ML23116A182

301 2A-3

ML23116A182
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/26/2023
From:	Division of Reactor Safety II
To:
References
Download: ML23116A182 (1)

Text

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: _Catawba Nuclear Station______

Date of Examination: _02/27/23____

Examination Level:

RO X

SRO Operating Test Number: _2023301___

Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

Conduct of Operations Perform Manual Shutdown Margin Calculation G 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables (reference potential). 3.9/4.2 R, M Conduct of Operations Calculate FWST Makeup G 2.1.23 Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition. 4.3/4.4 R, D Equipment Control Determine Isolation Boundary G 2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings (reference potential). 3.5 / 3.9 R, P Radiation Control Calculate Total RL Discharge Flow G 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases.

3.8/4.3 R, M Emergency Plan ML23116A182

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: _Catawba Nuclear Station______

Date of Examination: _02/27/23_____

Examination Level:

RO SRO X

Operating Test Number: _2023301___

Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

Conduct of Operations Evaluate Shift Manning G 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement or overtime limitations (reference potential). 2.9 / 3.9 R, N Conduct of Operations Determine Final BAT level for a Rapid Boration and evaluate Selected License Commitments G 2.1.23 Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition. 4.3 / 4.4 R, P Equipment Control Determine Fire Risk Management Requirements G2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments and work prioritization. 2.6 / 3.9 R, D Radiation Control Review Total RL Discharge Flow and determine LWR approval G 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. 3.8/4.3 R, M Emergency Plan Determine PARs per AD-EP-ALL-0109 G 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementing procedures.

4.5 R, N

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.

3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

• Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).

JPM A.1-1S Evaluate Shift Manning - NEW JPM K/A Generic 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement or overtime limitations (reference potential). (CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

IMPORTANCE: 2.9 / 3.9 Initial conditions are that the applicant is required to review and evaluate crew lineups for three recent shifts in accordance with applicable TS and SLCs. Applicant will determine that the first roster violates SLC 16.13-4 because only the minimum number of required Reactor Operators are available and one is designated as the Fire Brigade Captain. The second roster violates SLC 16.13-4 because an Auxiliary Operator has been assigned Control Room Safe Shutdown and Shift Communicator duties concurrently. The third shift will be determined to meet the requirements of applicable TS and SLCs.

JPM A.1-2S Determine Final BAT level for a Rapid Boration and evaluate Selected License Commitments - Previous Bank JPM 2019 NRC Exam A.1-2S.

K/A Generic 2.1.23 Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition. (CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) IMPORTANCE: 4.3 / 4.4 Initial conditions are that Unit 1 is in Mode 3 following shutdown to investigate an equipment issue at 50 EFPD. Preparations are being made to perform a rapid boration to reach refueling boron concentration. The applicants are directed to determine required boric acid addition to reach minimum refueling concentration, determine Boric Acid Tank #1 level following this addition, and evaluate Tech Specs / SLCs. Per procedure, the applicant will calculate the required boric acid addition and final Boric Acid Tank #1 level. The applicant will then determine that SLC 16.9-12, Condition A, is required to be entered because final BAT #1 tank level is less than required per the COLR.

JPM A.2 Determine Fire Risk Management Requirements - Bank JPM K/A Generic 2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments and work prioritization. (CFR 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.13) IMPORTANCE: 2.6 / 3.9 Initial conditions are that Unit 1 is in Mode 6 for a refueling outage. Workers are welding a bracket in an Aux Feedwater Pump pit. A Fire Detection zone is non-functional. Decay Heat Defense in Depth status has changed to Orange due to equipment failure. The applicant is directed to determine applicable fire watch requirements in accordance with AD-WC-CNS-0420 (Shutdown Rick Management). Additionally, the applicant is required to determine Hot Work requirements for the Aux Feedwater Pump pit in which the welding is occurring.

The applicant will first determine that stated conditions represent Higher Risk Plant Operating Status per the applicable procedure. The applicant will then locate Table 1 and determine an hourly firewatch will be required for the listed Fire Detection zone out of service and then locate Table 2 to determine areas required to be covered (Unit 1 CA Pump Room, 1A Aux Shutdown Panel, and 1B Aux Shutdown Panel). In order to determine Hot Work requirements, the applicant will refer to Table 2 and decide that Hot Work is limited in this area with stated conditions. Per Attachment 1 of the procedure, limited Hot Work requires approval of the Fire Protection Program Manager, or designee, including determination of required protection.

JPM A.3 Review Total RL Discharge Flow and determine Liquid Waste Release approval-Bank JPM WL-003 Modified (provided completed low pressure service water discharge flow surveillance, and required review by SRO).

K/A Generic 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. (CFR 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE: 3.8 / 4.3 Initial conditions are that the low pressure service water discharge header flow instrumentation is inoperable and an LWR package has been delivered to the control room for approval. Applicants are given plant conditions and directed to review PT/0/A/4250/011 (RL Temperature and Discharge Flow Determination) and determine if conditions exist to allow approval of the LWR. Applicant will determine that dilution flow has been miscalculated and the sufficient dilution flow does NOT exist for the LWR approval.

JPM A.4 -

Determine Protective Action Recommendations per AD-EP-ALL-0109 (Offsite Protective Action Recommendations) - NEW JPM K/A Generic 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementing procedures. (CFR 43.5 / 45.11) IMPORTANCE: 4.5 Initial conditions are that a series of events have occurred which results in the declaration of a General Emergency. The applicant is required to determine Protective Action Recommendations per AD-EP-ALL-0111 (Control Room Activation of the ERO), step 1.1.5.

This step will direct the applicant to AD-EP-ALL-0109 (Offsite Protective Action Recommendations). The first decision point is to determine if this is a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident (RPSA). The applicant will be required to review RPSA criteria and then compare information supplied in the initial conditions with Containment Barrier criteria (both Loss and Potential Loss). Once the applicant has determined that the RPSA criteria does apply, they will proceed through the flow chart and be directed to requirements for evacuation and shelter. The candidate will then perform a calculation in order to determine correct wind direction and list associated PARs contained within a table.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station________ Date of Examination: _Feb 2023____

Operating Test Number: _2023301__

Exam Level:

RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems

a.

Respond to inadvertent dilution while shutdown A, L, D, S 1

b.

Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc A, EN, L, M, S 2

c.

Establish NC System Bleed and Feed A, D, EN, L, S

4P

d.

Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators During Shutdown LOCA A, D, L, S 3

e.

Realign CA Suction Source A, L, D, S 4S

f.

Operate Containment Cooling Fans D, S 5

g.

Reset Radiation Monitor Trip Setpoints D, P, S 7

h.

In-Plant Systems

i.

Reset ESPS D/G following Fire suppression actuation E, L, N 6

j.

Place 2A Hydrogen Analyzer in Service D, E, L, R 5

k.

Align Seal Injection to the Unit 1 NC Pumps D, E 4S

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 (5) 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 (8) 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 (3) 1 (EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1 (2) 1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 (7) 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2 (2) 1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3 (1) 2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 (1) 1 (S)imulator

Simulator JPMs JPM a - Respond to an Inadvertent Dilution While Shutdown - Bank JPM - Alternate Path K/A 004 A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Chemical and Volume Control System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Inadvertent boration/dilution (CFR: 41.5 to 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5) IMPORTANCE: 3.9 / 4.1 Initial conditions are that the unit is in Mode 3, with Shutdown banks withdrawn, and a boron dilution event in progress. The applicant is directed to perform Case II of AP/1/A/5500/013 (Boron Dilution). This procedure will direct the applicant to manually trip the reactor and align the charging system for normal boration. During system alignment, the boric acid to blender control valve will fail to open to begin the ALTERNATE PATH.

Once verification that no boric acid flow exists, the applicant will transition to the procedure RNO and open the emergency boration supply valve to complete this JPM.

JPM b - Transfer the ECCS to Hot Leg Recirculation - Modified by failing 1B NI pump start and A train valve in injection line to require alignment of RHR system for Hot Leg Recirc -

Alternate Path K/A 013 A2.01 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: LOCA.

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 /41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE: 4.0 / 4.4 Initial conditions are that a LOCA has been in progress for 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. NI Pump 1B failed to start automatically and could not be started manually. An AO has been dispatched to rack out NI Pump 1B. The CRS instructs the applicant to transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation lineup per EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.4 (Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation). The applicant will successfully secure the 1A Safety Injection Pump and begin valve manipulations to align this train for HLR. When attempted, the Hot Leg Injection isolation valve (1NI-121A) will not open beginning the ALTERNATE PATH. The applicant will then transition to the RNO and attempt to align 1B train Safety Injection for HLR while dispatching an operator to manually open 1NI-121A. Upon unsuccessful alignment of the 1B Safety Injection train (and notification that 1NI-121A cannot be opened), the applicant will align ND (RHR system) for HLR.

JPM c - Initiate RCS Bleed and Feed following loss of Secondary Heat Sink - Bank JPM -

Alternate Path.

K/A WE05 EA1.13 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: ECCS. (CFR: 41.5 to 41.8 / 45.5 to 45.8) IMPORTANCE:3.9 Initial conditions are that a Reactor Trip has occurred due to a loss of both main feed pumps. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps will not function. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 has been entered and Bleed and Feed initiation criteria has been met. The applicant is directed to initiate Bleed and Feed in accordance with FR-H.1. Applicant will stop all NC pumps and manually initiate both trains of safety injection (Only A train will initiate & NV pump cold leg injection valves fail to open). This begins the ALTERNATE PATH. When NV S/I flow cannot be verified, the applicant will start 1B NV pump and 1B NI pump and manually aligns the cold leg injection flowpath from the NV pumps. The applicant will then establish a bleed path from the NC system by opening 2 Pressurizer PORVs to finish the JPM JPM d - Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators Following a Shutdown LOCA - Bank JPM - Alternate Path.

K/A 006 A1.13 - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System, including: Safety Injection tank pressure, level, and boron concentration (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5 / 45.3 / 45.4) IMPORTANCE: 3.5 Initial conditions are Unit 1 is in Mode 4 when pressurizer level and pressure begin to decrease uncontrollably. The CRS enters AP/1/A/5500/027 (Shutdown LOCA) to address the LOCA. The CRS directs the applicant to isolate the Unit 1 Cold Leg Accumulators by performing Enclosure 14 (Isolating Cold Leg Accumulators) of AP/27.

The applicant will attempt to close all Cold Leg Accumulator discharge isolation valves, but only 1A and 1D will isolate. The applicant will transition to the RNO to begin the ALTERNATE PATH. Applicant will isolate the Nitrogen supply to the 1B and 1C Cold Leg Accumulators and then make the valve alignment to vent these accumulators to containment. This JPM is written to terminate at this time since all critical steps have been completed. Complete depressurization of these accumulators would take ~ 30 minutes.

JPM e - Realign CA Suction Source - Bank JPM - Bank JPM - Alternate Path.

K/A 054 AA1.01 - Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater: AFW system (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) IMPORTANCE:4.2 Initial conditions are that the crew is performing actions in EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response) following a reactor trip when alarm 1AD-8, B/1 (UST LO LEVEL) is received. The crew has transitioned to AP/1/A/5500/006 (Loss of S/G Feedwater) Case II (Loss of Normal CA Supply). The CRS directs the applicant to perform the actions of AP-06 Case II beginning at step 7. The applicant will attempt to manually close 1CA-4 (CA Pmps Suct From UST) but is unsuccessful and will dispatch an operator to locally close 1CS-19 (CA Pumps Supply From Upper Surge Tank). Applicant will throttle CA flow to < 600 gpm to conserve UST inventory. Applicant will then attempt to break condenser vacuum from the control room, but is unsuccessful and dispatches operators to locally open the vacuum breaker valves. Operators are unable to locally open the vacuum breaker valves to begin the ALTERNATE PATH. Applicant will then align RN (Nuclear Service Water) to supply the running CA pumps to complete the JPM.

JPM f - Operate Containment Cooling System Fans - Bank JPM.

K/A 022 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans. (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) IMPORTANCE:3.7 Initial conditions are that a secondary steam leak is occurring. The CRS directs the applicant to perform step 9 of AP/1/A/5500/028 (Secondary Steam Leak). The applicant will determine, based on conditions specified in the procedure, that the leak is occurring inside containment. The applicant will then start one additional Lower Containment Ventilation Unit, three additional Upper Containment Ventilation Units, and place all eight operating ventilation units in MAX cooling mode.

JPM g - Reset Radiation Monitor Trip Setpoints - Bank JPM.

K/A 073 A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: RMS control panel (CFR 41.7 / 45.8 / 45.9) IMPORTANCE:3.6 Initial conditions are that Unit 1 is at 100% power. Following a discussion with RP concerning a premature gaseous release termination, the CRS directs the applicant to reset EMF 50L setpoints per OP/0/A/6500/080 (EMF RP86A Output Modules).2 (EMF RP86A Trip Setpoint Adjustment). The new setpoints will have a Trip 1 value of 6300 cpm and a Trip 2 value of 9000 cpm. The OAC program EMFLIB is not available. The applicants will input the new values one at a time per procedure and perform a verification of proper setpoints per the procedure. The applicant will then fill out the appropriate setpoint log entries to finish the JPM.

In-Plant JPMs JPM i - Bypass ESPS Fire Suppression shutdown command and restart D/G - New JPM K/A 064 A2.28 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Emergency Diesel Generators and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: FPS actuation.

(CFR 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE:2.6 / 3.1 Initial conditions are that a 1A D/G has been removed from service for maintenance activities. A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred and the crew has aligned both ESPS D/Gs per AP/1/A/5500/007 (Loss of Normal Power). Following alignment of ESPS D/Gs, a spurious fire alarm has secured ESPS D/G 2. The applicant is directed to bypass the fire suppression shutdown command and restart ESPS D/G 2 per Enclosure 38 (ESPS Monitoring) of AP/07.

JPM j - Place the 2A Hydrogen Analyzer in Service - Bank JPM (RCA entry required)

K/A 028 A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System, including: Hydrogen concentration.

(CFR 41.5 / 45.5) IMPORTANCE:3.2 Initial conditions are that a Large Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 2 and 2B Hydrogen Analyzer is tagged out for maintenance. The CRS directs the applicant to place the 2A Containment Hydrogen Analyzer in service to position 1 for sampling Upper Containment per OP/2/A/6450/010 (Containment Hydrogen Control Systems) Enclosure 4.9 (Operation of the Containment Hydrogen Analyzers Following a LOCA). Applicant will select the desired sample location, insert key and turn key-switch to open containment isolation valves, verify the analyzer is in standby, and energize the hydrogen analyzer.

JPM k - Align Seal Injection to the Unit 1 NC Pumps - Bank JPM K/A 076 A2.08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Service Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Malfunction of breakers, relays, and disconnects (CFR 41.5 / 41.1 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.6 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE:3.5 / 3.1 Initial conditions are that a loss of RN has occurred on Unit 1 and AP/0/A/5500/020 (Loss of Nuclear Service Water) has been entered. Alternate power has been aligned to 1EMXS per AP-20 Enclosure 4 (Align Alternate Power Supply To 1EMXS or 2EMXS). The CRS directs the applicant to place standby makeup pump #1 in service to provide seal injection to the Unit 1 NC pumps per the local copy of AP-20 Enclosure 6 (Align Seal Injection to the Unit 1 NC Pumps). Applicant will verify power to 1EMXS, open 1NV-865A (Stdby M/U Pump Suct Frm Xfer Tube) and 1NV-872A (Stdby M/U Pmp Filt Otlt), close 1NV-89A (NC Pmps Seal Ret Cont Isol), verify 1NV-877 (Stdby M/U To NC Pump Seal Inj) is open, and start Standby Makeup Pump #1 by depressing the ON pushbutton.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station________ Date of Examination: _Feb 2023____

Operating Test Number: _2023301__

Exam Level:

RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems

a.

Respond to inadvertent dilution while shutdown A, L, D, S 1

b.

Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc A, EN, L, M, S 2

c.

Establish NC System Bleed and Feed A, D, EN, L, S

4P

d.

Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators During Shutdown LOCA A, D, L, S 3

e.

Realign CA Suction Source A, L, D, S 4S

f.

Operate Containment Cooling Fans D, S 5

g.

Reset Radiation Monitor Trip Setpoints D, P, S 7

h.

Loss of KC (AP-21)

A, D, P, S 8

In-Plant Systems

i.

Reset ESPS D/G following Fire suppression actuation E, L, N 6

j.

Place 2A Hydrogen Analyzer in Service D, E, L, R 5

k.

Align Seal Injection to the Unit 1 NC Pumps D, E 4S

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 (6) 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 (9) 8 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (3) 1 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 (2) 1 1

(L)ow power/shutdown 1 (7) 1 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 (2) 2 1

(P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 (2) 3 2

(R)adiologically controlled area 1 (1) 1 1

(S)imulator

Simulator JPMs JPM a - Respond to an Inadvertent Dilution While Shutdown - Bank JPM - Alternate Path K/A 004 A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Chemical and Volume Control System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Inadvertent boration/dilution (CFR: 41.5 to 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5) IMPORTANCE: 3.9 / 4.1 Initial conditions are that the unit is in Mode 3, with Shutdown banks withdrawn, and a boron dilution event in progress. The applicant is directed to perform Case II of AP/1/A/5500/013 (Boron Dilution). This procedure will direct the applicant to manually trip the reactor and align the charging system for normal boration. During system alignment, the boric acid to blender control valve will fail to open to begin the ALTERNATE PATH.

Once verification that no boric acid flow exists, the applicant will transition to the procedure RNO and open the emergency boration supply valve to complete this JPM.

JPM b - Transfer the ECCS to Hot Leg Recirculation - Modified by failing 1B NI pump start and A train valve in injection line to require alignment of RHR system for Hot Leg Recirc -

Alternate Path K/A 013 A2.01 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: LOCA.

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 /41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE: 4.0 / 4.4 Initial conditions are that a LOCA has been in progress for 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. NI Pump 1B failed to start automatically and could not be started manually. An AO has been dispatched to rack out NI Pump 1B. The CRS instructs the applicant to transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation lineup per EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.4 (Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation). The applicant will successfully secure the 1A Safety Injection Pump and begin valve manipulations to align this train for HLR. When attempted, the Hot Leg Injection isolation valve (1NI-121A) will not open beginning the ALTERNATE PATH. The applicant will then transition to the RNO and attempt to align 1B train Safety Injection for HLR while dispatching an operator to manually open 1NI-121A. Upon unsuccessful alignment of the 1B Safety Injection train (and notification that 1NI-121A cannot be opened), the applicant will align ND (RHR system) for HLR.

JPM c - Initiate RCS Bleed and Feed following loss of Secondary Heat Sink - Bank JPM -

Alternate Path.

K/A WE05 EA1.13 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: ECCS. (CFR: 41.5 to 41.8 / 45.5 to 45.8) IMPORTANCE:3.9 Initial conditions are that a Reactor Trip has occurred due to a loss of both main feed pumps. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps will not function. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 has been entered and Bleed and Feed initiation criteria has been met. The applicant is directed to initiate Bleed and Feed in accordance with FR-H.1. Applicant will stop all NC pumps and manually initiate both trains of safety injection (Only A train will initiate & NV pump cold leg injection valves fail to open). This begins the ALTERNATE PATH. When NV S/I flow cannot be verified, the applicant will start 1B NV pump and 1B NI pump and manually aligns the cold leg injection flowpath from the NV pumps. The applicant will then establish a bleed path from the NC system by opening 2 Pressurizer PORVs to finish the JPM JPM d - Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators Following a Shutdown LOCA - Bank JPM - Alternate Path.

K/A 006 A1.13 - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System, including: Safety Injection tank pressure, level, and boron concentration (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5 / 45.3 / 45.4) IMPORTANCE: 3.5 Initial conditions are Unit 1 is in Mode 4 when pressurizer level and pressure begin to decrease uncontrollably. The CRS enters AP/1/A/5500/027 (Shutdown LOCA) to address the LOCA. The CRS directs the applicant to isolate the Unit 1 Cold Leg Accumulators by performing Enclosure 14 (Isolating Cold Leg Accumulators) of AP/27.

The applicant will attempt to close all Cold Leg Accumulator discharge isolation valves, but only 1A and 1D will isolate. The applicant will transition to the RNO to begin the ALTERNATE PATH. Applicant will isolate the Nitrogen supply to the 1B and 1C Cold Leg Accumulators and then make the valve alignment to vent these accumulators to containment. This JPM is written to terminate at this time since all critical steps have been completed. Complete depressurization of these accumulators would take ~ 30 minutes.

JPM e - Realign CA Suction Source - Bank JPM - Bank JPM - Alternate Path.

K/A 054 AA1.01 - Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater: AFW system (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) IMPORTANCE:4.2 Initial conditions are that the crew is performing actions in EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response) following a reactor trip when alarm 1AD-8, B/1 (UST LO LEVEL) is received. The crew has transitioned to AP/1/A/5500/006 (Loss of S/G Feedwater) Case II (Loss of Normal CA Supply). The CRS directs the applicant to perform the actions of AP-06 Case II. The applicant will attempt to manually close 1CA-4 (CA Pmps Suct From UST) but is unsuccessful and will dispatch an operator to locally close 1CS-19 (CA Pumps Supply From Upper Surge Tank). Applicant will throttle CA flow to < 600 gpm to conserve UST inventory. Applicant will then attempt to break condenser vacuum from the control room, but is unsuccessful and dispatches operators to locally open the vacuum breaker valves. Operators are unable to locally open the vacuum breaker valves to begin the ALTERNATE PATH. Applicant will then align RN (Nuclear Service Water) to supply the running CA pumps to complete the JPM.

JPM f - Operate Containment Cooling System Fans - Bank JPM.

K/A 022 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans. (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) IMPORTANCE:3.7 Initial conditions are that a secondary steam leak is occurring. The CRS directs the applicant to perform step 9 of AP/1/A/5500/028 (Secondary Steam Leak). The applicant will determine, based on conditions specified in the procedure, that the leak is occurring inside containment. The applicant will then start one additional Lower Containment Ventilation Unit, three additional Upper Containment Ventilation Units, and place all eight operating ventilation units in MAX cooling mode.

JPM g - Reset Radiation Monitor Trip Setpoints - Bank JPM.

K/A 073 A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: RMS control panel (CFR 41.7 / 45.8 / 45.9) IMPORTANCE:3.6 Initial conditions are that Unit 1 is at 100% power. Following a discussion with RP concerning a premature gaseous release termination, the CRS directs the applicant to reset EMF 50L setpoints per OP/0/A/6500/080 (EMF RP86A Output Modules).2 (EMF RP86A Trip Setpoint Adjustment). The new setpoints will have a Trip 1 value of 6300 cpm and a Trip 2 value of 9000 cpm. The OAC program EMFLIB is not available. The applicants will input the new values one at a time per procedure and perform a verification of proper setpoints per the procedure. The applicant will then fill out the appropriate setpoint log entries to finish the JPM.

JPM h - Loss of KC AP-21 step 8 (Reactor Trip Sequence) Bank JPM-Alternate Path.

K/A 008 A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Loss of CCW pump (CFR 41.5 / 43.5

/ 45.3 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE:4.3 / 4.0 Initial conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% power. AP/1/A/5500/021 (Loss of Component Cooling) has been entered. The CRS directs the applicant to perform step 8 of AP/21.

The applicant will not be able to verify KC flow to the NC pumps (due to three closed Containment Isolation Valves) and will transition to the RNO. The applicant will successfully open two Containment Isolation Valves and unsuccessfully attempt to open 1KC-425A (NC Pumps Ret Hdr Cont Isol). This begins the ALTERNATE PATH.

The applicant will place steam dumps in Pressure control mode, ensure the reactor is tripped, when reactor power is verified < 5% will trip the NC Pumps, and will place both Pressurizer Spray Valves in manual and closed. The JPM will be terminated with a cue that the CRS is ready to begin reading EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

In-Plant JPMs JPM i - Bypass ESPS Fire Suppression shutdown command and restart D/G - New JPM K/A 064 A2.28 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Emergency Diesel Generators and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: FPS actuation.

(CFR 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE:2.6 / 3.1 Initial conditions are that a 1A D/G has been removed from service for maintenance activities. A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred and the crew has aligned both ESPS D/Gs per AP/1/A/5500/007 (Loss of Normal Power). Following alignment of ESPS D/Gs, a spurious fire alarm has secured ESPS D/G 2. The applicant is directed to bypass the fire suppression shutdown command and restart ESPS D/G 2 per Enclosure 38 (ESPS Monitoring) of AP/07.

JPM j - Place the 2A Hydrogen Analyzer in Service - Bank JPM (RCA entry required)

K/A 028 A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System, including: Hydrogen concentration.

(CFR 41.5 / 45.5) IMPORTANCE:3.2 Initial conditions are that a Large Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 2 and 2B Hydrogen Analyzer is tagged out for maintenance. The CRS directs the applicant to place the 2A Containment Hydrogen Analyzer in service to position 1 for sampling Upper Containment per OP/2/A/6450/010 (Containment Hydrogen Control Systems) Enclosure 4.9 (Operation of the Containment Hydrogen Analyzers Following a LOCA). Applicant will select the desired sample location, insert key and turn key-switch to open containment isolation valves, verify the analyzer is in standby, and energize the hydrogen analyzer.

JPM k - Align Seal Injection to the Unit 1 NC Pumps - Bank JPM K/A 076 A2.08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Service Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Malfunction of breakers, relays, and disconnects (CFR 41.5 / 41.1 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.6 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE:3.5 / 3.1 Initial conditions are that a loss of RN has occurred on Unit 1 and AP/0/A/5500/020 (Loss of Nuclear Service Water) has been entered. Alternate power has been aligned to 1EMXS per AP-20 Enclosure 4 (Align Alternate Power Supply To 1EMXS or 2EMXS). The CRS directs the applicant to place standby makeup pump #1 in service to provide seal injection to the Unit 1 NC pumps per the local copy of AP-20 Enclosure 6 (Align Seal Injection to the Unit 1 NC Pumps). Applicant will verify power to 1EMXS, open 1NV-865A (Stdby M/U Pump Suct Frm Xfer Tube) and 1NV-872A (Stdby M/U Pmp Filt Otlt), close 1NV-89A (NC Pmps Seal Ret Cont Isol), verify 1NV-877 (Stdby M/U To NC Pump Seal Inj) is open, and start Standby Makeup Pump #1 by depressing the ON pushbutton.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station________ Date of Examination: _Feb 2023____

Operating Test Number: _2023301__

Exam Level:

RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems

a.

Respond to inadvertent dilution while shutdown (EP1-123)

A, L, D, S 1

b.

Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc (NI-100)

A, EN, L, M, S 2

c.

Establish NC System Bleed and Feed (NC-46)

A, D, EN, L, S

4P

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

In-Plant Systems

i.

Reset ESPS D/G following Fire suppression actuation E, L, N 6

j.

Place 2A Hydrogen Analyzer in Service D, E, L, R 5

k.

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (3)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4 (3)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 (2)

(L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1 (5)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 (2)

(P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 (0)

(R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1 (1)

(S)imulator

Simulator JPMs JPM a - Respond to an Inadvertent Dilution While Shutdown - Bank JPM - Alternate Path K/A 004 A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Chemical and Volume Control System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Inadvertent boration/dilution (CFR: 41.5 to 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5) IMPORTANCE: 3.9 / 4.1 Initial conditions are that the unit is in Mode 3, with Shutdown banks withdrawn, and a boron dilution event in progress. The applicant is directed to perform Case II of AP/1/A/5500/013 (Boron Dilution). This procedure will direct the applicant to manually trip the reactor and align the charging system for normal boration. During system alignment, the boric acid to blender control valve will fail to open to begin the ALTERNATE PATH.

Once verification that no boric acid flow exists, the applicant will transition to the procedure RNO and open the emergency boration supply valve to complete this JPM.

JPM b - Transfer the ECCS to Hot Leg Recirculation - Modified by failing 1B NI pump start and A train valve in injection line to require alignment of RHR system for Hot Leg Recirc -

Alternate Path K/A 013 A2.01 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: LOCA.

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 /41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE: 4.0 / 4.4 Initial conditions are that a LOCA has been in progress for 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. NI Pump 1B failed to start automatically and could not be started manually. An AO has been dispatched to rack out NI Pump 1B. The CRS instructs the applicant to transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation lineup per EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.4 (Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation). The applicant will successfully secure the 1A Safety Injection Pump and begin valve manipulations to align this train for HLR. When attempted, the Hot Leg Injection isolation valve (1NI-121A) will not open beginning the ALTERNATE PATH. The applicant will then transition to the RNO and attempt to align 1B train Safety Injection for HLR while dispatching an operator to manually open 1NI-121A. Upon unsuccessful alignment of the 1B Safety Injection train (and notification that 1NI-121A cannot be opened), the applicant will align ND (RHR system) for HLR.

JPM c - Initiate RCS Bleed and Feed following loss of Secondary Heat Sink - Bank JPM -

Alternate Path.

K/A WE05 EA1.13 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: ECCS. (CFR: 41.5 to 41.8 / 45.5 to 45.8) IMPORTANCE:3.9 Initial conditions are that a Reactor Trip has occurred due to a loss of both main feed pumps. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps will not function. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 has been entered and Bleed and Feed initiation criteria has been met. The applicant is directed to initiate Bleed and Feed in accordance with FR-H.1. Applicant will stop all NC pumps and manually initiate both trains of safety injection (Only A train will initiate & NV pump cold leg injection valves fail to open). This begins the ALTERNATE PATH. When NV S/I flow cannot be verified, the applicant will start 1B NV pump and 1B NI pump and manually aligns the cold leg injection flowpath from the NV pumps. The applicant will then establish a bleed path from the NC system by opening 2 Pressurizer PORVs to finish the JPM In-Plant JPMs JPM i - Bypass ESPS Fire Suppression shutdown command and restart D/G - New JPM K/A 064 A2.28 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Emergency Diesel Generators and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: FPS actuation.

(CFR 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE:2.6 / 3.1 Initial conditions are that a 1A D/G has been removed from service for maintenance activities. A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred and the crew has aligned both ESPS D/Gs per AP/1/A/5500/007 (Loss of Normal Power). Following alignment of ESPS D/Gs, a spurious fire alarm has secured ESPS D/G 2. The applicant is directed to bypass the fire suppression shutdown command and restart ESPS D/G 2 per Enclosure 38 (ESPS Monitoring) of AP/07.

JPM j - Place the 2A Hydrogen Analyzer in Service - Bank JPM (RCA entry required)

K/A 028 A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System, including: Hydrogen concentration.

(CFR 41.5 / 45.5) IMPORTANCE:3.2 Initial conditions are that a Large Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 2 and 2B Hydrogen Analyzer is tagged out for maintenance. The CRS directs the applicant to place the 2A Containment Hydrogen Analyzer in service to position 1 for sampling Upper Containment per OP/2/A/6450/010 (Containment Hydrogen Control Systems) Enclosure 4.9 (Operation of the Containment Hydrogen Analyzers Following a LOCA). Applicant will select the desired sample location, insert key and turn key-switch to open containment isolation valves, verify the analyzer is in standby, and energize the hydrogen analyzer.

Facility: Catawba Exam Date: February 2023 1

JPM # or title 2

Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6

U/E/S 7

Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL RO A1-1 A

N 3

S Time Critical RO A1-2 A

N 3

S RO A2 A

N 2

S RO A3 A

N 2

E S

I just need to make sure I understand the error bands provided. Well do that when we validate onsite.

Error bands validated SRO A1-1 A

N 3

S SRO A1-2 A

N 2

S Change wording on initiating cue to It is desired NOT to use SRO A-2 A

N 3

S SRO A-3 A

N 3

U S

One step for SRO to compare answer paperwork is insufficient for SRO. Also, an RO error could cause the SRO answer to be wrong. Perhaps if the special instruction were removed and/or give them a completed calculation with an error that would make a difference. We would need to work on the wording to ensure we got the answers we wanted.

Review the calculation and determine if the release would be allowed for the conditions (or something like that) would probably be the best way to make this one work JPM replaced. New JPM Sat.

SRO A-4 A

N 3

S

Facility: Catawba Exam Date: February 2023 1

JPM # or title 2

Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6

U/E/S 7

Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL a

S Y

3 E

S The task standard and critical steps match, but what is the effect if the operator fails to secure the dilution?

No affect on the JPM. JPM is SAT b

S Y

3 S

c S

Y 2

S d

S Y

3 S

e S

Y 2

S f

S N

2 S

g S

N 2

S h

S Y

3 E

S As written, Im not certain that it really is alternate path. Either we tell them to restore KC flow to the NC pumps IAW step 8 or we start them out with no issues and have them respond to plant conditions when the valves (or perhaps only the NC header supply valve) go(es) closed.

This would be a 6th Alternate path for the RO applicants which is OK. Another option would be to not call it alternate path, but I like that option least of all.

Slight modification made to give them attachment 1 which controls flow. After validation, NRC concurs it is alternate path. Now SAT.

i P

N 2

E S

How long does a reboot take? Can we put that information in the evaluator notes?

Engaged Engineer to get needed info. Now SAT.

j P

N 2

S k

P N

2 S

Form 2.3 -3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (JPMs)

Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the JPM Table

1. Enter the JPM number and/or title.

2. Enter the type of JPM(S)imulator, (P)lant, or (A)dministrative.

3. Enter (Y)es or (N)o for an Alternate Path JPM.

4. Rate the level of difficulty (LOD) of each JPM using a scale of 1-5 (easy-difficult). A JPM containing less than two critical steps, a JPM that tests solely for recall or memorization, or a JPM that involves directly looking up a single correct answer is likely LOD = 1 (too easy). Conversely, a JPM with over 30 steps or a JPM that takes more than 45 minutes to complete is likely LOD = 5 (too difficult).

5. Check the appropriate block for each JPM error type, using the following criteria:

LOD = 1 or 5 is unsatisfactory (U).

REF: The JPM lacks required references, tools, or procedures (U).

IC: The JPM initial conditions are missing or the JPM lacks an adequate initial cue (U).

CUE: The JPM lacks adequate evaluator cues to allow the applicant to complete the task, or the evaluator cues are subjective or leading (U).

TSK: The JPM lacks a task standard or lacks completion criteria for a task standard (U).

CS: The JPM contains errors in designating critical steps, or the JPM lacks an adequate performance standard for a critical step (U).

TL: The JPM validation times are unreasonable, or a time-critical JPM lacks a completion time (U).

6. Mark the JPM as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). A JPM is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 5. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.

7. Briefly describe any JPM determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.

Facility: Catawba Scenario: 1 Exam Date: February 2023 1

Scenario Event ID/Name:

2 Scenario event errors 3

U/E/S 4

Explanation Realism/

Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1

S 2

S Am I right in that the regulator works in AUTO? Correct 3

Y S

4 S

5 Y

E S

Who does the surveillance for SR 3.8.1.1? Id like to consider seeing the crew do this.

Additionally, if they are in TS 3.1.6, how do they get the SDM verification completed? Is this the REACT program?

Per ES-3.4 C.2(8) you cannot give both the BOP and RO credit for a reactivity manipulation for a single event. One of them should be a I/C failure.

3.8.1.1 done by other units RO.

SDM done by computer program.

BOP given I/C credit and nortmal at the beginning was dropped.

6 S

Major 7

1 S

CT looks good 8

2 S

CT looks good 9

S

Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)

Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)

Facility: Catawba Scenario: 2 Exam Date: February 2023 1

Scenario Event ID/Name:

2 Scenario event errors 3

U/E/S 4

Explanation Realism/

Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1

S 2

Y S

3 S

4 S

5 Y

E S

Per ES-3.4 C.2(8) you cannot give both the BOP and RO credit for a reactivity manipulation for a single event. One of them should be a I/C failure.

I/C given to BOP. Normal at the start was dropped 6

S 7

1,2 S

Major Both CTs appear appropriate 8

S 9

S

Facility: Catawba Scenario: 3 Exam Date: February 2023 1

Scenario Event ID/Name:

2 Scenario event errors 3

U/E/S 4

Explanation Realism/

Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1

S 2

E S

Per ES-3.4 C.2(8) you cannot give both the BOP and RO credit for a reactivity manipulation for a single event. One of them should be a normal evolution.

Normal credit given to BOP. Normal evolution at beginning dropped.

3 E

S I think we need a copy of AD-5 B/4 and/or E/5 in the scenario. This is where the direction to trip the pump is, correct?

Done 4

Y S

This is the same TS for the same reason in scenario 1. Need to be careful how we do this. An individual SRO should not get both.

Done 5

Y S

6 S

7 S

Major 8

1 S

9 2

E S

If NC pumps are tripped, then the crew may need to terminate SI prior to it causing a cooldown to FR-P.1 entry conditions Noted

Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)

Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)

Facility: Catawba Scenario: 4 Exam Date: February 2023 1

Scenario Event ID/Name:

2 Scenario event errors 3

U/E/S 4

Explanation Realism/

Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1

S 2

S 3

Y S

4 S

5 Y

S 6

S 7

1 S

Major - Do we need the appropriate AD procedures here to trip the pump Added 8

2 S

Major - What do we need to see once the reactor is tripped before initiating trigger 8?

Added to examiner notes 9

S 10 S

Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the Scenario Table

1. For each scenario, enter the scenario event names and descriptions.

2. Review the individual events contained in each scenario, and identify and mark event errors:

The scenario guide event description is not realistic/credibleunsatisfactory (U).

The scenario guide event description lacks adequate crew/operator performance standardsneeds enhancement (E).

The scenario guide event description lacks verifiable actions for a credited normal event, reactivity event instrument/component malfunction, or technical specification (TS) event (or a combination of these) (U).

The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates an event as a critical task (i.e., a noncritical task labeled as critical or a critical task labeled as noncritical). This includes critical tasks that do not meet the critical task criteria (i.e., the critical task does not have a measurable performance standard) (U).

The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates entry into TS actions when not required or does not designate entry into TS actions when required (U).

3. Based on the outcome in step 2, mark the scenario event as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). An event is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 2. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.

4. Briefly describe any scenario event determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario event is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.

3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

• Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).

JPM A.1-1R Perform Manual Shutdown Margin Calculation - Bank JPM RB-127 Modified (Changed Cycle Burnup and Boron concentration which alters final calculated result and acceptable shutdown margin answer)

This JPM is time critical with a completion time requirement of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (to comply with requirement of T.S. 3.1.4).

K/A Generic 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables (reference potential). (CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) RO 3.9 SRO 4.2 Initial conditions are that the computer program used to calculate shutdown margin is inoperable and that during performance of the Unit 2 RCCA Bank Movement Periodic Test, control rods C5 and L3 have been determined to be immovable and untrippable. Tech Specs require that a shutdown margin calculation be performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Applicants are given values for current power level, core life, control rod positions, and current boron concentration and are instructed to perform a manual shutdown margin calculation per OP/0/A/6100/006 (Reactivity Balance Calculations) Enclosure 4.3 (Shutdown Margin -

Untrippable / Misaligned RCCA(s) - Modes 1 & 2). Applicant will determine that current calculated shutdown margin is 1259 pcm. Applicant determines that required shutdown margin of 1300 pcm for the current mode does not exist.

JPM A.1-2R Calculate boric acid and water addition to FWST-Bank JPM K/A Generic 2.1.23 Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition. (CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) RO 4.3 SRO 4.4 Initial conditions are that an improper valve lineup has decreased Unit 1 FWST level. The valve lineup issue has been corrected to stop the level decrease. The applicant is directed to calculate a makeup to the FWST to restore level to a value above the Tech Spec minimum. Applicant will determine 368 - 370 gallons of boric acid are required along with 3401 - 3403 gallons of reactor makeup water.

JPM A.2R Use Flow Diagrams, Electrical Prints and Load Lists to Determine Leak Isolation Boundary - Previous Bank JPM 2019 NRC Exam K/A Generic 2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings (reference potential). (CFR 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) RO 3.5 SRO 3.9 Initial conditions are the 1B Condensate Booster Pump has been shut down in accordance with OP/1/A/6250/001 and is to be tagged out for removal and replacement of 1CM-327 (1B Condensate Booster Pump Suction Header Relief Valve). The applicant is provided CM flow diagrams CN 1590-1.5 and CN 1590-1.7, Load List for 1MXB, and Electrical Drawings CN 1702-1.1 through CN 1702-1.4, and is directed to determine all mechanical isolations, electrical isolations, and to identify applicable vent or drain path for use for the development of a tagout.

JPM A.3R Calculate Total RL Discharge Flow - Bank JPM WL-003 Modified (Changed the number of Low Pressure Service water pumps in service which changed the total flow calculation).

K/A Generic 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. (CFR 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10) RO 3.8 SRO 4.3 Initial conditions are that the RL discharge header flow instrumentation is inoperable.

Applicants are given plant conditions and directed to calculate and record the total RL discharge flow per PT/0/A/4250/011 (RL Temperature and Discharge Flow Determination).

Applicant will calculate Total RL Discharge Flow to be 39,946 gpm (39,946 to 41,154 gpm acceptable).

Form 4.1-PWR Pressurized-Water Reactor Examination Outline Facility:

Catawba K/A Catalog Rev. 3 Rev.

0 Date of Exam:

02/27/2023 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

2 3

3 3

4 3

18 3

3 6

2 2

2 1

1 1

1 8

2 2

4 Tier Totals 4

5 4

4 5

4 26 5

5 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

3 2

2 4

3 2

2 3

2 3

2 28 3

2 5

2 1

0 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

9 0

2 1

3 Tier Totals 4

2 3

4 4

3 3

4 3

4 3

37 5

3 8

3.

Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories CO EC RC EM 6

CO EC RC EM 7

2 2

1 1

2 2

1 2

4. Theory Reactor Theory Thermodynamics 6

3 3

Notes: CO EM =

Conduct of Operations; EC = Equipment Control; RC = Radiation Control; Emergency Procedures/Plan These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

These systems/evolutions are only included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-4.1-PWR Catawba Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

Item E/APE # / Name /

Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

1 (000007) (EPE 7; BW E02 & E10; CE E02) Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery X

(000007EA2.13) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 7) REACTOR TRIP, STABILIZATION, RECOVERY (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13):

ECCS flows 3.0 1

2 (000008) (APE 8)

Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident X

(000008AA2.15) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 8) PRESSURIZER VAPOR Space Accident (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): ECCS status 3.5 2

3 (000009) (EPE 9)

Small Break LOCA X

(000009) (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA (G2.2.4)

EQUIPMENT CONTROL: (Multi-unit license) Ability to explain the variations in control room layouts, systems, instrumentation, and/or procedural actions between units at a facility (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.13) 3.6 3

4 (000011) (EPE 11)

Large Break LOCA X

(000011EK3.02) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (EPE 11)

LARGE-Break LOCA (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13):

MFW isolation 3.4 4

5 (000015) (APE 15)

Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions X

(000015AK3.07) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 15)

REACTOR COOLANT Pump Malfunctions (CFR: 41.5 /

41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13): Ensuring that S/G levels are controlled properly for natural circulation enhancement 3.7 5

6 (000022) (APE 22)

Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup X

(000022AK2.09) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 22) LOSS OF REACTOR Coolant Makeup and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 /

45.3): CVCS 3.9 6

7 (000025) (APE 25)

Loss of Residual Heat Removal System X

(000025AK1.07) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 25) LOSS OF RESIDUAL Heat Removal System (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): RHR pump flow versus level 3.7 7

8 9

(000026) (APE 26)

Loss of Component Cooling Water X

X (000026AK2.05) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 26) LOSS OF Component Cooling Water and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 /

45.3): RMS (000026AA2.03) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 26) LOSS OF Component Cooling Water (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13):

The valve lineups necessary to restart the CCWS while bypassing the portion of the system causing the abnormal condition 3.0 3.1 8

76 10 (000027) (APE 27)

Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction X

(000027AK3.06) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 27)

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE Control System Malfunction (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13): Actions to be taken if the PZR pressure instrument fails low 3.9 9

11 (000029) (EPE 29)

Anticipated Transient Without Scram X

(000029) (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram (G2.1.1) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS:

Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements (CFR: 41.10 / 43.10 / 45.13) 4.1 77 12 (000038) (EPE 38)

Steam Generator Tube Rupture X

(000038EK2.16) Knowledge of the relationship between (EPE 38) STEAM GENERATOR Tube Rupture and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 /

45.3): RCP 3.3 10 13 (000040) (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12) Steam Line Rupture -

Excessive Heat Transfer X

(WE12EA2.03) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (W E12) UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): SDM 3.8 78

14 (000054) (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater X

(000054AA2.09) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 54) LOSS OF Main Feedwater (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): S/G dryout conditions 4.1 11 15 (000055) (EPE 55)

Station Blackout X

(000055EK1.06) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (EPE 55) Station Blackout (CFR:

41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Long-term SDM management (recriticality) 3.4 12 16 (000056) (APE 56)

Loss of Offsite Power X

(000056AA2.33) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Status of bus voltage indication 3.5 13 17 (000057) (APE 57)

Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus X

(000057) (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus (G2.1.46) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to use integrated control systems to operate plant systems or components (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 3.3 79 18 (000058) (APE 58)

Loss of DC Power X

(000058AA1.05) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (APE 58) LOSS OF DC Power (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): Valves or components affected by loss of DC 3.9 14 19 (000062) (APE 62)

Loss of Nuclear Service Water X

(000062) (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water (G2.1.18) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 3.6 15 20 (000065) (APE 65)

Loss of Instrument Air X

(000065AA2.09) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 65) LOSS OF Instrument Air (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Automatic IAS responses as air header pressure lowers 3.3 80 21 (000077) (APE 77)

Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances X

(000077) (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances (G2.1.32) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS:

Ability to explain and apply system precautions, limitations, notes, or cautions (CFR 41.10 /43.2 /45.12) 3.8 16 22 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment X

(WE04EA1.04) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): RCS 3.8 17 23 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation X

(W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (G2.4.18) EMERENCY PROCEDURES/PLANS:

Knowledge of the specific bases for emergency and abnormal operating procedures (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 /

45.130 4.0 81 24 (BW E04; W E05)

Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink X

(WE05EA1.16) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E05) Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): CSS 2.9 18 K/A Category Totals:

2 3

3 3

4/3 3/3 Group Point Total:

24

ES-4.1-PWR Catawba Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

Item E/APE # / Name /

Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

25 (000001) (APE 1)

Continuous Rod Withdrawal X

(000001AA1.09) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (APE 1) CONTINUOUS Rod Withdrawal (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): PZR 3.3 19 26 (000003) (APE 3)

Dropped Control Rod X

(000003AA2.07) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 3) DROPPED Control Rod (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): In-core NIS 3.5 20 27 (000005) (APE 5)

Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod X

(000005AA2.07) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 5)

INOPERABLE/STUCK Control Rod (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.13): RPI 3.7 82 000024 (APE 24)

Emergency Boration

/ 1 000028 (APE 28)

Pressurizer (PZR)

Level Control Malfunction / 2 000032 (APE 32)

Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 28 (000033) (APE 33)

Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation X

(000033) (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation (G2.2.25) EQUIPMENT CONTROL:

Knowledge of the bases in TS for limiting conditions for operation and safety limits (CFR: 43.2) 4.2 83 29 (000036) (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents X

(000036) (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents (G2.1.45) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS:

Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.4) 4.3 84 000037 (APE 37)

Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 (APE 51)

Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 (APE 59)

Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release /

9 000060 (APE 60)

Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release /

9 000061 (APE 61)

Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms / 7 30 (000067) (APE 67)

Plant Fire On Site X

(000067AK1.02) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 67) PLANT Fire On Site (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Fire-fighting methods for each type of fire 3.0 21 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8

31 (000069) (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity X

(000069AA2.02) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 69) LOSS OF Containment Integrity (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13):

Verification of automatic and/or manual means of restoring integrity 4.0 85 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07)

Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 X

(000074EK2.02) Knowledge of the relationship between (EPE 74) Inadequate Core Cooling and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7): RCS 4.0 22 32 (000076) (APE 76)

High Reactor Coolant Activity 33 (000078) (APE 78*)

RCS Leak X

(000078AK3.08) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 78)

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 /

45.6 / 45.13): Isolation of containment 4.0 23 34 (W E01 & E02)

Rediagnosis & SI Termination X

(W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination (G2.4.21)

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLANS: Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of emergency operating procedures critical safety functions or shutdown critical safety functions (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.0 24 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 (W E15)

Containment Flooding / 5 (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 (BW A02 & A03)

Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 (BW A05)

Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 (BW A07) Flooding /

8 (BW E03)

Inadequate Subcooling Margin /

4 35 (BW E08; W E03)

LOCA Cooldown -

Depressurization X

(WE03EK1.07) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (W E03) LOCA COOLDOWN AND Depressurization (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8):

MSLI on high steam pressure rate during cooldown 3.6 25 36 (BW E09; CE A13**;

W E09 & E10)

Natural Circulation X

(WE10EK2.15) Knowledge of the relationship between (W E10) NATURAL CIRCULATION WITH STEAM VOID IN VESSEL WITH/WITHOUT THE RVLIS and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3): AFW system 3.8 26 (BW E13 & E14)

EOP Rules and Enclosures (CE A11**; W E08)

RCS Overcooling -

Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2

(CE E09) Functional Recovery (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation /

LOOP / Blackout / 4 K/A Category Totals:

2 2

1 1

1/2 1/2 Group Point Total:

12

ES-4.1-PWR Catawba Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

Item System / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

37 (003) (SF4P RCP)

REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM X

(003A2.01) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4P RCP) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Problems with RCP seals, especially seal leakoff rates 4.0 27 38 39 (004) (SF1; SF2 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM X

X (004A1.05) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF1; SF2 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5

/ 45.5): S/G pressure and level (004A2.31) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF1; SF2 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Potential for RCS chemical contamination when placing CVCS demineralizer in service 2.6 2.8 28 86 40 (005) (SF4P RHR)

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM X

(005K4.10) Knowledge of (SF4P RHR) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR: 41.7): Control of RHR heat exchanger outlet flow 3.9 29 41 (006) (SF2; SF3 ECCS)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM X

(006K6.10) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF2; SF3 ECCS) EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (CFR:

41.7 / 45.7): Valves 3.3 30 42 (007) (SF5 PRTS)

PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM X

(007K3.01) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF5 PRTS)

PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4):

Containment 3.4 31

43 (007) (SF5 PRTS)

PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM X

(007K4.01) Knowledge of (SF5 PRTS) PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR: 41.7):

PRT/quench tank cooling.

2.9 32 44 (008) (SF8 CCW)

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X

(008A2.05) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF8 CCW) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Effect of loss of instrument and control air on the position of air-operated CCW valves.

3.2 33 45 (008) (SF8 CCW)

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X

(008A2.08) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF8 CCW) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Effects of shutting (automatically or otherwise) the isolation valves of the letdown cooler.

3.4 34 46 47 (010) (SF3 PZR PCS)

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM X

X (010) (SF3 PZR PCS)

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM (G2.2.43)

EQUIPMENT CONTROL:

Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.13)

(010A2.09) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF3 PZR PCS) PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): RPS failure 3.0 3.8 35 87 48 (012) (SF7 RPS)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM X

(012A4.06) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF7 RPS) REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): Reactor trip breakers 4.2 36 49 50 (013) (SF2 ESFAS)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM X

X (013A3.03) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF2 ESFAS) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7):

Continuous testing feature 2.9 4.7 37 88

(013) (SF2 ESFAS)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (G2.1.7) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12

/ 45.13) 51 (022) (SF5 CCS)

CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM X

(022K2.01) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following (CFR: 41.7): (SF5 CCS) CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM CCS fans 3.6 38 52 53 (025) (SF5 ICE) ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM X

X (025A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF5 ICE) ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8):

Containment vent fans (025K5.01) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF5 ICE)

ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3):

Containment temperature and pressure 3.8 4.1 39 40 54 55 (026) (SF5 CSS)

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM X

X (026A3.01) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF5 CSS) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.7): Pump starts and correct valve positioning (026K1.05) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF5 CSS)

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8): ESFAS 4.1 4.1 41 42 56 (039) (SF4S MSS)

MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM X

(039K5.13) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF4S MSS)

MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3):

Indications and alarms for main steam and radiation monitors (during S/G tube rupture) 4.0 43

57 58 (059) (SF4S MFW)

MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM X

X (059) (SF4S MFW) MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM (191003K1.07)

CONTROLLERS AND POSITIONERS (CFR: 41.7):

Safety precautions with respect to the operation of controllers and positioners (059K1.01) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF4S MFW)

MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8): CDS 2.6 3.6 44 45 59 (061) (SF4S AFW)

AUXILIARY /

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM X

(061K1.12) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF4S AFW)

AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8):

ESFAS 4.2 46 60 61 (062) (SF6 ED AC)

AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM X

X (062K6.03) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF6 ED AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7): Control power (062) (SF6 ED AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (G2.1.23)

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.2 / 45.6) 3.6 4.4 47 89 62 63 (063) (SF6 ED DC)

DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM X

X (063K4.04) Knowledge of (SF6 ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR: 41.7): Battery charger trip/shutdown (high voltage)

(063K5.02) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF6 ED DC)

DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3): Hydrogen generation during battery charging 3.1 2.8 48 49 64 (064) (SF6 EDG)

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM X

(064A1.10) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF6 EDG)

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5):

Generator operating parameters 3.6 50

65 (073) (SF7 PRM)

PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM X

(073K4.01) Knowledge of (SF7 PRM) PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR: 41.7): Release termination 3.9 51 66 67 (076) (SF4S SW)

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM X

X (076K2.08) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following (CFR: 41.7): (SF4S SW) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ESF-actuated motor-operated valves (076A2.06) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S SW)

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6):

Controller and positioner failure 3.5 3.2 52 90 68 (078) (SF8 IAS)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM X

(078K3.23) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF8 IAS)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4): WGS 2.5 53 69 (103) (SF5 CNT)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEM X

(103A4.09) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF5 CNT) CONTAINMENT SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8):

Containment vacuum system 3.0 54 K/A Category Totals:

3 2

2 4

3 2

2 3/3 2

3 2/2 Group Point Total:

33

ES-4.1-PWR Catawba Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

Item System / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

70 (001) (SF1 CRDS)

CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM X

(001K3.06) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF1 CRDS) CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.4): RPIS 3.7 55 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 71 (011) (SF2 PZR LCS)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM X

(011A2.13) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF2 PZR LCS) PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): ESFAS 3.9 91 72 (014) (SF1 RPI) ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM X

(014A3.01) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF1 RPI) ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7):

RPI accuracy 3.4 56 73 (015) (SF7 NI)

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM X

(015K5.06) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF7 NI)

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3):

Subcritical multiplications and NIS indications 3.7 57 016 (SF7 NNI)

NONNUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM 74 (017) (SF7 ITM) IN CORE TEMPERATURE MONITOR SYSTEM X

(017K6.01) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF7 ITM)

IN CORE TEMPERATURE MONITOR SYSTEM (CFR:

41.7 / 45.7): Temperature measuring device (for example thermocouple) 3.2 58 75 (027) (SF5 CIRS)

CONTAINMENT IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM X

(027G2.1.19)

Ability to use available indications to evaluate system or component status 3.9 59 028 (SF5 HRPS)

HYDROGEN RECOMBINER AND PURGE CONTROL SYSTEM 029 (SF8 CPS)

CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM

76 (033) (SF8 SFPCS)

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM X

(033A1.02) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF8 SFPCS)

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5): Radiation levels 3.5 60 034 (SF8 FHS) FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT SYSTEM 77 (035) (SF4P SG)

STEAM GENERATOR SYSTEM X

(035K1.15) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF4P SG)

STEAM GENERATOR SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8): SDS 3.5 61 78 (041) (SF4S SDS)

STEAM DUMP/TURBINE BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM X

(041A2.07) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S SDS)

STEAM DUMP/TURBINE BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Failure of the steam dump controller 3.7 92 045 (SF4S MTG)

MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM 050 (SF9 CRV*)

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION 055 (SF4S CARS)

CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM 79 (056) (SF4S CDS)

CONDENSATE SYSTEM X

(056A2.05) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S CDS)

CONDENSATE SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Condenser tube leakage 3.7 62 80 (068) (SF9 LRS)

LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM X

(068) (SF9 LRS) LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM (G2.4.32) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN:

Knowledge of operator response to loss of annunciators (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.13) 4.0 93 071 (SF9 WGS)

WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM

81 (072) (SF7 ARM)

AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM X

(072A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF7 ARM) AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8):

Radiation monitor function 3.4 63 075 (SF8 CW)

CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM 079 (SF8 SAS**)

STATION AIR SYSTEM 086 (SF8 FPS) FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM K/A Category Totals:

1 0

1 0

1 1

1 1/2 1

1 1/1 Group Point Total:

12

Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Catawba)

Facility:

Catawba Date of Exam:

02/27/2023 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) (RO/SRO)

Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-Only Item #

IR Q#

IR Q#

G2.1.15 (G2.1.15) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management direction, such as standing orders, night orders, or operations memoranda (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) 82 3.4 94 G2.1.4 (G2.1.4) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, and maintenance of active license status, 10 CFR Part 55 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2) 83 3.8 95 G2.1.14 (G2.1.14) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plantwide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, and mode changes (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.12) 84 3.1 64 G2.1.37 (G2.1.37) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR: 41.1 / 41.5 / 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.6) 85 4.3 65 Subtotal N/A 2

N/A 2

2.

Equipment Control G2.2.22 (G2.2.22) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Knowledge of limiting conditions for operation and safety limits (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2) 86 4

66 G2.2.23 (G2.2.23) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to track TS limiting conditions for operation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 87 3.1 67 G2.2.18 (G2.2.18) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments and work prioritization (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 88 3.9 96 G2.2.38 (G2.2.38) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 /

45.13) 89 4.5 97 Subtotal N/A 2

N/A 2

3.

Radiation Control G2.3.5 (G2.3.5) RADIATION CONTROL: Ability to use RMSs, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring equipment (CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 90 2.9 68 G2.3.12 (G2.3.12) RADIATION CONTROL: Knowledge of radiological safety principles and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, or alignment of filters (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10) 91 3.7 98 Subtotal N/A 1

N/A 1

4.

Emergency Procedures /

Plan G2.4.16 (G2.4.16) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines, such as operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, or severe accident management guidelines (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 92 3.5 69 G2.4.12 (G2.4.12) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of operating crew responsibilities during emergency and abnormal operations (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) 93 4.3 99

G2.4.28 (G2.4.28) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of procedures relating to a security event (ensure that the test item includes no safeguards information) (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.13) 94 4.1 100 Subtotal N/A 1

N/A 2

Tier 3 Point Total N/A 6

N/A 7

Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Catawba)

Facility:

Catawba Date of Exam:

02/27/2023 Theory (Tier 4) (RO)

Category K/A #

Topic RO Item #

IR Q#

Reactor Theory 192006 (192006K1.06) FISSION PRODUCT POISONS (CFR: 41.1):

Describe the following processes and state their effect on reactor operations: -- transient xenon 95 3.4 70 192007 (192007K1.01) FUEL DEPLETION AND BURNABLE POISONS (CFR: 41.1): Define burnable poison and state its use in the reactor 96 2.5 71 192008 (192008K1.10) REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS (CFR:

41.1): (CRITICALITY) Describe reactor power and startup rate response once criticality is reached 97 3.4 72 Subtotal N/A 3

Thermodynamics 193003 (193003K1.12) STEAM (CFR: 41.14): Define the following term: --

moisture content 98 2.8 73 193004 (193004K1.15) THERMODYNAMIC PROCESS (CFR: 41.14):

(THROTTLING AND THE THROTTLING PROCESS) Determine the exit conditions for a throttling process based on the use of steam and/or water 99 2.8 74 193009 (193009K1.06) CORE THERMAL LIMITS (CFR: 41.14): Describe the function of the core protection calculator (thermal margin calculator) 100 3.7 75 Subtotal N/A 3

Tier 4 Point Total N/A 6

Form 4.1-1 Record of Rejected Knowledge and Abilities Refer to Examination Standard (ES)-4.2, Developing Written Examinations, Section B.3, for deviations from the approved written examination outline.

Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 2/2 027 G191008K1.09 Breakers for this system are only Load Center type breakers.

Replaced with 027G2.1.19 1/2 076AK2.02 Unable to operationally valid question to license level. Changed with 074EK2.02.

3 G2.1.25 Task too specific to make a Tier 3 question. Changed to G2.1.37

Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 1

H 3

B S

EPE007 EA2.13 2

F 2

N S

APE008AA2.15 3

H 3

N S

EPE009G2.2.4 4

F 3

X N

E/U S

EPE011EK3.02 Question: Could the applicant argue that the primary is essentially uncoupled from the secondary during a LBLOCA and since E-0 states that the CF Isolation prevents overfilling a SG and prevents a cooldown of the NC system that for this question is NOT would be the correct answer?

Agree that the S/Gs will no longer be coupled to the NC system, but the reason for CF isolation does not change because of that. Not sure how else we could meet this K/A. Discuss.

Could we put down the purpose of a CF isolation Changed as requested 5

F 2

B S

APE015AK3.07 6

H 3

B S

APE022AK2.09 7

H 2

B E

S APE025AK1.07 Could we modify this one and make the level 5.3%?

The answer would be A.

Think this would overly complicate the question as this is in the RNO for a specific NC level. Think it would be above and beyond normal mitigation strategy.

Discuss.

I agree. Original question SAT 8

H 3

X N

E S

APE026AK2.05 Are SLC entry conditions required knowledge for ROs?

Yes, just like for Tech Specs, they are required to know above the line information (Commitment, etc.).

Original question is SAT 9

F 3

N S

APE027AK3.06

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 10 F

2 B

S EPE038EK2.16 11 H

3 X

B E

S APE054AA2.09 Could you change the second question to The primary basis for the restoration of flow criteria is/is NOT to minimize thermal stress of the S/G components?

Changed as suggested.

Revised question is SAT 12 F

2 N

S EPE055EK1.06 13 M

2 N

E S

APE056AA2.33 I know the wording is straight out of the basis document, but I am uncomfortable with it. Could we change the question to read ____ will always be an accurate indication that 1ETA and 1ETB are energized?

Dont like the wording of always. If load shed had been completed, the E30 status lights would be dark, even following energization of ETA or ETB prior to closing back in load center breakers from ELXA(B) and ELXC(D). Discuss.

Break into two questions Changed as requested 14 F

2 N

S APE058AA1.05 15 F

>1 N

S APE062G2.1.18 16 F

2 B

E S

APE077G2.1.32 How about rewording the 2nd question to Once jumpers are installed, LOCA sequencer actuation timing for the 4160V incoming breakers is/is NOT affected?

Changed as suggested.

Revised question is SAT

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 17 H

2 X

M E/U S

WE04EA1.04 Second question is not quite right. NC pressure is a good indicator but not a unique indicator. We need to ask this a different way.

How about Procedurally, rising NC pressure is the only indication used to verify leak isolation? Or something like that.

Changed as suggested.

Revised question is SAT 18 F

3 N

S WE05EA1.16 19 H

2 N

S APE001AA1.09 20 H

2 X

B E

S APE003AA2.07 Per NUREG-1021 ES-4.2 section B.6.d embedded pictures need to be identified as student reference provided (on the page with the job level, cog level etc.

is fine)

Added as Reference to Student.

What is Trend B? It appears to be a downpower.

Could we use a 10% load reject or something a little more drastic?

Trend B is a downpower. The program used to produce these trends is no longer available to us to be able to change Trend B. Will need to go in a different direction if current trends are not acceptable.

Accept as is 21 F

2 B

S APE067AK1.02 22 H

3 X

B U

S APE076AK2.02 EPE074EK2.02 Question doesnt meet the K/A. The hi NC rad levels are immaterial to the question asked.

If you want to keep this KA, Ive seen some talk about the effects of higher rad levels on the rapidity of the effects of an NC to KV leak. I wasnt very happy with that KA match either but let it go.

Id be willing to change this KA out if you desire.

Requested new K/A. New bank question used to meet new K/A provided.

New question is SAT 23 F

2 M

S APE078AK3.08

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 24 F

3 B

S WE02G2.4.21 25 H

2 X

N E/U S

WE03EK1.07 Im having issues understanding the plausibility of is NOT for the first question. In the stem you state ECCS Steam Pressure Block pushbuttons have been depressed, what would make an applicant think the MSI signal is not active?

When below P-11 (NC pressure < 1955 PSIG), and the ECCS Steam Pressure block pushbuttons are depressed, it blocks the MSI signal on low steamline pressure and instates a MSI signal on Main Steam pressure rate (2 PSIG/sec for 250 seconds ramped to 100 PSIG/sec for 1 second). For this question NC pressure is 800 PSIG, so when the block pushbuttons are depressed, the low steamline pressure MSI signal is NOT active.

Original question was SAT 26 H

2 N

S WE10EK2.15 27 H

3 X

N E

S 003A2.01 Im having trouble with AP-4 as a distractor. It clearly is for a loss of the pump. Could you get rid of the annunciator and set the leakage flow below the alarm setpoint but rising. Then ask if youve met entrance into AP-8.

Changed as suggested.

Also, is knowing the trip setpoint for bearing temperature by heart required RO knowledge?

Yes, NCP trip setpoints are required RO knowledge.

Revised question is SAT 28 F

2 N

S 004A1.05 29 H

3 B

S 005K4.10 30 F

3 B

S 006K6.10 31 H

2 B

S 007K3.01

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 32 H

2 B

S 007K4.01 33 H

2 N

S 008A2.05 34 F

2 N

E S

008A2.08 Per NUREG-1021 ES-4.2 section B.6.d embedded pictures need to be identified as student reference provided (on the page with the job level, cog level etc.

is fine)

Added to References for Students.

Revised question is SAT 35 F

2 M

S 010G2.2.43 36 F

>1 B

S 012A4.06 37 F

2 N

S 013A3.03 38 F

2 B

S 022K2.01 39 F

2 N

S 025A4.02 40 H

2 X

X M

U S

025K5.01 Why would someone think that a design feature being degraded would result in better performance?

This should really be rewritten, the second part is OK, but the first part should focus on how the system works, surveillances, or something like that.

Changed Part 1 as suggested. Reworded Part 2 to flow better with new Part 1. Question type changed to modified.

Rewritten question is SAT 41 H

2 B

S 026A3.01 42 H

2 B

S 026K1.05 43 H

2 M

E S

039K5.13 Make the second question 2EMF-72 remains as accurate / becomes more accurate as power level rises Changed as suggested. Question type changed to modified.

Revised question is SAT

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 44 H

3 B

S 059C3K1.07 45 F

2 B

E S

059K1.01 Add the word directly to the first question will directly cause the Changed as suggested.

Revised question is SAT 46 H

2 B

S 061K1.12 47 H

2 B

S 062K6.03 48 H

3 N

S 063K4.04 49 F

2 N

S 063K5.02 50 F

2 B

S 064A1.10 51 F

2 B

S 073K4.01 52 H

3 B

S 076K2.08 53 F

2 N

S 078K3.23 54 F

2 B

S 103A4.09 55 H

2 N

E S

001K3.06 Overlap with question 20. Is there a way to get away from colors on either this question or question 20?

Although both questions refer to a dropped rod, they actually refer to different indications which are fed from different actuations. Q20 requires knowledge of DRPI background color (black vs.orange). The alarm is fed by individual rod position indication (height).

Q55 requires knowledge of rod bottom indication (red vs green). This indication is based on calculated position of 0 and requires the system to know rod position. Discuss.

No overlap. Original question is SAT.

56 H

3 B

E S

014A3.01 Change the second question to will / will NOT be approximately the same Changed as suggested.

Revised question is SAT

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 57 H

2 B

S 015K5.06 58 H

2 B

S 017K6.01 59 H

2 N

S 027G2.1.19 60 H

2 B

E S

033A1.02 Lets change the dates to March 2 and March 29 Changed as suggested.

Revised question is SAT 61 H

3 B

S 035K1.15 62 F

3 X

N U

S 056A2.05 Is time to SD RO level knowledge?

There is a big difference between 21 days and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> is also a good distractor)

I dont see in the procedure where shutdown to mode 3 is required. It just says that work with chemistry to reduce concentration within 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br />. Shutting down may be the intent, but the procedure does not let you go to step 4.i in AP-34 until parameter value is less than Action Level

1. This looks like it may need a procedure change This is too detailed procedure knowledge for an RO question.

How about make bullet 2 Action Level 1 and getting rid of the 3rd bullet? Then ask AP-34 requires /does NOT require the unit to be below 50%RTP within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Power operations below 50%RTP can /cannot continue indefinitely with an Engineering justification.

Changed question as suggested. Changed cognitive level to memory.

Revised question is SAT

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 63 H

2 B

S 072A4.02 64 F

2 B

S G2.1.14 65 F

2 X

B U

S G2.1.25 G2.1.37 By using a LOCA graph, this is another Tier 1. If you cant find something more generic, lets change the K/A Requested a new K/A. New bank question used for the new K/A.

New question is SAT 66 F

2 B

S G2.2.22 67 H

2 X

B U

S G2.2.23 This is a tier 2 question. This generic is looking more for how they track LCOs Replaced with new bank question with generic Tech Spec usage to address concern.

Revised question is SAT 68 F

>1 B

S G2.3.5 69 F

2 B

S G2.4.16 70 F

2 B

S R06K1.06 71 F

2 B

S R07K1.01 72 F

2 B

S R8K1.10 73 H

3 B

S T3K1.12 74 H

3 B

S T4K1.15 75 H

2 B

S T9K1.06

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 76 H

2 N

S APE026AA2.03 77 H

3 B

S EPE029 78 H

2 N

S WE12EA2.03 79 H

2 B

S APE057G2.1.46 80 H

3 B

S APE065AA2.09 81 F

2 B

S WE11G2.4.18 82 H

3 B

S APE005AA2.07 83 H

3 M

S APE033G2.2.25 84 F

3 B

S APE036G2.1.45 85 F

2 B

E S

APE069AA2.02 Better first question would be TS 3.6.2 requires the outer door to be CLOSED within a maximum of 1 /

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Changed as suggested.

Revised question is SAT 86 H

2 N

S 004A2.31

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 87 F

3 N

E S

010A2.09 I like the second question. Could we get rid of the first question and add a new second question? How about per FR-S.1 Maximum of 2315 / 2135 PSIG in order to prevent a primary safety from lifting / allow boron injection in NC system Changed as suggested. Cognitive level changed to memory.

Revised question is SAT 88 F

3 B

S 013G2.1.7 89 H

2 X

X X

B E/U S

062G2.1.23 This is an interesting scenario. Since youve adjusted the frequency and voltage for the reduced load on the machine then dump all the load on it will the D/G handle it. The normal D/G trips may or may not be active depending on what the 1ETA-03 trip was caused by. If the droop/isochronous circuit is driven by the bus status versus the incoming breaker status, that could also have an effect.

Could you run this on the simulator and see how the machine handles it?

Ran on the simulator with 1A RN pump, 1A2 KC pump, and 1A NV pump in service (question only has 1A RN pump in service). Paralleled the D/G to 1ETA, reduced load to ~200KW and then opened 1ETA-03.

D/G voltage relatively stable and D/G load adjusted to

~ 2500KW. No additional alarms received or changes in status light for Blackout Sequencer Actuated Train A.

Original question is SAT

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 90 F

2 X

N E

S 076A2.06 Im not sure why anyone would not call 3.7.8 Condition A applicable. Why not ask if the D/G TS is required to be entered instead?

Plausibility is that the loss of NSW occurred on Unit 2 but the question asks TS application of Unit 1. Wanted to ensure that was clear. However, if desired, we can certainly change part 1 to question D/G spec. Just 3.7.8 seemed to flow better and provide better match to K/A. Discuss.

Original question is SAT 91 H

2 X

M U

S 011A2.13 Not quite meeting the K/A yet. The K/A is looking for some kind of predicting impact (even if impact is none). The using procedures part can even be TS actions Rearranged the question by telling them that Pzr Press. Ch. 4 fails low. Part 1 now asks whether automatic reactor trip and SI will/will NOT occur. Part 2 added IF SI occurs to the statement. Changed question type to Modified.

Revised question is SAT 92 H

2 X

M U

S 041A2.07 This doesnt predict impacts, nor does it use procedures to make it better. Perhaps we could have it ask what the AP tells them to do when temperature is dropping uncontrollably or how long to address entering the TS Revised question to ask time required to enter the TS for prediction. Kept part 2 (TS basis) to cover mitigation.

will first be required Otherwise SAT 93 H

3 N

E S

068G2.4.32 Wording of first question is right out of SLC. This really suggests a positive answer. How about 0EMF-49 is / is NOT FUNCTIONAL per SLC 16.11-2?

Changed as suggested.

Second answer to D. is cut off Verified answer D is not cut off on actual applicant copy of the exam.

SAT

Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. K/A Use Flaws

6. Source (B/M/N)

7. Status (U/E/S)

8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

1. /Units Logic Stem Focus Cues 94 F

2 N

S G2.1.15 95 F

2 X

B E

S G2.1.4 Change the second question to... SRO duties CANNOT exceed a maximum of 15 minutes / 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Changed as suggested.

96 F

2 B

S G2.2.18 97 F

3 X

X B

U S

G2.2.38 This K/A for Tier 3 is looking more at TS 2.0 or 3.0 sections. As written, this is a Tier 2 question.

Replaced with new question to address the concern where they have to apply Tech Spec 2.0 and 3.0 sections.

Revised question is SAT 98 H

2 B

S G2.3.12 99 H

3 B

S G.2.4.12 100 H

2 B

S G2.4.28 Note: For public ADAMS the material associated with this question will need to be redacted

Form 2.3-5 Instructions for Written Examination Review Worksheet Refer to ES-4.2 for the definitions of terms used in this worksheet for the written examination.

Review each question (Q) as submitted and as subsequently revised and document the following in the associated worksheet columns:

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) from 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); mark direct lookup questions (applicant can directly determine the answer from the provided reference) as LOD 1. A question is (U)nsatisfactory if it is LOD 1 or LOD 5.

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

Stem Focus: The stem lacks enough focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Cues: The stem or one or more answer choices contains cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

T/F: All of the answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors require (E)nhancement, and more than one noncredible distractor in the same question results in an (U)satisfactory question.

Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:

Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid knowledge or ability (K/A) but, as written, is not operational in content). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

1. /Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Logic: The question requires backward or reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

5. Check the first box if a K/A mismatch flaw exists. Check the second box if the question is flawed because it is written at the wrong license level. Either condition results in an (U)nsatisfactory question.

6. Enter the questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-4.2.

7. Based on the review performed in steps 2-5, mark the question as (U)nsatisfactory, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory.

8. Fully explain the reason for any (U) in column 7 (e.g., how the psychometric attributes are not being met).

9. Save the initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound question is marked by an (S) on this form.