ML23151A467

PR-050 - 52FR03788 - Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors

ML23151A467
Person / Time
Issue date:	02/06/1987
From:	Chilk S NRC/SECY
To:
References
PR-050, 52FR03788
Download: ML23151A467 (1)

Text

ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 02/06/1987 TITLE: PR-050 - 52FR03788 - PROPOSED POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS CASE

REFERENCE:

PR-050 52FR03788 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

STATUS OF RULEMAKING PROPOSED RULE: PR-050 RULE NAME: PROPOSED POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE: 52FR03788 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 02/06/87 NUMBER OF COMMENTS: 29 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 03/23/87 EXTENSION DATE: I I FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: 58FR39132 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 07/22/93 NOTES ON FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE: FINAL RULE (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS)

TATUS PUBLISHED ON 7/19/95 AT 60FR36953. FILE LOCATED ON Pl.

F RULE TO FIND THE STAFF CONTACT OR VIEW THE RULEMAKING HISTORY PRESS PAGE DOWN KEY HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PR-050 RULE TITLE: PROPOSED POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS OPOSED RULE PROPOSED RULE DATE PROPOSED RULE SECY PAPER: 86-310 SRM DATE: 01/09/87 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 02/03/87 FINAL RULE FINAL RULE DATE FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: SRM DATE: I I SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 07/16/93 STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULE CONTACTl: DAVID C. FISCHER MAIL STOP: AR-5221 PHONE: 492-7924 CONTACT2: NANETTE V. GILLES MAIL STOP: PHONE: 504-1180

\

DOCKET NO. PR-050 (52FR03788)

In the Matter of PROPOSED POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 02/04/87 02/03/87 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT 03/20/87 03/18/87 COMMENT OF YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY (D. W. EDWARDS) ( 1) 03/23/87 03/20/87 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.

(M. 0. MEDFORD) ( 2) 03/23/87 03/20/87 COMMENT OF OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT (J. K. GASPER) ( 3) 03/23/87 03/17/87 COMMENT OF OCRE (SUSAN L. HIATT) ( 4) 03/23/87 03/18/87 COMMENT OF ECOLOGY/ALERT (E. NEMETHY) ( 5) 03/23/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF COMBUSTION ENGINEERING (A. E. SCHERER) ( 6) 03/23/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF STUART A. WEBSTER ( 7) 03/24/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF GEORGIA POWER (L. T. GUCWA) ( 8) 03/24/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF NORTHEAST UTILITIES ( 9) 03/24/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC.

(FREDERICK W. BUCKMAN) ( 10) 03/25/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER CORP. (E. C. SIMPSON) ( 11) 03/25/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC (JOSEPH A. TIERNAN) ( 12) 03/26/87 03/26/87 COMMENT OF UNITED STATES DEPT OF INTERIOR (JAMES F. DEVINE) ( 13) 03/26/87 03/20/87 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES INC.

(L. B. LONG) ( 14) 03/26/87 03/22/87 COMMENT OF WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP (R. A. NEWTON) ( 15)

DOCKET NO. PR-050 (52FR03788)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 03/26/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF THE B&W OWNERS GROUP (R. L. GILL, JR.) ( 16) 03/27/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.

(S. R. ZIMMERMAN) ( 17) 03/27/87 03/20/87 COMMENT OF MARVIN LEWIS ( 18) 03/30/87 03/16/87 COMMENT OF WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

(W. J. JOHNSON) ( 19)

- 03/30/87 03/23/87 COMMENT OF VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER COMPANY (W. L. STEWART) ( 20) 03/30/87 03/25/87 COMMENT OF PP&L (H. W. KEISER) ( 21) 03/30/87 03/27/87 COMMENT OF SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCES, INC.

(OLIVER D. KINGSLEY, JR.) ( 22) 03/30/87 03/27/87 COMMENT OF STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPT OF NUC SAFETY (TERRY R. LASH) ( 23) 03/30/87 03/27/87 COMMENT OF NYPA, NORTHEAST UTILITIES ET AL.

(JOSEPH B. KNOTTS, JR.) ( 24) 04/02/87 03/30/87 COMMENT OF DAVID J. MCGOFF (DAVID J. MCGOFF) ( 25) 04/06/87 03/31/87 COMMENT OF MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY (G.D. WHITTIER) ( 26) 04/07/87 03/30/87 COMMENT OF WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM (G. C. SORENSEN) ( 27) 04/10/87 03/27/87 COMMENT OF NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY (JOHN C. BRONS) ( 28) 05/12/87 05/06/87 COMMENT OF BWR OWNERS' GROUP (T. A. PICKENS) ( 29)

07/16/93 07/16/93 FINAL POLICY STATEMENT PUBLISHED ON 7/22/93 AT 58 FR 39132.

01/03/94 12/30/93 COMMENT BY VIRGINIA POWER ON THE FINAL POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS SUBMITTED BY M. L. BOWLING

5000 Dominion Boulez,ard Glen Allen, Vi,ginia 23060

'91.j JAN -3 P3 :36

,_,I="**! ( ! r  : ' I,. 1 ., VIRGINIA POWER

[il;CKt i th '< ' : , * ' f December 30, 1993 i .:. t~L I.

Secretary of the Commission Serial No.93-482 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL&P/RBP Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:

COMMENTS ON FINAL POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS Virginia Power has reviewed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) final policy statement on Technical Specifications improvements for nuclear power reactors published in the Federal Register dated July 22, 1993. The final policy established a specific set of objective criteria as guidance for determining which regulatory requirements and operating restrictions should be included in Technical Specifications.

We are in favor of the changes made to the policy statement as a result of the public comment period which began February 6, 1987 and ended March 23, 1987, and we

- are in support of the policy statement in its final form.

Very truly yours, M. L. Bowling, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Programs

N' :;* -- r, :- L

• ft,TOfW COMMISSION L

• DO :v .;1, *, .. & <:;tRV,CE SECTION Off ;..,E Of f 1i: SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION

ll,~

(' .t ...

JU ;

[7590'4>\f-P]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• 93 JUL 16 A11 :35 10 CFR Part 50

"Fr- !C* ...,, -~ ..,, t. ,,.,;

Final Policy Statement on i iJ( I\: ~ 1 , , : r Technical Specifications Improvements t.' /' n ~~I H for Nuclear Power Reactors AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final policy statement.

SUMMARY

This statement presents the policy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with respect to the scope and purpose of Technica l Specifications for nuclear power plants as required by 10 CFR 50.36. It establishes a specific set of objective criteria (see Section IV) as guidance for determining which regulatory requirements and operating restrictions should be included in Technical Specifications. It encourages licensees to implement a voluntary program to update their Technical Specifications to be consistent with improved vendor-specific Standard Technical Specifications (STS) issued by the NRC in September 1992. The improved STS were published as the following NRC Reports:

• NUREG-1430, "Standard Technical Specifications, Babcock and Wilcox Plants"

• NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants"

• NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants"

• NUREG-1433, 11 Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4U

• NUREG-1434, 11 Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/6" These improved STS were the result of extensive technical meetings and discussions among the NRC staff, industry owners groups, vendors, and the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC). The improved STS were developed based on the criteria in the interim Policy Statement published in February 1987. The Policy Statement now reflects modifications resulting from public comments on the interim Policy Statement and from the experience gained in developing the improved STS. Implementation of the Policy Statement through implementation of the improved STS is expected to produce an improvement in the safety of nuclear power plants through the use of more operator-oriented Technical Specifications, improved Technical Specification Bases, reduced action statement induced plant transients, and more efficient use of NRC and industry resources. The Policy Statement is not a regulation and does not establish binding requirements or limit the scope of safety issues for case-specific adjudication.

ADDRESSES: Copies of NUREGs-1430, 1431, 1432, 1433, and 1434 may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O.

Box 37082, Washington, D.C. 20013-7082. Copies are also available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy is also available for public inspection and/or copying at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Lower Level of the Gelman Building, Washington, D.C. The NUREGs can also be accessed through the NRC electronic bulletin board system. Details of how to use this system were published in the Federal Register on November 25, 1992 (57 FR 55602).

EFFECTIVE DATE: (Upon publication in the Federal Register).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nanette V. Gilles, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Operating Reactor Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, telephone (301) 504-1180.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. BACKGROUND Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Act), as amended (42 U.S.C. 2232), mandates the inclusion of Technical Specifications in

- licenses for the operation of production and utilization facilities. The Act requires that Technical Specifications include information of the amount, kind, and source of special nuclear material, the place of use, and the specific characteristics of the facility. That section also indicates that Technical Specifications should contain such information as the Commission may by rule deem necessary to enable it to find that the utilization of special nuclear material will be in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection of public health and safety. Finally, that section requires Technical Specifications to be made a part of any license issued to operate production or utilization facilities.

Section 50.36, "Technical Specifications," which implements Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act, was promulgated by the Commission on December 17, 1968 (33 FR 18610). This rule delineates requirements for determining the contents of Technical Specifications. Technical Specifications set forth the specific characteristics of the facility and the conditions for its operation that are required to provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.36 requires that:

Each lic~ns~ authorizing ~peration of a production or utiliiation facility of a type described in §50.21 or §50.22 will include technical specifications. The technical specifications will be derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report, and amendments thereto, submitted pursuant to §50.34. The Commission may include such additional technical specifications as the Convnission finds appropriate.

Technical Specifications cannot be changed by licensees without prior NRC approval. However, since 1969, there has been a trend towards including in Technical Specifications not only those requirements derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report but also essentially all other Commission requirements governing the operation of nuclear power reactors. This extensive use of Technical Specifications is due in part to a lack of well-defined criteria (in either the body of the rule or in some other regulatory document) for what should be included in Technical Specifications.

This has contributed to the volume of Technical Specifications and to the several-fold increase, since 1969, in the number of license amendment applications to effect changes to the Technical Specifications. It has

• diverted both staff and licensee attention from the more important requirements in these documents to the extent that it has resulted in an adverse but unquantifiable impact on safety.

On March 30, 1982, the NRC published in the Federal Register (47 FR 13369) a proposed amendment to its regulations, 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." The proposed amendment would have revised §50.36, "Technical Specifications," to establish a new system of Specifications divided-into two general c-ategories. _Only those specification-s contained in the first general category as Technical Specifications would have become part of the operating license and would have required prior NRC approval for any changes. Those specifications contained in the second general category would have become supplemental specifications and would not have required prior NRC approval for most changes. The NRC review of the first general category of specifications would have been the same as currently performed for Technical Specification changes, which are amendments to the operating license. For the second category, supplemental specifications, the licensee would have been allowed to make changes within specified conditions without prior NRC approval. The NRC would have reviewed these changes when they were made and would have done so in a manner similar to that currently used for reviewing design changes, tests, and experiments performed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. Because of difficulties with defining the criteria for dividing the Technical Specifications into the two categories of the proposed rule and because of other higher priority licensing work, the rule change was deferred.

In the early 1980s, the nuclear industry and the NRC staff began studying the question of whether improvement to the existing system of establishing Technical Specification requirements for nuclear power plants was needed.

During this time frame, two studies of this issue were performed by an NRC task group known as the Technical Specifications Improvement Project (TSIP) and a Subcommittee of the Atomic Industrial Forum's (AIF) Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety. 1 The overall conclusion of these studies was that many improvements in the scope and content of Technical Specifications were needed, and that a joint NRC and industry program should be initiated to implement these improvements. Both of these groups made specific recommendations which*

are summarized as follows:

1) The NRC should adopt the criteria for defining the scope of Technical Specifications proposed in the AIF and TSIP reports. Those criteria should then be used by the NRC and each of the nuclear steam supply system vendor owners groups to completely rewrite and streamline the existing STS. This process would result in many requirements being 1

SECY-86-10, "Recommendations for Improving Technical Specifications," dated January 13, 1986, contains both "Recommendations for Improving Technical Specifications," NRC Technical Specifications Improvement Project, September 30, 1985, and "Technical Specifications Improvements," AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specification~ Improvements, October 1, 1985.

transferred from control by Technical Specifications requirements to control by other mechanisms [e.g., the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Operating Procedures, Quality Assurance (QA) Plan] which would not require a license amendment or prior NRC approval when changes are needed.

The new STS should include greater emphasis on human factors principles in order to add clarity and understanding to the text of the STS. The new STS should also provide improvements to the Bases Section of Technical Specifications which provides the purpose for each requirement in the specification.

2) A parallel program of short-term improvements in both the scope and substance of the existing Technical Specifications should be initiated in addition to developing a new STS as identified in paragraph (1) above.

On February 6, 1987, the NRC published in the Federal Reqjster for public comment (52 FR 3788) an interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors containing proposed criteria in response to item (1). These criteria were generally derived from the criteria proposed in the AIF and TSIP reports and were modified slightly based on discussions between the NRC staff and the industry. The public comment period expired on March 23, 1987.

The NRC has developed a program for short-term improvements as described in item (2.) These are known as "line-item" improvements and are generic improvements developed and promulgated by the NRC staff for voluntary adoption by licensees.

Subsequently, improved vendor-specific STS were developed and issued by the NRC in September 1992. The improved STS were published as the following NRC Reports:

NUREG-1430, "Standard Technical Specifications, Babcock and Wilcox Plants" NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants" NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants" NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4" NUREG-1434, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/6" These improved STS were the result of extensive technical meetings and discussions among the NRC staff, industry owners groups, vendors, and NUMARC .

• II.

SUMMARY

OF PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT AND NRC RESPONSES In early 1987, the Commission received 29 letters with comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements. A list of the commenters and a detailed analysis of public comments are available for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Lower Level of the Gelman Building, Washington, D.C. 20555.

Twenty-five of the 29 commenters were generally supportive of the Convnission Policy Statement and the overall Technical Specifications Improvement Program; 3 commenters were generally not supportive; and 1 commenter was neutral. Of the 29 commenters, 23 can be categorized as representing industry views, 3 are government agencies, and 3 are interested members of the public. The industry group stated strong support for the Policy Statement and its criteria. The comments included extensive support for the overall Commission objectives of improving Technical Specifications so they are clearer and less ambiguous.

The three commenters opposed to the Policy Statement were primarily concerned that moving any requirements to other documents might make them "less enforceable" than Technical Specifications or might weaken the inspection process.

Based on the criteria in this Policy Statement that define requirements that should be controlled by Technical Specifications, the Commission concludes that some requirements previously contained in Technical Specifications should be relocated to other documents that do not have the direct enforceability of Technical Specifications and do not require NRC staff approval before changes are made. Many of the requirements will be relocated to the FSAR and will be controlled through 10 CFR 50.59. Other requirements will be relocated to more appropriate documents (e.g., Security Plan, QA Plan) and controlled by the applicable regulatory requirements. The adequacy of controls for relocated requirements which do not fit in the above categories will be reviewed and approved by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis to determine, among other things, whether an enforceable control method will need to be established.

NRC approval would still be required for any changes to requirements covered by 10 CFR 50.59 that involved an unreviewed safety question and for changes which exceed the threshold criteria in the regulations for other controlled documents. The Commission believes that this control and enforcement posture is commensurate with the safety importance of the relocated requirements.

Many of the commenters addressed specific issues discussed in the Policy Statement. The following paragraphs discuss issues addressed by a significant portion of the commenters or that are of particular interest.

- A slight majority of the industry commenters stated that they agreed with the Policy Statement that improvements should be voluntary. In addition, four of the commenters stated that if licensees elect to implement the Policy Statement, they should not be required to convert to STS. The Commission has concluded that where STS requirements are generally applicable, the STS should be adopted unless adequate justification for acceptance of a plant-specific Technical Specification is provided. Cases may arise where there is a question concerning the NRC staff proposed addition of requirements in the improved STS that are not in a licensee's current Technical Specifications.

In such cases, the Commission intends to control the process by evaluating the imposition of additional requirements in accordance with the Commission regulations on backfitting (10 CFR 50.109).

The interim Policy Statement identified three criteria to be used to define which of the current Technical Specification requirements should be retained or included in Technical Specifications and which requirements could be relocated to licensee-controlled documents. Half of the industry commenters stated that licensees should be allowed to selectively apply the criteria without fully adopting the improvement process (e.g., not improving Bases and not applying accepted human factors principles to Technical Specifications).

In this regard, it is the Commission policy that licensees may adopt portions of the improved STS without fully implementing all STS improvements. The Commission will, however, place the highest priority on the review and approval of Technical Specifications related submittals for complete conversions to the improved STS. For licensees who adopt portions of the improved STS, these portions shall include all related requirements and will normally be developed as line-item improvements by the NRC staff. In all

- cases, the Commission expects improved Bases to accompany requests for improved Technical Specifications. The Commission realizes, however, that it may not always be practical for licensees to apply all of the human factors, principles used in the improved srs. The Commission believes that the above approach will result in safety improvements as well as consistency in Technical Specifications requirements and will allow the most efficient use of NRC and industry resources.

When the interim Policy Statement was issued, the Commission believed that it was only the overall package of improvements which, if adopted, would produce an improvement in safety. However, experience in the development of the improved STS and in the review of license amendment requests has led the Corrmission to conclude that safety benefits can be realized from adopting portions of the improved STS without fully implementing all STS improvements.

The NRC staff has developed several line-item improvements since the publication of the interim Policy Statement. These improvements have been reviewed by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements and have been made available for voluntary implementation through generic letters. While the Commission continues to believe that the greatest improvement to safety can be realized by implementing all of the improvements in the improved STS, it also believes there is considerable merit in allowing licensees to improve portions of their Technical Specifications that could result in a safety benefit.

Fifteen industry respondents strongly supported the use of the criteria to determine which future requirements (e.g., from generic issues) would be included in Technical Specifications. This has been the Commission intent and the Policy Statement has been modified accordingly.

Ten commenters stated that the proposed criteria were acceptable as is, and several reconnnended prompt rulemaking to codify the criteria. Five other commenters indicated that the criteria were inadequate or that additional-discussion of the criteria scope and intent was needed. After studying comments and use of the criteria, the Connnission determined that further discussion of the criteria was needed and this is included in Section IV. The Department of Nuclear Safety, State of Illinois, reconnnended adding a fourth criterion and delaying implementation of the Policy Statement until rule changes necessary for implementation are promulgated. The criterion suggested would expand on Criterion 3 to cover all anticipated operational sequences.

The Commission believes that safety significant operational sequences are adequately addressed by Criteria 2 and 3. The Commission has added a fourth criterion (different from that proposed by the State of Illinois) to capture requirements which operating experi.ence or probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) show to be significant to public health and safety.

In considering the specific comments on the criteria and based on experience in applying the criteria, the Commission concluded that the criteria should be codified through rulemaking. Currently, there is a common understanding between the NRC staff and the industry that the criteria provide a template to develop improved Technical Specifications. The criteria are being used by licensees to prepare Technical Specification submittals to the NRC. If the NRC staff does not believe a licensee has properly applied the criteria, the staff will not issue a license amendment until the licensee has properly applied the criteria. For these reasons, the Commission believes it is appropriate to codify the criteria in a rule which will be consistent with this Policy Statement. The Commission will ensure that the voluntary nature of the Technical Specifications Improvement Program is preserved in the rulemaking process. Comments on this Policy Statement are welcomed and will be considered and addressed during preparation of the proposed rule.

In addition to the comments on the three original criteria, seven of the commenters were opposed to using PSA to define the contents of the Technical Specifications. They expressed concern that PSA has only limited applicability and that its use is not well defined. Moreover, these commenters noted that plant licensing is based primarily on Design Basis Accident analysis which lends itself to a deterministic process rather than a PSA-based process for identifying Technical Specification requirements. The Commission believes that plant- and design-specific PSAs have yielded valuable insight to unique plant vulnerabilities not fully recognized in the safety analysis report Design Basis Accident or Transient analyses.

Some commenters stated that if PSA is used to impose Technical Specifications for some high-risk items, it should also be used to remove some low-risk items. The Commission notes that this approach to Technical Specifications has been considered at length during the development of the Policy Statement.

Since the first three criteria in the Policy Statement are derived from the plant safety analysis report which is deterministic in nature, (but which itself incorporates qualitative risk insights) the Commission believes that a broad application of PSA to remove individual requirements from Technical Specifications is generally counter to the philosophy of the first three criteria. However, risk insights were used to determine the values of some completion times and surveillance frequencies for items retained in the improved STS.

The extension of the sole use of PSA to remove individual requirements from Technical Specifications would need to be founded in a broader policy of risk-based regulation which the Commission is currently pursuing at a level more inclusive than Technical Specifications improvements. Specifically, if a requirement meets any one of the four criteria, it should be retained or included in Technical Specifications. The Commission believes that it would be inappropriate at this time to allow requirements which meet one or more of the first three criteria to be deleted from Technical Specifications based solely on PSA (Criterion 4). However, if the results of PSA indicate that Technical Specifications can be relaxed or removed, a deterministic review will be performed. If the results of the deterministic review also support relaxing or removing the Technical Specifications, the NRC staff will not preclude relaxing or removing such Technical Specifications.

The Commission Policy in this regard is consistent with its Policy Statement on "Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, 51 FR 30028, published on August 21, 1986. The Policy Statement on Safety Goals states in part, " . . . probabilistic results should also be reasonably balanced and supported through use of deterministic arguments. In this way, judgements can be made . . . about the degree of confidence to be given to these

[probabilistic] estimates and assumptions. This is a key part of the process of determining the degree of regulatory conservatism that may be warranted for particular decisions. This defense-in-depth approach is expected to continue to ensure the protection of public health and safety." At its conclusion, the Policy Statement on Safety Goals adds, "Nor are the safety goals and these implementation guidelines in and of themselves meant to serve as a sole basis for licensing decisions. However, if pursuant to these guidelines, information is developed that is applicable to a particular licensing decision, it may be considered as one factor in the licensing decision."

The Commission will continue to use PSA, consistent with its policy on Safety Goals, as a tool in evaluating specific line-item improvements to Technical Specifications, new requirements, and industry proposals for risk-based Technical Specification changes.

About a third of the respondents stated that NRC should place a high priority on making available specific line-item improvements to current Technical Specifications. The Connnission agrees with these comments but will continue to give the highest priority to complete conversions to the improved STS.

III. DISCUSSION The Commission recognizes the advantages of improved Technical Specifications.

Clarification of the scope and purpose of Technical Specifications has provided useful guidance to both the NRC and industry and has served as an important incentive for industry participation in a voluntary program to improve Technical Specifications. It has resulted in improved STS that are intended to focus licensee and plant operator attention on those plant conditio~s most important to safety. This should also result in more efficient use of agency and industry resources.

The Policy Statement identifies four criteria for defining the scope of

- Technical Specifications. These criteria are intended to be consistent with the scope of Technical Specifications as stated in the Statement of Consideration accompanying the current rule, 10 CFR 50.36.

The Statement of Consideration for the final rule issuing 10 CFR 50.36 (33 FR 18610, December 17, 1968) discusses the scope of Technical Specifications as including the following:

In the revised system, emphasis is placed on two general classes of technical matters: (1) those related to prevention of accidents, and (2) those related to mitigation of the consequences of accidents. By systematic analysis and evaluation of a particular facility, each applicant is required to identify at the construction permit stage, those items that are directly related to maintaining the integrity of the physical barriers designed to contain radioactivity. Such items are expected to be the subjects of Technical Specifications in the operating license.

The first of these two general classes of technical matters to be included in Technical Specifications is captured by criteria (1), (4), and to some extent criterion (2) in that they address systems and process variables that alert the operator to a situation when accident initiation is more likely. The second general class of technical matters is explicitly addressed and captured by criteria (2), (3), and (4). By applying the four criteria contained in the Policy Statement a licensee should capture all of those specific characteristics of its facility and the conditions for its operation that are

_. required to meet the principal operative standard in Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act, that is, that adequate protection is provided to the health and safety of the public.

The Commission recognizes that the four criteria carry a theme of focusing on the technical requirements for features of controlling importance to safety.

Since many of the requirements are of _immediate concern to the health and safety of the public, this Policy Statement adopts, for the purpose of relocating requirements from Technical Specifications to licensee-controlled documents, the subjective statement of the purpose of Technical Specifications expressed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in Portland General Electric Company (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263 (1979). There, the Appeal Board interpreted Technical Specifications as being reserved for those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety.

The Commission wishes to emphasize that this Policy Statement is intended to be consistent with the language of Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act, 10 CFR 50.36, and previous interpretations of the regulations. The Policy Statement merely clarifies the scope and purpose of Technical Specifications by identifying criteria which can be used to establish, more clearly, the framework for Technical Specifications (i.e., identify those requirements derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report and which are of immediate concern to the health and safety of the public). The Commission intends to codify these criteria in a rule which will be consistent with the Policy Statement. The Policy Statement also describes a mechanism whereby requirements that do not meet these criteria can be identified and controlled through mechanisms other than Technical Specifications.

Over the past several years, the Commission has seen an improvement in industry development of effective maintenance programs. In addition, there has been an overall improvement in the industry in the conduct of 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations since the NUMARC publication of NSAC-125, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations," in June 1989. Furthermore, the ongoing NRC study on shutdown and low-power operation should provide some important insights for additional Technical Specification improvements in the areas of shutdown and low power operations. The Commission believes that these improvements, combined with improved Technical Specifications developed based on this Policy Statement, can lead to significant improvements in the operational safety of nuclear power facilities.

IV. THE COMMISSION POLICY The purpose of Technical Specifications is to impose those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety by identifying those features that are of controlling importance to safety and establishing on them certain conditions of operation which cannot be changed without prior Corranission approval.

Licensees are encouraged to implement a program to upgrade the1r Technical Specifications consistent with this purpose. The Commission will place the highest priority on requests based on the criteria below (as clarified by the supporting discussion) for individual license amendments that evaluate all of the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) for an individual plant to determine which LCOs should be included in the Technical Specifications. In addition, the Commission will also entertain requests to adopt portions of the i~proved STS, even if the licensee does not adopt all STS improvements. These portions shall include all related requirements and will normally be developed as line-item improvements by the NRC staff. The Commission encourages all licensees who submit Technical Specification related submittals based on this Policy Statement to emphasize human factors principles.

LCOs which do not meet any of the criteria below may be proposed for removal from the Technical Specifications and relocation to licensee-controlled documents, such as the FSAR. The criteria may be applied to either standard or custom Technical Specifications. 1he Commission will also *consider the criteria in evaluating future generic requirements for inclusion in Technical Specifications.

In accordance with this Policy Statement, improved STS have been developed and will be maintained for each NSSS owners group. The Commission encourages licensees to use the improved STS as the basis for plant-specific Technical Specifications. During individual Technical Specification conversions, the nonvoluntary addition of new requirements from the improved STS to individual plant Technical Specifications will be evaluated in accordance with the Commission regulations on backfitting (10 CFR 50.109) unless the staff suggested additional changes are needed to make the licensee requested changes acceptable from the standpoint of adequate protection or compliance with NRC regulations, in which case §50.109 does not apply and the request may be denied without the additional items. However, in all other cases, it is the Commission intent that the wording and Bases of the improved STS be used in the Technical Specification related submittal to the extent practicable.

The following criteria delineate those constraints on design and operation of nuclear power plants that are derived from the plant safety analysis report or PSA information and that belong in Technical Specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36 and the purpose of Technical Specifications stated above.

Criterion 1: Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary:

Discussion of Criterion 1: A basic concept in the adequate protection of the public health and safety is the prevention of accidents.

Instrumentation is installed to detect significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary so as to allow operator actions to either correct the condition or to shut down the plant safely, thus reducing the likelihood of a loss-of-coolant accident.

This criterion is intended to ensure that Technical Specifications control those instruments specifically installed to detect excessive reactor coolant system leakage. This criterion should not, however, be interpreted to include instrumentation to detect precursors to reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage or instrumentation to identify the source of actual leakage (e.g., loose parts monitor, seismic instrumentation, valve position indicators).

Criterion 2: A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident or Transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier:

Discussion of Criterion 2: Another basic concept in the adequate protection of the public health and safety is that the plant shall be operated within the bounds of the initial conditions assumed in the existing Design Basis Accident and Transient analyses and that the plant will be operated to preclude unanalyzed transients and accidents. These analyses consist of postulated events, analyzed in the FSAR, for which a structure, system, or component must meet specified functional goals.

These analyses are contained in Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR (or equivalent chapters) and are identified as Condition II, III, or IV events (ANSI N 18.2) (or equivalent) that either assume the failure of or present a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

As used in Criterion 2, process variables are only those parameters for which specific values or ranges of values have been chosen as reference bounds in the Design Basis Accident or Transient analyses and which are monitored and controlled during power operation such that process values remain within the analysis bounds. Process variables captured by Criterion 2 are not, however, limited to only those directly monitored and controlled from the control room. These could also include other features or characteristics that are specifically assumed in Design Basis Accident and Transient analyses even if they cannot be directly observed in the control room (e.g., moderator temperature coefficient and hot channel factors).

The purpose of this criterion is to capture those process variables that have initial values assumed in the_ Design Basis Accident and Transient analyses, and which are monitored and controlled during power operation.

As long as these variables are maintained within the established values, risk to the public safety is presumed to be acceptably low. This criterion also includes active design features (e.g., high pressure/low pressure system valves and interlocks) and operating restrictions (pressure/temperature limits) needed to preclude unanalyzed accidents and transients.

Criterion 3: A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier:

Discussion of Criterion 3: A third concept in the adequate protection of the public health and safety is that in the event that a postulated Design Basis Accident or Transient should occur, structures, systems, and components are available to function or to actuate in order to mitigate the consequence- of the Design Basis Accident cir Transient.

Safety sequence analyses or their equivalent have been performed in recent years and provide a method of presenting the plant response to an accident. These can be used to define the primary success paths.

A safety sequence analysis is a systematic examination of the actions required to mitigate the consequences of events considered in the plant's Design Basis Accident and Transient analyses, as presented in Chapters 6 and 15 of the plant's FSAR (or equivalent chapters). Such a safety sequence analysis considers all applicable events, whether explicitly or implicitly presented. The primary success path of a safety sequence analysis consists of the combination and sequences of equipment needed to operate (including consideration of the single failure criteria), so that the plant response to Design Basis Accidents and Transients limits the consequences of these events to within the appropriate acceptance criteria.

It is the i~tent of this criterion to capture into Technical Specifications only those structures, systems, and components that are part of the primary success path of a safety sequence analysis. Also captured by this criterion are those support and actuation systems that are necessary for items in the primary success path to successfully function. The primary success path for a particular mode of operation does not include backup and diverse equipment (e.g., rod withdrawal block which is a backup to the average power range monitor high flux trip in the startup mode, safety valves which are backup to low temperature overpressure relief valves during cold shutdown).

Criterion 4: A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety:

Ojscussjon of Criterion 4: It is the Commission policy that licensees retain in their Technical Specifications LCOs, action statements and Surveillance Requirements for the following systems (as applicable), which operating experience and PSA have generally shown to be significant to public health and safety and any other structures, systems, or components that meet this criterion:

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling/Isolation Condenser, Residual Heat Removal, Standby Liquid Control, and Recirculation Pump Trip.

The Commission recognizes that other structures, systems, or components may meet this criterion. Plant- and design-specific PSAs have yielded valuable insight to unique plant vulnerabilities not fully recognized in the safety analysis report Design Basis Accident or Transient analyses.

It is the intent of this criterion that those requirements that PSA or operating experience exposes as significant to public health and safety, consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal and Severe Accident Policies, be retained or included in Technical Specifications.

The-Commission expects that licensees, in preparing their Technical Specification related submittals, will utilize any plant-specific PSA or risk survey and any available literature on risk insights and PSAs. This material should be employed to strengthen the technical bases for those requirements that remain in Technical Specifications, when applicable, and to verify that none of the requirements to be relocated contain constraints of prime importance in limiting the likelihood or severity of the accident sequences that are commonly found to dominate risk.

Similarly, the NRC staff will also employ risk insights and PSAs in evaluating Technical Specifications related submittals. Further, as a part of the Commission's ongoing program of improving Technical Specifications, it will continue to consider methods to make better use of ri'sk and reliability information for defining future generic Technical Specification requirements.

Requirements which would be relocated from Technical Specifications to a licensee-controlled document (e.g., the FSAR, the Security Plan, the QA Plan, or Fire Protection Plan) may be changed or deleted in conjunction with the filing of individual Technical Specifications related requests to implement this Policy Statement. The package containing the amendment request must contain a clear statement of the basis for the change or deletion, a safety evaluation, and a statement that the changes have been reviewed by a multidisciplinary group of responsible, technical supervisory personnel, including onsite operations personnel.

Appropriate Surveillance Requirements and Actions should be retained for each LCD which remains or is included in the Technical Specifications. Each LCD, Action, and Surveillance Requirement should have supporting Bases. The Bases should at a minimum address the following questions and cite references to appropriate licensing documentation (e.g., FSAR, Topical Report) to support the Bases.

What is the justification for the Technical Specification, i.e., which Policy Statement criterion requires it to be in the Technical Specifications?

2. What are the Bases for each LCD, i.e., why was it determined to be the lowest functional capability or performance level for the system or component in question necessary for safe operation of the facility and, what are the reasons for the Applicability of the LCD?

3. What are the Bases for each Action, i.e., why should this remedial action be taken if the associated LCO cannot be met; how does this Action relate to other Actions associated with the LCO; and what justifies continued operation of the system or component at the reduced state from the state specified in the LCO for the allowed time period?

4. What are the Bases for each Safety Limit?

5. What are the Bases for each Surveillance Requirement and Surveillance Frequency; i.e., what specific functional requirement is the surveillance designed to verify? Why is this surveillance necessary at the specified frequency to assure that the system or component function is mafntained, that facility operation will be within the Safety Limits, and that the LCO will be met?

NOTE: In answering these questions the Bases for each number (e.g.,

Allowable Value, Response Time, Completion Time, Surveillance Frequency),

state, condition, and definition (e.g., operability) should be clearly specified. As an example, a number might be based on engineering judgment, past experienc~, or PSA insights; but this should be clearly stated.

When licensees submit amendment requests based on this Policy Statement, they should identify the location of and controls for the technical and administrative requirements of the relocated requirements. The NRC staff will carefully review these submittals to ensure the accountability and the acceptability of controls for each relocated requirement. Many of the requirements will be relocated to the FSAR and will be enforceable through 10 CFR 50.59. Other requirements will be relocated to more appropriate documents (e.g., Security Plan, QA Plan) and controlled by the applicable regulatory requirements. The adequacy of controls for relocated requirements which do not fit in the above categories will be reviewed and approved by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis to determine, among other things, whether an enforceable control method will need to be established.

Since some of the requirements currently contained in the Technical Specifications will be relocated to licensee-controlled documents to which changes will be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59, the NRC has been giving increased attention to the 10 CFR 50.59 change process. In the interim Pol icy Statement~

the Commission encouraged industry to obtain the support of NUMARC in sponsoring activities to encourage the highest quality for utility review of changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. In June 1989, NUMARC published NSAC-125, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations." During the development of these guidelines, the NRC staff and NUMARC met on several occasions to discuss the content of NSAC-125. Since its publication, nearly all of the industry has been using NSAC-125 as guidance in performing 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations. While the NRC and the industry do not fully agree on all issues associated with NSAC-125, based on inspections and reviews since its issuance, the NRC staff has seen an overall improvement in the conduct of 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations. Moreover, the guidelines described in NSAC-125 go beyond what is required by 10 CFR 50.59 in certain respects. Thus, the Commission does not believe that the guidelines are appropriate for endorsement as regulatory guidance.

In addition, in December 1992, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued Inspection Procedure 37001, "10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program," to provide NRC inspectors with updated guidance for evaluating utility performance in implementing the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The Commission believes use of this inspection guidance will provide continued assurance that the NRC is appropriately monitoring 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation programs for licensees who convert to the improved STS.

The Commission emphasizes the importance of a well-planned transition for licensees who plan to convert to the improved STS. Such a transition should include careful consideration of procedure revisions and operator training to ensure safe operation during and following the conversion.

The NRC will, consistent with its mission, allocate resources as necessary to implement this Policy Statement.

V. ENFORCEMENT POLICY Any changes to a licensee's Technical Specifications to apply this Policy Statement's criteria will be made by the license amendment process prior to implementation. Compliance with Technical Specifications is required by the Commission, and adherence to commitments contained in licensee-controlled documents is expected by the Commission. Violations and deviations will, as in the past, be handled in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1992).

If a licensee elects to apply these criteria, the requirements of the removed specifications will be relocated to the FSAR or other licensee-controlled documents. Licensees are to operate their facilities in conformance with the descriptions of their facilities and procedures in their FSAR. Changes to the facility or to procedures described in the FSAR are to be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The Commission will take appropriate enforcement action to ensure that licensees comply with 10 CFR 50.59. Changes made in accordance with the provisions of other licensee-controlled documents (e.g., QA plan, Security Plan) are subject to the specific requirements for those documents.

Nothing in this Policy Statement shall limit the authority of the NRC to conduct inspections as deemed necessary and to take appropriate enforcement action when regulatory requirements or commitments are not met.

This draft final Policy Statement amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et

• seq). This Policy Statement has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of the paperwork requirements.

The public reporting burden for this voluntary collection of information is estimated to average 4000 hours0.0463 days <br />1.111 hours <br />0.00661 weeks <br />0.00152 months <br /> per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send connnents regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C. 20555, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150-0011), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503.

Dated at Washington, D.C:, this - - -

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J.

Secretary of the Convnission WR c/o NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.

• 414 Nicollet Moll

• M inneapolis, MN 55401 DO(;K[TE [!

USNHC t A. Pickens. Chairman (612 ) 337-2037

• a1 tfAY 12 PS :17 BWROG-8732 May 6, 1987 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docket and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS (FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE 52FR3788, DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1987)

Reference:

"Technical Specification Improvements," AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specification Improvements, October 1, 1985

Dear Sir:

The BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) has reviewed the proposed policy statement on Technical Specification Improvements and appreciates the opportunity to submit comments. Detailed comments are provided in the attachment.

The BWROG strongly supports the NRC initiative to clarify the purpose and scope of technical specifications. The BWROG has been an active contributor to the development of the recommendations of the Reference which are reflected in the proposed interim policy statement.

Of particular importance to technical specification improvements is the en~b~~~m ~~ -cf the screening criteria. The BWROG believes that the three deterministic criteria are sufficient t o ensure that plants are operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. The BWROG understands the objective of utilizing available risk insights to augment the deterministic criteria. However, the strong emphasis on the use of probabilistic risk assessments in the interim policy statement, without appropriate constraints, would continue to encourage the NRC staff to impose requirements in technical specifications which may not be of immediate importance to safety and which could unnecessarily burden plant operators.

The BWROG is nearing completion of a revised standard technical specification section for reactivity control (Section 3/4.1) which will adopt all of the interim policy statement recommendations. NRC staff review of this lead section will provide feedback prior to utilities nowledged by ca

-' u 'llf\lllOlfl.,~..tfll:!

".)C OHiCE Of T H & ~

0 THE: COMM-1 ClM,I tmarlc

.~-7 _;___

Opi s I

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 6, 1987 continuing with multi-million dollar technical specification improvement programs. Strong NRC management and staff support of this policy statement is required to ensure that its goals are achieved.

This letter has been endorsed by a substantial number of members of the BWROG; however, it should not be interpreted as a commitment of any individual member to a specific course of action. Each member must formally endorse the BWROG position in order for that position to become the member's position.

Very truly yours,

1. d~

~ . A . Pickens, Chairman BWR Owners' Group cc: AIF TSI Subcommittee BWROG TSC Representatives BWROG Primary Representatives R.F. Janecek, BWROG Vice Chairman J. Power, EPRI D. Helwig, RRG Chairman C. Tully, AIF W. Green, INPO E. Butcher, NRC D. Fischer, NRC

ATTACHMENT Comments on the Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements

1. Validation studies by both the NRC and the industry have demonstrated that the three deterministic screening criteria along with the four additional systems identified in the policy statement successfully identify those features which are of controlling .

importance to safety. The BWROG is concerned, however, with the emphasis being placed on the use of PRA techniques in the establishment of technical specification requirements. Since there is no specific criteria proposed for determining those cases which can be "significant contributors to the plant's overall core melt probability and risk," this provides the vehicle for NRC staff reviewers to continue to impose requirements which may not be of immediate importance to safety. It is recommended that the specific systems required to be under technical specification control be agreed on between the NRC and the BWROG now so that participating utilities can be provided with some assurance of the final scope of the revised standard technical specifications (STS).

2. The proposed policy statement states that the technical specification improvement program is voluntary. However, it is also stated that first review priority will be given to revised STS and the associated license amendment requests. High review priority should also be given to individual technical specification improvements that benefit a majority of existing technical specifications. Short term improvements to existing technical specifications should be approved now to eliminate recurring problems.

3. The proposed policy statement should be strengthened to identify the implementation process for the revised STS. Specifically, it is the BWROG position that the revised STS will be submitted to the NRG as a Licensing Topical Report (LTR). Revisions to this LTR will be controlled by the BWROG, with approval by the NRC. Plant license amendment requests will be based on the approved LTR.

Also , the policy statement should clearly state that revised t echnical specifications can be phased in in an orderly fashion. A phased approach (e.g., adoption of individual sections as they became available) allows utilities to realize the benefits of technical specification improvements earlier while at the same time allowing for a smooth transition (e.g., operator training and procedure rewrites).

4.

• The proposed policy statement states that a safety evaluation must be performed for each requirement that is changed or deleted. It should be noted that the basis for this safety evaluation and corresponding determination of no signif i cant hazard, for policy statement related changes, will be essentially administrative since requirements are merely being relocated pursuant to policy

guidance. The fact that the requirement did not satisfy any of the screening criteria indicates that it does not have a controlling importance to plant safety.

5. The interim policy statement should explicitly state that the screening criteria should be utilized now by the NRC staff to determine if proposed additions to existing technical specifications are warranted.

6. Once confidence has been obtained that the screening criteria properly identify the necessary systems/components to ensure safe plant operation, the NRC should immediately initiate rulemaking to codify the criteria and provide necessary changes to regulations.

7. Response to Commissioner Asselstine's comments:

a. An explicit statement that changes to surveillance test intervals (STI) and allowable outage times (AOT) will not be allowed until maintenance programs are strengthened is counterproductive to the overall technical specification improvement program. Recent studies by the BWROG and others have clearly demonstrated analytically that STis and AOTs can be extended with insignificant impact on plant safety. For example, a detailed reliability assessment for an improved test plan for BWR RPS instrumentation indicates that the core damage frequency is reduced. It is potentially contrary to safety to delay implementation of improvement programs.

b. The NRC's enforcement options for some important safety requirements will not be diminished by adoption of the policy statement recommendations. Technical Specifications should contain only those requirements which are of immediate importance to safety and which are under control of the operator. The screening criteria ensure that these systems will be retained in technical specifications. Relocated requirements, which by definition are of less importance to safety, are still enforceable. It is inappropriate to burden the operator with voluminous technical specifications just to protect one of many enforcement options.

123 Main Street White Plains, New ~rk 10601 914 681 .6240 John C. Brona

, . NewVorkPower Senior Vice Presider

. , Authority "8? APR , . Q Al l :l j uclear Generation OFFICE Cf S:: Lr-t. fAr<'*

DOCKE TING & sc .. v:cr.

31' AN CH March 27, 1987 JPN 016 IPN-87-018

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn. Document Control Desk Washington, D. c. 20555

Subject:

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 Comments on NRC Interim Policy statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Plants

References:

l. u. s. Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 25 dated February 25, 1987

Dear Sir:

The New York Power Authority has reviewed the Commission's

• recently published interim policy statement on technical . .. __ . .

specification improvements (Reference 1). The Authority*s*

comments focus on two areas: the proposed use of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) to determine what should be included or e~~lud~~ f~o~ techni:al ~p~cificatlons, ana the selective

.i mplementation of parts of the policy.

Technical specifications should be operator-oriented.

Instead of maintaining this goal in sharp focus, they have evolved into a repository for many requirements that have little or nothing to do with the operators* main responsibility - plant safety. The three criteria enumerated in the interim policy provide a sound basis for determining what belongs in the technical specifications. The application of this criteria to APR 1 5 1987 AcknO\,'!ied'.Jzd '.;fr *. *a .. , .. *.* ** ****** ...

U. S. NUCLEAR T,",~V :o ,',ISSIO OOO'"T' *c .I 0* I r.

Pos tm-* 1 Copies I Add'I C pecial

existing technical specifications would go a long way towards reducing the ~necessary bulk of technical specifications.

The policy statement implies that a fourth criterion exists; a PRA critierion. The Authority considers the three criteria alone adequate to define what regulatory requirements and operating restrictions belong in the technical specifications.

The Authority does not agree that PRAs should be used to determine if a specific requirement should be included in or excluded from operator-oriented technical specifications.

Because a PRA has determined that a component contributes to overall risk does not by itself mean that it is directly related to the control room operators responsibilities or that the

• surveillance frequency needs to be specified in the technical specifications. The policy statement also does not try to define the lower limit of risk for not including a requirement in the technical specifications. The use of PRA as a criterion leaves an open door for the incorportation of unnecessary requirements and operating restrictions in the technical specifications.

There is a place for using PRAs in the technical specification improvement policy. PRAs are tools for gaining insight into the relative risk contributions of structures, systems or components. The NRC's current Standard Technical Specifications were not developed with the use of PRA techniques. Rather, LCOs and AOTs were based on a vague, poorly documented, evaluation of risk. Industry groups have successfully applied PRA techniques to quantatively justifiy LCOs, AOTs and surveillance frequencies. The Commission's ,

policy statement should use PRAs where appropriate - not .as a

-*catch-all for specifications that are not required by application of the first three criteria.

• Sele~tive par~ial iiilplament~tion .of a~y policy .tatem&nt on technical specification improvements should be permitted. It may in fact prove to .be the preferrable means for updating technical specifications. The improvement process could be divided into two parts. The first part would apply the three criteria -of the interim policy and relocate these requirements and operating restrictions to other licensee-controlled documents. Part two would apply PRAs, either plant specific or generic, to revising LCOs, AOTs and surveillance frequencies.

The first part could be executed at one time, while part two might be selectively applied. In part one, requirements or

\

operating restrictions would not be altered. The auditability and enforceablity of these requirement would not be reduced by their relocation.

The Authority's experience with emergency operating procedures has shown that the application of human factors engineering principals can significantly . improve the value and readability of techncial documents. The policy statement does not endorse the application of human factors engineering to the format of technical specifications. The Authority considers this point important enough to warrant inclusion.

The Authority is encouraged by the Commission's continued interest in improving technical specifications a~d will continue

-to work with industry groups and the NRC towards this goal.

Except where noted by comment, the Commission is urged to adopt

• the subject policy statement as final. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. J. A. Gray, Jr. or Mr. P. Kokolakis of my staff.

truly yours,

(_) ohn c. Brons Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation cc: Mr. David c. Fischer _* * . -... ..:. . .

Technical Specifications Coordination Branch Division of Human Factors Technology

u. s. Nuclear Regul~tory Commission Washington, o. c. 20555

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Ave.

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Office of the Resident Inspect~r

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. o. Box 136 Lycoming, N. Y. 13093 Resident Inspector's Office Indian Point Unit 3

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. o. Box 215 Buchanan, N. Y. 10511 Mr. Don Neighbors, Senior Project Manager PWR Project Directorate No. 3 Division of PWR Licensing - A U. - s -. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, M. D. 20014

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethseda, M. D. 20014

• Attn. Mr. H. Abelson Mail Stop 416 (To Be Opened By Addressee Only)

C

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968

• 3000 George Washington Way

• Richland, Washington 99352 USNHC

• 57 APR -7 A10 :27 March 30, 1987 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Docketing &Service Branch

Subject:

PROPOSED POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The Supply System participates in the BWR Owners Group Technical Specification Improvements Subcommittee, and observes the activities of the Combustion Engineering and Babcock &Wilcox Owners Group subcommittees. We would like to acknowlede and express our agreement with comments being filed on this subject by the NSSS Owners Groups which we belong to, the Atomic Industrial Forum, and the law firm of Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds.

The comments which follow are based upon our experience as an individual licensee, and as an owner of three different NSSS types.

The Supply System supports the efforts of the Commission in the area of improvements to the Technical Specifications, and urges that those amendments to the Regulations considered necessary be published now.

Similarly, we urge the Commission to begin work now on preparation and issuance for comment of those guidance documents and/or standards which may be considered necessary to support the purpose of the policy statement. Our primary concern here is that the process not be extended by further administrative delays pending issuance of supporting amendments and guidance documents.

We are concerned that the Commission will not assign the appropriate level of resources to this project during its most difficult stage. We would hope that there is not an unrealistic attitude within NRC management regarding what is an appropriate level of resources. Our concern11 stems mainly from the statement of purpose in the interim policy that, The NRC will give first priority in its Technical Specification Improvements efforts to the review and approval of the revised STS and the plant specific license amendment applications based on them. 11 Given our past experience with license amendment requests, and considering the age and number of those now pending NRC approval for WNP-2, there would seem to be sufficient evidence to warrant increased attention in this area. It would indeed be most unfortunate if license amendments needed to support day-to-day operations, outages, and/or those otherwise necessary to improve safe operation were delayed any further due to inadequate support.

APR 13 \987 Acknowledged by card ..* ffJ 'nT'i"M'"rw'MT'ffllf

U.S. NUC'.E! R ~. , ',,:--7.v COM ISSIOH DOCKET I  !

Postmark Copie* ._

Add" Spec id

Document Control Desk Comments - Tech. Spec. Improvements Page 2 With regard to the use of engineering judgment, past experience and/or PRA insights to provide answers to the five questions posed in the policy: We understand that some NSSS vendor owners groups will propose surveillance intervals based primarily on PRAs, while others may not. We understand further that the NRC staff is strongly recommending that surviellance intervals be staggered, based primarily on human factors concerns. We would simply note that a well structured PRA should include failures due to human interactions, and thus account for the staff's human factors concerns. Thus, the NRC Staff may actually be covering the same issue twice and negating any compensating factors built into the PRA result. Failure to resolve this issue could adversely impact the use of PRAs to support plant operation, and impact those utilities with plans to extend their fuel cycles to 24 months.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to participate in the NRC's policy development process. Should you have any questions, or desire further clarification of the points in this letter, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

/ G. C. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs

0ocKEt NUMBERPR - n iRQeosED BULB ~u 0

{ !F2 Ft, J?ff) ~

DOlKEHr*

EDISON DRIVE A1om1c POWER comPAnH ~ NPc AUGUSTA , MAINE 04336 (207) 623-3521 March 31'87 19AP.R -6 P2 :14 MN-87-39 GDW-87-74 Secretary of the Commission United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

References:

(a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)

Subject:

Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors Gentlemen:

As a nuclear power reactor operator, Maine Yankee would like to provide comments on the subject proposed policy statement.

In the discussion of the Policy Statement, the commission requested comments on the benefits of using the criteria for modification of individual LCOs. We believe that the revised Technical Specification Policy can be successfully applied to individual LCO's. The NRC staff has used this concept through the use of standard technical specifications in the review of individual LCOs from licensees with custom technical specifications.

With regard to the voluntary nature of the Technical Specification Improvement Program, Maine Yankee strongly urges you to keep the use of the new policy on technical specifications voluntary. We believe each licensee should determine whether wholesale changes to the technical specifications would be beneficial.

Maine Yankee appreciates the opportunity to comment on this proposed policy statement.

Very truly yours, MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

...2111-!Jv~

G.D. Whittier, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Licensing GDW/hbg Enclosure cc: Mr. Ashok C. Thadani Dr . Thomas E. Murley Mr. Pat Sears Mr . Cornelius F. Holden APR 13 ,.

8570L-GDW Acknowledged by card . ........ .-....,.....

• uw 1

I U. S. NLH.,LE t< N l DO~

V

[.

, Postmarl<

j c,*. 1 d, '

s,..

Department of Energy DOC.KETH!

Washington , DC 20545 USNRC Tl APR -2 Pl2 :05 MAR 3 1 1987 8ff/CE ;)f 'tlht.. ,,-..riv DOCKETING & SEAVIC[

BRANG~

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

The Department of Energy is pleased to submit comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors, Federal Register Notice 52FR3788, dated February 6, 1987. We commend the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for its joint efforts with the Atomic Industrial Forum and the s~veral reactor vendor owners groups leading to the development of this policy. We support the purpose and intent of the interim policy statement and the voluntary nature of its implementation by licensees.

In response to the invitation to comment in the discussion portion of the Federal Register notice, we believe that it would be beneficial for licensees to be able to modify related portions of their Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) without having to apply the terms and provisions of the policy statement to all LCOs. Allowing use of the three criteria as a basis for relocating individual LCOs to other controlled documents in a case-by-case application of the rules would significantly enhance the realization of the benefits of improved technical specifications. Timely removal of individual specifications not meeting the criteria to other documents could lead to early improvement in nuclear powerplant safety and operation.

The policy states that the first priority will be given to the review and approval of the revised Standard Technical Specifications (STS) and the plant specific license amendments based on them. While this may be an efficient way to review changes applying to a number of plants, it defers consideration of improvements for the many plants that have and want to retain customized technical specifications. Plants having customized technical specifications may be among the most in need of the streamlining improvements of the interim policy statement. However, the licensees with plants having customized technical specifications may be reluctant to change to STS due to concerns that the safety and operability of their plants could be jeopardized during the transition period. The high cost of preparing, licensing, and retraining their operating staff to use the new STS may also be a deterrent. The NRC should consider dedicating adequate resources to review and approve all amendments for licensees wishing to implement the policy with either custom or standard technical specifications. It is suggested that the statement referring to priority in review and approval either be modified or deleted.

R 1" 1sa1 Acknowledged by card .* ****** r't-** ,...-

• c fostmerk I)

Copies P.

Add'I C 5 cial

2 The policy statement should be applied to all proposed future additions to all existing technical specifications. The final policy statement should require that the staff determine that proposed additions meet the purpose of technical specifications and the three criteria before the additions are made.

The policy statement recognizes that certain amendments to the regulations may be necessary for its full implementation. We encourage the Commission to explicitly state in the final policy statement that a rulemaking codifying the criteria and associated provisions will proceed in parallel with its implementation.

We trust that our comments will assist in the development and implementation of a Final Policy Statement on technical specification improvements. Should you have any questions regarding our comments, please contact Charles Thompson on 353-3918.

Sincerely, P~fK'4 David J. McGoff Office of Reactor Deployment Office of Nuclear Energy

BISHOP, LIBERMAN, COOK , PURCELL &li\W~lo LOS 1200 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

( 202 ) 857 - 9800

-S7 MAR 30 A8 :50 IN NEW YORK TELEX 440574 INTLAW UI TELECOPI ER ( 202 ) 857 - 9846 OFFICE OF s::i; i: fi;.. , f31SHOP , LIBERMAN°' COOK OOCKETI *G ;~ '*,' \* ** rrts AVENUE OF THE AMERIC A S Bi\1\NCi~ NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036 March 27, 1987 \ 212 ) 704 - 0100 TELEX 222767 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary WRITER ' S DIRECT DIAL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ( 202 )

Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Subj: Comments On Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (52 Fed. Reg. 3788 (February 6, 1987) )

Dear Mr. Chilk:

I. INTRODUCTION On February 6, 1987, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "Commission") published in the Federal Register a Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors." The Commission requested that publi!

comments on the Policy Statement ( "Int erim Policy Statement") be filed by March 23 , 1987. We informed the Commission Staff representative on this issue that we would be filing comments this day, and were assured the comments would be giv e n consideration. On behalf of New York Power Authority, Northeast Utilities, System Energy Resourc e s , Inc. , TU Electric, and Washington Public Power Supply System, we submit the following comments on the Interim Policy Statement. As indicated below, we support the Commission ' s efforts to encourage licensees to update and improve their Technical Specifications. We do suggest, however, that the Commission clarify the Interim Policy Statement in certain respects.

l/ The Policy Stat ement was made effective upon issuance.

However , the Commission noted its intent to consider public comments thereon and, if ap p ropriate , modify the Policy Statement befor e issuing it as final. Thus , it is referred to as an "Int e rim Policy S tatement".

I APR - 3 7987 Acknowledged by card

I' . i :i U. S NUCI EAR REC:

C ., . (

(.

Po!:tma:~

Copi

• Add'I eci ,

II . COMMENT S ON INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT A. Use of Commission Policy Statement Is Appropriate At This Time A Policy Statement is an appropriate administrative mechanism by wh ich to initiate a process whereby licensees up date a nd improve their Technical Specifications voluntarily , wit h out unduly restricting their ability to implement the goals established therein in a manner appropriate for their in d ividual sit u ations . The flexibility afforded licensees by t h is Pol i cy Statement is particularly appropriate where , as foun d by t h e NRC task group , the Technical Specifications Improvement Pr oj ect

( TSIP " ) , t here is no present safety concern regardi ng th e a d equacy of existing Technical Specifications. In a d dition , t h e Commission ' s desire to work with licensees in this area , as is c l early demonstrated by the Interim Policy Statement , prov id es a d equ ate incentives for licensees to proceed t owar d acc ompl i sh i ng t h e goals set forth in the Policy Statement,~ ' reduci n g t h e volume of Technical Specifications when appropriate for t h eir facilities and the number of non-substantive license a me n dme nt s .

In addition , while a Policy Statement is an appropr i ate regulatory 2 mechanism by which to provide guidance to licensees at this time , the Commission should continue to explore t h e n eed to promulgate regulations in this area . Regulations may be appropriate to assure consistency between existing regu l ations and/ or th 3 Policy Statement, and , ultimately , to establish firm criteria .

ll The Commission has promulgated regulations g over n in g th e establis hment of Technical Specifications (1 0 C. F . R.§50.36), pursuant to Section 182 . a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U. S . C. §2232 . a .).

Providing additional guidance regarding the implementation of those regulations , whether by Policy Statement or other guidance mechanism, is an appropriate exercise of Commission discretion.

ll As noted by the Atomic Industrial Forum in its report ,

"Technical Specifications Improvements , " dated October 1, 1985 , there may be areas in which changes to existing regulations should be made. We no te that issuance of this Policy Statement does not preclude ad ditional Commission direction through rule or regulation.

B. Statement of Technicals ecification Pur ose The purpose of Technical Specifications descri~ed in the Interim Policy Statement is generally appropriate . We suggest ,

however, clarification regarding the intent of the state ment is appropriate in two respects. With such clarification we see no need to amend the statement itself.

First , the Commission should indicate that the p h rase "necessary to obviate the possibility of" is not intended to a l ter applicable regulatory standards. Specifically , it sho u ld be stated that this phrase is not intended to change existing standards applied to obtain the requisite level of assurance on which to base licensing decisions,~, reasonable assurance.

Second , the Commission should also indicate that the term "controlling importance to safety" is not intended to alter existing, well-established system or component safety classifications,~, safety- related. Instead , the Commission should note that the proposed criteria establish the necessary guidance for classifying components or systems for inclusion in Technical Specifications .

C . Criteria Governing Retention of Technical Specifications The three proposed criteria for identifying Technical Specifications to be retained in accordance with the Interim Policy Statement appear to mirror in material respects the criteria applied by the TSIP and Atomic Industrial Forum in their trial review of existing Technical Specifications . That review demonstrated the feasibility of applying these criteria to existing Technical Specifications. Accordingly , we have no specific comments regarding these criteria.

ii The expressed purpos e of Te chnical Specifications set forth in the Interim Policy Statement is:

[T]o impose those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation n e cessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety by establishing those conditions of operation which cannot be changed without prior Commission approval and by identifying those features which are of controlling importance to safet y .

[52 Fed. Reg. 3791.]

D. Application of Interim Policy Statement The Commission provides in the Interim Policy Sta t e ment guidance regarding the manner in which the Policy Statement is t o be implemented. We recommend modification or clarification , as appropriate , of three aspects of this guidance. Our recommendations are consistent with the the Commission ' s intent that application of the Interim Policy Statement be voluntary.

First , the Commission states that it intends to " entertain requests " for removal of provisions in existing Technical Specifications , utilizing the criteria discussed above, where licensees submit evaluations of "all" Limiting Conditions for Operation for an individual plant. The Commission notes that it does not intend that the criteria be applied to the removal of individual criteria. (52 Fed. Reg. 3790.) The Commission s h ould mo d ify , or clarify , this aspect of its Interim Policy St atement to allow for application of the criteria on an individual basis in certain circumstances .

The Interim Policy Statement contemplates that modifications of Tec h nical Specifications pursuant thereto be base d o n a comprehensive review. It need not follow , however , tha t the entire Technical Specifications be submitted for modification.

We recommend that the Commission acknowledge that licensees may submit , in certain circumstances , proposed modifications to individual provisions of the Technical Specifications that would be implemented consistent with the criteria set forth in the Interim Policy Statement. Such circumstances could include changes to the Technical Specifications which are necessary or appropriate but arise outside the scope of any effort to upgrade the Technical Specifications, and circumstances do not permit inc]usion of those changes in the overall modification effort (such circumstances certainly may occur during normal p l ant operations) . The Commission should encourage such modifications and allow for their accomplishment consistent with the Interim Policy Statement . Accordingly, we urge the Commission to provide f o r consideration of modifications to individual Techni c al Specifications which are demonstrated to further the go a ls of t h e Interim Policy Statement .

In addition , the Commission noted that it intends t o " give first priority " to review revised Standard Technical Specifications and amendment requests based thereon (52 Fed . Reg .

3790). We request that the Commission modify the Interim Policy Statement to provide that regardless of the status of a licensee ' s use of Standard Technical Specifications, the Commission will conduct a timely review of any proposed revisions to existing , including custom , Technical Specifications ,

consistent with its intent to permit application of the Interim Policy Statement criteria to all Technical Specifications.

Facilities which rely on custom Technical Specifications , whether by necessity or other good reason, and desire to apply the

- 5 -

Interim Policy Statement th ereto , should not be precluded from timely Commission r eview of changes to th eir Technical Specifications.

Finally, the Commission i ndicated that licensees may use Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA's) to assist in making determinations regarding the inclusion or exclusi on of particular actions in Technical Specification s . The Commission notes, however, that licensees need not await developments of plant specific PRA's to apply the Policy Statement. (52 Fed. Reg. 3791.) The Commission should not, and arguably may not, impose a requirement or presumption on licensees that PRA's are to be used in making improvements to Technical Specifications pursuant to the Policy Statement. Acco r dingly, the Commission should expressly acknowledge that whereas a PRA may be used in applying the Policy Statement, the Commission does not intend thereby to suggest it expects or requires PRA's to be used in this context.

E. Amendment Requests Under Interim Policy Statement The Commission proposes that eac h package containing an

• individual licensee's request to amend its Technical Specifications pursuant to the Interim Policy Stateme nt contain ,

inter alia, a clear statement of the basis for th e require ments to be changed or deleted. In addition , the Commission proposes that each LCO, Action Statement, or Surveillance Requirement that remains in the Technical Sp ecifica tions hav e a supporti ng Basis which addresses five separate que s tions. (52 Fed. Reg. 3791.)

We generally support the guidance provided in this regard .

We suggest, however, that the Commission clarify that, to the extent previously approved Technical Specifications remain unchanged following application of the Interim Policy Statement, it would be unnecessary to address seriatim each of the questions posed. This is not to suggest that licensees should not review unchanged Technical Specific ations to assure consistency with modified provisions. Rathe r , licensees should be allowed to state they have performed such a review with respect to any unchanged provisions and, th e r e by , obviate t he need to address the listed qu es tions, in effect relyin g on prior Commission approvals, where appropriate. We otherwise have no comments on the five questions present ed .

F. Additional Views of Commissioner Asselstine In addition to our comments pr ese nted above on the proposed rule, we provide below comments on certain of the additional views of Commissioner Asselstin e. We believe that Commissioner Asselstine's concerns are either already a dequately addressed by the Interim Policy Statem ent or will be addressed in a separate context.

First , Commissioner Asselstine would withhold Commissi on approval of changes in testing and surveillance interva l s a nd allowed outage times until licensee maintenance programs are strengthened . Commissioner Asselstine presumes either t h at exis t ing maintenance programs are somehow deficient or , if n o t deficient, should be strengthened to the extent that chan g e s t o the above provisions under the Interim Policy Statement may be affected by maintenance activities . As to the first pre mise ,

even assuming it were correct, th e Commission certainly possesses adequate authority to assure that individual licensees are properly implementing their approved maintenance programs . Th u s ,

there is no present justification for withholding , generically ,

application of the Interim Policy Statement to aspects of Technical Specifications wh e n they have been deemed appropriate for revision by both the Commission, its Staff , and industry review groups after extensive review .

Further , to the extent testing and surveillance intervals are changed pursuant to the Interim Policy Statement , the Co mmissi on has provided that careful review of those changes be performed (see Question 5 regarding Technical Specification Bases ). Thus ,

licensees must demonstrate , and th e Commission must agree , that s u ch changes do not adversely affect the public health and safety. Accordingly , we do not ag r ee with Commissioner Asselstine ' s suggestion that c hanges to Technical Specifications in the above ar e as be condition e d on improved maintenance programs.

Commissioner Asselstin e also would strength e n the Section 50.59 review proce s s befor e p er mi tting a pplication of the Interim Policy Statement . We submit that anticipat e d industry and Commission reviews of this area, coupled with a projected elevation of Commission oversight both of individual Section 50 . 59 reviews and Section 5 0 . 5 9 programs in c onnection with the review of modifications to Tec hnic a l Specifications pursuant to the Interim Policy Statement (see 52 Fed. Reg . 3792) , provide substantial assurance that S e ction 50 . 59 reviews will be adequately performed . The pendency of these efforts do not justify withholding implementation of the Policy Stateme nt.

Accordingly, we do not concur with Commissioner Asselstine ' s comments in this regard.

Finally, Commissioner Asselstine would treat failures to meet safety provisions in the FSAR and "other such controlled documents" in the same mann e r as failures to comply with Technical Specifications. Commi s sioner As se lstine apparently presumes that that Commission au t ho r ity to e nforce licensee commitments contaiged in th e FSAR a nd r e li e d on by the NRC is somehow deficient. To th e co n tra ry , th e Co mmission possesses

~/ The nature of Commis s ion er Asse l stine 's c onc e rn rega r ding "other such controlled d oc um e nts" is un c lear . Documents (Footnote 5 continu e d on next page)

appropriate enforcement authority with respect to such licensing basis commitments in the FSAR. (See 10 C.F.R. Part 2 ,

Appendix C, §IV.E.; see also Long~land Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB - 788 , 20 NRC 1102, 1124-26 (198 4) ). We see no justification for altering the Commission's practice in this area.

III. CONCLUSION With the above-described modifications, we support issuance in final form of the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements.

Respectfully submitted, (Footnote 5 continued from previous page) which clearly are part of the licensing basis, as is the FSAR, would be subject to Commission enforcement authority. To the extent documents are not part of the licensing basis, they would not represent a commitment necessary to bring the plant into conformance with the rules, regulations, and orders of the the NRC, or the license. Thus, the enforceability of those documents would properly be limited in that t he NRC does not rely upon those documents to assure sat i sfaction of applicable requirements . To the extent Commi s sioner Asselstine would suggest otherwise, we respectfully disagree.

JU(;f(fT eRDPQSED .

IIUM6tK PR -.6<J, @

(ff,Z,F£.J7?V ocH.:KETED USNRC STATE OF ILLINOIS

• a? MR 30 P4 :11 DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE SPRINGFIELD 62704 (217) 546-8100 TERRY R. LASH D IRECTOR March 27, 1987 The Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors; 52 Fed. Reg. 3788 - 3792 (Feb. 6, 1987)

The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IONS) hereby submits its comments on the above-referenced Interim Policy Statement concerning improvements of the Technical Specifications for nuclear power reactors. IONS is the lead state agency for regulating radioactive materials and assuring radiation protection in Illinois.

IONS commends the U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for taking the initiative to improve the current Technical Specifications. IONS agrees with NRC that "clarifications of the scope and purpose of Technical Specifications will provide useful guidance to both the NRC and industry. 11 (p. 3789) IONS also agrees that the Technical Specifications should include only 11 those conditions or limitations upon reactor operations that are necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety." (p. 3780)

IONS believes, however, that the Policy Statement, while a good start, is not sufficient to achieve NRC's objectives. First, the three criteria provided in the Policy Statement have been drafted to exclude from the Technical Specifications all technical matters that are not of controlling importance in the prevention of accidents or the mitigation of the consequences of accidents. The result is to define narrowly the matters to be included in the Technical Specifications. Some requirements important to public health and safety, however, could be excluded from the Technical Specifications as a result of the application of the three criteria. NRC recognized this deficiency and attempted to address it in the Policy Statement by providing that, in addition to the material required to be maintained in the Technical Specifications pursuant to the three criteria, licensees should:

APR - 3 1987 f.cknowledged by card ......*.*** *** u.-.

u, . NUCLfA~ ~t~' LI' RY OMMISSIOB OOCKET. ~ n ,r. ' 'lCE SECT ION

~tfti,.tk r.

o pie.s f.tJ s)z~_

Add 'I

. -. z;,

ecid 01  ; 6 '9s,17~

• *

• retain in their Technical Specifications LCOs [Limiting Conditions for 11 Operation], action statements, and Surveillance Requirements for the following systems (as applicable) which operating experience and probabilistic risk assessment have generally shown to be important to public health and safety:

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/Isolation Condenser, Residual Heat Removal (RHR),

Standby Liquid Control (SBLC), and Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT). 11 (Policy Statement at p. 3791).

IONS agrees that the above systems should be included in the Technical Specifications. However, future operating experience and refinements in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment methods will in all likelihood reveal other structures, systems, and components which escape the three criteria provided in the Policy Statement. Therefore, rather than attempting to list all individual structures, systems and components which do not fit a narrow criterion, but which must be included in the Technical Specifications, the Commission should add a fourth, general criterion. This criterion should include:

Process variables, structures, systems or components that are elements of a primary success path of a safety sequence (including support and actuation systems) that are necessary during any anticipated operational sequence.

In addition to imposing this criterion, IONS recommends that before it implements the policy expressed in the Policy Statement, NRC develop and submit for public comment the standards it will use to evaluate amendment requests based on the stated criteria. These standards should include a complete description of the analytical methods used to test the effect of the removal of a specification, and a description of the decision process to determine which other document will include the specification.

Also before implementing this policy, NRC should clarify the status of plant documents, such as Final Safety Analysis Reports, to which current Technical Specifications would be relocated. While some of the current requirements could appropriately be relocated to an unenforceable document, others must be relocated to documents which are as binding as the Technical Specifications. In this regard IO NS agrees with Commissioner Asselstine's concern that "this interim policy weakens the Commission's enforcement options for some important safety requirements now contained in the Technical Specifications." (p. 3792) IONS recommends that NRC abstain from implementation of this Policy Statement until it has promulgated the rules necessary for implementation.

IONS has not yet had an opportunity to review the February 7, 1986, memorandum from the Acting Director for Operations to the Commissioners

(

Subject:

Test Application of TSIP Technical Specification Selection Criteria), which was referenced by Commissioner Asselstine in his comments.

The Department requested a copy of this memorandum by telephone. This informal request was denied on the grounds that the document could possibly be

characterized as a "pre-decision" document. In a separate letter IONS has requested a copy of this document. After reviewing this document, the Department may amend its comments.

S1ncerel~

L i~;~:

ror Lasi TRL:sp cc: David C. Fischer Technical Specifications Coordination Branch, Div. of Human Factors Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations

!iY!iTEM ENERGY RE!iDURCE!i, INC.

UIVER D. KINGSLEY. JR

87 t1AR 30 Al 1

35 Vice President Nuclear Operations March 27, 1987 OFFICE CF S: t,hc. f ARY DOCKET ING &. SEr VICL BRANCH U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29 Comments on Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements AECM-87/0069 System Energy Resources, Inc. (SERI), holder of Operating License NPF-29 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1, is submitting by this letter comments on the NRC Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (Federal Register Vol . 52 No. 25 dated February 6, 1987).

SERI endorses the comments submitted by the Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group regarding the subject policy statement and is encouraged by the NRC's initiative in the technical specification improvement matters. SERI is committed to programs that will provide improvements to the current industry technical specifications.

Consideration should be given to expanding the Policy Statement to include the Design Features and Administrative Controls sections of the Technical Specifications. Since these sections are required by 10 CFR 50.36, criteria should be established to determine content. Most of the design features provisions could be included in system or component specifications or the FSAR. Most or all of the administrative control provisions could be included in the FSAR or plant procedures. Consideration should be given to deletion of these two sections from 10 CFR 50.36 requirements and relocating the requirements as discussed above.

Control of the Techni cal Specification Bases should be addressed in the Policy Statement. The Bases are not part of the Technical Specifications per 10 CFR 50.36. However, as a matter of NRC practice, changes to the Bases are presently processed and approved as though they were formal license amendments.

SERI proposes that the Bases be deleted from the operating license and controlled under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 . Utility control of the Bases should be similar to control and update provisions for the FSAR.

P O BOX 23070 I JACKSON. MISSISSIPPI 39225-3070 I (601) 960-9600 A Middle South Ut1l1t1es Company APR J16AECM87031901 - 1 ..... - 3 198i CJ\,knowledged by card ....**.**. , . , ***** -~

C

'Pc!t a:~ ;* 3/47i - - -

Copie:;

. z__

Add'I L *p*

Special f I ;c!4S-, 7~

AECM-87/0069 Page 2 Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to provide these comments.

Please feel free to direct any questions concerning these comments to my office.

0DK:bms cc: Mr. T. H. Cloninger Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. N. s. Reynolds Mr. H. L. Thomas Mr. R. C. Butcher Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., N. W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 J16AECM87031901 - 2

\)Ut.:i<ET NUMottt pR_ )2}

RBQPQSEO iW1E .;,

(52 t:=£~//fF Pennsylvania Power & Light C Two North Ninth Street

• Allentown , PA 18101

• 21 MAR 2 5 1987

'87 MAR 30 p 1 :52 Harold W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations 215/770-7502 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION COMMENTS ON INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS PLA-2827 FILES R41-2, Al7-ll

Reference:

Federal Register Notice 52FR3788, dated February 6, 1987.

Dear Mr. Chilk:

The purpose of this letter is to provide Pennsylvania Power & Light Company's comments on the referenced interim policy statement on Technical Specifications. Our comments are provided with reference to the appropriate section of the Federal Register notice for your convenience.

General Comments We fully support the intent of the interim policy statement. Moreover, we would like to express our gratitude for the opportunity to interact (via the AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specification Improvements) with the NRC staff who developed the policy. It is our belief that this interaction was extremely worthwhile in providing insights to both parties with respect to the objectives each were attempting to attain; the absence of this type of insight has historically been a barrier to reaching common goals and has resulted in the compromise positions that are the direct cause of problems like the current Standard Technical Specifications (STS).

One area we encourage more explicit wording on in the final policy statement is how the NRC staff will be directed to use the policy in evaluating new issues as potential Technical Specifications. As noted in the Background section of the Federal Register notice, a lack of well defined criteria for what should be included in the Technical Specifications coupled with the "Carte Blanche" provided to the NRC in 10CFR50.36 resulted in an uncontrolled increase in the volume of the STS. In order to avoid a recurrence of this, we recommend that the final policy statement include provisions for requiring the APR - 3 19&

,J . .....*.**********

6. NfJ("L F P oocnrn C,  :::

[

p SI "1f Copies _;. ,

Ad,l ' I - .

Special Di

PLA-2827 FILES R41-2, Al7-ll Mr. Samuel J. Chilk NRC staff to use the criteria in evaluating future additional Technical Specifications that they intend to promulgate. The interim policy statement seems to implicitly require this, but we feel that it is inappropriate to leave this particular issue up for interpretation.

We also encourage the Commission to take action on a parallel path to proceed with rulemaking which codifies the criteria in the policy statement. We believe that taking action in this fashion will provide sufficient time to accomplish the objective of testing the criteria.

The Commission's Policy We are in full agreement with the purpose of Technical Specifications as defined in this section. However, we are concerned with the lack of flexibility provided to propose changes. The policy specifies that first priority will be given to licensees whose applications are based on revised STS, that single LCO's cannot be amended without consideration of all LCO's, and that amendments must incorporate all terms and provisions of the policy statement (eg. Bases improvement). This requirement is provided but not justified. We believe that it is based on the perception that the policy statement will be used selectively if a package deal is not required. It is not PP&L's intent to overlook any change that is necessary to ensure safe operation at Susquehanna SES. For practical reasons, we believe that other options exist which would provide greater flexibility in making changes before the Herculean effort of completing an STS, getting it approved by NRC, making it plant-specific and going through the intentionally arduous internal and external license amendment process for every LCO is completed: Examples are:

1. Specify that a section must be fully completed rather than the entire book

- including bases for the section.

2. Specify that a subdivision of LCO's based on a safety function can be proposed to be amended. For example, the Primary Containment Isolation function could be amended by completing all policy provisions associated with all specifications related to the function. Such a breakdown in most cases is self evident.

3. Specify that individual LCO's can be modified only with a commitment to a reasonable schedule to complete the balance of the program - this may be difficult to implement, but should be considered as an option.

Whatever option is chosen, we understand provisions would have to be included for future alignment with the vendor STS as appropriate, if the vendor STS for the affected specifications were not already completed.

Other options surely ex ist; one or more palatable to the Commission should be proposed in the final policy statement in the interest of expediting industry's ability to utilize the policy. Without this flexibility, this policy will not be available for use to some utilities for a significant period of time - probably on the order of years, not months.

PLA-2827 FILES R41-2, Al7-ll Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Commissioner Asselstine's Views A common thread appears to run through each of the four issues raised by the Commissioner. He seems to believe that unless an item is included in the Technical Specifications, it will not receive proper maintenance nor will it be enforceable. This is the type of philosophy that allowed the STS to evolve from its intended purpose to the voluminous assortment of requirements of varying importance to the operator that we have to deal with today. The problems expressed by Commissioner Asselstine should be stated in a more explicit fashion and then resolved directly as required. The interim policy statement should not be held hostage to the resolution of other issues.

We appreciate the opportunity to express these comments; if you have questions on them, please contact Mr. R. Sgarro at (215) 770-7916.

Very truly yours, H. W. Keiser Vice President - Nuclear Operations cc: NRC Document Control Desk (original)

NRC Region I Mr. L. R. Plisco - NRC Resident Inspector Mr. M. C. Thadani - NRC Project Manager

l)O. KH NUMBER PR eBOPO~D RULE -

(t,/l !=£. .,3?FV VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 DOGKETED USN~C W. L. STEWART V1cE PRESIDENT lJ7 HAR 30 A11 :27 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF Sr. Cr-.:: ~*A;; 't March 23, 1987 DOCKET ING & 5!:.t< VICI.

BRANCH Secretary of the Commission Serial No.87-071 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY COMMENTS ON THE NRC POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS We have reviewed the subject Policy Statement as provided _in the Federal Register, volume 52, number 25, pages 3788 through 3792, dated February 6, 1987 and offer the following general comments. We are generally pleased with the Policy Statement. The NRC Staff and the AIF have worked very hard to bring Technical Specifications Improvements to this point and we commend them for their efforts. We are very supportive of the goals of the Policy Statement and are looking forward to a practical and effective program implementation. Our specific comments are contained in the Enclosure to this letter.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this Policy Statement.

Very truly yours, Enclosure cc: Mr. Thomas E. Tipton - Atomic Industrial Forum Mr. David C. Fischer Technical Specifications Coordination Branch Division of Human Factors Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations APR - 3 1987 Acknowleuc,ed .:iy card . ................~

wru TO y COMMISSIO~

.,, -1= S"CTION r,- c c::- *:v-, "'Y

,osfm r!: 3/z.~

Ccp1- I dd' I aci I  ;?;1)~~-~

Enclosure VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY COMMENTS ON THE NRC POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

1. The Policy Statement identifies three objective criteria for defining the scope of Technical Specifications. Our comment is that we concur that it is appropriate to use criteria to control the content of the Technical Specifications. We endorse the criteria contained in the Policy Statement and concur that they focus attention on those plant conditions most important to safety.

2. The Policy Statement states that "Licensees are encouraged to implement a program to upgrade their Technical Specifications . . . . " Our comment is that we endorse having this as a voluntary program. We believe that this feature of the Policy Statement will help insure that an objective and productive process will be established for implementation; and that the resulting improvements to the Technical Specifications will be attractive and likely to be widely accepted by the industry.

3. The Policy Statement states that "The Commission does not intend that these criteria be used as the basis for relocation of individual LCOs." Our comment is that this seems to be unduely inflexible. As noted in the Background section, since 1969 there has been a trend towards including in Technical Specifications essentially all Commission requirements governing the operation of nuclear power reactors. Because of this, it is appropriate that the Policy Statement make some provision that would allow licensees to streamline their Technical Specifications without necessarily having to incorporate all of the terms and provisions of the Policy Statement.

4. The Policy Statement states that "The NRC will give first priority in its Technical Specifications improvements efforts to the review and approval of the revised STS and the plant specific license amendment applications based on them." Our comment is that we endorse this position. The Westinghouse Owners Group and the Virginia Electric and

• Power Company have made a very substantial resource commitment to develop revised Technical Specifications based on this Policy Statement. We have established an agressive schedule for our program. We are pleased to see that the NRC has identified this as a high priority program.

5. The Policy Statement states "Approved short term Technical Specifications improvements will be included in the revised STS." Our comment is that the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) report titled "Technical Specifications Improvements" which was issued in October, 1985 identified several short term improvements to the Technical Specifications. Since that time the AIF has worked with the NRC Staff to implement these improvements. However, to date we are not aware that any of the short term improvements have been

approved by the NRC. We are concerned that this situation may be allowed to persist. We recommend that the Policy Statement identify the specific short term improvements under consideration and also specify a schedule to resolve these issues.

6. The Policy Statement states that "The Staff will initiate in parallel with issuance of this Policy Statement the rule changes necessary to fully implement this Policy Statement." Our comment is that the Policy Statement neither elaborates on which rules are intended to be changed nor does it propose or suggest a schedule for the implementation of these rule changes.

We suggest that the Policy Statement would be strengthened by being more specific in these two areas since they will definitely have a significant effect on the work being done by the vendor owners groups and the NRC Staff, and ultimately affect the plant specific license amendment applications.

7. The Policy Statement states that "Any changes to a licensees' Technical Specifications to apply this Policy Statements criteria will be made by the license amendment process prior to implementation." Our comment is that the Policy Statement does not provide guidance on the scope and level of detail of information that will be required to support these changes. We encourage the continued dialogue among the NRC staff and the vendor owners groups on this issue. We are hopeful that a practical solution will be adopted that would encourage implementation by the licensees.

pol statement

Westinghouse Power Systems

• Box 355 Electric Corporation '87 MAR 30 Pl2 :30 Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 15230-0355 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary of the Comrnission 1717 H Street Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

Westinghouse Comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (Federal Register Notice 52FR3788, dated February 6, 1987)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Westinghouse is pleased to submit comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements. Westinghouse commends the NRC for recognizing the need for Technical Specification improvements and initiating the actions which resulted in issuance of the Policy Statement per the published schedule. The following general comrnents are provided. Specific comrnents on the Policy Statement are contained in Attachment A.

The Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) and Westinghouse have since 1982, been active in Technical Specification improvement activities. These activities have focused on enhancing plant safety while improving plant operability. Most recently the WOG and Westinghouse have participated in the AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specification Improvements. This Subcormnittee has worked with the NRC to identify a process for making improvements to Technical Specifications which enhance the operators ability to maintain safe plant operation. Westinghouse believes that implementation of the Policy Statement will result in such improvements.

Westinghouse supports the overall language and intent of the Interim Policy Statement. The Policy Statement generally includes and endorses the findings and recormnendations of the AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specification Improvements. In particular the Policy Statement includes criteria for determining the content of Technical Specifications, encourages industry involvement in the generation of improved Technical Specifications, and recognizes utility control of some important aspects of plant operation.

APR - 3 1987 Acknowled ged by card ..........*...***-. -

U. S. ** ,..,

• P ISSJOM uor:. ON e

Po< ..,.,rk 3/27 Co;:,1 e.s (

Add'I Sp" i..J /11Js, "f.stii:Z:,

Mr

• S. J . Chilk Page Two Westinghouse agrees with the need for Technical Specification improvements and acknowledges that implementation of the Policy Statement should result in these needed improvements. This process can be enhanced however, by using the criteria in the resolution of generic and plant specific issues now before the NRC.

A significant commitment of both industry and NRC resources will be necessary to implement the Policy Statement. The industry has demonstrated such a commitment through the authorization of aggressive Owners Groups' programs. It is vital that the NRC make similar commitments.

In conclusion, Westinghouse supports the overall language and intent of the Interim Policy Statement. Westinghouse agrees with the Commission's description of the purpose of Technical Specifications. The Commission is encouraged to commit the necessary NRC resources to assure a timely review of the Owners Groups' revised Technical Specifications. Westinghouse encourages continuation of the working relationship between the AIF Subcommittee, Owners Groups and the staff in addressing implementation of the Policy Statement.

Very truly yours, W. J. Johnson, Manager Nuclear Safety Department RLJ/kk Attachment cc: E. J. Butcher D. C. Fischer

Attachment A Specific Westinghouse Comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements

1. Westinghouse agrees with the NRC's description of the purpose of Technical Specifications and further agrees that the three criteria capture those constraints on design and operation of nuclear power plants that are derived from the plant safety analysis report and belong in technical specifications in accord with this purpose.

2. Westinghouse agrees that implementation of the Policy Statement should be on a voluntary basis.

3. The top of the second column on page 3790 contains an open parenthetical statement which should be corrected as follows:

below (as clarified by the supporting discussion for individual license amendments)

4. The Policy Statement states that the Commission does not intend that the criteria be used as the basis for relocation of individual LCOs.

Westinghouse interprets this to mean that the Commission intends that the criteria will be applied to the all of the LCOs in the Technical Specifications and not selectively to a limited set of LCOs. The Commission has, in conjunction with short term Technical Specification improvement activities, granted amendments to individual plant Technical Specifications relocating certain LCOs to documents controlled by the licensee independently of the criteria. Additionally, the criteria may demonstrate, in a generic sense, that some LCOs clearly have no basis for inclusion in Technical Specifications. The Commission should allow these and similar LCOs to be relocated from licensee Technical Specifications regardless of whether a licensee implements the Policy Statement. It is proposed therefore, that the Policy Statement be amended as follows:

The Commission will entertain requests based on the criteria below (as clarified by the supporting discussions for individual license amendments) that evaluate all of the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) foran individual plant to determine which LCOs should be included in the Technical Specifications. The Commission does not intend that these criteria be applied selectively to a limited set of LCOs of the Technical Specifications but rather to the entire Technical Specification. Licensees choosing not to implement this Policy Statement may request however, the relocation of individual LCOs as short term Technical Specifications improvements independently of this Policy Statement.

5. The intended condition for removal of an LC0 using the criteria is the LC0 fails to meet all of the criteria. If one (or more) criterion is met then the LCO must remain in the Technical Specifications. The Policy Statement however, allows LCOs which fail to meet any one criterion to be rEI!loved. In recognition of this difference, it is proposed that the sentence, "LC0s which fail to meet any one or more of the criteria below may be removed from the Technical Specifications and relocated to other licensee-controlled documents, such as the FSAR or licensee procedures." be revised as follows:

LC0s which fail to meet all three of the criteria below may be removed from .*.

6. It is proposed that the sentence, "The following criteria delineate those constraints on design and operation of nuclear power plants that are derived from the plant safety analysis report and below in Technical Specifications

" be revised as follows:

The following criteria delineate those constraints on design and operation of nuclear power plants that are derived from the plant safety analysis report and belong in Technical Specifications *.*

7. It is proposed that Criterion 2 be modified as follows:

A process variable that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or Transient Analysis that either assumes ...*

8. The NRC is encouraged to continue research in methods to make better use of risk and reliability considerations for refining generic Technical Specification requirements resulting from application of this Policy Statement. The NRC is further encouraged to involve the industry in this research to the extent necessary to reach industry consensus.

9. Westinghouse proposes that the Policy Statement be amended to address the following three issues:

a. It is proposed that the Policy Statement be amended to specifically state that any proposed rule issued for comment for the purpose of codifying the Policy Statement will include the three criteria (or their equivalent) contained in the Policy Statement. Any such proposed rule should require use of the criteria for evaluating all proposed additions to the Technical Specifications occurring after issuance of the rule.

b. The Policy Statement recognizes that certain amendments to the regulations may be necessary before the content of Technical Specifications can be limited entirely to the purpose defined in the Policy Statement. To address this the Policy Statement contains a commitment that the staff will initiate in parallel with the Policy Statement the rule changes necessary to fully implement the Policy Statement. Westinghouse while agreeing with the need to initiate rulemaking, proposes that the Policy Statement be amended to specifically refer to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.12 which allow exemptions from the requirements of the regulations, to encourage implementation of the Policy Statement prior to rulemaking

c. The Policy Statement encourages the licensees to upgrade their Technical Specifications consistent with the Policy Statement and states that NRC resources will be allocated for this purpose. The Policy Statement does not however, direct the staff to begin to use the criteria to address issues now before the staff. It is proposed that the Policy Statement be amended to direct the staff to use the criteria contained in the Policy Statement to evaluate all proposed additions to existing Technical Specifications.

The following amendment to the Policy Statement is proposed to address the above concerns:

The Staff will initiate in parallel with issuance of this Policy Statement the rule changes necessary to fully implement this Policy Statement. Pro sed rule chan es will include the three criteria (or their equivalent contained in this Policy Statement requiring their use for evaluating all future proposed additions to the Technical Specifications. In the interim, licensees may request exemptions in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.12 from those regulations which prevent full implementation of this Policy Statement. Also in the interim, the staff is directed by this Policy Statement to make use of the criteria contained in this Policy Statement for evaluating all proposed additions to existing generic and plant specific Technical Specifications.

10. The Policy Statement sentence,

" ... if Technical Specifications requirements are relocated to plant procedures, then the revised Technical Specifications must contain administrative controls to ensure that they are appropriately maintained and implemented."

is ambiguous. It is not clear whether administrative controls are to address the relocated requirements or the procedures to which they are relocated. The Administrative Controls section of the Technical Specifications currently includes requirements for the maintenance and revision of procedures that are adequate to ensure that any requirements relocated to procedures are properly controlled. In recognition of this, it is proposed that this statement be amended as follows:

... if Technical Specifications requirements are relocated to plant procedures, then the revised Technical Specifications must contain administrative controls to ensure that the applicable plant procedures are appropriately maintained and implemented.

11. The Policy Statement does not include a detailed discussion of the license amendment process as it will apply to plant specific implementation of the Policy Statement. Because of the magnitude and complexity of the effort required for plant specific implementation and the importance of proper implementation, it is proposed that the NRC work with the AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specifications Improvements and the various Owners Groups to identify an effective implementation process. The process identified should address the following:

a. 10 CFR 50.91 and 50.92 It appears that the preferred method to address 50.91 and 50.92 is to have one no significant hazards evaluation for the entire Technical Specification submittal as opposed to individual no significant hazards evaluations for each change from the existing Technical Specifications. However, use of this approach should not preclude isolating a few of the changes for separate treatment.

b. Licensee defense of submittal of new Plant Specific Technical Specifications (PSTS)

It appears that the preferable method for defense of the PSTS is to reference the NRC SER for the new Generic Standard Technical Specifications (GSTS) and justify only differences between the new PSTS and the new GSTS as opposed to justifying every change from the old PSTS to the new PSTS.

What proof will be required on the part of the licensees to show that the new GSTS or portions thereof are directly applicable to their plant?

Will each licensee be required to certify by letter to the NRC that the PSTS when submitted are correct for their plant?

Portions of existing LCOs that are retained in the new GSTS may be deleted as being inappropriate or incorrect. For these cases, will the licensee be required to follow the guidelines in the Policy Statement for changing or deleting requirements relocated fran Technical Specifications or will referencing the NRC SER for the new GSTS which includes the deletion be the only defense required?

c. Details of the transition fran the old to the new PSTS once the new PSTS is approved A transition process should be identified which allows a smooth change over from the old to the new specifications once the new PSTS is approved by the NRC.

12. The Policy Statement contains dissenting remarks made by Commissioner Asselstine and asks for comments on the remarks. The following are comments on the remarks by Commissioner Asselstine.

a. Commissioner Asselstine recommends that the Policy Statement contain an explicit statement that the Commission will not entertain changes in testing and surveillance intervals and allowed outage times until licensee maintenance programs are strengthened. This remark implies that all existing licensee maintenance programs are somehow inadequate. Westinghouse believes this to be an incorrect and unfair assessment of the facts. Accordingly, Westinghouse does not recommend incorporation of such a statement into the Policy Statement.

b. Commissioner Asselstine remarks that the 10 CFR 50.59 review process be strengthened before licensees are given the flexibility afforded the interim Policy Statement. The Policy Statement as written requires the 50.59 review process to be supplemented by administrative controls prior to licensee implementation of the Policy Statement.

Additionally, the Policy Statement states that the NRC will give increased attention to changes made pursuant to 50.59. These activities should ensure that the licensees will adequately control any requirements relocated from the Technical Specifications. Westinghouse does not recommend incorporation of such a requirement into the Policy Statement.

c. Commissioner Asselstine uses the results of the test application of the criteria to the Technical Specifications to question the adequacy of the criteria. Westinghouse is of the opinion that in conjunction with the other elements of the Policy Statement the criteria are adequate to determine the content of Technical Specifications. The test application of the criteria referred to by Commissioner Asselstine was for the purpose of determining the viability of continued develoµnent and eventual use of the criteria and not for finalizing the content of the Technical Specifications. The test application was not as exhaustive an exercise as formal application will be and did not include docketing nor formal NRC review or approval. Formal application of the criteria by the various Owners Groups and licensees will require a more extensive defense and justification process than that used for the test case and will require review and approval by the NRC. Westinghouse believes that formal application will prove the adequacy of the criteria and so allay the concerns of Commissioner Asselstine. Items relocated fran the Technical Specifications by formal application of the criteria, as AC and DC power sources may be, will have a justifiable basis and will rightly fall under licensee control.

JOC<<ET NUMBER R p Af.{jl) cs~ ;=,e ~?FO OOPOSfD 8111.& pa DOCKET((;

USNRC MARVIN LEW..,

7801 ROOSEVELT BLVD. #87 t1AR 27 AlQ :46

.P.HllA., PA -191-52 OFF. IC[ OF :E.,,1\-. ! Ali'(

DOCK ETING 1-. SERViCL BRANC Chairman Lando Zech United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Dear Mr. Chairman :

P lease accept this letter as my comments on 10 CFR Part 50 Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Plants. My general comments include

1. Nothing in this policy statement imp r oves t h e tec h nical e ecificc:1tic,ns ar1cl much in this pol icy statement can lead to the adoption of changes in technical specifications which can endanger the health and safety of the public.

2. The Proposed Rule omits the relationship, if any, of the backfit rule with the proposed changes or with this policy statement. Will a backfit analysis have to be done on every TS change, some TS changes, or none? The Proposed Rule does not seem to contain any criteria for invoking or ignoring the backfit 1-u 1 e.

3. Many unresolved issues remain. This Proposed Rule reads like an invitation to avoid facing unresolved safety issues by reclassifying them into FSAR, QA, or other mechanisms which would not require a license amendment or prior NRC approval. CA I F ,

TSIP recommendation (1)) Th e invitation to reduce an unremitting problem such as safety interactions, loss of off-site power, even chugging l oad in Mark I containments could be avoided as a safety

~ lated issue by relec;;Jating the pi-oblem tc, the FSAR c,r Qi:-!\

W- as.;t-1baskE:'t.

4. The present state of affairs shows that NRC review and overview is lacking to non-existent. The farces and harass ment of NRC inspectors at Marble Hill, Zimmer, S6uth Texas Project, WPPSS, Shearon Harris show that the NRC inspection is a farce and totally inadequate. This Proposed Rule wi l l weaken the inadequate NRC inspection even further by allowing the Licensee to reclassify any embarrassing or deficient actions out of the sight of the NRC, FEMA, Local and State Authorities and anybody else that they want to avoid.

Specifically there are many problems. Commissioner Asselstine points out that AC and DC power supplies would not be covered by the TS while the plant is in the decay mode. Please note how similar this description comes to the description of the Chernobyl configuration. (Nature V 323 4 Sep. 86.) Chernobyl was at low power which in output is close to a decay mode. It was simulating problems with power supply which is similar to not having AC and DC power supplies.

APR 1 1987 Acknowledged by card . ....* , ............, ** r

(} :~: - *:. 'i\ . 1 U.S. NUCLEM ~ECULAfORY C(;,MMISSIOH (

DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION om-:- ,. :: ' *~ - ~~:.? ET ARY C . ** c ;, * ' ' .- .. *,~N l" -5 Pos trnar', ::' . ,,, !5 /zl/,,

- . - 1 --

Copic, ;:

Add 'I C

,' -z_ -~

Special D;"' ' :_-i , /,iJJ:J,k~~

The NRC is proposing to l egitimatize the very same errors that lead to an accident at Chernobyl. The example gleaned from Commissioner Asselstine*s Dissenting Opinion does not stand alone. The problem of the PJM dispatcher and the Kiev controller calling for more power at the same time as the reactor should not have been on line has not been addressed in the Technical specifications. Requiring the operators to produce energy on demand means that the operators are not in control of the reactor. Th e dispatcher is. What the Technical specifications cry out for is not elimination but strengthening to include many of A ese~ f ,Ac tcq-s t,,Jh i c:h have beE:*n and are continuing to b£;:, i gnc,r-ed

, spite their contribution to two accidents; one here , one in Che~i-noby 1 .

The Federal Register on the Proposed Rule refers to SECY 86-10 as a major source document, but does not include same. The public: is reduced to commenting on the Proposed Rule without the benefit of the source documentation. This omission is very unfair and expensive to individual citizen commenters. I, respectfully, request that the FR Notice be reissued with the SECY 86-10 included and a new comment period be started.

The three criterion ignore many, many dangers. One specific danger is the electromagnetic pulse tests aboard the Empress II.

Calvert Cliffs is in a direct line of sight to the barge. Any error can cause the Calvert Cliffs instrumentation to malfunction as Calvert Cliffs is not hardened against EMP. The criterion ignore this danger completely as has the NRC and the Licensees.

A f-=<esti-icting the T!::1 to the::.> "pi-imai-y suc:cc::.>ss path of a si~fety

~ quence" avoids the very n,?al problem of intE*i-c:\ctic,ns with non-safety related equipment. The reactor at Indian Point was under several feet of water from a leak in non-safety related water supply. Luckily the reactor vessel suffered little damage and held up to the thermal stress of the difference of internal and external temperature. Interactions of non-safety related equipment need more attention. These interactions do not need a Proposed Rule which will allow the Licensees to avoid consideration of non-safety related interactions.

The omissions and commissions of inadequacies in this Proposed Rule is endless. I request that t h is Proposed Rule be taken back or eliminated. In the alternative, I suggest a longer comment period to allow the public to grasp the significance of this very dangerous Proposed Rule.

Respectfully Submitted,

~ ~ 57/ ~ MARVIN LEWIS 7801 ROOSEVELT BLVD. # 62 PHILA., PA 19152

opr.m NUMBER PR CP&L~~ R~,e Ji;~@

Carolina Power & Light Company DOCKET ED USNRC SERIAL: NLS-87 -068 l 0C_FR50.36 Mr. Sam uel J. Chilk MAR 2 3 1987 "87 MAR 27 A10 :49 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch COMMENTS ON THE INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

Dear Mr. Ch ilk:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) appreciates the opportunity to provide the NRC with our comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements. The Policy Statement was published in the Federal Register (52 FR3788) on February 6, 1987. Carolina Power & Light Company commends the NRC on recognizing the need to improve the Technical Specifications and for your efforts in issuing the Policy Statement.

Carolina Power & Light Company is actively involved in industry programs which are committed to implement the Policy Statement. Particularly, we have committed resources to the Westinghouse and BWR Owner's Groups and the AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specification Improvements. Furthermore, during the development of the Shearon Harris Plant Technical Specifications, CP&L aggressively pursued and obtained NRC approval for many short-term Technical Specificat10n improvements (i.e., removal of lengthy tables and fire protection Technical Specifications). Carolina Power & Light Company has also pursued many improvements in the Robinson and Brunswick Plant Technical Specifications by utilizing state- of-the-art techniques (i.e . , PRA methodology).

Carolina Power & Light Company is pleased that the NRC has established Technical Specification Improvements as a high priority program. Carolina Power & Light Company requests the NRC's consideration and prompt resolution of the enclosed comments to support issuance of the final Policy Statement. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Gregg A. Sinders at (919) 836-8168.

Yours very truly, GAS/lah (5162GAS)

Enclosure cc: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)

Mr. E. J. Butcher, Jr. (NRC)

Mr. H. R . Denton (NRC)

Mr. T. G. Dunning (NRC)

Mr. D. C. Fischer (NRC)

Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)

Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Dr. T. E. Murley (NRC)

Mr. C. E. Rossi (NRC)

Mr. J. H. Sniezak (NRC) 411 Fayetteville Street* P. 0 . Box 1551

• Raleigh , N. C. 27602 APR 1 1987 Ae~Mwledged by cci rd.~ .... .... , ** .,,,.. , , , ,

• U.S. NUCLEA-R R~GULATORY COMMISSIOS ooci<r:r ;-',;(; ll. :-~Wl CE SECT ION I *

• Ac:,r l IJ>ecial L' ,

Comments on the Interim Policy Statement of Technical Specification Improvements

l. The Commission specifically requested comments on the statement of the purpose of Technical Specifications which introduces the text of the Policy Statement.

Carolina Power & Light Company agrees with the Commission's description of the purpose of Technical Specifications.

2. Carolina Power & Light Company agrees with the three criteria in the Policy Statement and suggests that the Policy Statement be revised to require that the criteria be applied to all proposed additions to the Technical Specifications in the future.

3. Carolina Power & Light Company requests that the sentence in the second paragraph of the Policy Statement which states, "LCOs which fail to meet any one or more of the criteria below may be removed from the Technical Specifications ..* " be changed to "LCOs which fail to meet all three of the criteria below may be removed from the Technical Specifications ... "

4. Carolina Power & Light Company agrees that implementation of the Policy Statement should be voluntary. Issuance of the Policy Statement encourages our continued commitment of resources to industry Technical Specification Improvement Programs.

5. Carolina Power & Light Company agrees with the statement in the second paragraph of the Policy Statement which states, "The criteria will be applied to either standard or custom Technical Specifications."

6. Carolina Power & Light Company agrees with the Commission's commitment to work with industry to develop a standard for the conduct of 10CFR50.59 reviews.

Carolina Power & Light Company is an active participant in industry programs that are working toward this goal. The NUMARC Technical Subcommittee is following this activity. Therefore, this issue is being addressed by industry at this time.

7. The Commission specifically invited comments on whether it would be beneficial for licensees to be able to modify related portions of their LCOs (such as containment systems) without having to apply the terms and provisions of the Policy Statement to all LCOs. Carolina Power & Light Company requests that the Policy Statement be revised to allow more flexibility in the implementation of the Policy Statement.

This includes provisions that would allow licensees to improve their plant specific Technical Specifications without having to apply the terms and provisions of the Policy Statement to their entire Technical Specifications. Flexibility in implementation should allow plant s to use the Policy Statement as a basis to improve their current Technical Specifications to minimize the need for burdensome and unnecessary Technical Specifi cation changes (i.e., organization changes).

8. Carolina Power & Light Company encourages extending the Policy Statement to apply to other items that are unnecessarily included as part of operating licenses.

For example, Appendix B to licenses typically contains non-radiological Technical Specifications on Environmental Protection Plans that could be licensee controlled in the same manner as the Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual or Process Control Program. This would allow removal of the specific requirements currently contained in licenses.

(5162GAS / lah)

9. Carolina Power & Light Company requests that the NRC give a higher priority to the resolution of short-term items that have been identified to the NRC to allow for timely incorporation into the revised STS.

10. The Policy Statement states, "The staff will initiate in parallel with issuance of this Policy Statement the rule changes necessary to fully implement this Policy Statement." Carolina Power & Light Company urges the NRC to give priority to identifying and initiating the specific rule changes.

11. The Policy Statement states, "Any changes to a licensees' Technical Specifications to apply this Policy Statement criteria will be made by the license amendment process prior to implementation." The Policy Statement does not include an in-depth discussion of the scope and level of detail required for plant specific implementation of the Policy Statement. Carolina Power & Light Company requests the NRC to further discuss this matter with industry to assure that implementation will be attractive and encouraged.

(5162GAS / lah)

oorA<EI NUMBIRPR'

-'1Wf08f0 ill1li

---

-!Jo (/j)

I&?, .

(..ff£F~ .J?J?,fj

~!OWNERS GROUP DOCKETED USNRC

~-*u.,,.~

ouu-C........,

ANO-t o c - t . Z, J Toledo Edison COfflpany T e n - Vallay ~

Washlft1110n Pultlk UIIO

"'fHtr S"f'll'Y\

26 l'lortda - eo,por-crysu,1_,

TMl-t s,......

GPU - Co,pcw- Babcock & WIicox COfflpany S a c r - Municipal Ullllty Dlllrfct RanchoSeco

\' I working Together to Economically Provide Reliable and Safe Electri2Rf~~~ e'r ,\.*i Suite 220 March 23, 1987 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda , Maryland 20814 (301 ) 951-3344 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Subject:

B&W Owners Group Comments on Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors - (52 FR 3788, 2/06/87)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

The B&W Owners Group Technical Specification Subcommittee has reviewed the subject policy statement and offers the following comments.

The B&W Owners Group commends the NRC Staff for their efforts in the development and issuance of this interim policy statement. This issuance helps demonstrate a positive commitment by the NRC towards improving the overall quality of Technical Specifications and will serve as an important incentive for industry participation in programs to improve Technical Specifications.

- We agree with the overall message provided by this interim policy statement.

However , we are concerned with three aspects. First, we are concerned about the application of PRA to confirming the s e lec t ion requirements for inclusion in technical specification. PRA's are, in many respects, still in the developmental stage. There exists no clearly established acceptable methodology. There is not clear delineation as to what is important versus what is not. Judgements of a subjective nature are involved. The staff should provide guidance as to what it really wants in this area.

Second, we are concerned that many short term items, identified by the industry in 1985 are still open. These were identified as short term items because it was felt extensive technical justification was not required, nor was rulemaking. The staff has indicated that such items should be handled in owners group reports.

The B&W Owners Group as addressed several of these items in the recent submittal of BAW-1921 "Generic Technical Specifications, Surveillance, and Bases for B&W Operating Plants". We encourage staff review of this document.

Finally, the policy is silent with respect to use of PRA to relax allowable outage times or surveillance test intervals. We encourage the commitment of staff resources to act on the owners group submittals in hand as well as those plant specific requests.

Acknowledged by car ****

f ( I ... ~ I f *<I. *

0. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM! SSIOl'i DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE 0~ TYE S:CRETARY OF T1 : 1: er ~f, , .J, ! )S ION Postmarl, r , *,

Copies ;,

Add'! C Special c, _ I  :

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk March 23, 1987 Page 2 As a result of our efforts to date, we have identified several areas where speci-fic questions need to be addressed. We are in the process of resolving these with the staff. Our efforts have also provided insights into the overall technical specification improvement effort and are reflected in our comments on several elements of the Policy Stated included in the attachment to this letter.

We have also reviewed the comments letter provided by AIF and endorse its remarks.

Very truly yours, R. Gill, Chairman B&WOG Technic Specification Committee RLG/191/jgm xc: N.A. Rutherford Tom Tipton (AIF)

Pat Rogers (AP&L)

Dan Green (FPC)

Courtney Smyth (GPU)

Ron Colombo (SMIJD)

Bill Salyer (TVA)

Jerry Lammars (TED)

(8)

B&W OWNERS GROUP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SUBCOMMITTEE COMMENTS ON INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMJ;>ROVEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

1. COMMISSION POLICY: The purpose of Technical Specifications is to impose those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety by establishing those conditions of operation which cannot be changed without prior Commission approval and by identifying those features which are of controlling importance to safety.

B&WOG COMMENT: We agree with Commission Policy.

2. COMMISSION POLICY: Licensees are encouraged to implement a program to upgrade their Technical Specifications consistent with this purpose.

B&WOG COMMENT: We, as an Owners Group, have undertaken a program to create improved Generic Technical Specifications. Implementation by individual licensees is voluntary and should consider such benefits to be gained as well as costs to adopt perhaps new and different requirements.

The Staff needs to establish guidance relative to plant specific imple-mentation of generic standard technical specifications.

3. COMMISSION POLICY: The Commission will entertain requests based on the criteria below (as clarified by the supporting discussion) for individual license amendments that evaluate all of the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) for an individual plant to determine which LCOs should be included in the Technical Specifications.

B&WOG COMMENT: We endorse the criteria. We also believe that the selec-tion criteria should be applied to all proposed future additions to technical specifications. In fact, past generic technical specification requirements that are still not implemented should be reassessed using the selection criteria.

4. COMMISSION POLICY: The Commission does not intend that these criteria be used as the basis for relocation of individual LCO's.

B&WOG COMMENT: This policy implies that such short term improvements items as relocation of fire protection requirements can not be continued.

We believe the intent of the policy is to prevent "piece-meal" relocation of certain requirements without incorporation of improved style and format of specifications and improved bases. We believe this aspect should be clarified.

5. COMMISSION POLICY: However, it is expected that each of the nuclear steam supply system vendor owners groups will undertake the development of revised STS based on this Policy Statement.

B&WOG COMMENT: As noted above, the B&W Owners Group has undertaken such a program. In late February 1987, a topical report containing initial results of our program as well as supporting document were provided to the Staff. Our present plans are to present the staff completely revised generic technical specifications by the end of 1987. Timely NRC approval of this topical report will allow timely plant specific submittals and implementation.

6. COMMISSION POLICY: We encourage licensees to use the revised STS as the basis for their individual plant Technical Specifications.

B&WOG COMMENT: As noted above, plant specific implementation should remain voluntary, as many factors (including staff actions on initial requests) need to be considered.

7. COMMISSION POLICY: The NRC will give first priority in its Technical Specifications improvements efforts to the review and approval of the revised STS and the plant specific license amendment applications based on them.

B&WOG COMMENT: As noted above, timely approval of new generic tech-nical specification will allow timely plant specific submittals. We also encourage Staff review of short-term items (both generic and plant specific submittals) related to relaxation of allowable outage times and surveillance intervals.

8. COMMISSION POLICY: Approved short term Technical Specifications improve-ments will be included in the revised STS.

B&WOG COMMENT: The short term improvements should be included in the revised STS. However, at this time, there have been no short term improvements issued nor does it appear that there will be any improve-ments issued by the time the B&WOG submits revised Technical Specifi-cations. It is suggested that the NRC expend more effort in this area so short term improvements will be available for inclusion in the revised STS.

9. COMMISSION POLICY: The revised STS and individual license amendment requests that are submitted based on this Policy Statement should in-corporate all terms and provisions of the Policy Statement.

B&WOG COMMENT: We agree except that we have concerns relative to use of PRA and short term items.

10. COMMISSION POLICY: The following criteria delineate those constraints on design and operation of nuclear power plants that are derived from the plant safety analysis report and below in Technical Specifications in accord with 10CFR 50.36 and the purpose of Technical Specifications stated above.

B&WOG COMMENT: We endorse these selection criteria.

11. COMMISSION POLICY: In addition to those structures, systems, and com-ponents captured by the above criteria, it is the Commission's policy that licensees retain in their Technical Specifications LCOs, action statements, and Surveillance Requirements for the following systems (as applicable) which operating experience and probabilistic risk assessment have generally shown to be important to public health and safety:

o Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/Isolation Condenser, o Residual Heat Removal (RHR),

o Standby Liquid Control (SBLC), and o Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT).

B&WOG COMMENT: We will include the appropriate requirements for Residual Heat Removal in the generic technical specifications. Other items are not applicable to B&W plants.

12. COMMISSION POLICY: The Commission finds that risk evaluations are an appropriate tool for defining requirements that should be retained in Technical Specifications where including such requirements is consistent with the purpose of Technical Specifications as defined above.

B&WOG COMMENT: PRA's are, in many respects, still in the developmental stage as an analytical tool with respect to determining technical speci-fication content. This is evidenced by the ongoing NRC/Industry develop-ment efforts in the PRA area. The objectives of these efforts are to standardize the use of PRA by establishing appropriate guidelines regard-ing acceptance criteria, data sources and validity, and PRA complexity.

To date these issues have yet to be finalized. The primary applications of PRA techniques to technical specifications has been in the area of outage times and surveillance intervals. Very few applications have concentrated on determining content. This application is largely un-tried. Considering this, it is our recommendation that the use of PRA for determining the content of technical specifications be kept at a minimum.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply PRA to many requirements that might be relocated. Another concern is that STS are based on plant that is typical. PRA' s are plant specific. Application of "generic PRA insight" may not be appropriate on a plant specific basis.

13. COMMISSION. POLICY: The Commission expects that owners groups, in pre-paring their proposals to streamline the Standard Technical Specifica-tions, will utilize the available literature on risk insights and Proba-bilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs).

B&WOG COMMENT: The policy statement discussion is lacking in detail, as a result uncertainty will be added to the industry technical speci-fication programs. This uncertainty will manifest itself in the form of more poorly defined program scope, content, and cost, diminishing the attractiveness of the program and reducing the likelihood of wide accep-tance.

14. COMMISSION POLICY: This material should be employed to strengthen the technical bases for those requirements that remain in Technical Speci-fications, when applicable, and to verify that none of the requirements to be relocated contain constraints of prime importance in limiting the likelihood or severity of the accident sequences that are commonly found to dominate risk.

B&WOG COMMENT: The regulations required that Technical Specifications be derived from the plant's safety analysis. These safety analysis have been deterministic rather than probabilistic and serve as the licensing basis for the plant. As such, it is inappropriate to use PRA as a basis for Technical Specifications.

15. COMMISSION POLICY: Where such PRAs or surveys are available, they should be used to strengthen the Bases and screen those Technical Specifications to be relocated.

B&WOG COMMENT: Our concerns relative to the use of PRA's apply to the statement.

16. COMMISSION POLICY: The Bases should at a minilllu:m address the following questions and cite references to appropriate licensing documentation (e.g., FSAR, Topical Report) to support the Bases.

1. What is the justification for the Technical Specification, i.e.,

which criterion requires it to be in the Technical Specifications?

2. What are the Bases for each Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO),

i.e., why was it determined to be the lowest functional capability or performance.level for the system/component in question necessary for'safe operation of the facility and what are the reasons for the Applicable Operational Modes(s) for the LCO?

3. What are the Bases for each Action Statement, i.e., why should this remedial action be taken if the associated LCO cannot be met, how does this action relate to other Action Statements associated with the LCO, and what justifies continued operation of the system/com-ponent at the reduced state from the state specified in the LCO for the allowed time period?

4. What are the Bases for each Limiting Safety System Setting?

5. What are Bases for each Surveillance Requirement and the surveil-lance interval specified, i.e., what specific functional requirement is the surveillance designed to verify, and why is this surveillance necessary at the specified frequency to assure that the system/com-ponent function is maintained, that facility operation will be within the safety limits, and that the LCO will be met?

Note.-In answering these questions the Bases for each number (e.g., Trip Setpoint, Response Time, Allowed Outage Time, Surveillance Test Inter-val), state, condition, and definition (e.g., operability) should be clearly specified. As an example, a number might be based on engineering judgment, past experience, and/or PRA insights but this should be clearly stated.

B&WOG COMMENT: We believe that improvement of the Bases is a worth-while endeavor. However, it is also one that will take considerable resources and time to complete. As such we recommend that the Bases become a licensee document which is maintained by each licensee. The Owners Group effort is limited to development of generic bases with areas that of necessity will be completed on a plant specific basis. Lack of completion of this effort on a plant specific basis should not prevent issuance of a plant specific license amendment containing the improved technical specifications.

17. COMMISSION POLICY: The Staff will initiate in parallel with issuance of this Policy Statement the rule changes necessary to fully implement this Policy Statement.

B&WOG COMMENT: It should be recognized that the Atomic Industrial Forum Technical Specification subcommittee working group on regulatory changes has been assigned that task of ensuring that a rulemaking program is developed for making the necessary changes to the regulations. As such, this group is available to provide any assistance necessary for achieving this goal. We encourage that this effort move forward.

18. COMMISSION POLICY: If Technical Specifications requirements are relo-cated to plant procedures, then the revised Technical Specifications must contain administrative controls to ensure that they are appropriately maintained and implemented.

B&WOG COMMENT: The B&WOG suggests the policy statement be revised to include the appropriate control mechanisms for all requirements in Technical Specifications which are relocated, not just those which are relocated in plant procedures. It should be recognized that requirements may be relocated in documents that presently have control mechanisms which are not described in Technical Specification (i.e., QA Plan, 10CFR 5O.54a). For these requirements, the Policy Statement need not require that the control mechanism be included in the revised Technical Specifi-cations as it is already covered by a rule.

19. COMMISSION POLICY: The NR.C will, consistent with its mission, allocate resources as necessary to implement this Policy Statement.

B&WOG COMMENT: In keeping with this Policy Statement, the NRC (in an effort to utilize resources more efficiently), should use these criteria now in day-to-day licensing activities dealing with plant specific Technical Specifications.

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE COMMENT: #1: First, any such policy should contain an explicit statement that the Commission will not entertain changes in testing and surveillance intervals and allowed outage times until licen-see maintenance programs are strengthened.

B&WOG COMMENT: Generically, the B&WOG believes, INPO/NUMARC initia-tives along with growing NRC involvement is sufficient to lay this concern to rest. Further implementation of the TSIP policy requires plant specific amendments. Past performance will be judged on an in-dividual basis and can be dealt with effectively qn this basis. In fact it becomes an incentive to improve perception and performance. Finally, allowed outage times and surveillance intervals are not explicitly addressed in the interim Policy Statement.

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE COMMENT: #2: Second, I believe the 10CFR 50.59 review process should be strengthened before licensees are given the flexibility afforded this interim policy.

B&WOG COMMENT: The B&WOG considers this to be of sufficient importance and to be sufficiently separable to warrant independent action. For that very reason AIF/TSIP declined to take the industry lead and took exten-sive steps to assure industry progress. The efforts can, and should, proceed in parallel. Again plant specific licensing actions afford the staff the opporttm.ity for appropriate reviews and provide positive incentive for licensees to improve.

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE COMMENT: #3: Third, this interim policy weakens the Commission's enforcement options for some important safety requirements now contained in the Technical Specifications. For example, plants licensed since January 1, 1979 (33 full power licenses thus far) are not covered by the requirements of the Commission's fire protection regula-tions (10CFR Part 50, Appendix R).

B&WOG COMMENT: The B&WOG disagrees with this conclusion. The example given, Fire Protection, will still be controlled via a License Condition (i.e., Perry and Palo Verde). Several utilities are developing an Appendix R "level" Fire Protection Description controlled via specific license condition modeled after Generic Letter 86-10 to support this facet of Technical Specification. The AIF report addressed enforce-ability, in general, and concluded that since no requirements were being eliminated, per se, and since their alternate locations are controlled via rules (10CFR 50.54), specific license conditions or the FSAR; enforce-ability is maintained.

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE COMMENT: #4: Finally, the February 7, 1986 memoran-dum indicates that AC and DC power sources would not be covered by Technical Specifications while the plant is in the decay heat removal mode.

B&WOG COMMENT: The B&WOG agrees that certain aspects of AC and DC Power sources should be retained as operable in all modes. We must express some concern that the policy issue is being criticized based on an interpretation on criteria application that was performed prior to the AIF and NRC/TSIP reaching agreement on issues not addressed "well" by the criteria. These issues have now been addressed and as a result the Policy Statement now includes RCIC, RHR, SBLC, and RPT explicitly.

Further by including RHR and the words " *** those support and actuation systems necessary *** " in the policy, critical parts of AC and DC power are retained.

JUCf(El NUMBER PR -s-~

W uo~ ( 5TF~.3?cro @

~ "'J~ DOC.:KETEO Westinghouse Owners Group usNRC Domestic utll lties -a-, Foreign Ulllltles Alabama Power Georgia Power Pacific Gos & Electric TennesseeVolleyAuU:fity MAR 2~1g Elifl/Jil52 American Electric Power Florido Power & Light Portland General Electric Texas Utilities Electric ~

Carolina Power & Light Cammanweclth Edison Consolidated Edison Houston Lighting & Power Kansas Gos & Electric New York Power Auth0<ity Public Service Electric & Gos Public Service of New Hampshire Rochester Gos & Electric Union Electric Virginia Power Wisconsin Electric IBCE _..

Kansai Electric Power K0<ea Electric

_ , ' _.. ~Sponisti l}(i/iiies Duq uesne Light Northeast utilities South Carolina Electric & Gos Wisconsin Public K£ I IN Li A: ~i,st\Sfcp)power Boord Duke Power Northern States Power Southern ColifO<ni0 Edison Yankee Atomic Electric aRAN 1)#,,,on Power OG-87-14 March 22, 1987 Mr. Samuel J. Chi lk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors Notice 52FR3788, dated February 6, 1987

Dear Mr. Chi lk:

The Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) is supportive of the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements which the NRC published in the Federal Register (52FR3788) on February 6, 1987. The Westinghouse Owners Group commends the NRC Commissioners, Management, and Staff for their efforts in issuing the Pol icy Statement. The Westinghouse Owners Group appreciates the opportunity to provide the NRC with our comments on the Policy Statement.

The Westinghouse Owners Group is committed to improving the Technical Specifications through our Methodically Engineered, Restructured and Improved Technical Specification (MERITS) program. The MERITS program wi II develop new and improved Standard Technical Specifications for the Westinghouse plants.

The MERITS program involves an extensive commitment of resources to improve Technical Specifications. The Owners are anxious to realize the benefits of improved Technical Specifications and are encouraged that the Commission has establ ished the Technical Specification Improvements program as a high priority program. This should assure a timely review of WOG submittals regarding the new Standard Technical Specifications.

2196V: 12 MAR 2 7 1987 Acknowledged by ca rd ** , , , .,. , , ,,, **** , *'*.*liif

---

z ': I. PPV

/ *; -a!do:,

1 l';' Wjf0cf

• J AC:'i.t:ic .:.~:-_ .:..L. *, :._., ~.:o NOID3S 3:,1,,t ::*; *,J s-:,:w~ooo ROISSIWWO::> A~OlV ,r.9:i.l ~v'3DnN *s *n

The Westinghouse Owners Group requests the NRC's consideration of the attached comments and supports prompt issuance of the final pol icy statement. The Westinghouse Owners Group encourages consideration of the working relationship between the Owners Groups and the NRC in addressing implementation of the Policy Statement. If you have any questions please contact Mr. Gregg A.

Sinders, Chairman of the WOG Technical Specification Subcommittee, at 919-836-8168.

Very truly yours, 4-t~

R.A. Newton, Chairman Westinghouse Owners Group RAN/dac attachment

- cc: Mr. H.R. Denton, NRC Dr. T.E. Murley, NRC Mr. J.H. Sniezak, NRC Mr. C.E. Rossi, NRC Mr. E.J. Butcher, Jr.,NRC Mr. T.G. Dunning, NRC Mr. D.C. Fischer, NRC Westinghouse Owners Group Representatives Tech Spec Subcommittee Representatives MERITS Working Group 2196V:12

COMMENTS ON THE INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS The Commission specifically requested comments on the statement of the purpose of Technical Specifications which introduces the text of the Policy Statement.

The WOG agrees with the Commission's description of the purpose of technical specifications.

The WOG agrees with the three criteria in the Policy Statement and suggests that the Pol icy Statement be revised to require that the criteria be applied to all proposed additions to the Technical Specifications in the future.

The WOG requests that the sentence in the second paragraph of the Policy Statement which states "LCOs which fai I to meet any one or more of the criteria below may be removed from the Technical Specifications ... " be changed to "LCOs which fail to meet al I three of the criteria below may be removed from the Technical Specifications . .. "

The WOG agrees that implementation of the Pol icy Statement should be voluntary. The Policy Statement encourages continuation of industry Technical Specification Improvement Programs. We should continue to work together to ensure that the results of the Tech Spec Improvement Program wi I I be attractive and widely accepted by the Owners.

The Commission specifically invited comments on whether it would be beneficial for licensees to be able to modify related portions of their LCOs (such as containment systems) without having to apply the terms and provisions of the Pol icy Statement to al I LCOs. The WOG requests that the Po1 icy Statement be revised to allow more flexibility in the implementation of the Policy Statement. This includes provisions that would al low I icensees to improve their plant specific Technical Specifications without having to apply the terms and provisions of the Pol icy Statement to their entire Technical Specifications.

The WOG requests that the NRC give a higher priority to the resolution of the AIF recommendations for short term Tech Spec Improvements that have been submitted to the NRC, in order to al low for timely incorporation into the revised STS.

T e Pol icy Statement states , "t he staff wi 11 initiate in para I lel with issuance of this Pol icy Statement the rule changes necessary to fully implement this Policy Statement." The WOG urges the NRC to give priority for identifying and initiating the specific rule changes.

The Pol icy Statement states, "any changes to a licensee's Technical Speci f ications to apply this Policy Statement criteria wi II be made by the I icense amendment process prior to implementation." The Policy Statement does not include an in-depth discussion of the scope and level of detail required for plant specific implementation of the Policy Statement. The WOG requests the NRC to further discuss this matter with us to assure that implementation will be attractive and encouraged.

2196V:12

Southern Company Services, Inc.

Post Office Box 2625 Birmingham , Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 870-6011 DOtKETCr ~

USNRC lfl HAR52Wt!ptJ~ompany Services the southern electnc system OF FICE o~ :-t. ., . 1 ,, ' 1 March 20, 1987 DOCKETING -\ '.iF. R !Cf 3 ANCH Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors

Dear Sir:

The NRC published the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors in Federal Register Notice 52FR3788 dated February 6, 1987. In noticing the Interim Policy Statement the NRC invited comments from the public which would be considered before issuing the Final Policy Statement. Southern Company Services (SCS) is pleased to provide the following comments on the Interim Policy Statement and hopes the NRC will consider these points in the development of the Final Policy Statement.

SCS supports the overall intent of the Interim Policy Statement and agrees with the NRC's description of the scope and purpose of the technical specifications. We further agree that the NRC should initiate a joint program with the industry to implement the improvements delineated in the Policy Statement. In this regard the four vendor owners groups have major programs underway to improve the Standard Technical Specifications which represent a significant commitment of resources. The NRC is encouraged to make a similar commitment of resources to assure these programs are reviewed and implemented in a timely manner.

The Policy Statement noted that any changes to a licensee's technical specifications to apply the Policy Statement's criteria will be made by the license amendment process prior to implementation. In this regard, an exhaustive effort may be required to process these changes if every deletion and addition must be addressed in a significant hazards evaluation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92. In an effort to avoid such a resource intensive process on the part of both the NRC and licensees, the NRC is encouraged to include in the Final Policy Statement a statement that reflects the NRC intent to simplify the implementation phase of the technical specification improvement process in order to allow for the most efficient utilization of licensee and NRC resources.

q 2 7 1987 Ackn* we d by c~ d * '4 14 i I Ii 1* i "rP ~

U,I, NlJCtFA~ P-ECULATORY COMMISSIOB OOCKEtiNu &. srnv1cE SECTION OFFIG c,~ TW <;:CRET ARY OF T ~

,6stmar'.: ,

{opies r, _

Add'I C*

§p.,cial D .

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Page 2 The Policy Statement indicated that it would apply to the improvement of the existing Standard Technical Specifications. The Policy Statement should also apply to all proposed future additions to technical specifications. It is recommended that a separate statement be included in the Final Policy Statement that reflects the NRC intention to use the Policy Statement criteria to evaluate any future additions to all technical specifications. The proposed addition should meet the provisions of the Policy Statement.

The NRC recognized that certain amendments to the regulations are required to implement all aspects of the Policy Statement . In this regard we encourage the NRC to explicitly state in the Final Policy Statement that a rulemaking codifying the criteria and associated provisions will proceed in parallel with the implementation of the Policy Statement.

In conclusion, we support the overall intent of the Interim Policy Statement and agree with the NRC's description of the scope and purpose of technical specifications. The NRC is encouraged to commit the necessary NRC resources to assure a timely review of the owners groups revised Standard Technical Specifications and the associated plant specific license amendments.

In addition, we offer the following comments concerning the views of Commissioner Asselstine. The provisions of the Interim Policy Statement clearly describe the scope and purpose of the technical specifications. In this regard the technical specifications should not be used as an enforcement vehicle for all NRC requirements. There are other mechanisms available to the NRC to accomplish its enforcement role. The technical specifications should be reserved for those items that are immediately important to safety.

Further, the industry is developing additional guidance to strengthen the 10 CFR 50.59 review process which can be accomplished in parallel with the technical specification improvement process. The industry recognizes the need for improvement in this area and steps are being taken to achieve this. The policy statement discusses at length the issue of controlling changes to those items that are removed from the technical specifications. The attention that will be given these items by the staff and the improvements in the 10 CFR 50.59 review process which are being formulated by the industry will ensure that these items are adequately controlled.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments.

L.B. Long, General Manager Nuclear Safety and Fuel LBL/sm 1016F

JU~KET NUMBERPR QQPQIFQ &UJ.i (5,1/F~~?.

~ @)

United States Department of the Intert'1Jr~Ml 0 GEOLOGICAL SURVEY RES TON , VA . 22092

-S7 MAR 26 P3 :01 In Reply Refer To:

WGS-Mail Stop 423 ER 87/140 Memorandum To: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

From: Assistant Director for Engineering Geology

Subject:

Request for technical assistance for proposed policy statement on technical specification improvements for nuclear power reactors We have reviewed the request for technical assistance as requested in your memorandum of February 11.

The discussion of the proposed changes in NRC policy suggests that relaxation of controls on radiological effluents may result from the proposed changes in Technical Specifications, which would place radio-logical effluent controls within documents that do not require NRC approval or license amendment before changes can be made. We believe that this proposed change should be carefully evaluated with regard to its potential for future impacts on the environment, particularly on water resources.

Devine

/ .,

MAR 2 7 1987

f. . C ,., ,.

NUCLE~P ".,- , ro MMISSI08 O ET* qCTION or~ - RY r k i'

C l C,: ,

• BALTIMORE GAS AND DOCKETED ELECTRIC USNRC CHARLES CENTER* P. 0 . BOX 1475

• BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

~7 HAR 25 P3 :53 J OS EPH A . Tl ER NAN VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR ENERGY March 23, 1987 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Mr. Samuel J. Chilk

SUBJECT:

Comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors Gentlemen:

The Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements.

BG&E has actively supported industry efforts relating to Technical Specification improvements. We have participated on both the Combustion Engineering Owners Group and the Atomic Industrial Forum's Technical Specification Subcommittees. Detailed comments to the Interim Policy Statement are enclosed as an Attachment. The following general comments are provided.

We support the overall language and intent of the Interim Policy Statement. In particular, we agree with the Commission's position that Technical Specifications should focus the plant operator's attention on those plant conditions most important to safety.

Two aspects of the Interim Policy Statement merit particular attention. First, the policy statement does not address implementation by the NRC Staff. We are concerned that without an adequate plan for implementation, many utilities will be reluctant to commit to voluntarily apply the criteria to their existing Technical Specifications. We encourage the Commission to include in the policy statement guidance for implementation, particularly in regard to the no significant hazards considerations determinations required by 10 CFR 50.91.

Secondly, the Commission requested comments as to whether it would be beneficial for licensees to be able to modify related portions of their Technical Specifications without having to apply all of the terms and provisions of the policy statement to all Technical Specifications. The criteria for screening Technical Specifications defined in the policy statement are valid for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs). While the Commission should encourage individual licensees to implement all of the provisions of the policy statement, the application of the criteria to individual LCOs should not be Acknowledged by card ..** MAa tl J9SZ.liiil

U,5. NUCL REGULATORY CQMMISSI08 OOGKETl-#G & S::RVICE SiCTION OFFICE 0:- ":"'-ff , E(R~TARY OF n,_ CO,,,., *~ SION

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk March 23, 1987 Page 2 restricted. Furthermore, we encourage the Commission to use these criteria in considering future generic additions to Technical Specification requirements.

Should you have any questions regarding our comments, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

- JAT/BEH/dlm Attachment cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire A. C. Thadani, NRC S. A. McNeil, NRC T. E. Murley, NRC T. Foley/D. A. Trimble, NRC

DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS

1. Commission Policy: The purpose of Technical Specifications is to impose those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety by establishing those conditions of operation which cannot be changed without prior Commission approval and by identifying those features which are of controlling importance to safety.

BG&:E Comment: We agree with the Commission policy and endorse the three criteria established to determine the content of Technical Specifications.

2. Commission Policy: The NRC will give first priority in its Technical Specification improvement efforts to the review and approval of the revised Standard Technical Specifications and the plant-specific license amendment applications based on them.

BG&:E Comment: We do not feel it is the intent of the Technical Specification Improvement Program to reduce staff support of individual licensee requests for Technical Specification amendments. Many of these amendments are needed in order to restart the plant, support necessary modifications, etc. As described in the policy statement, first priority will go to approval of revised Standard Technical Specifications and the plant-specific license amendment applications based on them. This position can be viewed as penalizing those licensees who elect not to amend their Technical Specifications utilizing the policy statement. We suggest this sentence be deleted from the policy statement. The priority of review should be emphasized, but it should be reflected in the policy statement as a commitment by the Commission to provide the necessary staff to review the Owners Groups' Topical Reports and the plant-specific license amendment applications based on them. This commitment should be explicitly stated in the policy statement.

3. Commission Policy: Approved short-term Technical Specification improve-ments will be included in the revised Standard Technical Specifications.

BG&:E Comment: The short-term improvements should be included in the revised Standard Technical Specifications. However, at this time, there have been no short-term improvements issued; although, an October 1, 1985, Atomic Industrial Forum report identified six short-term improvements and suggested regulatory actions. Overall, we have been discouraged with the Commission's response to these important short-term items (e.g., Definition of Operability, 18-month Surveillance Requirements, Missed Surveillances, etc.) It is suggested that the NRC apply more effort to this area so short-term improvements are available for inclusion in the revised Standard Technical Specifications. Licensees should also be permitted to adopt short-term improvements without committing to the other improvements identified in this policy statement.

- l -

DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS

4. Commission Policr The policy statement identifies Probabilistic Risk AssessmentPRA) as an appropriate tool for defining requirements that should be retained in Technical Specifications. Probabilistic Risk Assessments conducted to date have highlighted the four systems identified in the policy statement as significant risk contributors which may be excluded by the criteria, but on a risk basis are appropriate for inclusion in Technical Specification.

BG&E Comment: We believe PRA is an effective tool for optimizing the content of individual LCOs and Surveillance Requirements in the Technical Specifications (e.g., Allowable Outage Times and Surveillance Test Inter-vals). However, using PRA to define which Technical Specification require-ments should be retained raises several concerns. First, the licensing basis for plants is deterministic. Secondly, potential costs associated with PRA may prohibit licensees from availing themselves of the policy statement.

Finally, PRAs are still in the developmental stage as an analytical tool with respect to determining which requirements should be retained in Technical Specifications. There is currently no threshold to define what constitutes sufficient risk to merit inclusion in Technical Specifications. For the above reasons, we do not, in general, agree with using PRA for defining which LCOs should remain in the Technical Specifications Additionally, if the policy statement should recognize PRA as an appropriate, future tool for adding Technical Specifications, it should also allow for removal of Technical Specifications of low risk significance which would otherwise be retained by the criteria.

DOCKET ED USNRC "ffl MAR 25 Al 1 :OO Florida Power COR P ORATION March 23, 1987 3F0387 - 10 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C . 20555

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Comments on Commission Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (52 Fed. Reg. 3788, 2/6/87).

Dear Sir:

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) has reviewed the Commission Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors. The com-ments that follow have been generated as a result of this review.

FPC wishes to commend the NRC Staff for their efforts in the development and issuance of this interim policy statement . This issuance helps demonstrate a positive commitment by the NRC towards improving the overall quality of Tech-nical Specifications and will serve as an important incentive for industry participation in programs to improve Technical Specifications.

In conclusion, FPC supports the efforts to improve Technical Specifications.

Crystal River Unit 3 has been endorsed by the B&WOG as the 1ead pl ant. As a result, FPC is planning to submit improved Technical Specifications in 1987.

Some concerns have been identified regarding the details of the Policy Statement. In an effort to help resolve these concerns, specific comments are provided in Attachment 1.

GENERAL OFFICE: 3201 Th irty-fourth Street South

• P.O. Box 14042

• St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 * (813) 866-51 51 A Florida Progress Company a

Acknowted~ed bv card . .MAR 2 7 1987*~

r *

. MJ0.(1...!?' !'tE"Gl'Jl A1'6N COMMfSSIOS

~CKE*r ~ **G" SfRVlCf S~1fi'Ot4

r. J *:. , .:., - , , ... ,

fostrr*"t: ' , ---~/?_2_ ___

<!op*cs ,, *. _ j _ _ _ __

Add 'I *~-* ..-_; 2

~ci.il Ci ~,r-*. . * }21/)~~c~ -

- * *-sswsr --* C l'

March 23, 1987 3F0387-10 Page 2 Should you have any questions regarding these comments, please do not hesitate to contact this office.

E. C. Simpson Director, Nuclear Operations Engineering and Licensing DGG/ps Attachment

ATTACHMENT 1 3F0387-10 Page 1 of 4 SPECIFIC CCJ'1MENTS REGARDING POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS COMMISSION POLICY: Approved short term Technical Specifications improvements will be included in the revised STS.

FPC COMMENT: The short term improvements should be included in the revised STS. However, at this time, there have been no short term improvements issued nor is it clear there will be significant improvements issued by the time FPC submits revised Technical Specifications. It is suggested the NRC expend more effort in this area so short term improvements will be available for inclusion in the revised STS.

COMMISSION POLICY: The commission finds that risk evaluations are an appro-priate tool for defining requirements that should be retained in Technical Specifications where including such requirements is consistent with the purpose of Technical Specifications as defined above.

FPC COMMENT: PRA s are, in many respects, still in the developmental stage 1

as an analytical tool with respect to determining technical specification con-tent. This is evidenced by the ongoing NRC/Industry development efforts in the PRA area. The objectives of these efforts are to standardize the use of PRA by establishing appropriate guidelines regarding acceptance criteria, data sources and validity, and PRA complexity. To date, these issues have yet to be finalized. The primary applications of PRA techniques to technical specifications has been in the area of outage times and surveillance intervals. Very few applications have concentrated on determining content.

Such an application is largely untried. Considering this, it is our recommendation the use of PRA for determining the content of technical specifications be kept at a minimum.

COMMISSION POLICY: The Commission expects that owner groups, in preparing their proposals to streamline the Standard Technical Specifications, will utilize the available literature on risk insights and Probabilistic Risk As-sessments (PRA 1 s).

FPC COMMENT: The policy statement discussion is lacking in detail, as a re-sult uncertainty will be added to the industry technical specification programs. This uncertainty will manifest itself in the fonn of more poorly defined program scope, content, and cost, diminishing the attractiveness of the program and reducing the likelihood of wide acceptance.

COMMISSION POLICY: This material should be employed to strengthen the tech-nical bases for those requirements that remain in Technical Specifications, when applicable , and to verify that none of the requirements to be relocated contain constraints of prime importance in limiting the likelihood or severity of the accident sequences that are commonly found to dominate risk... Where such PRA I s or surveys are available, they should be used to strenghten the bases and screen those Technical Specifications to be relocated.

3F0387-10 Page 2 of 4 FPC COMMENT: The regulations require Technical Specifications be derived from the plant 1 s safety analysis. These safety analysis have been deterministic rather than probabilistic and serve as the licensing basis for the plant. As such, it is inappropriate to use PRA as a basis for Technical Specifications. Addi ti on ally, it should be acknowledged the NRC staff has already concluded 11 PRA sensitive systems 11 are not being removed by the implementation of this Policy Statement.

COMMISSION POLICY: The Staff will initiate in parallel with issuance of this Policy Statement the rule changes necessary to fully implement this Policy Statement.

FPC COMMENT: It should be recognized that the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF)

Technical Speci fi cation subcommittee working group on regulatory changes has been assigned the task of ensuring a rulemaking program is developed for making the necessary changes to the regulations. As such, this group is available to provide any assistance necessary for achieving this goal.

Further, proposed rule changes were submitted with the AIF/TSIP (Technical Specification Improvement Project) Report.

COMMISSION POLICY: If Technical Specifications requirements are relocated to p I ant procedures, then the revised Technical Speci fi cations must contain ad-ministrative controls to ensure that they are appropriately maintained and im-plemented *** The staff will issue guidance on appropriate control mechanisms for requirements removed from Technical Specifications (e.g., FSAR amendment, procedures, or other license controlled documents) in time for use when the policy statement is issued in final form.

FPC COMMENT: FPC suggests the policy statement be revised to include the ap-propr, ate control mechanisms for all requirements in Technical Speci fi cations which are relocated, not just those which are relocated in plant procedures.

It should be recognized requirements may be relocated in documents that presently have control mechanisms which are not described in Technical Speci-fication (i.e., QA Plan/10CFR 50.54a). For these requirements, the Policy Statement need not require the control mechanism be included in the revised Technical Specifications as it is already covered by a rule.

COMMISSION POLICY: The NRC will, consistent with its mission, allocate resources as necessary to implement this Policy Statement.

FPC COMMENT: In keeping with this Policy Statement, the NRC (in an effort to utilize resources more efficiently), should use these criteria now in day-to-day licensing activities dealing with plant specific Technical Specifications.

Additionally, recent discussions with the NRC/TSCB staff have indicated plant specific implementation of Technical Specification improvement would effectively require the utility accept the new Standard Technical Specifications (STS) in total. They also indicated technical changes to the new STS or during plant specific implementation of the new STS should be minimized. These two positions are inconsistent. They fail to acknowledge conversions of any pl ant I s current technical speci fi cations to the la test

3F0387-10 Page 3 of 4 STS wi 11 necessitate numerous technical changes which must be evaluated and approved by both the utility and the NRC. Once again the staff seems to be failing to recognize non-standard plants cannot be controlled by completely standard Technical Specifications. These current positions on implementation are not acceptable nor are they consistent with the NRC position taken in the Final Report of the Technical Specification Improvement Project dated 9/30/85 from D. H. Beckham, NRC, to H. R. Denton, NRC. This position is as follows:

"Finally, TSIP recognizes that the improvements recommended by NUREG-1024 and confirmed in its work wi 11 only be made through a program involving the utilities and owners groups in the technical evaluations. (Conclusion 4, Recommendations 1, 3, and 4). TSIP believes that allowing licensees to revise their existing Technical Specifications to reflect the proposed criteria wi 11 serve as incentive for them to improve the Bases, clarity and technical adequacy of the i terns that remain Technical Specifications. Because TSIP could find no acute safety concern with existing Technical Specifications, the program should be voluntary. Therefore, industry support is essential in realizing the improvements that can and are being made. NRC reluctance to relinquish any items from Technical Specifications to other control mechanisms will surely limit the cooperation extended by licensees."

FPC does not believe the NRC staff recognizes the practical, real consequences of these positions and encourages them to seek input from the industry to ensure implementation of Technical Specification improvement is not side-tracked again.

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE COMMENT: First, any such policy should contain an explicit statement that the Commission will not entertain changes in testing and surveillance intervals and allowed outage times until licensee maintenance programs are strengthened.

FPC COMMENT: Crystal River Unit #3 was a Phase II plant for the NRC's Maintenance and Surveillance Program. The conclusions for this review follow:

The site survey demonstrated that the organization, administration, and work control practices of the Maintenance Department at CR-3 are exemplary because (1) goals are established ahead of time and measures are used to verify accomplishment of these goals, (2) the safety goals are combined with the production goals, (3) sufficient technical and administrative staff complement management and supervision, (4) unique methods of communication are used through an extensive array of routinely scheduled meetings on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis, and (5) careful attention in the form of feasible methods and detailed documentation is paid to all functions of the Maintenance Department extending, for example, from setting tangible departmental objectives, through interdepartmental communications, to job planning with pre- and post-job reviews.

3F0387-10 Page 4 of 4 Generically, FPC believes, INP0/NUMARC initiatives along with growing NRC in-volvement is sufficient to lay this concern to rest. Further implementation of the Technical Specification Improvement policy requires plant specific amendments. Plast performance will be judged on an individual basis and can be dealth with effectively on this basis. In fact, it becomes an incentive to improve perception and performance. Finally, allowed outage times and surveillance intervals are not explicitly addressed in the interim Policy Statement. -

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE COMMENT: Second, I believe the 10CFR 50.59 review process should be strengthened before licensees are given the flexibility af-forded this interim policy.

FPC COMMENT: FPC considers this to be of sufficient importance and to be sufficiently separable to warrant independent action. For that very reason, AIF/TSIP declined to take the industry lead and took extensive steps to assure industry progress. The efforts can, and should, proceed in parallel. Again plant specific licensing actions afford the staff the opportunity for appro-priate reviews and provide positive incentive for licensees to improve.

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE COMMENT: Third, this interim policy weakens the Com-mission's enforcement options tor some important safety requirements now con-tained in the Technical Specifications, For example, plants licensed since January 1, 1979 ( 33 full power 1i censes thus far) are not covered by the re-quirements of the Commission's fire protection regulations (10 CFR 50, Appen-dix R).

FPC COMMENT: FPC disagrees with this conclusion. The example given, Fire Protection, will still be controlled via a License Condition (i.e., Perry, Palo Verde and Callaway [the industry lead plant]). FPC is, in fact, developing an Appendix R "level" Fire Protection Program Description controlled via a specific license condition modeled after Generic Letter 86-10 to support this facet of Technical Specification Improvement. The AIF report addressed enforceability, in general, and concluded that since no requirements were being eliminated, per se, and since their alternate locations are controlled via rules (10 CFR 50.54), specific license conditions or the FSAR; enforceability is maintained and, in fact, better focused.

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE COMMENT: Finally, the February 7, 1986 memorandum indicates that AC and DC power sources would not be covered by Techni ca 1 Specifications while the plant is in the decay heat removal mode.

FPC COMMENT: FPC agrees certain aspects of AC and DC Power sources should be retained as operable in all modes. FPC must express some concern that the policy issue is being criticized based on an interpretation on criteria application that was performed prior to the AIF and NRC/TSIP reaching agreement on issues not addressed "well" by the criteria. These issues have now been addressed and as a result the Policy Statement now includes Reactor Core Isolation Cooling/Isolation Condenser, Residual Heat Removal (RHR),

Standby Liquid Control, and Recirculation Pump Trip. Further by including RHR and the words " *** those support and actuation systems necessary *** " in the policy, critical parts of AC and DC power are retained.

Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814-4891 Telephone : (301) 654-9260 TWX 7108249602 ATOMIC FOR DC "87 HAR 24 All :18 March 23, 1987 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (Federal Register Notice 52FR3788, dated February 6, 1987)

Dear Sir:

The AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specification Improvements of the Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety is pleased to submit comments on the interim policy statement on technical specification improvements. We appreciate this opportunity to provide these comments. Detailed comments are enclosed as Attachment A. The following general comments are provided.

The Commission is to be commended on the timely manner in which it developed this policy. We support its overall language and intent. In particular, we agree with the Commission's descrip~

tion of the purpose of technical specifications. We fully sup ~

port the Commission's position that this should be a volunteer program. As discussed in the background section of the Federal Register notice, the AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specification Improvements issued a detailed report dated October 1, 1985. The conclusions and recommendations of that report were endorsed by all four vendor owners groups. The interim policy statement reflects many of the issues addressed in this report, the most crucial being the criteria used to determine what should be in technical specifications.

All four owners groups have committed to major programs to im~

prove the Standarg Technical Specifications. This represents a commitment of several million dollars and significant manpower in support of the activity. We are encouraged by the Commission's position in the policy statement that the necessary NRC resources will be allocated to implement it. This commitment of NRC re ~

sources is needed to assure a timely review of the programs and maintain the momentum to make the necessary improvements.

MAR 2 7 1987 Acknowledged by card .** *.,,,,,, illf:'iiHw~

Ui , NUCLEM REGULAT~Y COMMISSI08 0OCK~T ING & :UVI CE SECT ION OFr "C: ::, ~* - ~~*-.,-

• RY

"~d p

~pecir.1 , . *.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk March 23, 1987 The Commission recognized in its policy statement that certain amendments to the regulations are required to support the state~

ment in its entirety. In the interim, until the necessary rule changes are made, the Commission should entertain exemption requests (e.g., to 10CFRS0.36a) to allow full implementation of the final policy statement to proceed.

We encourage the Commission to explicitly state in the final policy statement that a rulemaking codifying the criteria and associated provisions will proceed in parallel with the imple~

me~!ation of the fina! po~icf _state~e~t.

The policy statement should apply to all proposed future addi~

tions to technical specifications. A separate statement should be included in the final policy statement that the Commission directs the staff to use the criteria to determine any future additions to all technical specifications. Any future proposed staff additions to the technical specifications, whether generic or plant~specific, should meet the purpose of technical specifi~

cations and the three objective criteria used in defining the scope of technical specifications as reflected in the policy statement. An explicit statement to that effect should be included in the final policy statement.

In conclusion, we support the overall language and intent of the interim policy statement. We agree with the Commission's description of the purpose of technical specifications. The Commission is encouraged to complete a prompt review of the comments received on the interim policy statement and issue it as final as soon as possible. We encourage continuation of the working relationship between the Subcommittee, owners groups and the NRC staff in addressing implementation of the policy statement. Considerable progress has been made by approving the interim policy statement but the fruits of this labor will be realized by using it in making the necessary improvements in technical specifications.

Sincerely, Frederick W. Buckman Chairman, Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety FWB:tkr Enclosure

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS In Mr. Edelman's cover letter of October 8, 1985 to Mr. Denton transmitting our report of October 1, 1985, the need to dedicate the necessary staffing resources and management attention to this very important issue was emphasized. With the interim policy statement issued, this need is even more essential. All four owners groups have committed to major programs to improve the Standard Technical Specifications. This represents a commitment of several million dollars and significant manpower in support of the activity. Lead plants have been identified by all four owners groups to work in parallel or series using the generic improve~

ments on a plant~spetific set of technical specifications. To date the industry has experienced significant delays on some of these improvements. For example, one owners group expected to receive its SER on a technical specification improvement during the first quarter of 1986. The SER has still not been issued.

-" The indus-tr;y- is -demons tra t-ing- its -support" for- technical- -spec i-f i ~- -- - - -- -

cation improvements* through major programs; a similar commitment of NRC resources is needed. Otherwise, the present momentum will be lost and, perhaps, never regained.

The Commission recognized in its policy statement that certain amendments to the regulations are required to support the state~

ment in its entirety. In the interim, until the necessary rule changes are made, the Commission should entertain exemption requests (e.g., to 10CFR 50.36a) to allow full implementation of the policy statement to proceed.

We encourage the Commission to start the amendment process to incorporate the policy statement into the regulations. During its briefing of the Commission on January 21, 1986, the staff agreed that once confidence is gained in the criteria through its actual use, a.proposed rule could follow codifying the requirements. During our presentation to the Commission on February 11, 1986, Mr. Tucker, Vice President of Duke Power, endorsed the issuance of a policy statement. The NRC having issued it and gaining the necessary confidence in the criteria, he recommended that rulemaking go forward in parallel to formalize the standard for determining what should go into technical speci~

fications. In Appendix Hof our report, suggested changes to the regulations were addressed. We encourage the Commission to expli~

citly state in the final policy statement that a rulemaking cod~

ifying the criteria and associated provisions will proceed in parallel with the implementation of the policy statement.

The policys statement noted that any changes to a licensee's tech~

nical spe~ifications will be made by the license amendment process prior to implementation. In this regard, an exhaustive effort may be required to process these changes if every deletion and addi~

tion must be addressed in a significant hazards evaluation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92. In an effort to avoid such a resource~intensive process on the part of both

the NRC and licensees, the NRC is encouraged to include in the final policy statement a statement that the NRC intents to address simplification of the implementation phase of the technical spec~

ification improvement process in order to allow for the most efficient utilization of licensee and NRC resources. We stand ready to work with the NRC in developing the necessary process for implementation of the final policy statement.

In addition to the three criteria, the interim policy statement identifies Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as an appropriate tool for defining requirements that should be retained in tech~

nical specifications. The use of PRA to define the content of technical specifications in regard to the policy statement raises several concerns. First, the present technical specifications are derived from a licensing basis that is deterministic, rather than probabilistic. Second, PRA's are, in many respects, still in the developmental stage as analytical tools with respect to determin~

ing technical specification content. To date the primary use of PRA techniques being applied to technical specification improve~

ments has been in the area of establishing the allowed outage times and surveillance time intervals. Finally, there is no threshold to define what constitutes sufficient risk to merit inclusion in technical specifications.

It is our understanding, though not explicitly stated in the policy statement, that the level of effort required by industry in using PRA's in the implementation of the policy statement is limited. PRA's will be used in the review of those Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO's) removed by the criteria relative to the overall body of knowledge gained from the PRA's conducted to date to ensure that no LCO's involving significant risk con~

tributors are removed from technical specifications. The PRA's conducted to date have highlighted the four systems identified in the policy statement as significant risk contributors which may be excluded by the criteria but on a risk basis are appropriate for inclusion in technical specifications. Unless there are signifi~

cant increases in the body of PRA knowledge between the date of issuance of the policy statement and when a licensee uses it, no additional effort relative to the PRA body of knowledge would be required. Furthermore, the policy statement should recognize PRA as an appropriate tool for removing technical specifications of low risk significance which would otherwise be retained by the criteria. We recommend that the Commission replace its statement that "licensee need not await the performance of plant~specific PRA studies before availing themselves of the policy" with the more definitive statement that neither the owners groups nor an individual licensee is required to conduct a PRA to screen those technical specification items that are to be relocated or to strengthen the bases of those that are to be retained.

We feel the licensee and the staff should be able to modify re~

lated portions of the LCO's without having to apply the terms and provisions of the policy statement to all LCO's. There may be a section of the technical specifications that the licensee

and staff recognize need not be in technical specifications: The section may not meet the criteria. However, the position can be taken that unless the licensee addresses all of the LCOs, the specific LCO won't be removed. Due to this position, the operator will continue to have to address an LCO that has no safety signi~

ficance. Thus the final policy statement should include a state~

ment that LCO's may be handled on an individual basis.

The policy statement should apply to all proposed future additions to technical specifications. It is suggested that the final policy statement include a separate statement that the Commission expects the staff to use the criteria to determine any potential future additions to existing technical specifications. Only those potential specifications that meet the purpose of technical speci~

fications and the three objective criteria used in defining the scope of technical specifications, as described in the policy statement, should be included.

We request that the Commission modify the interim policy statement to provide, that regardless of the status of a licensee's use of Standard Technical Specifications, the Commission will conduct a timely review of any proposed revisions to existing, including custom technical specifications. Facilities which rely on custom technical specifications and desire to apply the interim policy statement thereto, should not be precluded from timely Commission review of changes to their technical specifications. Nor should the staff review schedule for individual licensee requests for technical specification amendments be adversely impacted by the policy statement.

It is suggested that the policy statement include a statement that, if the vendor owners group elects to issue a revised set of Standard Technical Specifications as a topical, the staff~approved topical would serve as the standard for that particular vendor.

The topical would then be maintained and updated, with staff review and approval, by the owners group. Consequently, the staff would not maintain a separate NUREG but rather rely on the approved topical.

It is our understanding that the revised bases can cite existing topical reports, sections of the FSAR, or other documents rather than include considerable detail in them. If this is not the case, the intent of making the revised technical specification useful to the operator has been compromised. The size and detailed information in the technical specifications will grow significantly, with questionable benefit to the operator. Further clarification of this point is needed.

Commissioner Asselstine's Views Commissioner Asselstine in his dissenting vote expressed four concerns. The following comments are provided with regard to each.

He suggested an explicit statement that the Commission will "not entertain changes in testing and surveillance intervals and allowed outage times until licensee maintenance programs are

strengthened." This suggestion is symptomatic of what has brought the NRC and industry to the problem we have today, i.e., in order to get the right attention paid to the issue, use the technical specifications. As a result of this misused approach, the tech~

nical specifications have become a licensing tool, not a document to be used by the operator. If in fact maintenance programs need to be strengthened, there are other mechanisms to accomplish that goal. For example, following the TMI accident there was a recog~

nized need to make improvements in emergency planning. This was done without using technical specifications as the vehicle for change.

Regarding strengthening the 10CFRS0.59 review process, the indus~

try is developing additional guidance that can be used by licens~

ees to perform a 10CFRS0.59 review. A meeting has been held with the staff on this topic, and future meetings will be scheduled to solicit their review and comments. The NUMARC Technical Subcom~

mit-tee- is- following--this--acti-v-ity. 'l'her-ef-ore,- -t-his -issue-is-being tit addressed by the industry at this time.

Commissioner Asselstine has stated his concern that the interim policy statement weakens the Commission's enforcement options for some important safety requirements now contained in the technical specifications. First, the technical specifications should not be 1 established to allow the NRC enforcement options. As reflected in the Atomic Safety and Lic~nsing Appeals Board's clarification on the Trojan Nuclear Plant docket, ALAB~S31, 9NRC263(1979),

"technical specifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event, giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety." The Commission concurred in this in the interim policy statement. There are many facets of plant operation and support (quality assurance, security, emer~

gency planning, emergency operating procedures, detailed staffing etc.) that are not reflected in the technical specifications.

However, they are important to the safe operation of the plant and are enforceable. It makes no sense to burden the operator with the present complex set of technical specifications for the sole purpose of protecting one of many enforcement options. For example, although Appendix R does not cover plants licensed since January 1, 1979, these plants have gone through an extensive staff review of their fire protection capability prior to receiving an operating license. This detailed review is reflected in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and supplements. There is no indication that removing fire protection requirements from the technical specifications makes them "far less enforceable."

If, after applying the criteria, the AC and DC power sources would not be addressed in the technical specifications while the plant is in the decay heat removal mode~ these support systems would certainly not be neglected. The operating procedures for the individual plants address the systems needed in the various modes of operation and the necessary support systems. What corrective action should be taken if a system or a support system is not available is also addressed in the operating procedures. It should be emphasized that even though a system or support system is not included in the technical specifications, it is maintained and surveilled on a set schedule.

MAR.24 '87 12:18 NRC MESSAGE CENTE BETH!SD MD .002 00(,KEf tu U5NHC 1

00.ct< -----***----

---:;-~

( 52-F~ J'?J?~

(J)

GIMrllOffloN* llldantt,_, IMh\COf.l.Wlllln :

ft,O-IOXIPO HMT,OM>>. OONltflCTICUT Dl1'1-CIIJO (IGl)* IHD March z,, 1917 U.S. Nuclear ae1u1atory CommJNlon Attru Document Control Deak Wuhln&ton* D.C. ZOH, Centlern.n, Haddam Neck Plant M1U1tone Nuclear Power Station* Unlt Noa. 1, 2 and J Comments on the lnterlm Polley Statement on Il&b.nlca1 Speclflc:atlon lmprov1ment1 On Pebtuary 6, 1t11.<U the Commllsion p\lt.Ulhed for comment a propONCI policy natem.nt whlc:h provide* w, pol101 of the NRC Ntprdlng the scope and purpose of Techt1lcal Spedflea1lon1 for nuclear power rlantt u requlred by IOCPUO.U.

Northaa1t Utllltl** Service Compan)' (NUSCO hat reviewed the propoeed Polley statement and 1ubml1a the followlna comment* on behalf of The Conn-.:tlc:ut Yankee Attlmle Power Company and Northe&1t Nuclear Et11r11 Company, llcen*e* for the Haddam Neck Plant and Mlllttone Ura1t Noa. 1, 2 and J, reapectlvely.

A, a general comment, NUSCO fully suppo,u the intent of the pollcy statement and believes thl.t lt provldt1 for aJanlflcant Improvement, In s,lant safety and re1l1b1Uty 11 well ** more effective utlllaatlon ol utlUty and NRC reaource1. We would also like to recOlftlae ihe effo,tl of the NRC and A'tOmlc Jnctul'tr1a1 Porum (AIP) tulc aro~* that cClftttlbuted to the development of thl1 pollc:~ ttatement.

Our epeclflc eommentl on die pollc:y statement are ** follow11 o We concur 1n the Commlnlan'a opinion that Tec:hnlc:al SpecUlc:atlons lho\lld Identify only thoae _plant ftatu11t1 whleh are of convoJlln1 ll&niflcanc* to *fety. Thlllt w* Mlleve that the Commlqlon'*

1tatemant of purpoa for T.chnlc&l Speclflcatlon, 11 approprlate.

(I) JZ PederaJ Reglater J718 MAR 2 7 1987 Ackrcw,edged by card *** , ,. . ~ .. ; .. *iil

. S. NUCLf.AR REGUl 10RY COMMISSION oocv.r.r1t-lG I'. <:.ER 'ICE SEC1l0"'4 l _r ;:> '(

'

• r c..

I J}IJ>S, $::,4,IJ;e"

• ~-

MAR.24 '87 12:19 HRC MESSAGE CENTER BETHESDA MD .P.003 U.S. Nuclear Jteplator~ Commltslon 112*,, /Pap 2 March 23, 1911 o We IIN* that Jmplemen~tlon of Improved Techn1ca1 Spec:lflc:atlona ahould Nmaln voluntary, noting that tht NR.C Technical &peclflcatlon Improvement Project (TSIP) *le aroup concluded Iha t current Techttlcal Speclflcailon* provlde aclequai. protection of pubUc health and lalety.

Whlle we *aree that all lfcen. ., lhould be encouraged 10 lmplel'Mfli Improved Sianctard Technical S~flcationa (STS), we beUev* that It would be lnapproprlate to require 'thla of all Ucenlffl.

o The Comml11lon 1tata1 that it wm enwrtaln reque111 for Ucen*

amandmen11 baled on th* crl*rla aet forih In 'Che polic:1 atatement 1hat evaluate au of the Llmltlng Condltlon1 for Operatlora (LCOs) far an e

• lndlvldual plant. The Comrn"'1on allO l'Calel that lt doe IIO'C lntend that the c:rherla be uaed to re&oc:ata Jncllvldual LC01 from t1'e Tec:hnlcaJ SpecHlc:atlOM to o'Cher documenta. We bttll*ve that the policy 11au,ment Should be re¥l&ad

• allow application of lhe crherla enumerated In the

• poUcy 1tatement to related portions of LCOI, The c:rlterla for 1creenlng

• Technle&I Speolfloatlon1 ~lde

• mean* of obJectlve&y de1ermlnln1 the appropriate c:ontent of Technleal 5-dflcatlons and 1r1 equally appllcable to section* of Tec:hnleal lplclflcatlona u weU ** to the entire document, Application of die crlterla to related portions of Technical Spec:lfleetlon, 11 ane method of accomplllhlft& lrnproYementl ln the lhort term, o One of the recommend&tlOftt of n NRC TSIP and AJF task aroup1 wu that a parallel proaram of lhort*i.rm lmprcwements ln both .cope and substanc* of **ltUii1 Technical s.-=1ncat1on1 be lnltlated 1n Mldltlon

• the lona*term(development of an Improved STS, A number of $hort*term lmprovamenu ;21 w*re ldentlflecl In the AIP'a OctoNr 1, ltlJ report on Technical Spedflcatlon lmprovemenu. Unfortunately, Commlallon guidance reprdln1 lhort*term Jmprovemenu to Technical Speclflcatlons r, notably atasent from Ille prooc,aed pollcy 1taiement, Notwlth1tandln1 the &bNnce of ComtnlU1on _pldance In thl1 area, we 1tt0n1ly urp lhe NR.C to 1upport lhott*tarm Technical S,-clfloat&on lmprovementl which have been recol!"lled by 1he nuclear lncluttty and the NRC S'C&ff UI bl! of tianlflcant benefit and r*l*tlvti)' llmple to Implement.

(2) SpecHlcaUy1 1b, .,.., for poienu.l lhort*term lmpra'V'*menta were 11i111eted by lhe AIP 1ft their Octobtr l, 1NJ report. They area l) DeletlDl'I of Tec:hnlc:al Speclflcatlon requlremenu which dupUc:ate requirement* ln fecllra& re1u1&t10n1e

2) Revlsecf Deflnlilon of 0perable/Operal,1Ut1.

3) 11 Month v1, Refu.llr,g OUtqe SurvelU&nc:e Interval.

• > Dtletlan of Cycle SpecHlc Varl&ble1 from Tec:hnlcal Spec:1flcatlont.

,> Conal1tent Appllcatlon of Spec:lUcatlon J.o.,.

6) Delatlon of Component Ll1t1 from Tachn1c,.1 Spec:lflcatlon1.

MAR.24 ' 87 12: 20 NRC MESSAGE CE~TER ETHESDA MD P. 004 I

I 112.,,,,2),... 3 U.S. Nuclear Re1u&atory Comml11lon Mlrch 1917 o The nuclear lndu1tty has committed 1Ub1tantlal re1owc** to the ,

development of Technical Speclflcatlon Improvement proa,ams. We urge thlt Comm111lon

• dedicate tht reaource, nece*ry to ensure that vendor owner,* aroup and llcen'" IU.bm&itel* are reviewed In

• t lmely ffllll"lner.

I o The Comml111on has determined that Probablllstlc Rlak Asaeumente (PRA1) are an approprlate tool for daflnlng reqwrtm*nu that ahould be retained ln the Techftlcal Speclflcatlon, where lncJudlng tuch requlretnenta 11 Col\llltent wlth fie purpoae of Technlcal Spec:1ficatlon1 a, *aned ln the policy atatement. The Comml1110n encoura**

utlllz&tlon of Jltetature on r111c lnelghta and PM, to 11ren1ttten technlca1 ba** lot Ntqulttementa mat remain 1n Tec:hnlcaJ Speclf{catlona and to verlfy that none of the ....,1remant1 relocated to other documents car,uln conatralnia of primary lmporiance 1n Umltlng the Uk*Jlhood or severity of ac:elclent sequencea th*t ate found to be Important contrlbuton to rlllc. We *pe* with the Comml111on th&t 1uch uM of rllk evaluatlon t.ctinlcaues 11 appropriate when aufflclent and pertinent lnlormatlon 1t available. However, we do not bellev* that llc MNt should be r*~lred to perlorm

• plani-ep~Ulc PRA prlor to lmplementlng the policy 1tatem*nt, We allo belleve mat the CommlUlon lhou1d amend the poUc:}' 1tatement to allow ua of PllA1 to reloea* Item, from the Tec:hfllcal Speclflcatlon,. which wowcl othtrwlae b* retained bated on the pollc~ ***m*nt crlterla, 1f 1:hey have an ac:ceptDly low contrlln1tlon to rlllc.

a We note ihat R1cUolo&1cal Envlronrn,ntal Technical Specll1c1Uon1 were cited u belft& an *xample or a requirement of 1ocpa.,o.u which would need to be amended In order to fully Implement the policy atatement.

We would like to allO *!lll**t other *re** of l0CPl.50.3' which lhe Comml11.lon lho1,dd conllcler amendll'la, Speclfleally, wa racommend that the Commlulon conslder an.encllftl lDCPR,o,,s to eUmlnate the reqwremet1t1 1D Include Design P*ture, and Admlnlstratlve Control, 1n Technical Speclflcatlons. fl1e Technlcal Speclflcatlon1 ln th. .

two area, do not lmpoae Umltl on plant eperatlon neceuary io obviate the poaslblllty of an abnormal iltuatlon whlch could become an lmmedlate threat to public health encl afety and thu1 are not within the proper acope of Technical Speclflcatlon, u defined 1n the poUcy statement. Purthermore, llcenNe commhment1 to plant cle1lgn featurea and admlnl1tratlve control* 11:her al,.ady are or may euUy be Included 1n the PSAR with chanae* controlled under the req"lrementa of l0CPRJ0.Jt and ,o.71.

To addreu the points ralNd by Comrt1lllloner Auelttlne, we vffer the following oemmenu. W* -are* wlth Cornmluloner A...i,une that a aood malnieMnce proaram II a key element In the *fe UICI reliable operation ol a n\lf:lear power plant. However, we dlNgree wlt:h the

• Comml11loner'1 uaettion that malnttnanc:* pro1ram1 mu1t be strengthe.,.d ** a prerequlllte for 1he CemmlHlon to full)' lmpltrnel\t thl1 pollcy 1tatement. Otherf. moN apptoprlate mechanl1rn1 ex11t <**I* rout:liw ln1peetlon1t SALP evaluatlon11 whlch enable the NRC to er11ure that llcenNe malntel'\&I\Ce proaram, ve adequate and are being Implemented properly. Secondly, any c:haf\** to te1tlng and aurvelllafte* ,

MAR.24 '87 12:21 NRC MESSAGE CENTER BETHESDA MD P..005 .I U.S. Nuc:IHt aeau&atory Commlulon

,12..,JP.....

March 23, 1917 lflterval1 or allowed out.ap time, mutt be reviewed by the NRC Md found to not adversely *lf*ct public: h"lth and talety. Thl* revlew wlll Jnclude conllderaUon of all technical lnformallon teltvant to 1he propoaed chatlp lncludlna. whln appropriate, rMlnteftanc. practlce1. We recommend that ttie CommlHlon nai Umlt the potent.la! for tachnlcally lmprovlftl Ttchnlc:aJ Speclllcatlant based on a perc:1ptlon that utility maintenance p,ogram1 are In aome wa)' clef1Clent With regard 1D 1he need to 1trena1111tn the l0CPIU0*.tt review proc:e11, we believe that lt 11 appropriate for the NRC to worlc wlth the lndU1try to dtve!op '

more *talled auldanc* for u1e by Ucen1NI In lhe conduct of l0CPRJ0-'9 1afety evaluation,. How.wer, we vle'II thl1 action tO be pan of 'the r,at1,1ra! evolutlon or the Nl'll*tori proceA, It Med not, ln our oplnlon, precede lmp!ementaUon of th1I poller 1tawment. The Commlulon h~, via thl1 pOllcy 1taiem1nt, made c:11ar lt1 ln-ntlon to mora clo*l)' 1Crut1nl* change* rMde pur1uant to lOCPIJ0.'9.

Lutly, operating requirements tha'C are truly of controlllna 11&nlDeance to plant Mfety w111 .-.main ln the Technical Speclflcatlons. Vlolation1 of auch requirement, wUl continue to be dJect tD NRC enforcement policy dellneaied ln l0CPR2, Appendix C. The Commllll* l\a1 made clear lu Jnwntlon io take "appropriate" enforcement actlon 1:0 enture 1:hal Ueen..., com;,ly with PSAR comnUtmenta and lOCPIUO,,,. 10 CPR 2, Appendix C, par11raph Vtl! prcwlclea for 1pproprlate tnforcement or IUCh Ucen... commltmenta.

We dluaree with Comml11loner Alael1tlne's belief mat devlailon1 from the PSAR or other lleenaee controlled doalmenta thould INt treated ln the am*

manner ** fallure1 to comply wlih Tectu,lcal Speclflcatlon1 ~nlalnl the somewhat lener Importance of hae relative to Tecl'lnlcal Spec:lflcatlon vlolatlon1 ln i.rm1 of the potential to adversely lmpac:t ('ubllc health and Nfety.

We ee no Juttlflcatlon for revll.lna NRC lnfotGtlftent Polley u a reau1t of this poHoy ,tatement,

'We apprec:lat* ttse opportunity to provlde our commentl ol'I this proposed poll~)'

1tatemen1 and ttle *portunlty that the CommlHlon'I lnierltn policy statemen1:

provldla for us to improve our Technlc:al ~lflcat1on1 and betier achieve the obJectlve1 for it1hlch they were Intended. We remain av-allable to dlacua our views of th11 subject with the Staff u 111Ce11Uy.

Verr 1rul1 youn, NORTHIAST UTILrl'IIS SIRVICB COMPANY

MAR.24 '87 12:22 NRC MESSAGE CENTER BETHESDA MD p.006 .1 U.S. N1.1elear R*&u1a1:0ry Commlulon 112.,,,, ... ,

March ZJ, 19&1 cca 5. 3. Chllk, Secretary of the Comml111on Dr, T. a. Murle_yLRe&,lon I Admlnlltrator

,. J. Shea, NRC ProJect Manapr, Ml111tone Unlt No. 1 r,. H. laf:re, NRC Project Manager, MU11iont Unlt No. 2

!, I., DooHttle, NllC Project Manag*r, MU11tone Unlt No. J P, M. AkttY1ewlcz, NRC ProJect Manager, Haddam Nec:k P!ant T. Rebelow1lcl, Re1ldent lntpector, MIUrtone U"lt Noa. 1 and 2 l, T. Shedlolky 1 Resident lnapector, Mlllsione Unit No. J P. Swetland, ll..lde"t lnapector, Haddam Neck Plant

Georgia Power Company JUc<<EI NUMfJtHPR' 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30308 2ROfOSEQ . __ . -t;?J ~

Telephone 404 526-6526 Mailing Address:

(S",/1,F~ J7cri] (V DOCKETED Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302 us~rnc a, P3....:37 Georgia Power

-cfJt

,,\

L. T. Gucwa '87 MAR Manager Nuclear Safety the southern electnc system and Licensing OFFIC E OF ::~'...t*.C:*i'1\~Y SL-2200 DOCK ETING ,~ S~i< ViC( l 240C BR ANCH March 23, 1987 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Georgia Power Company Comments:

Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Georgia Power Company (GPC) has reviewed the "Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors", as published in the Federal Register on February 6, 1987, and appreciates the opportunity to provide the following comments:

In general, GPC strongly supports the objectives and elements of the Interim Policy Statement (!PS). GPC has taken a significant role in the joint NRG/Industry development of the !PS, and intends to apply the elements of the IPS to the Technical Specifications for the E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant in the near future, as lead plant for the Boiling Hater Reactor Owners Group.

The commission recognizes in the !PS that certain amendments to the regulations are required to support the statement in its entirety.

Additionally, rulemaking is needed to codify the elements of the IPS into 10 CFR 50.36. We believe these rulemaking efforts should proceed immediately.

We understand and support the objective of utilizing avaflable risk insights to augment the deterministic criteria for inclusion of items in the Technical Specifications (TS). However, caution must be used with this approach. The !PS states that Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques should be used to 11 * *

• verify that none of the requirements to be relocated contain constraints of prime importance in l imi ting the likelihood or severity of the accident sequences that are commonly found to dominate risk. 11 It should be noted that major systems known to fall into this category (e.g. RCIC, RHR, SBLC, and RPT) have already been identified in the IPS as appropriate for TS inclusion. The current IPS APR 11987 Aoknow1et1g~ ..hu, ca..,,. -:_

1q **~

• ie ,,, a e *'* ,1, *'* ,L._..

Georgia Power <<\

Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 23, 1987 Page Two wording may be subject to overly broad staff interpretations. Also, plants without PRAs could be improper penalized. Si nee no numerical criteria are provided, even plants with PRAs may be subject to non uniform Safety Evaluations due to the interpretation of individual reviewers. We suggest that more explicit wording be provided. Also, the paragraphs discussing PRA aspects should specifically note that the major systems falling outside the deterministic criteria have been identified, and that few other systems are expected to fall into this category. This will assure that the deterministic criteria are not bypassed.

We believe the area of implementation needs to be further addressed in the IPS. A major concern is availability of staff resources for timely review of owners group topical reports and utility lead plant submittals. How these i terns wi 11 be reviewed, and by what elements of the staff, are important considerations. Current generic TS efforts, of much small er scope, have not always been dealt with in a timely fashion. Examples are lack of issuance of generic letters related to 11 short term improvements 11 identified by industry, and 1 ack of issuance of a Safety Evaluation Report for the BWR Owners Group topical report regarding RPS instrumentation TS improvements. NRC review of IPS related TS changes should be strongly controlled generically within the Technical Specification Coordination Branch, and not by individual staff reviewers. This will assist NRC management in ensuring that the spirit and intent of the policy statement is met.

We believe the IPS should explicitly state that future suggested additions to TS must meet the IPS TS inclusion criteria.

Finally, we would like to briefly respond to the additional views of Commissioner Asselstine:

11

1. * *

• any such policy should contain an explicit statement that the Commission will not entertain changes in testing and surveillance intervals and allowed outage times until licensee maintenance programs are strengthened. 11 Maintenance programs do need to be strengthened, and mechanisms other than TS are available and appropriate. The present intervals are basically without analytical bases. Today's computer technology and knowledge of failure modes and effects demonstrates that lengthening a survei 11 a nee interval or outage time may represent an overall increase in performance and safety. It is potentially contrary to safety to delay implemenation of improved programs.

1240C

Georgia Power <<\.

Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 23, 1987 Page Three

2. 11 I believe the 10 CFR 50.59 review process should be strengthened before licensees are given the flexibility afforded this interim policy."

The addition of items deleted from TS to the 10 CFR 50.59 process represents a relatively small addition to the overall scope of 50.59, which includes design changes and procedure changes. Moreover, the IPS specifies processes in addition to 50.59 which must be used for control of relocated items. Thus, we do not believe that the IPS requires any change to 10 CFR 50.59.

3. 11

• • • It appears that this policy statement would allow removing the enforceable fire protection requirements from Technical Specifications and placing them in a far less enforceable document - the Final Safety Analysis Report. 11 Fire protection requirements have been relocated to the FSAR for Plant Hatch, as well as several other plants, under the provisions of NRC Generic Letter 86-10. Implementation of the IPS is not necessary to effect this change. The argument that requirements removed from TS are less enforceable is not believed to be correct. Minor and major enforcement actions, including civil penalties have been levied in the areas of waste transportation, emergency planning, QA, and security.

These items are not included in the TS.

We express our appreciation to the NRC staff and Commissioners for promulgating a policy statement which provides for significant progress in the area of Technical Specification reform.

Please contact this office if you desire further information in this regard.

Sincerely, L. T. Gucwa REB/1 c c: Georgia Power Company Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.

Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.

GO-NORMS l 240C

U.S. NUCLEAR REGf.1 1P"'"'" roMMISSIOr-4 DOCKET1t-1r. r. '" . ** C:.ECTION OFFIG *:,*  :*-: ** ;* q\~Y OF T' i . 'I ,: I : :. ION Ponmark [),, !, X<'.) ~

Copies Rec , . ' /

Add'ICop,~ s1<,". -* , ,;1.._ -* -

Special Dist rib~ iQn f?. I ru,. . ~

NUM8ERPR JOCf(El GOfOIED iUUi. t'K~~ <J)

(5AF~ ~

STU ART A. WEBSTER ooc;KETED ATTO R NEY AT LAW USNRC 280 WESTE R LY TERRACE -

P.O. BOX 136 '87 t1AR 23 P3 :11 ROCKY H ILL, CONNECTICUT 06067 GENERAL AND PATENT LAW Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary c/o Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (52FR3788, 2/6/87).

Dear Sir:

I have reviewed the proposed interim policy statement on technical specification improvements. I am pleased to see the advances made in this area in the relatively short period of the past two years. I endorse the general content and intent of this statement of Commission policy. The policy statement has a limited, but important, purpose. By adherence to this limited purpose, the Commission has enabled this important effort to proceed expeditiously. The Commission and industry are encouraged to continue with the implementation of the improvements envisioned in it.

There are a large number of details to be worked out in the implementation of the restructured standard technical specifications by the four light water r eactor owners groups. Two main points need to be considered if it is to be successfully implemented:

1. If the improvements in technical specifications are to be accepted on a large scale, they must not be used to backfit requirements on older plants. Operating plants must be allowed to incorporate the improvements to their existing set of technical specifications.

2. The licensing of plant specific implementation of a set of restructured technical specifications must be kept simple. It is expected that about 40% of a plant's technical specifications may not meet the criteria for retention in the operating license. : *.The*.

federal register notice for this many individual changes for one plant would be a small book. For many plants it could be a multi-volume library. No legitimate public purpose would be served by such volume of paper, and the diversion of NRC and industry effort s would be counter-productive to increased safety.

Attached are a few, more detailed comments. If you have any questions concerning my comments, please feel free to contact me at (203) 285-4405.

Very truly yours,

,1-----,---a. µ;~

Acknowledged by card .** -~~~-~.:.~~~

il.f. M.JC(EAR ,m;ur ,UORY COMMISSIOB

~~~IP,fO ~ ifitVfCi siCTIO omt."£ (j : 1, ,,; "ff P.t1AR.V

('ft; 1* t r,-:,M~!. 1 :.'.! '(JN

====-----..r*,_*..,..,g,.,_**,...*....,.._..,._.., ,.,,.,..--~---

Mr . Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Comments on proposed interim policy statement on technical specification i mprovements.

Detailed Comments

1. I agree with the statement of purpose of technical specifications as set forth in Section III of the policy statement. A reordering of phrases as follows would clarify the intent further:

The purpose of Technical Specifications is to impose those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety by identifying those features which are of controlling importance to safety and establishing on them those conditions of operation which cannot be changed without prior Commission approval.

2. Although the intent of the policy is to encourage the wholesale upgrading of a plant's technical specifications, there is no reason why the criteria of the policy statement cannot be applied to individual portions of the technical specifications if done properly. Once the generic application of the criteria is completed by each owners group, the application of the criteria to individual sections will be clearer. In the interim, where there are areas which the staff and applicants can agree on, such changes should be approved.

3. The reports of the NRC's Technical Specification Improvement Project and the AIF's Subcommittee on Technical Specification Improvements transmitted by SECY-86-10, and referenced in the policy statement, contain many other suggestions for improvements which should be implemented . One of these is rulemaking to permit some of the lesser important items, such as RETS, to be relocated to other control documents. This is recognized i n the policy statement at 52FR3791, and the Commission is urged to pursue this in implementation of the improvements being developed. Specifically, the Commission's proposed revision to 10CFR50 Appendix J, Containment Leakage Testing (51FR39538, 10/29/86), contains such an inappropriate provision requiring implementation through technical specifications.

4. The present criteria were developed because the previous proposed rule, 47FR13369, March 30, 1982, was not implemented for lack of just such criteria . A listing of other criteria considered in the development of the present criteria, but rejected for various reasons, is contained in Appendix D to the AIF report of October 1, 1985 (contained in SECY 10).

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Comments on proposed interim policy statement on technical specification improvements. (continued)

5. The following are accomplished by this policy statement:

1. Efforts are being focused on those things which are of real importance to safe plant operation.

2. An important plant document is being made more usable to both the operator and those involved in the licensing and regulatory processes.

3. The licensing process will ultimately be improved as fewer things of low safety significance go through the amendment process of 10CFR50.91 and 50.92.

4. The NRC and industry have set an example of cooperation towards achieving a common goal which neither could accomplish alone.

6. Now that this progress has been made, the real test is yet to come. The magnitude of the effort required for the next step is large. There is a real danger that the effort will become lost in a morass of detailed review. The cooperation evidenced in getting this far must continue.

The next step in the technical specification improvement process is for the four light water reactor owners' groups to prepare and submit topical reports These topicals will apply this criteria and make other improvements, such as in the application of human factors and upgrading of the bases. It must be recognized that although there is an unprecedented amount of cooperation in this effort, each owners' group is preparing its own version of the restructured standard technical specification topical report. The NRC staff must be prepared to cope with four different versions. These versions will have a consistent format, but will differ in style and presentation of information. I believe that these four separate efforts will eventually lead to an overall better end product, in a timely manner.

7. While the editorial content of a given restructured technical specification may not differ materially from that of an existing plant specific set of technical specifications, technical content may differ.

Both the plant's old set, and the new generic set of numbers will have been approved. In such a case, the plant should be permitted to use whichever of the approved numbers it finds appropriate for its technical specifications. Such differences should be noted in the bases with justification, or at least notation as to the source of the number used.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Comments on proposed interim policy statement on technical specification i mprovements. (continued)

8. The following is suggested as a possible method for plant specific implementation:

1. Owners group's generic topical report submitted and approved.

2. Plant specific submittal prepared and submitted to NRC containing:

a. Revised set of technical specifications and bases.

b. Requirements to be relocated .

c. Discussion of differences between old technical specifications and new, restructured technical specifications.

3. NRC staff reviews submittal and issues safety evaluation report (SER).

4. Applicant submits license amendment incorporating approved changes.

a. This could be submitted with 2. and held pending issuance of SER .

b. Applicant updates submittal for any interim changes in old technical specifications since original plant specific submittal of restructured technical specifications.

5. NRC issues Federal Register notice clearly stating what is being proposed, but in brief. Reference is made to plant specific submittal and SER, and to location s where they can be examined .

(This is instead of listing each individual change.)

6. Upon expiration of comment period, NRC staff approves change and issues Federal Register notice to that effect. Revisions are approved subject to implementation at a specified future date to permit the necessary changes in plant documentation.

7. Plant implements new, restructured technical specifications. (This may be six to eighteen months following approval . )

"87 tfAR 23 PS :02

• -m**~*****11111G March 23, 1987 LD-87-014 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk

• Office of the Seci-etary cl o Document Control Deak

. U.S. Nucleal" Regulatory Commission 9 Washington, D. C. 02555

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Polley Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactol"S (52FR3788, February 6, 1987)

Dear Sir:

On February 6, 1987, the NRC published in the Federal Register the s ubject policy statement and requested comments by March 23, 1987.

Combus tion Engineering ( C* E) is pleased to see the progress made in this area during the past two years and we appreciate the opportunity to provid e our comments.

Combustion Engineering endorses the general content of the interim policy statement and commends the NRC staff for their cooperation towards a common goal of s treamlined and improved technical specifications. We encourage the ataff to continue these successful cooperative efforts durinr:t the implementation proces s.

The industry has committed significant resources to improving technical ,

specifications . These include efforts to develop vendor specific ,

restructured stan dard technical specifications. Favorable implementation of these improved technical specifications will depend largely on the NRC's ability to provide timely reViews of the program submittal&. In addition, C-E continues to support the need for the "short term" improvements to be implemented in parallel with the larger term ongoing tasks , We understand that some improvements were to have been promulgated by NRC by December 31 , 1986, however, final action has not yet been taken. Given the desire to include the "short term" issues in the restructured standard technical specifications , C-E encourages the staff to isau e the necessary guidance so that the Owne'l'S Group p rograms can effectively accommodate these improv ements in the program to restructure the standard technical specifications .

Power Systems 1000 Prospect Hill Road (203) 688-1911 Combustion Engineering, lno, Post Office Box 500 Telex: 99297 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 q_

, I '

• I I ff

w,t. UCL~/ '.; r:-,... , '"'")~Y COMMISSIO r,cc;<r r* ' ' \ fr~ SECTION r* ~~Er\RV *

- . 10,

,liWn r

(-u;;. e Add '! I cia 1.-

,, ON U S N

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk LD-87-014 March 23, 1987 Page 2 The Commission also requested comments as to the benefits for licensees to be able to modify related portions of their LCO's without having to apply the policy statement to all LCO's. We believe that the criteria for screening technical specifications defined in the policy statement can be considered valid for individual LCO's. While the Commission may wish to encourage individual licensees to implement all of the provisions of the policy statement to the entire set of Technical Specifications, selective application of the criteria to individual LCO's need not be prohibited.

In addition, C- E encourages the Commission to apply the critiera established by the policy statements to all proposed future generic technical specification requirements.

Should you have any questions concerning these comments, please feel free to contact me or Mr. J. B. Kingseed of my staff at (203) 285-5213.

Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.

~1',,-JM A.E.~ ~

Director Nuclear Licensing AES:ss

ECOLOGY/ ALERT JOCi<Et NlJM8ERPR .

10X r::.! 1 k?BOfOIEQ 11111 -j-}. ,

. t- 1-O0MSBU RG 1781 5 DOCKET[(;

{ 5~F£ .3?

E emethy , ec *y USHRC a r 18 -87 Co mmissioner es K Ass lstine PS 1"w Pro osed olicy st a te ent -

NRC *87 t1AR 23 ~'Y.>- echnical S ec I m rovernents W sh DC 20555 e Reg - Feb 6- 7, p 3788 er r Asselstine =

Since no addressee was liste on this notice , we ' ll a dress ur oornments to you - ,with. to Docketing e rvice Brancb .

ere it not for your A ---------------------- your integrity - we would never h ve realized this roposal co tains a quantity of fly-shit mixed with the black pe per.

Your oints 1 nd 2: Ba ed on reports -publ shed in v rious jour-n l s and new . stories, we certainly agree th~t licen ee mainten-

- ance prog *rame and NRC eview process need strengthening.

Point '3: It came as a revelation to learn tha t Final a fe~r n alysis Reports a re less enforceable than Standard Technical 13p cs -

a nd that 33 reactors licensed since Jan- 79 re ' t covere by RO fire

• rotection regul a tions, but rather by STS -

and removing them fro m S S wou] d rele gate the m to the less en-foreceable AR.

e tru s t your expose will result in s me back- edalling by the Co mission .

oint 4: e: removal of ar.d DC ower s urc s from STS while a plant sin the decay heat r moval mode, we en orse you recom-mend a tion this not be one . (Not tha t we now beans about t Le tec hnic ities, but we're confident ou wouldri't h ve mention e d it if it weren ' t importa t).

OUR DITI NAL VI EW S:

he phra se-ma1 er who dra fted this monumental piffle has not only "ca pture " - but r a ed and 111 d - Eng i sh synt a x .

For exam le , what's this sup os d to ean?: "The new ST S s hould iTiclude a greater e pha is on huma n fact rs rinci lee in order to a d olari ty an d un rstandi ng to the te t of the STS".

Or th ' : ir t, w ee "The Co i 1 sion does not intend th a t t ese criteria be u ed s the basis for relocatio of individual LC s" .

This is followe immediately by: "LCO which fail to eet a ny one

U.S. NUCLEA-R R:GULATORY COMMISSIOB DOCKET! *,:; ::. sr-r* 11G SECTION o rr1:" ,.,. * * *: :-..:, ETARY:

,ostm.:r'.

Copies :

Add '! '

iSs,ecial L.

or ore of' the ori teria below m y be re ov fr the Techn i c a ecific a t one and reloc a te to other licen ee-- contr lled docu-men s *** "

hi l e y o r policy-dr. fter w s pa re n tly triving tow r mor e picturesque speech, the ( *ncorrect) re eti tion of t he verb "c a1>-

ture" bee me u,onotonou s .

cc : Sec 'y - l RC TT: SK " I G & Sl!; VIC ' BRM CH

,OCKET NUMBER p

{;~;;; .1i~7! &) fl 0CK£T rn US NRC March 17, 1987 COMMENTS OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RE*;PcH~SIBLE ENE*RGV, INC. c*oll EfftR 23 PJ:39 ON INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS, 52 FED REG 3788 ( FEBRUARY 6, 1987). BFFICE OF S~ t., l-h:TAtc Y DOCKETING i<, S[RVICf OCRE does not support this interim policy statement. BRAN CH Insufficient need has been shown for any revisions to the present s yst em; additionally, the changes proposed appear to hold the potential for decreased safet y and enforceabilit y, The stated purpose for this new technical specification policy is that the present system has resulted in voluminous technical specifications which divert "both staff and licensee attention from the more important requirements in these documents to the extent that it has resulted in an adverse but

- unquantifiable impact on safety,

• OCRE finds this to be an insufficient reason for the sweeping changes proposed, needs to be more substantiation for the adverse impact on safety that is claimed to e xist than the bald assertion that this is so. It is ironic that an i ndustry and an agency which claim the ability to quantif y the risks of nuclear power through PRA There techniques, and thus find these risks to be, in their vi ew , so small as to lead to the conclusion that reactors are safe enough, are unable to quantify the "adverse impact" of the present technical specifications yet find this impact to be se r ious enough to warrant deregulatory action. It is incongruent for an agency which has enacted a backfit rule requiring a strict cost-benefit analysis for more stringent regulations to at the same time Ju stif y relaxation of its r egulatory requirements with no analysis at all but merely an unsubstantiated as sertion that the present rules impede safety, Similarly, the NRC has not shown that revisions less radical than those proposed would alleviate any problems which are claimed to exist, For e xam ple , would measures short of relocating items now covered by the technical specifications to other documents ( such as reorganizing or rewriting the technical specifications using human factors principles for greater clarity and ease of usage) be Ju st as successful? wou ldn't it be mor e prudent to try th ese less drastic changes first?

The NRC's rationale for this new policy also implies that licensees are unable to k eep track of all the items which have been included in the technical specifications, such that they are ignoring the the *more important* requ ireme nts therein.

This implication is troubling on two counts. First is the idea that some of the Commissio n' s regulato ry requirements are more important than others, such that they can be relegated

• to less critical, unenforceable documents. The Atomic Energy Act and MAR 2 7 1987* * -

Acknowledged by card ..**********.***

U.S. NUCLEAt! REGULA TOR.Y COMM! SSIOij DOCKETh'JG ?, S~~ VICE SECTION OFF: ~- ,:: r * *,i- r* t r ~ETARY er ~* ..* *. * ** :.*s-N Postma,~ -

Cbpie~

Add' I lpecial ;,:

r

Pa*3e 2 the NRC's regulations do not contemplate selecti v e compliance with regulations; rather, the standard is absolute, unconditional compliance. Secondly, if licensees do not have the technical, human, financial, or managerial resources to comply with all of the NRC's regulations, then the NRC should take the appropriate enforcement actions, including suspending a license, rather than relaxing the regulatory burden to one that can be met with the licensee's deficiencies uncorrected, The new policy also appears to ha ve the potential to increase the burden upon the NRC, instead of reducing it as hoped. The NRC states that i t will be giving increased attention to changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, administrative controls, and FSAR updates,

- The stated pur*pose for technical specifications in the ne 1...1 pelicy statement is to impose those limitations upon reactor operation necessary to pre v ent an immediate threat to public health and safety, What does the NRC mean b y "immediate threat"? Does " immediate " mean the release of such quantities of radioactivity that would cause immediate radiological injuries or fatalities? Would an e v ent releasing lesser quantities of radio activit y, not causing immediate effects but causing latent injuries and deaths, be considered too insubstantial for inclusion of preventive or mitigative factors in the technical specifications? If so, OCRE finds this Lrr,c,ccep tc.b le.

The narrow focus on design basis accidents in Criteria 2 and 3 ( and particularly on the limitation of Criterion 3 to only those systems, structures, and components part of the primary success path of a safet y seque nce analysis) is too restrictive and may ser v e to degrade safety, As Commissioner Asselstine pointed out in his additional v iews, these criteria serve to exclude vital systems, such as AC and DC power sources during decay heat removal mode of operation, operating events ha v e shown that accidents do not always initiate and proceed as planned, Thus , limiting technical specifications to only those items on the primary success path will remove other equipment from the protection of the technical specifications, equipment which may be necessary to prevent disaster if the accident does not proceed as planned, along the primary success path.

OCRE agrees with the additional vi ews of Commissioner Asselstine. OCRE is particularly disturbed by the NRC's insistence on this new policy in spite of its own admission that its enforcement ability will be diminished. OCRE shares commissioner Asselstine's v iew that this is unacceptable.

Similarly, OCRE agrees that licensee maint enance programs must

Pc,ge 3 be strengthened, and no relaxation of testing and surveillance intervals should be permitted until maintenance practices are improved.

Unfortunately, b y this polic y statement the NRC continues its march down the path of deregulation of nuclear power. The Commission, rather than weakening its requirements in fa vor of self-regulatory concepts and the use of administrative controls, should learn the lessons of Chernobyl before such a tragedy is repeated in this country, At Chernobyl administrative controls failed miserably, They are not failure-pruof in this country either. And, if licensees do not have the resources to comply with all the present technical specifications, what assurance is there that compliance will be enhanced if many of these items are removed into other documents? Clearly, what is needed is more regulation and enforcement, not less. The Commission should abandon its flawed technical specification policy statement in favor of more v igorous enforcement of the current

• ystem.

Respectfully submitted, Susan L. Hiatt OCRE Representative 8275 Munson Road Mentor, OH 44060 (216) 255-3158

JOC~ET NUM8£RPR .

eBOf0-8.fD RULE - t). . (j)

(PF£ ~7??

Omaha Public Power Dist11at HAR 23 A10 :56 1623 Harn e y Omaha . Nebraska 681Ll2 -2247 402/536 -4000 March 20, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors On February 6, 1987, the NRC published in the Federal Register the subject policy statement and solicited comments by March 23, 1987. The Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) appreciates the opportunity to comment on this important NRC policy, which will provide benefits to both the nuclear industry and the NRC. The CEOG has actively supported industry efforts relating to technical specification improvements and has committed the resources necessary to develop restructured standard technical specifications for implementation of the improvements authorized by the policy statement.

The CEOG commends the NRC on its timeliness in developing and promulgating this policy.

The CEOG supports the overall language and intent of the interim policy state -

ment. In particular, the CEOG agrees with the policy statement definition of the overall purpose of technical specifications, which is to impose those limitations required to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situations giv -

ing rise to an immediate threat to the health and safety of the public .

While many aspects of nuclear power plant design and operation preserve the public health and safety, it is this concept of immediacy which establishes the threshold for inclusion of a requirement in technical specifications.

The policy statement establishes three criteria consistent with the stated purpose of technical specifications to determine whether or not a requirement should be included. The application on these criteria will undoubtedly be subject to interpretation. While the supporting information in the policy statement provides some clarification of the intent of the criteria , it is suggested that additional information is necessary to fully clarify the application of Criteria 2 and 3 for the reasons provided below.

For some process variables, such as moderator temperature coefficient (MTC),

t he application of Criterion 2 has not resulted in universal agreement as t o 45 S 124 Employme nt with Equal Opportunity Mal e/Fema le l.~knowletlged fr'IAR 2 7 by card . .....**-~

~~!,a

i u s. Alv , {

C I ,.

l, ,_;_ , I L.r 1 _ L , ,I

Samuel J. Chilk March 20, 1987 Page Two whether or not the requirement should be retained in technical specifica-tions. MTC is a process variable assumed as an initial condition in technical specifications. However, the value of MTC is determined by the core design and is a function of burnup, reactor coolant system temperature, power level, etc., and as such, is neither directly controlled nor continuously monitored by the operator. MTC is measured by the performance of special physics tests which are periodically conducted to verify design predictions. The supporting discussion for Criterion 2 would not include MTC in technical specifications, since it is not directly monitored or controlled; however, this conclusion was not shared unanimously in trial applications of the criteria. The policy statement should include information to clarify the application of Criterion 2.

In the case of Criterion 3, the point at which an event no longer presents an immediate threat to the health and safety of the public is not clearly defined. Definition of this point would establish whether a requirement satisfies Criterion 3 and remains in technical specifications. For example, a steam generator tube rupture event may be considered to be terminated when the plant reaches cold shutdown. Alternatively, the event is stabilized when the operator has recognized the occurrence of the event, isolated the affected steam generator and commenced plant cooldown. In the former situation, Criterion 3 would retain a larger set of equipment in technical specifications. The CEOG requests that this aspect of the application of Criterion 3 be clarified in final policy statement.

In addition to the three criteria, the policy statement identifies probabil-istic risk assessment (PRA) as an appropriate tool for defining requirements that should be retained in technical specifications. In an October, 1986 meeting with the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), industry voiced a concern regarding the use of PRA to define the content of technical specifications. The concern was primarily due to uncertainty in the extent of PRA work that would be required and, more broadly, the possible impact of that uncertainty on the level of industry support for technical specifica-tions improvements. Based on the meeting with the EDO, we understand that the level of effort required by industry in implementing the policy statement will be to review those LCOs removed by the criteria relative to the overall body of knowledge gained from the PRAs conducted to date to insure that no LCOs involving significant risk contributors are removed from technical specifications. The PRAs conducted to date have highlighted the four systems identified in the policy statement as significant risk contributors which may be excluded by the criteria but on a risk basis are appropriate for inclusion in technical specifications. Unless there has been a significant increase in the body of PRA knowledge since issuance of the policy statement, no additional effort would be required. Furthermore, the policy statement should recognize PRA as an appropriate tool for removing technical specifi-cations of low risk significance which would otherwise be retained by the criteria.

Samuel J. Chilk March 20, 1987 Page Three The Commission notes that certain rule changes (e.g., 10 CFR 50.36a) are necessary to fully implement the policy statement. In the interim, until the necessary rule changes are made, the Commission should entertain exemption requests (e.g., to 10 CFR 50.36a) to allow full implementation of the policy statement.

Currently, several administrative hurdles must be cleared to obtain license amendments. The license amendment process embodied in 10 CFR 50.91 and 10 CFR 50 . 92 may inhibit timely implementation of the policy statement. The Commission policy for implementation with regard to the no-significant-hazard consideration determinations required by 10 CFR 50.91, should be included in the policy statement. Further, the Commission should set goals for and monitor the performance of the Staff implementation of this policy statement.

The Commission requested comments as to whether it would be beneficial for licensees to be able to modify related portions of their LCOs without having to apply all of the terms and provisions of the policy statement to all LCOs. The criteria for screening technical specifications defined in the policy statement are valid for individual LCOs and reflect the purpose of technical specifications. The selective application of the criteria to individual LCOs should not be prohibited. Furthermore, these criteria should be used in considering future generic technical specification requirements.

If you have any questions regarding our comments, please call me at (402) 536-4555.

g:;.r~k-J. K. Gasper Chairman C-E Owners Group JKG:bjb c: Jim Pfiefer Combustion Engineering 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, CT 06095

IJUJ,;l\t.l NUMtitN ilWfOS.fD RULE PR - ;) u

-71

~

( ff~ F;( J'7tf'"lJ (!!;I DOCKETED ust-mc Southern California Edison Company P . 0 . BOX 800

-S7 HAR 23 A10 :51 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD . CALIFORN IA 91 770 M . 0 . MEDFORD TE LEPHONE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEER I NG (81 8 ) 302 - 1 749 ANO LICENS ING March 20, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention : Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen :

Subject : Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors On February 6, 1987, the NRC published in the Federal Register the subject policy statement and solicited comments by March 23, 1987. The Southern California Edison Company (SCE) appreciates the opportunity to comment on this important NRC policy which promises to offer great benefit both to the nuclear industry and NRC alike. SC E has actively supported industry efforts relating to technical specification improvements and has committed the resources necessary to be the lead plant from the Combustion Engineering Owners Group for implementation of the improvements authorized by the policy statement. SCE commends the NRC on its timeliness in developing and promulgating this policy.

SCE supports the overall language and intent of the interim policy statement. In particular, SCE agrees with the policy statement definition of t he overall purpose of technical specifications which is to impose those limitations required to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation giving rise to an immediate threat to the health and safety of the public .

While many aspects of nuclear power plant design and operation preserve the public health and safety, it is this concept of immediacy which establishes t he threshold for inclusion of a requirement in technical specifications.

The policy statement establishes three criteria consistent with the stated purpose of technical specifications, to determine whether or not a requirement should be included. The criteria would retain in technical specifications: instrumentation that is used to detect a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary (Criterion 1),

process variables which are the initial conditions assumed in the design basis accident and transient analyses (Criterion 2), and equipment that is part of the primary success path and which functions to mitigate design basis accidents or transients (Criterion 3).

Whereas Criterion l is quite simple and should be applied consistently by all licensees, the application of Criteria 2 and 3 will undoubtedly be subject to interpretation. SCE suggests that additional discussion of these will be necessary in order to ensure consistent application.

MAR 2 7 1987 Acknowledged by card ...... .;;..,..'"', ,,, .,. , , ,w

I- J f. \ *.

I u s. r J 1._ *-; r.:GJLATO?Y CO'"' .1~:,10N L... \ I , I _ ' , ,',Cl!

l, {

• I

Mr. Samuel J. Chlik In particular, the application of Criterion 2 has not resulted in universal agreement as to whether or not the requirement for periodic monitoring of parameters not under the direct control of operators should be retained in technical specifications. For example, Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) is a process variable assumed as an initial condition in the accident and transient analyses and currently included in technical specifications as a Limiting Condition for Operation. The value of MTC, however, is determined by the core design and is a function of burnup, reactor coolant system temperature, power level, etc., and as such is indirectly controlled by other parameters and it is not continuously monitored by the operator. MTC is measured by the performance of special physics tests which are periodically conducted to verify design predictions. The policy statement discussion for Criterion 2, does not support inclusion of MTC in technical specificat i ons since it is not directly monitored or controlled by operators.

However, this conclusion was not shared unanimously in trial industry applications of the criteria. SCE suggests that discussion of such parameters be included in the policy statement to clarify the application of Criterion 2.

In the case of Criterion 3 relating to equipment which is assumed to operate as part of the primary success path in the mitigation of accidents and transients, the point at which an event no longer presents an immediate threat to the health and safety of the public is not clearly defined. Whether a requirement satisfies Criterion 3 and remains in technical specifications is determined by definition of when this "i mmediate threat" no longer exists .

For example, the immediate threat of a steam generator tube rupture event may be considered to be terminated when the affected steam generator is isolated, or when control of RCS pressure is regained, or when the reactor is shut down, or when RCS cooldown is initiated or when cold shutdown is achieved . The amount of equipment that must be included in technical specifications pursuant to Criterion 3 would depend on when you considered the "immediate threat" to be terminated. SCE requests that this aspect of the application of Criterion 3 be clarified in final policy statement.

In addition to the three criteria, the policy statement identifies probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as an appropriate tool for defining r equirements that should be retained in technical specifications . In an October 1986 meeting with the Executive Director for Operations (EDD),

industry voiced some concern relating to the policy statement including the use of PRA to define the content of technical specifications . Industry was primarily concerned with the potential cost and scope of effort associated with the use PRA and the effect on the overall level of industry support for t echnical specifications improvements. Based on the meeting with the EDD, we understand that the level of effort required by industry in implementing the policy statement will be to review those LCO's removed by the criteria relative to the overall body of knowledge gained from the PRA's conducted to date to ensure that no LCO's involving significant risk contributors are removed from technical specifications. The PRA's conducted to date have highlighted the four systems identified in the policy statement as significant risk contributors which may be excluded by the criteria but on a risk basis are appropriate for inclusion in technical specifications. Unless there has been a significant increase in the body of PRA knowledge, since issuance of

Mr. Samuel J. Chlik the policy statement, no additional effort would be required. Furthermore, the policy statement should recognize PRA as an appropriate tool for removing technical specifications of low risk significance which would otherwise be retained by the criteria.

The Commission notes that certain rule changes (e.g., 10 CFR 50.36a) are necessary to fully implement the policy statement. In the interim, until the necessary rule changes are made, the Commission should entertain exemption requests (e.g., to 10 CFR 50.36a) to allow full implementation of the policy statement. In addition to the necessary rule changes, SCE encourages the Commission to codify the policy statement as a rule at the earliest opportunity.

The policy statement should address implementation by the NRC Staff. Currently, several administrative hurdles exist which must be overcome to obtain even the most benign license amendments. SCE is concerned that the license amendment process embodied in 10 CFR 50.91 and 10 CFR 50.92 will inhibit timely implementation of the policy statement. SCE encourages the Commission to include in the policy statement guidance for implementation with regard to the no significant hazard consideration determinations required by 10 CFR 50.91. SCE also encourages the Commission to set goals for the Staff relative to implementation of this policy statement and monitor the Staff's performance in this area.

The Commission requested comments as to whether it would be beneficial for licensees to be able to modify related portions of their LCO's without having to apply all of the terms and provisions of the policy statement to all LCO's. The criteria for screening technical specifications defined in the policy statement are valid for individual LCO's and reflect the purpose of technical specifications. While the Commission should encourage individual licensees to implement all of the provisions of the policy statement, the selective application of the criteria to individual LCO's should not be prohibited. Furthermore, SCE encourages the Commission to use these criteria in considering future generic technical specification requirements.

If you have any questions regarding our comments, please call me.

Very truly yours, cc: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V H. Rood, NRC Senior Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 F. R. Huey, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units l, 2 and 3

OOG<<El PWMCUPR .

gRQP98EQ illli - ~ :a (!)

(.5ZF~ J7?j) Telephone (61 7) 8 72-8100 TWX 710-380-7619 YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY

~:a*

00CKEf[ [FYC 87-009 US NH GLA 87- 056 Mass~ s'ffAA~Q°1P2 :59

\..,Y~KEo 16 71 Worcester Road, Framingham ,

---

* March 18, 1987 OFF ICE Or ~:i ..... t*'.t !ARY OOCKEl ING ,\ Sr HVl r.f.

BR ANCH Secretary of the Commission United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on the Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (52FR3788)

Dear Sir:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject interim policy statement on Technical Specification improvements. YAEC owns and operates a nuclear power plant in Rowe, Massachusetts. Our Nuclear Services Division also provides engineering and licensing services to other nuclear power plants in the Northeast, including Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Seabrook.

The AIF Subcommittee on Technical Specifications is filing detailed comments on the subject interim policy statement. We are an active member of AIF and endorse its comments. We would also like to offer the following.

We support the Commission in its efforts to facilitate improvements to the Technical Specifications (TS) now used at nuclear power plants. We believe the interim policy statement incorporates such improvements. We also commend the Commission on maintaining the TS Improvement Program as voluntary. It has been our experience that plants with custom TS have expended a great deal of time in developing and maintaining their TS to ensure that they provide an optimal means of meeting both regulatory requirements and also the needs of their plant and operations staff. As such, converting from custom to standard TS could serve to negate any safety benefit intended by the TS Improvement Program.

In the interest of making the final policy statement a tool available to all licensees, we recommend that the Commission reconsider its position that the criteria be used only by those licensees who convert entirely to the new standard TS. We contend that the objective criteria defined in the policy statement are as valid for one TS as another and that the changes which result from applying the criteria to either all or selective TS will represent an improvement in the overall safety of the facility as intended by the policy statement. Therefore, we recommend that application of the criteria not be restricted. Furthermore, we urge the Commission* to continue to use these criteria in qualifying future generic items for inclusion in the TS.

MAR 2 3 1987 Acknowledged by card . . *.****** , **o-.-n:ww

q O r *,

U.S. NUCLEAR REGUl A TORY COMMISSIOtJ DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFf *c~ r,~ T' *;: SECRET ARY 0* . ,. . .u .,.. !CC 'ON C--opics ,

Add'I r -

• Special D ,

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 18, 1987 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Page 2 We agree with the Commission's statement that risk evaluations are an appropriate tool for defining requirements that should be retained in TS.

However, it is our understanding that, to a large extent, the Commission has already used such a tool in deciding that certain systems will be retained in TS, and what remains as the responsibility of the licensee is the use of risk evaluations and insights, where available, for the additional screening of requirements that are to be relocated and the strengthening of the Bases for those requirements that are to be retained. If this is not the intent, we urge the Commission to clarify its discussion on risk evaluations and insights in the final policy statement. Nevertheless, we do recommend that the Commission replace its statement that "licensees need not await the performance of plant-specific PRA studies before availing themselves of this policy" with the more definitive statement that a licensee is not required to conduct a PRA to screen those TS that are to be relocated or to strengthen the Bases of those TS that are to be retained.

In summary, we urge the Commission to maintain the TS Improvement Program as voluntary, use the decision criteria in qualifying future generic items for TS inclusion, afford licensees the opportunity to use the decision criteria for individual TS improvements, and clarify, if contrary to our understanding, the Commission's intent with regard to use of risk evaluations and insights in the TS Improvement Program.

Very truly yours, tdd~a D. W. Edwards Director of Industry Affairs

uOCKll NUMBER PAMIL........o RULE PR-.i?J

(§i ,:ifl17J;)

DOCKETED

[7590-o fi3 *"ilC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• s7 FEB -4 P3 :42 10 CFR Part 50 Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission.

ACTION: Interim Policy Statement.

SUMMARY

This statement presents the policy of the Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission (NRC) with respect to the scope and purpose of Technical Specifications for nuclear power plants as required by 10 CFR 50.36. It establishes a specific set of objective criteria for determining which regulatory requirements and operating restrictions should be included in Technical Specifications. It encourages licensees to implement a voluntary program to update their Technical Specifications to be consistent with revised vendor-specific Standard Technical Specifications (STS) to be developed by the industry based on these criteria and subj ect to NRC Staff approval.

The Policy Statement also identifies mechanisms to be used by the NRC and industry to control changes to those items removed from Technical Specifications. The Policy Statement is expected to produce an improvement in the safety of nuclear power plants through the development of more operator-oriented Technical Specifications, improved Technical Specification Bases, reduced action statement-induced plant transients, and more efficient use of NRC and industry resources.

DATE: This Interim Policy Statement is effective upon issuance. However, the public is invited to submit comnents by 3/23/87 ,_

• Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or before this date. On the basis of the submitted corrments, the Commission will detennine whether to modify the Policy Statement before issuing it as final.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David C. Fischer, Technical Specifications Coordination Branch, Division of Human Factors Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor 'Regulai1o'n,--u.f:***Nucfear Regulatory Corrmiss-ion, *washington*; o.c-.-*

20555, telephone (301) 492-7924.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. BACKGROUND Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2232),

mandates the inclusion of Technical Specifications in licenses for the opera ti on of P.roduct1on and u'ti 1i zati on faci 1i ti es. The Act re qui res that Technical Specifications include information of the amount, kind, and source of special nuclear material, the place of use, and the specific characteristics of the facility. That section also indicates that Technical Specifications should contain such information as the ColTlllission may by rule deem necessary to enable it to find that the utilization of special nuclear material will be in accord with the co111T1on defense and will provide adequate protection of public health and safety. Finally, that section requires Technical Specifications to be made a part of any license issued.

Section 50.36, "Technical Specifications," which implements Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act, was promulgated by the C0111T1ission on December 17, 1968 (33 FR 18610). This rule delineates requirements for determining the contents ~f Technical Specifications. Technical Specifications set forth the specific characteristics of the facility and the conditions for its operation that are required to provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.36 requires that:

MEach Titens* authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in §50.21 or §50.22 will include Technical Specifications. The Technical Specifications will be derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report, and amendments thereto, submitted pursuant to §50.34. The Comnission may include such additional Technical Specifications as the C01T111ission finds appropriate."

Technical Specifications cannot be changed by licensees without prior NRC appro-val. However_;- since- t969, there tta's been a trend towards including in-- -

4I Technical Specifications not only those requirements derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report but also essentially all other Comnission requirements governing the operation of nuclear power reactors. This extensive use of Technical Specifications is due in part to a lack of well defined criteria (in either the body of the rule or in some other regulatory document) for what should be included in Technical Specifications. This has contributed to the volume of Technical Specifications and to the several fold increase, since 1969, in the number of license amendment applications to effect changes to the Technical Specifications. It has diverted both staff and licensee attention from the more important requirements in these documents to the extent that it has resulted in an adverse but unquantifiable impact on safety.

On March 30, 1982, the NRC published in the Federal Register (47 FR 13369) a proposed amendment to its regulations, 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities. 11 The propose_d amendment would have revised §50.36, "Technical Specifications, to establish a new system of specifications divided into two general categories. Only those specifications contained in the first general category as Technical Specifications would have become part of the operating license and require prior NRC approval for any changes. Those specifications contained in the second general category would have become supplemental specifications and would not require prior NRC approval for most changes. The NRC review of the first general category of specifications would have been the same as

currently perfonned for Technical Specifications changes, which are amendments* to the operating license. For the second category, supplemental specifications, the licensee would have been allowed to make changes within specified conditions without prior NRC approval. The NRC would have reviewed these changes when they were made and would have done so in a manner similar to that currently used for reviewing design changes, tests, and experiments perfonned under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

Because of difficulties with defining the criteria for dividing the Technical Specifications into* the two categories* of the proposed rule and *other* higher*

4t priority licensing work, the rule change was deferred.

In the past several years the nuclear industry and the NRC Staff have been~_

studying the question of whether improvement to the current system of establishing Technical Specification requirements for nuclear power plants is needed. The two most recent studies of this issue were perfonned by an NRC task group known as the Technical Specifications Improvement Project (TSIP) and a Subconmittee of the Atomic Industrial Forum's (AIF) Conmittee on Reactor Licensing and Safety. 1 The overall conclusion of these studies was that many improvements in the scope and content of Technical Specifications are needed, and that a joint NRC and Industry program should be initfated to implement these improvements. Both of these groups made specific recommendations which are summarized as follows:

1) The NRC should adopt the criteria for defining the scope of Technical Specifications proposed in the AIF and TSIP reports. Those criteria should then _be used by the NRC and each of the nuclear steam supply 1sECY-86-10, Recommendations for Improving Technical Specification," dated 11 January 13, 1986, contains both "Recommendations for Improving Technical Specifications," NRC Technical Specifications Improvement Project, September 30, 1985, and "Technical Specifications Improveme~ts, AIF 11 Subcorrmittee on Technical Specifications Improvements, October 1, 1985.

system vendor owners groups to completely rewrite and streamline the existing Standard Technical Specifications (STS). This process would result in many requirements being transferred from control by Technical Specification requirements to control by other mechanisms [e.g., the Final Safety* Analysis Report (FSAR), Operating Procedures, Quality Assurance (QA) Plan] which would not require a license amendment or prior NRC approval when changes are needed. The new STS should include greater emphasis on human factors principles in order to add clarity and understanding to the text of the STS. The new STS should also provide improvements to the Bases Section of Technical Specifications which e provides the purpose for each requirement in the specification.

2) A parallel program of short-term improvements in both the scope and substance of the existing Technical Specifications should be initiated in addition to developing a new STS as identified in (1) above.

II. DISCUSSION The Coomission recognizes the advantages of improved Technical Specifications.

Clarification of the scope and purpose of Technical Specifications will provide useful guidance to both the NRC and industry and should serve as an It important incentive for industry participation in a voluntary program to improve Technical Specifications. It will result in Technical Specifications that focus licensee's and the plant operator's attention on those plant conditions most important to safety and should also result in more efficient use of agency and industry resources.

The Policy Statement identifies three objective criteria for defining the scope of Technical Specifications. These criteria are intended to be consistent with the scope of Technical Specifications as stated in the Statement of Consideration accompanying the current rule.

The Statement of Consideration discusses the scope of Technical Specifications as including the following:

"In.the revised systein, emphasis is placed on two general classes of technical matters: (1) those related to prevention of accidents, and (2) those related to mitigation of the consequences of accidents. By systematic analysis and evaluation of a particular facility, each applicant is required to identify at the construction permit stage, those items that are directly related to maintaining the integrity of the physical barriers designed to contain radioactivity. Such items are expected to be the subjects of Technical Specifications in the operating license."

e 33 FR 18610 (December 17, 1968). The first of these two general classes of technical matters to be included in Technical Specifications i,s captured by criterion (1) and to some extent criterion* (2) in that they address systems -

and process variables that alert the operator to a situation when accident initiation is more likely. The second general class of technical matters is explicitly addressed and captured by criteria (2) and (3). By applying the three criteria contained in the Policy Statement a licensee should capture all of those specific characteristics of its facility and the conditions for its operation that are required to meet the principal operative standard in Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act, that is, that adequate protection is provided to the health and safety of the public.

The Co0111ission recognizes that the three criteria carry with them a corranon theme of focusing on those requirements related to technical matters dealing with those features of a facili.ty that are of controlling importance to safety. Since many of the requirements are of irrmediate concern to the health and safety of the public, the Policy Statement adopts, for the purpose of relocating requirements from Technical Specifications to other licensee-controlled documents, the subjective statement of the purpose of Technical Specifications expressed by an' Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Portland General Electric Company (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263 (1979). There the Appeal Board interpreted Technical Specifications as being reserved for those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnonnal

situation ot event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health 4

and safety. The Conmission wishes to emphasize that this Policy Statement is intended to be consistent with the language of Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act, 10 CFR 50.36, and previous interpretations of the regulations.

It merely clarifies the scope and purpose of Technical Specifications by identifying criteria which can be used to establish, more clearly, the framework for Technical Specifications (i.e.-, identify those requirements derived from the analyses and evaluation included in th*e safety analysis report and which are of irrmediate concern to the health and safety of the publfc)". . It identifies r*e*quir.emen°ts which shoulct"l:>e* reta-ined fo**Te*chnfcal ,c*

Specifications and also describes a mechanism whereby other 11 additional 11 requirements can be identified and controlled through mechanisms other than Technical Speci~ications.

The Conmission invites public corrment on this Policy Statement and particularly invites corrment on the statement of the purpose of Technical

• Specifications which introduces the text of the Policy Statement and on whether it would be beneficial for licensees to be able to modify related portions of their LCOs (such as containment systems) without having to apply the tenns and provisions of the Policy Statement to all LCOs.

III. THE COMMISSION'S POLICY The purpose of Technical Specifications is to impose those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnonnal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety by establishing those conditions of operation which cannot be changed without prior Corrmission approval and by identifying those features which are of controlling importance to safety.

Licensees are encouraged to implement a program to upgrade their Technical Specifications consistent with this purpose. The Commission will entertain requests based on the criteria below (as clarified by the supporting discussion) for individual license amendments that evaluate all of the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) for an individual plant to determine

which -LC0s*shouid be included in the Technical Specifications. The Comnission does not intend that these criteria be used as the basis for relocation of individual LC0s. LC0s which fail to meet any one or more of the criteria below may be removed from the Technical Specifications and relocated to other licensee-controlled documents, such as the FSAR or licensee procedures. The-criteria may be applied to either Standard or custom Technical Specifications. However, it is expected that each of the nuclear steam supply system vendor owners groups will undertake the development of revised STS based on this Policy Statement, and we encourage licensees to use the revised STS as the ~asis for their-'indivfaual plarit

- Technical Specifications. The NRC will give first priority in its Technical Specifications improvements efforts to the review and approval of the *revised STS and the plant specific license amendment applications based on them.

Approved short term Technical Specifications improvements will be included in the revised STS. The revised STS and individual license amendme_nt requests that are submitted based on this Policy Statement should incorporate all tenns and provisions of the Policy Statement.

The following criteria delineate those constraints on design and operation of nuclear power plants that are derived from the plant safety analysis report and belong in Technical Specifications in accord with 10 CFR 50.36 and the

- purpose of Technical Specifications stated above.

Criterion 1: Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary:

Discussion of Criterion 1: A basic concept in the adequate protection of the public health and safety is the prevention of accidents.

Instrumentation is installed to detect significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary so as to allow operator actions to either correct the condition or to shut down the plant safely, thus reducing the likelihood of a loss-of-coolant accident.

This criterion is intended to ensure that Technical Specifications control those instruments specifically installed to detect excessive reactor coolant system leakage.

Criterion 2: A process _variable that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident_ (OBA) or Transient Analyses that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier:

Discussion of Criterion 2: Another basic concept in the adequate

• protection of the public health and safety*is that the-plant shal4*be operated within the bounds of the initial conditions asstnned in the existing Design Basis Accident and Transient Analyses. These analyses

• consist of postulated events, analyzed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), for which a structure, system, or component must meet specified functional goals. These analyses are contained in Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR (or equivalent chapters) and are identified as Condition II, III, or IV events (ANSI N 18.2) (or equivalent) that either assume the*failure of or present a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

As used in Criterion 2, process variables are only those parameters for which specific values or ranges of values have been chosen as reference bounds in the Design Basis Accident or Transient Analyses and which are monitored and controll~d during power operation such that process values remain within the analysis bounds.

The purpose of this criterion is to capture those process variables that have initial values assumed in the Design Basis Accident and Transient Analyses, and which are monitored and controlled during power operation.

So long as these variables are maintained within the established values, risk to the public safety is presumed to be acceptably low.

Criterion 3~:: ... A structure, system, or component that is* part of the primary success path* and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier:

Discussion of Criterion 3: A third concept in the adequate protection of the public health and safety is that in the event that a postulated Design Basis Accident or Transient should occur, structures, systems, and components are available to function or to actuate in order to

- tnftigate the consequence of the De:sign* Basfs Accident -or* Transfenf.-

Safety sequence analyses or their equivalent have been perfonned in recent years and provide a method of presenting the plant response to an accident. These can be used to define the primary success paths.

A safety sequenc~ analysis is a systematic examination of the actions required to mitigate the consequences of events considered in the plant's Design Basis Accident and Transient Analyses, as presented in Chapters 6 and 15 of the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (or equivalent chapters). Such a safety sequence analysis considers all applicable events, whether explicitly or implicitly presented. The primary success path of a safety sequence analysis consists of the combination and sequences of equipment needed to operate (including consideration of the single failure criteria), so that the plant response to Design Basis Accidents and Transients limits the consequences of these events to within the appropriate acceptance criteria.

It is the intent of this criterion to capture into Technical Specifications only those structures, systems, and components that are part of the primary success path of a safety sequence analysis. Also captured by this criterion are those support and actuation systems that are necessary for items in the primary success path to successfully function.

~ 11 -

In addition--to those structures, systems, and components captured by the above criteria, it is the Comnission's policy that licensees retain in their Technical Specifications LCOs, action statements, and Surveillance Requirements for the following systems (as applicable) which operating experience and probabilistic risk assessment have generally shown to be

-important to public health and safety:

0 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/Isolation Condenser, 0

Residual Heat Removal (RHR),

Standby-Liquid Control (SBLC), and 0

Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT).

The Comnission recognizes that features of plant design and operation not addressed in the safety analysis report's Design Basis Accidents or Transient Analyses can, in-some cases, be significant contributors to the plant's overall core melt probability and risk. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission may include such additional Technical Specifications as the Cormnission finds appropriate. Based on this, and consistent with the Conrnission's Safety Goal and Severe Accident Policy Statements, the Comnission finds that risk evaluations are an appropriate tool for defining requirements that should be retained in Technical Specifications where including such requirements is consistent with the purpose of Technical Specifications as defined above.

The Corrmission expects that owners groups, in preparing their proposals to streamline the Standard.Technical Specifications, will utilize the available literature on risk insights and Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs). This material should be employed to strengthen the technical bases for those requirements that remain in Technical Specifications, when applicable, and to verify that none of the requirements to be relocated contain constraints of prime importance in limiting the likelihood or severity of the accident sequences that are commonly found to dominate risk. Similarly, the Staff will also employ risk insights and PRAs in evaluating the revised STS.

In some casei;*plant-s~ecific PRAs or risk surveys conducted, for example, pursuant to the C01111Tiission's Severe Accident Policy, may be available to licensees as they prepare license amendments to adopt the revised STS to their plant, or to streamline custom Technical Specifications under this Policy Statement. Where such PRAs or surveys are available, they should be used to strengthen the Bases and screen those Tec~nical Specifications to be relocated, as suggested above. Where such plant-specific risk surveys are unavailable, licensees should utilize the available literature on risk insights and PRAs, as described above. However, licensees need not await the perfonnance of plant-specific PRA studies before availing themselves of-this*

- policy. As in the case of the revised STS discussed above, the Staff will also utilize risk insights and PRAs in evaluating the plant-specific submittals.

Further, as a part of the Comnission's ongoing program of improving Technic~)

Specifications, it will continue research in methods to make better use of -

risk and reliability considerations for defining future generic Technical Specification requirements.

Requirement(s) which would be relocated from Technical Specifications to another licensee-controlled document (e.g., the FSAR and 10 CFR 50.59, Operating Procedures, the QA Plan, or Fire Protection Plan) may be changed or deleted in conjunction with the filing of the revised STS or of individual 9 license amendment request to implement this Policy Statement. The package containing the revised STS or the amendment request must contain a clear statement of the basis of the requirement(s) to be changed or deleted, a safety evaluation, and a statement that the change(s) has been reviewed by a multidisciplinary group of responsible, technical sup~rvisory personnel, including onsite operations personnel.

When licensees submit amendment requests based on this Policy Statement, they should identify the location of, and controls for, the technical and administrative requirements of the removed Technical Specifications. The Staff will carefully review these submittals to ensure the accountability of each relocated requirement.

Appropriatif~urveillance requirements and action statements should be retained for each LCO which remains in the Technical Specifications. Each LCO, Action Statement, and Surveillance Requirement should have supporting Bases. The Bases should at a minimum address the following questions ~nd cite references to appropriate licensing documentation (e.g., FSAR, Topical Report) to support the Bases *

1. What is the justification for the Technical Specification, i.e., which criterion requires it to be in the Technical-Specifications?

e 2. What are the Bases for each Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO),

i.e., why was it determined to be the lowest functional capability or performance level for the system/component in question necessary for ,

safe operation of the facility and what are the reasons for the Applicable Operational Modes(s) for the LCO?

3. What are the Bases for each Action Statement, i.e., why should this remedial action be taken if the associated LCO cannot be met, how does this action relate to other Action Statements associated with the LCO, and what justifies continued operation of the system/component at the reduced state from the state specified in the LCO for the allowed time

- period?

4. What are the Bases for each Limiting Safety System Setting?

5. What are the Bases for each Surveillance Requirement and the surveillance interval specified, i.e., what specific functional requirement is the surveillance designed to verify, and why is this surveillance necessary at the specified frequency to assure that the system/component function is maintained, that facility operation will be within the safety limits, and that the LCO will be met?

NOTE: . ~r~~answering these questions the Bases for each number (e.g.,

Trip Set point, Response Time, Allowed Outage Time, Surveillance Test Interval), state, condition, and definition (e.g., operability) should be clearly specified. As an example, a number might be based on engineering judgment, past experience, and/or PRA insights but this should be clearly stated.

The COfl1Tlission recognizes that certain amendments to the regulations 2 may be necessary before the content of Technical Specifications can be limited

_, **entirely* to -the* purpose dEfffriecl *above as embodied ~in- the ass*ociated* crlteria

- (e.g., §50.36a on Radiological Environmental Technical Specifications would have to be amended before radiological effluent controls can be transferred from the Technical Specifications to other documents). The Staff will initiate in parallel with issuance of this Policy Statement the rule changes necessary to fully implement this Policy.Statement.

To give added assurance that the conditions and limitations currenily contained in Technical Specifications that will be removed are adequately controlled, the NRC will give increased attention to changes made pursuant to

§50.59 and to the administrative control requirements of the Technical Specifications. The NRC is paying closer attention to FSAR updates, and will specifically look for changes which potentially violate §50.59. The Staff is encouraging industry to get the help of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the support of the Nuclear Utility Management Resource Committee (NUMARC), in sponsoring activities to encourage the highest quality for utility review of changes,including those made pursuant to §50.59. The NRC will work with industry to develop a standard for the conduct of §50.59 reviews. This standard will then be afforded regulatory status (e.g., by a separate policy statement, regulatory guide, or generic letter). In the interim, utilities that choose to file an application to amend their Technical 2Ibid, Enclosure 1, Table 3.1.

Spec1f1cat1ons. 1n accordance with this Policy Statement must have in place administrative controls to ensure that changes made pursuant to §50.59 are made only after the bases for the requirement have been clearly established and after review by a multidisciplinary review group made up of responsible, technical supervisory personnel, including onsite operations personnel. In addition, if Technical Specification requirements are relocated to plant procedures, then the revised Technical Specifications must contain administrative controls to ensure that they are appropriately maintained and implemented. The Staff will issue guidance on the appropriate control mechanisms for -requirements removed from Technical Spe-cffications (e.g.-, FSAR - --

- amendment, procedures, or other licensee-controlled document) in time for use when the Policy Statement is issued in final fonn.

The NRC will, consistent with its mission, allocate resources as necessary to implement this Policy Statement.

IV. ENFORCEMENT POLICY Any changes to a licensees' Technical Specifications to apply this Policy Statement's criteria will be made by the license amendment process prior to implementation. Continued compliance with Technical Specifications and with

- the commitments contained in other licensee-controlled documents is required by the Commission. Violations and deviations will, as in the past, be subject to the Enforcement Policy in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, (1986).

If a licensee elects to apply these criteria, the requirements of the removed specifications will be relocated to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or other licensee controlled documents. Licensees must operate their facilities in confonnance with the descriptions of their facilities and procedures in their FSAR unless the change is reviewed and approved in accordance with §50.59. The Commission will take appropriate enforcement action to ensure that licensees comply with FSAR commitments and §50.59.

Changes to the provisions of other documents (e.g., QA plan, plant procedures) are subject to the specific requirements for those documents.

Nothing in this-Policy Statement shall limit the authority of the NRG to conduct inspections as d~emed necessary and to take appropriate enforcement action when regulatory requirements or corranitments are not met.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE-Conmissioner Asselstine adds the following: I disapprove this interim policy statement. Although I support an effort to bring about improvements in plant Technical Specifications, I believe that this policy statement must be modified in four resp*ects:" First, any sud- policy should contain an explicit --

- statement that the Commission will not entertain changes in testing and surveillance intervals and allowed outage times until licensee maintenance programs are strengthened. Second, I believe the 10 CFR 50.59 review process should be strengthened before licensees are given the flexibility afforded ~

this interim policy. Third, this interim policy weakens the Commission's enforcement options for some important safety requirements now contained in the Technical Specifications. For example, plants licensed since January 1, 1979 (33 full power licenses thus far) are not covered by the requirements of the Commission's fire protection regulations- (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R). Instead, the Technical Specifications and license conditions have been used as the vehicle for establishing enforceable fire protection e requirements for the plants licensed since 1978. It appears that this policy statement would allow removing the enforceable fire protection requirements from the Technical Specifications and placing them in a far less enforceable document -- the Final Safety J1.nalysis Report. The February 7, 1986 memorandum from the Acting Director for Operations to the ColliT1issioners

(

Subject:

Test Application of TSIP Technical Specificatfon Selection Criteria) indicates that fire detection instrumentation, fire suppression systems and fire barriers would no longer be covered by the Technical Specifications. As the NRC staff admits, 11 (T)he NRC's ability to fine a licensee or to seek escalated enforcement action against a licensee who fails to comply with some relocated Technical Specifications is somewhat diminished." This is unacceptable. At a minimum, the Corrnnission should treat failures to meet safety provisions in the Final Safety Analysis Report and other such controlled documents in the same manner as failures to comply with Technical Specifications.

Finally, the February 7, 1986 memorandum indicates that AC and DC power sources would not be covered by Technical Specifications while the plant is in the decay heat removal mode. These power sources are not deemed vital because events in this mode or operation are not "design basis accidents." I find this argument troubling. The significance of the decay heat rem9val function is described in, for example, the NRC's Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data report "Decay Heat Removal Problems at U.S.

Pressurized Water Reactors" AEOD/C5O3, December, 1985. I fail to see the wisdom of not addressing power sources in the Technical Specifications while the pl ant' is in the --decay-heat-removal mode. -Therefore, I -musf question the-adequacy of the selection criteria for what is and is not to remain in the Technical Specifications.

I would appreciate receiving comments on the above.

Dated at Washington, D.C., this ~~ day of ~~~"Lt , 1987.

\

For the Nuclear Regulatory Corrunission Co11111ission.