ML22333B094
| ML22333B094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River, San Onofre, Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/2022 |
| From: | Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs |
| To: | Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch, NRC/RGN-III/DRSS, NRC/RGN-IV/DRSS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22333B090 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML22333B094 (6) | |
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OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Enclosure 2 Summary of Fire Protection Issues at Fort Calhoun Station, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, and Crystal River Unit 3 Inspection Report/Site/Date/Severity Issue Summary ML18219B607 - San Onofre The inspectors concluded that the licensee was not Nuclear Generating Station NRC effectively controlling combustible materials around Inspection Report 05000361/2018- ignition sources and impairments.
002 and 05000362/2018-002 On July 12, 2018, the licensee failed to maintain the Unit Date of Report: 8/10/2018 3 Penetration Room free of combustible material, including but not limited to waste and debris following the Date of Occurrence: 7/12/2018 completion of the work. The licensee stored combustible materials in inactive cable trays that were below active Severity Level: Level IV NCV cable trays without the required 10 feet vertical separation of combustible materials from cable trays.
(Since the licensee placed the Specifically, the licensee had bags of waste throughout deficiency into its corrective action the Unit 3 Penetration Room and the licensee had a bag program, the safety of waste and leftover distribution cables stored in an significance of the issue was inactive cable tray that was located directly under an determined to be low, and because active cable tray that supported plant equipment. (pg. 12-the violation was 13) not willful or repetitive) (pg.13)
The NRC determined that one Severity Level IV NCV of Technical Specifications, Section 5.5.1.1.d, occurred based on the licensees failure to maintain the Unit 3 Penetration Room free of combustible material and improperly storing combustible materials in inactive cable trays that were below active cable trays without the required 10 feet vertical separation of combustible materials from cable trays. (pg. 14)
ML19031C919 - Fort Calhoun During the inspection week, on the night of January 16, Station NRC Inspection Report 050- 2019, there was a fire outside the protected area in an 00285/2019-001 unoccupied Exclusion Area Opening (EAO) shack. Blair Fire Department responded to the site within 15 minutes Date of Report: 2/12/2019 and extinguished the fire. FCS entered AOP-6, Fire Emergency, Revision 35, and followed the steps as Date of Occurrence: 1/16/2019 required. FCS contacted the NRC Operations Center on January 16, 2019, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) to report the Severity Level: None event (NRC Event Number 53831). The cause of the (No violation identified) fire was determined to be a malfunctioning heating element in a climate unit. The NRC inspectors reported to the EAO shack the following day, to observe the current condition of the EAO shack and to evaluate the steps taken by FCS in response to the event. The NRC inspectors determined that FCS followed OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION 1
OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION its procedure as required and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. There was no release of radioactive or hazardous material. (pg. 5)
ML21048A322 - Fort Calhoun On September 23, 2020, a fire was started in the Station NRC Inspection report containment because of hot work. The licensee was 050-00285/2021-001 performing torch cutting on the reactor head lift ring when a piece of slag from the cutting fell multiple elevations Date of Report: 2/17/2021 down into a High Radiation Area, which resulted in a piece of wood and insulation catching on fire. The fire Date of Occurrence: 9/23/2020 was quickly extinguished by the onsite fire watch with a fire extinguisher and the Blair and Fort Calhoun offsite fire Severity Level: None departments responded promptly to the site. The offsite fire departments overhauled the area and verified the fire (No violation identified) was extinguished. The inspectors reviewed the fire event report, toured the containment to review the hazards in the field, and reviewed the corrective actions taken to prevent re-occurrence. The licensee has increased the use of fire blankets around the hot work activities. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements, due to the fire at the site. (pg. 8)
ML22011A005 - Crystal River Unit The NRC determined that one Severity Level IV non-cited 3 NRC Inspection Report No. violation of 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1), was identified based on 05000302/2021004 the licensees failure to reasonably prevent fires from occurring. Specifically, the site did not properly implement Date of Report: 1/24/2022 procedure FIR-0003, Control of Hot Work and Ignition Sources to store combustible material in the Unit 3 Sea Date of Occurrence: 9/24/2021 Water Room at a minimum distance of 35 feet of hot work or otherwise protected, which resulted in a fire. (pg. 3)
Severity Level: Level IV NCV On September 24, 2021, hot work was being performed the violation was of very low safety by several individuals in the seawater room on the 95 significance and was entered into elevation of the auxiliary building. A fire watch had Crystal Rivers CAP (2021000123), recently left the site, so the nearby fire watch was given this violation is being treated as an additional responsibility to oversee two burners NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of performing hot work in separate areas. The fire watch the Enforcement Policy. (NCV noticed smoke coming from an area proximal to a 05000302/2021004-01 (pg. ii) concrete column out of sight. An investigation found two 5- yard disposal bags on fire. The fire was extinguished by a site employee using an ABC fire extinguisher. Upon identification, hot work was immediately suspended, and the licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as condition report 2021000123. The licensee took the following immediate corrective actions: (1) stopped hot work; (2) performed a housekeeping check and clean up; and (3) performed a stand-down with craft personnel to re-train and reinforce expectations on fire watch, and (4) modified the procedure to require the OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION 2
OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION burner (hot worker) to sign the hot work permit prior to commencing work. (pg. 3-4) the licensee failed perform required work area inspections to ensure combustible material in the Unit 3 Sea Water Room were maintained at an adequate distance of hot work, which resulted in a fire. (pg. 4)
ML22068A233 - San Onofre The NRC evaluated the licensees implementation of Nuclear Generating Station NRC procedures and determined that the licensees failure to Inspection implement the control of ignition source procedure was a Report 05000361/2022-001 and violation of 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1), which requires, in part, 05000362/2022-001 that licensees maintain a fire protection program to address the potential for fires that could cause the Date of Report: 3/14/2022 release or spread of radioactive materials, including reasonable preventing these fires. The SDS Date of Occurrence: 2/16/2022 Procedure, SDS-FP1-PCD-0015, Control of Ignition Sources, Revision 8, Step 4.1.8, requires, to verify all Severity Level: Level IV NCV Class A combustibles within 35 feet of hot work have been removed or are shielded with approved welding Violation was not willful or repetitive; curtains, welding blankets, or welding pads. (pg. 7) therefore, this violation was treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), Contrary to the above, on February 16, 2022, during the consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of NRC inspectors walkdown of the Unit 2 Containment, the the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV inspectors identified multiple pieces of Class A 05000362/2022001-01 (pg. 8) combustible material, to include non-covered wood and a plastic bag of radiation protection trash within the 35 feet of the hot work activity. The inspectors also identified multiple pieces of 4x4 wood planks directly under a steel plate where the crew was performing the hot work activity. The 4x4 wood planks were not covered in fire blankets to prevent sparks from catching the wood on fire. (pg. 7)
Upon identification, the licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as SDS Condition Report #
SDS-001299. The licensee took the following immediate actions: (1) removed the combustible materials from the area; (2) performed walkdowns through containment to verify any other combustible materials that potentially could be in an area where hot work will be performed; and (3) performed a stand-down with craft personnel to reinforce expectations on combustible materials around hot work activities. (pg. 7)
ML22116A183 - Crystal River Unit 3 NRC Inspection Report No. The inspectors determined that one Severity Level IV 05000302/2022001 NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.48(f)(1), was identified based on the licensees OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION 3
OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Date of Report: 5/3/2022 failure to prevent fires from occurring on-site. Specifically, the site did not properly implement FIR-0003, Control of Date of Occurrence: 1/10/2022 Hot Work and Ignition Sources to (1) ensure combustible material meets the required minimum distance from Severity Level: Level IV NCV ignition sources, and (2) assure no outbreak of fire by having an individual assigned to fire watch duties remain However, because the violation was in the area after completion of hot work activities for 30 of very low safety significance and minutes. This failure resulted in fire, which started shortly was entered into Crystal Rivers after the completion of hot work when nearby combustible CAP (2022000007), this violation is materials became ignited, going undetected for a period being treated as an NCV consistent of time until fortuitously identified by an individual passing with Section 2.3.2 of the through the area. (pg. 2)
Enforcement Policy. (pg. 2)
Specific follow up to a fire that occurred on January 10, 2022, was performed, including interviews with personnel, review of initial corrective actions, and site walkdowns of areas where hot work will be performed.
(pg. 3)
On January 10, 2022, a crew in the Radioactive Materials Area-6 (RMA-6) room on the 119 elevation of the auxiliary building conducted hot work and left the area, including the fire watch. Soon after, a site employee conducting other activities noticed smoke on elevation 143 of the auxiliary building and investigated the 119 level where the fire was discovered in the RMA-6 area.
The site employee sought assistance from radiation protection personnel, extinguished the fire using a fire extinguisher, and notified management. Initial investigation determined that the material that was on fire included a safety harness, air hoses, plasma cutting tools, and extension cords, all located within the 35 required minimum distance from ignition sources. The licensee took immediate corrective actions, including: (1) stopping all hot work; (2) performing an investigation of the fire; and (3) holding a stand-down with craft personnel to re-train and reinforce expectations on fire watch, and (4) implementing site wide housekeeping and hazard recognition walkdowns. (pg. 6)
The inspectors reviewed the site fire protection program as defined by Crystal River Unit 3 Fire Protection Plan, Revision 38 and associated procedures and fire hazards analysis for compliance with regulatory and license requirements. The inspectors initial review focused on the January 10, 2022, fire to evaluate the sites immediate corrective actions. During the subsequent inspection, the inspectors focus included a review of the sites ongoing and planned corrective actions. At the time of the review, the site had recommenced hot work with OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION 4
OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION numerous corrective actions in place, including a daily sign-off instead of weekly sign-off of hot work permits and a required work area walk down by a knowledgeable individual. The inspectors observed several of these work area walkdowns, including one in the B decay heat vault and noted that the knowledgeable individual appropriately identified combustibles that required them to be removed or covered prior to hot work being conducted. Additional corrective actions included weekly field observations by responsible managers and assignment of knowledgeable staff members to each major work area for the purpose of increasing knowledge transfer between work groups. The inspectors will continue to follow up on these corrective actions during future inspections. (pg. 3)
ML22112A158 - Fort Calhoun The inspectors attended a meeting with management Station NRC Inspection Report 050- from the licensee, contractor, and subcontractor to clarify 00285/2022-002 the events leading up to the stand-down. The subcontractor was involved with the demolition of non-Date of Report: 4/28/2022 radiologically impacted structures, and the negative observations were related to industrial safety hazards.
Date of Occurrence: Not given One negative observation was related to a small fire on a piece of compact loading equipment being used by the Severity Level: None subcontractor for internal demolition of the Auxiliary Building. A piece of hot slag apparently dripped onto a (No violation Identified) greasy spot of the loading equipment which sparked a small fire. The subcontractor immediately used a fire extinguisher to put the fire out. (pg. 5)
The inspectors inquired if use of a fire extinguisher required notification of the licensees designated on-site fire marshal. The licensee had expectations that use of a fire extinguisher should require a conversation with the on-site fire marshal, although this action was not proceduralized, nor was the subcontractor informed. The inspectors determined that a lack of communications regarding expectations existed between the licensee, contractor, and subcontractor. Although there were no radiologically significant issues identified in this situation, the inspectors stressed the importance of licensee oversite of its contractors and subcontractors and making expectations clear. (pg. 5)
At the time of the inspection, there was only one recent condition report of significance requiring an investigation.
This item of significance was the January 2022 fire at the intake structure. This incident was reviewed during the previous inspection (NRC Inspection Report 050-00285/2022-001, ADAMS Accession No. ML22055A979).
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OFFICIAL USE ONLYSENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Although deemed to be significant, this incident was subsequently determined to be primarily related to industrial safety. (pg. 8) (Another incident not covered in this summary)
ML22055A979 - Fort Calhoun On January 5, 2022, the licensee notified the NRC, in Station NRC Inspection Report 050- accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), of a small fire 00285/2022-001 that occurred in the Intake Structure during internal demolition work. The fire was started when a contractor Date of Report: 2/252022 used a torch to punch a hole in a traveling river water screen to allow for removal. The Fire Watch immediately Date of Occurrence: 1/5/2022 responded, although due to the inaccessibility of the flames, an offsite fire department was required to Severity Level: None extinguish the fire. The fire occurred in the non-Radiological area of the plant and there was no release of (No violation identified) radioactivity or hazardous materials. There were no injuries reported. To evaluate the licensees response to the event, the inspectors conducted interviews with contractors and site personnel, observed the Intake Structure, and evaluated the licensees Condition Report and follow-up actions. The fire occurred because the contractors mistakenly believed the screens were constructed of stainless steel, which would not have reacted to the use of a torch. Upon further investigation, the licensee identified that the screens had been purchased in a poly-type material to prevent rusting from contact with river water. To prevent a recurrence of this event, the licensee committed to closer scrutiny of the composition of materials being demolished. The inspectors concluded that the licensee had responded to the fire in accordance with their Station Fire Plan and took appropriate corrective actions. (pg. 5)
The licensee was implementing the decommissioning activities in accordance with the regulations and license requirements. The inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately controlling decommissioning activities and radiological work areas at the facility. The licensee had responded to and took appropriate corrective actions after a small fire occurred in the Intake Structure during January 2022. (pg. 6)
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