ML22347A191
| ML22347A191 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/02/2022 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NRC-2149 | |
| Download: ML22347A191 (1) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Docket Number:
(n/a)
Location:
teleconference Date:
Wednesday, November 2, 2022 Work Order No.:
NRC-2149 Pages 1-104 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1716 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-4433
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 1
1 2
3 DISCLAIMER 4
5 6
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 7
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 8
9 10 The contents of this transcript of the 11 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 12 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 13 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 14 recorded at the meeting.
15 16 This transcript has not been reviewed, 17 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 18 inaccuracies.
19 20 21 22 23
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
+ + + + +
3 700TH MEETING 4
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5
(ACRS) 6
+ + + + +
7 WEDNESDAY 8
NOVEMBER 2, 2022 9
+ + + + +
10 The Advisory Committee met via 11 teleconference at 8:30 a.m., Joy L. Rempe, Chairman, 12 presiding.
13 14 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
15 JOY L. REMPE, Chairman 16 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Vice Chairman 17 DAVID A. PETTI, Member-at-Large 18 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member 19 VICKI M. BIER, Member 20 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member 21 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 22 GREGORY H. HALNON, Member 23 JOSE A. MARCH-LEUBA, Member 24 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
2 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
1 DEREK WIDMAYER 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 1
8:30 a.m.
2 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Good morning. The 3
meeting will now come to order. This is the second 4
day of the 700th meeting of the Advisory Committee on 5
Reactor Safeguards.
6 I'm Joy Rempe, Chairman of the ACRS.
7 Other members in attendance are Ron Ballinger, Vicki 8
Bier, Charles Brown, Vesna Dimitrijevic, Greg Halnon, 9
Walt Kirchner, Jose March-Leuba, Dave Petti. And we 10 expect Matt Sunseri to join us soon.
11 I note, though, we do have a quorum at 12 this time. And similar to yesterday, the Committee is 13 meeting in person and virtually. The communications 14 channel has been opened to allow members of the public 15 to monitor the committee discussion, and Mr. Derek 16 Widmayer is the Designated Federal Officer for today's 17 meeting.
18 During today's meeting, the Committee will 19 consider the following topic: 10 CFR Part 53, risk-20 informed, technology-inclusive regulatory framework 21 for commercial nuclear power plants, the proposed 22 rulemaking language. The transcript of the open 23 portions of the meeting is being kept.
24 It's requested that speakers identify 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
4 themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and 1
volume so that they can be readily heard.
2 Additionally, participants should mute themselves when 3
they're not speaking.
4 At this time, I'd like to ask any other 5
members if they have any opening remarks. Not hearing 6
anyone speak up, I'd like to ask Dave Petti to lead us 7
in our first topic for today's meeting.
8 Dave?
9 MEMBER PETTI: Thank you. Good morning, 10 everyone. We had a full two days' subcommittee on 11 details in the language, and I think all members 12 attended, almost all members attended. So this is 13 obviously going to be a much higher level given the 14 time constraints. I don't have anything more except 15 this is draft the final language that's about to be 16 issued. It's a fairly big milestone, I guess, let's 17 say.
18 I guess John Segala, you up to kick us 19 off?
20 MR. SEGALA: Yes, thank you. Again, I'm 21 John Segala. I'm a special assistant in the Division 22 of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and 23 Utilization Facilities in the Office of Nuclear 24 Reactor Regulation. Glad to be here today to discuss 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
5 the 10 CFR Part 53, which would be a new alternative 1
risk-informed, performance-based and technology-2 inclusive framework for the licensing and regulation 3
of commercial nuclear power plants.
4 The objective of Part 53 is to continue to 5
provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of 6
public health and safety and the common defense and 7
security to promote regulatory stability, 8
predictability and clarity to reduce request for 9
exemptions from the current requirements in 10 CFR 10 Parts 50 and 52 to establish new requirements to 11 address non-light-water reactor technologies to 12 recognize technological advancements in reactor design 13 and credit the possible response of some designs of 14 commercial nuclear plants to postulate the accidents 15 including slower transient response times and 16 relatively small and slow release of fission products.
17 The NRC staff previously briefed the ACRS 18 Full Committee on Part 53 in July and responded to the 19 recommendations in the ACRS's fourth interim letter on 20 September 30th. Since the July ACRS Full Committee 21 meeting, the NRC staff has continued to engage 22 extensively with stakeholders, and this had the 23 opportunity to consider verbal and written feedback 24 from the stakeholders as part of the staff's ongoing 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
6 efforts to enhance the proposed rule package.
1 On October 18th, the NRC staff briefed the 2
ACRS subcommittee on the draft proposed Part 53 3
rulemaking package that the staff released on 4
September 30th, which includes the draft proposed rule 5
language for Framework A and Framework B, the 6
accompanying preamble, which we used to call the 7
statements of consideration, and five draft guidance 8
documents supporting the draft proposed rule language.
9 Today, the NRC staff plans to provide the 10 ACRS Full Committee a high level overview of the draft 11 proposed Part 53 rulemaking package, including follow-12 on discussions on topics such as the generally-13 licensed reactor operator, or GLRO, and recent 14 revisions made to the alternate evaluation for risk 15 insights or AERI entry conditions.
16 We're looking forward to have discussions 17 today and hearing any ACRS members' thoughts and 18 feedbacks. That completes my opening remarks. I can 19 turn it over maybe to Bob Beall?
20 MR. BEALL: Okay. Thanks, John. Our 21 first presenter today is Jordan Hoellman. He's going 22 to kick it off with a review of the Part 53 rule.
23 MR. HOELLMAN: Okay. Thanks, Bob.
24 Thanks, John. Good morning, everyone. This is Jordan 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
7 Hoellman, I'm a project manager in the Advanced 1
Reactor Policy Branch in NRR.
2 We can move to the next slide. This is 3
just the agenda slide for today. I'll kick it off 4
with an overview of the rulemaking schedule, the 5
frameworks within Part 53 proposed rule language, then 6
I'll turn it over to Bill Reckley to discuss the use 7
of the quantitative health objectives in Framework A 8
and fueled modules in Subparts E and O.
9 Marty Stutzke will talk about the AERI 10 entry conditions. Boyce Travis will talk about the 11 present standards in Framework B. And then Jesse 12 Seymour will talk about the generally-licensed reactor 13 operators and the human factors in other operator 14 licensing guidance documents as part of the rulemaking 15 package.
16 And then we'll wrap it up with just an 17 overview of the guidance that we've developed over 18 time to prepare for the review and licensing of 19 advanced reactors and non-light-water reactor 20 technologies.
21 Liz, you want to move to the next slide, 22 please?
23 Okay, so this slide just represents the 24 sort of schedule we've been on during the development 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
8 of Part 53. Over the past two and a half years or so, 1
we've briefed the ACRS over 15 times. We didn't 2
really feel it necessary to recap the entirety of the 3
Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act, or 4
NEIMA, and all the work that we've done previously.
5 As you may recall in the 2016-2017 time 6
period, the staff developed the vision and strategy 7
and implementation action plans for the licensing and 8
review of non-light-water reactor technologies, 9
focusing on our readiness within the existing 10 regulations due to increased interest from reactor 11 developers and Congress.
12 At the time, we focused on resolving key 13 policy issues and closing gaps within the existing 14 regulations. The enactment of NEIMA in 2019 required 15 the development of a new regulatory framework by 2027.
16 So that was kind of the rulemaking triggers there in 17 the start period.
18 The rulemaking plan described developing 19 a new 10 CFR Part that could, in a technology-20 inclusive way, address performance requirements, 21 design features and programmatic controls for a wide 22 variety of future reactors throughout the life of the 23 facility.
24 The rulemaking plan described focusing the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
9 rulemaking on risk-informed functional requirements, 1
building on existing NRC requirements, mission policy 2
statements and recent and ongoing activities. And the 3
rulemaking plan also describes seeking extensive 4
stakeholder engagement, including with this committee, 5
on the content of the rule.
6 In October of 2020, the Commission 7
approved the rulemaking plan in its SRM and directed 8
the staff to accelerate the schedule to complete the 9
rulemaking by 2024 to identify key uncertainties 10 impacting the publication of the final rule, and to 11 develop and release preliminary proposed rule language 12 intermittently followed by extensive stakeholder 13 outreach and dialogue.
14 In November of last year, the Commission 15 approved its schedule extension to provide additional 16 time for the staff to continue its efforts to reach 17 alignment and discuss with external stakeholders on 18 the scope of the rulemaking and further develop the 19 rule language to allow additional time for external 20 stakeholders to participate constructively and to 21 ensure better coordination with a number of other 22 advanced reactor activities.
23 The public comment period on the 24 preliminary proposed rule language closed on August 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
10 31st of 2022. So that takes us to where we are now, 1
on the right side of the slide, the October-November 2
Subcommittee and Full Committee meetings, as we work 3
to provide the proposed rulemaking package to the 4
Commission in February of 2023.
5 So there were some questions during the 6
subcommittee meeting on whether we'd have additional 7
ACRS interactions during the rulemaking process, and 8
of course we will. That's sort of indicated in the 9
2023-2024 timeline of the left side of the screen 10 where we'll continue to have interactions with 11 external stakeholders as we work to resolve comments 12 and provide additional discussions on the rulemaking 13 package after the rule is released for public comment.
14 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Before you leave that 15 slide, I just want to try and understand the schedule.
16 As you can imagine, the ACRS letter usually has some 17 suggestions for improvements.
18 What will happen if there's some easy 19 fixes in our letter, can you make some changes and 20 still get the draft text to the commissioners by 21 February 2023 is what you're shooting for, or is it 22 just too late with the process? Maybe, we'd have a 23 range of comment; some easy fixes, and some that we'll 24 think about in the future if it's too hard to fix.
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11 MR. HOELLMAN: Yes, thanks, Dr. Rempe. We 1
do envision making or continue to make adjustments as 2
the rulemaking package moves through concurrence of 3
course. We value the Committee's input and plan to 4
respond to the letters.
5 In our response, I think we will provide 6
our thoughts on your recommendations and conclusions, 7
any changes we would make in response, and that will 8
be documented in our response.
9 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Thank you.
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I have a question of 11 the same thing because that is in your preamble. In 12 the Part 7, you have a specific request for comments 13 where you requested comments in 20 different areas.
14 So what is your position of that? You requested those 15 comments, and when do you expect to receive them, 16 address them or anything?
17 MR. HOELLMAN: Thanks, Vesna. I think we 18 expect -- and part of our overall strategy and 19 extensive stakeholder engagement is in getting the 20 proposed rulemaking package available. What we 21 released in September of this year was to sort of give 22 some early indication of areas where we're interested 23 in continued interactions with stakeholder and 24 thoughts on specific language.
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
12 We've got similar questions in our 1
advanced reactor stakeholder meetings on how can we 2
continue to interact with the staff on these areas 3
given that we're not in a formal comment period right 4
now.
5 The way we've kind of responded to that is 6
we aren't in a formal comment period because we're 7
trying to get the package complete and work through 8
all the internal reviews to get it to the Commission 9
by February 2027. But we do recognize that there 10 areas folks may want to interact with us on between 11 now and when the proposed rule goes out for public 12 comment.
13 And if there's a specific area within 14 those questions that stakeholders want to engage on, 15 we're open to adding it in as a topic for one our 16 future stakeholder meetings and continue to gather 17 input.
18 One of the key uncertainties and 19 challenges I think we identified in our response to 20 the SRM was that there's only a planned 60-day public 21 comment period, and I think some of the members have 22 recognized that that's rather short for a rulemaking 23 of such complexity.
24 Some of the questions are specifically 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
13 targeted to areas where we continue to receive 1
comments and questions, so we continue to seek input 2
on those to refine the rule to get us to a place where 3
we want to be. But on the schedule we're on, it's 4
just -- we're trying to strike the right balance, I 5
guess, in interacting and getting the rulemaking 6
package complete.
7 (Simultaneous speaking.)
8 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: In light of your --
9 let's say the first one, you're seeking comments of 10 proposed organization and possibly improvements and 11 blah, blah. So this is just sort of theoretical 12 seeking because you will not have the time to do 13 anything about that before February, right?
14 MR. HOELLMAN: Yes, so the --
15 (Simultaneous speaking.)
16 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: -- you have a very 17 nice organization of the things you're interested in 18 the comments. My question is that, are you really 19 interested in these comments?
20 MR. BEALL: Yes. Hi, this is Bob Beall.
21 I'm the project manager for Part 53 rulemaking. Those 22 questions in the draft proposed rule right now will be 23 going out hopefully with the proposed rule for public 24 comment. And so they will be addressed with all the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
14 other comments we get on the proposed rule when issue 1
the final rule in the 2024 timeframe. If the ACRS has 2
some comments on those proposed questions, feel free 3
to put that in the letter.
4 MEMBER PETTI: We will.
5 MR. BEALL: Like Jordan said, we'll see if 6
we have time to address them in our response, or we 7
will then address them --- any early comments, I will 8
be addressing them in the follow-up.
9 MEMBER PETTI: Right. I didn't expect 10 that you'd address all of our comments by the end of 11 the year.
12 MR. BEALL: Right.
13 MEMBER PETTI: Some of them -- make sure 14 we don't forget about them.
15 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Dave, my question is 16 this has been indicated that they're open to change 17 organization, but they obviously -- I don't believe 18 that's true. There's many of these -- the requests 19 for comments that I don't believe they're opened for 20 those changes but asking for comments. That's my 21 take.
22 It says that -- that's my question.
23 Because if you are putting draft now, you're not going 24 to change organization after that. That's my comment.
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15 I understand that some of those questions are sort of 1
nice they're there, but that is -- are you open to 2
change the organization after the -- in the final?
3 MR. BEALL: I don't think we would ask the 4
question if we weren't totally against the possibility 5
of changing the organization. I think part of the 6
reason we landed where we landed on the draft proposed 7
rule language is we started down a path -- we've 8
gotten multiple letters from ACRS saying this is a 9
viable approach.
10 And then we started getting comments from 11 stakeholders that mentioned things like, well, this 12 doesn't quite align with international communities, 13 guidance and rules. What if a developer would pursue 14 international licensing before NRC licensing, and how 15 would that work. Would we have to change our whole 16 design or analysis to then fit within what we were 17 proposing in Part 53 at the time?
18 And so that's sort of why -- or a reason 19 why we took on the development of Framework B, which 20 originally started as, if you recall, Part 50x, which 21 tried to align or develop technology-inclusive 22 requirements, tried to revise the existing 23 requirements that were light-water reactor-focused to 24 be more technology-inclusive.
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
16 We've been working, and I mentioned in the 1
beginning in 2016, 2017, that was our initial focus in 2
our implementation action plans was in recognition 3
that early movers would -- Part 53 would not be 4
available for them. They would need to come under 5
Parts 50 and 52. So we started initially developing 6
that.
7 And at the end of the slide, you'll see 8
what the guidance development, what we've done over 9
the years. A lot of it and still most of it is 10 focused on Parts 50 and 52 because from a
11 predictability and clarity standpoint, we want to have 12 guidance available to support early movers. And we'll 13 continue to learn and revise those guidance documents 14 to support the final Part 53 rule as we move forward.
15 I don't think we're not looking for or not 16 open to better suggestions on how to improve the rule.
17 It's just sort of the timelines we're on, and how we 18 sort of got here. I know we've talked about it a 19 number of times. I know there's still external 20 stakeholder concerns on some of it.
21 Okay, let's keep moving, Liz.
22 Here's kind of what we were just talking 23 about, how we've got to Framework A and Framework B 24 within the draft proposed rule language. As we've 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
17 mentioned before, Subpart A is our one subpart that's 1
entirely common to both frameworks.
2 That has the general provisions, common 3
definitions, and also framework-specific definitions 4
for areas that just are -- the definition is specific 5
to the methodology within the frameworks.
6 As we've noted before and in the 7
rulemaking plan, Framework A was intended to align 8
with the licensing modernization project, the PRA-led 9
approach, following the DOE cost-shared, industry-led 10 efforts.
11 Framework B, Subparts N through U, are the 12 technical and application requirements for Framework 13 B. As I mentioned, they were -- we initially 14 developed them in response to stakeholder feedback 15 requesting a
technology-inclusive traditional 16 licensing option that aligns more with international 17 guidance and approaches.
18 It uses traditional uses of risk insights 19 and design-specific rules. It requires applicants to 20 develop principal design criteria. It also includes 21 the alternative evaluation of risk insights, which 22 Marty will discuss later.
23 The draft proposed rulemaking package 24 consists of four enclosures that make up the federal 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
18 register notice, which is intended to help readers 1
digest the numerous pages and be able to review the 2
preamble along with the rule text without scrolling up 3
and down a page or flipping back and forth.
4 We'll talk more about guidance later on 5
this morning. Are there any questions on this slide 6
or just keep moving?
7 Liz, next slide.
8 Okay, the front matter material in 9
Sections 53000 and 53010 are relatively new. They 10 weren't released publically until the draft proposed 11 rulemaking package was released in September, but 12 we've been discussing these over the last several 13 months.
14 We hope that these sections provide some 15 additional clarity on how the proposed rule is set up 16 that each framework is stamped with their own set of 17 consolidated requirements.
18 As Vesna mentioned, we know that we 19 reached -- a major comment we've been receiving is 20 that the rule should only consist of one framework, 21 and that's what that specific request for comment in 22 the federal register notice is sort of targeting.
23 I think we've noted in past meetings that 24 we've tried to acknowledge this comment in the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
19 preamble where we included a comment preamble 1
discussion or subparts within the two frameworks that 2
are similar or have requirements that essentially 3
reproduce themselves. An example of that is Subparts 4
G and Q on decommissioning.
5 I already mentioned, but the purpose of 6
these sections up front is to really direct readers to 7
understand that the frameworks are meant to be viewed 8
independently with some exceptions, and Jesse will 9
discuss some of them in Subpart F later on.
10 We think that it provides some additional 11 clarity instead of having internal cross references 12 within each subpart that might get confusing to the 13 reader, applicant or the staff.
14 Liz, next slide.
15 This is Subpart A. This is the general 16 provisions. I'll focus largely on the definitions.
17 So 53020 is the common definitions. Most of the terms 18 here are technically equivalent to the corresponding 19 terms defined in Part 52 and intended to be consistent 20 with other regulatory definitions or would be 21 consistent with how the terms are used in existing 22 regulations.
23 Commercial nuclear plan is one that we've 24 talked about in the past. We started with the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
20 definition that was intended to capture the NEIMA 1
definition of advanced nuclear reactor. That caused 2
some challenges with our stakeholders, and we didn't 3
necessarily think it provided anything additional than 4
what we would define as a commercial nuclear plant.
5 We do use plant more often in Part 53 than 6
reactor because with some advanced technologies, 7
radionuclide sources can be more prevalent in areas 8
outside of the actual reactor vessel. So as a 9
holistic look at the plant design, we want to make 10 sure that all radionuclide sources are considered and 11 identified and protected.
12 Manufactured reactor and manufactured 13 reactor module, we tried to address some of our 14 external stakeholders and potential vendors that are 15 interested in manufactured reactor and using a 16 manufacturing license.
17 And so we included the ability to load 18 fuel at a manufactured reactor or manufacturing 19 facility with proper mechanisms that prevent 20 criticality while it's been transported to its final 21 destination at a commercial nuclear plant.
22 As I mentioned before, some of the 23 Framework A, Framework B definitions that are unique 24 to the frameworks have to do with licensing basis 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
21 events and structure system component classifications.
1 A lot of these in Framework A were derived from what 2
was doing in the licensing modernization project as 3
endorsed in Regulatory Guide 1.233.
4 I think generally that's all I wanted to 5
cover on this slide. We did add the definition of 6
safety function in response to some of the members' 7
comments in their letter from August.
8 CHAIRMAN REMPE: I appreciate the changes 9
you made as we indicated in the subcommittee meeting 10 on the definition of safety function. But when I keep 11 looking at this slide that you presented during the 12 subcommittee meeting, I guess the thought comes to my 13 mind still why couldn't you just use the one 14 definition for Framework A to B.
15 Why is it you can't use that definition 16 and apply it to both A and B? Because I know we 17 heard, well, we want to a do a bottoms-up approach and 18 have the design criteria before we identify the safety 19 functions, but I would never know if my design 20 criteria were complete unless I had thought at the 21 beginning what safety functions were.
22 I know there's still this reluctance to 23 jump in and do something that would be generally 24 applicable to both frameworks. Is there something I'm 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
22 missing? Give me an example of why you couldn't have 1
use this for Framework B?
2 MR. HOELLMAN: I'll start. I'll let Boyce 3
maybe chime in or Bill. I think in general, we tried 4
to capture the general piece you're talking about in 5
the definition, but then we've included the Framework 6
A and Framework B -- like how it would be implemented 7
within the individual frameworks as sort of a subset 8
of the definition.
9 Essentially, it comes from sort of how the 10 safety functions are addressed by either design 11 features and functional design criteria in Framework 12 A.
13 So the safety functions play a distinct 14 role in doing that using the specific design rules in 15 Framework B and saying the principal design criteria 16 essentially capture the same things, but we weren't 17 sure what how would we implement that -- it's already 18 implemented within the principal design criteria.
19 We thought just including it as a 20 requirement in Framework B, we weren't sure how 21 exactly to implement it. I don't know if Bill, Boyce 22 23 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Give me an example on why 24 you can't use it for Framework B --
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23 MR. RECKLEY: This is Bill Reckley. As 1
Jordan mentioned, the first part of the definition is 2
basically common, and that is almost plain English, 3
safety function.
4 The reason we felt compelled to 5
distinguish how they're used within the two frameworks 6
is Framework A, if I could remember, basically you 7
derive your safety functions from what is needed to 8
meet the high level of performance.
9 Whereas in Framework B, and largely 10 existing in Parts 50 and 52, those functions are 11 reflected through the general design criteria.
12 They're going to be basically the same. This is 13 engineering. They're basically going to be the same.
14 Control heat level, control heat removal, contain the 15 radionuclides.
16 So it's not surprising that in the end 17 they look the same, but how they're used in the 18 language is in Framework B, they're basically assumed 19 from the beginning, these are your safety functions.
20 Whereas in Framework A,
a slight 21 difference. Instead of relying on the experience and 22 the existing construct of the GDC, we say derive. I 23 know that's a subtle difference.
24 CHAIRMAN REMPE: I'm still struggling 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
24 because, again, you may have a chemical hazard or 1
something that is not embedded in the existing 2
regulation and the general design criteria. And so to 3
me, to know what the principal design criteria are for 4
these non-LWRs, you should start thinking about what 5
are the hazards first.
6 I appreciate what you did. You got closer 7
to where you are, but I just don't know why you didn't 8
take the next step and say, okay, identify what the 9
hazards are and then see if all your design criteria 10 and address those hazards. To me, it's just a logical 11 approach.
12 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, and this is Boyce Travis 13 from the staff. I think the disconnect is in 14 Framework B, if we said define the safety functions, 15 that's -- so ultimately in Framework B, the staff is 16 making review findings against the principal design 17 criteria that are utilized by the designer. The staff 18 has to say, yes, these PDC are okay.
19 And in the review that the staff makes the 20 findings against in Framework B, similar to how it's 21 done in 50 and 52. The staff makes findings against 22 those principal design criteria, which are more 23 specific and cover the full spectrum of design -- a 24 subset of what constitutes the safety functions for 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
25 the design as opposed to the top-down holistic 1
approach in Framework A.
2 And so adding a requirement to define 3
safety functions, in our view in Framework B, is 4
adding another requirement that it's not clear how the 5
staff aids. It's an additional burden on top of the 6
principal design criteria, which we think cover it.
7 But B, it differs from how the staff is making their 8
review findings of Framework B coming from the bottom-9 up versus the top-down approach that's in Framework A.
10 CHAIRMAN REMPE: How will the staff know 11 that the identified principal design criteria are 12 complete unless everyone agrees on what the safety 13 functions are? Anyway, I've made my point.
14 That's why I just wanted to bring it up 15 because we were too nice, I thought, in the 16 subcommittee meeting and I didn't harass you, but I 17 kept thinking I must be missing something. I thought 18 about it some more, and I don't get what I'm missing.
19 But anyway, go ahead. I've belabored this point 20 enough.
21 (Laughter.)
22 MR. HOELLMAN: Okay, so I think we can 23 move to the next slide unless there's any other 24 questions on Part A.
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
26 Okay, so this is just another overview of 1
Framework A with some of the specific topics we plan 2
to cover today. We're going to cover the QHOs in 3
Subpart B, fueled modules in Subpart E and O. And 4
then in Subpart F, the generally-licensed reactor 5
operators, human factors and the associated ISGs that 6
are part of the proposed rulemaking package.
7 So with that, I think I'm turning it over 8
to Bill on the next slide.
9 MR. RECKLEY: Liz, just keep this slide 10 here for a second.
11 Again, this is Bill Reckley. Just as a 12 summary of Framework A, I know we've talked about it 13 in numerous meetings. We tried to organize it 14 somewhat like a systems engineering approach or 15 sometimes we've talked about this as a top-down 16 approach where we put the high level requirements in 17 Subpart B
and then follow that through the 18 organization that set up like the life cycle of a 19 facility to say what needs to be done within those 20 stages of the life cycle to meet those high level 21 criteria.
22 As Jordan mentioned, you go down through 23 the subparts and the life cycle of site, being 24 construction, operation and decommissioning with a few 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
27 licensing and general matters like quality assurance 1
in the latter Subparts I, J and K.
2 Again, the important part of this, and 3
we'll get into it on the next slide, is the 4
establishment of the high level criteria, Subpart B.
5 As Jordan mentioned, we'll talk about that. Jesse 6
will talk about the generally-licensed reactor 7
operators and other human factor issues later in the 8
presentation.
9 So, Liz, if you can go to the next slide.
10 This is one we used during the 11 subcommittee meeting to basically try to summarize an 12 integrated approach that we try to reflect in 13 Framework A. The first -- and we used the model 14 that's been around since the 1990s in Regulatory Guide 15 1.174, risk-informed decisionmaking, to try make sure 16 that we had captured things.
17 And also to try to make sure that 18 Framework A would provide a comparable level of safety 19 as is provided in Parts 50 and 52 for the operating 20 fleet. So just going around clockwise really quickly, 21 one of the first step there -- again, we had to tailor 22 this somewhat because 1.174 is written to address 23 changes to existing licensing basis whereas in Part 53 24 we're talking about basically starting from scratch 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
28 and forming the licensing basis. And nevertheless, 1
works pretty well, we think.
2 And so the first step in that, in 1.174, 3
is to make sure you're meeting the purpose of the 4
existing regs. We tried to do is -- we were doing 5
crosswalks and looking and through interactions.
6 One example, I think of this first box and 7
just the exercises we went through is if you remember 8
very early on in the process, as Jordan mentioned 9
maybe two years ago, a lot of the discussion with the 10 ACRS was on you have to have a requirement that the 11 facility will be subcritical in the long term.
12 And we had not had that provision in the 13 first draft. And so we added a requirement, a 14 specific requirement, under the design requirements in 15 53 440 to require -- so through those internal 16 interactions and interactions with stakeholders, 17 interactions with the ACRS, we think we addressed all 18 the topics that are addressed in 50 and 52.
19 The next one going, again, clockwise is 20 defense in-depth. As we talked many times, there's 21 specific provisions to assess defense in-depth. This, 22 again, it's an area that's different in that in 50 and 23 52, defense in-depth is already built into the general 24 design criteria and other requirements. It's a core 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
29 philosophy, but it's built in.
1 In Framework A, applicants are required to 2
do an assessment to make sure we end up in a 3
comparable place. Design requirements and margin, 4
engineering margins, that is addressed in, again, the 5
design requirements in 53 440 as well as in some of 6
the other higher level requirements in Subpart B.
7 Going around again, the next step we've 8
talked about, we'll talk about a little more I 9
suspect, is a comparison to the safety goals.
10 Remember, 1.174 was developed as a primary tool for 11 risk-informed decisionmaking. So what did it bring 12 into play that wasn't there, let's say, in the 70s or 13 early 80s? That was risk insights from PRAs.
14 And so this step is to make sure that a 15 facility meets the NRC safety goals. We're using the 16 quantitative health objectives, the QHOs, as a 17 technology-inclusive metric. And then lastly, the 18 process requires that whatever you do, you monitor 19 performance.
20 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay, this is Vesna.
21 So there is a couple -- you took this straight from 22 the Reg Guide 1.174. This is a good demonstration on 23 the integration of the existing regulation in that 24 time and the new one in the sense of defense in-depth 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
30 and safety margins and everything.
1 I mean, number one, I don't even know how 2
that applies to here. You want to consider the new 3
regulation as a change? You have a very little 4
meeting performance in this. But the bad thing which 5
I want to -- so this, how it is built, it was -- the 6
data applied to core damage frequency and large early 7
release frequency because all the criteria are based 8
on that.
9 So because we don't really know are the 10 new design going to have mounts and large releases to 11 be introduced to HO on your Part 4. You proposed to 12 replace that with QHOs. So let's say the plan comes, 13 which really have a core damage frequency and large 14 release frequency, and you want to use QHOs.
15 What's going to happen based on the 16 current experience with Level 3, if you look in that 17 NRC project, the Level 3, you will see that plans with 18 core damage frequency of ten to minus two will satisfy 19 the QHOs. So that doesn't really meet what you just 20 said that you have to have a comparable level of 21 safety.
22 That's one of my additional comments of 23 QHOs. Because as it's shown in the Level 3 results, 24 the US Level 3 -- so this is a couple orders of 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
31 magnitude different than what it was when they tried 1
to connect core damage frequencies to the constant 2
facilities and everything. So this is one of my 3
comments that if you started QHOs and then try to come 4
back to substitute measures, you will have a totally 5
different safety goal.
6 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, I think we would 7
acknowledge that with different technologies, you 8
might have different constructs of what you're 9
depending on in order to meet the QHOs.
10
- And, again, to try to develop a
11 technology-inclusive approach, we just didn't see how 12 we could stick with the use of core damage frequency 13 and containment failure given that some designs may 14 not be built that way.
15 We did try in the preamble to reinforce 16 that for those that want to develop surrogates or if 17 we have light-water reactors under Part 53 that want 18 to use existing surrogates, CDF and large release 19 frequency, that that would be okay.
20 MEMBER BIER: I don't want to harp on this 21 because I think it's a bit beyond the scope of Part 53 22 to address it, but I would also note, which I think I 23 commented before, that at some level the current 24 safety goals are kind of inherently not technology 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
32 neutral or at least size neutral because they were 1
kind of gear around you have a 1000 megawatt plant and 2
you're comparing it against coal generation.
3 You have, say, a five megawatt plant and 4
the alternative is not coal generation, then sort of 5
the whole rationale for those safety goals is not 6
really strong anymore.
7 MR. RECKLEY: Right. I think that's 8
actually a good point. I think we addressed it in the 9
letter. It's kind of beyond the scope. We were 10 sticking with established, recognizing that some of 11 that, when did that, that means we were established 12 forty years ago, but the Commission has, over the 13 years, reinforced that it's okay to continue to use.
14 So that's probably about as far as we can 15 go on this project. But we had recognized that a lot 16 of what we're trying to do -- you cannot escape that 17 it was developed in a light-water reactor world. In 18 severe accident space, for example, you look at the 19 severe accident policy statement, it's full of light-20 water reactors and maybe one or two lines that say, 21 yeah, we'll take this concept to other technologies.
22 But it was light-water focused.
23 But the concept we tried to capture, 24 because it builds, again, an adverse aspect -- usually 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
33 a defense in-depth aspect when you get into severe 1
accidents. So, point taken.
2 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: My main point here 3
was, because you quote them here, that is Reg Guide 4
1.174 on this slide. If you're using QHO, Reg Guide 5
1.174 is not anymore applicable. That's my main 6
point.
7 MR. RECKLEY: Right. I'll acknowledge 8
that, Vesna, that we took the concept from 1.174 and 9
tried to use it. 1.174, like we just said, almost 10 everything is light-water reactor-specific, so it's 11 built for light-water reactor technologies in terms of 12 what we're looking at, the prevalence of using Level 13 1 and Level 2 PRAs, CDF and large release frequencies.
14 So, yes.
15 Dave.
16 MEMBER PETTI: Bill, I just want to just 17 come at it. I love this slide. This is a critical 18 point we'll see in the letter because I like it so 19 much. But there are stakeholders who are making 20 claims that Framework A is a higher safety bar, but it 21 really isn't.
22 And this is what the staff has done to 23 convince themselves that it is an equivalent level of 24 safety. That's an incredibly important thing. It's 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
34 in the preamble. I know we've talked through in our 1
meetings, but if you just read the rule alone, this 2
doesn't come out easily.
3 Members, you'll see it. There's a whole 4
couple paragraphs on this. I think this is fairly 5
important because it anchors Framework A. It is a 6
complete and different thought process, and that's why 7
it was so important in the preamble, in my opinion, to 8
help people understand how different it really is than 9
Framework B.
10 And I don't think you get that sense when 11 you just read the rule itself. You really got to look 12 at the preamble. In some ways, I wish we had had the 13 preamble before we had Framework A and B because it 14 really helped a lot of things. So you'll see if it 15 survives in that letter writing, but -- this is very 16 important.
17 MR. RECKLEY: Liz, if we can go to the 18 next slide. And I'll acknowledge, Dr. Petti, that the 19 ACRS was asking for that explanation from the very 20 beginning, and we kept, due to various reasons, saying 21 we will get there.
22 We tried in the discussion tables and some 23 of the things that we released in real-time to provide 24 some of the explanation, but -- undoubtedly, it fell 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
35 short. So to that point, the primary thing that we 1
needed to do was prove to ourselves a comparable or 2
equivalent level of safety.
3 That might sound straightforward, but keep 4
in mind that for the existing fleet, the confidence 5
that there's an adequate level of safety is provided 6
by them complying with the rules that were developed 7
initially and as they've evolved over decades.
8 So there is no specific measure. Adequate 9
protection is provided by meeting the rules, so it's 10 a somewhat circular argument. When you bring in a new 11 effort and say, we're actually going to use measures, 12 but you can't really have it in numerical terms. That 13 was the challenge.
14 We did go through -- some of this touches 15 on what Joy was mentioning. Even under a traditional 16 approach if you go back to the 1960s, they were doing 17 things like this. That's why you get the same -- you 18 end up largely in similar places is because this isn't 19 a new concept.
20 But in any case, if you start on the 21 right, we've used this echelon or hierarchy many 22 times, safety criteria, then you use those to define 23 safety functions. From safety functions, what are the 24 design features I'm going to use provide those 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
36 functions. And then ultimately, how does that 1
equipment need to perform to provide the function.
2 Now, I think one interesting thing, and 3
Jesse's going to get to it later on, is under this 4
Framework, you're allowed to use the same similar 5
logic for people. And so that is, to me, one of the 6
more interesting things is that we're looking, again, 7
trying to take an integrated approach.
8 What's the role of the equipment, what's 9
the role of the people, what's the role of operating 10 programs in order to meet those things. So it does 11 help to kind of have this structure throughout. The 12 middle just repeats; I won't do that. Again, we've 13 talked about it many times. The safety criterion in 14 Subpart B.
15 And then just the caution, because we 16 heard this from some, that we don't equate the QHOs to 17 adequate protection.
It's one of multiple 18 considerations in our development and ultimately in 19 the finding that we would make.
20 Liz, if we can go to the next slide that 21 talks really about Framework B and the construct. I 22 did want to mention just because it's another area 23 that I think is a significant change and it affects 24 both Frameworks A and B. And that is to include 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
37 provisions for the loading of fuel in a factory.
1 In order to do that and make it work, it's 2
both a technical and somewhat legal consideration. We 3
came up with the technical criterion in order to 4
prevent criticality and work with our office of 5
general counsel to say if that's met, you can do this 6
activity and the thing that you have, which is 7
basically a manufactured reactor module loaded with 8
fuel, may not considered a utilization facility.
9 Because under the Atomic Energy Act, if we 10 were to put it in that bin, then it would trigger a 11 whole bunch of ramifications. Anyway, I just wanted 12 to mention that.
13 Liz, I think if you go to the next slide, 14 we can get into Framework B, and I'll turn it over to 15 Boyce.
16 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, so thanks, Bill.
17 This is Boyce Travis from the staff. This 18 slide --
19 MEMBER PETTI: Boyce, before you --
20 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, go ahead.
21 MEMBER PETTI: A time check, we're about 22 halfway. We have one hour left. Thanks.
23 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, no problem.
24 I will be briefly, thankfully. This slide 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
38 provides a summary of Framework B as it's currently 1
laid out in the rule. We had some extensive 2
discussion in the subcommittee meeting to touch on 3
various parts of Framework B.
4 I'll note most of them are similar or in 5
some cases basically identical to Framework A with the 6
exceptions that are in P and R that we discussed.
7 Over the next few slides, the staff is going to 8
revisit a couple of topics in Framework B.
9 One of which is codes of standards, 10 another which is AERI that Marty is going to discuss.
11 Aside from that, I'm not going to go into a lot of 12 detail on Framework B. I'll use this opportunity, if 13 anyone has any questions about other areas in this 14 framework, I'll be happy to talk about them here.
15 (No response.)
16 MR. TRAVIS: Hearing none, I'm going to 17 move onto Slide 12. The staff provided Slide 12 to 18 kind of revisit and provide some clarification on the 19 top of the codes and standards because this garnered 20 a fair amount of discussion during the subcommittee.
21 A lot of that discussion was focused on 22 the draft requirements related to codes and standards 23 in Framework A versus what's in Framework B. I kind 24 of want to step back and highlight what the role of 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
39 codes and standards in Framework B is.
1 With regards to non-LWRs, we think 2
Framework A and Framework B are fairly consistent in 3
that there's a
provision in Framework B
4 specifically that requested description and 5
justification for codes and standards not previously 6
endorsed or accepted by the NRCD (phonetic) for those 7
to be used in the design.
8 Because we recognize that non-LWRs are 9
probably going to be use codes and standards in order 10 to justify how their components meet various design 11 requirements. And those design requirements, we 12 didn't want to be prescriptive, and we wanted to allow 13 for commensurate qualification of those components 14 with their safety significance.
15 And so in that sense, Framework B and A 16 are consistent for non-LWRs. For LWRs, Framework B 17 has some specific requirements for what light-water 18 reactor codes and standards are applied because our 19 target an equivalent level of safety with the existing 20 requirements.
21 And as Bill has noted earlier, the 22 existing requirements for light-water reactors have 23 been developed with extensive operating, decades of 24 operating experience, and an adherence to a certain 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
40 set of codes and standards that have been used.
1 And so currently, those codes and 2
standards are reflected as requirements in Framework 3
B specifically for light-water reactors. The 4
specifics of that are detailed in the requirements.
5 It does create, I'll say, a difference in how codes 6
and standards are applied for LWRs in Framework A and 7
Framework B.
8 Part of that is derived from the 9
difference in philosophy that's used in the two 10 frameworks. Framework A, as Bill noted, an integrated 11 approach that involves the comprehensive, detailed 12 consideration of the full spectrum of event sequences.
13 Whereas Framework B
is the more 14 traditional, stylized deterministic analysis with 15 simplifications and conservatism that's coupled with 16 some checks on defense in-depth effectively. I sense 17 we're going to have a discussion here, so I'll open it 18 up --
19 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, this is Charlie Brown.
20 I had a question.
21 MR. TRAVIS: Go for it.
22 MEMBER BROWN: I have asked in previous 23 meetings about general design criteria as opposed to 24 kind of more amorphous claims (audio interference).
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
41 No, I've got it on. I just didn't bother 1
to talk into it. Thank you. I'm sorry.
2 John, I have some interest in humor here.
3 I need more wire.
4 So I raised that point before, and I think 5
others have pointed out that Framework B has the old 6
framework of 10 CFR 55(a)(h). I'm interested in H in 7
many circumstances. You talked about proposed changes 8
in 55a. I didn't get that out of the previous 9
meetings (audio interference).
10 Right
- now, there's general design 11 requirements, GDCs, there's specific things in that 12 area that I use frequently because guidance -- not 13 guidance, specific, we got to go by this, this and 14 this, although they're general principles.
15 Are you going to change that? You talked 16 about making changes. Why do we have to change 17 55(a)(h) if it's going to be light-water reactors.
18 You're going to turn those into jelly beans as well?
19 (Audio interference.)
20 MR. TRAVIS: Yes, so let's see if I can 21 address this appropriately. So setting aside the PDC 22 and GDC for the moment. 5055a as it stands in the 23 proposed rule right now is going to continue to apply 24 to light-water reactor designs that are 5052 in 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
42 Framework B.
1 There are conforming changes as part of 2
this rule package to ensure that they fall within the 3
umbrella requirements of 5055a. Right now, there's no 4
proposal to include non-light-water reactors under the 5
umbrella 5055a.
6 They would have to propose appropriate 7
codes and standards for whatever equipment needs to be 8
qualified up to the safety level they're proposing --
9 MEMBER BROWN: That's for advanced 10 reactors?
11 MR. TRAVIS: Correct, yes. For non-light-12 water reactors.
13 MEMBER BROWN: I got that, but --
14 MR. TRAVIS: Light-water under Framework 15 B, which under the proposed rule, would still be 16 required to meet these.
17 (Simultaneous speaking.)
18 MEMBER BROWN: -- doesn't -- it would fall 19 under that same category?
20 MR. TRAVIS: That's correct.
21 MEMBER BROWN: I call of those light-water 22 23 MR. TRAVIS: That is currently what is 24 being proposed, and I think we're going to continue to 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
43 iterate internally to figure out what the best path 1
forward is.
2 MEMBER BROWN: Is there going to be any 3
effort to try to -- you talked about now the non-4 light-waters. Is there going to be any attempt to try 5
to take or utilize what we know? If you look at the 6
GDCs and a few things like that, a lot of them, 7
they're very, very generalized.
8 They would apply, theoretically, to any 9
type of reactor, not specific to whether it's sodium 10 or lead-bismuth or whatever would be or whatever the 11 other coolants are, et cetera.
12 Is there going to be any effort to try to 13 tailor so that the non-light-water reactors that fall 14 under the Part B as well? Is that what you're talking 15 about? Somebody wanted to do a non-light-water and 16 advanced reactor under Framework B, could they do 17 that?
18 MR. TRAVIS: Yes. Framework B is tailored 19 to be technology-inclusive. It could be a light-water 20 reactor or non-light-water reactor.
21 MEMBER BROWN: So when you said on your 22 initial statement, you said this doesn't apply to non-23 light-water --
24 MR. TRAVIS: Sorry, there's a bifurcation 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
44 in Framework B for codes and standards in that it does 1
prescriptively say there are certain codes and 2
standards that LWRs, whether it's a BWR or PWR, are 3
going to have to apply. It isn't that prescriptive 4
for non-light-water reactors.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, I got it. That's 6
fine. Now, I understand a little bit. That's all --
7 MR. TRAVIS: Okay. Happy to provide the 8
clarification.
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: In practice, Boyce, what 10 would your expectation be under this language? For 11 example, say in this non-LWR advanced reactor design, 12 you identified a fission product barrier.
13 Typically, most reactors are going to have 14 some kind of primary system. Is the expectation that 15 that primary system would be made into an equivalent 16 standard as the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 17 and how do you signal that to the applicants?
18 MR. TRAVIS: I think this is a really good 19 question. I'm going to maybe speak a little 20 philosophically for a moment, so I apologize. I will 21 try to get to an example at the end that may make it 22 a little a bit more concrete.
23 But I think given the broad spectrum of 24 the designs that are being considered, we didn't want 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
45 to go down the path of actually saying, yes, your 1
primary system, for instance, has to meet this level 2
of standard.
3 Because there are different safety 4
implications for the integrity of the primary system 5
among the advanced reactor designs. For instance, 6
there might be reactor designs where only a very small 7
portion of the primary system, because let's say it's 8
a low pressure, needs to be qualified for integrity.
9 For
- instance, the vessel and some 10 connections below or above a certain height to prevent 11 a siphon effect or a leakage effect. We would expect 12 then there would be an as-we-like standard applied to 13 that vessel and those connections because that 14 integrity is sufficiently important that it's serving 15 as a fission product boundary.
16 I say as-we-like. As-we-like is the one 17 I'm aware of, we think there might be others that 18 could do that role for certain reactor designs. And 19 so yes, the expectation is for SSCs, they are being 20 relied on for a level of safety as a fission product 21 barrier.
22 There would be an appropriate standard or 23 code of standard or mechanism that we can point to and 24 say, yes, that level of functional performance by that 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
46 component is going to be assured by this code or this 1
standard.
2 And for many applications, I think there 3
are cases where these materials and what's being done 4
is new enough that that standard may not be 5
sufficiently developed yet.
6 I think as we license these reactor 7
designs, we're going to learn some things and probably 8
but some of this into guidance, for instance. So I 9
don't think we wanted to do the same thing we did with 10 5055a and say, and here's the list of codes and 11 standards that are going to apply.
12 Sorry, I'm not really answering the 13 question of how do I signal that. I think eventually 14 it will be signaled through guidance, but there's 15 still an expectation that whatever you are relying to 16 have your safety performance for your SSCs is going to 17 be qualified in some ways. And one of the best ways 18 to do is an appropriate code and standard.
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, that's a reasonable 20 way to address the question. I'm just looking at it 21 from the perspective, one is engineering, two from the 22 eyes of the public.
23 Because you've gone through significant 24 effort, as Bill outlined earlier, to demonstrate that 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
47 you're going to achieve an equivalent level of 1
adequate protection or however you want phrase it, 2
level of safety.
3 And I've heard the arguments from some of 4
the proponents for advanced designs that were low 5
pressure, so the primary system isn't as important as 6
in an LWR. It depends on the design, of course, 7
especially if you're reliant on the coolant that's in 8
the primary system no matter what the pressure is.
9 I appreciate your challenge here because 10 you don't want to be overly prescriptive not knowing 11 what the design might be like. But it's just in my 12 mind, the expectation would be that if it provides one 13 of those critical safety functions, then the integrity 14
-- one of the ways ensuring the integrity of the 15 function is through going through an ASME code by 16 case. Or if it's in the reactor protection system, 17 IEEE equivalent and so on. Well, I made my point.
18 MR. TRAVIS: I agree with you 100 percent.
19 Our expectation is that for applications that are 20 similar to what's being seen in the industry today, 21 for instance, RCS boundary, a reactor protection 22 system, there's going to be a code and standard 23 employed. And of those codes and standards, we know 24 which one currently is used to make that 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
48 justification.
1 But given, again, given the just huge 2
spectrum and variety of things that are coming in, it 3
doesn't -- it's both a challenging task, and it 4
doesn't necessarily benefit us to start prescribing 5
them in the regulation itself. If we have to go down 6
that road, I think guidance would be the way we would 7
go.
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you.
9 MEMBER BROWN: This is me again, Charlie.
10 I just want to amplify the -- if you look at the 11 standards -- can you hear me okay?
12 On the technology neutral side. It's 13 interesting to go back and reflect on even how we've 14 been using the current standards the 93 -- 603-1991 15 IEEE standard. It's got all the architectural stuff 16 in it.
17 Control of access is really the only one 18 because there was only physical access at that point, 19 not electronic access, which we're struggling with and 20 figuring out how to deal with now. But that's a 21 remarkably technology neutral -- it doesn't tell you 22 to use vacuum tubes, or mag amps or transistors or any 23
-- it doesn't tell you. It just says, hey, you need 24 these overall architectural standards functionally.
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49 And that's kind of the bulwark of what you 1
put together. So having that be amorphous, there's 2
going to be, even in the non-light-water reactors, you 3
got to generate steam somehow. People are going to 4
say, oh, we're going to have thermal -- I don't know, 5
some kind of heat transfer into these magic 6
thermoelectric conversion devices with tons of powered 7
electronics.
8 I'll believe that when I see it since I've 9
dealt with it for 20 years, 30 years. That's not 10 easy. Steam drives the big generators. So if the 11 stuff you look at, you're going to have steam 12 somewhere more than likely.
13 There's high pressure somewhere in that 14 system, and it's connected directly to the primary 15 systems. So you're going to have some reasonable 16 standards of that interface. You just can't leave it 17
-- we know how to deal with that interface on the 18 secondary sides, but I just think we need some thought 19 going forward as to how you do this into going 20 forward.
21 There's some areas where it's transparent.
22 You're going to have some type of reactor monitoring 23 systems, some type of safety systems, whatever they 24 are, the old standards really would apply. So I'm 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
50 just encouraging you to think broadly.
1 Don't throw the baby out with the 2
bathwater because we know how to do that, and we see 3
the systems we're developing today, and the new 4
applications would work just as well. We still got to 5
monitor the plant whatever the pressures and 6
temperatures and neutron configuration they have.
7 MR. TRAVIS: Fully agree. I think this is 8
just another -- it's a challenging task for the staff.
9 There's flexibility and certainty are, in a lot of 10 cases, on the same axis. By affording that 11 flexibility, there's -- it is going to make their view 12 a little more challenging in some cases. And it's not 13 as easy as checking the box. But we have been 14 considering it, and we'll continue to consider going 15 forward.
16 MEMBER BROWN: Thanks.
17 MEMBER PETTI: Let's keep moving.
18 MR. TRAVIS: Sorry, Dave.
19 MEMBER BROWN: Sorry about that, Dave.
20 MR. TRAVIS: Sorry, this is my last slide.
21 I'm going to pass it over to Marty Stutzke.
22 MR. STUTZKE: Good morning, I'm Marty 23 Stutzke from the staff. I wanted to talk to you about 24 the evolution of the alternative evaluation risk 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
51 insights approach, emphasizing the AERI approach that 1
has been developed. The underlying purpose is the 2
various Commission policies.
3
- Second, and I
guess probably most 4
important thing for this presentation, is we have the 5
AERI entry conditions since the subcommittee meeting 6
a couple of weeks ago in order to address various 7
stakeholders' comments and further consideration of 8
the insights we got from the MACCS calculations. I'll 9
explain that in some detail.
10 As a result of changing the entry 11 conditions, we went back and made sure that we didn't 12 deter perhaps some unintended consequence. The AERI 13 referenced elsewhere in the regulations. Notably, the 14 determination that a facility is a self-reliant 15 mitigation facility, which enables the use of 16 generally-licensed reactor operators. And last but 17 not least, we're continuing to develop our draft 18 regulatory guides DG-1413 and 1414 that enables and 19 support the AERI approach, like that. It's been an 20 exciting week.
21 Next slide.
22 I had presented this slide at the 23 subcommittee meeting that lays out how the various 24 policy statements from the Commission have informed 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
52 the development of the AERI process.
1 I point you to the upper left box that 2
talks about the advanced reactor policy statement that 3
says we expect advanced designers to comply with the 4
safety goal policy statement. Like that.
5 Later on, goes down and says, well, we 6
expect you to comply with the severe accident policy 7
statement and to use PRA as the design tool. When you 8
read the PRA policy statement as shown on the lower 9
left corner, it recognizes that not everything needs 10 to be a full fault tree, event tree, type of approach.
11 There's other ways to do risk assessments 12 like that. What's challenging here is indicates 13 broadly in a fault tree should apply to complex 14 systems. This is a big challenge to define. What is 15 a complex system?
16 So we need some way when we write a 17 regulation that translates those subjective terms into 18 something like that's a more crisp sort of yes or no.
19 If you meet this criteria, you're allowed to do AERI.
20 If not, something else. That's been a big challenge 21 for us.
22 But anyway, that enables the use of the 23 AERI process in lieu of a PRA if the entry conditions 24 are met. (Audio interference.)
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53 With that, next slide. Why did we 1
actually revise the entry conditions? Well, some 2
stakeholders commented that the current ones, the ones 3
that we presented at the subcommittee meeting, were 4
overly conservative.
5 And by that, what seems to be meant is 6
that we were screening out plants that should be 7
allowed to perform an AERI in lieu of a PRA. Of 8
course, the way that the entry conditions are 9
structured is anybody can perform a PRA. That's 10 always the option.
11 AERI would only be needed if they met the 12 certain conditions and didn't want to invest in doing 13 the PRA. I fully recognize PRAs can be enormously 14 time-consuming and resource-intensive. I personally 15 done about 40 in my career.
16 On top of what we have in the various 17 industry consensus standards that tell us how to 18 review PRAs, it's quite laborious at times. The 19 intent behind AERI is necessarily don't need to bring 20 all of that mechanism into play.
21 Second thing is that we re-examine the 22 scoping calculations that Keith Compton presented to 23 you at the subcommittee meeting. And I came to 24 realize, remember those earlier AERI entry conditions 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
54 were fixated on trying to dose at a 100 meters met 1
certain criteria.
2 And I looked at it and began to realize 3
that was probably an inadequate predictor of the 4
overall risk. Specifically, if you've got elevated 5
plans or buoyant releases.
6 And with the result that even though you 7
could have met the entry conditions, you can be --
8 sometimes the conditional risk would be well above the 9
QHOs, could be well below the QHOs. So we're trying 10 to reduce the variability. Last and not least --
11 MEMBER KIRCHNER: If I might add too, we 12 recently renewed methodology for EPZ sizing and we 13 came to the same -- not the exact same conclusion, but 14 you could have situations where a close in dose at 100 15 meters just like this entry level condition might not 16 be the best metric of evaluating EPZs, sizing.
17 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I appreciate that. I 18 realize the AERI entry conditions are dependent on the 19 sizing of the EPZ or other aspects. But yes, it's a 20 technical problem, and I'll show you a slide in just 21 a minute. Last but not least, just the desire to 22 provide increased flexibility and how you demonstrate 23 the AERI entry conditions are met.
24 Next slide.
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55 These are the revised AERI entry 1
conditions. You'll notice in Paragraph A in this 2
language, we have eliminated this notion of dose at 3
100 meters and replaced it with the notion of 4
consequence evaluated anywhere in the area between the 5
EAB or within ten miles of the EAB meets this 2.5 rem 6
criteria.
7 We replaced the language in Paragraph B to 8
specify how to identify the postulated boundaries as 9
they were found. So you'll notice the notion that you 10 need to search for all radiological sources, you need 11 to consider internal/external hazards, focus on the 12 combination, failures to get you into the bounding 13 event.
14 Last but not least, consideration of 15 various commission of various commission and omission, 16 like that. Realize in order to -- you have the 17 bounding event, one of the more of the plant's safety 18 functions have failed, had a major release going on 19 beyond the DBA like that.
20 So the intent here was to reword the entry 21 conditions being more -- I'll characterize it as 22 possibly other than do this and this and this rather 23 than, well, don't do that in the analysis. So we 24 think that it should be more effective.
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56 Next slide.
1 MEMBER PETTI: I'm a little confused. I 2
also thought there was language in that about you 3
could take credit for some inherent safety functions.
4 And there was also discussion of the self-reliant 5
mitigating facility as an entry requirement. That's 6
all gone now?
7 MR. STUTZKE: Well, the self-reliant 8
mitigation facility that enables the use of GLROs, 9
that was really never in the original condition. What 10 we said was if you met the original AERI entry 11 condition plus other criteria, then you would be 12 deemed a self-reliant facility.
13 MEMBER HALNON: It's the other way around, 14 Dave.
15 MEMBER PETTI: It's the other way around.
16 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, it's the other way 17 around.
18 MR. SEYMOUR: This is Jesse Seymour. On 19 the last slides, I'm not sure how it plugs in, but the 20 actual self-reliant mitigation designation happens 21 over in 53.800 --
22 MEMBER PETTI: Okay, because I could 23 imagine there's a plant -- this is a hazard-based 24 criteria if I understood that.
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57 MR. SEYMOUR: Correct.
1 MEMBER PETTI: But I can imagine there are 2
some designs that are not necessarily fully meet the 3
self-reliant definition but clearly would meet the 4
AERI. That's still a lot.
5 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. When we get to my 6
slides, I'll explore how that works. But one thing 7
that's important to remember is even a plant that 8
meets AERI when it enters into those criteria, it 9
still has other criteria that have to be met.
10 Specifically, for defense in-depth, that's not tied to 11 credited human action. Again, there's more to being 12 a GLRO self-reliant mitigation facility than just 13 meeting AERI by itself.
14 MEMBER PETTI: Yes, I understood that.
15 I'm talking -- I'm looking at the exact opposite. I 16 don't want to do a GLRO, but I want to do AERI. I 17 have a plant that I'm pretty sure can get into these 18 entry conditions.
19 But because of the restrictive nature of 20 the definition of self-reliant mitigating facility, 21 it's very gray whether or not I need human action 22 based on some aspects of the design. But they're 23 still allowed to do a more streamlined AERI approach.
24 I've seen some microreactor designs that may actually 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
58 be in that campus.
1 MR. STUTZKE: Next slide, Liz.
2 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Dave, may I make an 3
observation. That last slide, Marty, this is very 4
good to hear. I'm making a mental note that you're --
5 sorry, I can't read with or without glasses. When you 6
have A and B for -- in terms of guidance for 7
evaluating EPZ sizes. This is a very good, distinct 8
way to go about evaluating a proposed EPZ. Just 9
making an observation, thank you. Keep going.
10 MR. STUTZKE: Next slide, please. This 11 points to the results of the MACCS calculations. I 12 drew this cartoon to explain things to my managers 13 like this. The idea is simple. Hot air rises. But 14 we get some energy into the plume even though it's at 15 a ground release that actually rises up over the 100-16 meter reference point with the -- what MACCS was 17 telling us was that the major event of the largest 18 dose in the ten-mile area was around four to five to 19 six miles depending on how much energy you put in the 20 plume.
21 And of course, the area is bigger, so more 22 people are exposed to that higher dose, it was raising 23 the conditional risk, like that. It's obvious in 24 retrospect, but being said, the presumption that I had 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
59 used before with my back-of-the-envelope type of 1
calculation was, well, obviously the further away you 2
move from the reactor, the dose should go down, right?
3 But that's not necessarily the case.
4 We found that it can -- varying answers by 5
an order or two of magnitude. So the intent was, as 6
shown in the graphic on the left-hand side, it was to 7
limit the maximum dose anywhere within the annuals.
8 And that should work. But we're in the process of 9
doing a bit more confirmatory counts and things like 10 that.
11 Next slide.
12 So what MACCS scoping calculations were 13 telling us was if you get a 25 rem lifetime dose, 14 nominally 50 years, then the conditional individual 15 early fatality risk over that ten-mile region from the 16 EAB outward generally would meet 2x10-6 per event.
17 And assuming one of them appeared, then you've 18 demonstrated at least the QHOs.
19 Moreover, the MACCS scoping calculations 20 were telling us the first year dose seemed to be the 21 controlling or the limiting dose. In other words, you 22 meet 2.5 rem the first year, you're going to meet 25 23 rem over the lifetime due to various reasons.
24 Radioactive decay, weathering, groundshine, stuff like 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
60 that.
1 The second point here is 2.5 rem, let's 2
say, almost coincidentally is a small fraction, 10 3
percent, of the traditional dose limits that have been 4
used in Part 100 and over in 5034.
5 What we're trying to say here is if you 6
meet the AERI entry conditions, 2.5 rem over the first 7
year, you've met the 25 rem, at the worst two-hour 8
interval at the EAB, and you've met the 25 rem over 9
the duration of a (audio interference).
10 Converse is not true, however. So this is 11 an indication of how the AERI conditions restricts 12 itself. In other words, not every plant would be 13 eligible to perform an AERI.
14 MEMBER HALNON: Marty, this is Greg. The 15 ten miles, is that intended to have any similarity to 16 the ten-mile EPZ issues in Part 150?
17 MR. STUTZKE: The answer is no. It's 18 purely coincidental.
19 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. I would hope that 20 in the guidance you would make sure that people don't 21 confuse the two, especially with the new --
22 MR. STUTZKE: You're not the first one to 23 point this out. Actually, when the safety goals were 24 first formulated, it was a 50-mile radius. There was 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
61 big debate that your average (audio interference) 1 people closer would get more dose than --
2 MEMBER HALNON: It's a nominal issue --
3 (Simultaneous speaking.)
4 MEMBER HALNON: -- based on counties and 5
jurisdictions.
6 MR. STUTZKE: Right.
7 MEMBER HALNON: So just make sure that 8
that's clear in your guidance.
9 MR. STUTZKE: Will do. Next slide. As 10 I mentioned before, the AERI entry conditions not only 11 used to determine when an AERI can be performed in 12 lieu of a PRA. They're also used to consider when you 13 need to meet requirements for the mitigation beyond 14 design-basis event and combustible gas control.
15 As Jesse just commented, and certain 16 people will elaborate further, in combination with 17 other conditions the AERI entry conditions are used to 18 define when a plant is a self-reliant mitigation 19 facility.
20 But one of those things that I would 21 emphasize here that actually seemed to be confusing 22 among the staff is just because you perform an AERI, 23 you're not relieved from meeting all the other 24 requirements in Framework B. It is not like a maximum 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
62 hypothetical accident. Everything still applies to 1
you.
2 In other words, you need to have a bunch 3
of design criteria, et cetera, et cetera, like this.
4 And as I mentioned before on the second bullet there, 5
some applicants may elect to perform a PRA even if 6
they meet the AERI entry.
7 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg again. The 8
question comes in if they decide to do a PRA right 9
after an AERI, they still must have GLROs, even though 10 they meet the AERI condition. And maybe that's a 11 question for Jesse later on.
12 MR.
SEYMOUR:
When I
display The 13 comparison of Framework B and the criteria that are 14 there, it will show the comparison between non-AERI 15 and AERI facilities. I think that will make it more 16 clear than if someone were to come in and all that, 17 simply to do a PRA. There should be a reasonable 18 pathway for them --
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: The sub-bullet there 20 strikes me as a little bit -- I get the point you're 21 making, but what if a self -- a facility, a commercial 22 nuclear power plant, let me use the right terminology, 23 comes into you and meets the self-reliant mitigation 24 facility criteria but opts to have a senior reactor 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
63 operator and licensed reactor operators?
1 Why couldn't they do that? Because they 2
feel that your process for SROs and ROs is a higher 3
level of reliability in terms of protecting their 4
investment. This sub-bullet seems to say you must 5
have GLROs because you're a self-reliant facility.
6 Why would you ever turn anyone down and say, we want 7
a senior reactor operator and licensed reactor 8
operators --
9 MR. SEYMOUR: This is Jesse Seymour again.
10 It's a good question. What I can say is that in 11 earlier versions of the language, it was structured as 12 an alternative, that a facility that met those 13 requirements had the alternative using generally-14 licensed operators, meaning specifically licensed SROs 15 and ROs.
16 We did make a change later on based upon 17 some internal reviews for the work that we did to make 18 a clean demarcation between the two types of 19 facilities. And some of the language has been adapted 20 over time has attempted to make a more clear class 21 distinction between the facilities that fall on one 22 side of the line and the other.
23 A big driver for that in the nature of the 24 Atomic Energy Act and the language that's used in the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
64 Atomic Energy Act regarding the prescribing of 1
uniformed conditions for operator licensing for 2
various classes of reactors.
3 So in order to provide an alternative to 4
have this new generally-licensed operator, we had to 5
define a class to maintain uniformity. It becomes 6
problematic to try to allow multiple types of 7
operators fall within the same class of facility. So 8
again, there had to be a clear demarcation.
9 Something that, and I think Bill Reckley 10 had said this well before. In order to meet the 11 criteria to be deemed a self-reliant mitigation 12 facility, it is the designer that's going to have to 13 make the case for that.
14 Whether or not they elect to put the time 15 and effort into fully fleshing out that case to 16 achieve that designation is going to be something that 17 falls upon them. Again, I think I'll just leave that 18 right there. But there is time and legwork that will 19 have to come in to achieving that bar.
20 MR. STUTZKE: Okay. Next slide, please.
21 You had seen this before at the 22 subcommittee about the generally organization of DG-14 23 and 13, which is the identification of the licensing 24 events. I would just point out again, it applies not 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
65 only to Part 53 but also apply to Parts 50 and 52 like 1
that.
2 So it's a general purpose methodology like 3
this, which continued to make informing changes and 4
editorial changes to both these DGs based on comments 5
we've received during the subcommittee like this. We 6
will be hanging on every word that goes on this 7
afternoon to try to get a leg up.
8 As she had pointed it out, there's not a 9
lot of time, and the holidays are approaching. My 10 characterization of the situation, at least my team 11 that's developing this, is like right standard rudder, 12 all engine flank. We're moving fast, trying to be 13 responsible, but it is challenging.
14 Next slide.
15 Final one, again on DG-14 for the actual 16 AERI methodology guidance like that. Nothing new here 17 again. We're continuing to refine it like this.
18 Pointing out we changed the title from framework to 19 methodology because we'll be using the key language.
20 We tried Framework A and Framework B, and then we had 21 an AERI framework. And it's like, man, this is --
22 it's confusing.
23 Did that, and again the box down at the 24 bottom, it's like, well, you may always decide to 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
66 develop a PRA and it's my plug for my 40-some odd year 1
career of doing PRAs. Great. And further provides a 2
way to take advantage of risk-informed initiatives, 3
this manages completion
- times, risk-informed 4
categorizations, things like that. Anyway, hope I 5
left you enough time, Jesse.
6 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. Thanks, Marty. I 7
appreciate it.
8 Liz, can we move to the next slide, 9
please.
10 Okay, so as mentioned before, my name is 11 Jesse Seymour. I'm an operator licensing examiner and 12 human factors technical reviewer in NRR.
13 I'll be providing a follow-up on a recent 14 subcommittee presentation which both myself and other 15 technical staff from NRR and DRO provided an update on 16 rule language and overview of key guidance.
17 We intend to support the overall Part 53 18 framework within the specific areas of operating 19 licensing. Human factors, engineering, and operator 20 staffing.
21 Our updates on the status of Part 53 rule 22 language that we covered at the October 19th meeting 23 included how we consolidated our Framework A and B 24 requirements using a common sublanguage for Subpart F, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
67 and how we had expanded the provisions for generally-1 licensed reactor operator staffing to include pathways 2
under both Frameworks A and B for both AERI and non-3 AERI facilities as well.
4 We also discussed how we had elected to 5
retain the same provisions for on-shift engineering 6
expertise, namely in the form of to grade individuals 7
possessing plant familiarity.
8 Additionally, my colleagues and I provided 9
overviews or draft guidance documents covering the 10 review of operator licensing examination programs, the 11 review of staffing plans, and for developing scalable 12 human factors engineering review plans.
13 Today, I'd like to provide some additional 14 discussion regarding a number of points that have been 15 raised by the Committee members at that meeting.
16 Liz, we can move to the next slide, 17 please.
18 So within the general topic of operator 19 licensing, the numbers raised several points that I 20 would like to speak to here. It was asked that we 21 give further consideration to some form of regulatory 22 approval that would precede the licensing of 23 generally-licensed reactor operators.
24 This is a general matter that has been 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
68 carefully considered during the overall development of 1
that particular licensing framework. In considering 2
those, we've taken into account the programs used to 3
train and examine. Generally-licensed reactor 4
operators would need to go undergo NRC approval and 5
are intended to be subject to ongoing inspection 6
thereafter.
7 Additionally, facilities will be required 8
to maintain and administer the processes associated 9
with generally-licensed operator training and 10 qualifications as an enforceable condition of their 11 facility license.
12 Under 53805, GLROs will also be subject to 13 relevant requirements of Part 26 and Part 73 as they 14 relate in part to matters of behavioral observation 15 and site access.
16 Importantly while the nature of general 17 licensing would make certain features of individual 18 licensing problematic, such as would be the case if we 19 would attempt to incorporate a mechanism to approve 20 each individual becoming a GLRO, there is no 21 comparable difficulty to taking enforcement action 22 against individual GLROs once they're in the position.
23 And the necessary mechanisms for taking 24 that enforcement action on an individual basis have 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
69 been incorporated into the revisions of 53810.
1 MEMBER HALNON: Jesse, this is Greg. In 2
the interest of time, I'll just go through what the 3
concern is and try to state it clearly. When we went 4
to the certified operator program, we lowered the bar 5
pretty far, in our opinion, on the pedigree of the 6
individual.
7 Not necessarily the training, but we 8
agreed that the training and everything was going to 9
be okay with the pedigree of the individual. So you 10 brought in a GLRO which answered the accountability 11 issues and the enforcement issues and the authority of 12 the federal licensing issues.
13 But I still think the bar is low when you 14 allow a licensee to train somebody, put them on a list 15
- say, you're now
- licensed, without any NRC 16 verification -- at least the paperwork is all it said.
17 The medical is all done. Everything else is done.
18 So that's why we've made the comment that 19 at least get a verification that before a person 20 starts licensed duties that there is a federal 21 acknowledgment and verification that that person has 22 completed the necessary stuff.
23 Obviously not to the level of an SRO and 24 RO licensed person, but at least a verification by the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
70 federal government. So that's the point that we were 1
trying to make is -- and out of all the people on the 2
Committee, you would expect me to say, give the 3
industry maximum flexibility since that's where I came 4
from. So take note. I think that that's too low 5
still.
6 MR. SEYMOUR: I appreciate the comments.
7 Something that I would speak to, and I understand that 8
perception on this is probably going to be -- that's 9
a reactive after-the-fact thing is that the mechanisms 10 that are being deployed at the level of facility to 11 ensure that people are suitable to be placed on that 12 list are going to be subject to ongoing inspection 13 enforcement.
14 Again, if it's in inappropriately, that 15 will be something that's enforceable against the 16 facility licensee. Again, does that alleviate your 17 dominant concern there, which I understand people get 18 onto that list in the first place absent of that 19 check.
20 What I can say is that that's something 21 that we've considered pretty carefully. Something 22 that I would offer too is your concern, and I guess 23 just to kind of parse that out a little bit more, is 24 your concern primarily that there's going to be some 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
71 type of malfeasance on the part of the plants or just 1
an oversight?
2 MEMBER HALNON: Yes. There may be other 3
pressures, commercial pressures, other things that are 4
driving an increased union pressures, other things 5
that might be driving a more robust list than what 6
could be done.
7 Tell me that you've never had any operator 8
training malfeasance in the present system, and I 9
would say, don't worry about it. Clearly, we have.
10 Especially with new licensees coming in, some of the 11 folks that may not have a lot of experience operating 12 in the nuclear regulatory world.
13 MEMBER BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
14 I've not read the enforcement part of (audio 15 interference) but what does enforcement mean? What do 16 you do? As part of enforcement, could you take over 17 the process of certifying the GLROs, for example.
18 Could that be one of the enforcement actions which 19 would basically take care of that problem?
20 MEMBER HALNON: I think we were talking, 21 Ron, of individual enforcement and the accountability 22 of the individual.
23 MEMBER BALLINGER: Oh, okay. Sorry.
24 MEMBER HALNON: The overall enforcement is 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
72 always there with the inspection for the licensee but 1
the individual is what we were talking about.
2 MEMBER BIER: The other thing is my sense, 3
and this is something I haven't looked at for a really 4
long time, but if lines haven't been updated, they may 5
be by now kind of negligible and cost of doing 6
business.
7 MR. SEYMOUR: With regards to the overall 8
enforcement, again just to clarify. The mechanisms 9
are there to take enforcement action against both the 10 facility licensee and against individuals who are 11 covered under that general license.
12 If you go into the actual language that we 13 use under 53810, one of the provisions that's built in 14 there is to actually suspend the ability of 15 individuals to be covered under the general license.
16 Again, we apply comparable conditions of 17 license to those individuals in many regards is what 18 we will see with senior reactor operators and reactor 19 operators. And we retain that capability to disallow 20 any given individual on top of anything else in terms 21 of individual enforcement to disallow any given any 22 individual to be recovered by the general license.
23 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. Just one 24 last point is I would think that many, not all, of the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
73 enforcement actions taken against individuals are 1
post-event issues, in a reactionary -- you might have 2
some with medical paperwork and other things that are 3
caused, but it's going to be post-event. So the 4
reactionary piece should be in quotes.
5 MR. SEYMOUR: There's a point that I would 6
like to make. Again, this is Jesse. I understand the 7
need for time. I will definitely move on. What I 8
want to point out too is that when we look at things 9
that we do that are proactive vs reactive.
10 I don't know if this is necessarily 11 articulated anywhere. Something that's been a factor 12 that should anchor thinking is what is the scale of 13 the safety impact that's associated. And in the case 14 of the senior reactor operators and reactor operators, 15 the staff facilities that aren't meeting this bar to 16 be considered a self-reliant mitigation facility.
17 We see their role as being one where they 18 could be called upon to substantially influence the 19 safety outcome of the public. So in that case, we 20 don't see a reactive only approach as being sufficient 21 to provide public confidence.
22 In the case of generally-licensed reactor 23 operators, we're talking about facilities that have 24 entered into a different class by meeting more 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
74 stringent safety criteria. And because of that, 1
again, adopting a primarily reactive stance is 2
something that we feel would be justifiable based 3
upon, again, that comparative safety context.
4 MEMBER HALNON: Okay, and I think there's 5
room in between. I think maybe you should look at 6
even a -- much like what we do when we send a package 7
to the NRC and hear nothing in 90 days, you're on the 8
list or something to that effect. So there's room in 9
between, however, some of that oversight (audio 10 interference.)
11 MR. SEYMOUR: Thank you, and I captured 12 your comment.
13 MEMBER PETTI: Matt, did you have a 14 comment?
15 MEMBER SUNSERI: I did, but it was 16 addressed. I was going to bring us to the point of 17 the enforcement is reactive. What we're talking about 18 is proactively reviewing the candidates before they 19 assume duty, so I think it's been covered. Thanks.
20 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.
21 So another area that we were asked to 22 further discuss was how changes to the licensed 23 operator tasks stemming from plant modifications that 24 translate into adjustments to the examination (audio 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
75 interference) appropriate modifications to the 1
facilities. Kind of a two-edged comment there that 2
raised some really interesting points.
3 So first, I would like to say that our 4
overall approach, which spans everything going from 5
the original systems approach to training-based 6
operator training program all the way through the tail 7
end of the process of licensing examination itself has 8
to be constructed so as to balance the flexibility and 9
inherent adaptability of the (audio interference) 10 process with a need for holding the standard of a 11 comprehensive and rigorous examination process.
12 In that regard, it's important to point 13 out that we make a distinction between the complete 14 body of mass an operator needs to know, which is 15 addressed more flexibly. And specifically, that's 16 something that we cover under guidance that has not 17 gone before the Committee up to this point. That is 18 training program review guidance. That addresses that 19 broader body of knowledge.
20 Again, that's something that we see the 21 SAP (phonetic) process that's adapting as the needs of 22 the facility and of the operators change. That is 23 distinct from our body with specific knowledge and 24 abilities that have significant importance of 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
76 fulfillments of duties that having nexus to safety or 1
an important administrative nature. So again, a 2
smaller subset.
3 Tighter controls are imposed upon changes 4
to that latter pool of material because of the need to 5
ensure the content domain for the licensing 6
examination is neither permitted to exclude essential 7
material nor to become too dilute and thus fail to 8
examine important topics.
9 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. I think the 10 design control process adequately (audio interference) 11 next to the training program given in today's world, 12 you go through a checklist, you make sure that there's 13 no changes to the program. If there is, you establish 14 a rapport with the training staff who will fix it.
15 I think the plan was is that there's a 16 breakpoint where you do a modification where you cease 17 to be a self-reliant mitigation facility. What is the 18 check and balance to ensure that going forward, the 19 training is within the regulatory framework?
20 Because if you can't say that you're a 21 self-reliant mitigation facility, you can't have 22 GLROs. You have to have SROs and ROs. Is that a 23 concern, that breakpoint? Or are you going to 24 continue to -- once you, at the beginning of design, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
77 you establish GLROs and you're there forever 1
regardless?
2 MR. SEYMOUR: This is something we've come 3
around to a few times in the past. It is complicated, 4
right, because it raises issues of finality and some 5
other aspects as well, too. The first aspect that I 6
would like to point out is that when that issue 7
arises, there is a change to an analysis.
8 And Bill Reckley has made good points on 9
this on the past, too. A change to analysis, plant 10 modification or something that shifts that nature of 11 the operator with respect to ensuring acceptable 12 safety outcomes.
13 The owner-operator, the designer, whoever 14 that party may be, they're going to have to make a 15 decision in terms of how do you address that. Do you 16 address it via a system, or do you address it via 17 person, right?
18 You go ahead and take a design approach 19 that keeps the person in that role that they 20 previously were. Or do you take the approach of now 21 relying upon human action to mitigate the event that 22 now needs to be mitigated. So again, there's going to 23 be that initial decision point that's built in there.
24 Another factor that comes into play too, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
78 and again this does not directly address the question.
1 By design, the senior reactor operator training and 2
licensing requirements as the Committee has now seen 3
in the guidance and the general license reactor 4
operator guidance is driven by similar methods.
5 Very, very similar in terms of finding 6
what that testable content domain is, making sure that 7
important knowledge and abilities are tested to 8
identify the competence of the individuals there.
9 There's other things that are different in terms of 10 assuming that those are there. I should say ensuring, 11 not assuming that similar mechanisms.
12 So at the end of the day, things that are 13 determined to be significant for either sets of 14 operators to do will fall within that domain to be 15 tested and examined on.
16 The final part is ultimately that the 17 Commission does retain a broad authority to impose 18 conditions on the facility licensee that are necessary 19 to provide an adequate assurance of public health and 20 safety.
21 Again, if the need arises that we have to 22 take action via issuing an order or something to that 23 effect to modify the facility license that requires 24 something different, that is a possibility. Now, we 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
79 thought through that contingency.
1 One thing that we think is a very nice 2
feature is the general similarity construct of the 3
GLRO training examination programs and the SRO 4
programs. So while there may be a need in the 5
aftermath of that to shift to an individual licensing 6
operator. Fundamental pieces of the parts of those 7
programs shouldn't be they shouldn't be 8
dramatically removed from one another. Again, it 9
would be a transition to an individual license --
10 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, I would agree, Jesse.
11 It's incremental. However, there's other things 12 besides operator actions that drag you out of the 13 self-reliant mitigation facility. It could be the 14 level of passivity in the system, it could be a 15 barrier that you're eliminating, adding to or 16 changing.
17 So there's other things that may -- it's 18 probably more of a legal question than it is an actual 19 capability question. So the mechanism of how that 20 gets caught and how it's looked at again looks 21 reactionary and then scrambling with exemptions and 22 other mechanisms to allow an interim period to the 23 license operators or continue with some kind of 24 exemption process.
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80 You're right. It's complicated, and it 1
may be one of those things that we have to have happen 2
first before we actually figure out how to deal with 3
it.
4 MEMBER BIER: If I can follow up briefly.
5 I'm less concerned about the reactive nature. Maybe 6
it's a problem, but as Greg said, sometimes you have 7
to experience it to learn from it. But more concerned 8
about just what the transition would be if, for 9
example, we discover a situation where operator 10 actions are necessary.
11 Are they then no longer considered self-12 mitigating? What's the process by which they would 13 come under the new licensing regulations? Would be 14 there a waiver, would there be a possibility of 15 saying, you can still have the GLRO with some 16 additional criteria.
17 I just want to make sure that's kind of 18 being kind of thought through in an organized manner 19 and not ad hoc panic the first time we're in that 20 situation.
21 MR. SEYMOUR: It's a good comment. I can 22 say that that's nothing that currently exists in terms 23 of a written product at this point. It's something 24 that we've had the debates about going through that 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
81 thought exercise to make sure the mechanisms are 1
there.
2 And some of what happens in the aftermath 3
with that type of thing, again, because you're getting 4
into enforcement. It becomes a legal matter. What I 5
can say is I have been involved in escalated 6
enforcement actions in the past. Not as a licensee, 7
as the regulator.
8 What has transpired in the orders that 9
I've been involved with is for certain actions 10 articulated within the order, there was a time to 11 comply with each item that was within those orders.
12 Again, that was a carefully developed product. Again, 13 to make sure that there was a reasonable to come into 14 compliance that was commensurate with the nature of 15 what was going on.
16 Again, the Commission can issue a shutdown 17 order. Again, if there's something that's completely 18 unacceptable. We could do that. In other contexts, 19 we allow a timeframe to come into compliance. But 20 again, that's nothing that I can say that we've gone 21 through and specifically penned a paper on.
22 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Members, we've got five 23 minutes left. We still have slides, and we have 24 public comments today. We're supposed to be done at 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
82 10:30, so quick answers to understand things and quick 1
responses, please. Thank you.
2 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Yes.
3 So a further topic of discussion was how 4
the GLRO criteria interrelate with the AERI criteria.
5 And as Marty Stutzke has already provided an overview 6
of AERI, I'd like to illustrate on the next slide how 7
those criteria fit into determining which plants would 8
and would not be staffed by generally-licensed reactor 9
operators.
10 Liz, if we could move to the next slide, 11 please.
12 So this slide summarizes the GLRO 13 criteria. So again, the criteria that determine 14 whether or not a plant is a self-reliant mitigation 15 facility as they apply across Part 53 in its entirety.
16 The gray column on the left lists certain 17 principles that we identify as being appropriate to 18 inform this operator licensing staffing related 19 threshold during our earlier work that preceded us 20 actually sitting down and drafting the Part 53 21 requirements.
22 These principles should be viewed as 23 initial guidelines for the development of the 24 associated criteria that ultimately needed to be 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
83 balanced against matters, practicality and certain 1
pragmatic considerations such as the overall magnitude 2
of radiological hazard and other factors.
3 The second column in pink summarizes the 4
criteria and how they were applied within Framework A.
5 So again, the Framework A criteria are in the pink 6
column. These criteria are heavily intertwined with 7
revisions of Subparts B and C. Another key point is 8
that they also incorporate the insights gained via a 9
PRA.
10 The third column in green shows the 11 criteria for Framework B facilities that do not meet 12 the criteria for an AERI and instead a conduct PRA.
13 So again, I think this speaks to an earlier question 14 here. So if we just follow that green column all the 15 way to the bottom, that illustrates that.
16 As can be seen while there aren't 17 differences in what certain requirements are mapped to 18 and how certain criteria are structured, the overall 19 requirements between the pink and green columns, so 20 again Framework A and the non-AERI PRA-based Framework 21 B, generally mapped to one another.
22 Again, we had to adapt where things point 23 to in some cases. We had to align other requirements 24 to achieve the same thing. In the case of defense in-25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
84 depth, we actually had to craft a standalone defense 1
in-depth requirement because we didn't have an 2
equivalent to Framework A's provisional Framework B.
3 But again, in general, the two mirror each other from 4
a philosophic approach.
5 MEMBER HALNON: Jesse, let me help you 6
just move along here. Let me just very briefly 7
summarize our comment, and we can probably move on.
8 We just wanted to make sure that you walk 9
through each of the criteria and make consistent the 10 terms that you're using. Sometimes we'll use 11 credibly, reliable, sometimes we use human actions 12 credited, sometimes we use interface -- you know, 13 introduce the passive with caveats, sometimes single 14 barriers, and AERI brings in those criteria.
15 So just walk through that language and 16 make sure that it's the way you want it and it's 17 consistent. It feels like different people wrote 18 different portions of it. That's really the only 19 comment. We don't have any issues with the criteria.
20 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.
21 MEMBER PETTI: I'm still confused a little 22 bit. You can meet the GLRO criteria under AERI 23 without this human action. There's no words in 34II 24 that says that you have to do stuff without credited 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
85 human action. Is that correct?
1 MR. SEYMOUR: So under the modified AERI 2
criteria, it is true that the way you meet the 3
qualification has changed. Again, I offer that I 4
don't want to infringe on Marty's wording that's 5
there. But an important point to keep in mind is 6
this.
7 In identifying that bounding event, one of 8
the things that has to be considered are the influence 9
of credible human errors commission and omission. In 10 doing that, and also looking at combinations of system 11 failures and so forth, you have to show that bounding 12 events, and again, Marty, please interrupt if I 13 misspeak.
14 But that, quote-unquote, kind of worse 15 case event that drives everything still falls under a 16 very conservative radiological dose criteria. Again, 17 set at 2.5 rem. So in that case, what we had to do 18 was take a bit more of a open-minded stance in looking 19 at what is it reasonable to draw the line at here.
20 What I will say is the new AERI criteria, 21 that's something that's very fresh to us. Again, just 22 last week we started looking at that. And we are 23 still digesting that and considering its 24 appropriateness.
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86 As can be seen here, we already stack an 1
additional defense in-depth criteria on top of the 2
AERI qualification. And we certainly can add 3
additional provisions to the GLRO criteria that are 4
added on top of just meeting AERI.
5 So again, as we go through and we further 6
evaluate that, we do basically preserve that ongoing 7
work that's still there that we may opt to say we need 8
to put a restriction against crediting human action in 9
any way, shape or form or something to that effect.
10 MEMBER HALNON: So Dave, in 34AA IIE 11 connects to, and says you can't use operator action to 12 meet the dose criteria --
13 MEMBER PETTI: So, I'm confused. I'm 14 going by his latest language he showed us today. The 15 stuff that we got, the subcommittee has changed. That 16 language isn't --
17 MEMBER HALNON: That wasn't the dose 18 criteria. Not on the B side which says you have to go 19 and meet that without human action.
20 MEMBER PETTI: In the table, does it --
21 doesn't incline enough for me. There's still a 22 requirement of meeting stuff without human action.
23 MEMBER HALNON: In bigger letter B, this 24 is big letter A. The only language had dose criteria 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
87 and then the criteria how you had to make that dose 1
criteria, which was part of it was passive and other 2
things with no credit or human action. So they 3
changed the dose criteria, but you guys didn't change 4
big letter B.
5 (Simultaneous speaking.)
6 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, in fact we did. What 7
we said was --
8 MEMBER HALNON: Now, I'm confused.
9 MR. STUTZKE: What it now says that you 10 have to consider them when you're defining the 11 bounding events.
12 MEMBER HALNON: You have to consider the 13 human actions --
14 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, the human actions while 15 you're defining that bounding event. Not that you're 16 prohibited from having --
17 MEMBER HALNON: So it just amplifies my 18 comment. Walk through that and make sure that you got 19 some consistent language requirements.
20 MR. STUTZKE: Absolutely.
21 MEMBER HALNON: And that's something that 22 we continue to look at. Something that I do want to 23 put out there that gives us a reason to think through 24 this very carefully is this. Fundamentals in the AERI 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
88 qualification. Drawing a very conservative line for 1
the radiological hazard.
2 Again, set at 2.5 rem, which to keep it in 3
perspective is half of the occupational dose limit 4
that we established. So again, just keeping it in the 5
30,000-foot view.
6 And the other thing that we do is we say 7
for that event that caused that limiting radiological 8
dose, again, you have to show that you considered how 9
those human errors of doing things you shouldn't do or 10 not doing things that you're required to do 11 contributed into that and taking it into consideration 12 and so forth.
13 The last piece of it, and again is that we 14 still retain the defense in-depth requirement. What 15 we say is irrespective of that, you still have to 16 provide for a layered defense in-depth scheme that 17 doesn't have dependence on any single barrier or any 18 reliance on credited human action right there.
19 Again, that helps us to account for things 20 like uncertainties in the analysis. And again, the 21 potential that via reliance on this AERI approach that 22 perhaps there is human action embedded in there 23 somewhere. So again, an outside barrier.
24 MEMBER PETTI: I'm just looking at the new 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
89 criteria. That opens up the door a lot. MHTGI 1
(phonetic) would meet that criteria in spades. That 2
PRA claim one rem at the site boundary, which is like 3
300 meters.
4 I always thought AERI as sort of 5
microreactors, but that dose criteria is going to open 6
it up a little bit. So now you're going to have 7
larger systems that have grown more complex that can 8
meet the dose criteria potentially. You have to think 9
about this a little bit. I always envisioned it as 10 the smaller micros not these bigger sort of 11 intermediate-sized things that could be the case.
12 MR. SEYMOUR: Again, just going through 13 and making sure we covered everything here. I think 14 we have covered what we needed to talk about. Again, 15 I do appreciate the comments. But I'd like to go 16 ahead, for the sake of time, and just to move to onto 17 the slide.
18 (Pause.)
19 MR. SEYMOUR: I just want to silence this 20 alarm so it doesn't go off again. My apologies for 21 that.
22 So now, this is my final slide, what I'd 23 like to do is finally I'd like to address several 24 points that were raised regarding operational staffing 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
90 by the members.
1 First, a concern was raised that the 2
preliminary proposed framework would potentially for 3
allow for plants with no operators at all. So I want 4
to reiterate a point that I made in the past that 5
there is no allowance for zero-operator staffing 6
within this framework.
7 And that even in the least restrictive 8
conceivable iteration of where this would pan out, the 9
staffing requirements would still place a licensed 10 individual in a position of cognizance of a plant 11 operations at all times during the operating phase 12 while the reactor is fueling.
13 Another point that was raised that asked 14 us to give further consideration to the engineering 15 expertise degree requirement and whether factors like 16 experience would serve as a surrogate for that 17 educational requirement.
18 This is a point that we in NRR DRO have 19 given deep consideration to. And as the members will 20 recall back a year ago, we actually began our Part 53 21 work from a standpoint of looking to not carry forward 22 the role that was akin to a traditional shift 23 technical advisor.
24 However in the course of our work, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
91 including our consideration of the Committee's past 1
letters, we ultimately settled upon the stance that an 2
appropriately-degreed individual can complement and 3
augment the plant operation's experience of an 4
operating crew in a way that helps serve as a counter 5
to the uncertainties that may accompany the 6
introduction of new reactor technologies.
7 Building upon that perspective, we sought 8
to temper this requirement with new flexibility in how 9
it's met, and we feel that the end result represents 10 something that is both modern and relevant.
11 Another facet of the engineering expertise 12 role that we were asked to consider was the adequacy 13 of the training requirements provided for under our 14 framework. As noted in the prior meeting, this is 15 achieved in a manner that is twofold.
16 First, personnel requirements of 53830 17 would include individuals fulfilling the engineering 18 expertise role as an example of who would be covered 19 by a systems approach training-based training process.
20 Again, building upon that further, our 21 staffing plan review guidance then lists specific 22 topical content for the reviewer to check within such 23 programs, including areas like reactive theory plant 24 systems, accident analysis and mitigating core damage, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
92 again, specific to individuals in that engineering 1
expertise role.
2 A separate concern that was raised was 3
related to the possibility for engineering expertise 4
that is being provided remotely to be rendered 5
unavailable by way of disruption of communications.
6 On this point, I want to reinforce that making sure of 7
the engineering expertise role is supportive in an 8
advisory nature that is neither directive or 9
mitigative.
10
- Thus, the unavailability of the 11 engineering expertise role should have no direct 12 bearing on whether or not any given plan event could 13 be successfully mitigated from a standpoint of 14 credited response.
15 The final point that I would like to 16 address is the concern of the requirements within the 17 portions of Subpart F of the consideration here might 18 allow for remote operations.
19 Here, I want to be clear in our intention 20 that we only intend that the framework that we've 21 established for staffing and human factors engineering 22 operator license training is capable of adaptation in 23 the future concepts of operations without the need for 24 subsequent modification via rulemaking.
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93 To that end, we have merely crafted 1
requirements that are capable of addressing a wide 2
spectrum of operational approaches. Whether or not 3
remote operations will be one of them remains a 4
broader issue that is simply beyond the scope of this 5
limited subset of Subpart F to enable or otherwise 6
address with sufficiency. That's my final slide, so 7
turning it over to Jordan unless there's any 8
questions.
9 CHAIRMAN REMPE: So autonomous operation 10 is brought up in the past. There were documents that 11 are regulatory documents that basically said we don't 12 have to deal with this now because there's other 13 documents that say you can't do it. Now you're saying 14 the rule language is going to allow this? And are 15 those other documents not going to hold?
16 And I didn't bring the references with me.
17 I know, Matt, you came up with some that you sent out 18 and I found some others. What's the story here? Are 19 those documents still valid or not?
20 MR. SEYMOUR: The point that I was simply 21 trying to make is that just from the Subpart F 22 operational requirements that we talked about, they're 23 built to be adaptable to a wide range of --
24 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Right now, those others 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
94 documents hold autonomous operation is not allowed?
1 MR. SEYMOUR: So I would say is that you 2
could build a reactor that was autonomous, our 3
requirements are still going to say have at least a 4
generally-licensed reactor operator in a position of 5
oversight with certain indications, the ability to 6
shut down the reactor, all the things that we 7
articulate. We don't allow for any reactor to be 8
unattended and unsupervised, if that makes sense.
9 CHAIRMAN REMPE: I think what your answer 10 is, is yes, we don't allow autonomous operation at 11 this time. I can't get a yes or no.
12 (Laughter.)
13 MR. SEYMOUR: It's not trying to give an 14 opaque answer. What it is is the ability for a 15 reactor to operate itself autonomously is independent 16 from its ability to be allowed to do that in a 17 completely unsupervised way.
18 Again, if the reactor runs itself, what it 19 does it takes the operator from being a hands-on role 20 and shifts them, in a human factors engineering 21 perspective, what we consider to be a position of 22 supervisory control.
23 Again, it moves the role of the operator 24 to oversight. But again, the two are -- again, I know 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
95 it's kind of mincing words and so forth. There's 1
nothing that would preclude you from building a 2
reactor that could operate itself. Our rules say 3
that's nice, but someone will always be in a position 4
of oversight having cognizance over that reactor --
5 MEMBER BROWN: That means on-site as 6
opposed to be in New York City while the city is 7
operating in North Alaska?
8 MR. SEYMOUR: So our requirements, and 9
again I'm just talking about our limited subset 10 Subpart F, is neutral on the location of those 11 individuals. Again, that's by design so we can adapt 12 to future concepts --
13 MEMBER BALLINGER: What you're saying is 14 15 MEMBER BROWN: My brain is fried.
16 MEMBER BALLINGER: -- you're basically 17 taking the NASA approach? The satellite that's 18 humming along out there with the reactor operating.
19 Nobody riding in that satellite, but the reactor is 20 capable of notifying somebody who is a supervisor to 21 take action remotely.
22 MR. SEYMOUR: I think a better way to 23 frame this discussion is that so you get to that point 24 of remote operation, there's other considerations that 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
96 would need to be addressed there simply beyond the 1
scope of this work.
2 A key issue, and we've talked about this 3
before, is cybersecurity. Again, that's beyond the 4
scope of our work here. I think we have Ishmael 5
Garcia (phonetic) available on the call today. If we 6
want to talk about what impediments there are there 7
and the current state of that work, that's something 8
we can pull him in on.
9 But that's not something that our 10 requirements here in Subpart F don't get over that 11 hurdle for you. So again, if someone wanted to come 12 in and do that in a way that's remote, there's other 13 things that they would have to address before they 14 could even get to where our flexibility is in that 15 regard.
16 MR. RECKLEY: Jesse, this is Bill. If I 17 can, because we talked about this a number of times.
18 Whereas the rule doesn't specifically preclude it and 19 say this is not allowed, neither does it build in how 20 we would do that review in any proposal that would 21 say, well, we're going to have remote operation, would 22 have to be reviewed, approved, go through this 23 Committee.
24 And we would have to address some of the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
97 things that, Joy, you mentioned. We are just now 1
studying how we would approach that to do the review 2
of a proposal should it ever come. But the wording in 3
the rule language does not say, this is not allowed.
4 MEMBER BALLINGER: So again, what you're 5
saying is -- fission battery. I'm using another one 6
of these microreactor examples. Someone wants to put 7
a fission battery in a steel mill, could they do it?
8 MR. SEYMOUR: So what would happen is, and 9
we're just going to say for the sake of discussion, 10 this was an inherently safe fission battery.
11 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes, all the lying that 12 they do about it. Yes.
13 (Laughter.)
14 MR. SEYMOUR: So this hypothetical, right.
15 We'll say that this would go in, that it would satisfy 16 the criteria to be a self-reliant mitigation facility 17 by virtue of its inherent safety characteristics.
18 At that point, what we would say is, okay.
19 We would then establish that somewhere. Again, we're 20 going to use leave that open to the broader 21 discussion, you have a generally-licensed reactor 22 operator. They could have oversight of more than one, 23 because we say facilities. We use the term plural; we 24 leave that open.
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98 A generally-licensed reactor operator 1
would have to have cognizance over that thing for its 2
entire operating phase. So again, there would have to 3
be someone that was in a position of oversight in a 4
continuity of responsibilities between individuals.
5 So they would be responsible for technical 6
specifications for that.
7 They would have to have indications.
8 Again, we articulate certain proposed TMI requirements 9
we've adapted what type of indication they have to 10 have. They have to get capability of shutting down 11 that fission battery from their location. They would 12 have the capability of dispatching operation and 13 maintenance personnel to that facility.
14 They would retain the administrative 15 responsibility for any notifications associated with 16 it. Maintenance controls, things of that nature. So 17 again, we're very prescriptive about the capabilities 18 that that individual would have to have. But that 19 would represent kind of the basement level.
20 Now in terms of is that practical for a 21 fission battery. What I would say is we temper that 22 by not limiting how many of those fission batteries 23 this operator might have cognizance over.
24 So it could be that, again, if you were 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
99 able to come in and make that case down the road, 1
again, if we resolve all the other issues, you know, 2
road ops (phonetic), could someone remotely be 3
monitoring a dozen of these things? That case could 4
be made.
5 Again, we leave our requirements open to 6
do that so that in the future if things to that point, 7
our requirements could adapt to that. But again, what 8
we have is just by itself insufficient on its own to 9
address the full question (audio interference.)
10 What we do is we make sure that we're 11 adaptable from a staffing standpoint, licensing 12 standpoint, from a
human factors engineering 13 standpoint, to be able to scale up and scale down and 14 to look at things differently.
15 Again, a key point. We don't focus our 16 human factors engineering requirement on the control 17 room anymore. We focus on specific locations where 18 humans fulfill plant safety functions (audio 19 interference) safety functions. Again, that's one of 20 those key things is how do you address this concept of 21 operations that a future plant might not have a 22 traditional control room.
23 We don't want to have a regulation that 24 doesn't work because they don't have a, quote-unquote, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
100 control room. So what we do is we disassociate that 1
and say what were we trying to achieve, we want the 2
human being to have the capabilities to maintain the 3
plant's safety.
4 So again, it's just the type of thing that 5
we do there. We simply try to make something that's 6
adaptable, that's broadly technology-inclusive. When 7
the other factors align, we should be able to adapt 8
our requirements in a way that supports safety.
9 MEMBER SUNSERI: This is Matt. I have a 10 comment.
11 I think this is all very reminiscent of 12 what we discussed in the subcommittee meeting the 13 other day. It seemed to me that the conclusion that 14 we walked away with and we'll likely discuss in our 15 letter report, at least discuss the potential for it 16 to be in the letter report, is if a remote operator 17 exists that meets all these criterias you're 18 describing, our recommendation is however that 19 operator provides the oversight of the facility, 20 should there be an impairment that requires that 21 operator to intervene that that same impairment does 22 not also prevent the operator from intervening. If 23 you understand what I'm saying. That's all I wanted 24 to comment on.
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101 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes, I appreciate the 1
comment. Thank you. Again, it's a valid point.
2 Again, I understand that it's something that may be in 3
the letter, and we will definitely consider that.
4 Liz, if we can move to the next slide, 5
please. I think Jordan's up.
6 MR. HOELLMAN: Yes. Hi, everyone. This 7
is Jordan Hoellman again. I'm not going to touch too 8
much on this, but I'd like to just open it up if 9
there's any questions. I know we kind of talked about 10 a number of these guidance documents in detail at the 11 subcommittee meeting.
12 The focus should be on the Part 53 column 13 there with the specific italicized documents that we 14 presented in subcommittee last month and then some 15 additional guidance documents being developed for the 16 security side in Part 26. If anyone has any questions 17 about any guidance.
18 (Pause.)
19 MEMBER PETTI: Okay, thank you.
20 Before we go to public comments, I just 21 want to thank the staff. This has be a monumental 22 effort. You step back at this stage and look at 23 what's behind us. It was a tremendous amount of 24 effort to get here. I appreciate all of the good 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
102 discussions we've had.
1 With that, we are 20 minutes behind. We 2
do have some hard stops, so I don't know how it's all 3
going to work in terms of whether we'll get the letter 4
read in before the hard start. We might not. We 5
might have to do --
6 (Simultaneous speaking.)
7 MEMBER PETTI: So, yes, let's start with 8
public comments. Please identify yourself in your 9
comment. I guess we have someone from the 10 Breakthrough Institute, so they should go first 11 because they notified us.
12 MS. FRANOVICH: Thank you. This is Rani 13 Franovich. Can you hear me?
14 MEMBER PETTI: Yes.
15 MS. FRANOVICH: Okay, thank you. Dr.
16 Rempe and ACRS members, I speak on behalf of the 17 Breakthrough Institute. It's an independent global 18 research center that identifies and promotes 19 technological solutions to environmental and human 20 development challenges.
21 The Breakthrough Institute does not 22 receive funding from industry. We believe new and 23 advanced reactors offer critical pathways to deep 24 decarbonization, and we advocate for appropriate 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
103 regulation in the licensing and oversight of reactors.
1 Nuclear power advances clean energy goals, 2
enhances environmental quality and supplies reliable 3
electricity to the transmission grid. As such, timely 4
deployment of safe, innovative and economically viable 5
designs is an urgent public interest.
6 The Breakthrough Institute has closely 7
followed the development of Part 53 and express 8
concerns and comments. The ACRS has independently 9
identified many of the same issues. Numerous concerns 10 remain unresolved and alignment with stakeholders has 11 not been achieved.
12 The ACRS plays an important role in 13 ensuring the NRC staff delivers a usable rule that 14 satisfies NEIMA. We strongly urge the ACRS to 15 recommend the Commission redirect the staff to, one, 16 expeditiously work with external stakeholders in a 17 more open, collaborative manner.
18 Two, come to agreement on unresolved 19 issues like what should be governed by regulation 20 versus guidance. And three, significantly streamline 21 the rule to be more performance-based and 22 appropriately risk-informed.
23 Timely agreement on these matters can be 24 reached if the NRC staff changes its regulatory 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
104 posture, adopts a customer service ethic, and is open 1
and receptive to relocating detailed, prescriptive 2
requirements to guidance.
3 We appreciate this opportunity to express 4
the public's interest in this crucial rule and its as 5
yet unrealized potential to enable the rapid 6
deployment of new and advanced reactors. Thank you.
7 MEMBER PETTI: Thank you. Other comments 8
from the public? Identify yourself in your comment.
9 (Pause.)
10 MEMBER PETTI: Okay, not hearing any, I 11 turn it back over to the chair.
12 CHAIRMAN REMPE: Okay, so at this time, 13 we're going to go off the record.
14 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 15 off the record at 10:53 a.m.)
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1 0 C F R Pa r t 5 3 L i c e n s i n g a n d R e g u l a o n o f A d v a n c e d N u c l e a r R e a c t o r s N o v e m b e r 2, 2 0 2 2 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
Agenda 2
8:35 am - 10:30 am Staff presentation on 10 CFR Part 53, Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Commercial Nuclear Plants, Proposed Rulemaking Language Rulemaking Schedule Part 53 Licensing Frameworks Risk Insights/Quantitative Health Objectives (QHOs)
Fueled Modules Codes and Standards Alternative evaluation for risk insights (AERI)
Generally licensed reactor operators (GLROs), Human Factors, Engineering Expertise Guidance
Rulemaking Schedule 3
We are here
Part 53 Licensing Frameworks Framework A o Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)-led approach o Functional design criteria Framework B o Traditional use of risk insights o Principal design criteria o Includes an AERI approach Subpart A - General Provisions Subpart B - Safety Requirements Subpart C - Design Requirements Subpart D - Siting Subpart E - Construction/Manufacturing Subpart F - Operations Subpart G - Decommissioning Subpart H - Application Requirements Subpart I - License Maintenance Subpart J - Reporting Subpart K - Quality Assurance Subpart N - Siting Subpart O - Construction/Manufacturing Subpart P - Operations Subpart Q - Decommissioning Subpart R - Application Requirements Subpart S - License Maintenance Subpart T - Reporting Subpart U - Quality Assurance 4
Rule Package (ML22272A034)
Sections 53.000 and 53.010
- Purpose
- Provide optional frameworks for the issuance, amendment, renewal, and termination of licenses, permits, certifications, and approvals for commercial nuclear plants
- Frameworks
- Framework A and Framework B are distinct
- Applicants and licensees subject to the rules in this part must only use the subparts applicable to one framework 5
Subpart A -
General Provisions (Definitions)
- Common Definitions
- Commercial Nuclear Plant
- Manufactured reactor
- Manufactured reactor module
- Safety function
- Framework A Definitions
- Construction, Licensing basis events (LBEs),
structure, system, and component (SSC) classifications
- Framework B Definitions
- Construction, Design basis, Functional containment, Safety-related SSCs, Severe nuclear accident 6
7 Framework A Subpart Title Topics Subpart B Technology-Inclusive Safety Requirements Risk Insights (QHOs)
Subpart C Design and Analysis Requirements Subpart D Siting Requirements Subpart E Construction and Manufacturing Requirements Fueled Modules Subpart F Requirements for Operation GLROs, Human Factors Subpart G Decommissioning Requirements Subpart H Licenses, Certifications and Approvals Subpart I Maintaining and Revising Licensing Basis Information Subpart J Reporting and Other Administrative Requirements Subpart K Quality Assurance Criteria for Commercial Nuclear Plants
Framework A Ensuring Comparable Level of Safety Additional discussion in Preamble on how an integrated assessment like that in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174 can be used to support the comparisons to existing requirements and related regulatory findings.
8
Framework A QHOs as one of several performance standards for LBEs Additional discussion in Preamble on how QHOs are considered as one of several performance measures within Framework A.
Including the QHOs as one of several performance measures does not equate to the QHOs defining adequate protection of public health and safety.*
- Existing Paradigm Does not specifically define adequate protection but compliance with NRC regulations and guidance may be presumed to assure adequate protection at a minimum Additional requirements as necessary or desirable to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property 9
Subparts E & O Fuel loading for manufactured reactor modules
§ 53.620(d) / § 53.4120(d) Fuel loading
- A manufacturing license may include authorizing the loading of fuel into a manufactured reactor module
- Specify required protections to prevent criticality o At least two independent mechanisms that can prevent criticality should conditions result in the maximum reactivity being attained for the fissile material
- Commission finding that a manufactured reactor module in required configuration is not a utilization facility as defined in the Atomic Energy Act
- Manufactured reactor module becomes a utilization facility in its final place of use after the Commission makes required findings on inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria 10
11 Framework B Subpart Title Topics Subpart N Siting Subpart O Construction and Manufacturing Requirements Subpart P Requirements for Operation Codes and Standards Subpart Q Decommissioning Subpart R Licenses, Certifications and Approvals Codes and Standards AERI Subpart S Maintaining and Revising Licensing Basis Information Subpart T Reporting and Other Administrative Requirements Subpart U Quality Assurance
Codes and Standards (Clarification) 10 CFR 53.4730(a)(2)(ii)(A) would require applicants to provide a description and justification (for codes or standards not previously endorsed or accepted by the NRC) of the codes and standards to be used in the design Other Framework B requirements related to codes and standards are similar to those in the existing regulations 10 CFR 53.4360(a) would require boiling-water reactor (BWR) and pressurized-water reactor (PWR) licensees to meet requirements in 10 CFR 50.55a for inservice inspection and inservice testing programs 10 CFR 53.4730(a)(37)(ii) would require applicants for BWRs and PWRs to describe how they will comply with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and ASME Operation and Maintenance Code requirements in 10 CFR 50.55a Conforming changes proposed for 10 CFR 50.55a would support use of existing requirements by applicants and licensees with BWRs or PWRs under Framework B 12
Subpart R -
AERI The AERI approach is consistent with Commission policy.
The AERI entry conditions in § 53.4730(a)(34)(ii) were revised after the ACRS Part 53 subcommittee meeting (October 18-19, 2022) to address stakeholder comments and reflect insights from the scoping MELCOR Accident Consequence Calculation System (MACCS) calculations.
Other provisions in Part 53 reference make use of the AERI entry conditions.
Two draft regulatory guides (DGs) developed:
DG-1413: Technology-Inclusive Identification of Licensing Events for Commercial Nuclear Plants (proposed new RG 1.254)
DG-1414: Alternative Evaluation for Risk Insights Methodology (proposed new RG 1.255) 13
Regulatory Basis for the AERI Approach 14 Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors 73 FR 60612; October 14, 2008 73 FR 60616, left column: The Commission also expects that advanced reactor designs will comply with the Commissions safety goal policy statement (51 FR 28044; August 4, 1986, as corrected and republished at 51 FR 30028; August 21, 1986),
73 FR 60614, left column: the Commission has also issued policy statements on the use of PRA in regulatory activities (60 FR 42622; August 16, 1995), and severe accidents regarding future designs and existing plants (50 FR 32138; August 8, 1985). The use of PRA as a design tool is implied by the policy statement on the use of PRA and the NRC believes that the current regulations and policy statements provide sufficient guidance to designers.
Policy Statement: Use of PRA Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities 60 FR 42622; August 16, 1995 60 FR 42628, middle column: It is important to note that not all of the Commissions regulatory activities lend themselves to a risk analysis approach that utilizes fault tree methods. In general, a fault tree method is best suited for power reactor events that typically involve complex systemsthe Commission recognizes that a single approach for incorporating risk analyses into the regulatory process is not appropriate.
AERI Elements Evaluate defense in depth (DID) adequacy Identify risk insights Search for severe accident vulnerabilities Develop a demonstrably conservative risk estimate Demonstrate that the AERI entry conditions are met Identify and characterize the postulated bounding event use PRA or an alternative risk-informed approach as a design tool
Why Revise the AERI Entry Conditions?
15
- Some stakeholders have commented that the current proposed AERI entry conditions are overly conservative.
- MACCS scoping calculations indicate that dose at 100 meters is an inadequate predictor of conditional risk. Depending on the assumptions (e.g., plume elevation or buoyancy), some conditional risks may be below the QHOs while others may be above the QHOs even though the current AERI entry condition is met.
- Provide increased flexibility when determining if the AERI entry conditions are met.
Revised AERI Entry Conditions 16
§ 53.4730(a)(34) Description of risk evaluation. A description of the risk evaluation developed for the commercial nuclear plant and its results. The risk evaluation must be based on:
i.
A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA); or ii.
An alternative evaluation for risk insights (AERI), provided that:
(A) The analysis of a postulated bounding event demonstrates that the consequence evaluated within the area between the commercial nuclear plants exclusion area boundary (EAB) and 16.1 kilometers (10 miles) from the EAB is less than 25 mSv (2.5 rem) TEDE in the first year; and (B) The identification of the postulated bounding event is informed by a systematic and comprehensive search for severe nuclear accident scenarios that considers:
(1) All radiological sources at the commercial nuclear plant; (2) Relevant internal and external hazards; (3) Combinations of plant equipment failures including common-cause failures, hazard-induced equipment failures, and equipment failures caused by severe nuclear accident phenomena; and (4) Credible human errors of commission and omission.
Rationale for the Revised AERI Entry Conditions 17
- The change from dose at 100 meters to the peak dose within the 10-mile annulus addresses concerns about elevated releases and plume buoyancy.
EAB EAB + 10 miles Limit the peak dose within this annulus Buoyant Plume
Rationale for the Revised AERI Entry Conditions (Cont.)
18
- The 2.5-rem criterion is consistent with MACCS scoping calculations:
- A 25-rem lifetime (50-year) dose generally corresponds to a 10-mile population-weighted lifetime individual latent cancer fatality risk less than 2E-6 per event.
- A first-year dose of 2.5 rem generally corresponds to a 50-year dose less than 25 rem, probably due to radioactive decay and the effect of weathering on groundshine and resuspension.
- The 2.5-rem criterion is a small fraction (10%) of the traditional reference value (25 rem) used in Part 100 and § 50.34.
- For example, see the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), Section 15.0.3, Rev. 0: A small fraction is defined as less than 10% of the 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) reference values, or 2.5 rem TEDE.
- Would be used to determine:
o Which applicants could develop an AERI in lieu of a PRA to demonstrate compliance with the proposed risk evaluation requirement in § 53.4730(a)(34) o When the requirements to address the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events in § 53.4420 must be met o When the requirements to address combustible gas control in § 53.4730(a)(7) must be met
- In addition, the proposed AERI entry conditions would be used in combination with other conditions to determine when a commercial nuclear plant is a self-reliant mitigation facility, as provided in § 53.800(a)(2) o A self-reliant mitigation facility must have GLROs in lieu of senior reactor operators and reactor operators Proposed Uses of the AERI Entry Conditions 19
- All other applicable Framework B requirements must be met (AERI or PRA).
- Applicants may elect to develop a PRA even if the AERI entry conditions are met.
DG-1413: Technology-Inclusive Identification of Licensing Events for Commercial Nuclear Plants (proposed new RG 1.254)
- Section A: Applies to light-water reactors (LWRs) and non-LWRs licensed under Parts 50, 52, and 53 (Frameworks A and B)
- Section B (Discussion):
o Identifies licensing events for each licensing framework o Provides historical perspectives (early licensing, development of the standard review plan) o Addresses ACRS recommendations to start with a blank sheet of paper (10/7/2019, 10/21/2020, 5/30/2021, and 10/26/2021)
- Section C (Staff Guidance) provides an integrated approach for:
o Conducting a systematic and comprehensive search for initiating events o Delineating a systematic and comprehensive sets of event sequences o Grouping the lists of initiating events and event sequences into licensing events
- Appendix A (Comprehensive Search for Initiating Events):
o Reviews techniques for searching for initiating events and points the user to helpful references o Does not endorse or recommend any specific technique 20
- This RG provides the NRC staffs guidance on the use of an AERI methodology to inform the content of applications and licensing basis for LWRs and non-LWRs.
- 10 CFR 53.4730(a)(34)(ii) establishes AERI as an alternative to a PRA for a risk evaluation if the entry conditions A and B for an AERI are met.
- The title of this DG-1414 is now AERI Methodology, to distinguish it from Part 53 Frameworks A and B. This new title does not signal any change in approach.
DG-1414: Alternative Evaluation for Risk Insights Methodology (proposed new RG 1.255) 21 Applicants who meet the AERI entry conditions may elect to develop an AERI in lieu of a PRA.
However, PRA confers additional benefits such as:
- A means to optimize the design, and
- The ability to take advantage of various risk-informed initiatives, for example risk-informed completion times, risk-informed categorization of SSCs.
Subparts F and P Staffing, HFE, Operator Licensing, and Training
- During the 10/19/22 subcommittee meeting, the staff provided an update on the rule language, as well an overview of key guidance
- Updates on the rule language status had included:
o Consolidating Frameworks A & B requirements using a common set of language under Subpart F o Extending provisions for GLROs to Framework B, to include facilities using an AERI approach o Retaining previous engineering expertise provisions (i.e., degreed individuals with plant familiarity)
- Important points of ISG presentations included:
o Review guidance for tailored exam programs o Staffing review guidance for custom staffing plans o Guidance for conducting scalable human factors engineering (HFE) reviews 22
Follow-on Discussion of Operator Licensing Topics
- Regarding Operator Licensing, the members asked that the staff discuss several areas further, including:
o Lack of approval preceding licensing of GLROs NRC approved program with inspections o How changes to operator tasks from plant mods translate into adjustments to exam program knowledge and abilities lists and change control process burdens Balances adaptability and program assurance o How the GLRO criteria interrelate with the AERI criteria and whether AERI is too restrictive The following slide provides an overview that builds on earlier AERI discussions 23
Follow-on Discussion of GLRO Criteria 24 Underlying Principle from Paper GLRO Criteria for Framework A GLRO Criteria for Framework B (PRA)
GLRO Criteria for Framework B (AERI)
Radiological consequence criteria met without human action Safety criteria (53.210 and 53.220 or 53.470) met without human actions for credited event mitigation Safety assessment (53.4730(a)(1)(vi))
demonstrates requirements met without credited human action Qualification for AERI (53.4730(a)(34)(ii))
must be demonstrated to be met Licensing basis events addressed without human action Analysis of LBEs and DBAs (53.450(e & f))
demonstrates criteria met without human actions for credited mitigation PRA (53.4730(a)(34))
demonstrates event sequences met without human actions for credited mitigation Safety functions not allocated to human action Safety functions (53.230) achieved without reliance on human actions for credited event mitigation FRA/FA (53.730(d))
demonstrates functions required for safety do not rely on credited human action Reliance on inherent or robust passive features Plant response to licensing basis events does not credibly rely on human actions to assure the performance of SSCs (e.g., SSCs function through inherent characteristics or have engineered protections against human failures)
Adequate DID without human action DID requirements (53.250) met without human actions for the purposes of credited DID Plant design must provide for layered DID without dependence upon any single barrier or reliance upon credited human action.
Follow-on Discussion of Staffing Topics
- Regarding operational staffing, the members asked that the staff discuss several areas further, including:
o Potential for allowing plants with no operators There is no allowance for zero operator staffing o Engineering expertise degree requirement Complements/augments plant ops experience o Training requirements for engineering expertise role Systems approach to training required by § 53.830; topics covered by ISG o Availability of remote engineering expertise Not credited in event mitigation; supports crew o Requirements might allow remote operation Framework for staffing, HFE, operator licensing, and training is designed to adapt to future concept of operations; remote operations is a broader issue 25
Key Guidance Development
- LMP (RG 1.233)
- Siting Criteria (RG 4.7)
- Fuel Qualification Framework (NUREG-2246)
- Developing Principal Design Criteria for Non-LWR (RG 1.232)
Existing
- Analytical Margin
- Chemical Hazards
- Manufacturing
- Technical Specifications
- Facility Safety Program
- Framework B Content of Applications Future Under Development Near-Term
- ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA Standard
- High Temp Materials (ASME III-5)
- Reliability & Integrity Mgt (ASME XI-2)
- Molten Salt Reactor Fuel Qualification
- Seismic Design / Isolators
- Emergency Planning (50.160)
- Change Evaluation (SNC-led)
- QA Alternatives (NEI-led)
- Facility Training Programs ISG
- Materials Compatibility ISG
- Treatment of Consequence Uncertainty Part 53
- DG-1413, Identification of Licensing Events
- DG-1414, AERI Methodology
- DRO-ISG-2023-01, Operator Licensing Program Review ISG
- DRO-ISG-2023-02, Staffing Plan Review ISG Augmenting NUREG-1791
- DRO-ISG-2023-03, Scalable Human Factors Engineering Review ISG
- Part 26, Fitness for Duty
- Part 26, Fatigue Management
- Part 73, Access Authorization
- Part 73, Cyber Security
- Part 73 Security Programs Part 53
- DG-1413, Identification of Licensing Events
- DG-1414, AERI Methodology
- DRO-ISG-2023-01, Operator Licensing Program Review ISG
- DRO-ISG-2023-02, Staffing Plan Review ISG Augmenting NUREG-1791
- DRO-ISG-2023-03, Scalable Human Factors Engineering Review ISG
- Part 26, Fitness for Duty
- Part 26, Fatigue Management
- Part 73, Access Authorization
- Part 73, Cyber Security
- Part 73 Security Programs 26
Discussion 27
Additional Information Additional information on the 10 CFR Part 53 rulemaking is available at https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/rulemaking-and-guidance/part-53.html For information on how to submit comments go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0062 For further information, contact Robert Beall, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, telephone: 301-415-3874; email:
Robert.Beall@nrc.gov 28
ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards AERI Alternative evaluation for risk insights ANS American Nuclear Society ARCAP Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BWR boiling-water reactor CFR Code of Federal Regulations DBA design-basis accident DG draft regulatory guidance DID defense-in-depth DRO Division of Reactor Oversight EAB exclusion area boundary Acronyms EDO Executive Director for Operations FA function allocation FR Federal Register FRA functional requirements analysis GLRO generally licensed reactor operator HFE human factors engineering ISG interim staff guidance LBE licensing basis events LMP Licensing Modernization Project LWR light-water reactor MACCS MELCOR accident consequence code system mSv millisievert 29
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute non-LWR non-light-water reactor NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission technical report designation PRA probabilistic risk assessment PWR pressurized-water reactor QA quality assurance Acronyms QHO quantitative health objective rem Roentgen equivalent man RG regulatory guide SNC Southern Nuclear Operating Company SSCs structures, systems, and components TEDE total effective dose equivalent TICAP Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project 30