ML22347A191
| ML22347A191 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/02/2022 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NRC-2149 | |
| Download: ML22347A191 (1) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Docket Number: (n/a)
Location: teleconference Date: Wednesday, November 2, 2022 Work Order No.: NRC-2149 Pages 1-104 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1716 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-4433
1 1
2 3
4 DISCLAIMER 5
6 7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 9
10 11 The contents of this transcript of the 12 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 14 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 15 recorded at the meeting.
16 17 This transcript has not been reviewed, 18 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 19 inaccuracies.
20 21 22 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 700TH MEETING 5 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 6 (ACRS) 7 + + + + +
8 WEDNESDAY 9 NOVEMBER 2, 2022 10 + + + + +
11 The Advisory Committee met via 12 teleconference at 8:30 a.m., Joy L. Rempe, Chairman, 13 presiding.
14 15 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
16 JOY L. REMPE, Chairman 17 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Vice Chairman 18 DAVID A. PETTI, Member-at-Large 19 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member 20 VICKI M. BIER, Member 21 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member 22 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 23 GREGORY H. HALNON, Member 24 JOSE A. MARCH-LEUBA, Member 25 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
2 1 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
2 DEREK WIDMAYER 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
3 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 8:30 a.m.
3 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Good morning. The 4 meeting will now come to order. This is the second 5 day of the 700th meeting of the Advisory Committee on 6 Reactor Safeguards.
7 I'm Joy Rempe, Chairman of the ACRS.
8 Other members in attendance are Ron Ballinger, Vicki 9 Bier, Charles Brown, Vesna Dimitrijevic, Greg Halnon, 10 Walt Kirchner, Jose March-Leuba, Dave Petti. And we 11 expect Matt Sunseri to join us soon.
12 I note, though, we do have a quorum at 13 this time. And similar to yesterday, the Committee is 14 meeting in person and virtually. The communications 15 channel has been opened to allow members of the public 16 to monitor the committee discussion, and Mr. Derek 17 Widmayer is the Designated Federal Officer for today's 18 meeting.
19 During today's meeting, the Committee will 20 consider the following topic: 10 CFR Part 53, risk-21 informed, technology-inclusive regulatory framework 22 for commercial nuclear power plants, the proposed 23 rulemaking language. The transcript of the open 24 portions of the meeting is being kept.
25 It's requested that speakers identify NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
4 1 themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and 2 volume so that they can be readily heard.
3 Additionally, participants should mute themselves when 4 they're not speaking.
5 At this time, I'd like to ask any other 6 members if they have any opening remarks. Not hearing 7 anyone speak up, I'd like to ask Dave Petti to lead us 8 in our first topic for today's meeting.
9 Dave?
10 MEMBER PETTI: Thank you. Good morning, 11 everyone. We had a full two days' subcommittee on 12 details in the language, and I think all members 13 attended, almost all members attended. So this is 14 obviously going to be a much higher level given the 15 time constraints. I don't have anything more except 16 this is draft the final language that's about to be 17 issued. It's a fairly big milestone, I guess, let's 18 say.
19 I guess John Segala, you up to kick us 20 off?
21 MR. SEGALA: Yes, thank you. Again, I'm 22 John Segala. I'm a special assistant in the Division 23 of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and 24 Utilization Facilities in the Office of Nuclear 25 Reactor Regulation. Glad to be here today to discuss NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
5 1 the 10 CFR Part 53, which would be a new alternative 2 risk-informed, performance-based and technology-3 inclusive framework for the licensing and regulation 4 of commercial nuclear power plants.
5 The objective of Part 53 is to continue to 6 provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of 7 public health and safety and the common defense and 8 security to promote regulatory stability, 9 predictability and clarity to reduce request for 10 exemptions from the current requirements in 10 CFR 11 Parts 50 and 52 to establish new requirements to 12 address non-light-water reactor technologies to 13 recognize technological advancements in reactor design 14 and credit the possible response of some designs of 15 commercial nuclear plants to postulate the accidents 16 including slower transient response times and 17 relatively small and slow release of fission products.
18 The NRC staff previously briefed the ACRS 19 Full Committee on Part 53 in July and responded to the 20 recommendations in the ACRS's fourth interim letter on 21 September 30th. Since the July ACRS Full Committee 22 meeting, the NRC staff has continued to engage 23 extensively with stakeholders, and this had the 24 opportunity to consider verbal and written feedback 25 from the stakeholders as part of the staff's ongoing NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
6 1 efforts to enhance the proposed rule package.
2 On October 18th, the NRC staff briefed the 3 ACRS subcommittee on the draft proposed Part 53 4 rulemaking package that the staff released on 5 September 30th, which includes the draft proposed rule 6 language for Framework A and Framework B, the 7 accompanying preamble, which we used to call the 8 statements of consideration, and five draft guidance 9 documents supporting the draft proposed rule language.
10 Today, the NRC staff plans to provide the 11 ACRS Full Committee a high level overview of the draft 12 proposed Part 53 rulemaking package, including follow-13 on discussions on topics such as the generally-14 licensed reactor operator, or GLRO, and recent 15 revisions made to the alternate evaluation for risk 16 insights or AERI entry conditions.
17 We're looking forward to have discussions 18 today and hearing any ACRS members' thoughts and 19 feedbacks. That completes my opening remarks. I can 20 turn it over maybe to Bob Beall?
21 MR. BEALL: Okay. Thanks, John. Our 22 first presenter today is Jordan Hoellman. He's going 23 to kick it off with a review of the Part 53 rule.
24 MR. HOELLMAN: Okay. Thanks, Bob.
25 Thanks, John. Good morning, everyone. This is Jordan NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
7 1 Hoellman, I'm a project manager in the Advanced 2 Reactor Policy Branch in NRR.
3 We can move to the next slide. This is 4 just the agenda slide for today. I'll kick it off 5 with an overview of the rulemaking schedule, the 6 frameworks within Part 53 proposed rule language, then 7 I'll turn it over to Bill Reckley to discuss the use 8 of the quantitative health objectives in Framework A 9 and fueled modules in Subparts E and O.
10 Marty Stutzke will talk about the AERI 11 entry conditions. Boyce Travis will talk about the 12 present standards in Framework B. And then Jesse 13 Seymour will talk about the generally-licensed reactor 14 operators and the human factors in other operator 15 licensing guidance documents as part of the rulemaking 16 package.
17 And then we'll wrap it up with just an 18 overview of the guidance that we've developed over 19 time to prepare for the review and licensing of 20 advanced reactors and non-light-water reactor 21 technologies.
22 Liz, you want to move to the next slide, 23 please?
24 Okay, so this slide just represents the 25 sort of schedule we've been on during the development NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
8 1 of Part 53. Over the past two and a half years or so, 2 we've briefed the ACRS over 15 times. We didn't 3 really feel it necessary to recap the entirety of the 4 Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act, or 5 NEIMA, and all the work that we've done previously.
6 As you may recall in the 2016-2017 time 7 period, the staff developed the vision and strategy 8 and implementation action plans for the licensing and 9 review of non-light-water reactor technologies, 10 focusing on our readiness within the existing 11 regulations due to increased interest from reactor 12 developers and Congress.
13 At the time, we focused on resolving key 14 policy issues and closing gaps within the existing 15 regulations. The enactment of NEIMA in 2019 required 16 the development of a new regulatory framework by 2027.
17 So that was kind of the rulemaking triggers there in 18 the start period.
19 The rulemaking plan described developing 20 a new 10 CFR Part that could, in a technology-21 inclusive way, address performance requirements, 22 design features and programmatic controls for a wide 23 variety of future reactors throughout the life of the 24 facility.
25 The rulemaking plan described focusing the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
9 1 rulemaking on risk-informed functional requirements, 2 building on existing NRC requirements, mission policy 3 statements and recent and ongoing activities. And the 4 rulemaking plan also describes seeking extensive 5 stakeholder engagement, including with this committee, 6 on the content of the rule.
7 In October of 2020, the Commission 8 approved the rulemaking plan in its SRM and directed 9 the staff to accelerate the schedule to complete the 10 rulemaking by 2024 to identify key uncertainties 11 impacting the publication of the final rule, and to 12 develop and release preliminary proposed rule language 13 intermittently followed by extensive stakeholder 14 outreach and dialogue.
15 In November of last year, the Commission 16 approved its schedule extension to provide additional 17 time for the staff to continue its efforts to reach 18 alignment and discuss with external stakeholders on 19 the scope of the rulemaking and further develop the 20 rule language to allow additional time for external 21 stakeholders to participate constructively and to 22 ensure better coordination with a number of other 23 advanced reactor activities.
24 The public comment period on the 25 preliminary proposed rule language closed on August NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
10 1 31st of 2022. So that takes us to where we are now, 2 on the right side of the slide, the October-November 3 Subcommittee and Full Committee meetings, as we work 4 to provide the proposed rulemaking package to the 5 Commission in February of 2023.
6 So there were some questions during the 7 subcommittee meeting on whether we'd have additional 8 ACRS interactions during the rulemaking process, and 9 of course we will. That's sort of indicated in the 10 2023-2024 timeline of the left side of the screen 11 where we'll continue to have interactions with 12 external stakeholders as we work to resolve comments 13 and provide additional discussions on the rulemaking 14 package after the rule is released for public comment.
15 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Before you leave that 16 slide, I just want to try and understand the schedule.
17 As you can imagine, the ACRS letter usually has some 18 suggestions for improvements.
19 What will happen if there's some easy 20 fixes in our letter, can you make some changes and 21 still get the draft text to the commissioners by 22 February 2023 is what you're shooting for, or is it 23 just too late with the process? Maybe, we'd have a 24 range of comment; some easy fixes, and some that we'll 25 think about in the future if it's too hard to fix.
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11 1 MR. HOELLMAN: Yes, thanks, Dr. Rempe. We 2 do envision making or continue to make adjustments as 3 the rulemaking package moves through concurrence of 4 course. We value the Committee's input and plan to 5 respond to the letters.
6 In our response, I think we will provide 7 our thoughts on your recommendations and conclusions, 8 any changes we would make in response, and that will 9 be documented in our response.
10 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Thank you.
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I have a question of 12 the same thing because that is in your preamble. In 13 the Part 7, you have a specific request for comments 14 where you requested comments in 20 different areas.
15 So what is your position of that? You requested those 16 comments, and when do you expect to receive them, 17 address them or anything?
18 MR. HOELLMAN: Thanks, Vesna. I think we 19 expect -- and part of our overall strategy and 20 extensive stakeholder engagement is in getting the 21 proposed rulemaking package available. What we 22 released in September of this year was to sort of give 23 some early indication of areas where we're interested 24 in continued interactions with stakeholder and 25 thoughts on specific language.
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12 1 We've got similar questions in our 2 advanced reactor stakeholder meetings on how can we 3 continue to interact with the staff on these areas 4 given that we're not in a formal comment period right 5 now.
6 The way we've kind of responded to that is 7 we aren't in a formal comment period because we're 8 trying to get the package complete and work through 9 all the internal reviews to get it to the Commission 10 by February 2027. But we do recognize that there 11 areas folks may want to interact with us on between 12 now and when the proposed rule goes out for public 13 comment.
14 And if there's a specific area within 15 those questions that stakeholders want to engage on, 16 we're open to adding it in as a topic for one our 17 future stakeholder meetings and continue to gather 18 input.
19 One of the key uncertainties and 20 challenges I think we identified in our response to 21 the SRM was that there's only a planned 60-day public 22 comment period, and I think some of the members have 23 recognized that that's rather short for a rulemaking 24 of such complexity.
25 Some of the questions are specifically NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
13 1 targeted to areas where we continue to receive 2 comments and questions, so we continue to seek input 3 on those to refine the rule to get us to a place where 4 we want to be. But on the schedule we're on, it's 5 just -- we're trying to strike the right balance, I 6 guess, in interacting and getting the rulemaking 7 package complete.
8 (Simultaneous speaking.)
9 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: In light of your --
10 let's say the first one, you're seeking comments of 11 proposed organization and possibly improvements and 12 blah, blah. So this is just sort of theoretical 13 seeking because you will not have the time to do 14 anything about that before February, right?
15 MR. HOELLMAN: Yes, so the --
16 (Simultaneous speaking.)
17 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: -- you have a very 18 nice organization of the things you're interested in 19 the comments. My question is that, are you really 20 interested in these comments?
21 MR. BEALL: Yes. Hi, this is Bob Beall.
22 I'm the project manager for Part 53 rulemaking. Those 23 questions in the draft proposed rule right now will be 24 going out hopefully with the proposed rule for public 25 comment. And so they will be addressed with all the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
14 1 other comments we get on the proposed rule when issue 2 the final rule in the 2024 timeframe. If the ACRS has 3 some comments on those proposed questions, feel free 4 to put that in the letter.
5 MEMBER PETTI: We will.
6 MR. BEALL: Like Jordan said, we'll see if 7 we have time to address them in our response, or we 8 will then address them --- any early comments, I will 9 be addressing them in the follow-up.
10 MEMBER PETTI: Right. I didn't expect 11 that you'd address all of our comments by the end of 12 the year.
13 MR. BEALL: Right.
14 MEMBER PETTI: Some of them -- make sure 15 we don't forget about them.
16 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Dave, my question is 17 this has been indicated that they're open to change 18 organization, but they obviously -- I don't believe 19 that's true. There's many of these -- the requests 20 for comments that I don't believe they're opened for 21 those changes but asking for comments. That's my 22 take.
23 It says that -- that's my question.
24 Because if you are putting draft now, you're not going 25 to change organization after that. That's my comment.
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15 1 I understand that some of those questions are sort of 2 nice they're there, but that is -- are you open to 3 change the organization after the -- in the final?
4 MR. BEALL: I don't think we would ask the 5 question if we weren't totally against the possibility 6 of changing the organization. I think part of the 7 reason we landed where we landed on the draft proposed 8 rule language is we started down a path -- we've 9 gotten multiple letters from ACRS saying this is a 10 viable approach.
11 And then we started getting comments from 12 stakeholders that mentioned things like, well, this 13 doesn't quite align with international communities, 14 guidance and rules. What if a developer would pursue 15 international licensing before NRC licensing, and how 16 would that work. Would we have to change our whole 17 design or analysis to then fit within what we were 18 proposing in Part 53 at the time?
19 And so that's sort of why -- or a reason 20 why we took on the development of Framework B, which 21 originally started as, if you recall, Part 50x, which 22 tried to align or develop technology-inclusive 23 requirements, tried to revise the existing 24 requirements that were light-water reactor-focused to 25 be more technology-inclusive.
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16 1 We've been working, and I mentioned in the 2 beginning in 2016, 2017, that was our initial focus in 3 our implementation action plans was in recognition 4 that early movers would -- Part 53 would not be 5 available for them. They would need to come under 6 Parts 50 and 52. So we started initially developing 7 that.
8 And at the end of the slide, you'll see 9 what the guidance development, what we've done over 10 the years. A lot of it and still most of it is 11 focused on Parts 50 and 52 because from a 12 predictability and clarity standpoint, we want to have 13 guidance available to support early movers. And we'll 14 continue to learn and revise those guidance documents 15 to support the final Part 53 rule as we move forward.
16 I don't think we're not looking for or not 17 open to better suggestions on how to improve the rule.
18 It's just sort of the timelines we're on, and how we 19 sort of got here. I know we've talked about it a 20 number of times. I know there's still external 21 stakeholder concerns on some of it.
22 Okay, let's keep moving, Liz.
23 Here's kind of what we were just talking 24 about, how we've got to Framework A and Framework B 25 within the draft proposed rule language. As we've NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
17 1 mentioned before, Subpart A is our one subpart that's 2 entirely common to both frameworks.
3 That has the general provisions, common 4 definitions, and also framework-specific definitions 5 for areas that just are -- the definition is specific 6 to the methodology within the frameworks.
7 As we've noted before and in the 8 rulemaking plan, Framework A was intended to align 9 with the licensing modernization project, the PRA-led 10 approach, following the DOE cost-shared, industry-led 11 efforts.
12 Framework B, Subparts N through U, are the 13 technical and application requirements for Framework 14 B. As I mentioned, they were -- we initially 15 developed them in response to stakeholder feedback 16 requesting a technology-inclusive traditional 17 licensing option that aligns more with international 18 guidance and approaches.
19 It uses traditional uses of risk insights 20 and design-specific rules. It requires applicants to 21 develop principal design criteria. It also includes 22 the alternative evaluation of risk insights, which 23 Marty will discuss later.
24 The draft proposed rulemaking package 25 consists of four enclosures that make up the federal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
18 1 register notice, which is intended to help readers 2 digest the numerous pages and be able to review the 3 preamble along with the rule text without scrolling up 4 and down a page or flipping back and forth.
5 We'll talk more about guidance later on 6 this morning. Are there any questions on this slide 7 or just keep moving?
8 Liz, next slide.
9 Okay, the front matter material in 10 Sections 53000 and 53010 are relatively new. They 11 weren't released publically until the draft proposed 12 rulemaking package was released in September, but 13 we've been discussing these over the last several 14 months.
15 We hope that these sections provide some 16 additional clarity on how the proposed rule is set up 17 that each framework is stamped with their own set of 18 consolidated requirements.
19 As Vesna mentioned, we know that we 20 reached -- a major comment we've been receiving is 21 that the rule should only consist of one framework, 22 and that's what that specific request for comment in 23 the federal register notice is sort of targeting.
24 I think we've noted in past meetings that 25 we've tried to acknowledge this comment in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
19 1 preamble where we included a comment preamble 2 discussion or subparts within the two frameworks that 3 are similar or have requirements that essentially 4 reproduce themselves. An example of that is Subparts 5 G and Q on decommissioning.
6 I already mentioned, but the purpose of 7 these sections up front is to really direct readers to 8 understand that the frameworks are meant to be viewed 9 independently with some exceptions, and Jesse will 10 discuss some of them in Subpart F later on.
11 We think that it provides some additional 12 clarity instead of having internal cross references 13 within each subpart that might get confusing to the 14 reader, applicant or the staff.
15 Liz, next slide.
16 This is Subpart A. This is the general 17 provisions. I'll focus largely on the definitions.
18 So 53020 is the common definitions. Most of the terms 19 here are technically equivalent to the corresponding 20 terms defined in Part 52 and intended to be consistent 21 with other regulatory definitions or would be 22 consistent with how the terms are used in existing 23 regulations.
24 Commercial nuclear plan is one that we've 25 talked about in the past. We started with the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
20 1 definition that was intended to capture the NEIMA 2 definition of advanced nuclear reactor. That caused 3 some challenges with our stakeholders, and we didn't 4 necessarily think it provided anything additional than 5 what we would define as a commercial nuclear plant.
6 We do use plant more often in Part 53 than 7 reactor because with some advanced technologies, 8 radionuclide sources can be more prevalent in areas 9 outside of the actual reactor vessel. So as a 10 holistic look at the plant design, we want to make 11 sure that all radionuclide sources are considered and 12 identified and protected.
13 Manufactured reactor and manufactured 14 reactor module, we tried to address some of our 15 external stakeholders and potential vendors that are 16 interested in manufactured reactor and using a 17 manufacturing license.
18 And so we included the ability to load 19 fuel at a manufactured reactor or manufacturing 20 facility with proper mechanisms that prevent 21 criticality while it's been transported to its final 22 destination at a commercial nuclear plant.
23 As I mentioned before, some of the 24 Framework A, Framework B definitions that are unique 25 to the frameworks have to do with licensing basis NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
21 1 events and structure system component classifications.
2 A lot of these in Framework A were derived from what 3 was doing in the licensing modernization project as 4 endorsed in Regulatory Guide 1.233.
5 I think generally that's all I wanted to 6 cover on this slide. We did add the definition of 7 safety function in response to some of the members' 8 comments in their letter from August.
9 CHAIRMAN REMPE: I appreciate the changes 10 you made as we indicated in the subcommittee meeting 11 on the definition of safety function. But when I keep 12 looking at this slide that you presented during the 13 subcommittee meeting, I guess the thought comes to my 14 mind still why couldn't you just use the one 15 definition for Framework A to B.
16 Why is it you can't use that definition 17 and apply it to both A and B? Because I know we 18 heard, well, we want to a do a bottoms-up approach and 19 have the design criteria before we identify the safety 20 functions, but I would never know if my design 21 criteria were complete unless I had thought at the 22 beginning what safety functions were.
23 I know there's still this reluctance to 24 jump in and do something that would be generally 25 applicable to both frameworks. Is there something I'm NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
22 1 missing? Give me an example of why you couldn't have 2 use this for Framework B?
3 MR. HOELLMAN: I'll start. I'll let Boyce 4 maybe chime in or Bill. I think in general, we tried 5 to capture the general piece you're talking about in 6 the definition, but then we've included the Framework 7 A and Framework B -- like how it would be implemented 8 within the individual frameworks as sort of a subset 9 of the definition.
10 Essentially, it comes from sort of how the 11 safety functions are addressed by either design 12 features and functional design criteria in Framework 13 A.
14 So the safety functions play a distinct 15 role in doing that using the specific design rules in 16 Framework B and saying the principal design criteria 17 essentially capture the same things, but we weren't 18 sure what how would we implement that -- it's already 19 implemented within the principal design criteria.
20 We thought just including it as a 21 requirement in Framework B, we weren't sure how 22 exactly to implement it. I don't know if Bill, Boyce 23 --
24 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Give me an example on why 25 you can't use it for Framework B --
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23 1 MR. RECKLEY: This is Bill Reckley. As 2 Jordan mentioned, the first part of the definition is 3 basically common, and that is almost plain English, 4 safety function.
5 The reason we felt compelled to 6 distinguish how they're used within the two frameworks 7 is Framework A, if I could remember, basically you 8 derive your safety functions from what is needed to 9 meet the high level of performance.
10 Whereas in Framework B, and largely 11 existing in Parts 50 and 52, those functions are 12 reflected through the general design criteria.
13 They're going to be basically the same. This is 14 engineering. They're basically going to be the same.
15 Control heat level, control heat removal, contain the 16 radionuclides.
17 So it's not surprising that in the end 18 they look the same, but how they're used in the 19 language is in Framework B, they're basically assumed 20 from the beginning, these are your safety functions.
21 Whereas in Framework A, a slight 22 difference. Instead of relying on the experience and 23 the existing construct of the GDC, we say derive. I 24 know that's a subtle difference.
25 CHAIRMAN REMPE: I'm still struggling NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
24 1 because, again, you may have a chemical hazard or 2 something that is not embedded in the existing 3 regulation and the general design criteria. And so to 4 me, to know what the principal design criteria are for 5 these non-LWRs, you should start thinking about what 6 are the hazards first.
7 I appreciate what you did. You got closer 8 to where you are, but I just don't know why you didn't 9 take the next step and say, okay, identify what the 10 hazards are and then see if all your design criteria 11 and address those hazards. To me, it's just a logical 12 approach.
13 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, and this is Boyce Travis 14 from the staff. I think the disconnect is in 15 Framework B, if we said define the safety functions, 16 that's -- so ultimately in Framework B, the staff is 17 making review findings against the principal design 18 criteria that are utilized by the designer. The staff 19 has to say, yes, these PDC are okay.
20 And in the review that the staff makes the 21 findings against in Framework B, similar to how it's 22 done in 50 and 52. The staff makes findings against 23 those principal design criteria, which are more 24 specific and cover the full spectrum of design -- a 25 subset of what constitutes the safety functions for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
25 1 the design as opposed to the top-down holistic 2 approach in Framework A.
3 And so adding a requirement to define 4 safety functions, in our view in Framework B, is 5 adding another requirement that it's not clear how the 6 staff aids. It's an additional burden on top of the 7 principal design criteria, which we think cover it.
8 But B, it differs from how the staff is making their 9 review findings of Framework B coming from the bottom-10 up versus the top-down approach that's in Framework A.
11 CHAIRMAN REMPE: How will the staff know 12 that the identified principal design criteria are 13 complete unless everyone agrees on what the safety 14 functions are? Anyway, I've made my point.
15 That's why I just wanted to bring it up 16 because we were too nice, I thought, in the 17 subcommittee meeting and I didn't harass you, but I 18 kept thinking I must be missing something. I thought 19 about it some more, and I don't get what I'm missing.
20 But anyway, go ahead. I've belabored this point 21 enough.
22 (Laughter.)
23 MR. HOELLMAN: Okay, so I think we can 24 move to the next slide unless there's any other 25 questions on Part A.
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26 1 Okay, so this is just another overview of 2 Framework A with some of the specific topics we plan 3 to cover today. We're going to cover the QHOs in 4 Subpart B, fueled modules in Subpart E and O. And 5 then in Subpart F, the generally-licensed reactor 6 operators, human factors and the associated ISGs that 7 are part of the proposed rulemaking package.
8 So with that, I think I'm turning it over 9 to Bill on the next slide.
10 MR. RECKLEY: Liz, just keep this slide 11 here for a second.
12 Again, this is Bill Reckley. Just as a 13 summary of Framework A, I know we've talked about it 14 in numerous meetings. We tried to organize it 15 somewhat like a systems engineering approach or 16 sometimes we've talked about this as a top-down 17 approach where we put the high level requirements in 18 Subpart B and then follow that through the 19 organization that set up like the life cycle of a 20 facility to say what needs to be done within those 21 stages of the life cycle to meet those high level 22 criteria.
23 As Jordan mentioned, you go down through 24 the subparts and the life cycle of site, being 25 construction, operation and decommissioning with a few NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
27 1 licensing and general matters like quality assurance 2 in the latter Subparts I, J and K.
3 Again, the important part of this, and 4 we'll get into it on the next slide, is the 5 establishment of the high level criteria, Subpart B.
6 As Jordan mentioned, we'll talk about that. Jesse 7 will talk about the generally-licensed reactor 8 operators and other human factor issues later in the 9 presentation.
10 So, Liz, if you can go to the next slide.
11 This is one we used during the 12 subcommittee meeting to basically try to summarize an 13 integrated approach that we try to reflect in 14 Framework A. The first -- and we used the model 15 that's been around since the 1990s in Regulatory Guide 16 1.174, risk-informed decisionmaking, to try make sure 17 that we had captured things.
18 And also to try to make sure that 19 Framework A would provide a comparable level of safety 20 as is provided in Parts 50 and 52 for the operating 21 fleet. So just going around clockwise really quickly, 22 one of the first step there -- again, we had to tailor 23 this somewhat because 1.174 is written to address 24 changes to existing licensing basis whereas in Part 53 25 we're talking about basically starting from scratch NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
28 1 and forming the licensing basis. And nevertheless, 2 works pretty well, we think.
3 And so the first step in that, in 1.174, 4 is to make sure you're meeting the purpose of the 5 existing regs. We tried to do is -- we were doing 6 crosswalks and looking and through interactions.
7 One example, I think of this first box and 8 just the exercises we went through is if you remember 9 very early on in the process, as Jordan mentioned 10 maybe two years ago, a lot of the discussion with the 11 ACRS was on you have to have a requirement that the 12 facility will be subcritical in the long term.
13 And we had not had that provision in the 14 first draft. And so we added a requirement, a 15 specific requirement, under the design requirements in 16 53 440 to require -- so through those internal 17 interactions and interactions with stakeholders, 18 interactions with the ACRS, we think we addressed all 19 the topics that are addressed in 50 and 52.
20 The next one going, again, clockwise is 21 defense in-depth. As we talked many times, there's 22 specific provisions to assess defense in-depth. This, 23 again, it's an area that's different in that in 50 and 24 52, defense in-depth is already built into the general 25 design criteria and other requirements. It's a core NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
29 1 philosophy, but it's built in.
2 In Framework A, applicants are required to 3 do an assessment to make sure we end up in a 4 comparable place. Design requirements and margin, 5 engineering margins, that is addressed in, again, the 6 design requirements in 53 440 as well as in some of 7 the other higher level requirements in Subpart B.
8 Going around again, the next step we've 9 talked about, we'll talk about a little more I 10 suspect, is a comparison to the safety goals.
11 Remember, 1.174 was developed as a primary tool for 12 risk-informed decisionmaking. So what did it bring 13 into play that wasn't there, let's say, in the 70s or 14 early 80s? That was risk insights from PRAs.
15 And so this step is to make sure that a 16 facility meets the NRC safety goals. We're using the 17 quantitative health objectives, the QHOs, as a 18 technology-inclusive metric. And then lastly, the 19 process requires that whatever you do, you monitor 20 performance.
21 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay, this is Vesna.
22 So there is a couple -- you took this straight from 23 the Reg Guide 1.174. This is a good demonstration on 24 the integration of the existing regulation in that 25 time and the new one in the sense of defense in-depth NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
30 1 and safety margins and everything.
2 I mean, number one, I don't even know how 3 that applies to here. You want to consider the new 4 regulation as a change? You have a very little 5 meeting performance in this. But the bad thing which 6 I want to -- so this, how it is built, it was -- the 7 data applied to core damage frequency and large early 8 release frequency because all the criteria are based 9 on that.
10 So because we don't really know are the 11 new design going to have mounts and large releases to 12 be introduced to HO on your Part 4. You proposed to 13 replace that with QHOs. So let's say the plan comes, 14 which really have a core damage frequency and large 15 release frequency, and you want to use QHOs.
16 What's going to happen based on the 17 current experience with Level 3, if you look in that 18 NRC project, the Level 3, you will see that plans with 19 core damage frequency of ten to minus two will satisfy 20 the QHOs. So that doesn't really meet what you just 21 said that you have to have a comparable level of 22 safety.
23 That's one of my additional comments of 24 QHOs. Because as it's shown in the Level 3 results, 25 the US Level 3 -- so this is a couple orders of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
31 1 magnitude different than what it was when they tried 2 to connect core damage frequencies to the constant 3 facilities and everything. So this is one of my 4 comments that if you started QHOs and then try to come 5 back to substitute measures, you will have a totally 6 different safety goal.
7 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, I think we would 8 acknowledge that with different technologies, you 9 might have different constructs of what you're 10 depending on in order to meet the QHOs.
11 And, again, to try to develop a 12 technology-inclusive approach, we just didn't see how 13 we could stick with the use of core damage frequency 14 and containment failure given that some designs may 15 not be built that way.
16 We did try in the preamble to reinforce 17 that for those that want to develop surrogates or if 18 we have light-water reactors under Part 53 that want 19 to use existing surrogates, CDF and large release 20 frequency, that that would be okay.
21 MEMBER BIER: I don't want to harp on this 22 because I think it's a bit beyond the scope of Part 53 23 to address it, but I would also note, which I think I 24 commented before, that at some level the current 25 safety goals are kind of inherently not technology NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
32 1 neutral or at least size neutral because they were 2 kind of gear around you have a 1000 megawatt plant and 3 you're comparing it against coal generation.
4 You have, say, a five megawatt plant and 5 the alternative is not coal generation, then sort of 6 the whole rationale for those safety goals is not 7 really strong anymore.
8 MR. RECKLEY: Right. I think that's 9 actually a good point. I think we addressed it in the 10 letter. It's kind of beyond the scope. We were 11 sticking with established, recognizing that some of 12 that, when did that, that means we were established 13 forty years ago, but the Commission has, over the 14 years, reinforced that it's okay to continue to use.
15 So that's probably about as far as we can 16 go on this project. But we had recognized that a lot 17 of what we're trying to do -- you cannot escape that 18 it was developed in a light-water reactor world. In 19 severe accident space, for example, you look at the 20 severe accident policy statement, it's full of light-21 water reactors and maybe one or two lines that say, 22 yeah, we'll take this concept to other technologies.
23 But it was light-water focused.
24 But the concept we tried to capture, 25 because it builds, again, an adverse aspect -- usually NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
33 1 a defense in-depth aspect when you get into severe 2 accidents. So, point taken.
3 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: My main point here 4 was, because you quote them here, that is Reg Guide 5 1.174 on this slide. If you're using QHO, Reg Guide 6 1.174 is not anymore applicable. That's my main 7 point.
8 MR. RECKLEY: Right. I'll acknowledge 9 that, Vesna, that we took the concept from 1.174 and 10 tried to use it. 1.174, like we just said, almost 11 everything is light-water reactor-specific, so it's 12 built for light-water reactor technologies in terms of 13 what we're looking at, the prevalence of using Level 14 1 and Level 2 PRAs, CDF and large release frequencies.
15 So, yes.
16 Dave.
17 MEMBER PETTI: Bill, I just want to just 18 come at it. I love this slide. This is a critical 19 point we'll see in the letter because I like it so 20 much. But there are stakeholders who are making 21 claims that Framework A is a higher safety bar, but it 22 really isn't.
23 And this is what the staff has done to 24 convince themselves that it is an equivalent level of 25 safety. That's an incredibly important thing. It's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
34 1 in the preamble. I know we've talked through in our 2 meetings, but if you just read the rule alone, this 3 doesn't come out easily.
4 Members, you'll see it. There's a whole 5 couple paragraphs on this. I think this is fairly 6 important because it anchors Framework A. It is a 7 complete and different thought process, and that's why 8 it was so important in the preamble, in my opinion, to 9 help people understand how different it really is than 10 Framework B.
11 And I don't think you get that sense when 12 you just read the rule itself. You really got to look 13 at the preamble. In some ways, I wish we had had the 14 preamble before we had Framework A and B because it 15 really helped a lot of things. So you'll see if it 16 survives in that letter writing, but -- this is very 17 important.
18 MR. RECKLEY: Liz, if we can go to the 19 next slide. And I'll acknowledge, Dr. Petti, that the 20 ACRS was asking for that explanation from the very 21 beginning, and we kept, due to various reasons, saying 22 we will get there.
23 We tried in the discussion tables and some 24 of the things that we released in real-time to provide 25 some of the explanation, but -- undoubtedly, it fell NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
35 1 short. So to that point, the primary thing that we 2 needed to do was prove to ourselves a comparable or 3 equivalent level of safety.
4 That might sound straightforward, but keep 5 in mind that for the existing fleet, the confidence 6 that there's an adequate level of safety is provided 7 by them complying with the rules that were developed 8 initially and as they've evolved over decades.
9 So there is no specific measure. Adequate 10 protection is provided by meeting the rules, so it's 11 a somewhat circular argument. When you bring in a new 12 effort and say, we're actually going to use measures, 13 but you can't really have it in numerical terms. That 14 was the challenge.
15 We did go through -- some of this touches 16 on what Joy was mentioning. Even under a traditional 17 approach if you go back to the 1960s, they were doing 18 things like this. That's why you get the same -- you 19 end up largely in similar places is because this isn't 20 a new concept.
21 But in any case, if you start on the 22 right, we've used this echelon or hierarchy many 23 times, safety criteria, then you use those to define 24 safety functions. From safety functions, what are the 25 design features I'm going to use provide those NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
36 1 functions. And then ultimately, how does that 2 equipment need to perform to provide the function.
3 Now, I think one interesting thing, and 4 Jesse's going to get to it later on, is under this 5 Framework, you're allowed to use the same similar 6 logic for people. And so that is, to me, one of the 7 more interesting things is that we're looking, again, 8 trying to take an integrated approach.
9 What's the role of the equipment, what's 10 the role of the people, what's the role of operating 11 programs in order to meet those things. So it does 12 help to kind of have this structure throughout. The 13 middle just repeats; I won't do that. Again, we've 14 talked about it many times. The safety criterion in 15 Subpart B.
16 And then just the caution, because we 17 heard this from some, that we don't equate the QHOs to 18 adequate protection. It's one of multiple 19 considerations in our development and ultimately in 20 the finding that we would make.
21 Liz, if we can go to the next slide that 22 talks really about Framework B and the construct. I 23 did want to mention just because it's another area 24 that I think is a significant change and it affects 25 both Frameworks A and B. And that is to include NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
37 1 provisions for the loading of fuel in a factory.
2 In order to do that and make it work, it's 3 both a technical and somewhat legal consideration. We 4 came up with the technical criterion in order to 5 prevent criticality and work with our office of 6 general counsel to say if that's met, you can do this 7 activity and the thing that you have, which is 8 basically a manufactured reactor module loaded with 9 fuel, may not considered a utilization facility.
10 Because under the Atomic Energy Act, if we 11 were to put it in that bin, then it would trigger a 12 whole bunch of ramifications. Anyway, I just wanted 13 to mention that.
14 Liz, I think if you go to the next slide, 15 we can get into Framework B, and I'll turn it over to 16 Boyce.
17 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, so thanks, Bill.
18 This is Boyce Travis from the staff. This 19 slide --
20 MEMBER PETTI: Boyce, before you --
21 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, go ahead.
22 MEMBER PETTI: A time check, we're about 23 halfway. We have one hour left. Thanks.
24 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, no problem.
25 I will be briefly, thankfully. This slide NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
38 1 provides a summary of Framework B as it's currently 2 laid out in the rule. We had some extensive 3 discussion in the subcommittee meeting to touch on 4 various parts of Framework B.
5 I'll note most of them are similar or in 6 some cases basically identical to Framework A with the 7 exceptions that are in P and R that we discussed.
8 Over the next few slides, the staff is going to 9 revisit a couple of topics in Framework B.
10 One of which is codes of standards, 11 another which is AERI that Marty is going to discuss.
12 Aside from that, I'm not going to go into a lot of 13 detail on Framework B. I'll use this opportunity, if 14 anyone has any questions about other areas in this 15 framework, I'll be happy to talk about them here.
16 (No response.)
17 MR. TRAVIS: Hearing none, I'm going to 18 move onto Slide 12. The staff provided Slide 12 to 19 kind of revisit and provide some clarification on the 20 top of the codes and standards because this garnered 21 a fair amount of discussion during the subcommittee.
22 A lot of that discussion was focused on 23 the draft requirements related to codes and standards 24 in Framework A versus what's in Framework B. I kind 25 of want to step back and highlight what the role of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
39 1 codes and standards in Framework B is.
2 With regards to non-LWRs, we think 3 Framework A and Framework B are fairly consistent in 4 that -- there's a provision in Framework B 5 specifically that requested description and 6 justification for codes and standards not previously 7 endorsed or accepted by the NRCD (phonetic) for those 8 to be used in the design.
9 Because we recognize that non-LWRs are 10 probably going to be use codes and standards in order 11 to justify how their components meet various design 12 requirements. And those design requirements, we 13 didn't want to be prescriptive, and we wanted to allow 14 for commensurate qualification of those components 15 with their safety significance.
16 And so in that sense, Framework B and A 17 are consistent for non-LWRs. For LWRs, Framework B 18 has some specific requirements for what light-water 19 reactor codes and standards are applied because our 20 target an equivalent level of safety with the existing 21 requirements.
22 And as Bill has noted earlier, the 23 existing requirements for light-water reactors have 24 been developed with extensive operating, decades of 25 operating experience, and an adherence to a certain NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
40 1 set of codes and standards that have been used.
2 And so currently, those codes and 3 standards are reflected as requirements in Framework 4 B specifically for light-water reactors. The 5 specifics of that are detailed in the requirements.
6 It does create, I'll say, a difference in how codes 7 and standards are applied for LWRs in Framework A and 8 Framework B.
9 Part of that is derived from the 10 difference in philosophy that's used in the two 11 frameworks. Framework A, as Bill noted, an integrated 12 approach that involves the comprehensive, detailed 13 consideration of the full spectrum of event sequences.
14 Whereas Framework B is the more 15 traditional, stylized deterministic analysis with 16 simplifications and conservatism that's coupled with 17 some checks on defense in-depth effectively. I sense 18 we're going to have a discussion here, so I'll open it 19 up --
20 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, this is Charlie Brown.
21 I had a question.
22 MR. TRAVIS: Go for it.
23 MEMBER BROWN: I have asked in previous 24 meetings about general design criteria as opposed to 25 kind of more amorphous claims (audio interference).
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41 1 No, I've got it on. I just didn't bother 2 to talk into it. Thank you. I'm sorry.
3 John, I have some interest in humor here.
4 I need more wire.
5 So I raised that point before, and I think 6 others have pointed out that Framework B has the old 7 framework of 10 CFR 55(a)(h). I'm interested in H in 8 many circumstances. You talked about proposed changes 9 in 55a. I didn't get that out of the previous 10 meetings (audio interference).
11 Right now, there's general design 12 requirements, GDCs, there's specific things in that 13 area that I use frequently because guidance -- not 14 guidance, specific, we got to go by this, this and 15 this, although they're general principles.
16 Are you going to change that? You talked 17 about making changes. Why do we have to change 18 55(a)(h) if it's going to be light-water reactors.
19 You're going to turn those into jelly beans as well?
20 (Audio interference.)
21 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, so let's see if I can 22 address this appropriately. So setting aside the PDC 23 and GDC for the moment. 5055a as it stands in the 24 proposed rule right now is going to continue to apply 25 to light-water reactor designs that are 5052 in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
42 1 Framework B.
2 There are conforming changes as part of 3 this rule package to ensure that they fall within the 4 umbrella requirements of 5055a. Right now, there's no 5 proposal to include non-light-water reactors under the 6 umbrella 5055a.
7 They would have to propose appropriate 8 codes and standards for whatever equipment needs to be 9 qualified up to the safety level they're proposing --
10 MEMBER BROWN: That's for advanced 11 reactors?
12 MR. TRAVIS: Correct, yes. For non-light-13 water reactors.
14 MEMBER BROWN: I got that, but --
15 MR. TRAVIS: Light-water under Framework 16 B, which under the proposed rule, would still be 17 required to meet these.
18 (Simultaneous speaking.)
19 MEMBER BROWN: -- doesn't -- it would fall 20 under that same category?
21 MR. TRAVIS: That's correct.
22 MEMBER BROWN: I call of those light-water 23 --
24 MR. TRAVIS: That is currently what is 25 being proposed, and I think we're going to continue to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
43 1 iterate internally to figure out what the best path 2 forward is.
3 MEMBER BROWN: Is there going to be any 4 effort to try to -- you talked about now the non-5 light-waters. Is there going to be any attempt to try 6 to take or utilize what we know? If you look at the 7 GDCs and a few things like that, a lot of them, 8 they're very, very generalized.
9 They would apply, theoretically, to any 10 type of reactor, not specific to whether it's sodium 11 or lead-bismuth or whatever would be or whatever the 12 other coolants are, et cetera.
13 Is there going to be any effort to try to 14 tailor so that the non-light-water reactors that fall 15 under the Part B as well? Is that what you're talking 16 about? Somebody wanted to do a non-light-water and 17 advanced reactor under Framework B, could they do 18 that?
19 MR. TRAVIS: Yes. Framework B is tailored 20 to be technology-inclusive. It could be a light-water 21 reactor or non-light-water reactor.
22 MEMBER BROWN: So when you said on your 23 initial statement, you said this doesn't apply to non-24 light-water --
25 MR. TRAVIS: Sorry, there's a bifurcation NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
44 1 in Framework B for codes and standards in that it does 2 prescriptively say there are certain codes and 3 standards that LWRs, whether it's a BWR or PWR, are 4 going to have to apply. It isn't that prescriptive 5 for non-light-water reactors.
6 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, I got it. That's 7 fine. Now, I understand a little bit. That's all --
8 MR. TRAVIS: Okay. Happy to provide the 9 clarification.
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: In practice, Boyce, what 11 would your expectation be under this language? For 12 example, say in this non-LWR advanced reactor design, 13 you identified a fission product barrier.
14 Typically, most reactors are going to have 15 some kind of primary system. Is the expectation that 16 that primary system would be made into an equivalent 17 standard as the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 18 and how do you signal that to the applicants?
19 MR. TRAVIS: I think this is a really good 20 question. I'm going to maybe speak a little 21 philosophically for a moment, so I apologize. I will 22 try to get to an example at the end that may make it 23 a little a bit more concrete.
24 But I think given the broad spectrum of 25 the designs that are being considered, we didn't want NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
45 1 to go down the path of actually saying, yes, your 2 primary system, for instance, has to meet this level 3 of standard.
4 Because there are different safety 5 implications for the integrity of the primary system 6 among the advanced reactor designs. For instance, 7 there might be reactor designs where only a very small 8 portion of the primary system, because let's say it's 9 a low pressure, needs to be qualified for integrity.
10 For instance, the vessel and some 11 connections below or above a certain height to prevent 12 a siphon effect or a leakage effect. We would expect 13 then there would be an as-we-like standard applied to 14 that vessel and those connections because that 15 integrity is sufficiently important that it's serving 16 as a fission product boundary.
17 I say as-we-like. As-we-like is the one 18 I'm aware of, we think there might be others that 19 could do that role for certain reactor designs. And 20 so yes, the expectation is for SSCs, they are being 21 relied on for a level of safety as a fission product 22 barrier.
23 There would be an appropriate standard or 24 code of standard or mechanism that we can point to and 25 say, yes, that level of functional performance by that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
46 1 component is going to be assured by this code or this 2 standard.
3 And for many applications, I think there 4 are cases where these materials and what's being done 5 is new enough that that standard may not be 6 sufficiently developed yet.
7 I think as we license these reactor 8 designs, we're going to learn some things and probably 9 but some of this into guidance, for instance. So I 10 don't think we wanted to do the same thing we did with 11 5055a and say, and here's the list of codes and 12 standards that are going to apply.
13 Sorry, I'm not really answering the 14 question of how do I signal that. I think eventually 15 it will be signaled through guidance, but there's 16 still an expectation that whatever you are relying to 17 have your safety performance for your SSCs is going to 18 be qualified in some ways. And one of the best ways 19 to do is an appropriate code and standard.
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, that's a reasonable 21 way to address the question. I'm just looking at it 22 from the perspective, one is engineering, two from the 23 eyes of the public.
24 Because you've gone through significant 25 effort, as Bill outlined earlier, to demonstrate that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
47 1 you're going to achieve an equivalent level of 2 adequate protection or however you want phrase it, 3 level of safety.
4 And I've heard the arguments from some of 5 the proponents for advanced designs that were low 6 pressure, so the primary system isn't as important as 7 in an LWR. It depends on the design, of course, 8 especially if you're reliant on the coolant that's in 9 the primary system no matter what the pressure is.
10 I appreciate your challenge here because 11 you don't want to be overly prescriptive not knowing 12 what the design might be like. But it's just in my 13 mind, the expectation would be that if it provides one 14 of those critical safety functions, then the integrity 15 -- one of the ways ensuring the integrity of the 16 function is through going through an ASME code by 17 case. Or if it's in the reactor protection system, 18 IEEE equivalent and so on. Well, I made my point.
19 MR. TRAVIS: I agree with you 100 percent.
20 Our expectation is that for applications that are 21 similar to what's being seen in the industry today, 22 for instance, RCS boundary, a reactor protection 23 system, there's going to be a code and standard 24 employed. And of those codes and standards, we know 25 which one currently is used to make that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
48 1 justification.
2 But given, again, given the just huge 3 spectrum and variety of things that are coming in, it 4 doesn't -- it's both a challenging task, and it 5 doesn't necessarily benefit us to start prescribing 6 them in the regulation itself. If we have to go down 7 that road, I think guidance would be the way we would 8 go.
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you.
10 MEMBER BROWN: This is me again, Charlie.
11 I just want to amplify the -- if you look at the 12 standards -- can you hear me okay?
13 On the technology neutral side. It's 14 interesting to go back and reflect on even how we've 15 been using the current standards the 93 -- 603-1991 16 IEEE standard. It's got all the architectural stuff 17 in it.
18 Control of access is really the only one 19 because there was only physical access at that point, 20 not electronic access, which we're struggling with and 21 figuring out how to deal with now. But that's a 22 remarkably technology neutral -- it doesn't tell you 23 to use vacuum tubes, or mag amps or transistors or any 24 -- it doesn't tell you. It just says, hey, you need 25 these overall architectural standards functionally.
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49 1 And that's kind of the bulwark of what you 2 put together. So having that be amorphous, there's 3 going to be, even in the non-light-water reactors, you 4 got to generate steam somehow. People are going to 5 say, oh, we're going to have thermal -- I don't know, 6 some kind of heat transfer into these magic 7 thermoelectric conversion devices with tons of powered 8 electronics.
9 I'll believe that when I see it since I've 10 dealt with it for 20 years, 30 years. That's not 11 easy. Steam drives the big generators. So if the 12 stuff you look at, you're going to have steam 13 somewhere more than likely.
14 There's high pressure somewhere in that 15 system, and it's connected directly to the primary 16 systems. So you're going to have some reasonable 17 standards of that interface. You just can't leave it 18 -- we know how to deal with that interface on the 19 secondary sides, but I just think we need some thought 20 going forward as to how you do this into going 21 forward.
22 There's some areas where it's transparent.
23 You're going to have some type of reactor monitoring 24 systems, some type of safety systems, whatever they 25 are, the old standards really would apply. So I'm NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
50 1 just encouraging you to think broadly.
2 Don't throw the baby out with the 3 bathwater because we know how to do that, and we see 4 the systems we're developing today, and the new 5 applications would work just as well. We still got to 6 monitor the plant whatever the pressures and 7 temperatures and neutron configuration they have.
8 MR. TRAVIS: Fully agree. I think this is 9 just another -- it's a challenging task for the staff.
10 There's flexibility and certainty are, in a lot of 11 cases, on the same axis. By affording that 12 flexibility, there's -- it is going to make their view 13 a little more challenging in some cases. And it's not 14 as easy as checking the box. But we have been 15 considering it, and we'll continue to consider going 16 forward.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Thanks.
18 MEMBER PETTI: Let's keep moving.
19 MR. TRAVIS: Sorry, Dave.
20 MEMBER BROWN: Sorry about that, Dave.
21 MR. TRAVIS: Sorry, this is my last slide.
22 I'm going to pass it over to Marty Stutzke.
23 MR. STUTZKE: Good morning, I'm Marty 24 Stutzke from the staff. I wanted to talk to you about 25 the evolution of the alternative evaluation risk NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
51 1 insights approach, emphasizing the AERI approach that 2 has been developed. The underlying purpose is the 3 various Commission policies.
4 Second, and I guess probably most 5 important thing for this presentation, is we have the 6 AERI entry conditions since the subcommittee meeting 7 a couple of weeks ago in order to address various 8 stakeholders' comments and further consideration of 9 the insights we got from the MACCS calculations. I'll 10 explain that in some detail.
11 As a result of changing the entry 12 conditions, we went back and made sure that we didn't 13 deter perhaps some unintended consequence. The AERI 14 referenced elsewhere in the regulations. Notably, the 15 determination that a facility is a self-reliant 16 mitigation facility, which enables the use of 17 generally-licensed reactor operators. And last but 18 not least, we're continuing to develop our draft 19 regulatory guides DG-1413 and 1414 that enables and 20 support the AERI approach, like that. It's been an 21 exciting week.
22 Next slide.
23 I had presented this slide at the 24 subcommittee meeting that lays out how the various 25 policy statements from the Commission have informed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
52 1 the development of the AERI process.
2 I point you to the upper left box that 3 talks about the advanced reactor policy statement that 4 says we expect advanced designers to comply with the 5 safety goal policy statement. Like that.
6 Later on, goes down and says, well, we 7 expect you to comply with the severe accident policy 8 statement and to use PRA as the design tool. When you 9 read the PRA policy statement as shown on the lower 10 left corner, it recognizes that not everything needs 11 to be a full fault tree, event tree, type of approach.
12 There's other ways to do risk assessments 13 like that. What's challenging here is indicates 14 broadly in a fault tree should apply to complex 15 systems. This is a big challenge to define. What is 16 a complex system?
17 So we need some way when we write a 18 regulation that translates those subjective terms into 19 something like that's a more crisp sort of yes or no.
20 If you meet this criteria, you're allowed to do AERI.
21 If not, something else. That's been a big challenge 22 for us.
23 But anyway, that enables the use of the 24 AERI process in lieu of a PRA if the entry conditions 25 are met. (Audio interference.)
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53 1 With that, next slide. Why did we 2 actually revise the entry conditions? Well, some 3 stakeholders commented that the current ones, the ones 4 that we presented at the subcommittee meeting, were 5 overly conservative.
6 And by that, what seems to be meant is 7 that we were screening out plants that should be 8 allowed to perform an AERI in lieu of a PRA. Of 9 course, the way that the entry conditions are 10 structured is anybody can perform a PRA. That's 11 always the option.
12 AERI would only be needed if they met the 13 certain conditions and didn't want to invest in doing 14 the PRA. I fully recognize PRAs can be enormously 15 time-consuming and resource-intensive. I personally 16 done about 40 in my career.
17 On top of what we have in the various 18 industry consensus standards that tell us how to 19 review PRAs, it's quite laborious at times. The 20 intent behind AERI is necessarily don't need to bring 21 all of that mechanism into play.
22 Second thing is that we re-examine the 23 scoping calculations that Keith Compton presented to 24 you at the subcommittee meeting. And I came to 25 realize, remember those earlier AERI entry conditions NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
54 1 were fixated on trying to dose at a 100 meters met 2 certain criteria.
3 And I looked at it and began to realize 4 that was probably an inadequate predictor of the 5 overall risk. Specifically, if you've got elevated 6 plans or buoyant releases.
7 And with the result that even though you 8 could have met the entry conditions, you can be --
9 sometimes the conditional risk would be well above the 10 QHOs, could be well below the QHOs. So we're trying 11 to reduce the variability. Last and not least --
12 MEMBER KIRCHNER: If I might add too, we 13 recently renewed methodology for EPZ sizing and we 14 came to the same -- not the exact same conclusion, but 15 you could have situations where a close in dose at 100 16 meters just like this entry level condition might not 17 be the best metric of evaluating EPZs, sizing.
18 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I appreciate that. I 19 realize the AERI entry conditions are dependent on the 20 sizing of the EPZ or other aspects. But yes, it's a 21 technical problem, and I'll show you a slide in just 22 a minute. Last but not least, just the desire to 23 provide increased flexibility and how you demonstrate 24 the AERI entry conditions are met.
25 Next slide.
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55 1 These are the revised AERI entry 2 conditions. You'll notice in Paragraph A in this 3 language, we have eliminated this notion of dose at 4 100 meters and replaced it with the notion of 5 consequence evaluated anywhere in the area between the 6 EAB or within ten miles of the EAB meets this 2.5 rem 7 criteria.
8 We replaced the language in Paragraph B to 9 specify how to identify the postulated boundaries as 10 they were found. So you'll notice the notion that you 11 need to search for all radiological sources, you need 12 to consider internal/external hazards, focus on the 13 combination, failures to get you into the bounding 14 event.
15 Last but not least, consideration of 16 various commission of various commission and omission, 17 like that. Realize in order to -- you have the 18 bounding event, one of the more of the plant's safety 19 functions have failed, had a major release going on 20 beyond the DBA like that.
21 So the intent here was to reword the entry 22 conditions being more -- I'll characterize it as 23 possibly other than do this and this and this rather 24 than, well, don't do that in the analysis. So we 25 think that it should be more effective.
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56 1 Next slide.
2 MEMBER PETTI: I'm a little confused. I 3 also thought there was language in that about you 4 could take credit for some inherent safety functions.
5 And there was also discussion of the self-reliant 6 mitigating facility as an entry requirement. That's 7 all gone now?
8 MR. STUTZKE: Well, the self-reliant 9 mitigation facility that enables the use of GLROs, 10 that was really never in the original condition. What 11 we said was if you met the original AERI entry 12 condition plus other criteria, then you would be 13 deemed a self-reliant facility.
14 MEMBER HALNON: It's the other way around, 15 Dave.
16 MEMBER PETTI: It's the other way around.
17 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, it's the other way 18 around.
19 MR. SEYMOUR: This is Jesse Seymour. On 20 the last slides, I'm not sure how it plugs in, but the 21 actual self-reliant mitigation designation happens 22 over in 53.800 --
23 MEMBER PETTI: Okay, because I could 24 imagine there's a plant -- this is a hazard-based 25 criteria if I understood that.
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57 1 MR. SEYMOUR: Correct.
2 MEMBER PETTI: But I can imagine there are 3 some designs that are not necessarily fully meet the 4 self-reliant definition but clearly would meet the 5 AERI. That's still a lot.
6 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. When we get to my 7 slides, I'll explore how that works. But one thing 8 that's important to remember is even a plant that 9 meets AERI when it enters into those criteria, it 10 still has other criteria that have to be met.
11 Specifically, for defense in-depth, that's not tied to 12 credited human action. Again, there's more to being 13 a GLRO self-reliant mitigation facility than just 14 meeting AERI by itself.
15 MEMBER PETTI: Yes, I understood that.
16 I'm talking -- I'm looking at the exact opposite. I 17 don't want to do a GLRO, but I want to do AERI. I 18 have a plant that I'm pretty sure can get into these 19 entry conditions.
20 But because of the restrictive nature of 21 the definition of self-reliant mitigating facility, 22 it's very gray whether or not I need human action 23 based on some aspects of the design. But they're 24 still allowed to do a more streamlined AERI approach.
25 I've seen some microreactor designs that may actually NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
58 1 be in that campus.
2 MR. STUTZKE: Next slide, Liz.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Dave, may I make an 4 observation. That last slide, Marty, this is very 5 good to hear. I'm making a mental note that you're --
6 sorry, I can't read with or without glasses. When you 7 have A and B for -- in terms of guidance for 8 evaluating EPZ sizes. This is a very good, distinct 9 way to go about evaluating a proposed EPZ. Just 10 making an observation, thank you. Keep going.
11 MR. STUTZKE: Next slide, please. This 12 points to the results of the MACCS calculations. I 13 drew this cartoon to explain things to my managers 14 like this. The idea is simple. Hot air rises. But 15 we get some energy into the plume even though it's at 16 a ground release that actually rises up over the 100-17 meter reference point with the -- what MACCS was 18 telling us was that the major event of the largest 19 dose in the ten-mile area was around four to five to 20 six miles depending on how much energy you put in the 21 plume.
22 And of course, the area is bigger, so more 23 people are exposed to that higher dose, it was raising 24 the conditional risk, like that. It's obvious in 25 retrospect, but being said, the presumption that I had NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
59 1 used before with my back-of-the-envelope type of 2 calculation was, well, obviously the further away you 3 move from the reactor, the dose should go down, right?
4 But that's not necessarily the case.
5 We found that it can -- varying answers by 6 an order or two of magnitude. So the intent was, as 7 shown in the graphic on the left-hand side, it was to 8 limit the maximum dose anywhere within the annuals.
9 And that should work. But we're in the process of 10 doing a bit more confirmatory counts and things like 11 that.
12 Next slide.
13 So what MACCS scoping calculations were 14 telling us was if you get a 25 rem lifetime dose, 15 nominally 50 years, then the conditional individual 16 early fatality risk over that ten-mile region from the 17 EAB outward generally would meet 2x10-6 per event.
18 And assuming one of them appeared, then you've 19 demonstrated at least the QHOs.
20 Moreover, the MACCS scoping calculations 21 were telling us the first year dose seemed to be the 22 controlling or the limiting dose. In other words, you 23 meet 2.5 rem the first year, you're going to meet 25 24 rem over the lifetime due to various reasons.
25 Radioactive decay, weathering, groundshine, stuff like NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
60 1 that.
2 The second point here is 2.5 rem, let's 3 say, almost coincidentally is a small fraction, 10 4 percent, of the traditional dose limits that have been 5 used in Part 100 and over in 5034.
6 What we're trying to say here is if you 7 meet the AERI entry conditions, 2.5 rem over the first 8 year, you've met the 25 rem, at the worst two-hour 9 interval at the EAB, and you've met the 25 rem over 10 the duration of a (audio interference).
11 Converse is not true, however. So this is 12 an indication of how the AERI conditions restricts 13 itself. In other words, not every plant would be 14 eligible to perform an AERI.
15 MEMBER HALNON: Marty, this is Greg. The 16 ten miles, is that intended to have any similarity to 17 the ten-mile EPZ issues in Part 150?
18 MR. STUTZKE: The answer is no. It's 19 purely coincidental.
20 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. I would hope that 21 in the guidance you would make sure that people don't 22 confuse the two, especially with the new --
23 MR. STUTZKE: You're not the first one to 24 point this out. Actually, when the safety goals were 25 first formulated, it was a 50-mile radius. There was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
61 1 big debate that your average (audio interference) 2 people closer would get more dose than --
3 MEMBER HALNON: It's a nominal issue --
4 (Simultaneous speaking.)
5 MEMBER HALNON: -- based on counties and 6 jurisdictions.
7 MR. STUTZKE: Right.
8 MEMBER HALNON: So just make sure that 9 that's clear in your guidance.
10 MR. STUTZKE: Will do. Next slide. As 11 I mentioned before, the AERI entry conditions not only 12 used to determine when an AERI can be performed in 13 lieu of a PRA. They're also used to consider when you 14 need to meet requirements for the mitigation beyond 15 design-basis event and combustible gas control.
16 As Jesse just commented, and certain 17 people will elaborate further, in combination with 18 other conditions the AERI entry conditions are used to 19 define when a plant is a self-reliant mitigation 20 facility.
21 But one of those things that I would 22 emphasize here that actually seemed to be confusing 23 among the staff is just because you perform an AERI, 24 you're not relieved from meeting all the other 25 requirements in Framework B. It is not like a maximum NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
62 1 hypothetical accident. Everything still applies to 2 you.
3 In other words, you need to have a bunch 4 of design criteria, et cetera, et cetera, like this.
5 And as I mentioned before on the second bullet there, 6 some applicants may elect to perform a PRA even if 7 they meet the AERI entry.
8 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg again. The 9 question comes in if they decide to do a PRA right 10 after an AERI, they still must have GLROs, even though 11 they meet the AERI condition. And maybe that's a 12 question for Jesse later on.
13 MR. SEYMOUR: When I display The 14 comparison of Framework B and the criteria that are 15 there, it will show the comparison between non-AERI 16 and AERI facilities. I think that will make it more 17 clear than if someone were to come in and all that, 18 simply to do a PRA. There should be a reasonable 19 pathway for them --
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: The sub-bullet there 21 strikes me as a little bit -- I get the point you're 22 making, but what if a self -- a facility, a commercial 23 nuclear power plant, let me use the right terminology, 24 comes into you and meets the self-reliant mitigation 25 facility criteria but opts to have a senior reactor NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
63 1 operator and licensed reactor operators?
2 Why couldn't they do that? Because they 3 feel that your process for SROs and ROs is a higher 4 level of reliability in terms of protecting their 5 investment. This sub-bullet seems to say you must 6 have GLROs because you're a self-reliant facility.
7 Why would you ever turn anyone down and say, we want 8 a senior reactor operator and licensed reactor 9 operators --
10 MR. SEYMOUR: This is Jesse Seymour again.
11 It's a good question. What I can say is that in 12 earlier versions of the language, it was structured as 13 an alternative, that a facility that met those 14 requirements had the alternative using generally-15 licensed operators, meaning specifically licensed SROs 16 and ROs.
17 We did make a change later on based upon 18 some internal reviews for the work that we did to make 19 a clean demarcation between the two types of 20 facilities. And some of the language has been adapted 21 over time has attempted to make a more clear class 22 distinction between the facilities that fall on one 23 side of the line and the other.
24 A big driver for that in the nature of the 25 Atomic Energy Act and the language that's used in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
64 1 Atomic Energy Act regarding the prescribing of 2 uniformed conditions for operator licensing for 3 various classes of reactors.
4 So in order to provide an alternative to 5 have this new generally-licensed operator, we had to 6 define a class to maintain uniformity. It becomes 7 problematic to try to allow multiple types of 8 operators fall within the same class of facility. So 9 again, there had to be a clear demarcation.
10 Something that, and I think Bill Reckley 11 had said this well before. In order to meet the 12 criteria to be deemed a self-reliant mitigation 13 facility, it is the designer that's going to have to 14 make the case for that.
15 Whether or not they elect to put the time 16 and effort into fully fleshing out that case to 17 achieve that designation is going to be something that 18 falls upon them. Again, I think I'll just leave that 19 right there. But there is time and legwork that will 20 have to come in to achieving that bar.
21 MR. STUTZKE: Okay. Next slide, please.
22 You had seen this before at the 23 subcommittee about the generally organization of DG-14 24 and 13, which is the identification of the licensing 25 events. I would just point out again, it applies not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
65 1 only to Part 53 but also apply to Parts 50 and 52 like 2 that.
3 So it's a general purpose methodology like 4 this, which continued to make informing changes and 5 editorial changes to both these DGs based on comments 6 we've received during the subcommittee like this. We 7 will be hanging on every word that goes on this 8 afternoon to try to get a leg up.
9 As she had pointed it out, there's not a 10 lot of time, and the holidays are approaching. My 11 characterization of the situation, at least my team 12 that's developing this, is like right standard rudder, 13 all engine flank. We're moving fast, trying to be 14 responsible, but it is challenging.
15 Next slide.
16 Final one, again on DG-14 for the actual 17 AERI methodology guidance like that. Nothing new here 18 again. We're continuing to refine it like this.
19 Pointing out we changed the title from framework to 20 methodology because we'll be using the key language.
21 We tried Framework A and Framework B, and then we had 22 an AERI framework. And it's like, man, this is --
23 it's confusing.
24 Did that, and again the box down at the 25 bottom, it's like, well, you may always decide to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
66 1 develop a PRA and it's my plug for my 40-some odd year 2 career of doing PRAs. Great. And further provides a 3 way to take advantage of risk-informed initiatives, 4 this manages completion times, risk-informed 5 categorizations, things like that. Anyway, hope I 6 left you enough time, Jesse.
7 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. Thanks, Marty. I 8 appreciate it.
9 Liz, can we move to the next slide, 10 please.
11 Okay, so as mentioned before, my name is 12 Jesse Seymour. I'm an operator licensing examiner and 13 human factors technical reviewer in NRR.
14 I'll be providing a follow-up on a recent 15 subcommittee presentation which both myself and other 16 technical staff from NRR and DRO provided an update on 17 rule language and overview of key guidance.
18 We intend to support the overall Part 53 19 framework within the specific areas of operating 20 licensing. Human factors, engineering, and operator 21 staffing.
22 Our updates on the status of Part 53 rule 23 language that we covered at the October 19th meeting 24 included how we consolidated our Framework A and B 25 requirements using a common sublanguage for Subpart F, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
67 1 and how we had expanded the provisions for generally-2 licensed reactor operator staffing to include pathways 3 under both Frameworks A and B for both AERI and non-4 AERI facilities as well.
5 We also discussed how we had elected to 6 retain the same provisions for on-shift engineering 7 expertise, namely in the form of to grade individuals 8 possessing plant familiarity.
9 Additionally, my colleagues and I provided 10 overviews or draft guidance documents covering the 11 review of operator licensing examination programs, the 12 review of staffing plans, and for developing scalable 13 human factors engineering review plans.
14 Today, I'd like to provide some additional 15 discussion regarding a number of points that have been 16 raised by the Committee members at that meeting.
17 Liz, we can move to the next slide, 18 please.
19 So within the general topic of operator 20 licensing, the numbers raised several points that I 21 would like to speak to here. It was asked that we 22 give further consideration to some form of regulatory 23 approval that would precede the licensing of 24 generally-licensed reactor operators.
25 This is a general matter that has been NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
68 1 carefully considered during the overall development of 2 that particular licensing framework. In considering 3 those, we've taken into account the programs used to 4 train and examine. Generally-licensed reactor 5 operators would need to go undergo NRC approval and 6 are intended to be subject to ongoing inspection 7 thereafter.
8 Additionally, facilities will be required 9 to maintain and administer the processes associated 10 with generally-licensed operator training and 11 qualifications as an enforceable condition of their 12 facility license.
13 Under 53805, GLROs will also be subject to 14 relevant requirements of Part 26 and Part 73 as they 15 relate in part to matters of behavioral observation 16 and site access.
17 Importantly while the nature of general 18 licensing would make certain features of individual 19 licensing problematic, such as would be the case if we 20 would attempt to incorporate a mechanism to approve 21 each individual becoming a GLRO, there is no 22 comparable difficulty to taking enforcement action 23 against individual GLROs once they're in the position.
24 And the necessary mechanisms for taking 25 that enforcement action on an individual basis have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
69 1 been incorporated into the revisions of 53810.
2 MEMBER HALNON: Jesse, this is Greg. In 3 the interest of time, I'll just go through what the 4 concern is and try to state it clearly. When we went 5 to the certified operator program, we lowered the bar 6 pretty far, in our opinion, on the pedigree of the 7 individual.
8 Not necessarily the training, but we 9 agreed that the training and everything was going to 10 be okay with the pedigree of the individual. So you 11 brought in a GLRO which answered the accountability 12 issues and the enforcement issues and the authority of 13 the federal licensing issues.
14 But I still think the bar is low when you 15 allow a licensee to train somebody, put them on a list 16 say, you're now licensed, without any NRC 17 verification -- at least the paperwork is all it said.
18 The medical is all done. Everything else is done.
19 So that's why we've made the comment that 20 at least get a verification that before a person 21 starts licensed duties that there is a federal 22 acknowledgment and verification that that person has 23 completed the necessary stuff.
24 Obviously not to the level of an SRO and 25 RO licensed person, but at least a verification by the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
70 1 federal government. So that's the point that we were 2 trying to make is -- and out of all the people on the 3 Committee, you would expect me to say, give the 4 industry maximum flexibility since that's where I came 5 from. So take note. I think that that's too low 6 still.
7 MR. SEYMOUR: I appreciate the comments.
8 Something that I would speak to, and I understand that 9 perception on this is probably going to be -- that's 10 a reactive after-the-fact thing is that the mechanisms 11 that are being deployed at the level of facility to 12 ensure that people are suitable to be placed on that 13 list are going to be subject to ongoing inspection 14 enforcement.
15 Again, if it's in inappropriately, that 16 will be something that's enforceable against the 17 facility licensee. Again, does that alleviate your 18 dominant concern there, which I understand people get 19 onto that list in the first place absent of that 20 check.
21 What I can say is that that's something 22 that we've considered pretty carefully. Something 23 that I would offer too is your concern, and I guess 24 just to kind of parse that out a little bit more, is 25 your concern primarily that there's going to be some NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
71 1 type of malfeasance on the part of the plants or just 2 an oversight?
3 MEMBER HALNON: Yes. There may be other 4 pressures, commercial pressures, other things that are 5 driving an increased union pressures, other things 6 that might be driving a more robust list than what 7 could be done.
8 Tell me that you've never had any operator 9 training malfeasance in the present system, and I 10 would say, don't worry about it. Clearly, we have.
11 Especially with new licensees coming in, some of the 12 folks that may not have a lot of experience operating 13 in the nuclear regulatory world.
14 MEMBER BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
15 I've not read the enforcement part of (audio 16 interference) but what does enforcement mean? What do 17 you do? As part of enforcement, could you take over 18 the process of certifying the GLROs, for example.
19 Could that be one of the enforcement actions which 20 would basically take care of that problem?
21 MEMBER HALNON: I think we were talking, 22 Ron, of individual enforcement and the accountability 23 of the individual.
24 MEMBER BALLINGER: Oh, okay. Sorry.
25 MEMBER HALNON: The overall enforcement is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
72 1 always there with the inspection for the licensee but 2 the individual is what we were talking about.
3 MEMBER BIER: The other thing is my sense, 4 and this is something I haven't looked at for a really 5 long time, but if lines haven't been updated, they may 6 be by now kind of negligible and cost of doing 7 business.
8 MR. SEYMOUR: With regards to the overall 9 enforcement, again just to clarify. The mechanisms 10 are there to take enforcement action against both the 11 facility licensee and against individuals who are 12 covered under that general license.
13 If you go into the actual language that we 14 use under 53810, one of the provisions that's built in 15 there is to actually suspend the ability of 16 individuals to be covered under the general license.
17 Again, we apply comparable conditions of 18 license to those individuals in many regards is what 19 we will see with senior reactor operators and reactor 20 operators. And we retain that capability to disallow 21 any given individual on top of anything else in terms 22 of individual enforcement to disallow any given any 23 individual to be recovered by the general license.
24 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. Just one 25 last point is I would think that many, not all, of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
73 1 enforcement actions taken against individuals are 2 post-event issues, in a reactionary -- you might have 3 some with medical paperwork and other things that are 4 caused, but it's going to be post-event. So the 5 reactionary piece should be in quotes.
6 MR. SEYMOUR: There's a point that I would 7 like to make. Again, this is Jesse. I understand the 8 need for time. I will definitely move on. What I 9 want to point out too is that when we look at things 10 that we do that are proactive vs reactive.
11 I don't know if this is necessarily 12 articulated anywhere. Something that's been a factor 13 that should anchor thinking is what is the scale of 14 the safety impact that's associated. And in the case 15 of the senior reactor operators and reactor operators, 16 the staff facilities that aren't meeting this bar to 17 be considered a self-reliant mitigation facility.
18 We see their role as being one where they 19 could be called upon to substantially influence the 20 safety outcome of the public. So in that case, we 21 don't see a reactive only approach as being sufficient 22 to provide public confidence.
23 In the case of generally-licensed reactor 24 operators, we're talking about facilities that have 25 entered into a different class by meeting more NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
74 1 stringent safety criteria. And because of that, 2 again, adopting a primarily reactive stance is 3 something that we feel would be justifiable based 4 upon, again, that comparative safety context.
5 MEMBER HALNON: Okay, and I think there's 6 room in between. I think maybe you should look at 7 even a -- much like what we do when we send a package 8 to the NRC and hear nothing in 90 days, you're on the 9 list or something to that effect. So there's room in 10 between, however, some of that oversight (audio 11 interference.)
12 MR. SEYMOUR: Thank you, and I captured 13 your comment.
14 MEMBER PETTI: Matt, did you have a 15 comment?
16 MEMBER SUNSERI: I did, but it was 17 addressed. I was going to bring us to the point of 18 the enforcement is reactive. What we're talking about 19 is proactively reviewing the candidates before they 20 assume duty, so I think it's been covered. Thanks.
21 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.
22 So another area that we were asked to 23 further discuss was how changes to the licensed 24 operator tasks stemming from plant modifications that 25 translate into adjustments to the examination (audio NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
75 1 interference) appropriate modifications to the 2 facilities. Kind of a two-edged comment there that 3 raised some really interesting points.
4 So first, I would like to say that our 5 overall approach, which spans everything going from 6 the original systems approach to training-based 7 operator training program all the way through the tail 8 end of the process of licensing examination itself has 9 to be constructed so as to balance the flexibility and 10 inherent adaptability of the (audio interference) 11 process with a need for holding the standard of a 12 comprehensive and rigorous examination process.
13 In that regard, it's important to point 14 out that we make a distinction between the complete 15 body of mass an operator needs to know, which is 16 addressed more flexibly. And specifically, that's 17 something that we cover under guidance that has not 18 gone before the Committee up to this point. That is 19 training program review guidance. That addresses that 20 broader body of knowledge.
21 Again, that's something that we see the 22 SAP (phonetic) process that's adapting as the needs of 23 the facility and of the operators change. That is 24 distinct from our body with specific knowledge and 25 abilities that have significant importance of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
76 1 fulfillments of duties that having nexus to safety or 2 an important administrative nature. So again, a 3 smaller subset.
4 Tighter controls are imposed upon changes 5 to that latter pool of material because of the need to 6 ensure the content domain for the licensing 7 examination is neither permitted to exclude essential 8 material nor to become too dilute and thus fail to 9 examine important topics.
10 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. I think the 11 design control process adequately (audio interference) 12 next to the training program given in today's world, 13 you go through a checklist, you make sure that there's 14 no changes to the program. If there is, you establish 15 a rapport with the training staff who will fix it.
16 I think the plan was is that there's a 17 breakpoint where you do a modification where you cease 18 to be a self-reliant mitigation facility. What is the 19 check and balance to ensure that going forward, the 20 training is within the regulatory framework?
21 Because if you can't say that you're a 22 self-reliant mitigation facility, you can't have 23 GLROs. You have to have SROs and ROs. Is that a 24 concern, that breakpoint? Or are you going to 25 continue to -- once you, at the beginning of design, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
77 1 you establish GLROs and you're there forever 2 regardless?
3 MR. SEYMOUR: This is something we've come 4 around to a few times in the past. It is complicated, 5 right, because it raises issues of finality and some 6 other aspects as well, too. The first aspect that I 7 would like to point out is that when that issue 8 arises, there is a change to an analysis.
9 And Bill Reckley has made good points on 10 this on the past, too. A change to analysis, plant 11 modification or something that shifts that nature of 12 the operator with respect to ensuring acceptable 13 safety outcomes.
14 The owner-operator, the designer, whoever 15 that party may be, they're going to have to make a 16 decision in terms of how do you address that. Do you 17 address it via a system, or do you address it via 18 person, right?
19 You go ahead and take a design approach 20 that keeps the person in that role that they 21 previously were. Or do you take the approach of now 22 relying upon human action to mitigate the event that 23 now needs to be mitigated. So again, there's going to 24 be that initial decision point that's built in there.
25 Another factor that comes into play too, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
78 1 and again this does not directly address the question.
2 By design, the senior reactor operator training and 3 licensing requirements as the Committee has now seen 4 in the guidance and the general license reactor 5 operator guidance is driven by similar methods.
6 Very, very similar in terms of finding 7 what that testable content domain is, making sure that 8 important knowledge and abilities are tested to 9 identify the competence of the individuals there.
10 There's other things that are different in terms of 11 assuming that those are there. I should say ensuring, 12 not assuming that similar mechanisms.
13 So at the end of the day, things that are 14 determined to be significant for either sets of 15 operators to do will fall within that domain to be 16 tested and examined on.
17 The final part is ultimately that the 18 Commission does retain a broad authority to impose 19 conditions on the facility licensee that are necessary 20 to provide an adequate assurance of public health and 21 safety.
22 Again, if the need arises that we have to 23 take action via issuing an order or something to that 24 effect to modify the facility license that requires 25 something different, that is a possibility. Now, we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
79 1 thought through that contingency.
2 One thing that we think is a very nice 3 feature is the general similarity construct of the 4 GLRO training examination programs and the SRO 5 programs. So while there may be a need in the 6 aftermath of that to shift to an individual licensing 7 operator. Fundamental pieces of the parts of those 8 programs shouldn't be -- they shouldn't be 9 dramatically removed from one another. Again, it 10 would be a transition to an individual license --
11 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, I would agree, Jesse.
12 It's incremental. However, there's other things 13 besides operator actions that drag you out of the 14 self-reliant mitigation facility. It could be the 15 level of passivity in the system, it could be a 16 barrier that you're eliminating, adding to or 17 changing.
18 So there's other things that may -- it's 19 probably more of a legal question than it is an actual 20 capability question. So the mechanism of how that 21 gets caught and how it's looked at again looks 22 reactionary and then scrambling with exemptions and 23 other mechanisms to allow an interim period to the 24 license operators or continue with some kind of 25 exemption process.
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80 1 You're right. It's complicated, and it 2 may be one of those things that we have to have happen 3 first before we actually figure out how to deal with 4 it.
5 MEMBER BIER: If I can follow up briefly.
6 I'm less concerned about the reactive nature. Maybe 7 it's a problem, but as Greg said, sometimes you have 8 to experience it to learn from it. But more concerned 9 about just what the transition would be if, for 10 example, we discover a situation where operator 11 actions are necessary.
12 Are they then no longer considered self-13 mitigating? What's the process by which they would 14 come under the new licensing regulations? Would be 15 there a waiver, would there be a possibility of 16 saying, you can still have the GLRO with some 17 additional criteria.
18 I just want to make sure that's kind of 19 being kind of thought through in an organized manner 20 and not ad hoc panic the first time we're in that 21 situation.
22 MR. SEYMOUR: It's a good comment. I can 23 say that that's nothing that currently exists in terms 24 of a written product at this point. It's something 25 that we've had the debates about going through that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
81 1 thought exercise to make sure the mechanisms are 2 there.
3 And some of what happens in the aftermath 4 with that type of thing, again, because you're getting 5 into enforcement. It becomes a legal matter. What I 6 can say is I have been involved in escalated 7 enforcement actions in the past. Not as a licensee, 8 as the regulator.
9 What has transpired in the orders that 10 I've been involved with is for certain actions 11 articulated within the order, there was a time to 12 comply with each item that was within those orders.
13 Again, that was a carefully developed product. Again, 14 to make sure that there was a reasonable to come into 15 compliance that was commensurate with the nature of 16 what was going on.
17 Again, the Commission can issue a shutdown 18 order. Again, if there's something that's completely 19 unacceptable. We could do that. In other contexts, 20 we allow a timeframe to come into compliance. But 21 again, that's nothing that I can say that we've gone 22 through and specifically penned a paper on.
23 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Members, we've got five 24 minutes left. We still have slides, and we have 25 public comments today. We're supposed to be done at NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
82 1 10:30, so quick answers to understand things and quick 2 responses, please. Thank you.
3 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Yes.
4 So a further topic of discussion was how 5 the GLRO criteria interrelate with the AERI criteria.
6 And as Marty Stutzke has already provided an overview 7 of AERI, I'd like to illustrate on the next slide how 8 those criteria fit into determining which plants would 9 and would not be staffed by generally-licensed reactor 10 operators.
11 Liz, if we could move to the next slide, 12 please.
13 So this slide summarizes the GLRO 14 criteria. So again, the criteria that determine 15 whether or not a plant is a self-reliant mitigation 16 facility as they apply across Part 53 in its entirety.
17 The gray column on the left lists certain 18 principles that we identify as being appropriate to 19 inform this operator licensing staffing related 20 threshold during our earlier work that preceded us 21 actually sitting down and drafting the Part 53 22 requirements.
23 These principles should be viewed as 24 initial guidelines for the development of the 25 associated criteria that ultimately needed to be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
83 1 balanced against matters, practicality and certain 2 pragmatic considerations such as the overall magnitude 3 of radiological hazard and other factors.
4 The second column in pink summarizes the 5 criteria and how they were applied within Framework A.
6 So again, the Framework A criteria are in the pink 7 column. These criteria are heavily intertwined with 8 revisions of Subparts B and C. Another key point is 9 that they also incorporate the insights gained via a 10 PRA.
11 The third column in green shows the 12 criteria for Framework B facilities that do not meet 13 the criteria for an AERI and instead a conduct PRA.
14 So again, I think this speaks to an earlier question 15 here. So if we just follow that green column all the 16 way to the bottom, that illustrates that.
17 As can be seen while there aren't 18 differences in what certain requirements are mapped to 19 and how certain criteria are structured, the overall 20 requirements between the pink and green columns, so 21 again Framework A and the non-AERI PRA-based Framework 22 B, generally mapped to one another.
23 Again, we had to adapt where things point 24 to in some cases. We had to align other requirements 25 to achieve the same thing. In the case of defense in-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
84 1 depth, we actually had to craft a standalone defense 2 in-depth requirement because we didn't have an 3 equivalent to Framework A's provisional Framework B.
4 But again, in general, the two mirror each other from 5 a philosophic approach.
6 MEMBER HALNON: Jesse, let me help you 7 just move along here. Let me just very briefly 8 summarize our comment, and we can probably move on.
9 We just wanted to make sure that you walk 10 through each of the criteria and make consistent the 11 terms that you're using. Sometimes we'll use 12 credibly, reliable, sometimes we use human actions 13 credited, sometimes we use interface -- you know, 14 introduce the passive with caveats, sometimes single 15 barriers, and AERI brings in those criteria.
16 So just walk through that language and 17 make sure that it's the way you want it and it's 18 consistent. It feels like different people wrote 19 different portions of it. That's really the only 20 comment. We don't have any issues with the criteria.
21 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.
22 MEMBER PETTI: I'm still confused a little 23 bit. You can meet the GLRO criteria under AERI 24 without this human action. There's no words in 34II 25 that says that you have to do stuff without credited NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
85 1 human action. Is that correct?
2 MR. SEYMOUR: So under the modified AERI 3 criteria, it is true that the way you meet the 4 qualification has changed. Again, I offer that I 5 don't want to infringe on Marty's wording that's 6 there. But an important point to keep in mind is 7 this.
8 In identifying that bounding event, one of 9 the things that has to be considered are the influence 10 of credible human errors commission and omission. In 11 doing that, and also looking at combinations of system 12 failures and so forth, you have to show that bounding 13 events, and again, Marty, please interrupt if I 14 misspeak.
15 But that, quote-unquote, kind of worse 16 case event that drives everything still falls under a 17 very conservative radiological dose criteria. Again, 18 set at 2.5 rem. So in that case, what we had to do 19 was take a bit more of a open-minded stance in looking 20 at what is it reasonable to draw the line at here.
21 What I will say is the new AERI criteria, 22 that's something that's very fresh to us. Again, just 23 last week we started looking at that. And we are 24 still digesting that and considering its 25 appropriateness.
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86 1 As can be seen here, we already stack an 2 additional defense in-depth criteria on top of the 3 AERI qualification. And we certainly can add 4 additional provisions to the GLRO criteria that are 5 added on top of just meeting AERI.
6 So again, as we go through and we further 7 evaluate that, we do basically preserve that ongoing 8 work that's still there that we may opt to say we need 9 to put a restriction against crediting human action in 10 any way, shape or form or something to that effect.
11 MEMBER HALNON: So Dave, in 34AA IIE 12 connects to, and says you can't use operator action to 13 meet the dose criteria --
14 MEMBER PETTI: So, I'm confused. I'm 15 going by his latest language he showed us today. The 16 stuff that we got, the subcommittee has changed. That 17 language isn't --
18 MEMBER HALNON: That wasn't the dose 19 criteria. Not on the B side which says you have to go 20 and meet that without human action.
21 MEMBER PETTI: In the table, does it --
22 doesn't incline enough for me. There's still a 23 requirement of meeting stuff without human action.
24 MEMBER HALNON: In bigger letter B, this 25 is big letter A. The only language had dose criteria NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
87 1 and then the criteria how you had to make that dose 2 criteria, which was part of it was passive and other 3 things with no credit or human action. So they 4 changed the dose criteria, but you guys didn't change 5 big letter B.
6 (Simultaneous speaking.)
7 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, in fact we did. What 8 we said was --
9 MEMBER HALNON: Now, I'm confused.
10 MR. STUTZKE: What it now says that you 11 have to consider them when you're defining the 12 bounding events.
13 MEMBER HALNON: You have to consider the 14 human actions --
15 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, the human actions while 16 you're defining that bounding event. Not that you're 17 prohibited from having --
18 MEMBER HALNON: So it just amplifies my 19 comment. Walk through that and make sure that you got 20 some consistent language requirements.
21 MR. STUTZKE: Absolutely.
22 MEMBER HALNON: And that's something that 23 we continue to look at. Something that I do want to 24 put out there that gives us a reason to think through 25 this very carefully is this. Fundamentals in the AERI NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
88 1 qualification. Drawing a very conservative line for 2 the radiological hazard.
3 Again, set at 2.5 rem, which to keep it in 4 perspective is half of the occupational dose limit 5 that we established. So again, just keeping it in the 6 30,000-foot view.
7 And the other thing that we do is we say 8 for that event that caused that limiting radiological 9 dose, again, you have to show that you considered how 10 those human errors of doing things you shouldn't do or 11 not doing things that you're required to do 12 contributed into that and taking it into consideration 13 and so forth.
14 The last piece of it, and again is that we 15 still retain the defense in-depth requirement. What 16 we say is irrespective of that, you still have to 17 provide for a layered defense in-depth scheme that 18 doesn't have dependence on any single barrier or any 19 reliance on credited human action right there.
20 Again, that helps us to account for things 21 like uncertainties in the analysis. And again, the 22 potential that via reliance on this AERI approach that 23 perhaps there is human action embedded in there 24 somewhere. So again, an outside barrier.
25 MEMBER PETTI: I'm just looking at the new NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
89 1 criteria. That opens up the door a lot. MHTGI 2 (phonetic) would meet that criteria in spades. That 3 PRA claim one rem at the site boundary, which is like 4 300 meters.
5 I always thought AERI as sort of 6 microreactors, but that dose criteria is going to open 7 it up a little bit. So now you're going to have 8 larger systems that have grown more complex that can 9 meet the dose criteria potentially. You have to think 10 about this a little bit. I always envisioned it as 11 the smaller micros not these bigger sort of 12 intermediate-sized things that could be the case.
13 MR. SEYMOUR: Again, just going through 14 and making sure we covered everything here. I think 15 we have covered what we needed to talk about. Again, 16 I do appreciate the comments. But I'd like to go 17 ahead, for the sake of time, and just to move to onto 18 the slide.
19 (Pause.)
20 MR. SEYMOUR: I just want to silence this 21 alarm so it doesn't go off again. My apologies for 22 that.
23 So now, this is my final slide, what I'd 24 like to do is finally I'd like to address several 25 points that were raised regarding operational staffing NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
90 1 by the members.
2 First, a concern was raised that the 3 preliminary proposed framework would potentially for 4 allow for plants with no operators at all. So I want 5 to reiterate a point that I made in the past that 6 there is no allowance for zero-operator staffing 7 within this framework.
8 And that even in the least restrictive 9 conceivable iteration of where this would pan out, the 10 staffing requirements would still place a licensed 11 individual in a position of cognizance of a plant 12 operations at all times during the operating phase 13 while the reactor is fueling.
14 Another point that was raised that asked 15 us to give further consideration to the engineering 16 expertise degree requirement and whether factors like 17 experience would serve as a surrogate for that 18 educational requirement.
19 This is a point that we in NRR DRO have 20 given deep consideration to. And as the members will 21 recall back a year ago, we actually began our Part 53 22 work from a standpoint of looking to not carry forward 23 the role that was akin to a traditional shift 24 technical advisor.
25 However in the course of our work, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
91 1 including our consideration of the Committee's past 2 letters, we ultimately settled upon the stance that an 3 appropriately-degreed individual can complement and 4 augment the plant operation's experience of an 5 operating crew in a way that helps serve as a counter 6 to the uncertainties that may accompany the 7 introduction of new reactor technologies.
8 Building upon that perspective, we sought 9 to temper this requirement with new flexibility in how 10 it's met, and we feel that the end result represents 11 something that is both modern and relevant.
12 Another facet of the engineering expertise 13 role that we were asked to consider was the adequacy 14 of the training requirements provided for under our 15 framework. As noted in the prior meeting, this is 16 achieved in a manner that is twofold.
17 First, personnel requirements of 53830 18 would include individuals fulfilling the engineering 19 expertise role as an example of who would be covered 20 by a systems approach training-based training process.
21 Again, building upon that further, our 22 staffing plan review guidance then lists specific 23 topical content for the reviewer to check within such 24 programs, including areas like reactive theory plant 25 systems, accident analysis and mitigating core damage, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
92 1 again, specific to individuals in that engineering 2 expertise role.
3 A separate concern that was raised was 4 related to the possibility for engineering expertise 5 that is being provided remotely to be rendered 6 unavailable by way of disruption of communications.
7 On this point, I want to reinforce that making sure of 8 the engineering expertise role is supportive in an 9 advisory nature that is neither directive or 10 mitigative.
11 Thus, the unavailability of the 12 engineering expertise role should have no direct 13 bearing on whether or not any given plan event could 14 be successfully mitigated from a standpoint of 15 credited response.
16 The final point that I would like to 17 address is the concern of the requirements within the 18 portions of Subpart F of the consideration here might 19 allow for remote operations.
20 Here, I want to be clear in our intention 21 that we only intend that the framework that we've 22 established for staffing and human factors engineering 23 operator license training is capable of adaptation in 24 the future concepts of operations without the need for 25 subsequent modification via rulemaking.
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93 1 To that end, we have merely crafted 2 requirements that are capable of addressing a wide 3 spectrum of operational approaches. Whether or not 4 remote operations will be one of them remains a 5 broader issue that is simply beyond the scope of this 6 limited subset of Subpart F to enable or otherwise 7 address with sufficiency. That's my final slide, so 8 turning it over to Jordan unless there's any 9 questions.
10 CHAIRMAN REMPE: So autonomous operation 11 is brought up in the past. There were documents that 12 are regulatory documents that basically said we don't 13 have to deal with this now because there's other 14 documents that say you can't do it. Now you're saying 15 the rule language is going to allow this? And are 16 those other documents not going to hold?
17 And I didn't bring the references with me.
18 I know, Matt, you came up with some that you sent out 19 and I found some others. What's the story here? Are 20 those documents still valid or not?
21 MR. SEYMOUR: The point that I was simply 22 trying to make is that just from the Subpart F 23 operational requirements that we talked about, they're 24 built to be adaptable to a wide range of --
25 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Right now, those others NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
94 1 documents hold autonomous operation is not allowed?
2 MR. SEYMOUR: So I would say is that you 3 could build a reactor that was autonomous, our 4 requirements are still going to say have at least a 5 generally-licensed reactor operator in a position of 6 oversight with certain indications, the ability to 7 shut down the reactor, all the things that we 8 articulate. We don't allow for any reactor to be 9 unattended and unsupervised, if that makes sense.
10 CHAIRMAN REMPE: I think what your answer 11 is, is yes, we don't allow autonomous operation at 12 this time. I can't get a yes or no.
13 (Laughter.)
14 MR. SEYMOUR: It's not trying to give an 15 opaque answer. What it is is the ability for a 16 reactor to operate itself autonomously is independent 17 from its ability to be allowed to do that in a 18 completely unsupervised way.
19 Again, if the reactor runs itself, what it 20 does it takes the operator from being a hands-on role 21 and shifts them, in a human factors engineering 22 perspective, what we consider to be a position of 23 supervisory control.
24 Again, it moves the role of the operator 25 to oversight. But again, the two are -- again, I know NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
95 1 it's kind of mincing words and so forth. There's 2 nothing that would preclude you from building a 3 reactor that could operate itself. Our rules say 4 that's nice, but someone will always be in a position 5 of oversight having cognizance over that reactor --
6 MEMBER BROWN: That means on-site as 7 opposed to be in New York City while the city is 8 operating in North Alaska?
9 MR. SEYMOUR: So our requirements, and 10 again I'm just talking about our limited subset 11 Subpart F, is neutral on the location of those 12 individuals. Again, that's by design so we can adapt 13 to future concepts --
14 MEMBER BALLINGER: What you're saying is 15 --
16 MEMBER BROWN: My brain is fried.
17 MEMBER BALLINGER: -- you're basically 18 taking the NASA approach? The satellite that's 19 humming along out there with the reactor operating.
20 Nobody riding in that satellite, but the reactor is 21 capable of notifying somebody who is a supervisor to 22 take action remotely.
23 MR. SEYMOUR: I think a better way to 24 frame this discussion is that so you get to that point 25 of remote operation, there's other considerations that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
96 1 would need to be addressed there simply beyond the 2 scope of this work.
3 A key issue, and we've talked about this 4 before, is cybersecurity. Again, that's beyond the 5 scope of our work here. I think we have Ishmael 6 Garcia (phonetic) available on the call today. If we 7 want to talk about what impediments there are there 8 and the current state of that work, that's something 9 we can pull him in on.
10 But that's not something that our 11 requirements here in Subpart F don't get over that 12 hurdle for you. So again, if someone wanted to come 13 in and do that in a way that's remote, there's other 14 things that they would have to address before they 15 could even get to where our flexibility is in that 16 regard.
17 MR. RECKLEY: Jesse, this is Bill. If I 18 can, because we talked about this a number of times.
19 Whereas the rule doesn't specifically preclude it and 20 say this is not allowed, neither does it build in how 21 we would do that review in any proposal that would 22 say, well, we're going to have remote operation, would 23 have to be reviewed, approved, go through this 24 Committee.
25 And we would have to address some of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
97 1 things that, Joy, you mentioned. We are just now 2 studying how we would approach that to do the review 3 of a proposal should it ever come. But the wording in 4 the rule language does not say, this is not allowed.
5 MEMBER BALLINGER: So again, what you're 6 saying is -- fission battery. I'm using another one 7 of these microreactor examples. Someone wants to put 8 a fission battery in a steel mill, could they do it?
9 MR. SEYMOUR: So what would happen is, and 10 we're just going to say for the sake of discussion, 11 this was an inherently safe fission battery.
12 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes, all the lying that 13 they do about it. Yes.
14 (Laughter.)
15 MR. SEYMOUR: So this hypothetical, right.
16 We'll say that this would go in, that it would satisfy 17 the criteria to be a self-reliant mitigation facility 18 by virtue of its inherent safety characteristics.
19 At that point, what we would say is, okay.
20 We would then establish that somewhere. Again, we're 21 going to use leave that open to the broader 22 discussion, you have a generally-licensed reactor 23 operator. They could have oversight of more than one, 24 because we say facilities. We use the term plural; we 25 leave that open.
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98 1 A generally-licensed reactor operator 2 would have to have cognizance over that thing for its 3 entire operating phase. So again, there would have to 4 be someone that was in a position of oversight in a 5 continuity of responsibilities between individuals.
6 So they would be responsible for technical 7 specifications for that.
8 They would have to have indications.
9 Again, we articulate certain proposed TMI requirements 10 we've adapted what type of indication they have to 11 have. They have to get capability of shutting down 12 that fission battery from their location. They would 13 have the capability of dispatching operation and 14 maintenance personnel to that facility.
15 They would retain the administrative 16 responsibility for any notifications associated with 17 it. Maintenance controls, things of that nature. So 18 again, we're very prescriptive about the capabilities 19 that that individual would have to have. But that 20 would represent kind of the basement level.
21 Now in terms of is that practical for a 22 fission battery. What I would say is we temper that 23 by not limiting how many of those fission batteries 24 this operator might have cognizance over.
25 So it could be that, again, if you were NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
99 1 able to come in and make that case down the road, 2 again, if we resolve all the other issues, you know, 3 road ops (phonetic), could someone remotely be 4 monitoring a dozen of these things? That case could 5 be made.
6 Again, we leave our requirements open to 7 do that so that in the future if things to that point, 8 our requirements could adapt to that. But again, what 9 we have is just by itself insufficient on its own to 10 address the full question (audio interference.)
11 What we do is we make sure that we're 12 adaptable from a staffing standpoint, licensing 13 standpoint, from a human factors engineering 14 standpoint, to be able to scale up and scale down and 15 to look at things differently.
16 Again, a key point. We don't focus our 17 human factors engineering requirement on the control 18 room anymore. We focus on specific locations where 19 humans fulfill plant safety functions (audio 20 interference) safety functions. Again, that's one of 21 those key things is how do you address this concept of 22 operations that a future plant might not have a 23 traditional control room.
24 We don't want to have a regulation that 25 doesn't work because they don't have a, quote-unquote, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
100 1 control room. So what we do is we disassociate that 2 and say what were we trying to achieve, we want the 3 human being to have the capabilities to maintain the 4 plant's safety.
5 So again, it's just the type of thing that 6 we do there. We simply try to make something that's 7 adaptable, that's broadly technology-inclusive. When 8 the other factors align, we should be able to adapt 9 our requirements in a way that supports safety.
10 MEMBER SUNSERI: This is Matt. I have a 11 comment.
12 I think this is all very reminiscent of 13 what we discussed in the subcommittee meeting the 14 other day. It seemed to me that the conclusion that 15 we walked away with and we'll likely discuss in our 16 letter report, at least discuss the potential for it 17 to be in the letter report, is if a remote operator 18 exists that meets all these criterias you're 19 describing, our recommendation is however that 20 operator provides the oversight of the facility, 21 should there be an impairment that requires that 22 operator to intervene that that same impairment does 23 not also prevent the operator from intervening. If 24 you understand what I'm saying. That's all I wanted 25 to comment on.
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101 1 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes, I appreciate the 2 comment. Thank you. Again, it's a valid point.
3 Again, I understand that it's something that may be in 4 the letter, and we will definitely consider that.
5 Liz, if we can move to the next slide, 6 please. I think Jordan's up.
7 MR. HOELLMAN: Yes. Hi, everyone. This 8 is Jordan Hoellman again. I'm not going to touch too 9 much on this, but I'd like to just open it up if 10 there's any questions. I know we kind of talked about 11 a number of these guidance documents in detail at the 12 subcommittee meeting.
13 The focus should be on the Part 53 column 14 there with the specific italicized documents that we 15 presented in subcommittee last month and then some 16 additional guidance documents being developed for the 17 security side in Part 26. If anyone has any questions 18 about any guidance.
19 (Pause.)
20 MEMBER PETTI: Okay, thank you.
21 Before we go to public comments, I just 22 want to thank the staff. This has be a monumental 23 effort. You step back at this stage and look at 24 what's behind us. It was a tremendous amount of 25 effort to get here. I appreciate all of the good NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
102 1 discussions we've had.
2 With that, we are 20 minutes behind. We 3 do have some hard stops, so I don't know how it's all 4 going to work in terms of whether we'll get the letter 5 read in before the hard start. We might not. We 6 might have to do --
7 (Simultaneous speaking.)
8 MEMBER PETTI: So, yes, let's start with 9 public comments. Please identify yourself in your 10 comment. I guess we have someone from the 11 Breakthrough Institute, so they should go first 12 because they notified us.
13 MS. FRANOVICH: Thank you. This is Rani 14 Franovich. Can you hear me?
15 MEMBER PETTI: Yes.
16 MS. FRANOVICH: Okay, thank you. Dr.
17 Rempe and ACRS members, I speak on behalf of the 18 Breakthrough Institute. It's an independent global 19 research center that identifies and promotes 20 technological solutions to environmental and human 21 development challenges.
22 The Breakthrough Institute does not 23 receive funding from industry. We believe new and 24 advanced reactors offer critical pathways to deep 25 decarbonization, and we advocate for appropriate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
103 1 regulation in the licensing and oversight of reactors.
2 Nuclear power advances clean energy goals, 3 enhances environmental quality and supplies reliable 4 electricity to the transmission grid. As such, timely 5 deployment of safe, innovative and economically viable 6 designs is an urgent public interest.
7 The Breakthrough Institute has closely 8 followed the development of Part 53 and express 9 concerns and comments. The ACRS has independently 10 identified many of the same issues. Numerous concerns 11 remain unresolved and alignment with stakeholders has 12 not been achieved.
13 The ACRS plays an important role in 14 ensuring the NRC staff delivers a usable rule that 15 satisfies NEIMA. We strongly urge the ACRS to 16 recommend the Commission redirect the staff to, one, 17 expeditiously work with external stakeholders in a 18 more open, collaborative manner.
19 Two, come to agreement on unresolved 20 issues like what should be governed by regulation 21 versus guidance. And three, significantly streamline 22 the rule to be more performance-based and 23 appropriately risk-informed.
24 Timely agreement on these matters can be 25 reached if the NRC staff changes its regulatory NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
104 1 posture, adopts a customer service ethic, and is open 2 and receptive to relocating detailed, prescriptive 3 requirements to guidance.
4 We appreciate this opportunity to express 5 the public's interest in this crucial rule and its as 6 yet unrealized potential to enable the rapid 7 deployment of new and advanced reactors. Thank you.
8 MEMBER PETTI: Thank you. Other comments 9 from the public? Identify yourself in your comment.
10 (Pause.)
11 MEMBER PETTI: Okay, not hearing any, I 12 turn it back over to the chair.
13 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Okay, so at this time, 14 we're going to go off the record.
15 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 16 off the record at 10:53 a.m.)
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
A d v i s o r y C om m i tte e on Re ac to r Safe guards (ACRS )
10 CFR Part 53 Licensing and Regula on of A dvanced Nuclear Reactors November 2, 2022
Agenda 8:35 am - 10:30 am Staff presentation on 10 CFR Part 53, Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Commercial Nuclear Plants, Proposed Rulemaking Language
- Rulemaking Schedule
- Part 53 Licensing Frameworks
- Risk Insights/Quantitative Health Objectives (QHOs)
- Fueled Modules
- Codes and Standards
- Alternative evaluation for risk insights (AERI)
- Generally licensed reactor operators (GLROs), Human Factors, Engineering Expertise
- Guidance 2
Rulemaking Schedule We are here 3
Part 53 Licensing Subpart B - Safety Requirements Frameworks Subpart C - Design Requirements Framework A o Probabilistic Risk Assessment Subpart D - Siting (PRA)-led approach Subpart E - Construction/Manufacturing o Functional design criteria Subpart F - Operations Subpart G - Decommissioning Subpart H - Application Requirements Subpart I - License Maintenance Subpart J - Reporting Subpart K - Quality Assurance Subpart A - General Provisions Framework B Subpart N - Siting o Traditional use of risk insights Subpart O - Construction/Manufacturing o Principal design criteria Subpart P - Operations Rule Package Subpart Q - Decommissioning o Includes an AERI approach (ML22272A034) Subpart R - Application Requirements Subpart S - License Maintenance Subpart T - Reporting Subpart U - Quality Assurance 4
- Purpose
- Provide optional frameworks for the issuance, amendment, renewal, and Sections termination of licenses, permits, 53.000 certifications, and approvals for commercial nuclear plants and
- Frameworks 53.010
- Framework A and Framework B are distinct
- Applicants and licensees subject to the rules in this part must only use the subparts applicable to one framework 5
- Common Definitions
- Commercial Nuclear Plant Subpart A -
- Manufactured reactor General
- Manufactured reactor module Provisions
- Safety function
- Framework A Definitions (Definitions)
- Construction, Licensing basis events (LBEs),
structure, system, and component (SSC) classifications
- Framework B Definitions
- Construction, Design basis, Functional containment, Safety-related SSCs, Severe nuclear accident 6
Framework A Subpart Title Topics Subpart B Technology-Inclusive Safety Requirements Risk Insights (QHOs)
Subpart C Design and Analysis Requirements Subpart D Siting Requirements Subpart E Construction and Manufacturing Requirements Fueled Modules Subpart F Requirements for Operation GLROs, Human Factors Subpart G Decommissioning Requirements Subpart H Licenses, Certifications and Approvals Subpart I Maintaining and Revising Licensing Basis Information Subpart J Reporting and Other Administrative Requirements Subpart K Quality Assurance Criteria for Commercial Nuclear Plants 7
Framework A Ensuring Comparable Level of Safety Additional discussion in Preamble on how an integrated assessment like that in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174 can be used to support the comparisons to existing requirements and related regulatory findings.
8
Framework A QHOs as one of several performance standards for LBEs Additional discussion in Preamble on how QHOs are considered as one of several performance measures within Framework A.
Including the QHOs as one of several performance measures does not equate to the QHOs defining adequate protection of public health and safety.*
- Existing Paradigm
- Does not specifically define adequate protection but compliance with NRC regulations and guidance may be presumed to assure adequate protection at a minimum
- Additional requirements as necessary or desirable to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property 9
§ 53.620(d) / § 53.4120(d) Fuel loading
- A manufacturing license may include authorizing the loading of fuel into a manufactured reactor module
- Specify required protections to prevent criticality o At least two independent mechanisms that can prevent Subparts E & O criticality should conditions result in the maximum reactivity being attained for the fissile material Fuel loading for
- Commission finding that a manufactured reactor manufactured module in required configuration is not a utilization reactor modules facility as defined in the Atomic Energy Act
- Manufactured reactor module becomes a utilization facility in its final place of use after the Commission makes required findings on inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria 10
Framework B Subpart Title Topics Subpart N Siting Subpart O Construction and Manufacturing Requirements Subpart P Requirements for Operation Codes and Standards Subpart Q Decommissioning Subpart R Licenses, Certifications and Approvals Codes and Standards AERI Subpart S Maintaining and Revising Licensing Basis Information Subpart T Reporting and Other Administrative Requirements Subpart U Quality Assurance 11
- 10 CFR 53.4730(a)(2)(ii)(A) would require applicants to provide a description and justification (for codes or standards not previously endorsed or accepted by the NRC) of the codes and standards to be used in the design Codes and
- Other Framework B requirements related to codes and standards Standards are similar to those in the existing regulations (Clarification) - 10 CFR 53.4360(a) would require boiling-water reactor (BWR) and pressurized-water reactor (PWR) licensees to meet requirements in 10 CFR 50.55a for inservice inspection and inservice testing programs
- 10 CFR 53.4730(a)(37)(ii) would require applicants for BWRs and PWRs to describe how they will comply with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and ASME Operation and Maintenance Code requirements in 10 CFR 50.55a
- Conforming changes proposed for 10 CFR 50.55a would support use of existing requirements by applicants and licensees with BWRs or PWRs under Framework B 12
- The AERI approach is consistent with Commission policy.
- The AERI entry conditions in § 53.4730(a)(34)(ii) were revised after the ACRS Part 53 subcommittee meeting (October 18-19, 2022) to address stakeholder comments and reflect insights from the scoping MELCOR Accident Consequence Calculation System Subpart R - (MACCS) calculations.
AERI
- Other provisions in Part 53 reference make use of the AERI entry conditions.
- Two draft regulatory guides (DGs) developed:
- DG-1413: Technology-Inclusive Identification of Licensing Events for Commercial Nuclear Plants (proposed new RG 1.254)
- DG-1414: Alternative Evaluation for Risk Insights Methodology (proposed new RG 1.255) 13
Regulatory Basis for the AERI Approach Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors 73 FR 60612; October 14, 2008 AERI Elements 73 FR 60616, left column: The Commission also expects that Identify and characterize the postulated advanced reactor designs will comply with the Commissions bounding event safety goal policy statement (51 FR 28044; August 4, 1986, as corrected and republished at 51 FR 30028; August 21, 1986),
Demonstrate that the AERI entry conditions 73 FR 60614, left column: the Commission has also issued policy statements on the use of PRA in regulatory activities (60 FR are met 42622; August 16, 1995), and severe accidents regarding future designs and existing plants (50 FR 32138; August 8, 1985). The use Develop a demonstrably conservative of PRA as a design tool is implied by the policy statement on the use of PRA and the NRC believes that the current regulations and risk estimate policy statements provide sufficient guidance to designers.
Search for severe accident vulnerabilities Policy Statement: Use of PRA Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities 60 FR 42622; August 16, 1995 use PRA or an 60 FR 42628, middle column: It is important to note that not all alternative Identify risk insights of the Commissions regulatory activities lend themselves to a risk risk-informed analysis approach that utilizes fault tree methods. In general, a approach as a fault tree method is best suited for power reactor events that design tool typically involve complex systemsthe Commission recognizes Evaluate defense in depth (DID) adequacy that a single approach for incorporating risk analyses into the regulatory process is not appropriate. 14
Why Revise the AERI Entry Conditions?
- Some stakeholders have commented that the current proposed AERI entry conditions are overly conservative.
- MACCS scoping calculations indicate that dose at 100 meters is an inadequate predictor of conditional risk. Depending on the assumptions (e.g., plume elevation or buoyancy), some conditional risks may be below the QHOs while others may be above the QHOs even though the current AERI entry condition is met.
- Provide increased flexibility when determining if the AERI entry conditions are met.
15
Revised AERI Entry Conditions
§ 53.4730(a)(34) Description of risk evaluation. A description of the risk evaluation developed for the commercial nuclear plant and its results. The risk evaluation must be based on:
- i. A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA); or ii. An alternative evaluation for risk insights (AERI), provided that:
(A) The analysis of a postulated bounding event demonstrates that the consequence evaluated within the area between the commercial nuclear plants exclusion area boundary (EAB) and 16.1 kilometers (10 miles) from the EAB is less than 25 mSv (2.5 rem) TEDE in the first year; and (B) The identification of the postulated bounding event is informed by a systematic and comprehensive search for severe nuclear accident scenarios that considers:
(1) All radiological sources at the commercial nuclear plant; (2) Relevant internal and external hazards; (3) Combinations of plant equipment failures including common-cause failures, hazard-induced equipment failures, and equipment failures caused by severe nuclear accident phenomena; and (4) Credible human errors of commission and omission.
16
Rationale for the Revised AERI Entry Conditions
- The change from dose at 100 meters to the peak dose within the 10-mile annulus addresses concerns about elevated releases and plume buoyancy.
Buoyant Plume EAB Limit the peak dose within this annulus EAB + 10 miles 17
Rationale for the Revised AERI Entry Conditions (Cont.)
- The 2.5-rem criterion is consistent with MACCS scoping calculations:
- A 25-rem lifetime (50-year) dose generally corresponds to a 10-mile population-weighted lifetime individual latent cancer fatality risk less than 2E-6 per event.
- A first-year dose of 2.5 rem generally corresponds to a 50-year dose less than 25 rem, probably due to radioactive decay and the effect of weathering on groundshine and resuspension.
- The 2.5-rem criterion is a small fraction (10%) of the traditional reference value (25 rem) used in Part 100 and § 50.34.
- For example, see the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), Section 15.0.3, Rev. 0: A small fraction is defined as less than 10% of the 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) reference values, or 2.5 rem TEDE.
18
Proposed Uses of the AERI Entry Conditions
- Would be used to determine:
o Which applicants could develop an AERI in lieu of a PRA to demonstrate compliance with the proposed risk evaluation requirement in § 53.4730(a)(34) o When the requirements to address the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events in § 53.4420 must be met o When the requirements to address combustible gas control in § 53.4730(a)(7) must be met
- In addition, the proposed AERI entry conditions would be used in combination with other conditions to determine when a commercial nuclear plant is a self-reliant mitigation facility, as provided in § 53.800(a)(2) o A self-reliant mitigation facility must have GLROs in lieu of senior reactor operators and reactor operators
- All other applicable Framework B requirements must be met (AERI or PRA).
- Applicants may elect to develop a PRA even if the AERI entry conditions are met.
19
DG-1413: Technology-Inclusive Identification of Licensing Events for Commercial Nuclear Plants (proposed new RG 1.254)
- Section A: Applies to light-water reactors (LWRs) and non-LWRs licensed under Parts 50, 52, and 53 (Frameworks A and B)
- Section B (Discussion):
o Identifies licensing events for each licensing framework o Provides historical perspectives (early licensing, development of the standard review plan) o Addresses ACRS recommendations to start with a blank sheet of paper (10/7/2019, 10/21/2020, 5/30/2021, and 10/26/2021)
- Section C (Staff Guidance) provides an integrated approach for:
o Conducting a systematic and comprehensive search for initiating events o Delineating a systematic and comprehensive sets of event sequences o Grouping the lists of initiating events and event sequences into licensing events
- Appendix A (Comprehensive Search for Initiating Events):
o Reviews techniques for searching for initiating events and points the user to helpful references o Does not endorse or recommend any specific technique 20
DG-1414: Alternative Evaluation for Risk Insights Methodology (proposed new RG 1.255)
- This RG provides the NRC staffs guidance on the use of an AERI methodology to inform the content of applications and licensing basis for LWRs and non-LWRs.
- 10 CFR 53.4730(a)(34)(ii) establishes AERI as an alternative to a PRA for a risk evaluation if the entry conditions A and B for an AERI are met.
- The title of this DG-1414 is now AERI Methodology, to distinguish it from Part 53 Frameworks A and B. This new title does not signal any change in approach.
Applicants who meet the AERI entry conditions may elect to develop an AERI in lieu of a PRA.
However, PRA confers additional benefits such as:
- A means to optimize the design, and
- The ability to take advantage of various risk-informed initiatives, for example risk-informed completion times, risk-informed categorization of SSCs.
21
- During the 10/19/22 subcommittee meeting, the staff provided an update on the rule language, as well an overview of key guidance Subparts F and P
- Updates on the rule language status had included:
Staffing, HFE, o Consolidating Frameworks A & B requirements using a common set of language under Subpart F Operator o Extending provisions for GLROs to Framework B, to Licensing, include facilities using an AERI approach and Training o Retaining previous engineering expertise provisions (i.e., degreed individuals with plant familiarity)
- Important points of ISG presentations included:
o Review guidance for tailored exam programs o Staffing review guidance for custom staffing plans o Guidance for conducting scalable human factors engineering (HFE) reviews 22
- Regarding Operator Licensing, the members asked that the staff discuss several areas further, including:
o Lack of approval preceding licensing of GLROs Follow-on NRC approved program with inspections o How changes to operator tasks from plant mods Discussion of translate into adjustments to exam program Operator knowledge and abilities lists and change control process burdens Licensing Balances adaptability and program assurance Topics o How the GLRO criteria interrelate with the AERI criteria and whether AERI is too restrictive The following slide provides an overview that builds on earlier AERI discussions 23
Underlying GLRO Criteria for GLRO Criteria for GLRO Criteria Principle Framework A Framework B (PRA) for Framework B from Paper (AERI)
Radiological Safety criteria (53.210 and Safety assessment consequence 53.220 or 53.470) met (53.4730(a)(1)(vi))
criteria met without human actions for demonstrates requirements without human credited event mitigation met without credited human Follow-on action Licensing basis events Analysis of LBEs and DBAs (53.450(e & f))
action PRA (53.4730(a)(34))
demonstrates event Qualification for AERI Discussion of addressed without human demonstrates criteria met without human actions for sequences met without human actions for credited (53.4730(a)(34)(ii))
must be action credited mitigation mitigation demonstrated GLRO Criteria Safety functions not Safety functions (53.230) achieved without reliance FRA/FA (53.730(d))
demonstrates functions to be met allocated to on human actions for required for safety do not rely human action credited event mitigation on credited human action Reliance on Plant response to licensing basis events does not credibly inherent or rely on human actions to assure the performance of SSCs robust passive (e.g., SSCs function through inherent characteristics or have features engineered protections against human failures)
Adequate DID DID requirements (53.250) Plant design must provide for layered DID without without human met without human actions dependence upon any single barrier or reliance action for the purposes of credited upon credited human action.
DID 24
- Regarding operational staffing, the members asked that the staff discuss several areas further, including:
o Potential for allowing plants with no operators Follow-on There is no allowance for zero operator staffing o Engineering expertise degree requirement Discussion of Complements/augments plant ops experience Staffing o Training requirements for engineering expertise role Topics Systems approach to training required by § 53.830; topics covered by ISG o Availability of remote engineering expertise Not credited in event mitigation; supports crew o Requirements might allow remote operation Framework for staffing, HFE, operator licensing, and training is designed to adapt to future concept of 25 operations; remote operations is a broader issue
Key Guidance Development Under Development Near-Term Part 53 Existing Future
- DG-1413, Identification of
- LMP (RG 1.233)
- Analytical Margin
- ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA Standard Licensing Events
- Siting Criteria (RG 4.7)
- Chemical
- Non-LWR PRA Standard Applicability
- DG-1414, AERI Methodology
- Fuel Qualification Hazards ISG
- DRO-ISG-2023-01, Operator Framework (NUREG-
- Manufacturing
- Technical
- Reliability & Integrity Mgt (ASME XI-2)
- DRO-ISG-2023-02, Staffing Plan
- Developing Principal Specifications
- Molten Salt Reactor Fuel Qualification Review ISG Augmenting NUREG-Design Criteria for Non-1791
- Facility Safety
- DRO-ISG-2023-03, Scalable Program
- Emergency Planning (50.160)
- Change Evaluation (SNC-led) Human
- Framework B
- Facility Training Programs ISG
- Part 26, Fitness for Duty Applications
- Materials Compatibility ISG
- Part 26, Fatigue Management
- Treatment of Consequence Uncertainty
- Part 73, Access Authorization
- Part 73, Cyber Security 26
- Part 73 Security Programs
Discussion 27
Additional Information Additional information on the 10 CFR Part 53 rulemaking is available at https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/rulemaking-and-guidance/part-53.html For information on how to submit comments go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0062 For further information, contact Robert Beall, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, telephone: 301-415-3874; email:
Robert.Beall@nrc.gov 28
Acronyms ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards EDO Executive Director for Operations AERI Alternative evaluation for risk insights FA function allocation ANS American Nuclear Society FR Federal Register Advanced Reactor Content of Application FRA functional requirements analysis ARCAP Project GLRO generally licensed reactor operator ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers HFE human factors engineering BWR boiling-water reactor ISG interim staff guidance CFR Code of Federal Regulations LBE licensing basis events DBA design-basis accident LMP Licensing Modernization Project DG draft regulatory guidance LWR light-water reactor DID defense-in-depth MELCOR accident consequence code DRO Division of Reactor Oversight MACCS system EAB exclusion area boundary mSv millisievert 29
Acronyms NEI Nuclear Energy Institute QHO quantitative health objective non-LWR non-light-water reactor rem Roentgen equivalent man NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RG regulatory guide U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission SNC Southern Nuclear Operating Company NUREG technical report designation SSCs structures, systems, and components PRA probabilistic risk assessment TEDE total effective dose equivalent PWR pressurized-water reactor Technology Inclusive Content of QA quality assurance TICAP Application Project 30