking (PRM-50-31) submitted by the Citizens' Task Force of Chapel Hill, North Carolina which requested the expansion of EPZs to 20 miles. This petition taken in combination with the Sexton and Maine Attorney General's petitions {which requests an expanded zone) would result in more prudent emergency planning zones.

---

---*-*The following -comments--should-be -considered--to-apply-to-.all-of _____

the above-mentioned petitions, in as much as they. all address similar issues.

I. The Ten-Mile EPZ is Inadequate C

In promulgating its Emergency Planning rule in 1980, the NRC concluded that a 10 mile zone was a sufficiently large area,

based on the findings of the NRC/EPA Task Force on Emergency Planning (NOREG-0396 *Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergecy Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants", USNRC/USEPA.) The findings of the Task Force are accepted by the NRC in NUREG-0654

("Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants* Novemeber, 1980), the guidance for implementing the 1

1980 emergency planning rule, 10 CFR 50.47. The Task Force concluded that a 10-mile zone would provide adequate protection for the public and the flexibility to allow state and local officials to respond to emergencies, even in instances where high doses of radiation go beyond the 10-mile zone. This conclusion--that a 10-mile zone is sufficient--sbould not have been accepted by the NRC in its emergency planning rulemaking efforts in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident for a number of reasons. In light of some recent studies and experience, this conclusion is even less valid now.

The decision to plan for evacuation of a zone of 10 miles ignores both a sizable percentage of accidents which conceivably could cause large releases of radiation far beyond 10 miles and a body of evidence which indicates that far larger numbers of people can be expected to evacuate during an accident--a situation which could result in unpredicted complications and delays in evacuation, and therefore increased exposures to the public.

Further, the original decision to plan out to 10 miles, documented in NUREG-0396, pre-dates the Three Mile Island accident. That accident demonstrated the unreliability of ad hoc emergency response measures. Whetner an ad hoc evacuation occurs out to five miles, as the case in TMI, or beyond the 10-mile zone in a severe Class 9 accident, the measures are nevertheless still unplanned. There can be no assurance that town and county officials beyond the 10-mile zone will be any more prepared to deal with evacuees from a nuclear accident than were the befuddled officials at TMI.

The rul~ also pre-dates the Chernobyl accident. Doubtless-,-tfiere are a large number of lesson$ to be learned from the evacuation that took place in the Soviet Union in April, 1986., While only 7%

of the core was released into the atmosphere, the Soviets evacuated 18 miles and beyond--up to 50 miles in some areas (Yevgeny Velikohf, Vice-President of the Soviet National Academy of Sciences). Some of the details of that evacuation indicate that in many ways the Soviets may have had a nbest casen accident for the evacuation, including decreased doses to the public due

to the housing materials used, as well as a number of other factors.

A more prudent course than the current regulations does exist. It would include planning for the relatively high percentage of severe accidents with large consequences beyond 10 miles. Mr.

Sexton's petition presents some valuable suggestions for the Commission to consider, including updating the meteorological equipment and techniques employed in assessing an accident, as well as using this information in the emergency planning stage to prepare for particularly troublesome wind patterns found in various parts of the country, especially the coasts.

Indeed there are many site-specific considerations the Commission should take into account when developing a more comprehensive regulation. However, these considerations should be coupled with a 20-mile minimum zone to ensure that the effects of the more severe accidents can be planned for, as well as to establish a uniformly applicable and enforceable base-line zone.

A. The Basis of the 10-Mile Zone Decision in Flawed (1) The Reactor Safety Study is Unreliable The conclusion by the Task Force in NUREG-0396 to plan out to 10 miles was based in large part on the Reactor Safety Study, using its accident probability estimates which had very wide ranges of uncertainty attached to them. Indeed, the Reactor Safety Study has been highly criticized. A group convened to review the RSS, headed by Harold Lewis of the University of California at Santa Barbara, questioned the methodologies and conclusions of the report. A January 18, 1979 NRC Statement said of the Review Group's assessment of RSS's accident probabilities that:

The Review Group was unable to determine whether the absolute probabilities of.accident sequences in WASB-1400' are high or low, but believes that the error bounds on those

__es_tima.tes __ are_in__gen_~raL_g:i-;eatly understated. This, the Report said, is true in part becaus-eof--an-lnaffil.,,i~t-y---.t_o_____

quantify common cause failures, and in part because of some questionable methodological and statistical procedures.

The Review Group also criticizes, in some cases severely, various pf the calculational techniques in the -study as well as its lack of clarity.

Despite the uncertainty asso9iated with WASB-1400, its calculations were, nonetheless, relied upon in the development of the 10-mile :El>Z.

(2) The Decision To Plan Out to 10 Miles Was Made Prior to TMI NUREG-0396--the report the NRC relied on for its current emergency planning regulations, was written in 1978, before the Three Mile Island accident--the very event which spawned the need for cohesive emergency plans. We have learned a lot since that accident about the nature of accidents and emergency planning, including how humans react to an emergency--utility officials, reactor operators, NRC officials, governors, state and local officials and emergency response personnel and members of the general public.

TMI demonstrated that the complexitites involved in recognizing the seriousness of an accident and responding to it can lengthen the amount of time the public is exposed to radiation. TMI illustrated that we won't necessarily know that an accident is happening while it is in progress: that operators, utility officials and members of the NRC may tend to disbelieve what. the reactor instruments are telling them; that a chaos of miscommunications may prevail; that officials may hesitate to alert the general public to the occurrence of an accident or recommend eyacuation1 that larger numbers of people than expected will decide to *self-evacuate* causing congested roads and longer evacuation times (see section on shadow effect.) While changes in the regulations have occurred since TMI, these types of human reactions are of the sort that are difficult to regulate but must Qe considered. All of these factors lengthen the amount of time between the onset of an accident and the decision to remove the public from the area. Such delays, in most cases, would increase the period of time in which the public is ~xposed to radiation.

As the basis for the current regulation on emergency planning, NUREG-0396 is inadequate. It pre-dates the TMI accident and therefore does not take into account what was learned there; it

_ _ relias_on_t.be_discredited RSS, and within its contents, itself recognizes the large uncertant.Tes 1n -fts7: igures. Its - ---

recommendation for a 10-mile emergency planning zone should have been reevaluated in the aftermath of TMI with the decision to develop meaningful emergency planning regulations. Instead, the NRC simply adopted the recommendations of the Task Force and directed its staff to incorporate the outdated document into emergency preparedness documents (NUREG-0654 ncriteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response

Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants* at p.6.)

(3) A Large Risk of High Doses Exceeding 10 Miles Exists Accepting the flaws in calculational methods used in NUREG-0396 and evaluating the recommended 10 mile zone taking the figures at face value, the judgement used in reaching the decision for a 10 mile zone is highly questionable. For instance, the report statesz As illustrated in Appendix I, consequences of less severe Class 9 accidents would not exceed the PAG levels outside the recommended EPZ distance. In addition, the EPZ is of sufficient size to provide for substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) in the event of the more severe Class 9 accidents. {NUREG-0396 at pp. 16-17).

Such a judgement is unacceptably arbi~rary. Further, the task force acknowledges that a more severe Class 9 accident is not a remote possibility. In fact, the document states that *1ess than 30% of all core melt accidents would result in high exposure outside the recommended planning distances" (at p. I-9) and later that *it is evident that doses can potentially be quite high out to considerable distances.* {at p. I-41.) A 30% chance of exposures beyond the planning zone constitutes a relatively large

.e risk, in our opinion. Such a cut-off point causes undue peril to the health and safety of the population near the plant.

Recognizing that the current regulations do not preclude evacuation or protective measures beyond the zone, any evacuation of this kind would be carried out in an ad hoc fashion and is likely to result in chaos and perhaps curtail~ evacuation from this larger zone.

Additionally, the report states that the travel time for a ,

release out to 10 miles varies between 1 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (NUREG-0396

, Table 2 at p. 20.) At many of the more densely populated reactor 1-- sites in 'tne coi:mt::r*y,evacuees-1-ikely -wU:i*-be-s-itt-i-ng--tn-tr af..f-ic--- -*

when the plume passes. Estimated evacuation times for the Seabrook plant are up to eight hours, for example. This situation would be even further aggravated by an ad hoc evacuation beyond the 10-mile zone, given the speed with which winds can travel.

It is important for the Commission to keep in mind that the purpose of emergency planning is the planning. Since many studies indicate that many injuries and deaths could occur beyond a

10-mile zone, it is wise to extend planning beyond that zone.

While it may be true that evacuations for most accidents need not extend 20 miles or more, the possibility exists and should be planned for. The existence of a larger zone does not necessitate a full evacuation in every accident.

(4) The 30% Figure is Misleading While a 30% chance of core melts causing doses in excess of the Protective Action Guidelines (PAG) is itself a sizable risk, the figure is also misleading. As the Union of Concerned Scientists pointed out in its comments in 1982 to the Citizens Task Force Petition (PRM 50-31), the accidents which dominate the risk to the public are the accidents which result in the largest releases of radioactivity to the environment.

Emergency planning requirements were promulgated to protect the public in the event of an accident where radiation releases could present a health threat. The EPZ should accurately reflect that threat. A *risk assessment* of the relative risks posed by normal operational releases of radioactivity from nulcear plants, accidents which fall within the design basis and accidents which exceed the design basis was prepared for the NRC by Brookhaven National Laboratory (NUREG/CR-0603, *A Risk Assessment of a Pressurized-Water Reactor for Class 3-8 Accidentsa, October 1979). The study clearly shows that the risk to the public from nuclear power plants is dominated by accidents beyond the design basis. As UCS states in its 1982 comments, an analysis of the report shows that accidents beyond the design basis can be seen to contribute over 99% of the risk to the public from nucle*ar power plants. As we noted above, it is precisely for these accidents that emergency planning is a necessity, and the EPZ should reflect that threat.

B. The Current Risk Assessment Methodologies Are An Uncertain Science; the Current Regulations Are Not Conservative

• -------~Tl:ie bellef-tnirt- *aa hocr7nea*sur-es-*b-eyond--J.O milea-wou*ld-be-adequate----

is unfounded. In fact, uncertainties that exist in the current state of knowledge of severe accidents and containment performance would lead one to conclude that the decision to stop planning at 10-miles was merely a guess.

An internal NRC memo dated April 30, 1986 from the Executive Director for Operations, Victor Stello, to Commissioners Bernthal and Asselstine shows that there is presently no basis for

confidence in the estimates of accident "source ter-ms* (the quantity and timing of radiation releases in a severe accident.)

The memo states * *** it is becoming, apparent that some of the uncertainties may be so large, even with knowlege gained from the four years of intense focused research to date, that NRC may not be able to provide a satisfactory reduction of these uncertainties with existing resources." Within this memo Mr.

Stello admits that the NRC bas essentially W2 understanding of

• severe accident behavior at core melt conditions.*

The ramifications of this memo are clear for emergency planning--Mr. Stello goes on to state that the uncertainties in fuel melting and core melt progressions lead "to large uncertainties in containment heating and penetration calculations which in turn are used in health effect consequence determinations." Clearly neither WASB-1400 nor current source term work can be a reliable or conservative measure of the health th~eat posed by severe accidents.

The report which documents the source term work, the Reactor Risk Reference Document (NUREG-1150), in fact, discloses that the expected frequency of large releases from reactor accidents is higher than the Commission would like. The Commission tentatively suggested a goal for the frequency of large releases of radiation at 1 in 1,000,000 per year. The NRC staff then decided upon a definition for a large release as that "sufficient to cause one or more early fatalities*. (NUREG-1150, ES p.10) The staff reported in NUREG-1150 that "not a11* of the 5 types of plants examined met this test. It is important to note that the Chernobyl accident is not termed a large release under this definition.

It is clear that neither WASB-1400 nor the new source term study can predict the reliability of US containments, and that in fact, the containments will not meet the desired safety standards. An NRC-sponsored workshop on containment integrity in 1986 found that in eleven out of twelve evaluations, us containments could not meet the desired standards. The proposed goals for core melt probabilities themselves were unacceptably high. The core melt

...robablilit~goal..::::fQt,...J,IS -reactors_ of__!_9__ ".'"_4__per reactor-year used

- -------p in the evaluations at the workshop translates into approximate1y*----

a 40% chance of a core melt in the expected lives of the current population of plants, according to workshop participant, Daniel Hirsch of the University of California in Santa Cruz in his minority report. Hirsch claims that probability increases to a 60-70% probability if new plants are not prohibited.

Given the high probability of a core melt and the uncertain strengths of US containments, 9ne must question the adequacy of the 10-mile EPZ. With the body of evidence to show that radiation doses could conceivably extend beyond 10-miles, it is only sensible to Rl.An beyond 10 miles.

(1) No Criteria is Used For Mandating Evacuation While the NRC relies upon the Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines for recommended courses of action during an accident, there is no mandated expected dose for which specific protective actions should be taken. The NRC has stated that *the existing emergency planning regulations does (sic) not require that plans achieve any pre-established minimum dose savings in the event of an accident.* (52 FR 6980, March 6, 1987}. No criteria have been developed based on the expected health effects from radiation that would help determine when an evacuation should be ordered. The EPA PAGs include limits for the public of one to five rems whole-body dose and 5-25 rem to the thyroid. The EPA recommends that of these projected doses (the dose if no protective action were taken), the lowest value should be used if there are no major local constraints in providing protection at that level.

However, the NRC does not require its staff or utility officials to follow this guidance in recommendations for evacuation. The emergency planning regulations state that the 10-mile zone is flexible enough to allow for evacuation beyond the zone, should an accident occur which would have serious health effects for the public. But the NRC staff admitted to the Limerick Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that it felt an evacuation beyond the IO-mile m would be unlikely to occur unless a 200-rem thyroid dose was expected over a seven-day period (Limerick ASLB, December, 1984-January, 1985 p.11,561). Early fatalities begin to occur at 175 rem. Such an admission underscores the need for evacuation planning beyond the 10-mile zone1 evacuations ordered only when a projected dose of 200 rem thyroid is expected will cause unnecessary exposures to the public. Further, many of the cities beyond the 10-mile zone may act as hosts to evacuees. This

---

increased_p_opulation_may _cal,'l,se__ag_ded _q~lay_'l;:~c!_n ad---~-

hoc --- ---'----*----- -~

evacuation ordered at such a late date.

(2) California OES Study Recommends Larger Zone It is clear that the NRC must reconsider its approach to emergency planning. A more appropriate approach was used by the

State of California Office of Emergency Services (*Emergency Planning Zones for Serious Nuclear Power Plant Accidents*,

November, 1980, Alex R. Cunningham, Director). The OES study concerned itself with those accidents which pose the greatest risk to the public healtb--acidents beyond the desing basis LOCA.

The OES study stated (p. 66)1

• (P)ru4ence dictates that the EPZs be extended so that advance planning can be performed to aid in resolving the potential problems associated with the more severe types of accidents, the penetration leakage and major containment failure classifications *** It did not seem prudent to restrict planning attention to reponding QD.l.;z to the potential for incurring immediate life threatening radiation doses for such severe accidents. Thus the extended zones were selected so that the potential for incurring health impacting doses was reduced not only for early fatalities, but also for early injuries and delayed cancer effects as well *** (E)xtending the EPZ boundaries results in a prudent reduction in the probabilities of early health effects and a substantial reduction in the probabilities of early health effects and a substantial reduction in the probability of delayed health effects (associated with -0.5 to i' rem PAG dose limits).*

To establish a plume EPZ for major containment failure accidents, OBS-specified a zone outside of which the probability of exceeding a whole-body dose of 200 rem would be less than 1%1 the results, as shown in the OES study, table 4.1:

REACTOR MAJOR CONTAINMENT FAILURE EPZ Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 26 miles Rancho Seco 28 miles San Onofre 1 18 miles San Onofre 2 & 3 35, miles Similar conclusions were reached by a 1982 study conducted by Sandia National Laboratories for the NRC using the CRAC-2 computer code. The CRAC-2 study revealed that under adverse weather conditions, a severe reactor accident with containment failure could cause early (within one year) fatalities as far as 25 miles from a reactor site and cancers from even greater

distances.

c. Planning Must Extend Beyond 10 Miles, Ad Hoc Planning Does Not Work Given the likelihood of exposures exceeding the ten mile zone, a more prudent course would be to require planning out to a minimum of 20 miles. Another approach to emergency planning is an expanded response or graduated response zone such as was proposed before the Massachusetts State Legislature. A detailed planning zone would still exist--NIRS recommends 20 miles--along with a larger protective response zone out to 40 miles, recommended in the Massachusetts bill. This approach does not require that evacuation plans be developed for the entire 40 mile area, but calls for a variety of preparedness measures. "It requires that expanded preparedness efforts including increased public education about radiation hazards and appropriate protective actions, identification of public shelters, medical facilities, and reception centers for evacuees, training of medical facilities, and reception centers for evacuees, training of medical personnel in the treatment of radiation injuries, dissemination of a medication to pro~ect the thyroid gland and identification of optimal evacuation routees in case some evacuation beyond 10 miles were warranted.* (S.2066, Sen. Golden)

NUREG-0654 states that "it would be unlikely that any protective actions for the plume exposure pathway would be required beyond the plume exposure EPZ*, but that "detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary." (at 12.) The involvement in an evacuation by entities not previously involved, or the ad hoc involvement of towns and counties beyond the ten mile zone during a nuclear emergency would not be as simple as the report would have one believe. The evacuation which took place during the TMI accident is the best example we have to examine the benefits and drawbacks of ad hoc evacuation.

(1) The TMI Example Many of the counties surrounding TMI did indeed have emergency plans which spanned out to five miles around the plant. However, none of these were activated. In its review of the plans, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Task Force of the President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island, found that the plans suffered from a "military mentality*. It found that plan "assumes that the people will follow directions. Potential

evacuation problems are not addressed in specific detail *** * (p.

115). Some of the plans required evacuation after a release of radioactivity, but the plans were never implemented. The Commission task force found that confusion reigned as to who would make the order to evacuate. The counties assumed the governor would, and the governor left much of the response up to county officials who had a more immediate relationship to the problem. The State of Pennsylvani~ had a 1978 revised emergency plan stipulating a 5-mile zone, but the Task Force found that

• this document provided little guidance to those counties who are responsible -for this planning.* {p. 129).

such a situation of chaos resulting from an unfamiliarity with the plans will result from the lack of participation in emergency response drills by towns and counties beyond the 10-mile zone.

That the NRC-believes evacuation response could be carried out beyond the zone in an ad hoc fashion is an example of wishful thinking. It is precisely the situation the NRC, Congress and a lot of other people tried to avoid in promulgating the rule. The choice of a 10-mile zone was inappropriate, having been based as it was on old data written before TMI or Chernobyl.

(2) The "Shadow Phenomenonn Studies have shown that evacuation behavior differs in nuclear accidents than for natural disasters. The assertion that emergency resporise could be carried out beyond the zone because all states and counties have*evacuation plans for hurricanes and the like, is nonsense. First, states and counties almost always have advance warning of the impending emergency,and most likely would not for a nuclear accident. The assertion is further invalidated when one considers the divergent behaviors demonstrated for the different kinds of disasters. Studies have shown that people tend to wait until the last minute or until told to leave by police or other emergency personnel during natural disasters such as flood and hurricanes. However, this likely will not be the case for nuclear disasters. During the TMI evacuation--which was only a recommended evacuation of a limited poi:t1oh-----i>f cne-popu*~a*tion--39% ~of* the popul*ation--*fled-the area~~

within 15 miles of the plant. If only the people advised to evacuate had left the area, the number of evacuees would have been approximately 2,500 pre-school chldren and pregnant women.

Instead, 144,000 people evcacuated their homes within 15 miles of the plant.

Further, the number of evacuees involved in a nuclear accident far exceeds the number in other disasters. Evacuations from

natural disasters tend to affect a slice of the population. 941 of all evacuations involved 100,000 people or fewer and 53% less than 1,000. The TMI task force found that evacuation of entire communities is winfrequent*. (p.144) The scope of the evacuation and relocation necessary in a nuclear accident could become mind-boggling.

(3) Chernobyl One cannot ignore the real life experience we have had with the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the soviet Union. An accident like the one at Chernobyl probably cannot happen at a plant in the u.s., however, an accident of similar consequences could. While only 71 of the Chernobyl core was released into the atmosphere, the Soviets evacuated 135,000 people from an 18-mile radius--some permanently--as well as from

• hot spots* up to 50 miles from the reactor. The United States recalled its citizens visiting the area as far away as the city of Kiev--nearly 70 miles from the plant. Further, the accident had widespread consequences throughout Europe and, indeed, the world. Bans Blix, director general for the International Atomic Energy Agency said of Chernobyl "It was realized for the first--and hopefully last--time that a nuclear power accident in one country could have physical consequences through radioactive fallout in other c,ountries* (Associated Press, 4/14/87).

While the Chernob~l accident released 100 million curies or mQre of radiation, the accident clearly could have been worse. The Soviets estimate that up to 201 of the iodines were released and 13% of the cesium. These figures relate to offsite releases which are less than the worst releases predicted in WASH-1400. In that study, the worst accidents--the SST-1 ~nd SST-2--would cause the release of 70% of the iodines and 401 of the cesium. ("What the Chernobyl Accident Means for the u.s. Nuclear Power Program*,

Commissioner James Asselstine, September 20, 1986.) Nonetheless, the accident releases exceeded the EPA's Protective Action Guidelines in several we. stern_European countries, including Sweden, Finland, Norway, West Germany, Italy and Britain *

~ -- - - - -I*n-many-ways--,.-the Sov-iets -may.-have-had-a.....!bes L.case~.cenarJ._Q_fQ=r_ _

ev~cuation. The accident occurred during the night while most of the residents of the nearby town of Pripyat were sleeping.

Because the population was inside during the early hours of the accident, the Soviets had time to plot the logistics of the evacuation, including evacuation routes, alerting medical facilities, and locating appropriate relocation sites for evacuees. This process was further aided by the climate of the

area which was hot and dry, the high release from the plant and the positive sheltering capabilities of the materials used in constructing homes--primarily concrete. The thermal and wind conditions at the time of the first releas~ of radiation from the plant lifted the plume above and around Pripyat. (*Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station*, USNRC, NUREG-1250 p.7-8). These factors provided a 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> lee-way before evacuation of the residents within a few miles of the plant began.

An additional factor in reducing exposures was the relatively small number of privately-owned automobiles. This prevented residents from carrying radiation on their cars to areas far beyond the immediately affected area.

The bulk of the evacuation--the removal of 90,000 people and much of their cattle--was completed approximately one week after the initial explosion at the plant. Bus drivers making several trips to remove people received large doses because the evacuation route "(a)pparently coincided with the plume centerline for a fairly large distance.*(NtJREG-1250 p.7-9)

The Soviet accident was similar to TMI in that the operators at Chernobyl were reluctant to notify government authorities early on. The Soviets claim that the operators at Chernobyl failed to appreciate the potential impact of the accident, and therefore kept even Moscow in the dark. (NY Times, "Delay Reported on Evacuation at Nuclear Site,* May 7, 1986.) If these delays indicate a trend, it could have a harmful impact on evacuation times. The theory behind evacuation is to remove people before harmful doses of radiation are released. Any delays in alerting authorities could greatly hinder such efforts.

Unfortunately, many of the positive aspects of the Soviet evacuation would not be present at a o.s. reactorz housing materials are generally wooden for much of the nation as opposed to concrete, most people have their own vehicles and would self-evacuate causing a more chaotic scenario than the Soviets*,

the meteorologic conditions for the area where the majority of u.s. plants are located--the eastern seaboard--is noted for its changfrig-wind-pat:'t-etmr--and--unp?"'edictable---preci.pitati-on,-in~--,----

contrast to the bot, dry cli~ate near Chernobyl.

Conclusion The petitions under consideration contain a number of positive

aspects. It is only logical that site-specific factors should be considered in planning for evacuation. Mr. Sexton's suggestions on meteorological monitoring equipment and techniques are especially pertinent in light of the effect that weather conditions had on the concentration of and direction of the radioactive plume during the Chernobyl accident. However, for all of the above-stated reasons--the likely delays in notification and evacuation, the relatively large risk of accidents causing large doses eyond 10-miles etc.-- Mr. Sexton's petition should be granted only in conjunction with an expanded EPZ of 20 miles, as requested in PRM 50-31 (The Citizens Task Force, 1982).

NIRS concurs with the intent of the Maine Attorney General's petition. (PRM 50-46) to expand the.EPZs, and again would specify a 20-mile minimum zone. The two addition points raised in the Maine Attorney General's petition are also prudent requirements for the emergency planning regulations. One would require the approval of the plan by states within the EPZ before any construction begins. This requirement would eliminate the potential for the consideration of capital investment in a facility at licensing time when, under the current regulations, emergency plans are being evaluated. The other provision of that petition would require that offsite preparedness findings be made before fuel loading and/or low power operation. Such a provision would prevent unnecessary contamination of the plant, should those findings conclude that evacuation of a particular site is unfeasible or impossible.

We thank you for considering our comments in your review of the proposed petitions for rulemaking.

April 15, 1987

JAMES E. TIERNEY ATTORNEY GENERAL

'87 APR 15 P4 :27 STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE HOUSE STATION 6 AUGUSTA, MAINE 04333 April 14, 1987 Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20055 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Re: State of Maine Petition for Rulemaking, Docket No. PRM-50-46

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The State of Maine submits the following additional comments on the above-captioned matter pursuant to the extension provided until April 15, 1987. See 52 Fed. Reg. 8460 (Mar . 18 , 198 7 ) .

As we indicated in our previous submission dated February 27, 1987, our comments are necessarily preliminary because Maine's petition is based in part upon the implications of Chernobyl, which is still being studied. That continues to be true today. Although studies assessing the consequences of Chernobyl are just beginning to emerge, see,~-, c. Flavin, Reassessing Nuclear Power: The Fallout from Chernobyl (1987)

(incorporated by reference), much work remains to be done.

Indeed, the Commission's own analysis (Nureg-1150) has not yet been finalized.

In light of the potentially devastating consequences of an accident in face of inadequate emergency planning procedures, we believe that this rush to judgment on Maine's petition is unwarranted and unfortunate. Chernobyl and the surrounding Acknowledged by card. , *rm--~~~ XJ*.~Mi

I I (

Secretary, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 April 14, 1987 wastelands stand as a constant reminder of the necessity of adequate emergency planning. Although the nuclear industry ' s only response to this chilling memorial is that Chernobyl couldn't happen here, they also seek to dispose of Maine's petition before all of the evidence is in. We believe Maine's petition should be granted or that the record should be held open until dispositive information is available to make sure that the next Chernobyl does not, and cannot, occur in this country.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

---r -

ruly yours, TIERN Gener klc

~$1Dg .

• er: The Fallo

. Oi . .-*

March 1987

Table of Contents Sections of this paper may be reproduced in magazines and news- Introduction .....

papers with acknowledgment to Worldwatch Institute. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent An Accident Repor those of Worldwatch Institute and its directors, officers, or staff.

The Political Fallou How Safe is Nude Revising the NuclE Beyond Indecision Notes ......... .

C>Copyright Worldwatch Institute, 1987 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 87-50070 ISBN 0-916468-76-3 Printed on recycled paper

QC,  ::TED ECOLOGY CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA US RC Prqect of Educational Corrrn..ncations. Inc.

Mailing Addre ss. PO Box . . . .Los Angeles CA 1 I

~ 90035 '87 APR 10 P4 :33 Te le1::rore (213) 5 59 - 9 160 OFF ICE OF SE1.,1~::. fAR'(

OOCKE TI G SEiWICf.

April 4, 1987 BRA CH Secretary Samuel Chilk u . s . Nuclear Regulatory Connnission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

The owners of the Seabrook nuclear power plant have applied for an exemption from NRC .

We are extremely oppos~d to the granting of such an exemption, since it was requested using weak arguments that predate the I Dlhree Mile Island accident; also because this could set a dangerous precedent .

We have many problems about nuclear waste . For example, Maine Atty.

General Tierney has proposed that both EPZ and the ingestion pathway around nuclear plants be expanded iue to radiation expansion.

This is an important consideration .

Also , re waste disposal of radioactive materials, we would like to suggest that revised plans for high- level nuclear waste dump should not only be expedited immediately, but should cut short the time gap .

We are in effect sitting on an environmental time-bomp , and this problem should have top priority. It simply does not seem logical to us that we have nuclear toxics seeping out of what have now been proven are fragile containers, into our earth, air and oceans .

As a responsible environmental group, we also favor a moratorium on all nuclear proliferation until these problems are solved.

Sincerely ,

Elaine Stansfield Associate Director ES/lm APR 2 4 1987 krl6wledged by card .................. ..,

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TENNESSEE VALLEY CHATTANOOGA . TENNESSEE 37401 OOC,KETED SN 157B Lookout Place :JSNRC APR 031987 0 87 APR -6 P4 :37 OFFICE GF S~._, ,,t TA1 ,

• OOCKETING & Jt l~VICf

~ s . Nuclear Regulatory Commission BRANl~H Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Secretary of the Commission

Dear Sir:

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is pleased to provide colM\ents on the petition for rulemaking (PRM-50-46) fi led by the State of Maine as noticed in the December 30, 1986 Federal Register notice (51 FR 47025-47026).

We believe that it is premature to conclude that present emergency planning zones (EPZs) around U.S. reactors are insufficient based upon the Chernobyl reactor accident. Changing the present EPZ for the plume exposure pathway and the ingestion pathway may be somewhat unrealistic if such a change is based on an accident involving the Chernobyl-type reactor. The accident and its consequences are presently being studied by the scientific community, and this analysis should identify any deficiencies in NRC's licensing process, such as in emergency planning.

Therefore, no changes to either the plume exposure or the ingestion pathway EPZs should be undertaken at this time. Accordingly, we recommend the petition be denied.

Enclosed are our specific comments which address each of the proposed changes to 10 CFR 50.47. We appreciate the opportunity to colM\ent on the petition for rulemaking.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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Director and Licensing Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Executive Secretary Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Tom Tipton AIF, Inc.

7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 APR 13 1987

~know "dged by Qi ~:...i....., *... ***<tC An Equal Oppor tunity Employer

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Encl osure TVA's Comments on PRM-50-46

l. Proposed Revision:

Expand both the emergency planning zone (EPZ) fQr the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway .

Response

The 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ is intended to be an area in which significant preplanning ts done. It would be within portions of this area in which an immediate emergency response may be necessary in the event of a radiological eme rgency. AJthough it may be possible under certain worst-case scenarios to have radioactive particulate spread beyond the 10-mtle EPZ, the amount of radioactiv i ty would be much less than that experienced near the plant, and there would be suffi cie nt time to make any additional planning arrangements on an ad hoc basis because of the increased distance from the plant. A substantial amount of source analysis has been and continues to be conducted which may ultimately have an effect upon the size of the EPZs . However, unt il all data has been adequately considered, we do not believe changes to the plume exposure or the ingestion pathway EPZs are warranted .

2. Proposed Revision:

Require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the governor or governors of any affected State approve the emerge ncy plans as a precondition to construction.

Response

He believe that current regulations adequately allow for consideration of emergency planning matters at the construction permit stage. According to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section II, the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report must address a wide range of emergency planning considerations in conjunction with facility design and siting factors. He do believe there is grea t merit, however, in licensees closely coordinating their early emergency planning activities with the affected States. Early exchanges and developing a close working relationship with the States in emergency planning matters lessens the possibi l ity that States will refu se to cooperate in later licensing stages. He do not be li eve i ~ is feasible ,

however , to con duct all emergency planning acti vities before construction of the facility, nor do we be li eve that State approval at that early stage would sol ve the problem of nonpart i cipation at a later date when detailed plann ing must necessar ily be conducted .

3. Proposed Revision:

Require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low-power operations are permitted.

Response

We be li eve the current regulations adequately protect the health and safe t y of the publi c in authorizing fu el loading and/or low-power te st i ng . Becau se the re are no fiss ion products in the core during f ue l loading and the core rema in s rela tively free of these products during low-power testing, we do not believe there would be any real benefit to requiring NRC or the Federal Emergency Management Agency's findings regarding offsite emergency planning at these preoperational stages. Consideration of both onsite and offsite emergency preparedness throughout the facility planning and construction process and close coordination of these matters with affected States provide added pub l ic confidence and acceptance of operational readiness.

1052m

lf1 APR -3 P2 :SO March 30, 1987 Secretary Samuel Chilk United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C., 20555

Dear Secretary Chilk,

- The statewide members of the Ecology _Center of Southern California strongly oppose the request of Seabrook nuclear power pl a~t for an exemption from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirement for a ten (10) mile Emergency Planning Zone.

Seabrook claims they do not need a ten (10) mile Emergency Planning Zone because of their "double containment" capacity. In reality, Seabrook has a containment with an "enclosure". Yet, the utilities' own documents state that any accident that causes containment failure will cause failure of the enclosure FIRST, These document also state that any radiation that escapes the primary containment during an accident will also escape the enclosure.

Obviously, the public has no greater protection during an accident.

Accidents can, and will happen. Emergency planning does not eliminate the health effects of an accident, but can only reduce the consequences. Thus a minimum Emergency Planning Zone of at least ten (10) miles is vital. The people A of Chernobyl were evacuated for a nineteen (19 ) mile radius. Based on this W experience, and logic, we further urge you to approve PRM-50-45 and PRM-50-46, which would expand the current Emergency Planning Zone to a more realistic level, and would require that emergency plans be formulated and approved by the Governors of the affected states before new nuclear plants can be constructed.

The eyes of the country are on you to see that you enforce your .2!.!!.

regulations, and expand them when experience, (such as Chernobyl) shows you the need. Do .!!Q1 approve Se~brooks request for exemption from a ten (10) mile Emergency Planning Zone. Do approve PRM-50-45 and PRM-;50-46. Doing so may save many lives when the next nuclear accident happens in this .country.

Sincerely,

~~

Anna Harlowe Issues Coordinator Ecology Center of Southern California

OOCl<ETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM~ISSION lv.ootr-t'l 10 CFR Part 50 17 t1AR 16 All :39 Kenneth G. Sexton; Pe tition fer Rulemaking

[Docket Mo . PPM-50-45 ~ OFFICE ~f' SE L.r,t. fAF Y DOCKETING , SEf. VICL State of r~aine; Petition for RulemakinQ lltANCH roocket No. PRM-50-46~

• Extension of ColTl!lP-nt Period AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Co11JT1ission.

ACTION: Petitions for rulemaking: Extension of contnent period.

SUM~.ARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Co11111ission is extending the colTlllent period on two petitions for rulemaking (PRM-50-45) filed by Kenneth G. Sexton and (PRM-50-46) filed by the State of Maine. The Contnission has been requested to extend the comment period in order to provide more time for the public to submit comments. The two petitions request that t~e Corm1ission amend its regulations that pertain to emergency planning.

DATES: The comment period for PRM-50-45 and PP.M-50-46 has been extended to April 15, 1~87. Conments received after this date will be c~nsidered if it is practical to do so ~ut ass urance of consideration cann~t be given except a~ to corm1ents received before this date.

AD9RESSES: A copy of each petition for rulemaking is available for public inspect i on in the Conmission's Pub l ic Oocurient Room, 1717 H Street, N.W.,

~ashington, DC. 20555. A copy of each petition may be obtained by writing to the Division of Rules and ~ecords, Office of Administration, 11.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co1T111ission, Washington, DC ?.0555.

Mail written comments to: Secretary of the ColTf!lission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, nc 20555, Attention: rocketing and Service ~ranch.

FnR FtJRTHFP !NFCRMATIQN CONTACT: Sarah N. Wigginton, Actirg Chief, Rules and Procedures Branch, Division of Rules and P.ecords, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory ColTl'lission, ~las hington, OC 20555, Telephone: 301 492-775?. or Toll Free: R00-3~A-564?..

SUPPLE~F.NTARY INFOR~ATION: On October 6, 1986 (51 FR 35518,, the NPC published a notice of a petition for rulemaki ng filed hy Kenneth G. Sexton. The petition requested the CofTllT!ission to amend its regulations to require that current methodologies and analytical techniques bP ~sed to reevaluate thP estc1blished Er.iergenc_v Planning Zone (EPZ) for nuclear power plants. The notice reouested public coment on ~he petitior. and established a comment closing da te of December 5, 1986. The conment period for this petition was extended to March 9, 1987.

On December 30, !986 (51 FR 470~6), the N~C published a notice of a petition for rule~akin ~ filed by the State of ~aine. The petitioner requested the Commission to amend its regulations in th ree areas pertaining to emergency planning. The notice requested public co!PfTlent on the petition and established a comment closing date o~ March 2, 198?.

The Corm,ission has been reouested to extend the comment period for both petitions in order to provide more time to submit public corm,ents. This notice extends the colTl'!lent period for both petitions for rulemaking.

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Dated at Washington, DC this t:l - day of ~ 1 1987.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Joii2 c. Hoyle Acting Secretary of the Commission

DOCK T UMBER 4 ~ /'57) liE,TITlO1'1 RULE_ PRM___J1- £;}

VIROJ:NIA ELECTRIC AND PowEfrft~Nj?tJ,t,~

, DOC. KE TEC RICHMOND , VIRG I NIA 23261 USNRC

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DOCKETING & SE VICI.

BRANCH Secretary of the Commission Serial No.87-049 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY COMMENTS ON PETITION FOR RULEMAKING STATE OF MAINE Virginia Electric and Power Company reviewed the notice of receipt of Petition for Rulemaking filed by the State of Maine as provided in Federal Register, Volume 51 , No . 249, pp . 47025 and 47026 dated December 30 , 1986 .

The State of Maine has petitioned the NRC to amend 10 CFR 50.47 in three areas pertaining to emergency planning including expanding the emergency planning zone and requiring preapproval of emergency plans prior to construction and fuel load. Virginia Electric and Power Company considers the petition to be without technical basis. For this reason, we strongly disagree with the petition put forth by the State of Maine. Additionally, we have reviewed and endorse the comments submitted on this issue by the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) .

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this Petition for Rulemaking and encourage your careful consider ation of our comments .

Very truly yours ,

U.l~

W. L. Stewart 21)

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USNRC February 26. 1987

• a7 HAR 10 P3 :44 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk OfflCE Of :::c1.,Rt1A"Y U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 90t'KETIN G I.. S£/?VICF Washington. DC. 20555  !!RANCH .

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on Maine's Petition for Rulemaking Requesting the Commission Initiate a Rulemaking Proceeding to Change its Regulations on Emergency Plans. 10CFR50.48 (51 F.R. 47025; December 30. 1986)

Dear Sir:

Commonwealth Edison Company submits the following comments in opposition to the subject petition. We appreciate this opportunity to provide these comments.

The petition by the State of Maine advocating the expansion of both the plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones has no technical basis and. so. is without merit. Indeed.

Maine's petition does not present any technical justifications as required by the Commission's Regulations. Maine's failure to support its petition may simply reflect the absence of technically supportable conclusions contrary to those already reached by several studies begun after the TMI accident. The detailed studies already completed include the Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking Program (IDCOR). the American Nuclear Society's Special Committee on Source Terms. the EPRI research program on source terms and the NRC's recently issued NUREG-0956, "Reassessment of the Technical Bases for Estimating Source Terms". and the American Physical Society's study on radionuclide releases from severe accidents. None of these detailed technical studies and associated research have indicated a need to expand the current emergency planning zones.

The petitioner's references to Chernobyl fail to account for two major conclusions by the experts who have studied the Soviet accident. First. the design and institutional differences between the Chernobyl - type. water - cooled graphite reactor and U.S. light water nuclear power plants are so fundamental that the Soviet accident should not impact the processes of design and regulation of U.S. nuclear reactors. The accident simply reinforces the importance of the emphasis that the U.S. plants place on high quality training and procedures. and strict adherence to administrative controls. Second. the Chernobyl accident confirms MAR 111987 Aclmow by ca rd*..** .-.-. **..,;;;:;livow

U.S. choices in nuclear technology. From the beginning of the U.S.

nuclear industry. conservative reactor plant and containment designs. higher safety standards, defense - in-depth, and operating discipline were imposed. Our record of protecting the public is an affir mation of our safety philosophy.

The proposal to require that emergency planning be completed before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted, is ill - considered and pointlessly premature. In the up to twelve years that takes to const ruc t a commercial nuclear plant, it reasonable to expect that significance changes would take place around the plant. such as modifications to the local roadway network. additional schools. nursing homes. recreational areas as well as possible changes in the local political structure. Because all of these changes would have to be addressed in the local emergency plan prior to operation of a plant. requiring an emergency plan several years before it is needed would result in the wasteful expenditure of resources.

The proposal for requiring the approval of the Governor of the State in which the plant is located would appear to be superfluous since the Commission's Rules of Practice already permits governors of affected States to become fully involved in the NRC 1 s hearing process at both the construction permit and operating license stages. Additionally, the proposal to require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made prior to any fuel loading and/or low power operations is also superfluous because the NRC staff does make an emergency preparedness assessment with FEMA prior to authorizing the loading of fuel.

For the foregoing reasons. we do not agree with and cannot support the State of Maine's petition. Their petition simply does not present any technical basis or justification for expanding the existing emer gency planning zones. Therefore. the State of Maine's petition should be denied.

Dennis L. Farrar Nuclear Licensing Director

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KAAOL LYN NEWMAN PAMELA A. LACEY JOHN T .sTouGH,JR. March 9fFflS13!7F ~f;i~~ :..i, r: FAANKR. uNDH JAMcsa. vAS1LE uOCK£i,~ '.:i 4' ~. , i KEVIN J. uPsoN MICHAEL A. BAUSER t'l ~ ,~. i'-,' f j-!, KATHLEEN M. McDERMOTT ALVIN H. GUTTERMAN ., f",

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EDWAAOJ.TWOMEY ERROLR. PATTERSON KEVIN P. GALLEN JANE I. RYAN THOMAS A. SCHMUTZ PAUL J. SAVIDGE*

MICHAEL P'. HEALY DONALD J. SILVERMAN ROBERT I. WHITE JACOLYN A. SIMMONS SCOTT A. HARMAN ROBERT H. SOLOMON STEVEN P. FRANTZ JOSEPH E. STUBBS DAVID B. RASKIN NANCY A. WHITE*

ROBIN T. WIGGINS*

ROBERT LOWENSTEIN HERBERT 8 . COHN "'NOT ADMJTTU> IN 0.C.

ERNEST C. BAYNARD. Ill OP'COUNSEL Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Docket Nos. PRM-50-45 (51 Fed. Reg. 35,518) and PRM-50-46 (51 Fed. Reg. 47,025); Notices of Receipt of Petitions for Rulemaking

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On October 6, 1986, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) published a Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking in the Federal Register. 51 Fed. Reg. 35,518.

The Notice stated that Kenneth G. Sexton "requests that the Commission amend its regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 50 to require that current methodologies and analytical techniques be used to reevaluate the establishing [sic] Emergency Plan-ning Zone (EPZ) for nuclear power plants."

On December 30, 1986, the NRC published an additional Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking from the State of Maine (State). 51 Fed. Reg. 47025. The notice indicated that the State was requesting that "the Commission amend its regulations in three areas pertaining to emergency plan-ning."

The following comments are submitted on behalf of Flordia Power & Light Company (FPL). They are addressed, primari ly, to PRM-50-45. They are also pertinent to PRM-50-46, however, especially to the extent the State seeks expansion of the EPZ for both the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway.

MAR 111987 Acknowl~ed by card . * *******u**.-.......-...

NEWMAN & HoLTZINOER, P. C.

Samuel J. Chilk March 9, 1987 Page Two I. Comments o n Docket No. PRM-50-45 Kenneth G. Sexton (Petitioner) requests that the Commis-sion amend its regulations in 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(c)(2). The regulation now reads as follows:

(2) Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size a nd configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relat i on to local emergency re-sponse needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land character-istics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.

The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basi s for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less that 250 MW thermal.

The plans for ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.

The Petitioner proposes that the regulation be amended to read as follows:

The plume exposure pathway EPZ for all nuclear power plants shall consist of an a r ea to be determined by the NRC on a site-specific basis, after allowing for review of the determination report by any interested parties. The report shall li s t, describe, and reference all input data and methodolog ies used and all other factors considered. The NRC shall use methodologies and procedures whi c h are generally accepted as reasonably current and appropriate by recognized professional groups in each supporting field (including the American Meteorol-ogy Society (AMS) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)). Likewise, best avai l able estimates for model input (such as source terms) shall be used. This dis-tance shall be reevaluated at least every five years, using latest techniques and information, unless peti-tioned ear l ier by the NRC, another professional group (such as the EPA or AMS), or the general public: Gener-ally, the models shall be at least as complex and realis-tic as described in NUREG 0654 for Class B models.

NEWMAN & HOLTZINOER, P. C.

Samuel J. Chilk March 9, 1987 Page Three Meteorological submodels sha l l consider all factors which can have an effect on the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environmental [sic].

The exact size and configuration of the EPZ surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabil-ities as they are affected by such conditions as power plant specifics (type, power output, age, etc.), local meteorology (including data from both the power plant site and local national weath er service), demography, topograpy, [sic] land charac t eristics, access routes, jurisdictional boundaries, and proximity of seats of local government.

FPL opposes the suggested changes to the current regula-tion as proposed by the Petitioner. In essence, Petitioner misapprehends the regulations as they have been developed and are applied . .!/ There is no need for revision of the regula-tions and, accordingly, the petition should be denied .

.!/Furthermore, Petitioner's proposed rule is so carelessly drafted and contradictory to other provisions in the regula-tions as to be unsuitable in its present form for serious consideration. For example, 10 C.F.R. § S0.47(c)(2) pro-vides that the emergency planning zone (EPZ) shall consist of the plume exposure pathway EPZ, which is approximately 10 miles in radius and an ingestion pathway EPZ approxi-mately 5 0 miles in radius. Petitioner's suggested changes would eliminate completely any reference to the ingestion pathway EPZ. Petitioner's suggested changes focus on the plume exposure pathway EPZ which Petitioner variously refers to as the 11 10 mile EPZ II and simp ly the EPZ. To the ext*ent that Petitioner is suggesting t hat the ingestion pathway EPZ should be eliminated from t he regulations, FPL opposes such a change. Additionally, Petitioner suggests changes in 10 C.F.R. § S0.47(c)(2), but does not consider identical wording in other portions of NRC regulations, such as 10 C.F.R. § S0.54(s)( l ) or Appendix E of to C.F.R. Part SO.

NEWMAN & HOLTZINOEB, P. C.

Samuel J. Chilk March 9, 1987 Page Four As currently formulated, the Commission's regulations are fully sufficient to protect the public health and safety insofar as emergency planning is concerned. In particular, the regulations contained in 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 and Appendix E to Part 50 set forth requirements for emergency planning and action. These include the establishment of EPZ's for protection against both plume exposure and ingestion pathways i n case of an accident. S e e , ~ , 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b),

Appendix E,Section III. - -

At t h e operating license stage for a reactor, the Commis-sion must make a specific finding that -- with respect to emergency plans -- "there is reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. § S0.47(a)(l), Appen-dix E, Sections IV.F.l, 3-5 (emphasis added). Thereafter, emergency plans must be reviewed and exercised annually, with participation extend ing into areas encompassed within plume and ingestion pathway EPZ's on a periodic basis. 10 C.F .R. § 50.54(t), Append ix E, Sections IV.F.2, 3. Remedial action i s required in the case of deficiencies and, in a case where " the NRC finds that the state of emergency prepared-ness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency . .

• and if the deficiencies are not corrected within four months of that finding, the Commis-sion wi l l determine whether t he reactor shall be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforce-ment action is appropriate." 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(s)(2)(ii)

(emphasis added). See a l so, 1 0 C.F.R. Part SO, Appendix E,Section IV.F.4. - - - - -

Based on the foregoing it is clear that the current NRC regulations are fully s uf ficient to assure protection of the public health and safety in the case of an accident.

Emergency plans -- including the establishment of EPZ's and app ropriate responsive action therein -- are established, exercised and evaluated. If adequate protection of the public health and safety cannot be demonstrated to a level of reason-able assurance -- due to the existence of an inadequate EPZ resulting from improper consideration of meteorology or other-wise -- the Commission is fully empowered to take appropriat~

remedial action. Further, to the extent that NRC inspection and enforcement activities are viewed by any person as defi-cient, action may always be sought through a request under 10 C.F.R. § 2.206.

NEWMAN & HOLTZINOER, P. C.

Samuel J. Chilk March 9, 1987 Page Five Two additional points bear mention. First, Petitioner repeats throughout the petition the view that a generically determined, 10-mile radius exposure pathway EPZ is not ade-quate. The regulations provide, however, that:

Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.

The exact size and configurat ion of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabili-ties as they are affected by such conditions as demo-graphy, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries * . . .

10 C.F.R. § 50.47(c)(2) (emphasis added). See a l s o , ~ ,

10 C.F.R. § 50.54(s)(l), Appendix E,Section I. ftn.1. Thus, the current regulations provide fo r case-by-case, not generic, determination of the size and shape of EPZ's. Further, considera-tion of pertinent conditions -- including meteorology --

is not precluded. Demography, t opography, land character-istics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries are listed only by way of illustration, not limitation.

Second, Petitioner emphasizes the view that modeling improvements have been made over the years, particularly since publication of the "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radi ological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nu c l ear Power Plants (NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016) in December of 1978. According to Petitioner, Those responsible for assuring the health and safety of the pub l ic should be aware that current techniques have not been used in establ i shing the EPZ and that there are serious questions i n regard to some of the assumptions under which it was established. The obvious implication is that these ca l culations and the resulting 10-mile recommendation are therefore suspect and uncer-tain for purposes of protec t ing public health.

Petition, p. 7.

As discussed above, however, emergency plans are continu-ously exercised and evaluated. The NRC's role is to see that there is "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can be t aken in the event of a radiological emer-gency." E. g ., 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.4.

If new mode l s, information or data preclude such a finding, the Commission is empowered to take appropriate remedial action. S e e , ~ , id.

NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER, P. C.

Samuel J. Chilk March 9, 1987 Page Six In sum, current regulations are fully sufficient to provide emergency plans adequate to protect the pub l ic health and safety. Petitioner has failed either to identify any specific deficiencies in the present NRC regulations, or demonstrate how his proposed ame ndment would be an improve-ment. Accordingly, the petition should be denied.

II. Comments on Docket No. PRM- 50 -46 In its petition, the State requests that the Commission amend 10 C.F . R. § 50.47:

1. to expand both the emergency p l anning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for t h e ingestion pathway;

2. to require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the Governor or Governors of any affected State approve the emergency plans ~s a precondition to construction; and

3. to require that offsite emergency preparedness find-ings be made before any fuel load ing and/or low power operations are permitted.

FPL opposes the suggested changes in the current regula-tions proposed by the State. Other than general statements concerning Chernobyl and recent di scussions before the Advi-sory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, the State provides no justification or explanation concerning why the current regulations should be amer.ded.

First, the State requests that the p l ume exposure pathway and ingestior. pathway emergency EP Z's be expanded. However, the State neither specifies the extent or nature of the expan-sion requested, nor identifies a ny benefit provided by expan-sion. As discussed in detail in connection with PRM-50-45, above, the current regulations p er tinent to the establishment of EPZ's are fully adequate to protect the public health and safety and require no modification.

Second, in connection with the request "that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted," once again the State fails to provide any basis or rationale for its suggestion. Moreover, the State ignores the provisions of lO C.F.R. § 50.34(a)(10) and Appen-di x E to Part 50, which require that a discussion of the preliminary emergency response plan be s ubmitted as part of an application for a construction permit. Thus, emergency planning is already required bef o re construction of a nuclear

NEWMAN & HOLTZINOER, P. C.

Samuel J. Chilk March 9, 1987 Page Seven reactor. The State also proposes granting "the Governor or Governors of any affected State" the right to "approve the emergency plans as a precondi t io~ to construction."

Again, however, no support is provided for this suggestion, and it would unnecessarily complicate the emergency planning process.

Finally, the State suggests t hat "offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or l ow power operations." The State offers neither an explana-tion of what is meant by "offsite emergency preparedness" findings, however, nor any support for its suggestions.

Further, the State ignores the detailed emergency plan informa-tion required as part of an operating license application under 10 C.F.R. § 50.34 (b )(6)(v) and Appendix E to Part 50.

For the foregoing reasons, the State's petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

/JldJ(Uj_~

Michael A. Bauser

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DOCKET NUMBER P. 0. BOX 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 33408-0420 i<ETITION RULE PRtff°::16~

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-S7 HAR -9 P2 :29 S:::P MARCH O2 1987 Ff,c;:: Or '::i tl. ;,t.1 Aii 1' OCKE TING . SE. vier: L-87-99

~ANCH Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Re: Petition for Rulemaking from the State of Maine Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) would like to comment on the petition for rulemaking filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by the State of Maine pertaining to emergency planning.

APPROVAL OF EMERGENCY PLANS BY A STATE GOVERNOR The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 20 11 et seq.) and its amendments have narrowly defined the authority of federal, state, and local agencies in regulating nuclear matters. The NRC was the authority to transfer regulatory responsibility for source materials, byproduct materials, and limited quantities of special nuclear materials to a state government. However, the Act indicates that the licensing and regulation of health, safety and environmental aspects of nuclear power plants has been completely preempted by the federal government. There have been many court decisions that clearly declare that a state is precluded by the Act from regulating nuclear power activities. The Supreme Court upheld a decision in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota {447 F2d 1143, affd 405 US I035) that the Commission had exclusive and preemptive authority to regulate releases of radioactive effluents from nuclear plants so as to preclude any state regulation of such effluents.

The petition for rulemaking requests that the governor of any affect state approve a plant's emergency plans as a precondition to construction. This request is contrary to the Atomic Energy Act which only allows the NRC to grant a state regulatory authority in the three areas specified above. Emergency planning does not fall under these three areas. Such a request must be denied by the NRC because it does not have the authority to grant such a request. The State of Maine must ask Congress to change the Act to allow the NRC the authority requested in the petition.

EXPANSION OF Tt-E PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND INGESTION PATHWAY The petition proposes an expansion in the size of both the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) and ingestion EPZ without providing a recommendation for the increased size. The basis for the expansion is the results of the Chernobyl accident.

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk L-87-99 Page two Since the size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ relates to the source term produced by the type of reactor, the current technical information would dictate a possible reduction in size for light water reactors. The petitioner is either unaware or ignores this technical information. What the petitioner is asking from the NRC is to modify a regulation to reflect the plume exposure pathway EPZ of a civilian graphite reactor which does not exist in the United States. Not only is this irrational but is contrary to current NRC rulemaking procedures.

OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FINDINGS Under current NRC regulations, the NRC bases its findings on the adequacy of state and local emergency plans upon the findings and determinations made by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA}. FEMA has been designated the federa l lead agency in these matters. Requests to make findings on offsite, emergency preparedness before any fuel loading and/or low power operations should be made to FEMA and not the NRC.

In conclusion, FPL recommends that the NRC denies the three proposed amendments made in the petition for rulemaking by the State of Maine.

Thank you for providing this opportunity to comment of the State of Maine Petition for rulemaking.

Very truly yours,

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roup Vice President Nuc Iear Energy COW/DAB/gp MLC/003/2

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• 215 / 770-5151 Harold W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations 215/TT0-7502 nocimn:o MAR O2 1981 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn.: Docketing and Service Branch

• SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION COMMENTS ON THE STATE OF MAINE; FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-2807 FILE R41-2/Al7-ll 50-388

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Pennsylvania Power and Light (PP&L) offers the following comments to the State of Maine; Petition for Rulemaking.

We oppose this Petition for the following reasons:

1. There is no technical basis - emergency planning studies following the TMI accident have not indicated a need to expand the current emergency planning zone.

2. Specific emergency planning prior to construction would be so general as to be almost meaningless. Additionally, emergency planning is addressed during the siting process.

3. 10CFR2 presently allows state governmental participation during the hearing process at the construction permit stage, and

4. The need for off-site emergency preparedness at the fuel load/low power testing stage is not necessary since the core inventory of fission products has not developed to a significant degree.

Additionally, plant safety systems are in place during all plant operational periods and are adequate to safely protect the public health and safety during fuel load/low power testing.

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. MAR O2 1987 FILE R41-2 / A17-ll PLA-2807 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk These comments support those submitted by AIF. Although the Maine Petition appears to be directed at new construction, PP&L believes this petition and others like it may impact operational units in the future. Therefore,we are submitting these comments to express and strengthen industry support against such actions.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments.

Very truly yours,

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Dear Mr. Chilk,

The Nuclear Information and Resource Service would like to submit its comments in favor of the petition for rulemaking submitted by the State of Maine (51 FR 47025, December 30, 1986).

As we are sure you are aware, another petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-45), submitted by Kenneth Sexton, asks the Commission to consider similar emergency planning issues. NIRS will be submitting extensive comments on PRM 50-45 by the c omment period deadline of March 9, 1987. Real izing that the comment period deadlines are a week apart, we respectfully ask that the Commission consider the commen t s submitted by March 9, 1987 to reflect our position on the pe t ition by the State of Maine, as well.

There are a few points regarding the State of Maine petition with which we would especially like to emphasize our agreement, particularly its second proposed amendment to 10 CFR 50.47. We believe it is eminently important that approval for emergency plans be given by states within the Emergency Plann ing Zone before any construction begins. This requirement would eliminate the very real potential for the consideration of capital investment in a facility at licensing time when, under the current regulations, emergency plans are being evaluated. Such a requirement would acknowledge that, because of geographic, population density or other reasons, a site realistically cannot be evacuated. Further, because of the length of constructi on periods and the potential for change in factors which must be considered during evacuation suc h as populationt NIRS strongly urges the Commission to require reevaluation of emergency plans a t licensing time and the reaffirmed support for those plans by states within the EPZ.

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Thank you for considering our commen ts on PRM 50-45 in conjunction with the petition by the State of Maine.

Sincerely,

Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526 Mailing Address:

Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta , Georgia 30302 Georgia Power

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L. T. Gucwa '87 MAR - 5 P1 2 1ti09iuthern electnc system Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing February 25, 1987 SL-2046 0121U Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Georgia Power Company Comments on State of Maine; Filing of Petition For Rulemaking

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On December 30, 1986, the Nuclear Regu latory Commission (NRC} published in the Federal Refister and solicited coR111ents regarding a State of Maine petition for ru emaking. The petitioner requested the NRC amend 10 CFR Part 50.47 in three areas pertaining to emergency planning. Georgia Power Company (GPC} appreciates the opportunity to respond on this important issue.

Georgia Power Company has reviewed and fully endorses the conrnents on the subject issue submitted by the Atomic Industrial Forum's SubcoR111ittee on Emergency Planning and Siting. Through our membership on this subconwnittee as the Southern Company's (GPC's holding company} representative, GPC assisted in the development of these co11111ents. Additionally, GPC agrees with the subcommittee's reco11111endation that the State of Maine's petition should be denied.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

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• BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 JOSEPH A. TIERNAN VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR ENERGY February 26, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

- ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

Comments on Petition for Rulemaking by the State of Maine (PRM-50-46)

REFERENCES:

(a) Letter from Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr. (BG&E), to Mr. E. J. Butcher, Jr.

(NRC), dated November 18, 1985, Request for Exemption (b) Commission Briefing by the Staff on NUREG-1251, February 6, 1987 Gentlemen:

The following comments are submitted by the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company in response to Federal Register Notice 51 FR 47025, dated December 30, 1986. This notice provided a petition for rulemaking by the State of Maine requesting that the Commission amend its regulations (10 CFR Part 50.47) in three areas pertaining to emergency planning. We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments.

We have reviewed the subject petition, and have compared it to present regulations and recent studies on emergency planning. The State of Maine's petition to expand the emergency planning zone has no technical basis. To date, no detailed technical studies concerning source terms have indicated the need to expand the current emergency planning zones. In fact, recent industry studies (e.g. Reference (a)) have shown that the new source terms provided in NUREG-09 56 support reduction of emergency planning zones. To make any amendments to the present regulations, based on the petition's reference to Chernobyl, would be premature and contrary to staff findings that no immediate regulatory action is needed (Reference (b)).

The two additional proposed amendments -- to require emergency planning and state(s) approval prior to construction, and that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before permitting any fuel loading and/or low power operation -- have not been supported by clearly stated grounds or technical bases. The second proposed amendment also ignores the pre-emptive role which Congress specifically granted to the NRC, by federal statute, as final arbiter of nuclear regulation for protection of the public health and safety.

Therefore, we feel the petition by the State of Maine to ammend 10 CFR Part 50.47 should be denied. Our specific comments on t he petition are provided as an Attachment.

Docketing and Service Branch February 26, 1987 Page 2 Should you have any questions regarding these comments, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, JA T/LSL/ dlm Attachment cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire A. C. Thadani, NRC S. A. McNeil, NRC T. E. Murley, NRC T. Foley/D. A. Trimble

ATTACHMENT COMMENTS ON PETITION FOR RULEMAKING BY THE STATE OF MAINE; EMERGENCY PLANNING n *.1 Q

'87 t1AR -4 ~,11 The subject petition for rulemaking requests that 10 CFR 50.47 be amended .to

1. Expand both the emergency planning zone (EPZ) for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway;

2. Require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the Governor or Governors of any affected state approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction; and

3. Require that of fsi te emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted.

In support of the proposed amendments, the petitioner has submitted the following grounds for petition:

1. The nuclear industry has argued recently in the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, among other places, that a 2-mile EPZ is sufficient for evacuation purposes, notwithstanding Three Mile Island and Chernobyl;

2. Under 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), the plume exposure pathway EPZ is "generally ***

about 10 miles in radius" and the ingestion pathway EPZ is an area "about 50 miles in radius;" and

3. As a result of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Russians evacuated roughly 135,000 people within a 19-mile radius around Chernobyl. The fallout from the accident reached all over Europe, contaminating crops, milk, and animals.

Only the first of the above requests for amendment (concerning expansion of EPZs) appears to be supported by clearly stated grounds. However, while the first two grounds for petition are factual, neither provides a technical basis for modifying regulations on emergency planning. It is difficult to see how the industry's ongoing efforts to reduce the size of the plume exposure EPZ, in view of current technological information, is a basis for expanding the EPZ. In addition, the third ground for petition that references the Chernobyl accident, does not provide any meaningful information or detailed review of the facts surrounding the accident.

The Commission is presently assessing the Chernobyl accident as part of its comprehensive reevaluation of source terms and severe accidents. In absence of the final outcome, enough is known about the Soviet's reactor and the accident to state the following. First, the design and institutional differences between the Chernobyl-type water-cooled graphite reactor and U. S. light-water nuclear power plants are so fundamental that the Soviet accident should not significantly impact the process of design and regulation of U. S.

nuclear reactors. Second, the Chernobyl accident has served to highlight the emphasis that U. S. plants place on high quality training and procedures, strict adherence to administrative controls, and conservative reactor plant and containment designs.

ATTACHMENT COMMENTS ON PETITION FOR RULEMAKING BY THE STATE OF MAINE; EMERGENCY PLANNING On February 6, 1987, the staff briefed the Commission on a second report they have prepared that addresses the implication of the Chernobyl accident as it affects the U. S.

nuclear regulatory program. The overall conclusion, regarding commercial U. S. nuclear reactors, was that no immediate regulatory action is required and that there is no basis for expanding the ten-mile plume EPZ. Therefore, based on the petitioner's lack of technical basis in support of expanding current EPZs, this proposed amendment should be denied by the Commission.

The second and third proposed amendments should be denied due to insufficient grounds.

Without the supporting background information on the basis for each request, it is difficult to provide specific positive or negative comments on the proposed changes to the regulations. However, we have provided general comments on each of the proposals based on their relation to present Federal Regulations which we feel do adequately address the petitioner's postulated concerns.

With respect to the second proposed amendment (concerning completion of emergency planning and specific approval by the governor(s) of the affected state(s) prior to construction of a nuclear facility), applications for nuclear facility construction permits, filed pursuant to 10 CFR 2.101, will not be considered complete or docketed unless accom-panied by the site suitability study developed separately under 10 CFR 2.l0l(a-1) or, as part of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a)(l).

This study must be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and must give special attention to site evaluation factors identified in 10 CFR Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria. 10 CFR Part 100 considerations address emergency planning objectives which ensure that for a proposed site, residents will not be unduly at risk and that there is reasonable probability that appropriate protective measures could be taken for the public in the event of a serious accident. Throughout the site selection and construction permit review/approval process, State Governors will be notified of action in progress and have the opportunity to intervene (as described in 10 CFR Part 2, Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings).

The second request is related to the overall subject of "state veto" of nuclear power licensing, in general, using the emergency plan requirements as a vehicle. This subject has become increasingly troublesome since the advent of the NRC's emergency planning requirements, and the requested regulatory change would lessen the effectiveness, rather than improve emergency planning for nuclear power plants. Aside from the lack of a technical basis for expanding the state role in this area, as indicated above, the granting of additional state control over nuclear licensing is in clear conflict with the intent of Congress regarding the preemptive role to be played by the NRC. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Legislative History for both, clearly indicate that the NRC (and not the states) is to have the final say regarding such licensing matters. It is fundamental, and well established legally and otherwise, that these activities have consequences that are national in nature, affect interstate commerce, and the NRC is better equipped to deal with the complex technical and other regulatory issues related to the development of nuclear power and the protection of the health and safety of public regarding same. To dilute the Agency's preemptive authority goes against these well established principles and would serve no valid purpose whatsoever.

ATTACHMENT COMMENTS ON PETITION FOR RULEMAKING BY THE STATE OF MAINE; EMERGENCY PLANNING Regarding the third proposed amendment (requiring that "offsite" emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operation), in the absence of additional justification and relevant technical basis, we feel that the current regulations adequately protect the health and safety of the general public. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, section IV.F.l.b, requires a full scale (state/local participation) emergency response exercise before operation above 5 percent power. The NRC has provided guidance to applicants for a low power operating license that they should consider scheduling a full participation exercise to permit resolution of any issues concerning the implementation of emergency preparedness as demonstrated by the exercise. Offsite emergency preparedness findings would then be made in order to facilitate the resolution of any issues. Furthermore, 44 CFR 350.9(a) requires FEMA to notify states "* **

promptly in writing *** " if an exercise discloses deficiencies in the state and local plans.

During fuel loading and/or low power testing, the nuclear core has not had sufficient operating time to build up a significant amount of fission products. In addition, the containment and other safety systems are placed in the operation mode during low power testing to further minimize any offsite releases if any accident were to occur. Since the nuclear core is free of fission products during fuel loading and relatively free during low power testing, the need for offsite emergency preparedness to further reduce the consequence of a potential accident to the public is not justified. Therefore, to require offsite emergency preparedness findings be made, prior to any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted, represents a major economic burden to the licensee and the local governments with minimal, if any, benefit to the health and safety of the public.

In conclusion, we agree the NRC should continue to evaluate existing regulations on emergency planning. However, this should be done based on the most recent technical information. For the reasons stated herein, we disagree with the petitioner's request and the grounds provided therein. Presently no technical studies to date have indicated a need to expand the current EPZs. In fact, recent industry studies (e.g. Reference (a)) have shown that the new source terms provided in NUREG-0956 support reduction of EPZs. The present regulatory process affords all interested parties an opportunity to argue for or against the issuance of a construction permit. Finally, there is minimal, if any, reduction of risk to the public by requiring that offsite emergency planning be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted. For these reasons, Maine's petition should be denied.

16 71 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachusetts O1701

• a7 HAR - 3 All :2a March 2, 1987 Secretary of the Commission United states Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch FYC 87-005 GLA 87-028

Subject:

Comments pertaining to state of Maine; Filing of Petition for Rulemaking (51FR47025)

Dear Sir:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) appreciates this opportunity to comment on the state of Kaine petition for rulemaking regarding 10CFR50.47.

YAEC owns and operates the Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in Rowe, Massachusetts.

our Nuclear Services Division also provides engineering and licensing services for other nuclear power plants in the Northeast, including Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Seabrook.

Emergency planning has become the most significant factor in nuclear power plant licensing. We contend that this is not because it is more significant to public safety than other factors such as design, but because the approval process is entirely susceptible to arbitrary delay. The proposed petition would exacerbate this situation. Today, some plants continue to face substantial delays in obtaining a license despite the fact that these plants completely satisfy the formidable spectrum of nuclear power plant regulations and requirements including those governing emergency planning. These delays are almost entirely beyond their control. I f this trend continues, as it would under process advocated by the petition, even existing plants could become enmeshed in this administrative tangle.

The petition requests an expansion of areas and populations subject to the implementation of protective action. This expansion could well compromise the effectiveness of protective action on behalf of individuals who should receive most attention, those inhabiting areas immediately surrounding plant sites . Effective emergency plans require details in many areas. Each of these plan provisions must be structured to achieve the most effective implementation. This effectiveness hinges, primarily, upon the area and population characteristics involved. Expanding these two factors changes the overall nature of an optimal approach, and the benefit to any one population segment may be reduced thereby. Planning and response resources should be applied to the most important use, which is usually those areas and populations close to the site. More expansion means, effectively, less protection.

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 2, 1987 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Page 2 We believe that the emergency planning zones do not need to be extended.

Studies by both the industry and the NRC indicate that the current planning zone size is extremely conservative. Al l site-specific Level 3 probabilistic risk assessments conducted to date show that the NRC safety goals are met with substantial margins with current planning zones. Even if a particular site study should indicate that a planning zone should be modified (and, to date, none have), it can be done under the current regulations without amending 10CFRS0.47.

It should be noted that there are well over fifty docwnented instances of emergencies throughout this country in the past ten years, due to natural calamity, chemical spills, etc. In each case, state and local governments have demonstrated the ability to handle t hese emergencies, perform evacuations, etc. without pre-established plans for local action. This experience suggests that, although current planning efforts may be of benefit, we probably are well past the point of diminishing returns. The resources and attention these plans require are both substantial and greatly disproportionate to the actual hazard presented by radiological events compared to nonradiological hazards. The expansion of the planning areas, as proposed in the petition, only serves to further divert planning attention from an all-hazards approach.

The petition proposes to require emergency plan development and state approval as a precondition to construction, this is unworkable. The construction permit stage of licensing is so far in advance of facility completion and final licensing that emergency plans developed then would be meaningless. The many fundamental changes in the characteristics of the planning area, the planning and response organizations, and possibly new emergency planning regulatory requirements make the development of emergency plans at the construction permit stage a meaningless exercise. Even if drafted, plan approval would be impossible because of the uncertainties and unanswered questions that woul d exist.

The petition proposes that off-site emergency preparedness findings be made prior to fuel load or low power testing. We believe that such findings are unnecessary at this time because this phase of plant startup does not pose an off-site radiological threat which would require an off-site emergency response. The Statement of Consideration for 10CFRS0.47, Issue 6 (47FR30232),

added that, prior to low power testing and fuel loading, the NRC will review certain elements of the off-site plan to assure the public that adequate protective measures could and would be taken in the event of an accident.

This philosophy is represented in the current regulations, 10CFRS0.47(d),

which state, " *** no NRC or FEMA review, findings, *** are required prior to issuance of an operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power operations (up to si of the rated power)."

For the reasons outlined above, we firmly believe that the current regulations provide for emergency planning which more than adequately ensures the health and safety of the public. We encourage you to deny the subject petition.

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Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on Petition for Rulemaking of the State of Maine Regarding Emergency Planning (51 Fed. Reg. 47025).

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On Tuesday, December 30, 1986, the NRC published for public comment a notice of a petition for rulemaking filed by the State of Maine regarding emergency planning. See 51 Fed. Reg. 47025.

The petitioner asks the Commission to amend its emergency planning regulations in three respects. Specifically, the petitioners propose that 10 C.F.R. §50.47 be amended to:

"1. Expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway;

2. Require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the governor or governors of any affected State approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction; and

3. Require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted."

On behalf of Arkansas Power & Light Company, Consolidated Edison Company, Duke Power Company, Northeast Utilities, System Energy Resources, Inc., TU Electric, and Washington Public Power Supply System, we respectfully submit the following comments. In sum, we believe the proposals are unsupported by the existing technical data, inconsistent with NRC's plan for regulatory reform based on revised source term estimates, and generally MAR 6 1987

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1. Expanded Emergency Planning Zones Section 50.47(c)(2) of the Commission's regulations currently defines the required plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone ("EPZ") as an area of about 10 miles in radius. The regulation also defines the ingestion pathway EPZ as an area of about 50 miles in radius. The size of these EPZs was the product of an effort conducted by a joint NRC/EPA Task Force. The rationale for the concept and size of these EPZs was set forth in NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Bases for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Reactors" (December 1978).

To broadly summarize, the EPZs were chosen on the basis of careful technical analyses of then-available data. The Task Force based the EPZs on an evaluation of a full spectrum of accidents and corresponding consequences, utilizing WASH-1400 (the Reactor Safety Study) source terms. It should be emphasized that the WASH-1400 data provided predictions of radiological releases and quantitative estimates of risk which are known, in light of additional knowledge gained over the past 12 years, to substantially overstate the effects of the most serious accidents. However, even in 1978, it was the consensus of the Task Force -- and ultimately the Commission -- that a plume EPZ of about 10 miles and an ingestion pathway EPZ of about 50 miles would provide prudent risk reduction.2/ The concept of the regulation is that the EPZs provide an adequate planning base, or core planning, with sufficient flexibility to develop a reasonable ad hoc response in the event of very serious low probabilityaccfaents (for example, an accident requiring evacuation beyond 10 miles). See 45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 55406 (August 19, 1980). 1 /

!I It is also worth noting that procedurally the State of Maine's petition appears to be completely defective.

Contrary to the express requirements of 10 C.F.R.

§2.802(c)(3), the State provides no relevant technical, scientific, or other data to support its petition. A bald reference to the Chernobyl accident alone is insufficient for this purpose.

See generally NUREG-0396 at 11, 16, and Appendix I at page I-

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See also Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre NuclearGenerating station, Un i ts 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).

- 3 The State of Maine's proposal to expand the size of the EPZs is inconsistent with the technical record and the Commission's concept of emergency planning. First, the State provides no data to support the need for a larger EPZ. Rather, the State relies only upon the evacuation conducted around the Chernobyl plant without any showing of relevance to U.S. light water reactors.

Second, it is our opinion that the existing regulation is based on conservative data and a sound philosophy of prudent risk reduction. The current EPZs provide a more than sufficient planning basis for a wide range of accidents. An accident with releases on the scale of Chernobyl is precisely the type of low probability scenario for which ad hoc response can be made on the basis of existing preparedness. - Such a low probability (in the U.S.) accident does not justify an expansion of the EPZs.

In addition, increasing the size of the plume EPZ could actually increase risks. Existing data demonstrates that there is virtually no contribution to the mean early fatality risk beyond 10 miles. If even more massive evacuations (larger EPZs) are utilized the evacuation process could be slowed down, possibly to the detriment of those nearest the plant (where there is the most significant contribution to mean early fatality risk).

Further, diametrically opposed to the State of Maine's claim is current technical data based on releases calculated for the Three Mile Island accident and upon more recent research. Based on this data, the NRC and the industry are currently re-evaluating the source terms that serve as the basis for the current emergency planning regulations. This effort would elimi-nate unrealistic assumptions currently inherent in the emergency planning regulations (including the size of the EPZ). The research includes the Industrial Degraded Core Rulemakeing Program (IDCOR), the American Nuclear society's Special Committee on Source Terms, the EPRI research program on source terms, and the NRC's source term program documented in NUREG-0956 and NUREG-1150. Current data indicates that a reduction in the size of the EPZ, or at least in the scale of planned evacuations, is in fact appropriate.

NUREG-0956 compiles the new source term research. For the time being, the NRC has concluded that NUREG-0956 provides only a part of the information needed to revise the emergency planning regulations. Based on the recommendation of the ACRS, the Staff is performing a risk perspective analysis which would include a comparison of the new data with the WASH - 1400 data. The risk perspective analysis and regulatory implications will be addressed in NUREG-1150. The State of Maine's petition for rulemaking has not presented anything to justify a departure from the NRC's current regulatory position that it is not prepared to

make any regulatory changes prior to completing the new source term work.ii

2. Pre-approval of Emergency Planning The State of Maine next suggests that NRC regulations should require that emergency planning be completed (including all necessary State approvals) prior to the grant of an NRC construction permit. In our view, the State of Maine's proposal would require too much planning prior to authorization to begin construction . It would be inefficient from both a planning and a licensing standpoint to address the entirety of emergency planning prematurely. However, as also discussed below, there may be a kernel of merit in the State's proposal. In particular, the proposal would prevent an unequitable situation as now exists with respect to the Shoreham plant, where a $5 . 0 billion investment has been made, the plant is complete, yet no operating license can be issued until emergency planning issues can be resolved.

Our first point with respect to the proposal is that completion of all aspects of emergency planning prior to the grant of a construction permit is an unrealistic goal. Emergency planning involves the development of complete plans for the (prospective) licensee, and for all state and local governments within the EPZs. In addition, planning involves drafting of detailed emergency planning implementing procedures and completion of hundreds of logistical details . The latter include, inter alia, contracts with organizations providing support service~etters of agreement with public and private agencies, development of emergency action levels based on plant instrumentation, procurement of equipment, deployment of the prompt notification system, and training, exercises and drills.

This effort requires a great commitment of utility staff and is simply too large to undertake before a construction permit is even granted. In addition, emergency planning involves many matters that change quickly with time. Given the substantial time involved in constructing a nuclear power plant, much of the planning effort completed before construction would be stale by the time the operating license is granted.

The NRC, for example, has taken this approach in declining to act on Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's ("BG&E") site-specific application for an exemption allowing them to reduce the size of the plume EPZ around the Calvert Cliffs facility from ten miles to two miles. In a February 14, 1986 letter to BG&E, Harold Denton, director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, called the request "premature" because the NRC is still evaluating source term research. In a similar fashion, the State of Maine's petition should be dismissed as "premature."

Less drastic alternatives to the State's proposal, however, could result in a more practical and therefore better regulatory solution. For example, certain key determinations on emergency planning could be, and should be, made pr ior to the grant of a construction permit. First, any issues as to the objective feasibility of emergency planning for a given plant should be treated as a site-suitability issue. In other words, all concerns that sufficient emergency planning is impossible (or at least impractical) given local geography, demography, meteorology, etc., should be addressed in the construction permit site review. These are issues that should properly be addressed before the investment is made and before the plant is built.

Given a pre-construction finding that the site is adequate, these issues should be afforded preclusive effect and not be raised again at the time of the operating license review. The issues for the operating license review should be specifically limited to the development and implementation of the various emergency plans and implementing procedures (which would, of course, be completed simultaneously with construction).~/

A second issue potentially more appropriately addressed prior to construction is the issue of state and local government involvement. If a government does not want to participate in emergency planning, or simply does not want a nuclear plant, the prudent time to address the matter is before construction is approved. In such a case, it will be up to the utility, consistent with NRC regulations, to demonstrate that without government participation, it will be able to provide adequate assurances on emergency planning. Fundamental issues, such as the existence or even the necessity of government approvals, are issues which should be resolved at the outset. Again, given positive findings prior to construction, the issues prior to operation should be limited to the subjective issues of whether specific planning details provide the most prudent risk reduction measures.~/

We understand that many fundamental emergency planning issues have recently been or are currently being addressed for completed nuclear plants such as Shoreham. This, however, is the result of Implementation of plans should be evaluated on the subjective basis that the plans should provide adequate and prudent risk reduction given the totality of circumstances as they then exist. At the operating license stage there should be no argument that effectively states that no plan is or ever can be adequate.

The issue of state and local participation could also conceivably be altered by rule changes currently under Commission review. See SECY 35. We support these proposals.

- 6 -

the history of the development of the NRC's emergency planning regulations rather than the result of a logical, conscious licensing approach. Section 50.47 and Part SO, Appendix E, were developed and promulgated in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2. At the time the regulations went into effect, the current generation of plants had already received construction permits. Thus, as a result of the timing, the majority of emergency planning issues for those plants remained to be addressed at the operating license stage. We do not here propose that these issues be eliminated from current license reviews. However, the current situation should not be repeated for the next generation of nuclear plants.

3. Approvals Prior to Fuel Loading Finally, the State of Maine suggests that the NRC require that all offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before authorization is granted for fuel loading or low power operations. In effect, the State seeks the repeal of 10 C.F.R.

§50.47(d). We believe the State's proposal is neither supported by sound technical reasoning nor necessary for a complete licensing review. We therefore oppose the proposal.

The NRC promulgated §50.47(d) in 1982 to differentiate emergency planning r equirements applicable to the period of fuel loading and low power operation and those applicable to full power operation. As stated in the preamble to the rule, "the Commission . . . focused on the risks associated with this level of operation and . . . [chose] a level of emergency preparedness appropriate to assure the health and safety of the public

. . . . " See 47 Fed. Reg. 30232, at col. 3 (1982). The Commission stated~e technical basis for the regulation as follows:

First, the fission product inventory during low power testing is much less than during higher power operation due to the low level of reactor power and short period of operation. Second, at low power there is a significant reduction in the required capacity of systems designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents compared to the required capacities under full power operation. Third, the time available for taking actions to identify accident causes and mitigate accident consequences is much longer than at full power. This means the operators should have suff i cient time to prevent a radioactive release from occurring. In the worst case, the additional time available (at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />), even for a postulated low likelihood sequence wh ic h could eventually result in release of the fission products

accumulated at low power into the containment, would allow adequate precautionary actions to be taken to protect the public near the site.

Weighing all risks involved, the Commission has determined that the degree of emergency preparedness necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety is significantly less than that required for full-power operation. [Footnote omitted.]

Id. at 30233, col. 1. The State of Maine has not refuted this sound technical argument.

Furthermore, the Commission's regulation does not in any sense undermine the Staff's emergency planning review. The regulation merely recognizes that emergency planning is in a state of flux prior to full power operation. Plans and procedures are being finalized and drills and exercises are being conducted. The regulation therefore properly emphasizes the predictive nature of the Staff's review and a licensing board's decision, while preventing undue licensing delays. It should be emphasized that the regulation does not attenuate the emergency planning review. Rather, the NRC Staff and FEMA continue to monitor emergency planning throughout the period of low power operation as a preoperational / inspection matter. As the Commission concluded in the preamble to the final rule, the "rule changes . . . do not diminish in any respect the protection of public health and safety." Id. at 30233, col. 3.

The NRC's rule represents a reasoned balance between the need for complete, continuing review and the need for timely licensing decisions.

4. Conclusion In conclusion, we generally oppose the State of Maine's petition for rulemaking. The proposals to expand the EPZs and to require complete emergency planning prior to fuel load are not supported by either the technical record or sound policy considerations. The size of the EPZs should, however, be generically re-evaluated in the context of the ongoing source term research.

Further, we oppose the State's unrealistic proposal to require complete emergency planning prior to authorization of construction. However, as discussed above, we do believe NRC's regulations can be amended for future plants to require that certain fundamental emergency planning issues be addressed and resolved prior to the grant of a construction permit. Early resolution of issues related to objective "feasibility" of emergency planning at a given site and the existence and

necessity of state and local participation are logically issues to be resolved before a nuclear plant is constructed on the particular site.

We appreciate this opportunity to provide our comments on the petition for rulemaking.

submitted, s

BISHOP, LI PURCELL

UUL,;l\t. I 1~u1v1oc.n PETJJION RULE PRM ,:jJ-4 b L57 F,,e -4?t1 ~~

HARM O N & WEISS 2001 S STREET, N.W.

SUITE 430 '87 MAR -2 P4 :S 6 WASH I NGTON, D.C. 20009-1125 GAIL MCGREEVY HARMON TELEPHONE Off ELLYN R. WEISS DIANE CURRAN ,oc (202) 328 - 3500 DEAN R . TOUSLEY ANDREA C . FERSTER Mar ch 2, 1 9 8 7 Samuel J. Ch ilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street N.W., 11th Floor Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Ch ilk:

- On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists and the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, I hereby request a four-day extension of today's deadline for commenting on the State of Maine's petition for rulemaking, PRM-46. (See 51 Fed. Reg.

47,025 (December 30, 1987). The State of Maine's petition requests that the size of the emergency planning zone around nuclear power plants be expanded to twenty miles in radius. I understand that the Maine petition is being considered in con-junction with PRM-45, a rulemaking petition by Kenneth Sexton which requests the case-by-case determination of EPZ size. The deadline for filing comments on that petition is March 6.

Because the petitions are so closely related, we are filing one set of comments on both petitions. However, we find that we have been unable to complete the comments in time to meet the first deadline of March 2, and require a few additional days to

• finish them

• I have discussed this request with Emil Julian of your office and with Michael T. Lesar of the Rules and Procedures Branch. Both officials told me that they believed it would not be impractical for the NRC to consider our comments on the Maine petition if they were filed within a few days after the deadline, since they expect that comments on the Maine petition and the Sexton petition will be considered together, and the deadline for comments on the Sexton petition does not run until March 6. How-ever, in order to protect my clients' interest in assuring that their comments will be considered, I hereby formally request an extension of the deadline for filing comments on the Maine peti-tion until March 6, 1986.

jJ~ c__

Diane Curran

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DOCKET NUMBER J.J I OJ t-l?ETITION RULE PRM ..,J-4~@/ ~

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801 18TH STREET, NW SUITE 300 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-4200 March 2, 1987 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTN: DOCKETING AND SERVICE BRANCH

SUBJECT:

State of Maine Petition for Rulernaking - PRM 50.46

Dear Mr. Chilk:

The Coordinating Group on Emergency Preparedness (CGEP) is an organization of nineteen utilities whose purpose is to provide meaningful comments from a significant segment of the nuclear industry on rules affecting emergency preparedness. The CGEP has commented on several occasions to the Commission, both sua sponte and in response to requests made for comment by the Commission in the Federal Register. KMC, Inc., on behalf of itself and the nineteen utilities (listing enclosed), is pleased to comment on the Petition for Rulemaking - PRM 50.46.

The State of Maine petition (PRM 50.46) requests the Commis-sion:

1. to expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway;

2. to require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the Governors of all affected States approve the emer-gency plans as a precondition to construction; and

3. to require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power opera-tions are permitted.

CGEP has submitted comments on another similar petition for rule-making: PRM 50.31. As we indicated in that comment letter we believe that the present Commission regulations are conservative.

Acknow by

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Further, Commission and industry sponsored research initiated subsequent to the accident at Three Mile Island indicate strongly that the consequences of accidents are considerably less than those previously assumed. Therefore, we believe that the petition from the State of Maine (PRM 50.46) should be denied.

In addition, the petitioners have failed to meet the require-ments of 10 CFR 2.802 Petition for Rulemaking in that they have not provided their views or arguments with respect to the issue nor have they provided relevant technical or scientific or other data necessary to support the action sought namely to expand the emergency planning zones for both the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway. Their reference to the Chernobyl accident does not provide any meaningful information, and is apparently not based on a detailed analysis of the facts surround-ing this event. Recent reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency indicate that the radiation effects of the accident were less than originally assumed. In addition, the Commission is assessing the Chernobyl accident as part of its comprehensive reevaluation of source terms and severe accidents.

The petition also requests that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted is unreasonable in that it would require planning to be accomplished prior to the final design of the facility and some ten years prior to the need for such plans. It is unreasonable to assume this amount of lead time is appropriate since most of the present plans were developed after plants were in operation. These plans have been proven to be more than adequate to protect the health and safety of the general public. There is no reason to doubt that a successful plan can be developed for plants under construction at a time closer to the need for the plan to be operable. In addi-tion, facility and State and local resources would be unneces-sarily diverted from other activities during this period of time.

Under the present Commission regulations, emergency planning findings regarding onsite emergency plans are made prior to per-mitting fuel loading and/or low power operations. The Commission does not make findings or determinations concerning off-emergency preparedness since this phase of plant startup does not pose an offsite radiological threat which would require an off-site emergency response. Hence, there is no reason for the Commission to change its regulations in this regard.

For the above reasons, we believe that the petition should be denied.

Paul F. Collins Senior Associate Encl.

COORDINATING GROUP ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPLEMENTATION Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.

Boston Edison Co.

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.

Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.

Edison Electric Institute GPU Service Co.

tong Island Lighting Co.

Nebraska Public Power District Northeast Utilities Service Corp.

Northern States Power Co.

Omaha Public Power District Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

Pennsy lvania Power & Light Co.

Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

Sacramento Municipal Utility District Southern California Edison Co.

Toledo Edison Co.

Yankee Atomic Electric Co.

Virginia Power Co.

311 S. JUN IPER STREET, ROO M 603

• PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19 107 * (215) 545-1 832 DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER sTA_FF _ _ _

PETITION RULE_ PRM (5/ /:/!, .3~~7?}

itJ-4f!i!} February 26 , 198 l?ETITION RULE PRM (S'/!=£, 47~~~7

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Joseph Otle Minott, Eaq.

Executive Director Jenet L Fllante Program Director o~;

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Rlc:tlard J . M.,.._ Secret ary 0' Radiation Program Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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~ a M. MCGione Washington , D.C. 20555

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~=*ocacy Director . r-Betty A. Matcucel Attention : Chief , Docketing Administrator and Serv i ce Branch -0 BOARD OF DIRECTORS Laren Pitcairn President Mr. Secretary :

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Richard Hayden, Esq.

Vice President Robert Mayock, M.D. The Clean Ai r Council offers the fo l lowing Vice President JoHph Lowrey comments on two petitions for rulemaking now Treasurer before the Commiss i on. These are PRM-45 Robert J. Smith Secretary

( submitted by Kenneth Sexton ) and PRM-46

( submitted by the State of Maine ) referring ,

Richard Andren, Ph.D.

respec t ive l y , to s it e-spec i f i c emergency zone John A. Balley, P.E. planning and an expansion of the current zones .

R. Bruce Beck Martha Booden Norman Childs The Cl ean Air Counci l, a private env i ronmenta l

.A~alter Dickinson, Jr.

~ i l l Gal n, M.S. Ed.

organizat i on aff i liated wi th the Amer i can Lung Mary Harris Associations of the Delaware Va l ley , is concerned Barry Cheater Hertz, M.D.

Ralph Hirsch about air quality and c i t i zen health . The Counc il George Holt i s specifically i nterested i n the issue o f the Jessica Krow Viki Uet Emergency Planning Zones because mi lli ons of Hal Lockwood, Esq. Delaware Valley residents l i ve within a 50 -mi le Arthur F. Loeben Henry J. Magaziner, F.A.I.A.

radius of one of three nuclear reac t or s i tes .

Bruce Molholt, Ph.D. There are 6 . 8 million people around the Limer i ck Rudolph V. Tolbert Joyce Waite plant ; 4 . 9 mi llion around the Peach Bo t tom plant; David 8. Warheit, Ph.D. and 4 . 7 mi ll ion around the Hope Creek and Salem Jean K. Weglarz complex. Thus , all these people now l i ve within the " ingestion pathway " of one or more reactors . A subs t antial number of these same citizens also l ive wi thin the 10-mile "plume exposure pathway ".

CHRISTMAS SEALS HELP FIGHT AIR POLLUTION RECYCLED PAPER

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page 2 The Council strongl y supports amendment of regulation 10 CFR 50.47 (c) (2) to reflect the suggestions in PRM-45 and PRM-46. Specifically ,

such amendments should include site-specific planning for plume exposure pathways based on local demography, topography, access routes and other relevant criteria. They should also include a minimum exposure pathway of a 20-mile radius in all cases. The Council ' s position is based on a number of relevant facts , including the following.

Lessons drawn from the experience of the explosion at the Chernobyl reactor last year indicate that current U.S. planning zones may be drastically inadequate for protection of citizens health and safety. The Soviet government ordered a total evacuation to a distance of 18.6 miles and further partial evacuation of towns up to 50 miles from the reactor site because of radioactive hotspots. Some of those towns may be permanently uninhabitable. The ingestion pathway exceeded current NRC estimates by over 20 times ;

food products more than 1200 miles from Chernobyl were reclassified as low-level radioactive waste and were disposed of. Furthermore, the U.S.

government advised Americans in Kiev (80 miles distant from Chernobyl) to evacuate.

A 1982 study by the Sandia National Laboratory for the Commission indicated that a severe reactor accident with containment failure under adverse weather conditions could cause fatalities within one year up to 25 miles from the accident site.

Cancers could occur even further distant .

Evacuations under emergency conditions can not be controlled. For example , following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island only 3 , 500 citizens within five miles were advised to evacuate.

However, almost 200 , 000 people , living up to 25 miles from the reactor site spontaneously evacuated. In addition, studies of citizen attitudes around b o th the Shoreham and Shearon Harris reactors show that large numbers of people up to 25 miles from the reactors would spontaneously evacuate when citizens within the 10-mile zone were required to. The reality is that far more people and traffic wil be on the roads during an emergency than current plans anticipate. This situation could prove disastrous , especially in areas with large population concentrations.

(

page 3 The above examples, in addition to condi tions which are specific to different reactor sites, call for a heigh tened attention to protection of public health and safety. Thus, an expansion of the emergency planning zones to include people beyond the current 10-mi le plume exposure and 50-mile ingestion pathways is a minimal step in facing both citizen concerns and objective fact.

The Clean Air Council strongly urges the Commission to incorporate PRM-45 and PRM-46 into its planning process. Both site-specific planning and a minimum of a 20-mile radius plume exposure pathway are necessary to such planning. Expansion of the ingestion pathway is also strongly advised.

Sincerely, Richard J. Myers Radiation Program Director Clean Air Council e.

DOCKET NUMBER SAPL FET * , LILE PRM jJ-4~ ([jJ

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Seacoast Ant1-Pollut10G1Jc~~~gue 5 Market St., Portsmouth*,~i N.H. 03801 (i161},~31-soa9

'87 MAR - 2 p 6 :03 uFf I OOC r I ,.

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Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch RE: The Maine Petition at 51 Fed. Reg. 47,025-26, December JO, 1986

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) supports the amend-ments to the Commission's rules requested in the State of Maine's petition sent to the Commission on October 10, 1986 and published for comment in the Federal Register on December JO, 1986.

First, the State of Maine requests that the Commission expand the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure and ingestion exposure pathways. SAPL would strongly endorse the expansion of emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants.

The current 10- mile zone has been demonstrated inadequate by the accident in the Soviet Ukraine at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant .

Though different in type and design than American reactors, the Chernobyl reactor has demonstrated what can happen given a serious nuclear accident involving catastrophic gross failure of containment.

Malfunction of American reactors could result in similar large releases of radioactive material even though as a result of a differ-ing set of initiating conditions and equipment failures .

The Chernobyl accident has given us a painful lesson from which we must not fail to learn; radioactive materials can disperse over very large land areas and can differentially concentrate to deliver large doses at substantial distances from the reactor. Evacuations as far as 50 miles from the Chernobyl reactor were reported. Clearly, the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone does not provide a sufficient base from which to develop an adequate ad hoc expansion of response to cover the areas that could be affected follow-ing a severe accident. NUREG-0654 at 12 Similarly, the Chernobyl accident has pointed up the gross insufficiency of a 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway. The necessity of destroying the primary foodstuff of the Lapps in Sweden due to excessive levels of radiation contamination demonstrates that provisions for ingestion exposure control need to be greatly expanded.

The second request by the State of Maine is that a requirement Founded 1969 AR 4 1987 no led ed by carer. ...* **

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be added that emergency planning be done prior to construction of a nuclear facility, and that, further, the governor or governors of any affected state or states approve t he plans as a precondition of construction . This proposal would certainly make sense and remove t he temptation that utilities have succumbed to in certain instances to sink billions of dollars of investment into improperly-sited nuclear projects in the hope of prejudicing ultimate licensing decisions. Though the Con:mission has in the past consistently taken the position that the risk of lost investment is the risk that a licensee bears, the Commission is now contemplating reversing itself on this (see SECY 35) in view of large investments at the Seabrook and Shoreham reactors . This is despite the fact that both of these reactor sites were demonstrably ill-chosen. The State of Maine ' s proposal would prevent utilities from trying to employ this tactic of accruing a substantial weight of investment in the attempt to override public safety concerns .

The third request by the State of Maine would require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and low power operations are allowed. In SAPL ' s view , this requested amendment would bring the Commission ' s regulations into conformity with the fair hearing requirements of the Atomic Energy Act . The current provision at 10 CFR ~ 50 . 47(d) of the Commission' s regulations is palpably unfair to the public as it serves, as does the weight of financial investment in the nuclear facility , to create a momentum *toward full power licensing . This momentum prejudices the consideration of offsite emergency planning issues and deprives the public of its right to a full and fair hearing on all issues pertinent to adequate public protection .

For all of the above reasons , the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League fully supports the requested amendments to the Commission ' s regulations set forth in the State of ~~ine ' s petition.

Respectfully submitted,

~~

Jane Doughty Field Director

DOCKET NUMBER P.ETITION RULE PRM .!"d-4t /fr1 (51 PR, 47d:25) . l.!.Y

'.30 K[ .. l r-D NH GULF STATES UTILITIES CO~P~ "87 MAR -2 P6 :C P OST OFFICE B OX 2951

• BEAU M ONT , TEXAS 77704 AREA CODE 409 B3B - 6631 GFF I IOCI\

1 BR t-.

February 24, 1987 RBG- 25,396 File No. G9.23.l Secretary of the Commission

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Gulf States Utilities (GSU) is pleased to offer the following comments regarding the Commission's Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking submitted by the State of Maine (51FR47025). GSU does not agree with the proposed changes to 10CFR50.47. The bases for our determination that the petition should be denied are discussed below.

1) GSU does not feel that the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway needs to be expanded. The information which is currently available in NUREG-0956 indicates that the risk stated in WASH-1400 is overestimated. Additionally, current source term analysis suggests that no expansion of the EPZs is warranted; in fact a reduction may be justified.

2) Current ly , the Preliminary Safe ty Analysis Report is required, to a degree, to discuss the Emergency Plan. Specifics and details of this plan are not required at the construction stage because at that time there is no threat of a radio l ogical accident. The States which are aff ected by the EPZs currently have input to the Emergency Plan review as well as other facets of the licensing process. GSU feels that the current procedures allow all affected parties to be adequately represented.

AR 4 1987 Acknowledged by card . * * * * * * * * * * * * * ~..,.,.

~J M'./CLE.AR R:.GlllATORY COMMISSION 0:CCKET ING I]., SERVI CE SECT~

OH CE r-F TPE SECRET ARV' Of T it :'.:O,V,MISSI f01tm 11t1* (>,. ,. 2/2~I

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 24, 1987 Page 3) To propose that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading or low power operations is in disagreement with the findings of the Commission when 10CFR50.47(a)(2){d) was issued. At that time the Commission stated that the "risks of operating a power reactor at low power are significantly lower than the risks of operating at full power **** " The petitioner has provided no evidence that this is still not the case.

In summary, GSU feels that the proposed changes are not justified, therefore the petition should be denied.

Sincerely,

,1, F, ~

'3. E. Booke; - ~

Manager - River Bend Oversight JEB tfl111p

DOCKET NUMBER

.ETfflON RULE PRMcffJ-4(,/;;;)

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Februory 27, 1987 COHMENTS OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY, INC. <. ocRE * >*a7 HAR -2 P6 :1 ON PRM-50-46, 51 FEO. REG. 47025, DECEMBER 30, 1986.

PRM-50-46 is a petition For rulemaking submitted by the ~~FY State or Haine seeking three revisions to the NRC's emergency Ck_ _',1 '** . ,/J

~ulations: (1) expansion or both the Plume exposure DA' ;1 ,\.'Cr and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs; (2) require emergency planning and approval or such p1ons by the Governor or any arrected state as a precondition of Plant construction, and <3>

require orFsite emergency preparedness findings berore Fuel l~ading or low power permitted.

OCRE finds these general concepts to be appropriate for further consideration by the Commission ror incorporation into the NRC's emergency planning requirements. The merits or each e, of these three concepts is addressed seriatim.

1. Expansion or EPZs. As the petitioner points out, the Chernobyl accident required protective actions to be taken at distances much Farther rrom the site than is currently contemplated in the NRC's standards, Just as the TMI-2 occident demonstrated the need ror emergency planning in areas beyond the traditional Low population zone, the Chernobyl accident has hown the need ror eme rgency planning in areas beyond the current 10 and 50 mile EPZs. Substantial uncertainties exist with respect to se v ere accident progression and consequences

( and particularly with containment capabilities and Failure modes), such that the only prudent course is to learn rrom

• real-world* e v ents such as Chernobyl and to revise emergency preparedness requirements accordingly,

- 2, State Approval prior to Construction.

the event or a nuclear reactor accident, Clearly the States will have a major responsibility ror protecting the public in Only the States have the authority and resources to direct and carry out protective actions such os e va cuation. Logically, such plans should be developed and approved by the State. And, ir a State finds that it lacks th e authority or r esources to effectively implement these protective actions, then the responsible approach is for the Governor not to approve such plans and not to submit the flawed plans for FEMA/NRC approval. OCRE believes that State approval or emergency plans should be a precondition both for construction and operation; i,e,, emergency plans should reassessed at the operating license stage due to the potential for changed circumstances rrom the time of the earlier assessment, e,9., increased population near the site, availability oF emergency response personnel, etc. rr ract, it is to be expected that the OL review will r epresent a more MAR 4 1987 Acknowledged by carer .......-.-,., m:w1a11iiS

tJ; g, NU~LEA.R REGUlATORY COMMfSSIO(q DOGKEUlG & SERVICE se'cr ION OFFl(E Of i ,!E SEC -ETARY Of 1 z./z7 I

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Poge 2 occurat picture of merg_ncy re ponse capabiliti s. How v r, con . truction p rmit stager view will rev ol deficiencies which may be incopoble of being corrected, such as geographical configurotions, inod quote road n tworks, or opposition to the facility by the public or gov rnment such that emergency Planning will be *boycott d," Early id ntification of these problems will prevent construction of an unlic nsoble facility,

~ Requiring Em rg ncy pr_par dness Finding prior to FU-1 Load or LOW Pow r OP ration. Thi- is a prudent measure, as prolon ed low power op ration will occu ulat a substantial fission product inv ntory, Which, while obviously smaller than that resul~ing from full power op ration, can still be releas_d to th environm nt in an occid nt. causing offsite consequ nces.

Ex mpting low power op rotion from of sit emergency Planning i~

inconsistent with th rule requiring such plans for all power r actors. For exa pl , the P rry Nucl or Pow r Plant in Ohio *s rot dot 1205 MWe, 3579 MWt. Fiv percent Of its rated power lev_1 equals 179 MWt. A reactor of this size is required to h<'IV offsite emergency plans as a condition of operation, although it - EPZ sizes would bed termined on a cose-sp cific basis.

Respectfully submitted,

~:z~

Susan L. Hiott OCRE Representative 8275 Hunson Rood M- ntor, OH 44060 (216) 255-3158

DOCKET NUMBER

.ETITION RULE PRM ~-46/;Z)/

Atomiclndustrialforum,lnc. {_5/ r.i 7d2~ ~

71 01 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814-4891 COU'( I[-'

Telephone: (301) 654-9260 U'"i:IC TWX 7108249602 ATOMIC FOR DC "87 HAR -2 P4 :37 (jFf,..,

March 2, 1987 DOC

• Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on Maine's Petition for Rulemaking Requesting the Commission Initiate a Rulemaking Proceeding to Change its Regulations on Emergency Plans, 10CFR50.47 (51 F.R. 47025; December 30, 1986)

Dear Sir:

The Atomic Industrial Forum's Subcommittee on Emergency Planning and Siting of the Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety sub-mits the following comments on the subject petition. We apprec-iate this opportunity to provide these comments.

The State of Maine's petition to expand the emergency planning zones has no technical basis. Therefore, the petition does not meet the requirements of 10CFR Part 2.802(c). For example, fol-lowing the TMI accident, a letter dated August 14, 1980, was sent to former Chairman Ahearne and signed by W.R. Stratton, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and A.P. Malinauskas and D.O. Campbell, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The purpose of the letter was to recommend that an urgent study and assessment be made on the release of iodine following an accident. The issue was whether the iodine source terms used in the regulatory process are too conservative based on actual releases from TM!. Since this letter, there have been detailed studies completed including the Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking (IDCOR) Program, the American Nuclear Society's Special Committee on Source Terms report, the EPRI research program on source terms and the recently NRC issued NUREG-0956, "Reassessment of the Technical Bases for Estimating Source Terms". The American Physical Society established a study group on radionuclide releases from severe accidents. The results of this effort were presented to the Commission in February, 1985.

To date none of these detailed technical studies and associated research has indicated a need to expand the current emergency planning zones. However, recognizing the conservatism in the present emergency planning zones, we agree that the NRC should change its regulations on emergency planning based on the most recent technical information.

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk March 2, 1987 Regarding the Chernobyl accident, the Soviet Union's comparable emergency planning zone is a 3km (1.87 mile) safety zone. The 30km (18.75 mile) zone within which evacuation took place at Chernobyl was an "ad hoc" measure based on the severity of the accident. The evacuation did not start until 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> after the accident. Approximately 45,000 people were evacuated from Pripyat in less than three hours. In spite of the severity of the radio-logical release and the fact the emergency plan had to be changed to address the conditions following the accident, the emergency response worked.

There are two major conclusions emerging from the experts that have studied the Soviet accident. They are:

1. The design and institutional-differences between the Chernobyl-type, water-cooled graphite reactor and U.S. light water nuc-lear power plants are so fundamental that the Soviet accident should not impact the processes of design and regulation of U.S. nuclear reactors. The accident does point up the impor-tance of the emphasis that the U.S. plants place on high quali-ty training and procedures, and strict adherence to administra-tive controls.

2. The Chernobyl accident confirms U.S. choices in nuclear tech-nology, supported by our public regulatory program. A very deliberate determination was made at the foundation of the U.S. nuclear industry that we could not tolerate the same risks as other industries. From the beginning, conservative e reactor plant and containment designs, higher safety standards, defense-in-depth, and operating discipline were imposed.

Our record of protecting the public is an affirmation of our safety philosophy.

Regarding the suggestion that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted, the present reg-ulations, 10CFRS0, Appendix E,Section II, requires information on emergency planning be included in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). For example, the on-site and off-site organizations for coping with emergencies and the means for notification must be addressed. Provisions for a training program are to be addressed.

A preliminary analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway for trans-ients and permanent populations, noting major impediments to the evacuation, are also to be included in the PSAR. In the six to eight years it takes to construct the plant, significant changes will probably take place around it. This may include adding roads,

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk March 2, 1987 closing others, additional building, changes to the political structure etc. These changes have to be factored into the emergency plan to reflect the actual conditions when the plant goes into operation.

Additionally, one must recognize that emergency planning is being addressed indirectly when siting the facility. It is not a sep-arate but rather an integral part of the overall program to pro-tect the health and safety of the public.

The governor or governors of any affected State can become full participants in the public hearing required at the construction permit stage. The detailed procedures for doing this are as described in 10CFR, Part 2, "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings".

During fuel loading and/or low power testing the nuclear core has not had sufficient operating time to build up a significant amount of fission products. The emergency plan has been submitted and reviewed by the NRC staff. In addition, the containment and the necessary safety systems are placed in the operation mode during low power testing to minimize further any off-site releases if any accident were to occur. Since the nuclear core is free of fission products during fuel loading and relatively free during low power testing, the need for off-site emergency preparedness to reduct further the consequence of a potential accident to the public is minimal.

Therefore, to require that off-site emergency preparedness find-ings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted represents a major econom ic burden to the licensee with minimal, if any, benefit to the health and safety of the public. As we have stated before a Congressional Subcommittee, regardless of how responsible the nuclear industry is in addres-sing emergency preparedness, the present regulatory process per-mits a State or local government agency to directly jeopardize an operating license, or the issuance of one, at will. This jeopardy will continue for the life of the operating license unless some regulatory changes are made. To adopt this requirement would further exacerbate what constitutes a third party "veto" in the regulatory process.

In conclusion, for the reasons stated herein, we disagree with Maine's request as stated in their letter to the Commission of October 14, 1986, and the grounds provided therein. There is no technical basis for expanding the present emergency planning

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk March 2, 1987 i

zones. The present regulatory process affords all interested parties an opportunity to demonstrate why a construction permi t should not be issued. There is minimal, if any, reduction of risk to the public by requiring that off-site emergency planning findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted. For these reasons, Maine's petition should be denied.

Again, we appreciate the opportunity to comment on the subject petition.

Sincerely, Frederick W. Buckman Chairman, Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety FWB:tkr

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN W. McCORMACK STATE OFFICE BUILDING ONE ASHBURTON PLACE, BOSTON 02 1 08-1 698

'87 MAR -2 P4 :33 DOCKET NUMBER JAMES M. SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL PETITION RULE PRM /id-~@

CS-IF~ ,471,Z§}

February 27, 1987 Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Re gulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Re: State.of Maine Rulemaking Petition; Docket No. PRM-50-46 De ar Mr. Chilk:

I have enclosed for filing in the above-referenced rulemaking proceeding Comments of Massachusetts Attorney General James M. Shannon Concerning The Petition For Rulemaking By The State Of Maine For Amendments To 10 C.F.R. § 50.47.

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OtltKETEQ USNRC COMMENTS OF MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL.87 MAR -2 P4 :33 JAMES M. SHANNON CONCERNING THE PETITION FOR RULEMAKING BY THE STATE OF MAINE FOR AMENDMENTS TO 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 F

As Attorney General, representing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, I welcome this opportunity to comment on the rulemaking petition of the State of Maine proposing changes to 10 C.F.R. § 50.47, which appeared at 51 Fed. Reg. 47025 on December 30, 1986. The changes, if adopted, would amend 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47 in three areas pertaining to emergency planning. They would expand the plume exposure pathway and the i ngest i on exposure pathway emergency planning zones, require t hat emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted, and require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel load i ng and/or low-power operat i ons are permitted.

I support the proposed changes and recommend their adoption by the NRC. The changes would result in improved emergency planning at nuclear sites around the country.

I*

Currently, 10 c.F.R. § 50.47(c)(2) provides that,

"[g]enerally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ [emergency planning zone] for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius." No operating license may be issued unless there is "reasonable assurance that

adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the ev-of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. § S0.47(a). The proposed amendment would increase the plume exposure EPZ beyond ten miles, thus increasing the area for which planning for emergency responses would be required.

The principal reason for emergency planning is to reduce the health consequences of any radioactive release in the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant. The current generic ten-mile EPZ was adopted by the NRC following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island in order to provide protection beyond that provided by engineered safety features. The selection of the ten-mile area was based on studies commissioned at that time, and was chosen over a proposed alternative in which case-by-case determinations would be made for each site, in order to provide a more conservative level of emergency planning. In adopting the current emergency rules in 1980, the Commission concluded that a ten-mile planning zone provided an adequate basis for emergency planning.

More recent data, however, including information concerning the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union, demonstrate that a serious nuclear accident can have harmful effects on humans beyond ten miles. A 1982 study conducted by Sandia National Laboratories concluded that under adverse weather conditions, a severe reactor accident with containment failure could have serious human health consequences as far as 25 miles from a reactor site. Preliminary information based on a recP Commission study of the possible consequences of a reactor emergency with containment failure at the Surrey plant demonstrates that people living in the area between ten and twenty miles from the reactor could be exposed to high levels of radiation if they are not evacuated or sheltered.

The 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor caused Soviet authorities to order a total evacuation of the area within an 18.6 mile radius of the plant, with partial evacuation and significant contamination occurring up to 100 miles from the plant. The Union of Concerned Scientists has concluded that an accident of similar severity is technically possible in the United States . The new studies and the Chernobyl experience indicate that governments and utilities must be prepared to deal with the consequences of an accident beyond the ten-mile radius currently required.

The utilities contend that for most postulated accidents only a small evacuation area would be necessary. Even if true, a less likely but more severe accident would pose a dangerous threat to public health and safety outside the current ten mile zone. The theory of emergency planning has always been not to focus on the likelihood of an accident but rather to plan for an adequate level of protection in the event , even if unlikely, that an accident does occur. Requiring an expanded EPZ would merely require utilities to plan for such an event. If a severe accident should occur, the local governments and utility would then be prepared to cope with its consequences. The current requirement for a ten-mile EPZ results in no advance emergency planning for distances beyond ten miles. As long as there is some risk of harm beyond that distance, utilities should be required to address what they would do to counteract or reduce that danger . The risk of an accident of Chernobyl-type proportions mandates emergency planning beyond ten miles.

Moreover , there is evidence that , in the event of an emergency, populations outside the area from which officials have ordered evacuation will voluntarily choose to leave anyway (the " shadow evacuation phenomenon " ). Where there is official planning for a wider area, the likelihood of chaos and panic is greatly reduced since local governments will be prepared to handle evacuations beyond the officially-declared evacuation area.

Therefore , I strongly support expansion of the emergency planning zone for all nuclear reactors.

II.

The second aspect of the petition filed by the State of Maine would require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the governor or governors of any affected states approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction. This proposal is entirely sensible and, if adopted, would assure that the current impasses at Seabrook and Shoreham would not recur. In both these cases, billions of dollars have been expended in construction and yet there is a very real probability that no full-power operating license will issue because there is no "reasonable assurance that adequative protective measures * *

• will be taken." 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(a).

The proposal to require a governor's approval of emergency plans prior to construction is consistent with the position which the Attorney General of the commonwealth of Massachusetts has taken throughout the thirteen years of the Seabrook litigation. The Attorney General has consistently argued that the Seabrook plant is sited too close to a large, transient summer beach population for which adequate emergency planning is not feasible. Even before the accident at Three Mile Island and the current emergency planning requirements, the Commonwealth, along with the other intervenors in the construction permit proceeding, maintained that the utility should be required to demonstrate the feasibility of evacuating the summer beach population near Seabrook prior to issuance of the permit. See Public Service co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) LBP-76-26, 3 NRC 857, 922-26 (1976);

ALAB-390, 5 NRC 733 (1977). After the accident at Three Mile Island, the Commonwealth joined the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League in its Petition to Show Cause why the Seabrook construction permit should not be suspended or revoked unl-it could be demonstrated that emergency planning was feasible for the Seabrook Station ten-mile emergency planning zone.

The Commonwealth argued in 1979, and again in 1981, that adequate planning was not feasible. Moreover, the Commonwealth pressed for a determination of the emergency planning issues before allowing the utility to proceed with construction so as to avoid the risk that billions of dollars would be wasted should the plant be denied an operating license due to its inability to comply with the emergency planning regulations.

The Commonwealth further argued that emergency planning issues could not be decided fairly by the NRC if addressed for the first time at the operating license stage. However, the Commission has refused throughout the Seabrook litigation to consider the serious emergency planning issues before the utility invested billions in construction.

Now that there may be no full-power operating license issued because the Governor of Massachusetts has refused to submit emergency plans based on his well-founded conclusion that emergency planning is not feasible for Seabrook, the Commission is actually considering lowering its safety standards in order to assure the licensing of Seabrook. In particular, the staff has proposed a rule change to allow plants to be licensed despite an inability to meet the Section 50.47(a) requirement that there be "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures . .

• will be taken" in the event of an emergency. The Commission should reject this unwarranted change and, instead, should adopt the far more logical and safety-conscious approach of requiring approved emergency plans as a pre-condition to construction. Such a rule would protect the public, states, and localities, as well as assure that utilities do not squander billions on constructing a plant which cannot operate because no approved emergency plan is in place.

Consequently, the second provision of the State of Maine's petition should be adopted.

III.

The proposal by the State of Maine would also amend 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(d) to require that off-site emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low-power operation are permitted. I support this amendment as a means of assuring that the irreversible consequences of low-power operation do not occur where a plant may never receive a full-power operating license due to inadequate emergency planning.

Currently, Section 50.47(d) allows issuance of a low-power operating license without any determination of the adequacy of off-site emergency plans. As a matter of law, Section 50.47(d) is invalid since it violates the statutory right to a hearing

- 7 -

on all issues prior to the grant of an operating license.

42 u.s.c. § 2239(a). Moreover, as demonstrated by the ongoing Seabrook and Shoreham litigation, emergency planning issues can result in great uncertainty as to when, if ever, a plant may receive its full-power operating license. As a matter of policy, there is simply no logical reason for allowing low-power operation where full-power operation is so uncertain.

Low-power operation causes irradiation of the plant rendering conversion to another use impractical and decommissioning of the plant very expensive. Moreover, low-power operation results in accumulation of low-level and high-level radioactive waste. There is at present no clear solution to the difficult problem of disposing of radioactive waste. The Commission should not contribute to this problem by allowing accumulation of waste through low-power operation where full-power operation is uncertain. Moreover, postponing low-power operation until a time closer to full-power operation protects ratepayers and investors against the possibly unnecessary expenses associated with low-power operation.

Low-power operation typically requires no more than a few months to complete. Postponing such operation until emergency planning issues are resolved would still allow ample time to complete low-power testing with little or no delay in eventual full-power operation.

Since no discernible benefit can be derived from low-p -

operation unless the plant eventually receives its full-power operating license, the proposed amendment would save both the economic and environmental costs of needless low-power operation. In light of the Chernobyl disaster, we need to be more cautious in the licensing of nuclear power plants. It is essential that all relevant safety issues, particularly off-site emergency planning, be fully considered before any nuclear operations commence.

I urge the Commission to adopt the three changes to 10 C. F. R. § 50.4 7 propo sed by th e Stat e of Maine.

- 9 -

OOlK[ u DOCKET NUMBER

"':.NI, l?ETITION RULE PRM .:JJ-4~

. (~IF£47t126) c_:y 23 Offlcea

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Tli£ CONICCllCu* L,0,,T 111<0-~ rAW-Wltll'" - . . l ~T*11\.lf;TfllC' C:OW....., P.O. 80)( 210 MQ\. VQKI tu.ti~ ~ J I ~NlfY JriillOIITMiAIJ "-tllfl .IIIV'ttl ,,,,,_IH" HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 001.. 1-0270 f

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March 2. 1987 Docke t Nos * .50-21 .3 Jo-24,

,0-))6 J0-'123

!12434 Re: 10CFR5tr'.47 11 ~. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

,~:-; Document Control Desk

.,., \~hi 'lgton. D. C. 20,,,

Haddam Neck Plant

~lllstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Comments 011 Petition for Rulemaklng Piled by the State of Maine

• r n~cember 30, 1986,(l) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pubHshed

~c:r public com ment a notice of a petltlon for rulemaklng flled by the State of

• *al 11e regarding emerge ncy planning. The petitioner asks the Commission to

,mend 10CFR50.47 as follows:

"1. Expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway,

2. Require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the go>1ernor or governors of any affected States approve the emergency plans as a precondltlon to construction; and

3. Require that off site emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted."

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO} and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) hereby respectfully submit the following comments.

Ex,2anded Emergency Planning Zones The present regulations define the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) as an area of approximately 10 miles in radius and the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ as an area of approximately .50 mlles ln radius. These (1)  ; 1 Federal Register 4702;, December 30, 1986. MAR 4 1987 Acknow by carcf. ** ,-rr.-,.*7 ****

u. S NUCI FAR REG TORY COMM ISSION D(' "rT "; & S P, ICE "F(T!QN Post  ;::AV I

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u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B124.34/Page 2 March 2, 1987 sizes were determlned through an e{f9rt conducted by a joint NR.C/EPA Task Force and set forth in NUREG-039,.(2) The bases for the e)(i9tlng EPZs were reiterated ln NURE.G-0654/FEMA-REP-1.(l)

The methods used to determine the size of these EPZs were technically extensive and very conservative. The evaluation was based on a full spectrum of accidents and corresponding consequences, utili:dng WASH-1400 source terms.

The WASH-1400 data provided conservative predictions of radiological releases and conservative quantitative estimates of risk, The State of Maine's proposal to expand the size of the EP%s is not technically justified, and is inconsistent with the Commlsslon's concept of emergency planning. First, no data exist to support the need for a larger EPZ. Rather, the StatP of Maine relies only upon broad comparisons to the evacuation that was conducted around the Chernobyl plant in the u.s.S,R. after the accident at that facllity ln April 1986, without establlshlng any technical llnkage to U.S. light water reactors. Second, the existing regulation is based on conservative data and a philosophy of prudent rlsk reductlon. Further, the emergency preparedness associated with the current EPZs provide a more than sufficient planning basis ln the extremely unlikely case that expansion of the E.PZs should become necessary.

The NRC and the industry are currently re-evaluating the source terms that are the basis for the current emergency planning regulations. The effort is intended t:., provide a sound technical basis for the determination of the slze of the EPZs, dnd preliminary results indicate that if any change in the size of EPZs ls

ustified, it will be a reduction, not an increase, due to the inherent

.onservatisms ln both the source term data and the resultlng determinatlon of

!he size of the EPZs. This process, including any appropriate changes t.P.)the EPZs, should be allowed to continue. There is no need to act prematurely(4 on this issue; therefore, this aspect of the petltlon should be denied.

Additionally, simply increasing the slze of the EPZs wiU not increase the effectiveness of emergency planning. Any changes in the emergency planning area should focus on increasing the effectiveness of emergency preparedness, such as focusing on the population at risk, while at the same time recognizing that the risk varies inversely with distance from the facility.

(2) NUREG-0396, EPA ,20/1-78-016, "Planning Bases for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Reactors", December 1978.

(3) NUREG-06,4/FEMA-REP-l, "Criteria For Preparation and Evaluation of Radiologlcal Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness ln Support o.f Nuclear Power Plants," November 1, 1980.

• ' \ ,. I The NRC decllned to act on Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's (BC&:E) application to reduce the size of the plume EPZ around the Calvert Cliffs faclJlty. In a February 14, 1986 letter, the NRC called BCi&E's request "premature 0 because it was based on source term research that the Staff was still evaluating.

U.S. Nuclear Regulat ory Commission 8 124.34/Page )

March 2, 198 7 Finally, a petitioner who is dissatisfied with the plume exposure pathway EPZ boundaries at a particular site can petition the NRC to take appropriate action under 10CFR2,206. Appeal to FE.MA under 44-CFR3.50,1.5(a) is also an optlon which allows any individual to appeal a PE.MA decision to approve a state's emergency plan.

Pre-approval of Emergency Planning The petitioner's request that emergency planning be completed prior to any construction of the nuclear fac111ty and that the approval of the governor of any effec ted state be a pre ..condition to construction is presently unrealistic and inappropriate.

Since all four (4) of our nuclear units are fully operational, this aspect of the

? tltion does not directly imp ct us at the present tlme. However, we offer our p rspectives on this issue for the present and future generations of nuclear power plants.

For the present generation of nuclear power plantst we believe it ls lnefflctent fr om both a planning and a licensing standpoint to address emergency planning In

.its ent irety prior to starting construction. The engineering design and details needed to complete emergency planning are simply not available prior to construction, Emergency planning involves the development of complete mergency plans for the licensee, and for all state and local governments wlthln he EPZs. l'l addition, detailed implementing procedures and logistic detalls

~.i.e., contracts wlth organizations provldlng support s rvices1 procurement of

• quipment, installation of the prompt notification system, training, exercises and rills) nust be completed, Many of these emergency pl nnlng matters rely on

ieta iled information from the plant (e.g., emergency action levels) whlch ls only 1val1able later in the construction phase of the plant.

The present two-step licensing process has led industry and the regulators to a design/regulatory system ln which only design information of a mor preliminary nature is furnished on the front end of the design and construction process leaving open the potentlal for significant changes on the back end, Due to the uncertainties in the present licensing process pertaining to plant design and site reviews, utlUties have been hesitant to commit large investments up front to do detailed plant designs and complete the staffing of operational personnel. To have required emergency planning to be completed for the existing nuclear plan s prior to construction would have resulted in unnecessary and inefficient expendltures of resources slnce many portions of this plannlng would have to be redone due to changes made at the plant.

At present, if the governor does not approve a state's emergency plan, lt ca nnot be implemented by the state agencies. However, the timing of the governor's app roval of the em ergency plan would be premature lf done as a precondl tlon to construc tion.

(3) 47 Federal Register 30232.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B12434/Page 4 March 2, 1987 We belleve that if nuclear power is to remain a viable option in the u.s .* the future generation o! nuclear power plants wlll consist of standardized plant designs that are licensed in a one-step approach. This process ls envisioned to allow a utility to take an NRC approved standard plant design, Integrate site-specific information into the design, and apply to the NRC for a construction operating license (COL}. Prior to this application, an early site revlew (ESR) would be completed. The ESR could allow the publlc and the states lnvol'led to air their concerns about general emergency planning. Issues pertaining t o the overall feasibility of emergenc:y planning could be addl'cssod. In other words, concerns that sufficient emergency planning is impossible (or ilt least ripractical) given local geography, demograph, meteorology, etc., could be

.:ddressed at this stage. These issues could be properly addressed before

.,estrnent is made and before the plant ls built. Given a finding that the site is dequate, thes issues could not be raised in the COL reviews.

ue to the stability achieved through a standard design and the COL, utlllties would be more willing to comrnlt large up-front investments. All engineering design details would be completed prior to construction thus allowing most, lf not all emergency planning to be completed. The development and implementation of the various emergency plans and implementing procedures could be addressed at the COL review.

Approva s Prior to FueJ Loadlr:1g finally, the petitioner requests that all offsite emergency preparedness fin s

• reso:ved before authorization is granted for fuel loading or low power eratlon. We oppose this proposal because the petition does not provide any nd technkal support for the position. When the Commlsslon enacted

~ CFR.50.47(d) in 1982 to differentiate emergency planning requirements pplicable to the period of fuel load and low power operation, they gave extensive technical reasons for thls position. The Commission chose a level of emergency planning that was deemed adequate to assure the health and safety of the public during these phases of plant operation, Since the State of Maine does not dispute the Commission's technical basis, there is no reason to repeal thls regulation.

For the present generatlon of nuclear power plants, the NRC's rule represents a balance '.>etween the need for complete review and the need for timely licensing decisions. For the future generation of nuclear power plants, based on the standardized design and COL process, emergency plannlng issues could be addressed long be fore fuel load.

\:oncluslon ln conclusion, CY APCO and NNECO oppose the Sta te of Maine 's petltlon for rulemaklng. The proposals to expand the E.PZs and t o require emergency planning issues to be resolved prior to fuel load are not supported by technlcal ana lysis. However, we support the ongoing source term research which could lead to a generic re-evaluation of the slze of the EPZs as well as the reasonableness of the NRC evaluation of site-specific features in determlnlng appropriate E.PZs. Any changes to the EPZs prlor to completion of these efforts ls viewed as premature.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B12434/Page .5 March 2, 1987 We oppose the unrealistic proposal to require all emergency planning details to be completed prior to authorlza tion of construction for the present generation of nuclear power plants. However, for the future generation of nuclear power plant, a one-step licen lng process could result in emergency planning issues being resolved prior to construction.

We rust hat these comments will be useful ln the NRC Staff's review of the State of Maine's petition for rulernaklng.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I Administrator J. J. %ea, 'RC Project . anager, Mlllstone Unit No. 1 D. H. Jaffe, RC roject , anager, M11lstone Unit No. 2 E. L. Doolittle, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 f'. M. Akstulewicz, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant T. Rebelowski, Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1 and 2

1. T. Shed!osky, Resident Inspector, MiUstone Unit No. 3 P. ~wetland, Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant

DOCKET NUMBER PET TON RULE PPM 5J--4/c(!JJ

{5IF£47tJ2.5)

LAW OF FICES Ll"[T CONNER & WETTERHAHN, P.C. t.li i 1747 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.

TROY B. CONNER, JR.

MARK J. WETTERHAHN WASHINGTON, D . C.2OOO6

• a? MAR - 2 P3 :41 ROBERT M. RADER NILS N. NICHOLS vFf BERNHARD O . BECHHOEFER OF COUNSEL March 2, 1987 DOLt (2021 833*3500

• r CABLE ADDRESS: ATOMLAW Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Docket No. PRM-50-46; Petition for Rulemaking by the State of Maine Regarding Proposed Changes to 10 C.F.R. §50.47(c) (2)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On December 30, 1986, the NRC published for public comment (51 Fed. Reg. 47025) its notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking dated October 14, 1986, filed by the State of Maine. The State has requested the NRC to amend 10 C.F.R. §50.47(c) (2) in three respects. On behalf of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Public Service Electric and Gas Company and itself, the firm of Conner & Wetterhahn, P.C.

hereby opposes the State's petition.

1. The State proposes that the NRC expand both the emergency planning zone ("EPZ") for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway. Its proposal is unsupported by any scientific or technical evidence that increasing a plant's EPZs will reduce dose to the individual in the event of an accident or otherwise contribute to the public health and safety. In fact, the most recent source term study and peer analyses by the American Physical Society and industry groups, as described in NUREG-0956, show that previous calculations of overall risk in WASH-1400 were overstated. Accordingly, the Commission's most recent source term and containment failure analyses justify a reduction, not expansion, of the plume exposure EPZ.

Hopefully, the Commission's further source term study in NUREG-1150 and any assessment of potential changes in offsite planning regulations will support an adjustment of the plume exposure EPZ consistent with these findings.

Acknow ed b MAR 4 1987 y ca ref **********

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk March 2, 1987 Page 2

2. Without providing any details, the State asserts that emergency planning should precede construction of a nuclear plant. This is already a requirement for the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report under 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E. II. Inasmuch as there is no potential for any radiological threat to the public health and safety during construction, there is no need for detailed planning to be complete before or during construction. Nor should State governors be given veto power over nuclear plant con-struction, as the State of Maine suggests. The Commission recently rejected much the same argument in deciding to propose a new Section 50.47(e) to permit plant licensing in the face of State non-cooperation.

Existing licensing procedures provide the mechanism by which affected States assist in developing effective plans capable of protecting the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency. Thus, each State already has meaningful and adequate input into the licensing pro-cess.

3. The State's third suggestion would repeal 10 C.F.R.

§50. 4 7 (d)

• For the reasons stated by the Commission in adopting this rule in 1982 (47 Fed. Reg. 30232), there are valid distinctions between emergency planning requirements during low-power testing and full-power operation of a nuclear plant. The State has not offered any new scientific or technical insight which contradicts the Commission's j udgment in adopting Section 50.47(d).

Accordingly, the proposed changes in emergency planning requirements requested by the State of Maine should be denied.

Sincerely, sdd

DOCKET NUMBER i'ETITION RULE PRM

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' I., l EDISON DRI VE ATOmJC POWER comPAllH . AUGUSTA, MAIN E 04336 Feb ~1r)1AJ% ~219~-7' :l 2 (207) 623-3521 MN-87-21 GDW-87-41 Off 10(.;K Secretary of the Commission United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments regarding the State of Maine petition for Rulemaking to amend 10 CFR 50.47 (51 FR 47025)

Gemtlemen:

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company appreciates this opportunity to provide comments on the petition for rulemaking filed by the Attorney General of the State of Maine, to ammend emergency planning requirements in 10 CFR 50.47.

The petition asks the Commission to amend its regulations to require the expansion of the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) and the ingestion pathway emergency planning zone. No mention of the requested size of either zone is made in the petition.

Maine Yankee believes that such an expansion is unwarranted and may, in fact, be counter-productive to current emergency planning efforts.

Current research, conducted by the NRC and by the nuclear industry, may in fact support a reduction in the size of planning zones. The purpose of an emergency planning zone is to establish an area where pre-determined actions can be quickly taken to reduce the risk of exposure to the public. Research appears to indicate that this risk can be reduced by developing pre-determined actions for an area smaller than the currently required 10 mile plume exposure pathway.

We also believe that expansion of the current zones may in fact be counter-productive to emergency planning efforts. Utility, federal and state resources are inherently limited. Resources, including planning, financial, manpower and equipment should be applied to those areas where of maximum benefit.

The system in place for the plume exposure and ingestion exposure planning zones currently assumes that the greatest risk from a design basis or beyond design basis accident rests in an area close to the plant, where prompt evacuation could be accomplished. Should the danger extend beyond that immediate area, plans are in place to conduct evacuations beyond that point.

In the case of Three Mile Island, where core melting occurred, no appreciable amount of radiation was released, and no evacuation was necessary.

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MAINE Y ANKEE ATOM IC POWE R COMPANY United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page Two Attn: Docketing and Service Branch MN-87-21 We would also like to point out that, in the case of the Chernobyl accident, minimal pre-planning appeared to be in place, and the implementation of evacuations were delayed by more than a day. Even without the elaborate warning and notification systems in place, the Russians evacuated over 100,000 people in an efficient manner. There are hundreds of examples of public evacuations, some involving hundreds of thousands of individuals, which were conducted expeditiously and safely even without preplanning. However, the absence of elaborate plans should not be equated to a substantial increase in public risk.

The petitioner also requests that the NRC ammend 10 CFR 50.47 to require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted, and that the Governors of any affected States approve the plans as a pre-condition to construction and fuel loading. To accept the petitioners request would in fact allow Governors who oppose nuclear power to effectively block power licensing of nuclear power plants after prior construction approval by their predecessors.

In conclusion. we urge the Commission to deny the petitioners request to expand the emergency planning zones and require complete emergency planning prior to fuel load and prior to construction . We do see merit in generally re-evaluating EPZ size based upon ongoing source term research. and in requiring emergency preparedness feasibility studies prior to issuance of a construction permit for new plants.

Very truly yours.

MAINE YANKEE ATOM(C POWER COMPANY

-1bi-9-'nv~

G. D. Whittier, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Licensing GDW/bjp Enclosure cc: Mr. Ashok C. Thadani Mr. Richard Vollmer Mr. Pat Sears Mr. Cornelius F. Holden 8504L-JMT

• OCi<ET NUMBER n ~

' IT!r- J .., M ~v-,1{\J_y JAMES E. TIERNEY (51 r£. 47tJJ5.J ,..r; ATTORNEY GENERAL I '

• g7 MAR -2 P3 :Q9 STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 6Ff-STATE HOUSE STATION 6 HCK AUGUSTA, MAINE 04333 February 27, 1987 Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20055 Attention: Docketing and Servi c e Br anc h Re: State of Maine Petition for Rulemaking, Docket No. PRM-50-46

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The State of Maine submits the following preliminary comments on the above-captioned matter.

Our comments are necessarily preliminary because Maine's petition is based in part on the implications of Chernobyl, which are st i ll being studied. Indeed, it is our understanding that the Comm i ss i on will not issue even its preliminary analysis of Chernobyl (Nureg-1150) for at least another month.

Accordingly, we assume that our pending motion to hold open the comment period will be granted (which we understand from the Commiss i on s t aff is ordinarily granted even in routine cases),

and therefore we will submit further comments when the lessons of Chernobyl become clearer.

In the meantime, we believe that the mere occurrence in Chernobyl mandates a re-examination and improvement of emergency planning procedures, just as Three Mile Island resulted in the adoption of emergency planning procedures seve r a l years ago.

4 9 Acknow'ea-ged by ca rd . .**************

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Secretary, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 February 27, 1987 Both Three Mile Island and Chernobyl demonstrate the necessity of adequate emergency planning. Notwithstanding the assurances of the nuclear industry and its regulators that a nuclear accident is unlikely, experience demonstrates that such accidents do occur. Accordingly, irrespective of the likelihood of an accident, there must be emergency planning procedures in place adequate to protect the public against previously unthinkable accidents.

In promulgating the current emergency planning rule, 10 C.F.R. § 50.47, the Commission concluded that a 10-mile evacuation zone and a 50-mile emergency planning zone were adequate in light of Three Mile Island to protect the public against any anticipated accident. Chernobyl proved otherwise.

Following Chernobyl, 135,000 people were evacuated -- and remain evacuated today -- from a 19-mile radius surrounding the plant. Additionally, radiation was dispersed thousands of miles throughout Europe contaminating crops, milk, animals, and people. In light of this experience, the Commission's current regulations are woefully inadequate.

Emergency planning must not only be adequate, but it must also be credible. Credibility cannot come from procedures proposed by the nuclear industry, which has invested billions of dollars in these plants, or adopted by the nuclear regulators who are located hundreds or thousands of miles from the plant and are not locally accountable. Because Chernobyl f urther undermines the credibility of those who assured the public that such an accident could not occur, state and local government officia ls must be integrally involved in emergency planning issues.

Finally, emergency planning should not be an aftert~ought, but rather should be an essential part of the beginning of the licensing process. Because no plant ultimately can operate without emergency planning procedures, such procedures should be adopted at the outset of the process before the licensing

Secretary, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 February 27, 1987 process develops an unstoppable momentum and millions or b illions of dollars are spent on a white elephant. The current procedure puts the public, the industry, and the regulators on a potentially ruinous course: writing off an enormous investment or operating an unsafe nuclear plant. People should not have to choose either alternative: emergency planning procedures should be in place from the beginning.

We do not yet know the full implications of Chernobyl. We do know, however, that Chernobyl did occur, affecting the health and safety of people throughout Europe. In light of this fact, we believe that the changes proposed by the State of Maine in its petition for rulemaking should be adopted.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter. As we indicated at the outset, we assume that the comment period for this petition will be extended and that we will be afforded an opportunity, when all of the evidence is in, to submit further comments.

PJB:mfe

DOCKET NUMBER l?ETITION RULE PRM .jJ-4t (ij)

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• a7 FEB 27 Pl2 :19 Florida Power CORPORATION February 23, 1987 3F0287-20 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Docketing &Service Branch

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 State of Maine: Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking (51 FR 47025)

Dear Sir:

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) provides the following comments on the subject petition.

Petitioner Proposes Expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway.

FPC Comments This amendment should not be an issue in the U.S. due to the extreme design differences in U.S. commercial reactors and Chernobyl. The most significant of these differences is the lack of a containment structure at Chernobyl.

The expansion of the ten-mile exposure pathway and the fifty-mile ingestion pathway must be based on predicted dose to the population in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant as calculated from accident models. These accident models must accurately depict the possible release mechanisms, safety features, and source terms for the sites in question. This type of modeling has been accomplished for the design of plants typically used in the U.S. and was used in establishing EPZ's. To infer additional evacuation risks and costs should automatically be required for the nuclear plants in the U.S. because of the accident at Chernobyl is an unrealistic extension of accident analyses.

GENERAL OFFICE: 3201 Thirty-fourth Street South

• P.O. Box 14042

• St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 * (813) 866-5151 A Florida Progress Company

u 5. NU!=Ll'AR R"GU! AT')"Y ,~oMMISSION COCKETl, 'G & SERVlr* . 'CTION FflCf. OF 11-*r: 2 r-:** '~y Of Tl:~ COi .: .I., ' , *,

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February 23, 1987 3F0287-20 Page 2 The nuclear industry and the United States taxpayers have invested large amounts of time and money in source ten11 research in the last few years.

The conclusion from all of the independent studies, while differing in some details, support the fact the reactor containment structures are stronger than once believed and failure would be unlikely. These refined studies on accident and source ten11s also suggest the original arbitrary establishment of the two EPZ distances was very conservative.

Petitioner Proposes Require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the governor or governors of any affected State approve the emergency pl ans as a precondition to construction.

FPC Comments It is not reasonable to require a utility to complete emergency planning activities for a license prior to the receipt of a construction pen11it.

That would entail too much money and time. It is, however, reasonable to require a feasibility study to be done on emergency planning prior to a construction permit. This is accomplished through the PSAR submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.34(a}(10}.

The governors presently have control over state and local radial ogi cal emergency plans in many states, and approval of the utility plan should not be an issue as long as the plans interconnect properly. Presently, two organizations with expertise in the areas of evaluation of emergency plans are tasked with the acceptance of Radiological Emergency Response Plans

( the Federal Emergency Management Agency ( FEMA} evaluates state and local plans; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC} evaluates the licensee}.

The adequacy of emergency plans needs to be evaluated for its actual effectiveness based on cap a bi l iti es, resources, and implementation. FEMA and the NRC are capable of performing these evaluations.

Petitioner Proposes Require that offsi te emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted.

February 23, 1987 3F0287-20 Page 3 FPC Comments The benefit/ cost of this issue should be investigated to see if changing the requirement from prior to full power licensing to before fuel load is a reasonable request. The political nature of emergency planning makes it difficult to ascertain whether holding up fuel load or full power operations is viewed as a tool in an intervener's hand or the utility's; or whether it is a useful holdpoint in assuring the level of safety for the public.

Sincerely, E. C. Si mp son Director, Nuclear Operations Engineering and Licensing DVH/feb

DOCKET NUMBE ETIT Ul M IJ'°J-4~ (1)

(5/FR, L/7~JZ~j Sierra Club Cumberland ChaJJter 213 Westmoreland Court Georgetown , Kentucky 40324 Februacy 20 , 1987 Secretary US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington , D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch RE: PRM-50-46 (10 CFR Part 50)

The Cumberland Chapte r of the Sierra Club endorses the

._ proposal of Maine Attorney General James E. Tierney that both the EPZ and the ingestion pathway around nuclear plants be expanded.

The reasons we @SVe for supporting PRM- 50-45 for a site-specific emergency planning zone (EPZ) !Li..:tb. the provision that the z~ne be a minimum of 20 miles, apply also to a general enlargement of the EPZ and ingestion pathway:

The NRC, according to Victor Stel~, Jr., executive director of operations , does not know what will happ en in a severe accident , because budget cuts have prevented the completion of the needed research . Gaps in our knowledge of the behavior of fuel at high temperatures produce "uncertainties of up to a factor of 10 in source term analysis." A wide margin for error must be allowed.

At Chernobyl people living within 18.6 miles of the plant were evacuated, and people in hot spots as much as 100 miles away are being relocated permanently . An accident as severe or more severe than the Chernobyl accident could happen at a US plant *

• In a nuclear emergency people b eyond the ten-mile zone are going to try to flee , with reason . Their vehicles will help to make it difficult for people closer to the reactor to leave.

The zone needs to be ~ig enough to provide for the evacuation in an orderly fashion of everyone in immediate danger.

The Cumberland Chapter also sup ports Attorney General Tierney's proposal that the governors of affected states formulate and approve emergency plans before new plants can be constructed--they are more familiar with local conditions and are likely to be more concerned about the safety of the residents of the area than are federal officials--and that "offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted"--a commonsense step to ensure the welfare of citizens.

~ 1 3. ~

Mary B. Davis Nuclear Issues Chair

... To explore, enjoy and preserve the nation s fores ts, waters, wildlif.e, and wilderness... B 2 7 1987

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South Texas Cancellation Campaign P. 0 ~ 50484 Austin, Texa s 78 763 "KET

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~ iJlJC Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

Dear N.R.C. Secretary:

Recent petitions for rulemaking to the Nuclear regulatory Cormiission have recently come to my attention. These petitions (PRM-50-45 & PRM-50-46) seek changes in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) rule (10 CFR part 50.47). As a resident of Austin, Texas, just 100 miles from a nuclear plant under construc-tion near Bay City, the South Texas Project, we are concerned about changes to these rules.

We support the maximum possible protection of the public from the conse-quences of a potential nuclear reactor accident. After the near-disaster at Three Mile Island and the tragedy in the Soviet Union 's Chernobyl plant, the reality of the risk involved wi th operating nuclear plants has become clear.

It would be criminal to weaken or reduce the protection afforded the public from the current EPZ rule. If anything, these rules should widen the zone for emergency and evacuation planning.

Therefore, the Austin membership of the South Texas Cancellation campaign protests the proposed rule to establish site specific EPZ's rather than a 10-mile radius zone. It is not clear that the factors suggested to determine the evacuation zones will increase public safety. We also support the pro-posed rule to expand both the EPZ and the ingestion pathway around nuclear plants (PRM-50-46). In light of the magnitude of the radioactive contamina-tion from Chernobyl, this seems a wise decision to assure the public health and safety.

I In the case of the South Texas Project, there is at least one meterologi-cal factor, the wind , which might require expansion of the evacuation zone.

The wind off the Gulf of Mexico, which is within 5 miles of the STP, is almost constant year-round, and sometimes very strong. So we accept the possibility that such considerations might be included to enlarge the EPZ from the mini-mum, however, we believe at least a 10-rnile or greater (as in PRM-50-46) lower limit should be maintained.

We encourage you to take this action, not only to actually improve pro-tection of the public, but to demonstrate that the NRC is attempting to reduce accident risks. The public perception of NRC regulation is presently skeptical of your colllllitment in this regard.

Sincerely, /

l

vi\ ,1 >11/1,1 Dan Harrison

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'87 FEB 20 P1 :17 Amesbury Board of Selectmen GF Town Hall, Amesbury, MA 01913 5QC Tel. 388-0290 BEFORE THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No. PRM-50-46 TOWN OF AMESBURY'S COMMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION BY THE STATE OF MAINE, DOCKET NO. PRM-50-46.

The Town of Amesbury, Massachusetts is in general agreement with the petition of the State of Maine with regard to amendments to 10 CFR 50.47. As evidenced by the accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union, the effects of a radiological accident at any nuclear facility can and will have wide reaching consequences. According to numerous media reports and from sources including the NRC and Congress, at least 135,000 people within a 19 mile radius of Chernobyl were forced to evacuate because of the disaster. That evacuation was greatly delayed due in part to a lack of adequate planning for such an occurance and to the concept that no accident would have an impact at any great distance from the reactor. Other reports described ingestion related problems as far away as Nothern Scandinavia. A more rapid alerting of the accident may have provided the time necessary for protection of foodstuffs and livestock.

PRM-50-46 Item #1:

Typically, nuclear reactors are constructed near to the regions of highest electrical demand. The corallary is very simple to under-stand: high demand is a direct result of high population. We do not F B 2 3 1987 Acknowledged by car~ .........tT0 ,, , 11 . . , . .

Amesbury Board of Selectmen Town Hall, Amesbury, MA 01913 Tel. 388,0290 (2) find nuclear reactors in remote parts of the United States. In the case of Seabrook Station for example, the current planning zone often shows a population well in excess of a quarter of a million people, all of whom are confined to 180 degrees of the 10 mile EPZ. Elementary mathmatics quickly shows that Seabrook has twice the population of Chernobyl in one fourth the area, or potentially eight times the problem! To possibly evacuate people beyond the 10 mile zone into an area totally unprepared for this influx of people and automobiles is unconscionable.

Not only is Seabrook Station innnediately located in an area of excessive population, large metropolitan areas are found close by as well. Only a short distance away are Boston, Lowell and Worcester, Massachusetts; Nashua, Manchester and Concord, New Hampshire; Lewiston-Auburn and Portland, Maine; and Providence, Rhode Island. Protective measures must be established for those regions and their citizens.

It is the opinion of the Town of Amesbury that an absolute minimum of 20 miles be established for the plume exposure pathway and of 100 miles for the inges*tion exposul:'e pathway, The Town of Amesbury also agrees with the State of Maine that emergency planning be completed and approved by the Governor of the affected state prior to issuance of construction p~its for any nuclear reactor. In the case o;f; any* ex,t1;,t+/-.ng yet unlicensed plants the same precondition to licensing should hold true. Ultimately ;it will be

Amesbury Board of Selectmen Town Hall, Amesbury, MA 01913 Tel. 388-0290 (3) the responsibility of the affeeted state to provide for the safety of its residents, and thereforeshould make the final determination of emergency plan adequacy prior to operation.

PRM-50-46 Item #3:

The above comments are relevant to the issue of fuel loading an~

low power operation. The Town of Amesbury would like to add its thought that no fewer than two full, and successful, exercises of all aspects of emergency plans be conducted as a prerequisite to fuel loading and low power testing.

The comments of the Town of Amesbury are intended to add a level of specificity to a presently subjective regulation. The public interest will be served by the Commission 1 s adoption of the State of Maine's petition and the Town of Amesbury~s comments.

Williams. Lord Amesbury Board of Selectmen Town Hall - ;Friend st.

Amesbury, :MA 01913

Th~ G&'.\I Ldw <:rou11 with affiliated office, in Boston. '.\1A Burlington, VT Hartforrl. I' K1tter, '.\IE Poti:.,~outh. '.',;H PM,;idenr~. f{(

'87 FES 20 Pi2 :27 February 12, 1987 Secretary, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 At tention: Docketing and Surface Branch RE: Proposed Emergency Zone Rule Amendments PRM 5046 and PRM 5045

Dear Sir:

Enclosed for filing please find Town Of Hampton Comments upon the ab ove-referenced Rul e Ma kin g Pe t ition s .

Very truly your ~ r-....

~ --~~

Matthew T. Brock MTB/sk Enclosure cc: Peter J. Brann, Asst. Attorney General PO H,,x lt,11 _- \t1p!i P,,1t-*1, 1*~ \ H, , 1t "'

feleph11ne t I i, FA\. 1,1 * ,, _ 1 Rohert A. Sha*ne, Pdt,l \l, E.1 e 1 4 \I, F:. \

'.\lc Eachern. (,regon Rnhhtn,. lJan \\ I h, ll'l l fh1*1* ...,., * , \

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• William 8. Gamble. R. rimor*" *' , ~ .. ,

TOWN OF HAMPTON COMMENT ON PETITIQN FOR' MAKING, PRM 50-~6 NOW COMES the Town of Hampton, in_ response to the ~Ttlp:~N ~:27 RULE MAKING, PRM 50-46, as set forth 1n the 51 Fed. Re~: 141:;t'7dt5 (12/30/ 86 ) and hereby submits the following comments in support of the State of Maine's proposed amendments to 10 CFR § 50 .47. ur 00

1. The Emergency Planning Zone for the Plume Exposure Pathway should be expanded to a minimum of twenty (20) miles, in light of the Chernobyl accident which required evacuation within a twenty (20) mile radius of the plant.

2. Emergency plans for a proposed nuclear power plant should be fully reviewed and approved Q~fQL~ an Applicant is permitted to commence construction or incurs other substantial development costs.

As in the case of Seabrook, Applicant's significant construction expenditures predictably causes Applicant to ignore the obvious emergency planning deficiencies at Seabrook, in an effort to protect its sizeable financial investment.

3. Off-site Emergency Plans should be approved pefoc~ Appli ca nt is permitted to fuel loading and to low power test. Seabrook has demonstrated that, even if the facility is granted a low-power license, there is a high probability that the plant will never go on-line. Fuel loading and low-power testing, with its associated increased costs and irradiation of the facility, may render the site unfit or undesirable for conversion to an alternative energey facility.

Respectfully submitted, TOWN OF HAMPTON By and Through Their Attorneys SHAINES & McEACHERN Profess* al Association

/ /

Dated: ~ /4 McEachern Dated: ~

Matthew T. Brock

TOWN OF HAMPTON OMMENt ON PETITION ~Q QIANG~ fil1~RGENCY IlAflliI.Ng ZONE RUL~ *

.ERM . 5 . . 0 . = ! 5 _ 8 / FE8 20 P12 :27 vr GO NOW COMES the Town Of Hampton, in response to PRM 50-45, a Petition to Change the Emergency Planning Zone Rule set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 50-47, and hereby objects to and opposes that petition previously published in the Federal Register, 51 F.R. 193 :3 5518.

In essence, the above-referenced petition would call for site specific EPZs rather than the current ten (10) mile generic Emergency Planning Zone for Nuclear Plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has already considered and rejected ad hoc, site specific emergency planning. See e.g. 45 Fed. Reg. at 54406 (August 19, 1980). Three-Mile Island demonstrated that a mandatory minimum emergency planning zone of not less than ten (10) miles is essential to provide adequate protection to the public, over and above design safety features.

The above-referenced petition is without technical support, ignores the difficult lessons of Three-Mile Island, and should be rejected.

Respectfully submitted, TOWN OF HAMPTON By and Through Their Attorne s SHAINES & cEACHERN Professi 1 Assoc i at i on DATED:

p

/4 DATED:

Matthew T. Brock '-

Educational Campaign

'87 FEB 17 A11 :06 February 9, 1987 1083 Austin Avenue, N.E. Docketing & Service Branch I-Oom107 Office of the Secretary Atlanta, Georgia 30307 (404) 659-5675 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Boord of Directors Julie Sharpe Tifton Hcw:rd Deutsch Al1anto R~: PRM 46 (petition for rule change concerning Bruce GLnter emergency planning zones)

Altonto Burrel o nto y Barotz Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia wishes to comment on

()okv.{)od f;bber!Caine the above-referenced proposal.

Columbus Denr.s Creech Altonto A minimum emergency planning zone (EPZ) of thirty to Ogden Doremus Metter fifty miles should be established. We have the data Donny Feig from the Chernobyl accident--in which the U.S. Embassy Attonto JohnFo,;ler urged Americans to evacuate an area far larger--to Clayton Gene Guerrero de monstrate the need for a larger zone than the Attonta current 10 miles. Site-specific data should be NeilHermg Macon considered for expansion of the thirty-to-fifty-mile Ctie Hick5 Macon zone. In no case, however, should an area within Jim Kuttod Attonta thirty miles be excluded from the EPZ.

Lisat.a,,es Atlanta

.Jotv1 Lewis We thank you for addressing this important issue and Altonta Richard l.OMance urge your adoption of our suggestions.

Triton Mc l.oughhn avannah Sincerely,

• n M c Gregor Attonto Susan IIAocken Alhen';

Maytv'atin Macon Helen Mils Tim Johnson Attonta Jomes T. Mils Attonto Britt A9ndergrost Attonta Non A9ndergrost Atlanta Gene\/Oieece Montezuma Jim Ruttenber Attonta kl9becca Sharttond Sa.onnct1 Gay Wcmi1gton Altonta Wle'N<:XrlJ Attonto & Dubin Slaff R::ltricio Gitlin Tm.Johnson Debarct"I Shepperd

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• a7 FEB 17 A11 :00 February 12, 1987 Secretary US Nuclear Regulatory Commison Attn: Docketing & Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555 To Whom It May Concern:

It has come to our attention that there are pe titions to change the Emergency Planning Zone rule in the NRC.

In 1982 it was suggested that a 20 mile limit was a safe evacuation limit. The current rule change calls for site-specific EPZs rather than the current 10 mile zone surrounding most plants.

We the people understand *that these site-specific EPZs are determined by meteorological and demographic criteria and by uncertain and subjective data. Based on the fact that people were evacuated from a 19 mile radius around Chernobyl, it seems clear that the current 10 mile zone is insufficient.

Sincerely,

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D .C. 20555 JO(K[Tf:

February 12, 1987 NR OFFICE OF THE *a7 FEB 12 AlO :56 SECRETARY 6Fru;*

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NOTE TO RECIPIENTS OF PRM-50-46 (51 FR 47025) - STATE OF MfftJt:

Please disregard ALL co1TRT1ents (33) except Comment No. 23 received from ECOLOGY/ALERT (Nemethy) which will be renumbered as Comment No. 1.

Those comments were miscoded and will be recoded and placed in the appropriate file.

Docketing and Service Branch

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l6CKf !h  ! 1t~ .r Secretary, u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission IRANL..,

ATTN: Docketing & Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear NRC :

As a concerned citizen, I must take time to let you know how I feel about Nuclear Power issues. A nuclear power plant that has an operating license must have tOtJgh restrictions to operate. 'Any plant which wishes to open should not be allowed any exemptions in regards to Emergency Planning Zones(EPZ}. At this time the federal EPZ is 10-miles which should not be decre~sed for any reason, this includes Seabrook nuclear power plant. If any changes occur to current regulations, EPZ ' s and in-gestion pathways should be increased ; therefore, I support PRM-50-46 submitted by Maine Attorney General James E. Tierney.

The responsibility of an accident must fall on plant owners, as they are so interested in making money. With strict regulations we can assure citizens that they are more important than money; although plant owners display the contrary by wanting exemptions to restrictions and rushing the completion of their plants. We must continue to place tough regulqtions on nuclear power plants, and to do this PRM-50-46 must be considered and used as guidelines.

Sincerely, MICKEY W. SMITH CA .Registered Voter

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Senator Cranston (CA)

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• a:z FEB -6 A8 :53 Nuclear Information and Resource service 1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 160, Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-0002 1,;H r,oc February 3, 1987 Michael T. Lesar Acting Ch i ef Rules and Procedures Branch Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Lesar:

We would like to request an extension of time to comment on the petition for rulemaking filed by the State of Maine on Emergency Planning (Docket #PRM-50-46, Federal Register, December 30, 1986, Vol. 51, No. 249, page 47025). The comment period for this petition currently is scheduled to end March 2, 1987.

Although less detailed, this petition raises issues similar to those contained in the proposed rulemaking submitted by Kenneth Sexton (PRM-50-45). Also, PRM-50-46 raises additional issues relating to state authority over emergency planning and timing of fuel load and low power operations.

We are convinced that most commenters would wish to comment on both pet i tions, and in fact we suggest that the comments, and the c omment periods, for both petitions be combined. The comment period for the Kenneth Sexton petition currently is set to end March 9, 1987. However, because of the additional issues raised by PRM-50-46, we suggest that the comment periods for both petitions end on June 9, 1987.

we should note that the quality of comments would be considerably higher if the comment period were to be extended some 90-120 days beyond the publication date of NUREG-1150. Obviously , this complex, important document will have a great bearing on emergency planning issues, particularly on the appropriate size of Emergency Planning Zones, which both of these petitions address. However, the release date of NUREG-1150 has been delayed repeatedly, and it is unclear whether even June 9, 1987 will be sufficient time to incorporate the findings of this document.

Although we will not make a formal request at this time, you may wish to consider making the comment period open-ended, or based upon the release date of NUREG-1150.

we believe public interest in emergency planning issues is high, and we hope you will make every effort to accomodate this interest. Because of the short time left before the end of the comment periods for both PRM-50-45 and PRM-50-46, we look forward to your speedy reply.

Sincerely,

~~

Michael Mariotte Acting Executive Director

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BOX 621 (_$'/~£_ ,41_zgj :b,eb 1 - 87 BLOOMSBURG 17815 Re: Petition fo:rto&t~~ aking -

• USNP C E Ne me thy, Sec'y State of Maine Sec ' y - NRC Fed Reg , *at lE~O=J36p2~z4 70 2 5 Wash DC 20555 ATT : 0001.~ 11G & S.t.HVICE BRA.NCh Gentlemen=

~ur compliments to the State of ~aine !

As we ' ve commented in the pa.st , Emergency Planning is tr.e Achilles' heel of the nuclear power industry .

There ' s strong reason to suspect the Three lv1ile Is]end "data " and "conclusi ons " were faked .

11',ost conveniently , some of the crucmal monitoring ~ystems were "not operational" at the tirre of the " event" .

That in itself lent the aff2ir a strong smell of Mendacity (to quote Big Daddy in Tennessee WiJ 1 i arr s' "Cat on a Hot Tin Roof 11 )

A 2-mile evacuation zone?

We devoutly hope you ' re kidding !

. F~S 5 1987 by card. oTo **

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JAMES E. TIERNEY ATTORNEY GENERAL DOLK[T ((l USNRC STATE OF MAINE "86 OCT 17 P4 :21 DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE STATE HOUSE STATION 6 AUGUSTA, MAI E 04333 DOCKETING &*t ARY BRANC~ /ltV/Cf.

October 14, 1986 Samuel Chilk, Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

I write pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.802 (1986) to request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the "Commission")

initiate a rulemaking proceeding to change its regulation on emergency plans, 10 C.F.R. § 50.47. My office was advised by Mr. John Phillips of the Rules and Procedures Branch to write directly to you in order to start the rulemaking process.

The grounds for this petition are as follows:

1. Under 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(c)(2), the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone is "generally . . . about 10 miles in radius" and the ingestion pathway emergency planning zone is an area "about 50 miles in radius";

• 2. As a result of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Russians evacuated roughly 135,000 people within a 19-mile radius around Chernobyl. The fallout from the accident reached all over Europe, contaminating crops, milk, and animals; and

3. The nuclear industry has argued recently in the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, among other places, that a 2-mile emergency planning zone is sufficient for evacuation purposes, notwithstanding Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.

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For the foregoing reasons, the State of Maine respectfully r equest s that the Commission amend 10 C.F.R. § 50.47:

1. to expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway;

2. to require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the Governor or Governors of any affected State approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction; and

3. to require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted.

I look forward to your reply.

truly yours, TIERNEY Gener al

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY co~~ISSION 10 CFR Part 50 .86 DEC 23 P2 :58 Docket No. PRM-50-46 State of Maine; Filing of Petition for Rulemaking AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission.

ACTION: Notice of Receipt of Petitior. for Rulemaking.

SUMMARY

The Commiss ion is publishing for public comment this notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking dated October 14, 1986, which was filed with the Conrnission by the State of Maine. The petition was docketed by the Commission on October 17 , 1986, and has been assigned Docket No. PRM-50-46.

The petitioner requests that the Commission amend its regulations in three areas pertaining to emergency planning.

DATE: Submit comments by March 2, 1987 . Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conrnission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Dccketing and Service Branch.

For a copy of the petition write: Division of Rules and Records, Office of Administration, 4000 MNBB, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Lesar, Acting Chief, Rules and Procedures Branch, Division of Rules and Records, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone: (301}

492- 7086 or Toll Free (800} 368-5642.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Grounds for the petition In support of the three areas that the petit i oner requested be amended, the petitioner offers that under §50.47(c }(2} , the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone is generally about 10 miles in radius and the emergency planning zone for the ingestion pathway is an area about 50 miles in radius. The petitioner states that as a result of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, Russia evacuated roughly 135,000 people within a 19-mile radius around Chernobyl, and that the fallout from the accident reached al l over Europe, contaminating crops, milk, and animals.

The petitioner further states that, notwithstanding Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the nuclear industry has argued, in recent discussions in the Advisory Corrmittee on Reactor Safeguards, that a 2-mile emergency planning zone is sufficient for evacuation purposes.

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II. Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 The petitioner proposes that §50.47 be amended to--

1. Expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway;

2. Require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the governor or governors of any affected State approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction; and

3. Require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted.

Dated at Washington, DC this -;_),d day of 1986.

Regulatory Commission.

Secretary of the Commission.