ML22230A159

Tran-M780601: SECY-78-250: International Safeguards Function, Public Meeting

ML22230A159
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Issue date:	06/01/1978
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RETURN TO SECRETARIAT RECORDS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:

SECY-78-250:

INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS FUNCTION PUBLIC MEETING Place - Washington, D. C.

Date - Thursday, 1 June 1978 Pages 1 - 67 Telechone:

(202 ) 3.47-3700 A.CE - FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

OffiCUJ.l Reporters 4.44 North Capitol Street Washington, D C. 20001 NATlONWIDE COVERAGE* DAILY

DISCLAIMER This is. an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on _June_ l, 1.978 in the Commission's offices at 1717 H Street, N. H., l*Jashington, 0. C. The meeting was open to public attendance and observation. Tnis transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.

- The transcript is intended solely for general infonn'ationa1 purposes.

As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the fonnal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed. Expres-sions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final de.terminations or be 1i efs. No pleading or other paper may be fi 1ed with the Cotiuili ssi on in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or arg~ment contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.

2 CR 7746 UNITED STATES OF AMERIC WHITLOCK 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 PUBLIC MEETING 4 SECY-78-250: INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS FUNCTION 5

6 7

8 Room 1130 1717 H Street, N. W.

9 Washington, D.C.

10 Thursday, 1 June 1978 11 12 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m.

- 13 14 15 BEFORE:

DR. JOSEPH HENDRIE, Chairman PETER BRADFORD, Commissioner 16 RICHARD KENNEDY, Commissioner 17 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 18 ALSO PRESENT:

19 L. GOSSICK C. SMITH 20 J. SHEA B. BURNETT 21 H. SHAPAR

w. DIRCKS 22 R. PAGE K. PEDERSEN 23 c. STOIBER J. KELLEY 24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25

746.06.1 3 jwb P R OCE E D I NGS 2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE! Let us turn to the next of_this 3 afternoonJs subjects, which is a diicussion of the 4 responsibilities in international safeguards matters between 5 the Off ice_ of International Programs and NM.SS. We have a 6 staff paper, and a.ssorted additional papers-.

7 We just got two loose ones passed around. I 8 presume you will tell us where that fits into the scheme of 9 things.

10 Practically everybody is- here; please go ahead.

Jl Lee, do you want to start?

12 MR. GOSSICK.: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners:

13 The topic that we have here today is a result of 14 an effort that has extended.over better than two years, 15 actually, in trying to iron out and resolve the manual 16 chapters for both IP and NMSS.

17 The primary issue that is involved is with regard 18 to the international safeguards function. And I would like to 19 say, at the outset, that what is not in issue contrary to 20 some reports that have been around town -- is that there is 21 any proposal to strip NMSS of any responsibility that they 22 have for the functions given to them in the delegations that 23 are presently in existBnce that were put into effect following 24 the Commission*"s adoption of --- well, the decision with regard 25 to establishing the intBrnational office back in 1975.

7 746.06.2 4 jwb As Commissioner Gilinsky and Commissioner Kennedy 2 .will reca-11, ther.e was a joint study done by OPE and EDO --

3 the so-called "Hum and Gossick" study. That is pe.rt of the 4 paper that is bafore you, and which sort of gives a background 5 on the reasoning why *-- that underlie, I think, the 6 CommissionJs decision to go ahead and take the newly emphasized 7 export function that we picked up in the Energy Reorganization 8 Act, and to put it into the Office of International Programs 9 and to set up the International Programs as a separate o.ffice.

10 On the little handout that I have given to you are J1 tbe issues that are listed in the beginning of the paper that 12 there is disagreement over as to who should have lead 13 responsibility for.

14 They primarily center here on a problem that the 15 sta+/-f has bad in distinguishing between technical and policy 16 matters. I think this was primarily the intent -- at least 17 undErstood to be the intent of the Commission was to centralize 18 in IP the policy-kind nf functions related to export-imports, 19 as .well as the operational aspect of export-import licensing --

20 but the policy aspects of international safeguards.

21 The matrix that is orr the handout sheet that you 22 have there shows that there is really no disagreement with 23 regard to the export-import licensing functions, per se, 24 between NMSS and IP. It is only in the international 25 safeguards under the policy issue that there is disagreement

746.06.3 5 jwb as to who should have lead responsibility.

2 NMSS feels that 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: It would help me if I 4 understood more ~recisely what how II international 5 safeguards policy,-11 in the NRC context, is defined. What is 6 it?

7 MR. GOSSICK.: Okay. We have tried to distinguish, 8 on the second handout which we gave you which is also part 9 of the paper -- by example, the listing of things *-- the 10 enclosure, and one Section B - - that is in front of us *

.11 The first group of about five items there are 12 indicative of our understanding with regard to the technical 13 kind of functions that we expect NMSS -- I expect, and I think 14 it is my understanding that the Commission expected -- NMSS to 15 be responsible for.

16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: Is there any question on 17 those as to whoss?

18 MR. GOSSICK.: Not in my mind, nor in IP*'s mind, or 19 in the staffJs mind. I think NMSS can sp~ak to that, if they 20 like

• 21 As I sBy, again, there is no intent to remove --

22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But everyone on your side 23 of the table is agreed that those five~things are NMSS 24 functions? Is that correct?

25 MR

• GOSS I CK : Yes

• 746.06.4 6 jwb DR. SMITH: Mr. Commissioner, I had some comments

- 2 3

4 I wanted to make *--

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

DR. SMITH:

But I was wanting to --

-- with respect to those five things.

5 As a minimum, we see it as our responsibility.

- 6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But there is no question as 7 to those?

8 DR. SMITH: V~e are not sure .as to exactly what all 9 of them mean, because that brings us right back again to 10 technical vis-a-vis policy.

11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Then we will have to come back to them.

12 13 MR. GOSSICK: The general factors are subjects 14 that there are different positions on. It first of all starts 15 out With the differing interpretations of the delegations of 16 authority. And, as I indicated, the IP was established in 17 June of -'76 by the delegation from the Commission to the EDO, 18 and which I redelegated to IP.

19 And generally, it empowered the EDD to fulfLll 20 NRC functions for programs of cooperation with foreign 21 countries and international organizations, and responsibility 22 for export and import licensing actions,. including 23 international safeguards and nonproliferation matters.

24 It included.specific authority to coordinate the 25 international functions of the NHC staff. As you are well

746.06.5 7 jwb aware, there are international activities of one kind or 2 another in every office, practically, of the staff.

3 Second! y, t.o represent the NRC with in areas of its 4 responsibility in liaison with other U.S. agencies, U.S. firms 5 and organizations, and foreign countiies, and groups.

6 And a third, to coordinate representation of other 7 NRC offices within these areas.

8 IP and NMSS interpreted this delegation differently.

9 Given these responsibilities, IP believes that it should be 10 performing as the lead NRC office for international safeguards Jl policy and nontechnical matters. NMSS should provide the key 12 technical expert safeguard support on safeguards -- or for 13 that matter, any other f unctio.ns under their jurisdiction *

.x6 14 NMSS, on the other hand, does not perceive its 15 statutory responsibilities concerning international safeguards 16 activities to be diminished by the June JJ6 17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Are there any statutory 18 responsibilities as to international safeguards?

19 MR. SHAPAR: You are asking whether or not the law 20 dictates one conclusion or another, in terms of the dispute 21 now confronting the Commission?

22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: No. I am a.sking.: Is there 23 a statutory assignment of responsibility for international 24 safeguards?

25 DR. SMITH.: The law simply refers to "all materials

746.06.6 8 jwb licensing safeguards.II It doesn-'t distinguish between 2 "domestic" and JI inter.national **11 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: So there is no specific 4 statutory comment on the subject, one way or the other.

5 MR. SHAPAR: Correct.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: From which I conc.lude .what?

7 MR. SHAPAR: Th~t it is a policy decision, and 8 policy should dictate the Commiss.ion-'s decision.

9 MR. GOSSI CK: .On that point, the NM.SS views 10 expressed in the paper - and this has been expressed by

.Jl Dr. Smith believes that it has statutory -- has a 12 statutory mandate to have the lead responsibility for all 13 safeguards functions, both domesti~ and international.

14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But you just sa.id that isn-'t 15 correct.

16 MR. GOSSICK.: I am merely expressing the different 17 Views.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I-'rn trying to be sure I 19 undsrstand_this. I read all this. I want to make sure I 20 understand what is being said.

21 Are you saying that that is not correct?

22 MR. SHAPAR: I do not feel that 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: There is not a statutory 24 mandate.

25 MR. SHAPAR: I am.

7 4.6. 06. 7 9 jwb COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Good. That-'s what I wanted 2 to understand.

3 MR. GOSSICK: And also, that they should have the 4 lead responsibility for centralized policy input, both 5 technical and nontechnical, in the safeguards function.

6 On the next factor - the scope of NRCJ s role in 7 international safeguards - IP considers that NRC has broad 8 policy-oriented roles in international safeguards. IP is the 9 appropriate office where these should be carried on for the JO Commi..ssion *

.I I NMSS feels that responsibility for policy in 12 international safeguards is with the Executive Branch, and 1.3 that the NRC r.ole is to address technical isSUE;!S; and that 14 NMSS is the office to do this.

15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: If we donJt have - if - I 16 understood what you just said. The argument is that we don.,t 17 have any policy role, and there1ore it is a technical J8 r.espons ibLl i ty; and_ there.fore, the role should rest within 19 NMSS.

20 MR. GOSSI CK: As v.iewed by NMSS.

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: If that is a logical set of 22 postulates, I guess that that would be a wholly reasonable 23 syllogism. Since we don 1 t ~ave any policy questions, and 24 since they do have -- it is not argued that they don 1 ~ have 25 responsibility for the technical business and our

746.06.8 10 jwb responsibilities are technical, then they would be responsible.

2 The only question is: Do we, or do we not, have a 3 policy role? And if I understood the argument, they argue we 4 do not?

5 DR. SMITHi Mr. Commissioner, Mr. Gossick is giving 6 his interpretation. I have .my views, and I would be glad to 7 address .that when .he gets through. That is not exactly my 8 V i.ew.

9 MR. G0SSICK.: That is a quote out of your memo.

10 DR. SMITH: That all depends on how you read that.

,11 You have taken it out of cont.ext.

12 MR. G0SSICK: I donJt_ think so.

13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: All right. So that is the 14 question that we have. I take it that others are as confused 15 about it as I. Okay, I hope we will clear it up.

16 MR. GOSSICK: Let me go into the next point -- the 17 practicality of separating policy and technical aspects.

18 This, as I said earlier, has been sort of a problem 19 ever since the initial decision was made when Mr. Chatman and 20 I were initially trying to work out the agreement on the 21 manual 1 s chapter on responsibilities for the two organizations.

22 The IPJs view is that policy and technical aspects 23 of international safeguards are closely interrelated. They 24 are really primarily technical; therefore it is useful to have 25 a policy-oriented office on the technical expertise of others.

746.06.9 JI jwb Thus, IP would function very much lik.e international o.ffices 2 in DOE, DOT, and so forth.

3 NM SS-' s view, as I understand it, is that the 4 separation of policy from the technical aspects in 5 international safeguards has made the*development of overall 6 safeguards policy difficult to achieve in a timely mannsr; 7 and, that fractionalizing of safeguardsJ programs in six 8 offices is inefficient.

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Could .we get some examples 10 of that, later? Specific examples of where this "difficulty"

.11 is causing delays in developing policy?

12 DR. SMITH1 Yes.

13 MR. GOSSICK: Of course, the general area that is 14 a problem is in the practicality of separating domestic from 15 inte rna tio na 1 aspects.

16 IP has the view that ssparation is sound because 17 of substantive differences betwsen domestic and international 18 aspects, in that they involve negotiations with sovereign 19 countries, negotiations with international organizations, 20 nonproliferation considerations, and foreign relations policy 21 elements.

22 Since NRCJs interest in international safeguards 23 derives from NRCJs export licensing responsibilities, IPJs 24 lead is logical, sensible, and efficient.

25 NMSS states that domestic and international

746.06. 10 12 jwb safeguardsJ functions are intimately related. International

- 2 3

4 safeguardsJ functions rest on assessments of technology and require intimate knowledge .of domestic safeguards that NMSS should have the lead in; and otherwise, that the.re is 5 duplication.

6 Finally, the last point is the matter of Qffice 7 responsibilities with regard to intelligence interfaces. As 8 you Will recall, I sent a memo to the Commission on April the 9 6th 10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Could I ask - that is a

.I I ~lightly different subject?

-- 12 13 14 MR. GOSSICK; Yes, this is a different matter that has come up sort of as a corollary, or as we have tried to work with the rest of the problem. This has only fairly 15 recently been added on to the list of problems.

16 At any rate, in response to some questions that 17 Commissioner Gilinsky had with regard to how we were handling 18 the intelligence functions within the sta+/-f -- as I say, I 19 sent you the memo, and it is a part of the paper, as well.

20 The views here are that I.P +/-.eels that it should be 21 the focal point for intelligence on foreign nuclear programs 22 and activities, and that it has been for some time.

- 23 24 25 NMSS has the view that they should be the focal point for all NRC intelligence matters, and has already established contacts.

746.06. 11 13 jwb The view that I expressed to you in April was that

- 2 3

4 the agreements between NRC and the various international and domestic intelligence agencies, rather than being executed by any of the staff offices -- either of the staff offices --

5 should be executed by the EDO, of course, with the help of 6 both o+/-fices, or either offices, as appropriate, in the 7 farmulation of such agreements; that with regard to the 8 international intelligence matters, IP would be the principal 9 offfice for liaison with and for coordinating and levying 10 requests for information from such agencies as the CIA and

.11 the DIA dealing with nuclear programs and nonproliferation 12 activities in foreign countries, including information 13 concerning security and safeguards~ aspects and +/-oreign 14 terrorist activities.

15 The Information Assessment Team, which is composed 16 of the NMSS, chaired by NMSS, made up by representatives from

\

17 the NRR and I&E, would be the primary point of contact for 18 requesting information concerning domestic terrorist threats.

19 This would be under generally, under tne management of the 20 NMSS, as I say. It is chaired by a man from NMSS.

21 Their primary concentration would be, however, on 22 intelligence liaison work with the FBI, local and state law 23 enforcement agencies, with reJard to threats against the 24 domestic facilities. As we heard in the hearings in front 25 of Senator Glenn, with the FBI in the event of such an activity

746.06.12 14 jwb or incident which has the lead responsibility.

- 2 3

4 It seems to us that the primary emphasis should be in interacting with the FBI, and not that there wouldnJt be other inpGts with regard to threat information and so forth, 5 that we would not utilize it.

6 Nevertheless, that is the general arrangement that 7 I would recommend. This is based on a study that I asked end #6 8 Bill Dircks to do back earlier -- ~ell, actually, last fall.

9 10 JI 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

- 23 24 25

7746 .07. l 15 mte That b.rings us to the recommendations. As indicated 2 in the paper, my recommendation was to you that you reaffirm 3 the existing delegations that have been given to the ED0 and 4 to the NMSS explicitly delegating IP with the lead 5 responsibility for the broad international safeguards 6 responsibility for Commission consideration, development of 7 staff recommendati~ns for export-import licensing, review of 8 criteria regarding physical security and safeguards, and 9 nonproliferation assurances; and thirdly, for monitoring for 10 NRC in recommending NRC positions on upgrading of JI international safeguards programs and coordinating 12 international safeguards policies on nontechnical matters and 13 interacting with other agencies, the IAEA and other NRC 14 offices and the intelligence office community.

15 This is not to say, I want to say again, that this 16 is taking a.way from the present and past practice, .where the 17 NMSS folks have interacted extensively with the IAEA in 18 providing technical expertise and inputs into the various 19 activities that are going on there with regard to safeguards 20 and so forth.

21 Secondly, the director of NMSS should be given, of 22 course, specific direction with regard to the CommissionJs 23 view and intention with regard to rea+/-firming or any 24 modification that you may make of the existing delegations for 25 IP as well as NMSS.

746.07.2 16 mte And then, thirdly, designate IP as the NRC 2 coordinating office for information dealing with nuclear 3 programs and nonproliferation activities of foreign countries, 4 and the principal liaison office with intelligence agencies 5 such as DIA and CIA.

6 Fourthly, agree that a 11 interagency agr_eement s 7 between NRC and the intelligence agencies be concluded, if not 8 by the Commission, by the EDO; and note that we .will take the 9 necBssary action to implement these.

10 Again I want to repeat, at the risk of being

.11 redundant: There is no intent, and it has not been 12 contemplated by myself or IP, for that matter, to take a.way 13 any of the safeguards assessment functions, the expert 14 safeguards ability, that is in NMSS with regard to either 15 physical securit~ or safeguards or, for that matter, to 16 curtail their interaction with the .international bodies or 17 other bilateral talks ~1th technical efforts of various kinds, 18 such as the IAEA or other activities.

19 Now, as there has been indicatsd, there is 20 disagreement on this matter. I call on Cli+/-f to say whatever 21 he would like to at this point.

22 DR. SMITH: Thanks, Lee. I just have a +/-ew brief 23 comments that I would really like to make in toto if I could, 24 and then respond to questions.

25 As Mr. Gossick has pointed out, the background of

746.07.3 17 mte the issue, at least since my residence at NHC, really goes 2 back to being asked to sign o.ff on a proposed manual chapter 3 for IP which appeared to be -- not to be in concert with the 4 delegation of responsibility that they had vis a vis our 5 respons.ibility.

6 I felt that the manual chapter as proposed, and 7 inde,ed, Mr. GossickJs recommendations, do diminish my office~s 8 responsibilities as I perceived them in the area of 9 international safeguards and physical security. I felt that 10 it was important that we have the opportunity to discuss this JI issue with you and get guidance. Whichever way it goes, we 12 will do our best to implement it.

13 i,.i, We view international safeguards as an extension of 14 domestic safeguards. We donJt believe that you can separate 15 or at least very easily separate technical from policy, and 16 domestic from international, in the area of international 17 safeguqrds in the area of safeguards. My reasons for that 18 are policy formulation. That is, establishing goals and 19 objectives, performing them in terms of a_policy, .whether 20 domestic or international.

21 To a large extent, they flow from what is feasible.

22 We are not going to establish policy generally that is not 23 feasible. ~hat is feasible in this area rests on an intimate 24 knowledge of the technical aspects of, basically, the domestic 25 safe;Juards program. That is what can be done. _ This expertise

746.07.4 18 mte already exists in NMSS, and we are currently heavily involved 2 in international safeguards and physical security problems.

3 Further, we believe that these are really primarily 4 operational functions, if you will, as distinguished from 5 coordination functions, and they more properly belong in a 6 major program office where ail of these other activities where 7 the people reside are. If the rasponsibility is to be 8 affirmed in Mr. Gossick*'s staff o.ffice of IP, then .we believe 9 sincerely that it will invariably lead to two centers of 10 expertise in the area of international safeguards *

.I I Along with that is the attendant duplication 12 problem, communications problem, which we feel that we do to 13 some extent already have. It has been my opinion - and that 14 is why we are here -- that it was our responsibility to be the 15 lead office in the area of international safeguards and 16 physical security * . We felt, as I said earlier, that the 17 existing delegation was unclear. We had some difficulty with 18 the proposed manual chapter for IP. Thus we felt it proper to 19 seek guidance from you as to what the Commission deemed was 20 NMSSJs role to play.

21 To us, the fundamental question is, or the 22 fundamental questions are~ Is NMSS to have a passive role in 23 international safeguards and physical security? Are we to 24 have, if you will, no lead responsibility in this area? Are 25 we to participate, then, only when requested, or comment only

r146.07.5 19 mte when required? We are not sure. Then, to channel these

- 2 3

4 comments through IP and thus to the EDO and ultimately to the Commission?

In all candor, this is how we read the 5 recommendations that are embodied in SECY-78-250. One 6 example:

• It says on page 6: 11 The development o.f staff 7 *recommendations for export and import licensing review 8 criteria regarding safeguards and physical security is IP1 s 9 responsibility." We had been operating on the premise that 10 that was what we have been doing, and that it was clearly our

.11 responsibility.

12 Frankly, what I don 1 t wish to happen is to be

- 13 14 15 accused, if you wi 11, of not properly conducting_ the a.ff airs of this office, NMSS, with respect to international safeguards and physical security matters. Consequently, I share Mr.

16 Gossick-'s vie.w that it is impo_rtant to explicitly make it 17 clear what we in NMSS are responsible for and what we aren-'t 18 responsible for, and then we will do our very best to carry*

19 out the Commission.,s directives in the area.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Actually, NMSS -- you are 21 not the only ones 22 23 MR. PEDERSON: We represent you on the Ad Hoc 24 Committee on Nonproliferation, which gets into those matters 25 from time to time.

746.07.6 20.

mte MR. SHEA: There are other off ices within the st a.ff 2 also involved. The Office of Standards in IE, and so on.

3 Mostly it is NMSS and IP. NRR is also involved.

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Could you be more specific 5 and indicate some explicit activities over .which -- I am still 6 unclear whsn you talk about policy technical matters. It is 7 too abstract a level, I think.

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDYl This goes to the question I 9 was raising before. I was trying to see if we could see what IO of all of these. things ,that are somewhat more specific, and

.I l maybe .we could disp.ose of them, and see .what the others ar.e.

12 MR. G0SSICK.: I guess really, about th.e way it has 13 been .working as far as the kind of. things that com~ to you, as 14 far as export licenses or matters related to it - as I say, 15 we are not about to take anything away.

16 I guess I would prefer to ask Cliff what he feels is 17 being proposed as a policy kind of. thing that we ar.e proposing 18 to reaffirm to IP that he takes objection to.

19 MR. BURNETT: I guess if I could direct some words 20 toward Mr. Gilinsky~s question: In the new delegation as Mr.

21 Gossick has prepared it, .we again still have difficulty in 22 interpreting the rules.

23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Is it new? Is it different?

24 MR. G0SSICK: No.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Has it changed from the

746.07.7 21 mte existing delegations that are already in affect?

2 MR. BURNETT: We think it is a broadening of it.

3 But in this one, where he hits the technical aspects, Mr.

4 Commissioner, we have some degree of difficulty in 5 understanding what is meant in his item D, which is technical 6 aspects of the implementation. I guess Mr. Shea and I each 7 have drawn lines that we each recognize. Unfortunately, I do 8 not think that they are the same lines.

9 I am still confused as to what that means.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: Could somebody show me the JI technical aspects part?

12 MR. BURNETT: Enclosure one, section B.

13 MR. GOSSICK: That is the handout I gave you, 14 Commissioner Kennedy. The fourth one down, I think you are 15 pointing to?

16 MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir. I called it B. It could be 17 the fourth one down.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The technical aspect of 19 MR. BURNETT: Each of the deleg~tions that you see 20 there are purely technically oriented. We have difficulty 21 drawing such _a line on many aspects of the international. I 22 can give you examples which we have differed on.

23 Okay.. In some exports, NMSS wi 11 come back and ask 24 certain questions on which there is some opinion by IP that 25 either the questions are not needed to be asked or outside

746.07.8 22 mte the purview of NRC. Now, I donJt really know which of those 2 is true. I donJt_think that either one of us can answer that 3 question. That is why weJre coming to see you.

4 But in all cases it has resulted in some delay in 5 the process of the export applications.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: What kinds of questions are 7 these?

8 MR. BURNETT.: In our opinion they are questions as 9 to -- added to our --

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Give us a specific.

l I MR. BURNETT: Looking for information having to do 12 with physical security provided either during transport or 13 location of a particular export.

14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It sounds like technical 15 review let me ask you a question. Suppose the Commission

16. found for your interpretation. You now have an export license 17 on hand. You propose to handle the whole thing?

18 MR. BURNETT: No, sir.

19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEJ You propose that there be an IP?

20 MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir.

21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: And they handle inputs, outputs, 22 and so on?

23 DR. SMITH: Yes, sir. We are not questioning that.

24 We are not cont~sting that at all.

25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Now, in the license, where we

746.07.9 23 mte come down to the place that you feel that further information 2 is needed from the export -- okay, just as you did if it had 3 been IP leading, okay, you now get the list af questions ready 4 to go. You propose to ask IP what they think about it?

5 MR. BURNETT: That is how it is set up now.

6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: No, no. I am saying if the 7 Commission finds for your version o.f the delegation of 8 authority and puts the policy safeguards matters as well as 9 the technical safeguards matters in NMSS. That is, if we give 10 you the whole ball of wax the way that you have defined it.

J 1 You now, on a given license, have prepared draft questions.

12 IP continues to be the group that compiles the papers, pulls 13 things together, and so on.

14 Question: Ar.e you going to ask IP .what they think 15 about these questions?

16 DR. SMITH: It would be my view that I would s~e no 17 problem .with routing those questions .through IP. But it would 18 be not their decision to decide that those questions ought not 19 to be asked. If we are being asked---

20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You would propose to route them 21 through IP. Now IP sends you back a memorandum and says, we 22 think that these questions oughtnJt to be asked, or question 23 three oughtnJt to be asked, or ought to be authored in the 24 following way, because of certain international agreements 25 considerations or fore~gn policy considerations or so on. Now

746.07.10 24 mte what are you going to do?

2 MR. BURNETT.: That is what .we have experienced and 3 which has resulted in delays.

4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: No, I am asking what you-'re going 5 to do if w.e give you the .whole shmear?

6 DR. SMITH: We would say, fine, .we have heard you, 7 and perhaps .we don-'t agree with you. We would like to get the 8 information.

9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Without regard to the merits of 10 their --

11 DR. SM! TH: No, no. Obviously, we would consider 12 the merits of their comment, just like when .we coordinate 13 papers with ELD or any other office, sends it back and says, 14 you are all wet. We look _at it and if .we stiil feel that way, 15 we go with it.

16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: So now you have prepared the 17 questions. It has gone out for transmittal. You-'ve got a 18 comment that says: Question 3(a), we ought to do something 19 about that because of this consideration._ You have considered 20 that. Now you are going to sit down with IP and either agree 21 with them and change the nature of the question, or you are 22 going to disagree with them and say, here is why we disagree, 23 and now we want to go forward with the questions. Right?

24 DR. SMITH: Yes.

25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Now, presumably, if you -- if it

746.07.ll 25 mte were your full lead on international safeguards, IP presumably

- 2 3

4 would eventually have to transmit the questions.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Would they?

I don 1 t know whether they would 5 or not.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Or .would th_e responsibility 7 then rest with these people?

8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: No, I_think the opinion down here 9 would be that if we gave that whole responsibility, that 10 indeed, the ultimate decision to transmit or not ought to lie

.1 I .with them.

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes, but the actual 13 transmission wouldn 1 t be within 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE-: The actual transmission would be

'\

I 15 down here.

~

16 No.w, in the present cas.e *-- in the present case, 17 Mhat turns out different? What happens when you send a 18 question up to IP and they send back and say, 3(a), gee, 19 because o+/- the following foreign policy considerations, that 20 ought to be changed in some way or other, perhaps. And you 21 now go and discuss it with them. Now, what happens now?

22 23 24 25

26 46 .08. I pv MR. BURNETT: Generally happening right now is that 2 we do get our questions. sent to the proper party for 3 answering. In no case has IP other than delayed the answering 4 of the question. We have successfully got the question.

5 Sometimes, the importance 6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: How much of a delay?

7 MR. BURNETT: It varies. Sometimes, the importance 8 varies.

9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What are .the outer limits?

10 CHAIRMAN HENDR IEJ That is very ihteres.ting,

.I I because it kind of comes out where I suspect it came out, that 12 is, it doesn~t make a whale of a lot of difference if you have 13 got information that you think you have to have and a good 14 argument for it and you hang to it, you end up getting the 15 questions. And you don't propose, if you were given the lead, 16 that you would ignore these people, that you would either 17 bypass them and send the questions directly, you know, get 18 your own book of stamps, nor do you suggest you would ignore 19 their comments and criticisms and the question; you would 20 still discuss them.

21 I presume, then, that whatever delays now exist in 22 the system because of that discussion back and forth would, in 23 fact, obtain if you*were given the full thing. You would go 24 through the same steps. You are going to prepare the 25 questions. You're going to send them up there. YouJre going

46.08.2 27 pv to discuss differences. You are not going to do it any faster 2 because you have the lead than because they have the lead.

3 And, indeed, what you tell me is that, under the present 4 system, you end up getting your way in those cases, 5 apparently, where you feel that you want to get it.

6 MR. BURNETT: There is some discontent on both 7 sides.

8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: It is not going to be any 9 different if you got the lead, unless there is the implication 10 in your having the lead that, you know, it sounds all nice and

.11 even at the table and we wi 11 consult and so on, but after we 12 get back to Bethesda we will stomp on these people.

L.3 CLaughter.)

14 DR. SMITH: I don.,,t s_ee it that way, Mr. Chairman.

15 I think the problem now is that it is gray as to who has the 16 lead. Mr. Shea gets +/-rustrated because he feels that we are 17 asking questions that we donJt need to ask. On the other 18 hand, he is under pressure to get that export license. We are 19 frustrated because we are being required to sign off as to the 20 adequacy of physical security, and we can.,,t get the 21 information. It seems to me 22 CHAIRMAN *HENDRIE: Okay, good. Let.,,s stop right 23 there. Let's stop right there. Let.,,s stop right there. The 24 advantage of being chairman is that I get to say, ~~et.,,s stop 25 right there.

28 46.08.3 pv (Laughter.)

2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: When we have a disagrsement, I 3 win.

4 (Laughter.)

5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: With those frustrations which 6 are real, okay, and recognizable, what is going to change no 7 matter which way this decision now before us comes out?

8 DR. SMITH: That is what I was going to say. The 9 implication, to me, wbuld be that if we have the lead, then, 10 clearly -- and, of course, the procedures are set so that it

.1 1 is .channeled through IP for coo rd in at ion pur pose.s and so forth 12 is that after a very minimum amount of discussion in which 13 there might be some time set on it, the decision is made to 14 go. We donJt get into this constant going back and forth and 15 back and forth. You don't need it. We do need it. You donJt 16 need it. And finally, it comes out, and then, you are mad at 17 both of us because we didnJt get this export out, this license 18 out in a reasonable amount of time.

19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: You wouldn*'t have to go back 20 and forth. Just get together and sit there and talk about it.

21 DR. SM ITHa We have gotten together and sat down 22 and talked about it, and we have different views.

23 MR. GOSSICK: None of these have ever come to me 24 for resolution. They must be able to work them out one way or 25 another.

29 46.08.4 pv MR. SHEA: I would say it is not as bad as Cliff 2 portrays it. The issues are often ~nes that involve some new 3 matters, groundbreaking in certain questions. The involved 4 matters that have to be raised with the executive branch and 5 foreign countries, quite often. So, one has to consider those 6 issues very carefully. They have to be phrased. You have to 7 consider the right way to approach those countries, and that 8 takes a little while to work out. In all cases, as Bob has 9 said, we have worked them out. Maybe we could improve the -

10 part of the problem that Bob has stressed is the separation of

.I I the off ices in the two differen.t buildings. I think we may be 12 able to improve the pro..cedures, other than changing the 13 location of functions by improving the cooperation and the 14 closeness with which we work together.

15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: It ju_st seems to me that it is 16 unreasonable t~ say that you will gather into your shop all of 17 the foreign-policy aspects, foreign-program funcfions of the 18 Commission. There will conti.nue to have to be an IP. There 19 will continue to be the experts on foreign-policy matters.

20 You know, whether you have the lead or they have 21 . the lead, you are going to have to consider to give very 22 serious consideration to those things.

23 _ You know, I just don't see the great advantage that 24 flows from rearranging the authority delegations --

25 MR. BURNETT: We are not asking to rearrange .them.

'46.08.5 30 pv It is our contention that SECY 250 is actually going a little 2 bit further.

3 Now, I am aware of Lee's opinion here. When we 4 read his second bullet under recommendations --

5 DR. SMITH: He says it doesn 1 t take anything away 6 from us in the area, and everybody recognizes we have the 7 resi:onsj_bility for licensing. Wh~n I read developnent of 8 staff recommendations for export and import licensing review 9 criteria regarding safeguards, physical security, it is our 10 responsibility.

11 MR. GOSS.ICK: I have had similar problems with 12 these words. I think it might be well for the Commission to 13 hear from aach party what their interpretation of what this 14 means.

15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY-: That was what I was asking 16 earlier -- a definition of --*

17 MR. GOSSICK: What this criteria business is.

18 COMM! SSIONER KENNEDY.a What are we talking about 19 when we talk about policy?

20 Jim, why don't you give your vi~w of what that 21 really implies, and examples of where we have been in that 22 area and the kind of thing that might come up. Then, Cliff 23 can give his view of it.

24 MR. SHEA: I guess, in my view, the kinds of 25 actions that are involved in international safeguards policy

31 46.08.6 pv are fairly well covered, at least in general terms, in that 2 handout that you have there, the technical aspects at the top, 3 the policy considerations, and the bottom.

4 Those are very general. They touch on Commission 5 positions with relation to overall view as government policies 6 in the nonproliferation, export, international safeguards 7 areas, interaction with other agencies, mainly the State 8 Department, foreign-countries policy programs, country 9 motivations, and reliability, primarily.

10 But to give a more specific example and one that I

.II think touches on this review criteria for export-import 12 licensing in the safeguards area, as I read this last item on 13 page 6, the first thing that springs to mind is the issue that 14 we have had in recent months as to the adequacy df 15 international safeguards on exports that has occupied a fair 16 amount of the Commission's time over the last few months.

17 In that case, information that appeared in the IAEA 18 report indicated that there were some inadequacy of IAEA 19 safeguards. NMSS found that it could no longer given an 20 unqualified concurrence, if that is the right way to put it, 21 on each export application, because they felt that they did 22 not have information to assess the adequacy of safeguards on 23 each and every exp:::irt. That came to Cliff's attention, that 24 he was signing off and that he wanted to make it clear that he 25 was not signing off technically on those exports because he

46.08. 7 32 pv just didn't the safeguards -- he didn..,t-have the 2 information on a country-specific basis.

3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Country-specific, and let alone 4 facility-specific basis.

5. MR. SHEA: That is the way the licenses go through, 6 of £curse, case by case.

7 At that point, the question was what to do. And 8 the issue was brought to the Commission..,s attention. To my 9 mind, it involved both technical and policy considerations.

10 NRC had to consider what its role was in this area, what it

.I I should do in this situation. And there were questions of 12 technical adequacy of safeguards. If one had certain levels 13 of information, one could decide on -- that safeguards were at 14 a given level of assurance. Those could be defined. NMSS 15 could define it if they had certain informa+/-ion. One way or 16 another, they could say that the level of assurance was such 17 and such.

18 Beyond that, was the question of. just how to pursue 19 the matter. How should NRC obtain information? Should it go 20 off on its own? Should it work through tha State Department?

21 What kinds of information?

22 The role of th'.e IAEA was closely involved. It had 23 a number of broad considerations such as that, and this 24 resulted ultimately in the Commission communicating with 25 Congress on this matter.

46.08.8 33 pv The Nonproliferation Act has had relevance to this, 2 too. There is a provision for IAEA safeguards being 3 applicable to its export.

4 These issues came up. The broad nonproliferation 5 policies of the government were brought in. The Commission 6 had a number of directions from.the State Department, some on 7 a classified basis.

8 These issues, to my mind, then, became heavily 9 policy oriented in character, but certainly had some technical 10 considerations, as well.

.11 That is the example that comes to mind. I think 12 there the Commission was attempting to -- and still is, really 13 -- attempting to work on the ques-tion. of what criteria it 14 might have for having certain assurances in the safeguards 15 area in the export context.

16 That is the way I would read the last item on page 17 6. There, I think it was to the CommissionJs benefit to have tB the excellent technical expertise of NMSS integrated with the 19 foreign-policy knowledge that IP has, to give a full picture 20 to the Commission so they could see the full range of 21 considerations and make better decisions.

22 That is an example. I think it extends, to my 23 mind, to a number of issues. My view is, as far as working 24 together on these issues and what lead responsibility means 25 as it comes up in this paper, lead responsibility means, to

746.08.9 34 pv me, that the issues that are of a policy nature on a given 2 topic would be focused on by IP and the technical 3 considerations would be focused on by NMSS. The two groups 4 would work very closely together on the matter right from the 5 ground up, from the initial drafting stage to the preparation 6 of the paper and send that to the Commission as an integrated 7 analysis, rather than, let's say, a separate paper or only one 8 office or the other sending you one consideration of the 9 other.

10 I think if the Commission were to receive only

.11 policy~oriented analysis from IP, it would be ill served; if 12 it received only technical from NMSS, ill served, as well. I 13 think it is important to work together and to require that 14 coordination and not to have one or the other offices have the 15 ability to Ju5t go directly to the Commission without 16 consulting the other office, or at least letting it know that 17 it is going ahead, so the chance to comment is .there.

18 That is an example, and there are others like that.

19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Cliff, I want to learn a 20 little bit more about something you said about 10 minutes 21 back. You said something to the effect that you thought that 22 under the pre.sent arrangement NMSS was concurring in exports 23 without adequate assurances. Was that simply the SSR problem, 24 or were you referring to other matters, as well?

25 DR. SMITH: Jim mentioned that. I didn.J"t,

• 08. 1 0 35 pv specifically.

2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: You did, and I can*' t 3 remember the exact context, but talking about the concerns 4 you had. It wasn't during your prepared presentation, but in 5 the back-and-forth with the Chairman about concerns that you 6 had, you did say something to the e+/-fect of being compelled 7 under the pressures of the present system to sign off without 8 adequate assurances.

9 DR. SMITH: What I was talking about was in the 10 context of a question that Chairman Hendrie raised, that we

.11 would request information of IP. We would get into, perhaps, 12 some sort of a discussion, if you might call it that, as to 13 whether or not that kind of information was information we 14 n_eeded. There were pressures on both groups, pressures on IP 15 to get the export license out, pressures on us to fulfill it, 16 but we couldnJt -- we felt uneasy about approving something 17 without adequate information. That was the only context that 18 I think I mentioned.

19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY-: That was a different 20 question than the adequacy of safeguards. _

21 DR. SMITH: _Yes. I donJt remember mentioning that.

22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But I gather 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: This was time pressure on 24 you?

25 DR. SMITH: ThatJs right.

'46. 08. l l 36 pv COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But what you are saying, 2 then, is that there are some exports that we have signed off 3 on recently in which that has occ~rred? Your .concurrence in 4 them has, in some way, been flawed by the fact that you didn.,t 5 have the information you felt you nBeded?

6 DR. SMITH: No, no, no, no, no, no. Not recently.

7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Has it happened at all?

8 DR. SMITH: I don't know, off the top of my head.

9 Do you know?

10 MR. BURNETT: No, sir.

J1 DR. SMITH: What we were driving at was that we are 12 all under a time pressure here.* We have pressures on us with 13 respect to time, and that, in.order to fuake a decision~as to 14 whether or not, in our opinion, +/-he physical security measures 15 were adequate, we nBeded certain information. In order to get 16 that information, we would have to get into this debate, if 17 you wLll, in order to get it.

18 But we have not recommended to the Commission any 19 export where we felt that the physical security was not what 20 it should be. That has resulted in a lot of time.

21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I understand that. But 22 have there been cases in which you didnJt feel that you had 23 all the information you would have wanted to have to reach 24 that opinion?

25 DR. SMITH: You mean, are there cases where we

37 46.08.12 pv have, perhaps, said okay but we would have felt better if we 2 had gotten more than what we did get?

3 MR. PAGE: Not on physical que.stions. That 4 question is open. It is open on material accounting. That is 5 still to be decided. On physical security, we have signed off 6 on all exports.

7 DR. SMITH: I think it is fair to say thai there 8 have ~een cases where Mr. Mccorkle would, perhaps, like --

9 feel better if he had further information.

10 MR. ~)SSICK: But you have not asked IP to get you JI something that you were refused, did you?

12 MR. BURNETT: No.

13 DR. SMITH: But certain individuals might have felt 14 better.; but as an office, we made a decision that what we had 15 was adequate and there was no need to go back further to get 16 it.

17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: I mu st say, as sort of a 18 parenthetical comment, if the staff, the reviewing staff, is 19 worth a tinkerJs dam, it would be a rare case that goes in 20 which every man on the staff feels that he.knows everything 21 he might, in the best of all possible worlds, wish to know.

22 That is true, whether it is export licenses for rea~tors or 23 what have you. They are getting to be hard decisions about 24 when you are at an adequate level and you have to give up on 25 all of your druthers, in terms of information.

38 46.08.13 pv COMMISSIONER KENNEDY~ What you would like to know 2 -- and what you need to know.

3 CHAIR1'1AN HENDRIE: Yes. That is sort of -- that is 4 one of the chronic problems of being a technical regulator.

5 MR. BURNETT: If I could bring out a further thing *.

6 On page 7 7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~ Did you ever get a chance, in 8 fact, to give your interpretation of that last sentence?

9 MR. BURNETT: I'm going to hit both of those.

10 Our office is currently pursuing at the

.11 international level the development and recommending 12 international safeguards upgrading. I, myself, am the NRC 13 representative to the new physical security convention now 14 going on in the IAEA. If you look at that bullet I on page 7, 15 it would appear~ In my reading of it, a monitor for NRC and 16 recommending NRC positions on upgrading of international I7 safeguards programs.

18 Again, I believe that is what NMSS and safeguards 19 division was set up to do. Now, it may be just a wording 20 problem that we have here. Mr. Shea and myself try very hard 21 to get over these problems. I am not hitting the policy side 22 at all. And he must still represent that. And we are not 23 talking about proliferation aspects, either. That is still d#B 24 25 we are not brinQing up that point at all.

39

46. OY. 1 jwb We are starting -- and indeed have duplication of 2 staff right now that I think is starting - it is growing, it 3 is starting to a+/-f~ct us.

4 I have a recent case in point where our o+/-t ice.

5 generated a report at a request from a -- a congressional 6 request, in which a Commissioner had a question concerning 7 that report. One of the items on that report was directed to 8 the EDO, and I in my files could answer that que..stion almost Y immediately. It was assigned to IP, which had to go out and 10 do all of the leg work.

11 We are duplicating staff right now, to some extent.

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.:. Question. I have two.

13 First, my ques.tion is-: In that case, I wonder why 14 IP didnJt pick up the phone and ask you.? I guess I will ask 15 them for that.

16 Secondly 17 MR. BURNETT.: I pi eked up the phone.

18 CX)MMISSIONER KENNEDY.a I am not sure what that top 19 one means, either, if it doesn-' t me.an what you said. Maybe 20 Lee could explain what - how that affects.--

21 MR. GOSSICK: My interpretation of this is that 22 I think it is the thing -- from what Bob has described, 23 what he is involved in, where he is working with the IAEA 24 convention, or whatever it is called, providing input into 25 whatever this process is that will come to a proposal for an

40 46.0Y.2 jwb upgrading of IAEA safeguards within IAEA. I look at that as 2 maybe a mix between 11 technical 11 and J*policyJ* kinds of inputs, 3 but that is not the business of coming up or pulling together 4 for the NRC -- an NRC position for the CommissionJs 5 consideration with regard to whether, you know, we would 6 support, or insist on an upgrading of international, or 7 somebody1 s safeguards.

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: Maybe we could clarify that 9 a little bit. That seems to me -- I don 1 t know what you think, 10 but that seems to me a reasonable distinction.

-1 I MR. BURNETT: As I said, Mr. Shea and myself, we 12 are having some difficulty in interpreting the lines of 13 authority.

14 C>MMISSIONER KENNEDYJ Maybe there is a case in 15 point where the language doesn*'t seem to quite convey - I 16 can understand how Bob could see it one way, and I can 17 understand how you can see it the way you described it. That 18 suggests that the language really needs a little sharpening.

19 MR. GOSSICK: I agree.

20 DR. SMITH.: I agree. As Mr. Gossick was referring 21 to Mr. Burnett*'s participation in Vienna, and he said it is a 22 mix of policy and technical, then that makes my point. He is 23 there representing NRC at this IAEA convention, and it is not 24 a cleancut visa policy, but a mix.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: One of the things that most

46.09.3 41 jwb supergrade people in this town do for their entire careers is 2 to discuss, on a continuing basis, the difference between 3 J 1

policy 11 and J'operations. 11 Those that don-'t do that, discuss 4 the difference between J'planning operationsu and J'planning 5 policy .J, 6 (Laughter.)

7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY~ But that really doesn't help 8 very much, except, you kn.ow, sort of "come have a spirited 9 continuing debate.*"

10 DR. SMITH: It is very di+/-ficult to cut a line.

JI COMMISSIONER KENNEDY~ But we could get down to 12 some specifics. A couple of word changes might make the 13 distinction a little more clear.

14 Cer.tainly there are policy aspects in what Bob is 15 doing, but that doesn't seem to me to make it a major 16 MR. BURNETT: On page 2, 1 think that a similar 17 distinction can be made between the description of the duties 18 there. I believe that it is under the Division of SafeguardsJ 19 responsibilities to develop staff recommendations for export 20 and import licensing review criteria.

21 I again may be reading too much into it.

22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Regarding safeguards and 23 physical security -

24 MR. BURNETT: And not nonproliferation assurance, 25 however.

42 746 .09 .4

,jwb CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~ But again, there, suppose now I 2 that language up through the end of part (a) were assigned to 3 NMSS.

4 MR-. BURNETT: That would go a long ways toward our 5 resolution.

6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: Suppose it was. You then again 7 scope out these review criteria. You are well aware that you 8 are reviewing export-import applications. You have a crowd of 9 people whose game it is, among other things, to handle those 10 things. It would surprise me if you didn-'t consult with them.

. 11 MR. BURNETT: It would be negligent if we didn-'t

• 12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE-: Furthermore, when you consult 13 with them, then you probably get a lot of - the problem with 14 consulting with people is that they most often want to give 15 you their comments when what you want is a nod and a pat on 16 the back, but they insist on giving you comments.

17 They may make you mad, but I think you end up 18 f.eeling that you have a resp:msibility to take it pretty 19 seriously.

20 It isn~t clear to me that, wherever the so-called 21 *"lead responsibilityJ' lies, that that designates the guy who 22 eventually gets to stomp on the other one and say "that is it; 23 I have heard you enough; I won't listen anymore.D 24 I will tell you: My experience in these kinds of 25 conflicts comes from the reactor side, where Bussell(phonetic)NGG and

43 46.09.5 jwb I had two divisions. I did the J*technical_ work,j' so called; 2 and he did the *"project management work,-" so called. You 3 know, we had these several-hundred-people groups who .sort of, 4 all the way down the line to the lowest-ranked person, were 5 locked in mortal combat with one another.

6 You know, you talk about things escalating up the 7 chain of command, everything just.went automatically to the 8 top like some sort of a buoyancy pump. We were perpetually 9 untangling these things.

IO What we came to recognize was that, even though a

.l I matter was essentially "technical,-" you couldn-'.t end up just 12 ignoring and walking away from, after you had listened to it 13 _once, the strongly held opinion on the other side and vice 14 versa_; that somehow you had to work thps.e out and come .to what 15 might be a grudgingly mutual acceptance; but, by God, at least 16 it was a mutual acceptance.

17 It seems to me that, on these things as on so many 18 pieces of interoffice business, that is the posture you are 19 probably going to find yourselves in.

20 DR. SMITH: Well, I am 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: If the lead responsibility lies 22 over there, he is going to have exactly the same problem.:

23 that he can*'t turn away, even .though he would like .to, 24 ultimately, from something you want to do without working out 25 a mutually agreeable proposition.

46.09.6 44 jwb It concerns me a little bit where the indistinction 2 o.f where a thing called -11 lead responsibilityJ' lies:

3 It may have, or seem to have been translated into an inability 4 to in fact - between you, over the last year or so, to in 5 fact achieve those areas of grudging mutual acceptance.

6 Do you see what I am saying? Wherever n1ead 7 responsibilityJ' lies, you are going to have to reach that 8 accommodation with one another.

9 DR. SM.ITH: There is no question in my mind about 10 that. And that --

.II CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I am concerned .that you seem to I2 be having sone trouble doing .that now: Or do I l'T'istake that?

13 DR. SMITH: There is some problem. My experience 14 outside of this agency and other agencies and in private 15 industry is, too, that the problems that you mentioned are 16 true. However, it has been my experience that where the lead 17 resPonsibility is given to a particular office, and then in 18 general have to depend for that expertise on another office, 19 that they will have a tendency - a strong tendency to 20 duplicate, particularly where there are di ff erenc-es of opinion 21 and you don't always have to go to them to get the exper.tise.

22 We have been getting the job done. The reason that 23 we are here is that, basically, as we said earlier, I simply 24 did not interpret my responsibilities at NMSS as per the -

25 manual chapter that Mr. Gossick asked me to concur on, and we

45 46.09.7 jwb sought your guidance on this.

2 If it is your decision that the manual chapter 3 and indeed this paper - is the role you want us to play, we 4 w i 11 pl a y that r o l e and we wi 11 do i t we 11

• 5 MR. G0SSICK: I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, 6 that notwithstanding the question and argument over the 7 months or years now, for that matter, there has been a lot of 8 good-faith effort and cooperation in going ahead and getting 9 the job done. There still have been difference.s on points of 10 view, but very rarely, I think, has it reached the point where

.11 I have had to umpire the thing. They have gone ahead and 12 worked it out, and got the license out, or the paper done; but 13 it needs .to be clarified. It needs to be put down, one way or 14 the other so that we can get on with the job.

I5 I am concerned about the tendency, as Cl Lff just 16 pointed o~t, that there is a tendency to duplicate 17 .capabilities. If you are trying to do something 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEz Duplication we can hardly stand.

19 It doesn 1 t make any difference whether he is trying to build 20 in the safeguardsJ technical expertise, or.whether it goes the 21 other way; you end up trying to build in foreign-policy 22 capabilities, so you don't have to pay any attention to him 23 over there; you just handle the whole thing yourself.

24 We are going to frown on that as much as him 25 becoming

46 46.09.8 jwb DR. SMITH: We have no interest in --

2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I was .about to ask: Does 3 IP have the expertise?

4 MR. SHEA: Not the technical exper.tise. The only 5 people we have --- we have two people right now, and they are.

6 people with foreign-policy backgrounds, and some background 7 in physical security -- a fellow from another part of NRC, 8 without NMSS. And that person has a foreign-policy, 9 political-science background. That is the focus of our 10 efforts is to get people who will focus on the policy issues,

.11 because I see that as --

12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY.: We have got these SSAR 13 repor.ts. They come around and they say this or that aspect 14 of materials accounting is not being done as well as it should 15 be, and so on. Who do we tutn to to make an assessment *ot 16 those re ports?

17 DR. SMITH: It is being done -

18 MR. *GoSSICK: Both off_ice*s, but primari.ly NMSS has 19 the expertise as far as the safeguards, or the accounting and 20 control.

21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: For something like that, 22 you primarily turn to NMSS?

23 COMMISSIONER GOSSICK: That*'s what happened in 24 this past go-round.

25 DR. SMITH: That/s right.

46.09.Y 47 jwb MR. SHEA: And then the assessments are normally 2 shown to IP to see if we have anything to add to them, and 3 then they-'re sent down, usually, as a jointly signed paper to 4 the Commission.

5 COMM! SSIONER GI LINSKY: I think one of the problems 6 is -that J 1

policy 11 is somehow a fancier word than Jttechnical.*11 7 MR. GOSSICK: I agree.

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: I thought, around here, 9 J*technical-11 was fancier than *11 policy.,J' 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I was going to say - I donJt JI know what you mean by *11 fancy.* 11 Maybe that is the secret.

12 (Laughter. )

13 COMMISSIONER GI LINSKY: They are both higher than 14 11 legal ... ,

15 (Laughter.)

16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY..: ThatJs why the lawyers are 17 all in the policy business.

18 MR. SHAPAR: We struggle against it.

19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I must say, it is a pu.zzling 20 matter.

21 Peter, you have something?

22 COMMI5$IONER BRADFORD: I have a somewhat different 23 perspective on it than what I have heard. I think that there 24 are real differences in the way one assigns a lead function, 25 or what have you, in a situation like this; that, behind the

48 46.09.IO jwb institutional likene_sses and the exhortations to work .things 2 out, there probably are real differences in approach; and that 3 they essentially break down, in terms of international 4 programs, with a greater concern for foreign policy 5 c~nsiderations likely to be wary of asking certain kinds of 6 questions that may give offense to recipient countries, and 7 NMSS with a desire to have - a desire to have its concerns 8 fleshed out, perhaps pushing a little harder to get those 9 questions asked.

10 I think the decision we make, in terms of which ll side of these individual pieces we come down on, other than 12 the par~s that are clear, says something about whether or not 13 we, as a Commission, want those questions asked in the 14 international area.

15 I think that is a fairly important decision. I 16 think it is one that ought to be made on that basis. It is 17 pretty clear, from the record, that there - and there was, at 18 one point, a request for a specific example, and we never 19 really got too far into them but they are out there -- that 20 there have been cases in which this has, and does make a real 21 difference in the way things get done.

22 It seems to me --

23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: Could we pursue that? I 24 thought he said 11 no.J*

25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Will you talk, then, a

49 146. 09 .-1 1

jwb little about the question I asked about getting information 2 with regard to the Indian situation?

3 DR. SMITHr Yes. Bob, do you want to go into that?

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What was this question?

5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: The question that I asked 6 a while back was with regard to getting into just some further 7 information with regard to the alleged smuggling of uranium 8 in India.

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: Oh, yes.

IO MR. BURNETT: That one happens to be recent *

.11 Commissioner Kennedy said I would have expected IP to get on 12 the phone. IP and I did get on the phone, Mr. Commissioner.

13 I did attempt to make it clear that we did have relevant 14 information that was available, and as far as .I know there 15 was no more available within the community. It was in my 16 files, and that I could answer it.

17 Becau~e of the way your question was asked, it was 18 taken to be more in the .international arena than in answering 19 a question having to do with that paper.

20 There are o.ther export 21 O>MMISSI0NER KENNEDY~ I donJt know what this 22 means. What happened, then?

23 MR. BURNETT: I dropped out of the picture. I am 24 no longer in it.

25 DR. SMITH: Lee was assigned to IP, and we are no

50

'46. 09. I 2 jwb longer -- he never asked for it; he didn/t want it.

2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Did you provide the 3 information?

4 MR. BURNETT: No, we were never asked.

5 MR. SHEA: We want that information. I have a 6 different recollection of that phone call than you do.

7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: The net result is we have the CIA 8 wondering what we are going up to, because two o.ffices have

~ gone for the same information in a fairly short period of 10 time.

.I 1 MR. BURNETT: We didn t go back on this

• 12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD.: But you had the information 13 already. IP, after n6t getting the information, not choosing 14 to get the information 1 went to *the CIA to ask for the same 15 information that you already had.

16 MR. BURNETT: As far as I know -

I7 MR. SHEA: . That is not my understanding of that 18 situation. The answer is not put together yet. And that 19 is your question, Mr. Bradford. That answer is no.t put 20 together. Before it is sent down, it will .involve any input 21 from NMSS. It will be fully coordinated with that group. I 22 believe that was. instructed in the EDO .control, which assigned 23 it to IP to coordinate fully with NMSS.

24 The only question was - where I think Bob felt on 25 that question, that there had been an earlier question from

51

6. OCJ. 13 jwb Senator Glenn about this Indian smuggling ring which had come 2 in and asked specifically what was the story on a rnem.o from, 3 I think, a Mr. Casey to Mr. Joe Ya..rdumian of NMSS. It was 4 a very specific question: What was there in the correspondence 5 about that?

6 The action on that, I think quite properly, went 7 to NMSS. The answer was put together and sent to the 8 Commission, and that was subsequently sent to Senator Glenn.

9 Cammi ssioner Bradford-' s followup question was IO rather more specific. It said: What informa.tion do we have

.I I from the. intelligence community -- the inte.ll igen ce community 12 and other agencies -- regarding this? .

13 1 have seen what was in the answer to Senator 14 Glenn. Wciuld you find out from this intelligence community 15 and other. agencies what *is known further about this?

16 That was assigned to IP by the EDO. We then checked 17 with the other agencies, and are still checking. We talked to 18 NMSS and we factor only inputs that we can find, and we will 19 send that to the Commission, hopefully, by the time it is due.

20 That was our perception of that question; that it was very 21 different; that it was a proper question to be assigned to IP.

22 l talked it over with Tom Ream, and he pondered it 23 and said, *"yes , 11 he thought that was reasonable, in view of 24 the international intelligence focus of the question. We .are 25 certainly going to f igur*e in NMSS*"' positions *.

52 46.09.14 jwb COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: It is not as if input is 2 left out, but it doesn't seem to me to make a lot of sense to end #9 3

4 5

go traveling around to other agencies getting their information before we know what we have already.

• 6 7

8 9

10

.J l l2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

746.10. l 53 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I donJt remember what the 2 question was.

3 MR. BUHNETT~ I can give it to you. Do you want me 4 to r.ead it? Okay. *11 May 8th response to Senator Glenn 5 provide a general description of an apparent uranium smuggling 6 operation which had been uhcovered in India. The response 7 stated that no investig.ation was conducted since this involved 8 natural uranium. The staff is requested to contact the 9 intelligence com~unity and other agencies as appropriate to 10 deter.mine what additional information concerning the smuggling

.11 ring is available. Please provide me the status report on 12 . this matter by June 6th.*"

13 DR. SMITH: We had gotten all the information, as far 14 as we know, that was in the intelligence community on that 15 specific subject. And then, in the report to Senator Glenn, 16 .we had just summarized it in a paragraph. It was in that 17 sense when A1r. Burne.tt sa.w this, he said, .well, ge.e, all of 18 the information is in my files because that is the basis upon 19 which we answered Senator Glenn.

20 MR. BURNETT: I must admit and I did when I talked 21 to Mr. Shea -- I did not see the small difference in this 22 request and the other requests in having -- and havi.ng gone 23 through it the second time, I still don~t see the difference.

24 MR. SHEA: ~hen it says please contact, go and do it.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: t"lhen it says please contact

77 46. 10. 2 54 the agencies, thatJs what I would have done.

2 MR. BURNE TI: But we had al ready done it. It is your 3 letter, sir. Did you want us to- do it again?

4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I donJt know how many of the 5 different agencies you had contacted *. I would have thought 6 the way something like that would have been handled,. the first 7 one would ascertain what information existed within the NRC, 8 and then whatever agency was going to be contacted, make the 9 contact outside, would ask for inforrnstion other than that 10 which we already had, which would avoid.the CIAJs problem of

_JJ trying to provide duplicative information to that which they 12 already provided to the NRC before, for whatever period of 13 time in advance.

14 MR. DIRCKS: I think, Commissioner, that this gets to 15 this last issue that was pending, this intelligence question.

16 I think that this may be the point. The thing that we have 17 tried to stress among the offices is that they keep one 18 another informed, .and at least share information from the 19 various files. I am surprised that this information hadn~t 20 been shared.

21 We are not quite sure what files exist at the agency.

22 I think that is one of the recommendations that we made in the 23 last part of this paper, that the intelligence thing be 24 somewhat better organized and that this inform.ation is shared.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I would have thought that that

7746.10.3 55 goes without saying.

2 DR. SMITH: I thought we had offered to show it.

3 MR. DIRCKS: I am talking about on a routine basis.

4 DR. SM! TH-: I think that we do. We do that on the 5 !AT and many other areas. Intelligence wasnJt originally part 6 of the issues that we came to talk about.

7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I must say there were drafted 8 manual chapters?

9 MR. GOSSICK: Yes. They have sort of been put on the 10 back burner until we tried to resolve these t~ings. Depending

.11 upon how we come out, we -- what we w Lll do is to finalize 12 those ---

1.3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: They are, in your view, 14 consistent with existing delegations of authority approved by 15 the Commission in 1975, is that right?

16 MR. GOSSICK.: Yes, I would say we have to look at 17 them _very hard to see if some further clarification of 18 language and inclusion of things like the intelligence Lssue 19 that was never really addre_ssed before we. came here with this 20 paper, need to be included. But I was going to say, of 21 course, depending on how this comes out, we wiil continue 22 we will bring those manual chapters to a head, and then bring 23 them forward to the Commission for their approval.

24 (Pause.)

25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I'm trying to see how to regroup.

746.10.4 56 COMMISSIONcR BRADFORD: We might start with the 2 issues on the first page of the SECY paper and see where we 3 think they belong.

4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEJ How well do people feel that on 5 the first page of the SECY paper that the enunciation of those 6 four items characterizes the difference of opinion?

7 MR

• Go SS I CK : I . th i n k the re s er v a t ion i s prim a r il y on 8 the part of NMSS. Jim, do you have any problem ~1th the 9 listing of the issues on the first page of the paper as to 10 stating ~hat the issue is?

.1 l CHAIRMAN HENDRIEJ I guess these are also the 12 recom~endation items.

13 MR. SHEA: Weil, I suppose the review criteria mjght J,",

14 be clarified. I am not sure that is fully clear as it stands 15 there. I said, I thought, .what it meant to me. I donJt know 16 whether NMSS agrees. Perhaps that could stand some 17 clarification. The next one, perhaps, as weil. Although they 18 do mean certain things to me, in the case of, for example, the 19 second one, we looked at that. ~e talked about that earlier 20 in terms of the international physical security convention 21 activity in Vienna. This is aJl under the overall heading of 22 which of us has the lead responsibility for doing these 23 things.

24 In that case, IP is viewed, I think, as taking the 25 lead and coordinating the representation of participation of

46.10.5 57 the NRC in that activity. It .was decided that NM.SS would be 2 the appropriate group to attend. I donJt read this as 3 meaning that, even if one office has the lead responsibility, 4 that it does all of the monitoring or all of the recommending 5 or all the activities, by any means. In that case, with IPJs 6 full approval, Burnett was made the representative.

7 That is the .way I see it working in practice. It is 8 reasonably clear to me. But I am not sure that it is 9 completely to others, as I have heard the discussion here 10 today, those two. Even cnordinating, in the last item, people

,1 I may define that di.fferent ways. IJve had a lot of discussions 12 as to what coordination means over the years. To me, it means 13 working closely .with people. Others say it means you can kind 14 of go off on your own without getting their input.

15 I think one may have to get rather more specific in 16 some of the words here to be clear on exactly what the various 17 offices do. Otherwise, there is sti.11 r.oom for 18 interpretation.

19 MR. BURNETT~ It says international safeguards. Is 20 that interpreted to mean all requirements to work with the 21 IAEA, or is that different?

22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: \~here are you, Bob?

23 MR. BURNETT: IAEA is not mentioned directly. I am 24 asking, is international safeguards, is that IAEA matters or 25 is that something different; and if it is something different,

746.10.6 58 shouldnJt it be included in this list as one more item?

2 MR. GO.SSICK: IsnJt it under bu.llet 4, where they 3 have coordination Df international safeguards policies and 4 nontechnical matters interacting - well, that is on the 5 nontechnical, youJre right. The kind of thing that you are 6 doing now, working with the IAEA, with a full~+

7 D2. SMITH: That is our problem.

8 MR. GOSSICK: Is there a problem in that?

9 DR. SMITH.: The problem is, as we read your 10 recommendations, Lee, and the issues, you are saying one thing JI he_re as to how you see it working, but it doesnJt appear to 12 us that the language reflects that. I think the problsm is 13 perhaps just defining the issues a li~tle more specifically.

14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Niaybe based upon all of this 15 discussion --

16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: I arn tempted really --

17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: we have seen two or three 18 placES for a little sharpening of the language, would probably 19 clarify the issue without changing the status.quo, but just 20 clarifying it. My sensing is, the things that work in the 21 present circumstances outnumber by a very, very high margin, 22 the things that donJt work. The things that donJt work, it 23 seems to me from this discussion, depend essentially on very 24 small differences in meaning -- and I understand, as I said 25 earlier - I understood how you saw that third one as

746.10.7 59 contrasted as to how Jim Shea sees it. That is a matter of 2 semantics that we ought to be able to correct.

3 MR. BURNETf: I think it should be made c-lea r that it 4 is working.

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: I know that. That is 6 precisely why. DonJt disturb something that is working.

7 MR. GOSSICK.: Mr. Chairman, if there is general 8 agreement along the general argument here, why donJt you let 9 us go back and take a crack at the manual chapters with 10 attempts to clarify these points and the words themselves *

.I I Unless .we get the basic proposition settled, though, then we 12 are going to spend another year fighting over the manual 13 chapter.

14 DR. SMITH.: There is one basic 15 *co MMI SS I ONER BRADFORD: I want to indicate that in 16 indicating that list of items as I understood them, I didnJt 17 mean to indicate that I agreed that IP should have the lead 18 responsibility on all of them. I just wanted to use it as a 19 starting point for discussion of issues. - I donJt think that--

20 I donJt happen to think that IP should have the le?d 21 responsibility on all of them. So that we may have a real 22 problem as far as if by clarification of the present 23 situation, Dick, you ~eant a clearer speiling out of 24 functions, fine. But if by present situation, you essentially 25 are taking this SECY paper as being -- and its

746. l O. 8 60 recommendation -- as being a description, then I_think we 2 have a difference.

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I think we discussed today 4 that the SECY paper isnJt all that clear in many of its 5 aspects as to precisely what differences in the situation 6 there is. I would not disturb the situation. There is an 7 old saying.: If it works, don-'t fix it. It is already said 8 that it works.

9 I think that what is n_eeded here to make it ,work 10 better is just a little tightening of a nut or two, not a

.ll major overhaul in the shop so that it wonJt run when it comes 12 out.

13 DR. SMITH: I would like to make one comment. In the 14 memorandum that I sent you of May -22nd, there is one 15 fundamental difference, r_think. When I propose to affirm 16 that NMSS has the lead responsibility for implementing 17 domestic and international safeguards and physical security 18 programs, including establishment of the criteria for the 19 conduct of technical reviews of licensing-applications and so 20 forth, to me that is one of the reasons we are here, I 21 suppose, is that I saw. that as our re spans ibil i ty and having 22 the lead responsibility.

23 I guess our question is.: If we don 1 t -- if that is 24 not resolved, then we get into a problem in trying to work 25 out

746.10.9 61 MR. GOSSICK: But I have got to bring up a point 2 here, though, that your definition of lead respo~sibility, I 3 think, is a little different than what we have talked about 4 before.

5 DR. SMITH: Maybe we need to take a look at that.

6 MR

• GOSS I CK.: Your s w it h opt ion a l c on s u l t i v e in p u t

• 7 Optional input, andthat is not coordination.

8 DR. SMITH~ I don't know where we said optional.

9 MR. GOSS I CK: It is in the paper that you wrote and 10 gave back.

JI DR. SMITH: But o~viously, we CDordinate.

12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE.: It would b_e helpful --- we look at 13 page l of the SECY paper, at the four bullets. It appears to 14 me that there is something less than a precision of language 15 here that is helpful to the Commission. I think it would be 16 helpful to recast that language. We will have to return t7 again to the issue, I am afraid, in view of the hour and the 18 complexity of the issue.

19 It may be that,* by some consultation on language, 20 that the issues laid down before the Commission could be a 21 little more clearcut. I have a problem with attempting to 22 ~ote up or down, or vote to left or right, I guess is the way 23 to put it, on this so-called lead responsibility on the basis 24 of just going down this list of issues.

25 I am not confident that the language here fairly

746.10.10 62 reflects where we ought to be. I can vote to left or right on 2 one of these things and just make mush out of what is already 3 mush. That is not helpful. The discussion this afternoon may 4 indicate some ways in which we can get clarification and 5 sharpening.

6 It seems to me that it would be helpful if the two 7 points of view agreed on the wording. I donJt require people 3 to be happy, as I noted before. But even if itJs grudging, 9 a mutually-acceptable enunciation of the particular 10 responsibility areas for the CommissionJs future Jl consideration.

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Let me add that I have the' 13 same difficulty with the two propositions at the bottom of 14 page 3 of your memo. I am not clear as to precisely what they 15 mean, as I am with these (Indicating.)

16 DR. SMITH~ I think probably if we sharpened the 17 language, and then under each one of these_ give examples, as 18 you see the office participating, then you know exactly what 19 we are talking about.

20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: And if there are seemingly 21 irreconcilable differences in the language, put both of them 22 down and then put a little example, what is the difference, 23 what does it mean if you choose this, as contrasted with that.

24 Then I think that you can get someplace.

25 MR. GOSSICK: Mr. Chairman, I just got to say it:

7746.10.11 63 Here are the last three versions of the paper. before it 2 finally went to final, and thB last short version was 37 ~ages 3 compared to the seven pages. And we have had their version 4 and their version, and we have gone on ad nauseam on this 5 thing. I don~t_think you want to be blessed with this pile of 6 stuff.

7 I guess we need some guidance as to -- is there 8 anything that is agreed upon? Or can we at least focus this 9 thing down now as to defining the language in a little more --

10 in a less unsettled way?

11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You have four recommendations in 12 this staff paper before the Commission. We have discussed two 13 of them and found certain 14 MR. GOSSICK: We agree, they may have lost something 15 in the condensation.

16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: What I would like to know, is four 17 the right number? Should there be one or two more or 18 whatever? It doesnJt seem to me beyond possibility for Shea 19 and Burnett or all of you at the table, if that is 20 appropriate, to sit down and say, we donJt like it, but we 21 have been told to take these four and fix them so that we can 22 reasonably agree among us that they are the questions that we 23 are asking the Commission.

24 At the moment 1 I have the problem that he doesnJt 25 think that those are the right questions, or at least some of

746. 10.12 64 them don-'t correctly phrase the correct question. I know it I 2 has been a misery. And keep in mind that we don-'t want 3 another long paper. But you know, one or two pages. maybe.

4 MR. GOSSICK: That would be a help if you give us the 5 ground rules.

6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: SECY papers have to be small.

7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY.: For each one of the pages, 8 th~t means there-'s four pages. If anybody wants to tack on 9 more, then no more than a page 1or each.

10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: In your opinion, we are

.11 really talking about getting very far away from the first page 12 of those you want, that matrix of contested and uncontested 13 matters?

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

- 23 24 25

65 T-11 MR. GOSSICK: The issue of --

barbl 2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: No, I am sorry; enclosure

.3 one.

4 MR. GOSSICK: I don't really like enclosure one, 5 frankly. I think it is an attempt to -- we put it in there as 6 an attempt to simply something that I don't thirik can be neatly 7 simplified.

8 It shows literally that the only things that are 9 not contested, according to this, is the technical aspects wit.h 10 regard to international safeguards, and the IAEA U.S. agree-11 ment. Everything e.lse is contested.

12 But it doesn't really help you very much. It shows

- 13 14 15 who is doing it, and in most c;:::ases where it is contested, it says both.

But that merely says that: Well, one has got -- gen 16 erally, IP has the lead on these things, or has been acting 17 as a lead, coordinating with NMSS. I think for the most part, 18 that is the way it has been arranged.

19 But I just didn't find it very*helpful in trying to 20 really present the picture to you, as far as what the real 21 issue is.

22 But at any rate, we can take a crack at and see if 23 we can't 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25 MR. G'OSSICK:. -- boil this down.

66 CHAIRMAN HENDRI.E: There is an implication in your 2 disagreements and in these definitions of what you mean by lead 3 responsibility, *-that it will just assign what is called lead

• 4 5

6 responsibility some place.

That guy has now got an extra stripe on his sleeve, and he can ignore what is being said on the other side. And 7 let me reiterate for you my very strong feeling that where you 8 have disagreement and first round getting together to under-9 stand each other doesn't eliminate them; that is, it doesn't 10 turn out tobe a misunderstanding, that it doesn't.much matter 11 who has got lead responsibility. You are going to have to grin 12 on each other and come to mutually acceptable courses of action.

13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Or alternatively, put them 1...t.

14 forward.to some place where they can be --

15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Or elevate them in a kindly way 16 first to the EDO and then on up there.

17 That is, I don't regard lead responsibility in these 18 areas where two offices have to work together closely, where 19 the nature of the expertise is somewhat different in each of-20 fice,and they need to combine and coordinate the NRC action, 21 where the thrusts may, on given points, -- I don't like to re-

22. gard lead responsibility as permission after: *one roc1nd-- of 23 discussion to ignore the other fellow's point of view.

24 And keep that in mind in terms of the development

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25 of these things, and also, your thinking about the thing,

---

67 because -- I think that makes it clear?

2 Other commentary?

3 (No response.)

• 4 5

6 You have driven Commissioner Gilinksy from the room.

(Laughter.)

(Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the hearing in the*above-7 entitled matter was adjourned.)

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1

• 23 24

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