ML22301A007
| ML22301A007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/2022 |
| From: | Mahesh Chawla Plant Licensing Branch IV |
| To: | Diya F Union Electric Co |
| Chawla M | |
| References | |
| EPID L-2021-LLA-0197 | |
| Download: ML22301A007 (1) | |
Text
December 2, 2022 Mr. Fadi Diya Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Ameren Missouri Callaway Energy Center 8315 County Road 459 Steedman, MO 65077
SUBJECT:
CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 229 RE: REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO ADOPT TSTF-505, REVISION 2, PROVIDE RISK-INFORMED EXTENDED COMPLETION TIMES - RITSTF INITIATIVE 4b, AND TSTF-439, REVISION 2, ELIMINATE SECOND COMPLETION TIMES LIMITING TIME FROM DISCOVERY OF FAILURE TO MEET AN LCO (EPID L-2021-LLA-0197)
Dear Mr. Diya:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 229 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 for Callaway Plant, Unit No. 1. The amendment consists of changes to the technical specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated October 21, 2021, as supplemented by letters dated November 24, 2021, June 30, 2022, and November 30, 2022.
The amendment revises the TS requirements to permit the use of risk-informed completion times for actions to be taken when limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) are not met and eliminate second completion times.
The changes are based on Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Travelers TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF [Risk-Informed TSTF] Initiative 4b, dated July 2, 2018, and TSTF-439, Revision 2, Eliminate Second Completion Times Limiting Time from Discovery of Failure to Meet an LCO. The NRC issued a final model safety evaluation approving TSTF-505, Revision 2, and TSTF-439, Revision 2 on November 21, 2018, and January 11, 2006, respectively.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mahesh L. Chawla, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-483
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 229 to NPF-30
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv
UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-483 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 229 License No. NPF-30
- 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Union Electric Company (UE, the licensee),
dated October 21, 2021, as supplemented by letters dated November 24, 2021, June 30, 2022, and November 30, 2022, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan*
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 229 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
The license is also amended by changes as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 is hereby amended to add paragraph 2.C.(20) to read as follows:
(20)
Adoption of Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times -RITSTF Initiative 4b Ameren Missouri is approved to implement TSTF-505, Revision 2, modifying the Technical Specification requirements related to Completion Times (CT) for Required Actions to provide the option to calculate a longer, risk-informed CT (RICT). The methodology for using the new Risk-Informed Completion Time Program is described in NEI 06-09-A, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed, Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines.
Ameren Missouri will complete the implementation item identified in Attachments 1 and 9 of Ameren Missouri letter ULNRC-06739, Post-Audit Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-439 and TSTF-505 (LCDN 20-0007), dated June 30, 2022, prior to implementation of the RICT program (i.e., prior to implementing License Amendment 229).
- 3.
This amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Jennifer L. Dixon-Herrity, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 2, 2022 Jennifer L.
Dixon-Herrity Digitally signed by Jennifer L. Dixon-Herrity Date: 2022.12.02 16:21:43 -05'00'
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 229 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-30 CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-483 Replace the following pages of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 and the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Renewed Facility Operating License REMOVE INSERT Technical Specifications REMOVE INSERT TOC - 4 TOC - 4 1.3-3 1.3-3 1.3-6 1.3-6 1.3-7 1.3-7 1.3-13 1.3-13 1.3-14 1.3-14 3.3-1 3.3-1 3.3-3 3.3-3 3.3-4 3.3-4 3.3-5 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-6 3.3.7 3.3-7 3.3-8 3.3-8 3.3-9 3.3-9 3.3.10 3.3-10 3.3-19 3.3-19 3.3-20 3.3-20 3.3-21 3.3-21 3.3-23 3.3-23 3.3-24 3.3-24 3.3-27 3.3-27 3.3-28 3.3-28 3.3-29 3.3-29 3.3-30 3.3-30 3.3-31 3.3-31 3.3-32 3.3-32 3.3-33 3.3-33 3.3-34 3.3-34
REMOVE INSERT 3.3-35 3.3-35 3.3-59 3.3-59 3.4-22 3.4-22 3.4-23 3.4-23 3.5-4 3.5-4 3.6-5 3.6-5 3.6-7 3.6-7 3.6-8 3.6-8 3.6-10 3.6-10 3.6-18 3.6-18 3.7-5 3.7-5 3.7-6 3.7-6 3.7-12 3.7-12 3.7-15 3.7-15 3.7-16 3.7-16 3.7-21 3.7-21 3.7-23 3.7-23 3.7-24 3.7-24 3.7-26 3.7-26 3.8-2 3.8-2 3.8-4 3.8-4 3.8-5 3.8-5 3.8-6 3.8-6 3.8-25 3.8-25 3.8-34 3.8-34 3.8-38 3.8-38 3.8-39 3.8-39 5.0-23 5.0-23.
5.0-24 5.0-24 5.0-25 5.0-25 5.0-26 5.0-26 5.0-27 5.0-27 5.0-28 5.0-28 5.0-29 5.0-29 5.0-30 5.0-30 5.0-31 5.0-31 5.0-32 5.0-33
Renewed License No. NPF-30 Amendment No. 229 (3)
UE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (4)
UE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source of special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)
UE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
C.
This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
(1)
Maximum Power Level UE is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3565 megawatts thermal (100% power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein.
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan*
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 229 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
(3)
Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SSER #3)**
Deleted per Amendment No. 169.
Amendments 133, 134, & 135 were effective as of April 30, 2000 however these amendments were implemented on April 1, 2000.
The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.
Renewed License No. NPF-30 Amendment No. 229 associated supports; and the results of non-PRA evaluations that are based on a screening of other external hazards updated using the external hazard screening significance process identified in American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) PRA Standard RA-Sa-2009; as specified in License Amendment No. 226 dated December 29, 2021. Prior NRC approval, under 10 CFR 50.90, is required for a change to the categorization process specified above (e.g., change from a seismic margins approach to a seismic probabilistic risk assessment approach).
(20)
Adoption of Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times -RITSTF Initiative 4b Ameren Missouri is approved to implement TSTF-505, Revision 2, modifying the Technical Specification requirements related to Completion Times (CTs) for Required Actions to provide the option to calculate a longer, risk-informed CT (RICT). The methodology for using the new Risk-Informed Completion Time Program is described in NEI 06-09-A, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines.
Ameren Missouri will complete the implementation item identified in Attachments 1 and 9 of Ameren Missouri letter ULNRC-06739, "Post-Audit Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-439 and TSTF-505 (LDCN 20-0007)," dated June 30, 2022, prior to implementation of the RICT program (i.e., prior to implementing License Amendment 229).
D.
An Exemption from certain requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, are described in the October 9, 1984 staff letter. This exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, this exemption is hereby granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. With the granting of this exemption the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission.
E.
UE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: Callaway Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 0 submitted by letter dated October 20, 2004, as supplemented by the letter May 11, 2006.
UE shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Callaway Plant Unit 1 CSP
Renewed License No. NPF-30 Amendment No. 229 was approved by License Amendment No. 203, as supplemented by changes approved per License Amendment No. 214.
F.
Deleted per Amendment No. 169.
G.
UE shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.
H.
This renewed license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at Midnight on October 18, 2044.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
William M. Dean, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachments/Appendices:
- 1. (Deleted per Amendment No. 169)
- 2. (Deleted per Amendment No. 169)
- 3.
Appendix A - Technical Specifications (NUREG-1058, Revision 1)
- 4.
Appendix B - Environmental Protection Plan
- 5.
Appendix C - Additional Conditions Date of Issuance: March 6
, 2015
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 229 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-30 UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-483
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated October 21, 2021 (Reference 1), as supplemented by letters dated November 24, 2021 (Reference 2), June 30, 2022 (Reference 3), and November 30, 2022 (Reference 4), Union Electric Company doing business as (dba) Ameren Missouri (the licensee) requested changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 for Callaway Plant, Unit No. 1 (Callaway). The licensee request proposes to revise the technical specification (TS) requirements to permit the use of risk-informed completion times (RICTs) for actions to be taken when limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) are not met and eliminate second completion times (CTs).
The proposed changes are based on Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Travelers TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF [Risk-Informed TSTF] Initiative 4b, dated July 2, 2018 (Reference 5) and TSTF-439, Revision 2, Eliminate Second Completion Times Limiting Time From Discovery of Failure to Meet an LCO (Reference 6). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) issued a final model safety evaluation (SE) approving TSTF-505, Revision 2, and TSTF-439, Revision 2 on November 21, 2018 (Reference 7) and January 11, 2006 (Reference 6), respectively. The TSTF-439 implementation is not risk informed. The licensee has proposed variations from the TS changes approved in TSTF-505, Revision 2, which are provided in section 2.3 of the LAR and evaluated in section 3.2.1 of this SE.
The NRC staff participated in a regulatory audit in March 2022 to ascertain the information needed to support its review of the application and to develop requests for additional information, as needed. On October 17, 2022, the NRC staff issued an audit summary (Reference 8). Following the regulatory audit, the licensee submitted a supplement dated June 30, 2022, that included additional information resulting from the audit.
The supplemental letters dated June 30, 2022, and November 24, 2022, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on February 22, 2022 (87 FR 9654).
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
2.1 Regulatory Review 2.1.1 Applicable Regulations Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50 provides the general provisions for Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities. The general provisions include but are not limited to establishing the regulatory requirements that a licensee must adhere to for the submittal of a license application. The NRC staff has identified the following applicable sections within 10 CFR Part 50.
Section 50.36, Technical Specifications, of 10 CFR paragraphs (c)(2), Limiting conditions for operations, and (c)(5), Administrative controls Section 50.55a, Codes and standards, of 10 CFR paragraph (h), Protection and safety systems Section 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants (i.e., the Maintenance Rule) of 10 CFR 2.1.2 Regulatory Guidance NRC Regulatory Guides (RGs) provide one way to ensure that the codified regulations continue to be met. The NRC staff considered the following guidance, along with industry guidance endorsed by the NRC during its review of the proposed changes:
RG 1.200, Revision 2, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, dated March 2009 (Reference 9) and RG 1.200, Revision 3, Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, dated December 2020 (Reference 10).
RG 1.174, Revision 3, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis (Reference 11).
RG 1.177, Revision 2, Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications, dated January 2021 (Reference 12).
NUREG-1855, Revision 1, Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decisionmaking, dated March 2017 (Reference 13).
NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [light-water reactor] Edition, Chapter 19, Section 19.2, Review of Risk Information Used to Support Permanent Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis: General Guidance, dated June 2007 (Reference 14) and Section 16.1, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, dated March 2007 (Reference 15).
Nuclear Energy institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09-A, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, dated October 2012 (Reference 16),provides guidance for risk-informed TS. The NRC staff issued a final model SE approving NEI 06-09 with limitations and conditions on May 17, 2007 (Reference 17).
The licensees submittals cite RG 1.200, Revision 2 as applicable guidance. RG 1.200 has been updated to Revision 3. The updates do not include any technical changes that would impact the consistency with TR NEI 06-09-A; therefore, the NRC staff finds the updated revision to RG 1.200 (i.e., Revision 3) also applicable for use in the adoption of TSTF-505, Revision 2.
2.2 Description of Changes Description of Risk-Informed Completion Time Program The TS LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO is not met, the licensee must shut down the reactor or follow any remedial or required action (e.g., testing, maintenance, or repair activity) permitted by the TSs until the condition can be met. The remedial actions (i.e., ACTIONS) associated with an LCO contain Conditions that typically describe the ways in which the requirements of the LCO can fail to be met. Specified with each stated Condition are Required Action(s) and CTs). The CTs are referred to as the front stops in the context of this SE. For certain Conditions, the TSs require exiting the Mode of Applicability of an LCO (i.e., shut down the reactor).
The licensees submittal requested approval to add a RICT program to the Administrative Controls section of the TSs, and modify selected CTs to permit extending the CTs, provided risk is assessed and managed as described in TR NEI 06-09-A.
The licensee is proposing no changes to the design of the plant or any operating parameter, and no new changes to the design basis in the proposed changes to the TSs. The effect of the proposed changes when implemented will allow CTs to vary, based on the risk significance of the given plant configuration (i.e., the equipment out of service at any given time), provided that the system(s) retain(s) the capability to perform the applicable safety function(s) without any further failures (e.g., one train of a two-train system is inoperable). These restrictions on inoperability of all required trains of a system ensure that consistency with the defense-in-depth (DID) philosophy is maintained by following existing guidance when the capability to perform TS safety function(s) is lost.
The proposed RICT program uses plant-specific operating experience for component reliability and availability data. Thus, the allowances permitted by the RICT program are directly reflective of actual component performance in conjunction with component risk significance.
TS 1.0 Use and Application:
Example 1.3-8 would be added to TS 1.3, Completion Times, as discussed in TSTF-505 and read as follows:
EXAMPLE 1.3-8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.
A.1 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.
7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours When a subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered. The 7 day Completion Time may be applied as discussed in Example 1.3-2.
However, the licensee may elect to apply the Risk Informed Completion Time Program which permits calculation of a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) that may be used to complete the Required Action beyond the 7 day Completion Time. The RICT cannot exceed 30 days. After the 7 day Completion Time has expired, the subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within the RICT or Condition B must also be entered.
The Risk Informed Completion Time Program requires recalculation of the RICT to reflect changing plant conditions. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.
If the 7 day Completion Time clock of Condition A has expired and subsequent changes in plant condition result in exiting the applicability of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program without restoring the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered, and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start.
If the RICT expires or is recalculated to be less than the elapsed time since the Condition was entered and the inoperable subsystem has not
been restored to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered, and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start. If the inoperable subsystems are restored to OPERABLE status after Condition B is entered, Condition A is exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition B may be terminated.
Example 1.3-3 would be added to TS 1.3, Completion Times, as discussed in TSTF-439 and read as follows:
Example 1.3-3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Function X train inoperable A.1 Restore Function X train to OPERABLE status.
7 days B. One Function Y train inoperable B.1 Restore Function Y train to OPERABLE status.
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> C. One Function X train inoperable AND One Function Y train inoperable C.1 Restore Function X train to OPERABLE status.
OR C.2 Restore Function Y train to OPERABLE status.
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 72 hours EXAMPLE 1.3-3 (continued)
When one Function X train and one Function Y train are inoperable, Condition A and Condition B are concurrently applicable. The Completion Times for Condition A and Condition B are tracked separately for each train starting from the time each train was declared inoperable and the Condition was entered. A separate Completion Time is established for
Condition C and tracked from the time the second train was declared inoperable (i.e., the time the situation described in Condition C was discovered).
If Required Action C.2 is completed within the specified Completion Time, Conditions B and C are exited. If the Completion Time for Required Action A.1 has not expired, operation may continue in accordance with Condition A.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
For TSTF-505, Revision 2, an acceptable approach for making risk-informed decisions about proposed TS changes, including both permanent and temporary changes, is to demonstrate that the proposed licensing basis changes meet the five key principles provided in section C of RG 1.174 and the three-tiered approach outlined in section C of RG 1.177.
For TSTF-439, an acceptable approach to demonstrate that the proposed licensing basis changes are satisfactory and consists of demonstrating adherence to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2),
10 CFR 50.36(c)(5), 10 CFR 50.65, and elements included in the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP).
3.1 Method of Staff Review Each of the key principles and tiers are addressed in TR NEI 06-09-A and approved in the final model SE issued by the NRC for TSTF-505, Revision 2. TR NEI 06-09-A provides a methodology for extending existing CTs to delay exiting the operational mode of applicability or taking Required Actions if risk is assessed and managed within the limits and programmatic requirements established by a RICT program. The NRC staffs evaluation of the licensees proposed use of RICTs against the key safety principles of RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 is discussed below.
For TSTF-439, the guidance in the traveler provides a method for removing the second CTs and highlights the controls of the monitoring report, the ROP, and the new requirement in TS section 1.3. The LAR included proposed changes to the TS Bases. Although the TS Bases are not part of the TSs, the NRC staff confirmed that that the TS Bases described the basis for each revised TS requirement accurately, as described in Chapter 16 of NUREG-0800. The NRC staffs evaluation of the licensees proposed removal of the second CTs is provided within Key Principle 1, section 3.2.1 of this SE. Although TSTF-439 was not submitted as a risk-informed application, NRC staff found that Key Principles 1 through 3 and the applicability of the monitoring report along with the performance indicators for Key Principle 5 applied and included their findings on TSTF-439.
3.2 Review of Key Principles 3.2.1 Key Principle 1: Evaluation of Compliance with Current Regulations Paragraph 50.36(c)(2) of 10 CFR requires that LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TS until the condition can be met. The CTs in the current TSs were established using experiential data, risk insights, and engineering judgement. The RICT program provides
the necessary administrative controls to permit extension of CTs and, thereby, delay reactor shutdown or Required Actions, if risk is assessed and managed appropriately within specified limits and programmatic requirements, and the safety margins and DID remains sufficient. The option to determine the extended CT in accordance with the RICT program allows the licensee to perform an integrated evaluation in accordance with the methodology identified in TR NEI 06-09-A and TS 5.5.19, Risk Informed Completion Times. The RICT is limited to a maximum of 30 days (termed the back stop).
The typical CT for TSTF-505 is modified by the application of the RICT program as shown in the following example. The changed portion is indicated in italics.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.
A.1 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.
7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program As illustrated in Example 1.3-3 in section 2.2 of this SE, Traveler TSTF-439 deletes the second CT from the affected Required Action, and revises Improved Standard TS (ISTS) Example 1.3-3 to remove the second CT and include in the discussion portion that alternating between Conditions in such a manner that operation could continue indefinitely without ever restoring systems to meet the LCO is inconsistent with the basis of the CTs and is inappropriate.
Therefore, the licensee shall have administrative controls to limit the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions that result in a single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. These administrative controls shall ensure that the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions that result in a single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO is not inappropriately extended. The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes to the TSs and determined that they meet the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. Additionally, the changes to the TSs were reviewed for technical clarity and consistency with customary terminology and format in accordance with NUREG-0800, Chapter 16.
In attachment 2, Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up), and enclosure 1, List of Revised Required Actions to Corresponding PRA [Probabilistic Risk Assessment] Functions, to the LAR, as supplemented, the licensee provided a list of the TSs, associated LCOs, and Required Actions for the CTs that included modifications and variations from the approved TSTF-505. In response to NRC staffs audit questions, as provided in the LAR supplement dated June 30, 2022, the licensee removed the note from TS 3.7.4.A.1 and TS 3.7.4.B.1 from the RICT program. The modifications and variations consisted of proposed changes to the Required Actions and CTs. The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes to the TSs, associated LCOs, Required Actions and CTs provided by the licensee for the scope of the RICT program and removal of second CTs for TSTF-439, Revision 2. The NRC staff concluded with the incorporation of the RICT program, existing regulations, and processes, along with administrative controls, that the required performance levels of equipment specified in LCOs are not changed, only the required CTs for the Required Actions are modified, such that 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) will remain met. Based on the discussion provided above, the NRC staff
finds that for the RICT program provided in section 2.0 of this SE, LCOs, Required Actions, and CTs meet the first key principle of RG 1.174, Revision 3, and RG 1.177, Revision 2, and therefore is acceptable for meeting the requirements 10 CFR 50.36.
3.2.2 Key Principle 2: Evaluation of DID In RG 1.174, Revision 3, the NRC identified the following considerations used for evaluation of how the licensing basis change is maintained for the DID philosophy:
Preserve a reasonable balance among the layers of defense.
Preserve adequate capability of design features without an overreliance on programmatic activities as compensatory measures.
Preserve system redundancy, independence, and diversity commensurate with the expected frequency and consequences of challenges to the system, including consideration of uncertainty.
Preserve adequate defense against potential CCFs [common cause failures].
Maintain multiple fission product barriers.
Preserve sufficient defense against human errors.
Continue to meet the intent of the plants design criteria.
The licensee requested to use the RICT program to extend the existing CTs for the respective TS LCOs detailed in attachment 2 to the LAR, as supplemented. For the TS LCOs in enclosure 1 to the LAR, as supplemented, the licensee provided a description and assessment of the redundancy and diversity for the proposed changes. The NRC staffs evaluation of the proposed changes for these LCOs assessed Callaways redundant or diverse means to mitigate accidents to ensure consistency with the plant licensing basis requirements using the guidance in RG 1.174, RG 1.177, and TSTF-505, to ensure adequate DID (for each of the functions) to operate the facility in the proposed manner (i.e., that the changes are consistent with the DID criteria).
to the LAR provided information supporting the Callaway evaluation of the redundancy, diversity, and DID for each TS LCO and Required Action as they related to instrumentation and control (I&C), and electrical power systems. The NRC staff confirmed that for the following TS LCOs, the above DID criteria were applicable except for the criteria for maintaining multiple fission product barriers.
TS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation (I&C)
TS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation (I&C)
TS 3.3.5, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation (I&C)
TS 3.8.1, AC [Alternating Current] Sources - Operating (Electrical-Power)
TS 3.8.4, DC [Direct Current] Sources - Operating (Electrical-Power)
TS 3.8.7, Inverters - Operating (Electrical - Power)
TS 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating (Electrical-Power)
For the TS LCOs specific to I&C, the NRC staff reviewed the specific trip logic arrangements, redundancy, backup systems, manual actions, and diverse trips specified for each of the protective safety functions and associated instrumentation as described in the associated Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 18) chapter 7, Instrumentation and Controls, table 15.0.6, Plant Systems and Equipment Available for Transient and Accident Conditions, and as reflected in enclosure 1 to the LAR, as supplemented, for each I&C LCO above. The NRC staff systematically examined, analyzed, and performed a confirmatory assessment for all affected functions, the number of operable channels under each RICT condition, and identified the number of channels that are required to trip the specific safety function for all the design-basis accidents (DBAs). The NRC staff confirmed that a loss of function (LOF) condition would not exist for the DBAs and RICT evaluated in the Callaway UFSAR. The NRC staff also verified, that in accordance with the Callaway UFSAR, and equipment and actions credited in enclosure 1 to the LAR, as supplemented, in all applicable operating modes, there is either at least one redundancy or at least one diverse means available, and the affected protective feature would perform its intended function by ensuring the ability to detect and mitigate the associated event or accident when the CT of a channel is extended. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the I&C TS LCOs are acceptable in accordance with TSTF-505, Revision 2.
The NRC staff also evaluated an exception in TS 3.3.2 for Condition and Required Action R.1, for the RICT to be applied only when one train is inoperable and still prevents a LOF when applying the RICT. The NRC staff finds that the application of the RICT program to TS 3.3.2 for Condition and Required Action R.1 is acceptable. For TS 3.3.5, the Class 1E AC system loads are separated into two load groups, which are powered from separate engineered safety feature transformers or two independent DGs (one per load group). The NRC staff finds that the application of the RICT with one or more Functions with one channel per bus inoperable (Condition A) does not result in a LOF and is therefore acceptable.
The NRC staff concludes that there is sufficient I&C redundancy, diversity, and DID to protect against common cause failures (CCFs) and potential single failure for the Callaway instrumentation systems evaluated in LAR enclosure 1, as supplemented, during a RICT. There is at least one diverse means specified by the licensee for initiating mitigating action for each accident event, thus providing DID against a failure of instrumentation during the RICT for each TS LCO. The DID specified by the licensee does not overly rely on manual actions as the diverse means; therefore, there is not overreliance of programmatic activities as compensatory measures. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the intent of the plants design criteria (e.g., safety functions) for the above TS LCOs related to I&C are maintained.
For the TS LCOs specific to electrical power systems, the Callaway UFSAR states that the plant is designed such that the safety functions are maintained assuming a single failure within the electrical power system. Single-failure requirements are typically suspended for the time that a plant is not meeting an LCO (i.e., in an ACTION statement). The NRC staff reviewed the information the licensee provided throughout the entirety of the LAR, as supplemented, for the proposed TS LCOs, TS Bases, and the UFSAR to verify the capability of the affected electrical power systems to perform their safety functions (assuming no additional failures) is maintained.
The NRC staff verified that the design success criteria for the affected TS LCOs reflect the redundant or absolute minimum electrical power source or/and subsystem required to be operable to support the safety functions necessary to mitigate postulated DBAs, safely shutdown the reactor, and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. In addition, the NRC staff reviewed the risk management action (RMA) examples, which provide reasonable assurance that the appropriate RMAs will be implemented to monitor and control risk. The NRC
staff finds that the intent of the plants design criteria (e.g., safety functions) applicable to the electrical and power-related TS LCOs provided above are maintained.
The NRC staff notes that while in a TS LCO condition, the redundancy of the affected system will be temporarily relaxed and, consequently, the system reliability will be degraded accordingly. The NRC staff examined the design information from the Callaway UFSAR and the risk informed TS LCO conditions for the affected safety functions. Based on this information, the NRC staff confirmed that under any given DBA evaluated in the Callaway UFSAR, the affected protective features maintain adequate DID.
Considering that the CT extensions will be implemented in accordance with the TR NEI 06-09-A guidance that also considers RMAs, and the redundancy of the offsite and onsite power systems, the NRC staff finds that the plant will maintain adequate DID. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the TS LCOs proposed by the licensee in attachment 2 to the LAR, as supplemented, are acceptable for the RICT program.
The NRC staff reviewed all TS LCOs proposed by the licensee in attachment 2 to the LAR, as supplemented, and concludes that the proposed changes do not alter the ways in which the Callaway systems fail, do not introduce new CCF modes, and the system independence is maintained. The NRC staff finds that some proposed changes reduce the level of redundancy of the affected systems, and this reduction may reduce the level of defense against some CCFs; however, such reductions in redundancy and defense against CCFs are acceptable due to existing diverse means available to maintain adequate DID against a potential single failure during a RICT. The NRC staff finds that extending the selected CTs with the RICT program following loss of redundancy, but maintaining the capability of the system to perform its safety function, is an acceptable reduction in DID during the proposed RICT period provided that the licensee identifies and implements compensatory measures in accordance with the RICT program during the extended CT.
Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the licensees proposed changes are consistent with the NRC-endorsed guidance in TR NEI 06-09-A, along with TSTF-439, Revision 2, and satisfy the second key principle in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177. Additionally, the NRC staff concludes that the changes are consistent with the DID philosophy as described in RG 1.174.
The NRC staff also finds that the removal of the second CTs remain consistent with the DID philosophy.
3.2.3 Key Principle 3: Evaluation of Safety Margins Paragraph 50.55a(h) of 10 CFR requires in part, that protection systems of nuclear power reactors of all types must meet the requirements specified in this paragraph. Section 2.2.2, Technical Specification Change Maintains Sufficient Safety Margin (Principle 3), of RG 1.177 states, in part, that sufficient safety margins are maintained when:
Codes and standards or alternatives approved for use by the NRC are met.
Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the final safety analysis report are met, or proposed revisions provide sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainties.
The licensee is not proposing in this application to change any quality standard, material, or operating specification. In the LAR, the licensee proposed to add the RICT program in section 5.0, Administrative Controls, of the TSs, which would require adherence to TR NEI 06-09-A. Furthermore, for TSTF-439, Revision 2, the licensee proposed to remove second CTs for the specified TS provided in the LAR, as supplemented.
The NRC staff evaluated the effect on safety margins when the RICT is applied to extend the CT up to a backstop of 30 days in a TS condition with sufficient trains remaining operable to fulfill the TS safety function. Although the licensee will be able to have design-basis equipment out of service longer than the current TS allow, any increase in unavailability is expected to be insignificant and is addressed by the consideration of the single failure criterion in the design-basis analyses. Acceptance criteria for operability of equipment are not changed and, if sufficient trains remain operable to fulfill the TS safety function, the operability of the remaining train(s) ensure(s) that the current safety margins are maintained. The NRC staff finds that if the specified TS safety function remains operable, sufficient safety margins would be maintained during the extended CT of the RICT program.
Safety margins are also maintained if PRA functionality is determined for the inoperable train, which would result in an increased CT. Credit for PRA functionality, as described in TR NEI 06-09-A, is limited to the inoperable train, loss of offsite power (LOOP), or component.
Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the design-basis analyses for Callaway remain applicable and unchanged, sufficient safety margins would be maintained during the extended CT, and the proposed changes to the TSs do not include any change in the standards applied or the safety analysis acceptance criteria. The NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes meet 10 CFR 50.55a(h), and therefore, the third key principle in RG 1.174 is satisfied.
3.2.4 Key Principle 4: Change in Risk Consistent with the Safety Goal Policy Statement TR NEI 06-09-A provides a methodology for a licensee to evaluate and manage the risk impact of extensions to TS CTs. Permanent changes to the fixed TS CTs are typically evaluated by using the three-tiered approach described in section 16.1 of NUREG-0800, and RG 1.177. This approach addresses the calculated change in risk as measured by the change in core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), as well as the incremental conditional core damage probability and incremental conditional large early release probability; the use of compensatory measures to reduce risk; and the implementation of a configuration risk management program (CRMP) to identify risk-significant plant configurations.
The NRC staff evaluated the licensees processes and methodologies for determining that the change in risk from implementation of RICTs will be small and consistent with the intent of the Commissions Safety Goal Policy Statement. In addition, the NRC staff evaluated the licensees proposed changes against the three-tiered approach in RG 1.177 for the licensees evaluation of the risk associated with a proposed TS CT change. The results of the NRC staffs review are discussed below.
3.2.4.1 Tier 1: PRA Capability and Insights The first tier evaluates the impact of the proposed changes on plant operational risk. The Tier 1 review involves two aspects: (1) scope and acceptability of the PRA models and their application to the proposed changes, and (2) a review of the PRA results and insights described in the licensees application.
Enclosures 2, Information Supporting Consistency with Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2; and 4, Information Supporting Justification of Excluding Sources of Risk Not Addressed by the PRA Models, to the LAR, as supplemented, identified the following modeled hazards and alternate methodologies the licensee proposed to be used in the Callaway RICT program to assess the risk contribution for extending the CT of a TS LCO.
Internal Events PRA (IEPRA) model (includes internal floods)
Internal Events Fire PRA (FPRA) model Seismic PRA (SPRA) model High Winds PRA (HW PRA) model Other External Hazards: screened out from RICT program based on Appendix 6A of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS)
RA-Sa-2009 PRA Standard, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications (Reference 19)
Evaluation of IEPRA and FPRA Models The IEPRA and FPRA models supporting the RICT program are discussed in enclosure 2 to the LAR, as supplemented. The licensee stated that the PRA models had been peer reviewed using the ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 PRA Standard for the IEPRA and FPRA and RG 1.200 Revision 2.
For the open facts and observations (F&Os) resulting from these peer reviews, the licensee stated that closure of the F&Os was performed using an independent assessment process. The NRC staff confirmed that the licensee performed closure of the F&Os consistent with Appendix E to NEI 17-07, Performance of PRA Peer Reviews Using the ASME/ANS PRA Standard1 (Reference 20), as endorsed in RG 1.200, Revision 3.
In enclosure 9 to the LAR, as supplemented, the licensee provided a discussion of potential key assumptions and sources of uncertainty, along with treatment for the application of TSTF-505.
The licensee discussed PRA modeling of flexible and diverse coping (FLEX) strategies (and associated uncertainties). The NRC staff concluded that the licensees credit for FLEX equipment for the TSTF-505 application is appropriate because the licensee used consensus human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies and practices and performed sensitivity studies to assess the impact on the TSTF-505 application.
The NRC staff reviewed the PRA models peer review history provided by the licensee in enclosure 2 to the LAR, as supplemented. The licensee adequately applied the guidance for establishing PRA technical acceptability for the IEPRA and FPRA models. The NRC staff further considered the potential key assumptions and key sources of uncertainty identified by the licensee, the licensees proposed use of surrogates in the PRA models for specific TS functions, and the licensees PRA modeling to credit for FLEX. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the Callaway 1 NRC acceptance of Appendix X to NEI 05-04, 07-12, and 12-13, Close-Out of Facts and Observations F&Os) was provided in letter on May 3, 2017 (ML17079A427). NEI 17-07, Revision 2 was developed from collective NEI documents that have been deleted and now captures the independent assessment in Appendix E, Closure of F&Os. RG 1.200, Rev. 3 provides endorsement of the F&O independent assessment process using NEI 17-07, Revision 2, as an acceptable process for meeting regulatory position C.2.2.3.
IEPRA and FPRA models to be acceptable commensurate with the RICT application. As such, the licensees use in the integrated decision-making process is consistent with RG 1.174.
Evaluation of SPRA Model The SPRA model supporting the RICT program is discussed in section 6.0, Technical Adequacy of Callaway Seismic PRA Model, of enclosure 2 to the LAR, as supplemented by letter dated June 30, 2022. The licensee stated that the SPRA model has been peer reviewed against the requirements of the ASME/ANS Standard ASME/ANS RA-S Case 1, Case for ASME/ANS RA-Sb-2013, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, (Reference 21), which was accepted in a letter by the NRC dated March 12, 2018 (Reference 22), and is now endorsed by RG 1.200, Revision 3. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee used an NRC-endorsed standard for its SPRA used to support this application and therefore, it is acceptable.
The licensee stated that the Callaway SPRA model received a full-scope peer review in June 2018. The first independent assessment was performed in March 2019 on the supporting requirements (SRs) associated with all but two F&Os from the June 2018 full-scope peer review and included a focused-scope peer review of F&Os for three SRs whose resolutions were determined to be PRA upgrades. As a result of that focused-scope peer review, the three SRs were determined to be met at Capability Category II and the corresponding F&Os were closed.
Another F&O closure review was performed in June 2020 and closed all remaining F&Os. The NRC staff finds that the Callaway SPRA was appropriately peer reviewed consistent with RG 1.200, F&Os closure review performed consistent with corresponding NRC-accepted guidance, and all F&O findings have been closed.
In section 6.0, Assessment of Supplementary Seismic PRA Epistemic Uncertainty Impacts, of enclosure 9, Key Assumptions and Sources of Uncertainty, to the LAR, the licensee provided a discussion of potential key assumptions and sources of uncertainty, along with treatment for the application of TSTF-505. The licensee concluded that there are no key sources of uncertainty in the SPRA. The licensee indicated that the SPRA currently includes no credit for FLEX equipment in the baseline model. The licensee provided a detailed review of generic SPRA modeling uncertainties with applicability and resolution for this application in its supplement dated on June 30, 2022. The NRC staff finds that not taking credit for FLEX equipment in the SPRA for TSTF-505 application is conservative, and that the licensee has appropriately considered the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty in its SPRA for this application.
Regarding the seismic HRA bin levels and the human failure event failure probabilities, the licensee stated in Attachment 9 of its supplement dated June 30, 2022, that the uncertainty associated with seismic HRA binning does not impact this application because: (1) the treatment used is a consensus model as defined in section 7.2.4, Substep E-1.4: Qualitative Screening of Source of Model Uncertainty and Related Assumptions, of NUREG-1855, Revision 1, and (2) there is no reasonable alternative to the treatment. The licensee also stated that previous sensitivity studies performed for this source of seismic HRA uncertainty showed it had a negligible impact on SPRA results. In addition, the licensee stated that configuration-specific RMAs will be implemented if warranted based on risk information including the seismic risk contributors. Based on its review, the NRC staff finds that the uncertainty associated with seismic HRA binning does not impact this application because: (1) it is a consensus model, (2) the treatment is not expected to impact the RICT calculations based on past sensitivity
studies, and (3) configuration-specific operator action RMAs will be implemented as needed based on seismic risk information about important operator actions.
In summary, the NRC staff reviewed the SPRA model peer review history provided by the licensee in enclosure 2 to the LAR, as supplemented. The NRC staff reviewed the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty identified by the licensee, seismic HRA uncertainty, and proposed lack of credit for FLEX. The NRC staff finds that the licensee adequately applied the guidance for establishing SPRA technical acceptability for this application and therefore, the Callaway SPRA model is acceptable for use in the licensees RICT application.
Evaluation of HW PRA Model The HW PRA model supporting the RICT program is discussed in section 5, Technical Adequacy of Callaway High Winds PRA Model, of enclosure 2 to the LAR, as supplemented.
The licensee stated that the HW PRA model had been peer reviewed against the requirements of Part 7 of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 PRA Standard, which is endorsed by RG 1.200, Revision 2. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee use of the NRC-endorsed standard for its HW PRA used to support this application is acceptable.
The licensee stated that the Callaway HW PRA model received a full-scope peer review in April 2019. The independent assessment was performed in November 2019 for closure of the F&Os generated in the April 2019 peer review and all F&Os were closed. The NRC staff finds that the Callaway HW PRA was appropriately peer reviewed consistent with RG 1.200. F&Os reviewed were consistent with corresponding NRC-accepted guidance, and all F&O findings have been closed.
Regarding the fragility of the grid to high wind as a source of modeling uncertainty, the licensee explained in Attachment 9 of its supplement dated June 30, 2022, that engineering judgment was used to vary the fragility of the power grid to high winds between zero and 1.0. The licensee presented a sensitivity study in which the fragility of the power grid for all wind speeds in the sensitivity case was set to zero. The four LCO conditions selected for the sensitivity study were deemed to be impacted by the high wind power grid fragility uncertainty. The result of the sensitivity study shows only LCO 3.7.8.A.1 as having a moderate change (i.e., the RICT increased from 16.1 to 20.1 days), and the other three LCOs having almost no change.
Accordingly, NRC staff finds the licensees treatment of high wind fragility acceptable because:
(1) it is a reasonable assumption accounting for the power grid remaining intact at low wind speeds (i.e., F1) to avoid over conservatism, (2) it results in minimal impact on the RICTs for the most impacted LCOs except for one moderately impacted LCO RICT even without crediting recovery, (3) the licensee will check the weather prior to entering a RICT as stated in enclosure 12, Risk Management Action Examples, to the LAR, and (4) the impact of weather-related LOOP is also included in the licensees IEPRA.
Regarding the modeling assumption associated with high wind generated missiles that could impact the HW PRA risk results, the licensee assumed that high wind missile impacts through openings in Category 1 structures result in safety equipment impacts resulting in core damage (and possibly large early release). The licensee acknowledged that this assumption is conservative because of the physical separation of the redundant trains of safety-related equipment makes it unlikely that a postulated high wind missile through a small opening in the Category 1 structure would cause the failure of equipment in redundant trains. The licensee stated in Attachment 9 of its supplement dated June 30, 2022, that a refinement has been implemented in HW PRA Update 10 to address this uncertainty. The licensee provided the
result of a sensitivity study and showed that the LERF for this updated PRA would decrease by 98 percent, and therefore, the impact of the cited modeling uncertainty is essentially eliminated.
The licensee also stated that completion of HW PRA Update 10 has been identified as an implementation item tied to a license condition to be completed prior to implementation of the RICT program. This license condition is provided in the attachment 7, Proposed Operating License Changes (Mark-up), of the licensees supplement dated June 30, 2022. Therefore, NRC staff finds that the impact of this modeling uncertainty has been resolved for the RICT application because the HW PRA modeling will be updated to remove the uncertainty before implementation of the RICT program.
In summary, the NRC staff reviewed the HW PRA model peer review history provided by the licensee in enclosure 2 to the LAR, as supplemented. The licensee adequately applied the guidance for establishing HW PRA technical acceptability. The NRC staff reviewed the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty identified by the licensee for its HW PRA, and results of sensitivity studies for the grid fragilities and high wind generated missiles. The NRC staff finds the Callaway HW PRA model to be acceptable for use in the RICT application.
Evaluation of Other External Hazards Besides the seismic and high winds hazards discussed above, the licensee confirmed that other external hazards for Callaway have an insignificant contribution to RICT and proposed that these hazards be screened from the RICT program. In enclosure 4 to the LAR, as supplemented, the licensee provided its evaluation of external hazards for the RICT program and evaluated configuration-specific impacts on the RICT program for these hazards.
The licensee provided its evaluation of the external flooding hazard based on the Callaway sites elevation above the Missouri River flood plain. The external flooding hazard has been screened out because its frequency is a negligible impact on the RICT calculations. In of its supplement dated on June 30, 2022, the licensee confirmed that external flooding, local intense precipitation, and wave hazards have negligible impact on the RICT calculations, and they can be screened out regardless of plant configuration. The NRC staff reviewed the licensees evaluation of the external flooding hazard and finds that the licensee appropriately considered the risk from external flooding in the proposed RICTs and that the external flooding hazard has an insignificant contribution to configuration risk and can be excluded from the calculation of the proposed RICTs.
The licensee provided its evaluation of all other external hazards in table E4-1, External Hazards Screening, to enclosure 4 to the LAR. The NRC staff notes that the list of hazards assessed is essentially the same list of hazards as presented in table 4-1, Hazards, of NUREG-1855, Revision 1. The licensee provided a screening disposition for each external hazard and concluded that no unique PRA model for these hazards is required to assess configuration risk for the RICT program. The licensee also evaluated all external hazards impacts on configurations specific for the RICT program and concluded that there are no impacts from the external hazards. The NRC staff notes that the preliminary screening criteria and progressive screening criteria used is the same criteria presented in SRs EXT-B1, EXT-B2, and EXT-C1 of the ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2009 PRA Standard.
Based on the NRC staffs review of the information provided by the licensee, the staff finds that the contributions from the other external hazards have an insignificant contribution to configuration risk and can be excluded from the calculation of the proposed RICTs because
they either do not challenge the plant or they are bounded by the external hazards analyzed for the plant.
Application of PRA Models, Results, and Insights in the RICT Program The Callaway base PRA models that have been determined to be acceptable in this SE will be modified as an application-specific PRA model (i.e., CRMP tool) that will be used to analyze the risk for an extended CT. The CRMP model produces results (i.e., risk metrics) that are consistent with the TR NEI 06-09-A guidance. The LAR, as supplemented, provided all the information needed to support the requested LCO actions proposed for the Callaway RICT program consistent with the limitations and conditions detailed in section 4.0 of NRCs final SE incorporated in TR NEI 06-09-A.
The NRC staff did not identify any insufficiencies in the licensees information or the CRMP tool as described in enclosure 8, Attributes of the Real Time Risk Model, to the LAR. Furthermore, as stated in attachment 1, Description and Assessment, to the LAR, the proposed TS changes do not change the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different kind of equipment will be installed). The NRC staff finds that the Callaway PRA models and CRMP tool used will continue to reflect the as-built, as-operated plant, consistent with RG 1.200, for ensuring PRA acceptability is maintained. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed application of the Callaway RICT program is appropriate for use in the adoption of TSTF-505 for performing RICT calculations.
The licensee provided in enclosure 5 of the LAR the estimated total CDF and LERF of the base PRA models to demonstrate that Callaway meets the 1E-4/year CDF and 1E-5/year LERF criteria of RG 1.174, consistent with the guidance in TR NEI 06-09-A, and that these guidelines will be satisfied for implementation of a RICT.
The licensee has incorporated TR NEI 06-09-A into TS 5.5.19. The estimated current total CDF and LERF for Callaway PRAs meet the RG 1.174 guidelines, therefore, the NRC staff concludes the PRA results and insights to be used by the licensee in the RICT program will continue to be consistent with TR NEI 06-09-A.
3.2.4.1.1 Tier 1 Conclusions Based on the above conclusions, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied the intent of Tier 1 in RG 1.177 for determining the acceptability of the PRA, including the scope of the PRA models (i.e., IEPRA, FPRA, SPRA, HW PRA), the evaluation of other external hazards is appropriate for this application.
3.2.4.2 Tier 2: Avoidance of Risk-Significant Plant Configurations As detailed in RG 1.177, the second tier evaluates the capability of the licensee to identify and avoid risk-significant plant configurations that could result if equipment, in addition to that associated with the proposed change, is taken out of service simultaneously or if other risk-significant operational factors, such as concurrent system or equipment testing, are also involved. In section 2.0, RICT Program and Procedures, of enclosure 10 to the LAR, the licensee confirmed that the risk thresholds associated with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) will be coordinated with the RICT limits. Enclosure 12, Risk Management Action Examples, to the LAR identifies three kinds of RMAs (i.e., actions to provide increased risk awareness and
control, actions to reduce the duration of maintenance activities, and actions to minimize the magnitude of the risk increase). The LAR also explains that RMAs will be implemented in accordance with current plant procedures and no later than the time at which the 1E-06 incremental core damage probability or 1E-07 incremental large early release probability threshold is reached and under emergent conditions when the instantaneous CDF and LERF thresholds are exceeded.
The NRC staff concludes that the Tier 2 attributes of the proposed RICT program, including the limits established for entry into a RICT and implementation of RMAs, are consistent with the guidance in TR NEI 06-09-A. Therefore, the proposed changes are consistent with the intent of Tier 2 in RG 1.177.
3.2.4.3 Tier 3: Risk--Informed Configuration Risk Management The third tier stipulates that the licensee should develop a program that ensures the risk impact of out-of-service equipment is appropriately evaluated prior to performing any maintenance activity. The proposed RICT program establishes a CRMP based on the underlying PRA models. The CRMP is then used to evaluate configuration-specific risk for planned activities associated with the RMTS extended CT, as well as emergent conditions which may arise during an extended CT. This required assessment of configuration risk, along with the implementation of compensatory measures and RMAs, is consistent with the principle of Tier 3 for assessing and managing the risk impact of out-of-service equipment.
Paragraph 50.36(c)(5) of 10 CFR identifies administrative controls as the provisions relating to organization and management, procedures, [thereby] assuring operation of the facility in a safe manner. In enclosure 8 to the LAR, the licensee confirmed that future changes made to the baseline PRA models and changes made to the online model (i.e., CRMP) are controlled and documented by plant procedures. Enclosure 10 of the LAR provided the attributes that the licensees RICT program procedures will address, which are consistent with TR NEI 06-09-A.
The NRC staff finds that the licensee has identified appropriate administrative controls consistent with TR NEI 06-09-A and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5).
Based on the licensees incorporation of TR NEI 06-09-A in the TSs (discussed in LAR attachment 1, as supplemented, and its use of RMAs (discussed in LAR enclosure 12), and because the proposed changes are consistent with the Tier 3 guidance of RG 1.177, the NRC staff finds the licensees Tier 3 evaluation is acceptable and supports the proposed implementation of the RICT program.
3.2.4.4 Key Principle 4: Conclusions The licensee has demonstrated the technical acceptability and scope of its PRA models and alternative methods for considering the impact of external flooding and other external hazards, and that the models can support implementation of the RICT program for determining extensions to CTs. The licensee has made proper consideration of key assumptions and sources of uncertainty. The risk metrics are consistent with the approved methodology of TR NEI 06-09-A and the acceptance guidance in RG 1.177 and RG 1.174. The RICT program will be controlled administratively through plant procedures and training and follows the NRC-approved methodology in TR NEI 06-09-A. The NRC staff concludes that the RICT program satisfies the fourth key principle of RG 1.174 and RG 1.177, and therefore, is acceptable.
3.2.5 Key Principle 5: Performance Measurement Strategies - Implementation and Monitoring RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 establish the need for an implementation and monitoring program to ensure that extensions to TS CTs do not degrade operational safety over time and that no adverse degradation occurs due to unanticipated degradation or common cause mechanisms. 1, Monitoring Program, to the LAR states, that the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) in scope of the RICT program are also in the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 for the Maintenance Rule. The Maintenance Rule monitoring programs will provide for evaluation and disposition of unavailability impacts which may be incurred from implementation of the RICT program. Furthermore, in enclosure 11 to the LAR, the licensee confirmed that the cumulative risk is calculated at least every refueling cycle, but the recalculation period does not exceed 24 months, which is consistent with TR NEI 06-09-A.
The NRC staff concludes that for TSTF-505, Revision 2 (i.e., the RICT program), satisfies the fifth key principle of RG 1.174 because: (1) the RICT program will monitor the average annual cumulative risk increase as described in TR NEI 06-09-A, thereby, ensuring the program, as implemented, continues to meet the guidance in RG 1.174 for small risk increases; and (2) all affected SSCs are within the Maintenance Rule program, which is used to monitor changes to the reliability and availability of these SSCs.
For TSTF-439, Revision 2, there are two existing programs that provide a strong disincentive to licensees continuing operation with alternating Required Actions. These programs are the monitoring report (10 CFR 50.65) program and the ROP.
The TS completion time for one system within an LCO is not generally affected by inoperable equipment in another LCO. However, the second completion time influences the completion time for one system based on the condition of another system, but only if the two systems are required by the same LCO. Paragraph 50.65(a)(4) of 10 CFR is a much better mechanism to apply this influence, as the monitoring report considers all inoperable risk-significant equipment, not just the one or two systems governed by the same LCO. Furthermore, as discussed above, the monitoring report requires each licensee to monitor the performance or condition of SSCs against licensee-established goals to ensure the SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. The performance and condition monitoring activities required by 10 CFR 50.65 identify maintenance practices that would result from multiple entries into the actions of the TSs and unacceptable unavailability of these SSCs. The effectiveness of these performance monitoring activities, and associated corrective actions is evaluated at least every refueling cycle, not to exceed 24 months per 10 CFR 50.65.
In addition to the monitoring report, the reporting of performance indicator data governed by NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, (Reference 23) as endorsed by RIS 2001-11, Voluntary Submission of Performance Indicator Data (Reference
- 24) establishes an acceptable method for the submission of performance indicator data to the NRC. The ROP consists of cornerstones that includes inspection of the indicators to ensure all ROP objectives are being met. The mitigating systems cornerstone specifically addresses the AC sources-operating which encompasses the AC sources and distribution system LCOs and the auxiliary feedwater system. Any extended unavailability of these systems due to multiple entries into the TS Actions would affect the NRCs evaluation of the licensees performance indicator data provided under the ROP. The licensees performance within the mitigating systems ROP cornerstone provides reasonable assurance in monitoring the inappropriate use of TS condition CTs.
In addition to these regulatory programs, the administrative controls discussed above in section 3.2.1 of this SE limit the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions that result in a single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee continues to have mechanisms in place to monitor and to limit the maximum time allowed for any combination of conditions that could result in a single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. The NRC staff finds the proposed deletion of second CTs are acceptable because multiple, continuous entries into TSs conditions, without meeting the LCO, will be adequately controlled by: (1) the licensees administrative controls, (2) the CRMPs as implemented to meet the requirements of the monitoring report to assess and manage risk and performance indicators, (3) assessment of the licensees performance within the mitigating systems ROP cornerstone, and (4) the requirements of section 1.3 of the TSs. In addition, the NRC staff finds the monitoring report provides adequate assurance against inappropriate use of combinations of TS conditions that result in a single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. Accordingly, consistent with TSTF-439, Revision 2, the NRC staff finds the proposed changes to be acceptable.
The NRC staff also notes Ameren Missouri also has an action in the Callaway action item tracking program to revise Operations procedure ODP-ZZ-00001, Operations Department -
Code of Conduct, to include a statement that emphasizes: Alternating between LCO Conditions, in order to allow indefinite continued operation while not meeting the LCO, is not allowed.
3.3 Changes to Operating License In attachment 7 of its letter dated June 30, 2022, the licensee proposed to add a new license condition (License Condition 2.C.(20)) to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 for Callaway, which states:
Adoption of Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times -RITSTF Initiative 4b Ameren Missouri is approved to implement TSTF-505, Revision 2, modifying the Technical Specification requirements related to Completion Times (CT) for Required Actions to provide the option to calculate a longer, risk-informed CT (RICT). The methodology for using the new Risk-Informed Completion Time Program is described in NEI 06-09-A, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines.
Ameren Missouri will complete the implementation item identified in Attachments 1 and 9 of Ameren Missouri letter ULNRC-06739, Post-Audit Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-439 and TSTF-505 (LCDN 20-0007), dated June 30, 2022, prior to implementation of the RICT program (i.e., prior to implementing License Amendment 229).
The NRC staff finds that the proposed license condition is acceptable because it explicitly states for implementation that the Callaway RICT program and PRAs will: (1) be consistent with TR NEI 06-09-A, and therefore consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 2.
3.4 Technical Evaluation Conclusion
The NRC staff has evaluated the proposed changes against each of the five key principles in RG 1.177 and RG 1.174, including the optional variations from the approved TSTF-505 discussed in section 3.2.1 of this SE. The NRC staff concludes that the changes proposed by the licensee satisfy the key principles of risk-informed decision-making identified in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177, and therefore, the requested adoption of the proposed changes to the TSs, implementation items, and associated guidance, is acceptable to assure the paragraphs of 10 CFR Part 50 identified in Section 2.0 of this SE continue to be met.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Missouri State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on October 27, 2022. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration published in Federal Register on February 22, 2022 (87 FR 9654), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
7.0 REFERENCES
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Principal Contributors: A. Brown J. Circle M. Li E. Kleeh W. Roggenbrodt III S. Sun N. Khan A. Russell C. Moulton D. Wu C. Li D. Scully K. Tetter Date: December 2, 2022
- by email OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL4/PM*
NRR/DORL/LPL4/LA*
NRR/DRA/APLA/BC*
NRR/DRA/APLC/BC*
NAME MChawla PBlechman RPascarelli SVasavada DATE 11/3/2022 11/3/2022 10/25/2022 10/25/2022 OFFICE NRR/DEX/EEEB/BC*
NRR/DEX/EICB/BC*
NRR/DSS/SCPB/BC*
NRR/DSS/SNSB/BC(A)*
NAME WMorton MWaters BWittick DWoodyatt DATE 10/25/2022 10/25/2022 10/25/2022 10/26/2022 OFFICE NRR/DSS/STSB/BC*
OGC NLO*
NRR/DORL/LPL4/BC*
NRR/DORL/LPL4/PM*
NAME VCusumano KDowling JDixon-Herrity MChawla DATE 10/26/2022 11/22/2022 12/2/2022 12/2/2022